Panganiban vs.

Roldan
Facts :
On April 7, 1998, petitioner Agrifina Panganiban filed a complaint against
herein respondents, spouses Romeo Roldan and Elizabeth Roldan,
for recovery of possession anddamages in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Third
Judicial Region, Subic, Zamabales. She alleged that she was the registered owner
of a parcel of land with an area of 271 square meters, covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-12388, located in Ilwas, Subic, Zambales; that
sometime in 1984, respondents entered the land and built a small hut on a portion
thereof without her knowledge and consent; that respondents asked permission if
they could temporarily reside thereat, since they came from Bicol and had no place
to stay in Zambales; that she took pity on them and agreed on the condition that
they would vacate upon demand; that in 1997, petitioner asked respondents to
vacate the land, as she would be putting up a fence thereon; that respondents, who
refused to vacate; that because of their obstinate refusal to vacate, she suffered
mental anxiety; and that for being deprived of the use and enjoyment of the land,
respondents should be required to pay a rental of P500.00 per month from
December 1997 until they vacate.
In their defense, respondents denied that they entered into an agreement with
petitioner allowing them to stay on the land. They claimed that they had been
occupying the lot as caretakers of the heirs of Concepcion dela Paz-Lesaca since
1973, as evidenced by a Kasunduan. They alleged that the lot was part of the land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14884 issued in 1972, registered
in the name of Concepcion dela Paz-Lesaca; and that in December 1997, two (2)
men who were barangay officials went to the premises in order to survey the lot
for purposes of putting up a fence. Respondents thus objected to the intrusion
knowing that petitioner had no right or personality to eject them from the
land. Respondents averred that petitioner was merely a neighbor and that they were

surprised to find out that she was able to secure a new title over their portion of the
land.
On March 23, 2001, the MTC rendered judgment [2] in favor
of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendants:
1. For the defendants to vacate the premises;
2. For the defendants to pay the plaintiff the amount
of P20,000.00 as rental from the date of the filing of the
complaint until March 2001 and to pay the additional
amount ofP500.00 every month thereafter until the
defendants vacate and surrender the premises to the
plaintiff;
3. To pay attorneys fees in the amount of P10,000.00; and
4. To pay the costs of the proceedings

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City affirmed the MTC
Decision in toto. It, likewise, disregarded the Kasunduan and the TCT, since they
were not raised as a defense in respondents answer, and the same could not be
raised for the first time on appeal.[5]
Aggrieved, respondents went up to the CA.
On March 31, 2004, the CA reversed the decision and found
for respondents. It admitted the document denominated as Kasunduan, which
provided that respondents were allowed to stay on the subject land by its owners,
heirs of Concepcion dela Paz-Lesaca, as well as TCT No. T-14882 issued in 1972
in the name of Concepcion dela Paz-Lesaca.The CA found that the title from which
respondents derived their right of possession was an earlier title, thus, superior to
petitioners OCT P-12388, which was only issued on June 22, 1994 [6] by virtue of a

free patent application. Accordingly, the appellate court ruled that respondents right
of possession must prevail. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 72, is
hereby ANNULED AND SET ASIDE. Appellants[] right to possess
the disputed land is hereby recognized.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March
31, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 67696 is AFFIRMED.

Issue : who has the better right to possess the property?

Held :
Given these conflicting claims, we must abide by the rule
that where two certificates of title purport to include the
same land, the earlier in date prevails. [15] Thus, without
any legal or factual basis to lay claim over the land,
petitioner had clearly no right to order respondents
eviction from the land.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March
31, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 67696 is AFFIRMED.

VLASON VS. CA
FACTS:
Poro Point Shipping Services was then acting as the local agent of Omega
Sea Transport Company of Honduras & Panama (Omega) when it
requested permission for its vessel M/V Star Ace, experiencing engine
trouble, to unload its cargo and have it stored in the Philippine Ports
Authority compound in San Fernando, La Union while awaiting
transhipment to Hongkong. It approved by the Bureau of Customs.
Howvever, the customs personnel still boarded the vessel when it docked
on the suspicion that it was the hijacked M/V Silver Med owned by Med
Line Philippines and that its cargo would be smuggled into the country. The
vessel and its cargo were seized. A notice of hearing was served on its
consignee, Singkong Trading Co. of Hongkong, and its shipper, Dusit
International Co., Ltd of Thailand. While seizure proceedings were ongoing,
three typhoons hit La Union, and the vessel ran aground and was
abandoned. A salvage agreement was entered into with the respondent
Duraproof Services to secure and repair the vessel. The warrant of seizure
was lifted upon finding that there was no fraud. However, the Customs
Commissioner declined to issue a clearance and even forfeited the vessel
and its cargo. A decision was decreed for the forfeiture and sale of the
cargo in favor of the government. Seeking to enforce its preferred lien, the
Duraproof filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before
the RTC of Manila attacking the actions of the Bureau. PPA, Rep. Silverio
Mangaoang and Med Line Phils. were are named as respondents.
Subsequently, Duraproof amended its petition as to include former District
Collector Quiray, PPA Port Manager Adolfo Amor, Jr., Vlason Enterprises
Singkong Trading Company, Dusit International Co., Inc., Thai-Nan
Enterprises Ltd. And Thai-United Trading Co., Ltd as respondents. In both
its petitions, there was failure to allege against Vlason Enterprises or pray
for a relief against it. Summonses for the amended petition were served to
the respondents and their counsels. Summons by publication were allowed

to be served upon the alien respondents who had no representatives in the

country.
The cases against the other respondents were dismissed on the grounds of
litis pendentia and lack of jurisdiction despite Duraproof moving to declare
them in default. Duraproof again moved to declare the other respondents in
default. There was no record that these motions were acted upon.
Thereafter, Duraproof amended again its petition with supplemental
petition. The rest of the respondents were declared in default and
Duraproof was allowed to present its evidence. With regard to Vlason
Entreprises, it was alleged that it exhibited constant intimidation and
harassment and incurred heavy overhead expenses causing irreparable
damages. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of Duraproof. Vlason,
by special appearance, filed a motion for reconsideration on the grounds it
was not impleaded, served summons or declared in default. It also filed a
special appearance before the CA praying that the levy be lifted off its
properties, or a TRO be issued against the auction. Its motion was granted
and the previous decision was reversed. However, Duraproof countered
that although Vlason filed the motion for reconsideration in a timely manner,
it has otherwise failed to include a notice of hearing making its motion a
mere scrap of paper Duraproof filed a motion to file a supplemental petition
impleading Vlason as one of the respondents. It was granted by the CA.
Furthermore, it was able to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction against
the respondents to prevent them from interfering in the transfer of the
vessel and its cargo from the PPA compound. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Vlason Enterprises was properly served with
summons. HELD: No. Appeal GRANTED.
A corporation may be served summons through its agents or officers who
under the Rules are designated to accept service of process. A summons
addressed to a corporation and served on the secretary of its president
binds that corporation. This is based on the rationale that service must be
made on a representative so integrated with the corporation sued, that it is
safe to assume that said representative had sufficient responsibility and
discretion to realize the importance of the legal papers served and to relay

the same to the president or other responsible officer of the corporation

being sued. The secretary of the president satisfies this criterion. This rule
requires, however, that the secretary should be an employee of the
corporation sought to be summoned. Only in this manner can there be an
assurance that the
secretary will bring home to the corporation [the] notice of the filing of the
action against it.
In the present case, Bebero was the secretary of Angliongto, who was
president of both VSI and petitioner, but she was an employee of VSI, not
of petitioner. The piercing of the corporate veil cannot be resorted to when
serving summons. Doctrinally, a corporation is a legal entity distinct and
separate from the members and stockholders who compose it. However,
when the corporate fiction is used as a means of perpetrating a fraud,
evading an existing obligation, circumventing a statute, achieving or
perfecting a monopoly or, in generally perpetrating a crime, the veil will be
lifted to expose the individuals composing it. None of the foregoing
exceptions has been shown to exist in the present case. Quite the contrary,
the piercing of the corporate veil in this case will result in manifest injustice.
This we cannot allow. Hence, the corporate fiction remains. Petitioner
claims that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over it, because the
former had not been served summons anew for the Second Amended
Petition or for the Second Amended Petition with Supplemental Petition.
We disagree. Although it is well-settled that an amended pleading
supersedes the original one, which is thus deemed withdrawn and no
longer considered part of the record, it does not follow
ipso facto
that the service of a new summons for amended petitions or complaints is
required. Where the defendants have already appeared before the trial
court by virtue of a summons on the original complaint, the amended
complaint may be served upon them without need of another summons,
even if new causes of action are alleged.
After it is acquired, a courts jurisdiction continues until the case

is finally terminated. Conversely, when defendants have not yet appeared

in court and no summons has been validly served, new summons for the
amended complaint must be served on them. It is not the change of cause
of action that gives rise to the need to serve another summons for the
amended complaint, but rather the acquisition of jurisdiction over the
persons of the defendants. If the trial court has not yet acquired jurisdiction
over them, a new service of summons for the amended complaint is
required. In this case, the trial court obviously labored under the erroneous
impression that petitioner had already been placed under its jurisdiction
since it had been served summons through the secretary of its president.
Thus, it dispensed with the service on petitioner of new summons for the
subsequent amendments of the Petition. We have already ruled, however,
that the first service of summons on petitioner was invalid. Therefore, the
trial court never acquired jurisdiction, and the said court should have
required a new service of summons for the amended Petitions.