CIR v.

CA, ROH Auto

(BIR Rules and Regulations)
Facts:
EO41 was promulgated declaring a one-time tax amnestyon unpaid income taxes, lat
er amended to include estate anddonor's taxes and taxes on business, for the tax
able years1981 to 1985.Availing itself of the amnesty, R.O.H. Auto Products file
d,tax amnesty returnms and paid the amnesty taxes due.Prior to this availment, C
IR assessed the ROH deficiencyincome and business taxes in an aggregate amount o
f P1,410,157.71.ROH wrote back to state that since it had been able toavail itse
lf of the tax amnesty, the deficiency tax notice shouldforthwith be cancelled an
d withdrawn.The request was denied by the Commissioner on theground that Revenue
Memorandum Order No. 4-87, dated 09February 1987, implementing Executive Order
No. 41, hadconstrued the amnesty coverage to include only assessmentsissued by t
he Bureau of Internal Revenue after thepromulgation of the executive order on 22
August 1986 and notto assessments theretofore made.
ISSUE:
Is ROH covered by the tax amnesty?
YES.
Was the CIR s position correct?
NO.Ratio Decidendi:
1. The added exception urged by petitioner Commissioner based on Revenue Memoran
dum Order No. 4-87, further restricting the scope of the amnesty clearly amounts
to anact of administrative legislation quite contrary to themandate of the law
which the regulation ought toimplement.2. The authority of the Secretary of Fina
nce, in conjunction withthe CIR, to promulgate rules and regulations for theenfo
rcement of internal revenue laws cannot becontroverted. Neither can it be disput
ed that such rules andregulations, as well as administrative opinions and ruling
s,ordinarily should deserve weight and respect by the courts.Much more fundament
al than either of the above, however,is that all such issuances must not overrid
e, but mustremain consistent and in harmony with, the law they seek toapply and
implement. Administrative rules and regulationsare intended to carry out, neithe
r to supplant nor to modify,the law.
3. If, as the Commissioner argues, EO 41 had not beenintended to include 1981-19
85 tax liabilities alreadyassessed prior to 22 August 1986, the law could havesi
mply so provided in its exclusionary clauses. It did not.The conclusion is unavo
idable, and it is that the executiveorder has been designed to be in the nature
of a generalgrant of tax amnesty subject only to the cases
specifically
excepted by it
Holding:
CA affirmed
People v Castaneda
Facts:
Benjamin Manaloto was charged with the crime of Falsification of Public Document
. The complaint was filed by his wife, Victoria Manaloto.
That on or about the 19th day of May, 1975, in the Municipality of San Fernando,
province of Pampanga, Philippines, Benjamin falsified in a deed of sale the hou
se and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership in favor of Ponciano Lacsamana,
making it appear that his spouse gave her marital consent to said sale.
At the trial, the prosecution called the wife to the witness stand but the defen
se moved to disqualify her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130. The prosecu
tion stated that it is a "criminal case for a crime committed by one against the
other." Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent Judge granted the motion, d
isqualifying Victoria.

Issue:
Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public Document may be con
sidered as a criminal case for a crime committed by a husband against his wife a
nd, therefore, an exception to the rule on marital disqualification.
Held:
No. The case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule. WHEN AN OFFEN
SE DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION, IT
COMES WITHIN THE EXCEPTION to the statute that one shall not be a witness agains
t the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one agai
nst the other.
In the case, it must be noted that had the sale of the said house and lot, and t
he signing of the wife's name by her husband in the deed of sale, been made with
the consent of the wife, no crime could have been charged against said husband.
It is the husband's breach of his wife's confidence which gave rise to the offe
nse charged. And it is this same breach of trust which prompted the wife to make
the necessary complaint.
With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the victim o
f the crime and the person who stands to be directly prejudiced by the falsifica
tion is not a third person but the wife herself. And it is undeniable that the a
ct had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. This
is apparent not only in the act of the wife in personally lodging her complaint
with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts in c
onnection with the instant petition, which seeks to set aside the order disquali
fying her from testifying against her husband. Taken collectively, the actuation
s of the witness-wife underscore the fact that the martial and domestic relation
s between her and the accused-husband have become so strained that there is no m
ore harmony to be preserved said nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbe
d. In such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of
perjury based on that identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a situation, t
he security and confidence of private life which the law aims at protecting will
be nothing but ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the
unhappy home.
PASCUAL v. Commissioner of InternalRevenue #10 BUSORG
G.R. No. 78133 October 18, 1988
GANCAYCO, J.:
FACTS:
On June 22, 1965, petitioners bought two (2)parcels of land from Santiago Berna
rdino, et al.and on May 28, 1966, they bought anotherthree (3) parcels of land f
rom Juan Roque. Thefirst two parcels of land were sold by petitionersin 1968 to
Marenir Development Corporation,while the three parcels of land were sold bypeti
tioners to Erlinda Reyes and Maria Samsonon March 19,1970. Petitioner realized a
netprofit in the sale made in 1968 in the amount of P165, 224.70, while they re
alized a net profit of P60,000 in the sale made in 1970. Thecorresponding capita
l gains taxes were paid bypetitioners in 1973 and 1974 .Respondent Commissioner
informed petitionersthat in the years 1968 and 1970, petitioners asco-owners in
the real estate transactions formedan unregistered partnership or joint venturet
axable as a corporation under Section 20(b)and its income was subject to the tax
esprescribed under Section 24, both of theNational Internal Revenue Code; that t
heunregistered partnership was subject tocorporate income tax as distinguished f
romprofits derived from the partnership by themwhich is subject to individual in
come tax.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners formed an unregisteredpartnership subject to corporate incom

e tax(partnership vs. co-ownership)

RULING:
Article 1769 of the new Civil Code lays down therule for determining when a tr
ansaction shouldbe deemed a partnership or a co-ownership.Said article paragraph
s 2 and 3, provides:(2) Co-ownership or co-possession does not itself establish
a partnership, whether such co-ownersor co-possessors do or do not share any pro
fitsmade by the use of the property; (3) Thesharing of gross returns does not of
itself establish a partnership, whether or not thepersons sharing them have a j
oint or commonright or interest in any property from which thereturns are derive
d;The sharing of returns does not in itself establish a partnership whether or n
ot thepersons sharing therein have a joint or commonright or interest in the pro
perty. There must bea clear intent to form a partnership, theexistence of a juri
dical personality different fromthe individual partners, and the freedom of each
party to transfer or assign the whole property.In the present case, there is cle
ar evidence of co-ownership between the petitioners. There isno adequate basis t
o support the propositionthat they thereby formed an unregisteredpartnership. Th
e two isolated transactionswhereby they purchased properties and sold thesame a
few years thereafter did not therebymake them partners. They shared in the gross
profits as co- owners and paid their capital gainstaxes on their net profits and
availed of the taxamnesty thereby. Under the circumstances, theycannot be consi
dered to have formed anunregistered partnership which is thereby liablefor corpo
rate income tax, as the respondentcommissioner proposes. And even assuming for t
he sake of argumentthat such unregistered partnership appears tohave been formed
, since there is no suchexisting unregistered partnership with a distinctpersona
lity nor with assets that can be heldliable for said deficiency corporate income
tax,then petitioners can be held individually liable aspartners for this unpaid
obligation of thepartnership