G.R. No. 124617 April 28, 2000 PHILIPPINE AEOLUS AUTO-MOTIVE UNITED CORPORATION and/or FRANCIS CHUA vs.

NLRC
This petition seeks to set aside the Decision of 15 February 1996 and the Resolution of 28 March 1996 of public respondent
National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA No. 009753-95 (NLRC NCR Case No. 00-12-08759-94) which modified the
decision of the Labor Arbiter finding petitioners not guilty of illegal dismissal.
Petitioner Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation (PAAUC) is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine
laws, petitioner Francis Chua is its President while private respondent Rosalinda C. Cortez was a company nurse 1 of petitioner
corporation until her termination on 7 November 1994.
On 5 October 1994 a memorandum was a issued by Ms. Myrna Palomares, Personnel Manager of petitioner corporation,
addressed to private respondent Rosalinda C. Cortez requiring her to explain within forty-eight (48) hours why no disciplinary
action should be taken against her (a) for throwing a stapler at Plant Manager William Chua, her superior, and uttering invectives
against him on 2 August 1994; (b) for losing the amount of P1,488.00 entrusted to her by Plant Manager Chua to be given to Mr.
Fang of the CLMC Department on 23 August 1994; and, (c) for asking a co-employee to punch-in her time card thus making it
appear that she was in the office in the morning of 6 September 1944 when in fact she was not. The memorandum however was
refused by private respondent although it was read to her and discussed with her by a co-employee. She did not also submit the
required explanation, so that while her case pending investigation the company placed her under preventive suspension for thirty
(30) days effective 9 October 1994 to 7 November 1994.
On 20 October 1994, while Cortez was still under preventive suspension, another memorandum was issued by petitioner
corporation giving her seventy-two (72) hours to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against her for allegedly
failing to process the ATM applications of her nine (9) co-employees with the Allied Banking Corporation. On 21 October 1994
private respondent also refused to receive the second memorandum although it was read to her by a co-employee. A copy of the
memorandum was also sent by the Personnel Manager to private respondent at her last known address by registered mail.
Meanwhile, private respondent submitted a written explanation with respect to the loss of the P1,488.00 and the punching-in of
her time card by a co-employee.
On 3 November 1994 a third memorandum was issued to private respondent, this time informing her of her termination from the
service effective 7 November 1994 on grounds of gross and habitual neglect of duties, serious misconduct and fraud or willful
breach of trust.2
On 6 December 1994 private respondent filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of annual
service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay and damages against PAAUC and its president Francis Chua. 3
On 10 July 1995 the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision holding the termination of Cortez as valid and legal, at the same time
dismissing her claim for damages for lack of merit. 4
On appeal to the NLRC, public respondent reversed on 15 February 1996 the decision of the Labor Arbiter and found petitioner
corporation guilty of illegal dismissal of private respondent Cortez. The NLRC ordered petitioner PAAUC to reinstate respondent
Cortez to her former position with back wages computed from the time of dismissal up to her actual reinstatement. 5
On 11 March 1996 petitioners moved for reconsideration. On 28 March 1996 the motion was denied; 6 hence, this petition
for certiorari challenging the NLRC Decision and Resolution.
The crux of the controversy may be narrowed down to two (2) main issues: whether the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in
holding as illegal the dismissal of private respondent, and whether she is entitled to damages in the event that the illegality of
her dismissal is sustained.
The Labor Code as amended provides specific grounds by which an employer may validly terminate the services of an
employee 7 which grounds should be strictly construed since a person's employment constitutes "property" under the context of
the constitutional protection that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law" and, as such,
the burden of proving that there exists a valid ground for termination of the employment rests upon the employer. 8 Likewise, in
light of the employee's right to security of tenure, where a penalty less punitive than dismissal will suffice, whatever missteps
may have been committed by labor ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe. 9
As to the first charge, respondent Cortez claims that as early as her first year of employment her Plant Manager, William Chua,
already manifested a special liking for her, so much so that she was receiving special treatment from him who would oftentimes
invite her "for a date," which she would as often refuse. On many occasions, he would make sexual advances touching her
hands, putting his arms around her shoulders, running his fingers on her arms and telling her she looked beautiful. The special
treatment and sexual advances continued during her employment for four (4) years but she never reciprocated his flirtations,
until finally, she noticed that his attitude towards her changed. He made her understand that if she would not give in to his sexual
advances he would cause her termination from the service; and he made good his threat when he started harassing her. She just
found out one day that her table which was equipped with telephone and intercom units and containing her personal belongings
was transferred without her knowledge to a place with neither telephone nor intercom, for which reason, an argument ensued
when she confronted William Chua resulting in her being charged with gross disrespect. 11
Respondent Cortez explains, as regards the second charge, that the money entrusted to her for transmittal was not lost; instead,
she gave it to the company personnel in-charge for proper transmittal as evidenced by a receipt duly signed by the latter. 12
With respect to the third imputation, private respondent admits that she asked someone to punch-in her time card because at
that time she was doing an errand for one of the company's officers, Richard Tan, and that was with the permission of William

Chua. She maintains that she did it in good faith believing that she was anyway only accommodating the request of a company
executive and done for the benefit of the company with the acquiescence of her boss, William Chua. Besides, the practice was
apparently tolerated as the employees were not getting any reprimand for doing so. 13
As to the fourth charge regarding her alleged failure to process the ATM cards of her co-employees, private respondent claims
that she has no knowledge thereof and therefore denies it. After all, she was employed as a company nurse and not to process
ATM cards for her co-employees.
The Supreme Court, in a litany of decisions on serious misconduct warranting dismissal of an employee, has ruled that for
misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal (a) it must be serious; (b) must relate to the performance of the
employee's duties; and, (c) must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer. 14 The act of
private respondent in throwing a stapler and uttering abusive language upon the person of the plant manager may be
considered, from a lay man's perspective, as a serious misconduct. However, in order to consider it a serious misconduct that
would justify dismissal under the law, it must have been done in relation to the performance of her duties as would show her to
be unfit to continue working for her employer. The acts complained of, under the circumstances they were done, did not in any
way pertain to her duties as a nurse. Her employment identification card discloses the nature of her employment as a nurse and
no other. 15 Also, the memorandum informing her that she was being preventively suspended pending investigation of her case
was addressed to her as a nurse. 16
As regards the third alleged infraction, i.e., the act of private respondent in asking a co-employee to punch-in her time card,
although a violation of company rules, likewise does not constitute serious misconduct. Firstly, it was done by her in good faith
considering that she was asked by an officer to perform a task outside the office, which was for the benefit of the company, with
the consent of the plant manager. Secondly, it was her first time to commit such infraction during her five (5)-year service in the
company. Finally, the company did not lose anything by reason thereof as the offense was immediately known and corrected.
On alleged infraction No. 4, as may be gleaned from and admitted in the memorandum of petitioners to private respondent dated
20 October 1994 17 and the notice of termination dated 3 November 1994, the money entrusted to her was in fact deposited in
the respective accounts of the employees concerned, although belatedly. We agree with the submission of the Solicitor General
that
The mere delay/failure to open an ATM account for nine employees is not sufficient, by itself, to support a conclusion
that Rosalinda is guilty of gross and habitual neglect of duties. First, petitioner did not show that opening an ATM is one
of her primary duties as company nurse. Second, petitioner failed to show that Rosalinda intentionally, knowingly, and
purposely delayed the opening of ATM accounts for petitioner's employees. It is of common knowledge that a bank
imposes upon an applicant certain requirements before an ATM account can be opened, i.e. properly filled up application
forms, identification cards, minimum deposit etc. In the instant case, petitioner did not prove that the delay was caused
by Rosalinda's neglect or willful act (emphasis supplied). 18
Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It
evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. 19 The negligence, to warrant removal
from service, should not merely be gross but also habitual. Likewise, the ground "willful breach by the employee of the trust
reposed in him by his employer" must be founded on facts established by the employer who must clearly and convincingly prove
by substantial evidence the facts and incidents upon which loss of confidence in the employee may fairly be made to rest. 20 All
these requirements prescribed by law and jurisprudence are wanting in the case at bar.
On the issue of moral and exemplary damages, the NLRC ruled that private respondent was not entitled to recover such damages
for her failure to prove that petitioner corporation had been motivated by malice or bad faith or that it acted in a wanton,
oppressive or malevolent manner in terminating her services. In disbelieving the explanation proffered by private respondent that
the transfer of her table was the response of a spurned lothario, public respondent quoted the Labor Arbiter
Complainant's assertion that the cause of the altercation between her and the Plant Manager where she threw a stapler
to him and uttered invectives against him was her refusal to submit to his advances to her which started from her early
days of employment and lasted for almost four years, is hardly believable. For indeed, if there was such harassment,
why was there no complaints (sic) from her during that period? Why did she stay there for so long? Besides, it could not
have taken that period for the Plant Manager to react. This assertion of the complainant deserves no credence at all. 21
Public respondent in thus concluding appears baffled why it took private respondent more than four (4) years to expose William
Chua's alleged sexual harassment. It reasons out that it would have been more prepared to support her position if her act of
throwing the stapler and uttering invectives on William Chua were her immediate reaction to his amorous overtures. In that case,
according to public respondent, she would have been justified for such outburst because she would have been merely protecting
her womanhood, her person and her rights.
We are not persuaded. The gravamen of the offense in sexual harassment is not the violation of the employee's sexuality but the
abuse of power by the employer. Any employee, male or female, may rightfully cry "foul" provided the claim is well substantiated.
Strictly speaking, there is no time period within which he or she is expected to complain through the proper channels. The time to
do so may vary depending upon the needs, circumstances, and more importantly, the emotional threshold of the employee.
Anxiety was gradual in private respondent's five (5)-year employment. It began when her plant manager showed an obvious
partiality for her which went out of hand when he started to make it clear that he would terminate her services if she would not
give in to his sexual advances. Sexual harassment is an imposition of misplaced "superiority" which is enough to dampen an
employee's spirit in her capacity for advancement. It affects her sense of judgment; it changes her life. If for this alone private
respondent should be adequately compensated. Thus, for the anxiety, the seen and unseen hurt that she suffered, petitioners
should also be made to pay her moral damages, plus exemplary damages, for the oppressive manner with which petitioners
effected her dismissal from the service, and to serve as a forewarning to lecherous officers and employers who take undue
advantage of their ascendancy over their employees.

All told, the penalty of dismissal is too excessive and not proportionate to the alleged infractions committed considering that it
does not appear that private respondent was an incorrigible offender or that she inflicted serious damage to the company, nor
would her continuance in the service be patently inimical to her employer's interest. 25 Even the suspension imposed upon her
while her case was pending investigation appears to be unjustified and uncalled for.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of public respondent National Labor Relations Commssion finding the dismissal of private respondent
Rosalinda C. Cortez to be without just cause and ordering petitioners Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation and/or
Francis Chua to pay her back wages computed from the time of her dismissal, which should be full back wages, is AFFIRMED.
However, in view of the strained relations between the adverse parties, instead of reinstatement ordered by public respondent,
petitioners should pay private respondent separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service until finality
of this judgment. In addition, petitioners are ordered to pay private respondent P25,000.00 for moral damages and P10,000.00 for
exemplary damages. Costs against petitioners.

Libres v NLRC G.R. No. 123737. May 28, 1999

J. Bellosillo
Facts:
Petitioner Carlos G. Libres, an electrical engineer, was holding a managerial position with National Steel Corporation (NSC) as
Assistant Manager. He was then asked to comment regarding the charge of sexual harrassment filed against him by the VP's
secretary Capiral. This was included with a waiver of his right tobe heard once he didn't comment.
On 14 August 1993 petitioner submitted his written explanation denying the accusation against him and offering to submit
himself for clarificatory interrogation.
The Management Evaluation Committee said that "touching a female subordinate's hand and shoulder, caressing her nape and
telling other people that Capiral was the one who hugged and kissed or that she responded to the sexual advances are
unauthorized acts that damaged her honor." They suspended Libres for 30 days without pay.
He filed charges against the corporation in the Labor Arbiter, but the latter held that the company acted with due process and
that his punishment was only mild.
Moreover, he assailed the NLRC decision as without basis due to the massaging of her shoulders never discriminated against
her continued employment, impaired her rights and privileges under the Labor Code, or created a hostile, intimidating or
offensive environment.
He claimed that he wasn't guaranteed due process because he wasn't given the right be heard. This was due to his demand for
personal confrontation not being recognized by the MEC.
In the Supreme Court, petitioner assailed the failure of the NLRC to strictly apply RA No. 7877 or the law against sexual
harassment to the instant case. Moreover, petitioner also contends that public respondents reliance on Villarama v. NLRC and
Golden Donuts was misplaced. He draws attention to victim Divina Gonzagas immediate filing of her letter of resignation in
the Villarama case as opposed to the one year delay of Capiral in filing her complaint against him. He now surmises that the
filing of the case against him was merely an afterthought and not borne out of a valid complaint, hence, the Villarama case
should have no bearing on the instant case.
Issue: Was Libres accorded due process when the MEC denied his request for personal confrontatiom?
Held: Yes Petition denied.
Ratio:
On not strictly applying RA 7877- Republic Act No. 7877 was not yet in effect at the time of the occurrence of the act complained
of. It was still being deliberated upon in Congress when petitioners case was decided by the Labor Arbiter. As a rule, laws shall
have no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided, or except in a criminal case when their application will favor the
accused. Hence, the Labor Arbiter have to rely on the MEC report and the common connotation of sexual harassment as it is
generally understood by the public. Faced with the same predicament, the NLRC had to agree with the Labor Arbiter. In so doing,
the NLRC did not commit any abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
On the Villarama afterthought-it was both fitting and appropriate since it singularly addressed the issue of a managerial employee
committing sexual harassment on a subordinate. The disparity in the periods of filing the complaints in the two (2) cases did not
in any way reduce this case into insignificance. On the contrary, it even invited the attention of the Court to focus on sexual
harassment as a just and valid cause for termination. Whereas petitioner Libres was only meted a 30-day suspension by the
NLRC, Villarama, in the other case was penalized with termination. As a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by more
exacting work ethics. He failed to live up to his higher standard of responsibility when he succumbed to his moral perversity. And
when such moral perversity is perpetrated against his subordinate, he provides a justifiable ground for his dismissal for lack of
trust and confidence.
It is the the duty of every employer to protect his employees from oversexed superiors. Public respondent
therefore is correct in its observation that the Labor Arbiter was in fact lenient in his application of the law and jurisprudence for
which petitioner must be grateful for.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, it could be expected since Libres was Capirals immediate superior. Fear of retaliation
and backlash, not to forget the social humiliation and embarrassment that victims of this human frailty usually suffer, are all
realities that Capiral had to contend with. Moreover, the delay did not detract from the truth derived from the facts. Petitioner

Libres never questioned the veracity of Capirals allegations. In fact his narration even corroborated the latters assertion in
several material points. He only raised issue on the complaints protracted filing.
On the question of due process- Requirements were sufficiently complied with. Due process as a constitutional precept does not
always and in all situations require a trial type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge
against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of.
It is undeniable that petitioner was given a Notice of Investigation informing him of the charge of sexual harassment as well as
advising him to submit a written explanation regarding the matter; that he submitted his written explanation to his superior. The
VP further allowed him to air his grievance in a private session He was given more than adequate opportunity to explain his side
and air his grievances.
Personal confrontation was not necessary. Homeowners v NLRC- litigants may be heard through pleadings, written explanations,
position papers, memoranda or oral arguments.

G.R. No. 87210 July 16, 1990 FILOMENA BARCENAS, , vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC)
In 1978, Chua Se Su (Su for short) in his capacity as the Head Monk of the Buddhist Temple of Manila and Baguio City and as
President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Poh Toh Buddhist Association of the Phils. Inc. hired the petitioner who
speaks the Chinese language as secretary and interpreter. Petitioner's position required her to receive and assist Chinese visitors
to the temple, act as tourist guide for foreign Chinese visitors, attend to the callers of the Head Monk as well as to the food for
the temple visitors, run errands for the Head Monk such as paying the Meralco, PLDT, MWSS bills and act as liaison in some
government offices. Aside from her pay and allowances under the law, she received an amount of P500.00 per month plus free
board and lodging in the temple. In December, 1979, Su assumed the responsibility of paying for the education of petitioner's
nephew. In 1981, Su and petitioner had amorous relations. In May, 1982, of five months before giving birth to the alleged son of
Su on October 12, 1982, petitioner was sent home to Bicol. Upon the death of Su in July, 1983, complainant remained and
continued in her job. In 1985, respondent Manuel Chua (Chua, for short) was elected President and Chairman of the Board of the
Poh Toh Buddhist Association of the Philippines, Inc. and Rev. Sim Dee for short) was elected Head Buddhist Priest. Thereafter,
Chua and Dee discontinued payment of her monthly allowance and the additional P500.00 effective 1983. In addition, petitioner
and her son were evicted forcibly from their quarters in the temple by six police officers. She was brought first to the Police
precinct in Tondo and then brought to Aloha Hotel where she was compelled to sign a written undertaking not to return to the
Buddhist temple in consideration of the sum of P10,000.00. Petitioner refused and Chua shouted threats against her and her son.
Her personal belongings including assorted jewelries were never returned by respondent Chua.
Chua and DEE on the other hand, claimed that petitioner was never an employee of the Poh Toh Temple but a servant who
confined herself to the temple and to the personal needs of the late Chua Se Su and thus, her position is coterminous with that of
her master.
On February 10, 1988, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the complainant Filomena Barcenas, and the
respondent corporation is hereby ordered to pay her
Respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission which, as earlier stated, reversed the above decision of the
Labor Arbiter. Hence, this instant petition. A painstaking review of the records compels Us to dismiss the petition.
At the outset, however, We agree with the petitioner's claim that she was a regular employee of the Manila Buddhist Temple as
secretary and interpreter of its Head Monk, Su As Head Monk, President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Poh Toh
Buddhist Association of the Philippines, Su was empowered to hire the petitioner under Article V of the By-laws of the Association
which states:
. . . (T)he President or in his absence, the Vice President shall represent the Association in all its dealings with the public, subject
to the Board, shall have the power to enter into any contract or agreement in the name of the Association, shall manage the
active business operation of the Association, shall deal with the bank or banks . . . 2
Respondent NLRC represented by its Legal Offices 3 argues that since petitioner was hired without the approval of the Board of
Directors of the Poh Toh Buddhist Association of the Philippines, Inc., she was not an employee of respondents. This argument is
specious. The required Board approval would appear to relate to the acts of the President in representing the association "in all its
dealings with the public." And, even granting that prior Board approval is required to confirm the hiring of the petitioner, the

same was already granted, albeit, tacitly. It must be noted that petitioner was hired in 1978 and no whimper of protest was raised
until this present controversy.
Moreover, the work that petitioner performed in the temple could not be categorized as mere domestic work. Thus, We find that
petitioner, being proficient in the Chinese language, attended to the visitors, mostly Chinese, who came to pray or seek advice
before Buddha for personal or business problems; arranged meetings between these visitors and Su and supervised the
preparation of the food for the temple visitors; acted as tourist guide of foreign visitors; acted as liaison with some goverment
offices; and made the payment for the temple's Meralco, MWSS and PLDT bills. Indeed, these tasks may not be deemed activities
of a household helper. They were essential and important to the operation and religious functions of the temple.
In spite of this finding, her status as a regular employee ended upon her return to Bicol in May, 1982 to await the birth of her
love-child allegedly by Su The records do not show that petitioner filed any leave from work or that a leave was granted her.
Neither did she return to work after the birth of her child on October 12, 1982, whom she named Robert Chua alias Chua Sim
Tiong. The NLRC found that it was only in July, 1983 after Su died that she went back to the Manila Buddhist Temple. Petitioner's
pleadings failed to rebut this finding. Clearly, her return could not be deemed as a resumption of her old position which she had
already abandoned. Petitioner herself supplied the reason for her return. She stated:
. . . (I)t was the death-bed instruction to her by Chua Se Su to stay at the temple and to take care of the two boys and to see to it
that they finish their studies to become monks and when they are monks to eventually take over the two temples as their
inheritance from their father Chua Se Su. 4
Thus, her return to the temple was no longer as an employee but rather as Su's mistress who is bent on protecting the
proprietary and hereditary rights of her son and nephew. In her pleadings, the petitioner claims that they were forcefully evicted
from the temple, harassed and threatened by respondents and that the Poh Toh Buddhist Association is a trustee corporation with
the children as cestui que trust. These claims are not proper in this labor case. They should be appropriately threshed out in the
complaints already filed by the petitioner before the civil courts. Due to these claims, We view the respondents' offer of
P10,000.00 as indicative more of their desire to evict the petitioner and her son from the temple rather than an admission of an
employer-employee relations.
Anent the petitioner's claim for unpaid wages since May, 1982 which she filed only in 1986, We hold that the same has already
prescribed. Under Article 292 of the Labor Code, all money claims arising from employer-employee relations must be filed within
three years from the time the cause of action accrued, otherwise they shall forever be barred.
Finally, while petitioner contends that she continued to work in the temple after Su died, there is, however, no proof that she was
re-hired by the new Head Monk. In fact, she herself manifested that respondents made it clear to her in no uncertain terms that
her services as well as her presence and that of her son were no longer needed. 5 However, she persisted and continued to work
in the temple without receiving her salary because she expected Chua and Dee to relent and permit the studies of the two
boys. 6 Consequently, under these circumstances, no employer-employee relationship could have arisen.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission dated November 29, 1988 is hereby AFFIRMED for the
reasons aforestated. No costs.

Apex Mining Co v. NLRC

Candida performed laundry services at the staff house of company. Began as piece rate worker then later was paid on monthly
basis. On Dec. 18, 1987, while she was hanging laundry, she fell on her back. She immediately reported incident to dela Rosa, her
immediate supervisor who offered her 2thou then 5thou for her to quit her job. She refused and preferred to return to work but
petitioner did not allow her to work and she was dismissed. Petitioner claims that Candido should be treated as a mere
househelper or domestic servant and not as a regular employee.
Issue: WON Candida was a householder; Held: No;
Ratio:
1. (b) The term "househelper" as used herein is synonymous to the term "domestic servant" and shall refer to any person,
whether male or female, who renders services in and about the employer's home and which services are usually necessary or
desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the
employer's family.
2. criteria: personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the home of said employer
Separation pay granted. Reinstatement no longer possible.
Private respondent Sinclita Candida was employed by petitioner Apex Mining Company, Inc. on May 18, 1973 to perform laundry
services at its staff house located at Masara, Maco, Davao del Norte. In the beginning, she was paid on a piece rate basis.
However, on January 17, 1982, she was paid on a monthly basis at P250.00 a month which was ultimately increased to P575.00 a
month.

On December 18, 1987, while she was attending to her assigned task and she was hanging her laundry, she accidentally slipped
and hit her back on a stone. She reported the accident to her immediate supervisor Mila de la Rosa and to the personnel officer,
Florendo D. Asirit. As a result of the accident she was not able to continue with her work. She was permitted to go on leave for
medication. De la Rosa offered her the amount of P 2,000.00 which was eventually increased to P5,000.00 to persuade her to quit
her job, but she refused the offer and preferred to return to work. Petitioner did not allow her to return to work and dismissed her
on February 4, 1988.
Not satisfied therewith, petitioner appealed to the public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), wherein in due
course a decision was rendered by the Fifth Division thereof on July 20, 1989 dismissing the appeal for lack of merit and affirming
the appealed decision. A motion for reconsideration thereof was denied in a resolution of the NLRC dated June 29, 1990.
Hence, the herein petition for review by certiorari, which appopriately should be a special civil action for certiorari, and which in
the interest of justice, is hereby treated as such.2 The main thrust of the petition is that private respondent should be treated as a
mere househelper or domestic servant and not as a regular employee of petitioner. The petition is devoid of merit.
Under Rule XIII, Section l(b), Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended, the terms "househelper" or "domestic servant" are defined
as follows:
The term "househelper" as used herein is synonymous to the term "domestic servant" and shall refer to any person, whether
male or female, who renders services in and about the employer's home and which services are usually necessary or desirable
for the maintenance and enjoyment thereof, and ministers exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer's
family.3
The foregoing definition clearly contemplates such househelper or domestic servant who is employed in the employer's home to
minister exclusively to the personal comfort and enjoyment of the employer's family. Such definition covers family drivers,
domestic servants, laundry women, yayas, gardeners, houseboys and other similar househelps.
The definition cannot be interpreted to include househelp or laundrywomen working in staffhouses of a company, like petitioner
who attends to the needs of the company's guest and other persons availing of said facilities. By the same token, it cannot be
considered to extend to then driver, houseboy, or gardener exclusively working in the company, the staffhouses and its premises.
They may not be considered as within the meaning of a "househelper" or "domestic servant" as above-defined by law.
The criteria is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the home of said employer. While it may be
true that the nature of the work of a househelper, domestic servant or laundrywoman in a home or in a company staffhouse may
be similar in nature, the difference in their circumstances is that in the former instance they are actually serving the family while
in the latter case, whether it is a corporation or a single proprietorship engaged in business or industry or any other agricultural
or similar pursuit, service is being rendered in the staffhouses or within the premises of the business of the employer. In such
instance, they are employees of the company or employer in the business concerned entitled to the privileges of a regular
employee.
Petitioner contends that it is only when the househelper or domestic servant is assigned to certain aspects of the business of the
employer that such househelper or domestic servant may be considered as such as employee. The Court finds no merit in making
any such distinction. The mere fact that the househelper or domestic servant is working within the premises of the business of
the employer and in relation to or in connection with its business, as in its staffhouses for its guest or even for its officers and
employees, warrants the conclusion that such househelper or domestic servant is and should be considered as a regular
employee of the employer and not as a mere family househelper or domestic servant as contemplated in Rule XIII, Section l(b),
Book 3 of the Labor Code, as amended.
Petitioner denies having illegally dismissed private respondent and maintains that respondent abandoned her work.1wphi1 This
argument notwithstanding, there is enough evidence to show that because of an accident which took place while private
respondent was performing her laundry services, she was not able to work and was ultimately separated from the service. She is,
therefore, entitled to appropriate relief as a regular employee of petitioner. Inasmuch as private respondent appears not to be
interested in returning to her work for valid reasons, the payment of separation pay to her is in order.

ULTRA VILLA FOOD HAUS A/O ROSIE TIO v GENISTON, NLRC

This special civil action for certiorari arises from an illegal dismissal complaint filed by private respondent Geniston. He claims to
have been an all-around worker of Ultra Villa Food Haus Restaurant. He was employed from March 1, 1989 until May 13,
1992. As Geniston served acted as NUCD Poll Watcher in the 1992 elections, he did not report for work on May 11-12, 1992. He
alleged that his employer told his mother that he was dismissed from work and his pleas for reinstatement failed.
Petitioner Tio maintains that Geniston was her personal driver and not an employee of Ultra Villa. His responsibility was to drive
her to and from her Office. Although May 12, 1992 was a holiday, she asked him to report for work, but was told that he was
doing election duties. Hence she had to hire a substitute driver, as Respondent returned to work a week after and only to collect
his salary.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that Geniston was Petitioners personal driver and therefore not entitled to OT, premium pay, SIL pay and
13th month pay. He was also deemed not entitled to salary differentials or separation pay. However, Petitioner was ordered to
indemnify private Respondent the amount of P1,000.00 for failure of employer to observe procedural due process.

On appeal, the NLRC ordered petitioner to reinstate Geniston and pay backwages, OT,Holiday pay, premium pay, 13th month pay
and SIL. On Motion for Reconsideration, the NLRC ordered payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement (due to closure of
the business) but denied Genistons prayer for damages and attorneys fees. It denied petitioners MR, ruling that Gensiton was
an employee of Ultravilla Food Haus.
The Supreme Court found Geniston was the personal driver of petitioner, not of Ultra Villa Food Haus, as shown by the submitted
evidence and admissions of the respondent that he was petitioners personal driver. The criterion of househelper under Art. 141
have been met: Domestic or household service shall mean services in the employers home which is usually necessary or
desirable for the maintenance and enjoyment therefore and includes ministering to the personal comfort and convenience of the
members of the employers household, including services of family drivers. Book III, Title 1 of the Labor Code and Article 82,
expressly excludes domestic helpers from its coverage, and as such, petitioner is not required to grant OT, holiday pay, premium
pay and SIL. While PD851 excludes househelpers from the coverage of 13 th month pay, petitioner was required to pay such
considering that it has been its practice to give its employees 13 th Month Pay.
The Court found, however, that respondent did not abandon his job, as the two requisites ( failure to report to work without valid
reason, and a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship) were not met. Petitioner failed to prove
abandonment. It is quite unbelievable that private respondent would leave a stable and relatively well-paying job as petitioners
family driver to work as an election worker the functions of which are seasonal and temporary in nature. He was unjustly
dismissed from work, and is entitled to indemnity as provided for under Art. 149 of the Labor Code. . compensation already
earned plus that for fifteen days by way of indemnity. Further, because of failure to comply with die process in dismissing private
respondent, petitioner was also ordered to pay an additional indemnity of P 1,000.00
REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORP. vs. CASTAEDA 507 SCRA 391 November 20, 2006
FACTS: E r l i n d a C a s t a n e d a h a d i n s t i t u t e d a c o m p l a i n t f o r i l l e g a l dismissal, underpayment of wages, nonpayment of overtime service incentive leave pay and non-payment of 13th month pay against Remington (a trading business)
before the NLRC.
Castaeda alleged that she started working in August 1983 as a company cook for Remington, worked for six days a week. She
continuously worked with Remington until unceremoniously prevented from reporting for work when it transferred to a new site
but was informed that Remington no longer needed her services.
She was illegally dismissed because she was not given the notices required by law. So she filed her complaint for reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights.
Remington denied that it illegally dismissed Castaeda, saying that she was a domestic helper, not a regular employee. Her job
did not have anything to do with the business of trading in construction or hardware materials. She did not work 8 hours.
Remington did not exercise any degree of control over her work.
Castaeda filed a complaint before the LA but dismissed the same holding her a domestic helper. The NLRC reversed the decision
of the LA, that she was not a domestic helper in that she did not work in the house of the director of Remington, Mr. Tan. There
was also a certification issued by the corporate secretary certifying that she was a bona fide employee. Her work schedule and
the fact of being paid a monthly salary indicate that she is a company employee. The CA affirmed the NLRC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Castaeda is a regular employee of Remington.
HELD:
YES. In Apex Mining Co., Inc. vs. NLRC, a house helper in the staff houses of an industrial company was a regular employee of the
said firm. The criterion is the personal comfort and enjoyment of the family of the employer in the home of said employer. The
she works within the company premises and that she does not cater exclusively to the personal comfort of Mr. Tan and his family
reflects the existence of Remingtons right of control over her functions, which is the primary indicator of the existence of an
employer-employee relationship.
It is wrong to say that if the work is not directly related to the employers business, then the person performing such work could
not be considered an employee. The existence of the employer-employee relationship is defined by law according to the facts of
each case, regardless of the nature of the activities involved.
The mere fact that the house helper or domestic servant is working within the premises of the business, as in staff houses for its
guests or even for its officers and employees, warrants the conclusion that such house helper is and should be considered a
regular employee of the employer.
She was illegally dismissed. She enjoys security of tenure. She may not be dismissed in the absence of just or authorized cause.