Bella A. Guerrero v. Resurrecion A.

Bihis
G.R. No. 174144; April 17, 2007
CORONA, J.:
FACTS
Felisa Tamio de Buenaventura, mother of Bella Guerrero (Petitioner) and
Resurrecion Bihis (Respondent), died.
Guerrero filed a petition for probate of the last will and testament of their mother in
RTC- Quezon City. This was opposed by Bihis contending that:
o the will was not executed and attested as required by law
o its attestation clause and acknowledgement did not comply with the
requirements of the law;
o the signature of the testatrix was procured by fraud and petitioner and her
children procured the will through undue and improper pressure and
influence.
RTC-QC denied the probate of the will ruling that Article 806 of Civil Code was not
complied with because the will was acknowledged by the testatrix and the
witnesses at the Testatrixs residence (Quezon City) before Atty. Macario Directo
who was a commissioned notary public for and in Caloocan City.
ISSUE
Did the will acknowledged by the testatrix and the instrumental witnesses before a
notary public acting outside the place of his commission satisfy the requirement
under Article 806 of the Civil Code?
RULING:
No, it did not satisfy the requirement under Art. 806.
One of the formalities required by law in connection with the execution of a notarial
will is that it must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses (Art. 806). This formal requirement is one of the indispensable requisites for
the validity of a will. Acknowledgment can only be made before a competent officer, that
is, a lawyer duly commissioned as a notary public. No notary shall possess authority to
do any notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction. A notary publics commission is
the grant of authority in his favor to perform notarial acts. It is issued within and for a
particular territorial jurisdiction and the notary publics authority is coextensive with it. In
other words, a notary public is authorized to perform notarial acts, including the taking of
acknowledgments, within that territorial jurisdiction only. Outside the place of his
commission, he is bereft of power to perform any notarial act; he is not a notary public.
Any notarial act outside the limits of his jurisdiction has no force and effect. In Tecson v.
Tecson, it was held that An acknowledgment taken outside the territorial limits of the
officers jurisdiction is void as if the person taking it were wholly without official
character.
Since Atty. Directo was not a commissioned notary public for and in Quezon City, he
lacked the authority to take the acknowledgment of the testatrix and the instrumental
witnesses. In the same vein, the testatrix and her witnesses could not have validly

acknowledged the will before him. Thus, Felisa Tamio de Buenaventuras last will and
testament was, in effect, not acknowledged as required by law.
Hence, the compulsory language of Article 806 of the Civil Code was not complied
with and the interdiction of Article 240 of the Notarial Law was breached. Ineluctably, the
acts of the testatrix, her witnesses and Atty. Directo were all completely void.
Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.
G.R. No. 154953; June 26, 2008
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS
T.A.N Properties filed an Application for Original Registration of Title covering a land
(56 hectares at San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas).
During the hearings conducted, T.A.N. Properties presented 3 witnesses, namely:
Torres Operations Manager and its authorized representative; Primitivo
Evangelista 72 year old resident of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas; and
Regalado Marquez Records Officer II of the Land Registration Authority.
The testimonies of the witnesses showed that Prospero Dimayuga (Kabesang
Puroy) had peaceful, adverse, open, and continuous possession of the land in the
concept of an owner since 1942. Upon his death, Kabesang Puroy was succeeded
by his son Antonio Dimayuga (Antonio). On 27 September 1960, Antonio executed a
Deed of Donation covering the land in favor of one of his children, Fortunato
Dimayuga (Fortunato). Later, however, Antonio gave Fortunato another piece of
land. Hence on April 1961, Antonio executed a Partial Revocation of Donation, and
the land was adjudicated to one of Antonios children, Prospero Dimayuga (Porting).
On August 8, 1997, Porting sold the land to T.A.N. Properties.
RTC adjudicated the land in favor of the respondent. CA affirmed.
Petitioner alleges that the trial courts reliance on the testimonies of Evangelista and
Torres was misplaced. Petitioner alleges that Evangelistas statement that the
possession of respondents predecessors-in-interest was open, public, continuous,
peaceful, and adverse to the whole world was a general conclusion of law rather
than factual evidence of possession of title. Petitioner alleges that respondent
failed to establish that its predecessors-in-interest had held the land openly,
continuously, and exclusively for at least 30 years after it was declared alienable and
disposable.
ISSUE
Does respondent or its predecessors-in-interest had open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the land in the concept of an owner
since June 1945 or earlier?
RULING:
No, T.A.N. Properties Inc. had no open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation in the concept of an owner.

Article 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe
through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title
or of good faith.
There is no law that requires that the testimony of a single witness needs
corroboration. However, in this case, we find Evangelistas uncorroborated testimony
insufficient to prove that respondents predecessors-in-interest had been in possession
of the land in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. We cannot consider the
testimony of Torres as sufficient corroboration. Torres testified primarily on the fact of
respondents acquisition of the land. While he claimed to be related to the Dimayugas,
his knowledge of their possession of the land was hearsay. He did not even tell the trial
court where he obtained his information.
The tax declarations presented were only for the years starting 1955. While tax
declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of
ownership. Respondent did not present any credible explanation why the realty taxes
were only paid starting 1955 considering the claim that the Dimayugas were allegedly in
possession of the land before 1945. The payment of the realty taxes starting 1955 gives
rise to the presumption that the Dimayugas claimed ownership or possession of the
land only in that year.
Therefore, there was no open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation in the concept of an owner.
Emeterio Cui v. Arellano University
G.R. No. 15127; May 30, 1961
CONCEPCION, J.:
FACTS
Emeterio Cui took up preparatory law course in the Arellano University (Arellano)
and thereafter, enrolled in its College of Law. He studied law in Arellano up to and
including the first semester of 4th year. During his entire stay in Arellano, Francisco
Capistrano brother of his mother was the dean of College of Law and Legal
Counsel. He was also awarded scholarship grants for scholastic merit, where he
was made to sign a contract covenant and agreement, to wit:
"In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by the University, I hereby waive
my right to transfer to another school without having refunded to the University
(defendant) the equivalent of my scholarship cash.
When he enrolled for last semester of his law studies in Arellano, he failed to pay
tuition fees because his uncle, having severed his connection with Arellano and
having accepted the deanship and chancellorship of the College of Law of the Abad
Santos University. Thus he also transferred to Abad Santos University.
After Graduating in law from Abad Santos University he applied to take the bar
examination. To secure permission to take the bar, he needed the transcript of his
records in Arellano but the latter refused to issue such transcript not until he paid
back the 1,003.87 amount refunded by Arellano University.
Emeterio Cui hence paid such amount under protest.

ISSUE
Whether the provision of the said contract between Cui and Arellano (Cui waived his
right to transfer to another school without refunding to the Arellano University the
equivalent of his scholarships in cash) is valid or not.
RULING:
No, the said contract is not valid.
Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order,
public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law.
If Arellano University understood clearly the real essence of scholarships and the
motives which prompted this office to issue Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949, it should
have not entered into a contract of waiver with Cui on September 10, 1951, which is a
direct violation of our Memorandum and an open challenge to the authority of the
Director of Private Schools because the contract was repugnant to sound morality and
civic honesty.
Thus conceived, it is not only inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals.
Manresa has defined Morals as good customs; those generally accepted principles of
morality, which have received some kind of social and practical confirmation. The
practice of awarding scholarships to attract students and keep them in school is not
good customs nor has it received some kind of social and practical confirmation except
in some private institutions as in Arellano University. The University of the Philippines
which implements Section 5 of Article XIV of the Constitution with reference to the giving
of free scholarships to gifted children, does not require scholars to reimburse the
corresponding value of the scholarships if they transfer to other schools. So also with
the leading colleges and universities of the United States after which our educational
practices or policies are patterned. In these institutions scholarships are granted not to
attract and to keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda mine but to reward
merit or help gifted students in whom society has an established interest or a first lien.
The People of the Philippine Islands v. Lol-lo and Saraw
G.R. No. 17958; February 27, 1922
MALCOLM, J.:
FACTS
Six vintas intercepted 2 Dutch boats- carrying men, women and children, which were
on its way between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There
the six vintas were manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked
for food, but once on the Dutch boat, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated
two of the women by methods too horrible to the described. All of the persons on the
Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it and
holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge. The Moros finally arrived at
Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped
one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape.

 Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu,
Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First
Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy.
A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the
grounds that the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not
constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands. After the
demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, trial was had, and a judgment was
rendered finding the two defendants guilty.
ISSUE
Whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are
still in force.
RULING:
Yes, the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in
force.
Article 17: xxx Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not
be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with
piracy were meant to include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in
relation to article 1 of the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the
provisions of the Code applicable not only to Spaniards but to Filipinos.
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as
piracy by the civil law, and he has never been disputed. The specific provisions of the
Penal Code are similar in tenor to statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of
the public law. This must necessarily be so, considering that the Penal Code finds its
inspiration in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and the Novisima Recopilacion.
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A
logical construction of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime
of piracy, would be that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the
words "United States" and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be
substituted by the expression "citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine
Islands."
Thus, it is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the
Philippines relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in
force in the United States.