Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Page 2 of 14
respondents. It found the allegations of the complaint
sufficient to constitute a cause of action against
respondents. The court a quo likewise denied
respondents' affirmative defense that venue was
improperly laid. It reasoned, thus:
x x x [T]he fact alone that the plaintiff at the time he filed
the complaint was and still is, the incumbent
Congressman of the Lone District of Southern Leyte with
residence at Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, is
enough to dispell any and all doubts about his actual
residence. As a high-ranking government official of the
province, his residence there can be taken judicial notice
of. As such his personal, actual and physical habitation
or his actual residence or place of abode can never be in
some other place but in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern
Leyte. It is correctly stated by the plaintiff, citing the case
of Core v. Core, 100 Phil. 321 that, "residence, for
purposes of fixing venue of an action, is synonymous
with domicile. This is defined as the permanent home,
the place to which, whenever absent for business or
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on the
facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose
intent. A person can have but one domicile at a time. A
man can have but one domicile for one and the same
purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places
of residence. Venue could be at place of his residence.
(Masa v. Mison, 200 SCRA 715 [1991])3
Respondents sought the reconsideration thereof but the
court a quo denied the same in the Order dated January
2, 2002. They then filed with the appellate court a
petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the presiding judge of the
court a quo in issuing the September 10, 2001 and
January 2, 2002 Orders. Upon respondents' posting of a
bond, the appellate court issued on March 14, 2002 a
temporary restraining order which enjoined the presiding
judge of the court a quo from conducting further
proceedings in Civil Case No. R-3172.
On May 22, 2003, the appellate court rendered the
assailed decision granting respondents' petition for
certiorari as it found that venue was improperly laid. It
directed the court a quo to vacate and set aside its
Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002,
and enjoined the presiding judge thereof from further
proceeding in the case, except to dismiss the complaint.
The appellate court explained that the action filed by
petitioner Saludo against respondents is governed by
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. The said rule on
venue of personal actions basically provides that
personal actions may be commenced and tried where
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at
the election of plaintiff.
Venue was improperly laid in the court a quo, according
to the appellate court, because not one of the parties
was a resident of Southern Leyte. Specifically, it
declared that petitioner Saludo was not a resident
thereof. The appellate court pronounced that, for
purposes of venue, the residence of a person is his
personal, actual or physical habitation, or his actual
residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily
be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides
therein with continuity and consistency.4
Page 3 of 14
deprive a defendant of the rights conferred upon him by
the Rules of Court.9 Further, fundamental in the law
governing venue of actions that the situs for bringing real
and personal civil actions is fixed by the rules to attain
the greatest possible convenience to the party litigants
by taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to
them - i.e., to both plaintiff and defendant, not only to
one or the other - of the courts of justice.10
Page 4 of 14
The appellate court committed reversible error in finding
that petitioner Saludo was not a resident of Southern
Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint, and
consequently holding that venue was improperly laid in
the court a quo. In Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. v.
Sarmiento,17 the Court had the occasion to explain at
length the meaning of the term "resides" for purposes of
venue, thus:
In Koh v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the term
"resides" as employed in the rule on venue on personal
actions filed with the courts of first instance means the
place of abode, whether permanent or temporary, of the
plaintiff or the defendant, as distinguished from
"domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which, when absent, one has the intention of returning.
"It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions
(Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) that the situs for bringing
real and personal civil actions are fixed by the rules to
attain the greatest convenience possible to the partieslitigants by taking into consideration the maximum
accessibility to them of the courts of justice. It is,
likewise, undeniable that the term domicile is not exactly
synonymous in legal contemplation with the term
residence, for it is an established principle in Conflict of
Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more
permanent abode of a person while residence applies to
a temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact,
this distinction is very well emphasized in those cases
where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant
the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless
persons.
"This Court held in the case of Uytengsu v. Republic, 50
O.G. 4781, October, 1954, reversing its previous stand
in Larena v. Ferrer, 61 Phil. 36, and Nuval v. Guray, 52
Phil. 645, that 'There is a difference between domicile and residence.
Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether
permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one has the
intention of returning. A man may have a residence in
one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not
domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the
intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have
but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any
time, but he may have numerous places of residence.
His place of residence generally is his place of domicile,
but is not by any means, necessarily so since no length
of residence without intention of remaining will constitute
domicile.' (Italicized for emphasis)
"We note that the law on venue in Courts of First
Instance (Section 2, of Rule 4, Rules of Court) in
referring to the parties utilizes the words 'resides or may
be found,' and not 'is domiciled,' thus:
'Sec. 2(b) Personal actions - All other actions may be
commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the
defendants resides or may be found, or where the
plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of
the plaintiff.' (Italicized for emphasis)
"Applying the foregoing observation to the present case,
We are fully convinced that private respondent Coloma's
protestations of domicile in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte,
Page 5 of 14
x x x [T]he Court held that "domicile" and "residence" are
synonymous. The term "residence," as used in the
election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
"Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like
reasons, one intends to return. x x x21
It can be readily gleaned that the definition of
"residence" for purposes of election law is more stringent
in that it is equated with the term "domicile." Hence, for
the said purpose, the term "residence" imports "not only
an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative
of such intention."22 When parsed, therefore, the term
"residence" requires two elements: (1) intention to reside
in the particular place; and (2) personal or physical
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative
of such intention. As the Court elucidated, "the place
where a party actually or constructively has a permanent
home, where he, no matter where he may be found at
any given time, eventually intends to return and remain,
i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers
when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election
law."23
On the other hand, for purposes of venue, the less
technical definition of "residence" is adopted. Thus, it is
understood to mean as "the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term
means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not
legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also
an intention to make it one's domicile."24
Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone
representative of the district of Southern Leyte, had his
residence (or domicile) therein as the term is construed
in relation to election laws, necessarily, he is also
deemed to have had his residence therein for purposes
of venue for filing personal actions. Put in another
manner, Southern Leyte, as the domicile of petitioner
Saludo, was also his residence, as the term is
understood in its popular sense. This is because
"residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence
coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited
time."
Reliance by the appellate court on Koh v. Court of
Appeals25 is misplaced. Contrary to its holding,26 the
facts of the present case are not similar to the facts
therein. In Koh, the complaint was filed with the Court of
First Instance in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte by plaintiff
who admitted that he was a resident of Kamias, Quezon
City. Save for the fact that he grew up in San Nicolas,
Ilocos Norte and that he manifested the intent to return
there after retirement, plaintiff therein had not
established that he was actually a resident therein at the
time of the filing of his complaint. Neither did he
establish that he had his domicile therein because
although he manifested the intent to go back there after
retirement, the element of personal presence in that
place was lacking. To reiterate, domicile or residence, as
the terms are taken as synonyms, imports "not only an
Page 6 of 14
That petitioner Saludo was the congressman or
representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte at
the time of the filing of his complaint was admitted as a
fact by the court a quo. In this connection, it
consequently held that, as such, petitioner Saludo's
residence in Southern Leyte, the district he was the
representing, could be taken judicial notice of. The court
a quo cannot be faulted for doing so because courts are
allowed "to take judicial notice of matters which are of
public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because
of their judicial functions." 30 Courts are likewise bound to
take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence,
of the law in force in the Philippines, 31 including its
Constitution.
The concept of "facts of common knowledge" in the
context of judicial notice has been explained as those
facts that are "so commonly known in the community as
to make it unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly
known to as to make it indisputable among reasonable
men." 32 Moreover, "though usually facts of 'common
knowledge' will be generally known throughout the
country, it is sufficient as a basis for judicial notice that
they be known in the local community where the trial
court sits." 33 Certainly, the fact of petitioner Saludo being
the duly elected representative of Southern Leyte at the
time could be properly taken judicial notice of by the
court a quo, the same being a matter of common
knowledge in the community where it sits.
Further, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte
could likewise be properly taken judicial notice of by the
court a quo. It is bound to know that, under the
Constitution, one of the qualifications of a congressman
or representative to the House of Representatives is
having a residence in the district in which he shall be
elected.
In fine, petitioner Saludo's act of filing his complaint with
the court a quo cannot be characterized as a "specie of
forum-shopping" or capricious on his part because,
under the rules, as plaintiff, he is precisely given this
option.
Finally, respondents' claim that the instant petition for
review was not properly verified by petitioner Saludo
deserves scant consideration.
Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically
required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under
oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has
read the pleading and that the allegations therein are
true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on
authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a
verification based on "information and belief," or upon
"knowledge, information and belief," or lacks proper
verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
Petitioner Saludo's verification and certification of nonforum shopping states that he has "read the contents
thereof [referring to the petition] and the same are true
Page 7 of 14
In the hearing held on January 30, 1973, both parties
together with their respective counsels appeared. Both
counsels manifested that the parties had come to an
agreement to settle their case. The trial court on even
date issued an Order5 appointing Gloria as administratrix
of the estate. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, letters of administration of the estate of
the late Evaristo Cuyos and including the undivided half
accruing to his spouse Agatona Arrogante who recently
died is hereby issued in favor of Mrs. Gloria Cuyos
Talian who may qualify as such administratrix after
posting a nominal bond of P1,000.00.6
Subsequently, in the Order7 dated December 12, 1975,
the CFI stated that when the Intestate Estate hearing
was called on that date, respondent Gloria and her
brother, oppositor Francisco, together with their
respective counsels, appeared; that Atty. Yray,
Franciscos counsel, manifested that the parties had
come to an agreement to settle the case amicably; that
both counsels suggested that the Clerk of Court, Atty.
Andres C. Taneo (Atty. Taneo), be appointed to act as
Commissioner to effect the agreement of the parties and
to prepare the project of partition for the approval of the
court. In the same Order, the Court of First Instance
(CFI) appointed Atty. Taneo and ordered him to make a
project of partition within 30 days from December 12,
1975 for submission and approval of the court.
In his Commissioner's Report8 dated July 29, 1976, Atty.
Taneo stated that he issued subpoenae supplemented
by telegrams to all the heirs to cause their appearance
on February 28 and 29, 1976 in Tapilon, Daanbantayan,
Cebu, where the properties are located, for a conference
or meeting to arrive at an agreement; that out of the nine
heirs, only respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique Cuyos
failed to attend; that per return of the service, these three
heirs could not be located in their respective given
addresses; that since some of the heirs present resided
outside the province of Cebu, they decided to go ahead
with the scheduled meeting.
Atty. Taneo declared in his Report that the heirs who
were present:
Page 8 of 14
14132, 2014133 and 20-14134, were issued in
Columbas name; and that later on, Original Certificates
of Titles covering the estate of Evaristo Cuyos were
issued in favor of Columba; that some of these parcels
of land were subsequently transferred to the names of
spouses Renato C. Benatiro and Rosie M. Benatiro, son
and daughter-in-law, respectively, of petitioners
Gorgonio and Columba, for which transfer certificates of
title were subsequently issued; that they subsequently
discovered the existence of the assailed CFI Order
dated December 16, 1976 and the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated May 25, 1979.
was notice to client; that this was only a ploy so that they
could claim that they filed the petition for annulment
within the statutory period of four (4) years; that they
have been in possession of the six parcels of land since
May 25, 1979 when the same was sold to them pursuant
to the assailed Order in the intestate proceedings; that
no extrinsic fraud attended the issuance of the assailed
order; that Numeriano executed an affidavit in which he
attested to having received his share of the sale
proceeds on May 18, 1988; that respondents were
estopped from assailing the Order dated December 16,
1976, as it had already attained the status of finality.
Page 9 of 14
was required was the special authority to compromise on
behalf of his client; that a compromise agreement
entered into by a person not duly authorized to do so by
the principal is void and has no legal effect,
citing Quiban v. Butalid;19 that being a void compromise
agreement, the assailed Order had no legal effect.
Thus, the CA ruled that the Certificates of Titles obtained
by herein petitioners were procured fraudulently; that the
initial transfer of the properties to Columba CuyosBenatiro by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed
by Lope Cuyos was clearly defective, since the
compromise agreement which served as the basis of the
Deed of Absolute Sale was void and had no legal effect.
The CA elaborated that there was no showing that
Columba paid the sum of P36,000.00 to the
administrator as consideration for the sale, except for the
testimony of Numeriano Cuyos admitting that he
received his share of the proceeds but without indicating
the exact amount that he received; that even so, such
alleged payment was incomplete and was not in
compliance with the trial courts order for the
administratix to execute the deed of sale covering all
properties of the estate in favor of Columba CuyosBenatiro after the payment to the administratrix of the
sum of P36,000.00; that said sum of money shall remain
in custodia legis, but after all the claims and
administration expenses and the estate taxes shall have
been paid for, the remainder shall, upon order of the
Court, be divided equally among the heirs.
Moreover, the CA found that the copy of the Deed of
Sale was not even furnished the trial court nor was said
money placed under custodia legis as agreed upon; that
the Certification dated December 9, 1998 issued by the
Clerk of Court of Cebu indicated that the case had not
yet been terminated and that the last Order in the special
proceeding was the appointment of Lope Cuyos as the
new administrator of the estate; thus, the transfer of the
parcels of land, which included the execution of the
Deed of Absolute Sale, cancellation of Tax Declarations
and the issuance of new Tax Declarations and Transfer
Certificates of Title, all in favor of petitioners, were
tainted with fraud. Consequently, the CA concluded that
the compromise agreement, the certificates of title and
the transfers made by petitioners through fraud cannot
be made a legal basis of their ownership over the
properties, since to do so would result in enriching them
at the expense of the respondents; and that it was also
evident that the fraud attendant in this case was one of
extrinsic fraud, since respondents were denied the
opportunity to fully litigate their case because of the
scheme utilized by petitioners to assert their claim.
Hence, herein petition raising the following issues:
Whether or not annulment of order under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court was a proper remedy where the
aggrieved party had other appropriate remedies, such as
new trial, appeal, or petition for relief, which they failed to
take through their own fault.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals misapprehended
the facts when it annulled the 24 year old
Commissioner's Report of the Clerk of Court - an official
act which enjoys a strong presumption of regularity -
Page 10 of 14
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of
fraud will lie only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in
character.27 Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a
fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside
of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was
prevented from presenting fully his side of the case by
fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing
party.28 Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents
a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire
case to the court, or where it operates upon matters
pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in
which it is procured. The overriding consideration when
extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of
the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his
day in court. 29
While we find that the CA correctly annulled the CFI
Order dated December 16, 1976, we find that it should
be annulled not on the ground of extrinsic fraud, as there
is no sufficient evidence to hold Atty. Taneo or any of the
heirs guilty of fraud, but on the ground that the assailed
order is void for lack of due process.
Clerk of Court Taneo was appointed to act as
Commissioner to effect the agreement of the heirs and
to prepare the project of partition for submission and
approval of the court. Thus, it was incumbent upon Atty.
Taneo to set a time and place for the first meeting of the
heirs. In his Commissioners Report, Atty. Taneo stated
that he caused the appearance of all the heirs of
Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos in the
place, where the subject properties were located for
settlement, by sending them subpoenae supplemented
by telegrams for them to attend the conference
scheduled on February 28 to 29, 1976. It was also
alleged that out of the nine heirs, only six attended the
conference; however, as the CA aptly found, the
Commissioner did not state the names of those present,
but only those heirs who failed to attend the conference,
namely: respondents Gloria, Salud and Enrique who, as
stated in the Report, based on the return of service,
could not be located in their respective given addresses.
However, there is nothing in the records that would
establish that the alleged subpoenae, supplemented by
telegrams, for the heirs to appear in the scheduled
conference were indeed sent to the heirs. In fact,
respondent Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares, one of the heirs,
who was presumably present in the conference, as she
was not mentioned as among those absent, had
executed an affidavit30 dated December 8, 1998
attesting, to the fact that she was not called to a meeting
nor was there any telegram or notice of any meeting
received by her. While Patrocenia had executed on
December 17, 2004 an Affidavit of Waiver and
Desistance31 regarding this case, it was only for the
reason that the subject estate properties had been
bought by their late sister Columba, and that she had
already received her corresponding share of the
purchase price, but there was nothing in the affidavit that
retracted her previous statement that she was not called
to a meeting. Respondent Gloria also made an
unnotarized statement32 that there was no meeting held.
Thus, the veracity of Atty. Taneos holding of a
conference with the heirs was doubtful.
Moreover, there was no evidence showing that the heirs
indeed convened for the purpose of arriving at an
Page 11 of 14
already been executed as what happened in the
instant case with the publication of the first deed of
extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute
constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or
did not take part in it because the same was notice after
the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is
geared for the protection of creditors and was never
intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in
the decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of
the present case confirm that respondents never signed
either of the settlement documents, having discovered
their existence only shortly before the filing of the
present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial
settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition
made without their knowledge and consent is invalid
insofar as they are concerned36 (Emphasis supplied)
Applying the above-mentioned case by analogy, what
matters is whether the heirs were indeed notified before
the compromise agreement was arrived at, which was
not established, and not whether they were notified of
the Commissioner's Report embodying the alleged
agreement afterwards.
We also find nothing in the records that would show that
the heirs were called to a hearing to validate the Report.
The CFI adopted and approved the Report despite the
absence of the signatures of all the heirs showing
conformity thereto. The CFI adopted the Report despite
the statement therein that only six out of the nine heirs
attended the conference, thus, effectively depriving the
other heirs of their chance to be heard. The CFI's action
was tantamount to a violation of the constitutional
guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property
without due process of law. We find that the assailed
Order dated December 16, 1976, which approved a void
Commissioner's Report, is a void judgment for lack of
due process.
We are not persuaded by petitioners contentions that all
the parties in the intestate estate proceedings in the trial
court were duly represented by respective counsels,
namely, Atty. Lepiten for petitioners-heirs and Atty. Yray
for the oppositors-heirs; that when the heirs agreed to
settle the case amicably, they manifested such intention
through their lawyers, as stated in the Order dated
January 30, 1973; that an heir in the settlement of the
estate of a deceased person need not hire his own
lawyer, because his interest in the estate is represented
by the judicial administrator who retains the services of a
counsel; that a judicial administrator is the legal
representative not only of the estate but also of the heirs,
legatees, and creditors whose interest he represents;
that when the trial court issued the assailed Order dated
December 16, 1976 approving the Commissioner's
Report, the parties lawyers were duly served said copies
of the Order on December 21, 1976 as shown by the
Certification37 dated August 7, 2003 of the RTC OIC,
Clerk of Court; that notices to lawyers should be
considered notices to the clients, since, if a party is
represented by counsel, service of notices of orders and
pleadings shall be made upon the lawyer; that upon
receipt of such order by counsels, any one of the
respondents could have taken the appropriate remedy
such as a motion for reconsideration, a motion for new
trial or a petition for relief under Rule 38 at the proper
Page 12 of 14
The CFI's order being null and void, it may be assailed
anytime, collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting
such judgment or final order in any action or proceeding
whenever it is invoked, unless barred by
laches.41Consequently, the compromise agreement and
the Order approving it must be declared null and void
and set aside.
SO ORDERED.
3. Maria Avelino v. CA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
Page 13 of 14
settlement of the estate of the deceased Antonio
Avelino, Sr., the same is granted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is converted into
judicial partition of the estate of deceased
Antonio Avelino, Sr. The parties are directed to
submit a complete inventory of all the real and
personal properties left by the deceased. Set the
hearing of the judicial partition on APRIL 13,
1993, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. Notify all
the parties and their counsel of this assignment.
SO ORDERED.1
On March 17, 1993, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated
June 16, 1993.
On July 23, 1993, Ma. Socorro filed before the Court of
Appeals, a petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus alleging grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the trial court, in granting private respondents' motion to
convert the judicial proceeding for the issuance of letters
of administration to an action for judicial partition. Her
petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 31574.
On February 18, 1994, the respondent appellate court
rendered the assailed decision, stating that the "petition
is DENIED DUE COURSE" and accordingly dismissed. 2
On March 1, 1994, petitioner duly moved for
reconsideration, but it was denied on April 28, 1994.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner assigns the following
errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
UPHOLDING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING
THAT PARTITION IS PROPER UNDER THE
PREMISES.
ADMINISTRATION SHOULD BE THE PROPER
REMEDY PENDING THE DETERMINATION OF
THE CHARACTER AND EXTENT OF THE
DECEDENT'S ESTATE.3
For resolution, we find that given the circumstances in
this case, the sole issue here is whether respondent
appellate court committed an error of law and gravely
abused its discretion in upholding the trial court's finding
that a partition is proper.
Petitioner submits that: First, no partition of the estate is
possible in the instant case as no determination has yet
been made of the character and extent of the decedent's
estate. She points to the Court's ruling in Arcilles
v.Montejo, 26 SCRA 197 (1969), where we held that
when the existence of other properties of the decedent is
a matter still to be reckoned with, administration
proceedings are the proper mode of resolving the
same.4 In addition, petitioner contends that the estate is
in danger of being depleted for want of an administrator
to manage and attend to it.
Second, petitioner insists that the Rules of Court does
not provide for conversion of a motion for the issuance of
Page 14 of 14
need of delay and risks of being dissipated. When a
person dies without leaving pending obligations, his
heirs, are not required to submit the property for judicial
administration, nor apply for the appointment of an
administrator by the court.8
We note that the Court of Appeals found that in this case
"the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees
are all of age."9 With this finding, it is our view that
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court should apply.
In a last-ditch effort to justify the need for an
administrator, petitioner insists that there is nothing to
partition yet, as the nature and character of the estate
have yet to be determined. We find, however, that a
complete inventory of the estate may be done during the
partition proceedings, especially since the estate has no
debts. Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no
reversible error when it ruled that the lower court did not
err in converting petitioner's action for letters of
administration into an action for judicial partition.
Nor can we sustain petitioner's argument that the order
of the trial court converting an action for letters of