Tabaag, Ivy Noreen F.

November 20, 2016

Date:

Course/Yr: LLB III

Subject: Evidence

CASE DIGESTS ON EVIDENCE

REYES VS. CA, 216 S 25
FACTS:
Juan Mendoza, the father of defendant Olympio, is the owner of Farm Lots Nos. 46 and
106, devoted to the production of palay. The lots are tenanted and cultivated by Julian de la
Cruz, the husband of plaintiff Eufrocina de la Cruz.
In her complaint, Eufrocina alleged that upon the death of her husband, she succeeded
him as bona fide tenant. However, Olympio in conspiracy with the other defendants prevented
her daughter Violeta and her workers from entering and working on the farm lots. Defendants
likewise refused to vacate and surrender the lots, which prompted Eufrocina to file a case for the
recover of possession and damages with a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in the
meantime.
The petitioners in this case, the defendants Reyes, Parayao, Aguinaldo and Mananghaya,
are duly elected and appointed barangay officials of the locality, who denied their interference in
the tenancy relationship existing between Olympio and Eufrocina. Olympio, for his part, raised
abandonment, sublease and mortgage of the farm lots without his consent, and non-payment of
rentals as his defenses.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the agrarian courts decision with modification, which
ordered the defendants to restore possession of the farm lots to plaintiff Eufrocina. The CA
likewise ruled that the petitioners are solidarily liable to pay to Eufrocina the value of cavans of
palay until they have vacated the area.
On appeal, the petitioners questioned the favorable consideration given to the affidavits of
Eufrocina and Efren Tecson, since the affiants were not presented and subjected to crossexamination.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not the trial court erred when it gave favorable consideration to the affidavits
of plaintiff, even if the affiant was not presented and subjected to cross-examination.

RULING:
The judgment is affirmed. The trial court did not err when it favorable considered the
affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson although the affiants were not presented and subjected
to cross-examination. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that the Rules of Court shall not be
applicable in agrarian cases even in a suppletory character. The same provision states that In
the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy, affidavits and

counter-affidavits may be allowed and are admissible in evidence, Moreover, in agrarian cases,
the quantum of evidence required is no more than substantial evidence. Thus, this case is an
application of the rule with regard the scope of the Rules on Evidence which states that The
rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts and in all trials and hearings except as otherwise
provided by law (ex. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946) or these rules.

PP VS TURCO 337 S 714

FACTS:
Rodegelio Turco, Jr. (aka Totong) was charged with the rape of his neighbor 13-year-old Escelea
Tabada. Escelea was about to sleep when she heard a familiar voice calling her from outside her
house. She recognized appellant Turco immediately as she had known him for 4 years and he is
her second cousin. Unaware of the danger that was about to befall her, Escelea opened the door.
Turco, with the use of towel, covered Esceleas face, placed his right hand on the latters neck
and bid her to walk. When they reached a grassy part, near the pig pen which was about 12
meters away from the victims house, appellant lost no time in laying the victim on the grass,
laid on top of the victim and took off her short pants and panty and succeeded in pursuing his
evil design-by forcibly inserting his penis inside Esceleas private part despite Esceleas
resistance. Appellant then threatened her that he will kill her if she reports the incident to
anybody. For almost 10 days, she just kept the incident to herself until she was able to muster
enough courage to tell her brother-in-law, Orlando Pioquinto, who in turn informed Alejandro, the
victims father, about the rape of his daughter. Alejandro did not waste time and immediately
asked Escelea to see a doctor for medical examination and eventually file a complaint after the
issuance of the medical certificate. Turco, meanwhile, alleged that he and Escelea were
sweethearts.
The trial court found Turco guilty of the charge.
In his appeal, Turco argues, among others, that no actual proof was presented that the rape of
the complainant actually happened considering that although a medical certificate was
presented, the medico-legal officer who prepared the same was not presented in court to explain
the same.

ISSUE:
W/N the lower court erred in finding the appellant guilty of rape
W/N the appellants contention that the medical certificate may not be considered is with merit
HELD:
1. No. The Supreme Court agrees with the lower courts finding of credibility in the testimony and
evidence presented by the victim, and finds the appellant guilty of rape beyond reasonable
doubt.
2. Yes. With regards to appellants argument on the proof of medical certificate, while the
certificate could be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule since entries in official records
constitute exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule, since it involved an opinion of one who must
first be established as an expert witness, it could not be given weight or credit unless the doctor

who issued it is presented in court to show his qualifications. Emphasis must be placed on the
distinction between admissibility of evidence and the probative value thereof. Evidence is
admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or the rules or is
competent. Since admissibility of evidence is determined by its relevance and competence,
admissibility is, therefore, an affair of logic and law. On the other hand, the weight to be given to
such evidence, once admitted, depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided in
Rule 133 and the jurisprudence laid down by the Court. Thus, while evidence may be admissible,
it may be entitled to little or no weight at all. Conversely, evidence which may have evidentiary
weight
may
be
inadmissible
because
a
special
rule
forbids
its
reception.
Withal, although the medical certificate is an exception to the hearsay rule, hence admissible as
evidence, it has very little probative value due to the absence of the examining physician.
Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the prosecution relied solely on the medical certificate. In
fact, reliance was made on the testimony of the victim herself which, standing alone even
without medical examination, is sufficient to convict. It is well-settled that a medical examination
is not indispensable in the prosecution of rape. The absence of medical findings by a medicolegal officer does not disprove the occurrence of rape. It is enough that the evidence on hand
convinces the court that conviction is proper. In the instant case, the victims testimony alone is
credible and sufficient to convict.

BAUTISTA VS. APERECE, 1995

FACTS:
As owner of the lot subject of the case, Nicolas Anasco sold the same to Valentin Justiniani. In the
same year, Valentin sold this property to Claudio Justiniani. On October 12, 1935, Claudio
Justiniani executed a public instrument whereby he sold the same property for P100 to Apolonio
Aparece in whose name it was assessed since 1935. While Aparece was in possession,
Hermogenes Bautista illegally entered a part of the land and took possession thereof. Thus,
Aparece file a complaint with the guerilla forces then operating in the province of Bohol. When
the case was called for hearing, and after inspection was made by a guerilla officer, Bautista
executed a public instrument wherein he promised to return the land to Aparece in good will, and
recognized Apareces lawful ownership over the land. Thus, possession of the land was restored
to Aparece.
However, claiming that the property belongs to him, and alleging that with the aid of armed men
and pretending to be owner, usurped the land, Bautista filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Bohol. The CFI rendered judgment declaring Aparece as owner of the land.
On appeal, Bautista raised as defense the error of the trial court in admitting the public
instrument which he executed as evidence. He argued that the document was executed under
duress, violence, and intimidation, and that the guerilla officer before whom it was executed, had
no jurisdiction over the matter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting as evidence, a public document executed before
an officer who had no jurisdiction over the matter.

HELD:
This argument is beside the point. The test for the admissibility or inadmissibility of a certain
document is whether or not it is relevant, material or competent. The public document is not only
relevant, but is also material and competent to the issue of ownership between the parties
litigants. Relevant evidence is one that has any value in reason as tending to prove any matter
probable in ac action. And evidence is said to be material when it is directed to prove a fact in
issue as determined by the rules of substantive law and pleadings, while competent evidence is
one that s not excluded by law in a particular case.
With these criteria in mind, we hold that the mere fact that the public document was executed
before a guerilla officer does not make the same as irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent to the
main issue raised in the pleadings. The public document, considered together with the other
evidence, documentary and oral, satisfies the Court that the portions of land in question really
belong to defendant Aparece.
GAANAN VS. IAC, 145 S 112
FACTS:
Complainant Atty. Pintor and his client Montebon, were in the living room of complainants
residence, discussing the terms from the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which
they filed against Laconico. After they decided on the conditions, Atty. Pintor made a phone call
to Laconico.
That same morning, Laconico telephoned Atty. Gaanan to come to his office and advise
him on the settlement of the direct assault case. When Atty. Pintor called, Laconico requested
Atty. Gaanan to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as
to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement.
Twenty minutes later, Atty. Pinto called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the
conditions. Laconico agreed. An amount of P5,000 as settlement money was agreed upon. He
was instructed to give the money to give the money to Atty. Pintors wife at the office of the
Department of Public Highways. However, Laconico insisted that Atty. Pintor himself should
receive the money. However, when Atty. Pintor received the money, he was arrested by agents
of the Philippine Constabulary.
On the following day, Atty. Gaanan executed an affidavit that he heard complainant Atty.
Pintor demand P8,000 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the
affidavit to the complaint for robbery/extortion which he filed against Atty. Pintor. Since Atty.
Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without Atty. Pintors consent, Atty. Pintor charged
Atty. Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act (R.A. No. 4200).
Atty. Gaanan and Laconico were found guilty by the trial court. The decision was affirmed
by the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) stating that the extension telephone which was used
to overhear the telephone conversation was covered in the term device as provided in R.A. No.
4200.
ISSUE(S):

Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited device in Section 1 of the AntiWiretapping Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful
interception of communications between the two parties using a telephone line.
RULING:
The main issue revolves around the meaning of the phrase any other device or
arrangement. The law refers to a tap of a wire or cable or the use of a device or
arrangement for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the
communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate
installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken
words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone,
dictagraph or the other device enumerated un Section 1 of R.A. No. 4200 as the use thereof
cannot be considered as tapping the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone
extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for
ordinary office use.
The phrase device or arrangement, although not exclusive to that enumerated, should
be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the
use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to
instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being
overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is
precisely for tapping, intercepting, or recording a telephone conversation.
An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the
extended unit does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved
from place to place within a radius of a kilometer or more.
An extension telephone is not among such device or arrangements covered by Section 1
of R.A No. 4200.

ORTANEZ VS CA CA, 235 S 111

FACTS:
Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the Quezon City RTC a complaint for annulment of
marriage with damages against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of
marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner.
Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged
telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.
Teresita submitted her Objection/Comment to Rafaels oral offer of evidence. However, the trial
court admitted all of private respondents offered evidence and later on denied her motion for
reconsideration, prompting petitioner to file a petition for certiorari with the CA to assail the
admission in evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes.
These tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends
from the military to wire tap his home telephone.

CA denied the petition because (1) Tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any
other variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they
are presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and
fairness and the even handed administration of justice; and (2) A petition for certiorari is
notoriously inappropriate to rectify a supposed error in admitting evidence adduced during trial.
The ruling on admissibility is interlocutory; neither does it impinge on jurisdiction. If it is
erroneous, the ruling should be questioned in the appeal from the judgment on the merits and
not through the special civil action of certiorari. The error, assuming gratuitously that it exists,
cannot be anymore than an error of law, properly correctible by appeal and not by certiorari.
Petitioner then filed the present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
W/N the recordings of the telephone conversations are admissible in evidence
W/N the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was properly availed of by the
petitioner in the Court of Appeals

HELD:
1. No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes expressly makes such tape
recordings inadmissible in evidence thus:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie
or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described. . . .
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained, obtained or
secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in
evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of
the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
2. Yes and no. The extraordinary writ of certiorari is generally not available to challenge an
interlocutory order of a trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from
an adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory
order.
However, where the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal
would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of
redress.

RAMIREZ VS CA 248 S 590

FACTS:
The issue arose from a confrontation between parties where private respondent allegedly vexed,
insulted and humiliated petitioner in a hostile and furious mood and in a manner offensive to
the latters dignity.
In support of such claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral
damages, attorneys fees and other expenses of litigation. The transcript on which the civil case
was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of the said recording, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay for violation of RA 4200 or An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other
related violations of private communication, and other purposes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the act of secretly taping a conversation is illegal, and if in the positive, may not
be used as evidence
HELD:
Section 1 of RA 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by
all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of
a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by
the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private
communication.
Further, as found in the Congressional records, there is a complete ban on tape recorded
conversations taken without the authorization of all parties even if the record should be used not
in prosecution of offense but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings

CITY OF MANILA VS GARCIA 19 S 413

FACTS:
Plaintiff City of Manila is the owner of parcels of land, forming one compact area, bordering
Kansas, Vermont and Singalong streets in Malate, Manila. On the other hand, from 1945 to 1947,
defendants entered upon these premises without plaintiff's knowledge and consent. They built
houses of second class materials, again without plaintiff's knowledge and consent, and without
the necessary building permits from the city. There they lived thru the years to the present.
In November 1947, upon discovery of their presence in the said area, Mayor Fugoso gave
them written permits each labeled "lease contract" to occupy specific areas in the property
upon conditions therein set forth. For their occupancy, they were charged nominal rentals.
Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School is close, though not contiguous, to the property. Came
the need for this school's expansion; it became pressing. On 1961, plaintiff's City Engineer,
pursuant to the Mayor's directive to clear squatters' houses on city property, gave each of
defendants thirty (30) days to vacate and remove his construction or improvement on the
premises. This was followed by the City Treasurer's demand on each defendant, made in

February and March, 1962, for the payment of the amount due by reason of the occupancy and
to vacate in fifteen (15) days. Defendants refused. Hence, this suit to recover possession.
The court directed defendants to vacate the premises; to pay the amounts heretofore indicated
opposite their respective names; and to pay their monthly rentals from March, 1962, until they
vacate the said premises, and the costs. Defendants appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court properly found that the city needs the premises for school
purposes.
HELD:
Courts in the City of Manila should take judicial knowledge of all municipal ordinances passed by
the City for the Charter of Manila requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all
ordinances
passed
by
the
municipal
board
of
Manila.
In the case at bar, the city's evidence on this point is Exhibit E, the certification of the Chairman,
Committee on Appropriations of the Municipal Board. That document recites that the amount of
P100,000.00 had been set aside in Ordinance 4566, the 1962-1963 Manila City Budget, for the
construction of an additional building of the school. It is indeed correct to say that the court
below, at the hearing, ruled out the admissibility of said document. But then, the trial judge
declared that there was need for defendants to vacate the premises for school expansion; he
cited
the
very
document,
Exhibit
E,
aforesaid.
This court penned that, it is beyond debate that a court of justice may alter its ruling while the
case is within its power, to make it conformable to law and justice. For reversing his stand, the
trial judge could have well taken judicial notice of Ordinance 4566 which set aside an amount for
the
construction
of
an
additional
building
of
the
school.
It is in this factual background that we say that the city's need for the premises is unimportant.
The city's right to throw defendants out of the area cannot be gainsaid. The city's dominical right
to possession is paramount. If error there was in the finding that the city needs the land, such
error is harmless and will not justify reversal of the judgment below.

YAO-KEE VS SY-GONZALES
FACTS:
Herein respondents Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a
petition for the grant of letters of administration for the estate of Sy Kiat, a Chinese national.
died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was then residing, leaving behind real and
personal properties here in the Philippines worth P300,000.00 more or less.
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen who alleged
that Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on January 19, 1931 in China and the
other oppositors are the legitimate children of deceased wth Yao Kee.
The probate court held in favor of the oppositor, herein petitioners. On appeal the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision modifying that of the probate court declaring that petitioners

(herein respondents) are the acknowledge natural children of Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gallego;
declaring oppositors, herein petitioners acknowledge natural children of Sy Kiat with Yao Kee,
since the legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Kiat with Yao Kee in china had not been proven to
be valid of the Chinese Peoples Republic of China.
The instant petition questions the decision of the Court of Appeals. Petitioners argue that the
marriage of Sy Kiat with Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese laws and custom was conclusively
proven. To buttress this argument the rely on the following testimonial and documentary
evidence. First is the testimony of Yao Kee stating as follows:
Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on January 19, 1931 in Fookien, China;
that she does not have a marriage certificate because the practice during that time was for
elders to agree upon the betrothal of their children, and in her case, her elder brother was the
one who contracted or entered into [an] agreement with the parents of her husband. that she
has five children with Sy Kiat, but two of them died; that those who are alive are Sze Sook Wah,
Sze Lai Cho, and Sze Chun Yen, the eldest being Sze Sook Wah who is already 38 years old; that
Sze Sook Wah was born on November 7, 1939; that she and her husband, Sy Mat, have been
living in FooKien, China before he went to the Philippines on several occasions. that the practice
during the time of her marriage was a written document [is exchanged] just between the parents
of the bride and the parents of the groom, or any elder for that matter; that in China, the custom
is that there is a go between, a sort of marriage broker who is known to both parties who would
talk to the parents of the bride-to be; that if the parents of the bride-to-be agree to have the
groom-to-be their son in-law, then they agree on a date as an engagement day. she and Sy Mat
were married for 46 years already and the document was left in China and she doubt if that
document can still be found now; that it was left in the possession of Sy Kiat's family; that right
now, she does not know the whereabouts of that document because of the lapse of many years
and because they left it in a certain place and it was already eaten by the termites; that after her
wedding with Sy Kiat, they lived immediately together as husband and wife.

Second, the testimony of Gan Ching, a younger brother of Yao Kee who stated that he was
among the many people who attended the wedding of his sister with Sy Kiat and that no
marriage certificate is issued by the Chinese government, a document signed by the parents or
elders of the parties being sufficient.
Third, the statement made by Asuncion Gallego when she testified to the trial court that Sy Kiat
was married to Yao kee according to Chinese custom.
Fourth and Fifth, where Sy Kiats Master Card and Alien Certificate of Registration where it stated
that marriage status is married with Yao Kee on January 19, 1931 and place of marriage China.
ISSUE:
1. Wherther or not the fact of marriage in accordance with Chinsese custom is duly proven
2. Whether the respondents are the legitimate child of the deceased Sy Kiat
HELD:

No, the evidence presented may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy
Kiat. However, the same do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage in accordance
with Chinese law or custom. Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts,
uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule,legally binding and obligatory". The law requires
that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil
Code.] On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of right can
not be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent
evidence like any other fact" [Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).] The same evidence, if
not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom.
Article 71 of the Civil Code provides that in order to establish a valid foreign marriage two things
must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the
alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence.
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. With respect to an
unwritten foreign law,
Rule 130 section 45 states that:
SEC. 45. Unwritten law.The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled therein, is admissible as
evidence of the unwritten law of a foreign country, as are also printed and published books of
reports of decisions of the courts of the foreign country, if proved to be commonly admitted in
such courts. Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132
section 25, thus: SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.An official record or an entry therein,
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has
the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be
made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office.
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and
custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as
proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are self-serving evidence, but
more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter.
For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in
accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be
recognized in this jurisdiction.
Moreover a reading of said case would show that the party alleging the foreign marriage
presented a witness, one Li Ung Bieng, to prove that matrimonial letters mutually exchanged by
the contracting parties constitute the essential requisite for a marriage to be considered duly
solemnized in China. Based on his testimony, which as found by the Court is uniformly
corroborated by authors on the subject of Chinese marriage.
Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as any other fact.

The Court also rendered that as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy
Mat according to the laws of China, they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate children but
only that of acknowledged natural children. Petitioners are natural children, it appearing that at
the time of their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were not disqualified by any impediment to
marry one another [See Art. 269, Civil Code.] And they are acknowledged children of the
deceased because of Sy Kiat's recognition of Sze Sook Wah [Exhibit "3"] and its extension to Sze
Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen who are her sisters of the full blood [See Art. 271, Civil Code.
Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased's acknowledged natural children
with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina with whom he lived for twenty-five (25) years without the benefit
of marriage. They have in their
favor their father's acknowledgment, evidenced by a
compromise agreement entered into by and between their parents and approved by the Court of
First Instance on February 12, 1974 wherein Sy Kiat not only acknowleged them as his children
by Asuncion Gillego but likewise made provisions for their support and future inheritance.

TABUENA VS CA 196 S 650

FACTS:
The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land consisting about 440 sq.m. In 1973,
herein private respondent representing the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla filed an action for
recovery of ownership in the RTC claiming that in 1926 the lot was sold by Juan Peralta Jr. to
Alfredo Tabernilla while the two were in the United States. That upon their return to the
Philippines in 1934, Juan Peralta Jr. instructed his mother Damasa Timtiman to convey the subject
land to Tabernilla. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent and order the petitioner to surrender
the property. In arriving to its decision, the Court relied on Exhibits A, B & C of the private
respondent and a pronouncement of facts made by the petitioner in another case involving the
same parties but over a different subject land. Petitioner appealed in the CA which affirmed the
decision of the RTC. Petitioner then raised the issue in the SC, arguing that under the Rules of
Evidence, the private respondent failed to formally offer the evidence in the trial and can
therefore not be considered by the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not formal offering of evidence is required for the Court to consider such evidence in
its decision?
HELD:
YES. Under Sec. 35 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court the Court shall consider no evidence which
has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
In the case at bar, the mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit during the
pre-trial does not mean it has already been offered as part of the evidence. The reason behind
this rule is that the party who presented the evidence at the pre-trial still has the option to offer
the evidence in trial or to set it aside.
Private respondent failed to formally offer the evidence in the trial and therefore the Court could
not recognize such evidence. Furthermore, the Court is prohibited from applying parts of the

records

of

another

case

without

the

consent

of

the

parties.

PP VS GODOY 250 S 676

FACTS:
Accused-appellant, Danny Godoy, was charged with 2 separate information before the RTC for
rape and kidnapping with serious illegal detention against plaintiff-appellee, Mia Taha.
Appellee alleged that on Jan. 21, 1994, appellant raped her when she was visiting the boarding
house of her cousin near Palawan National Highschool, though she was allowed to go home after.
On Jan. 22, 1994, appellant went to appellee's home to ask permission from her parents to bring
appellee with him to solicit funds as appellee was a candidate for Miss PNS Pulot. Appellee did
not say anything about the rape to her parents because Appellant threatened to kill her family if
she did.
Appellant brought appellee to Sunset Garden where appellant allegedly raped her for 3 days. On
Jan. 25, 1994, appellee was brought to the house of appellant's friend in Edward's subdivision, in
which appellee was raped 3 times. On Jan. 27, 1994, appellee was reported and listed as a
missing person in a police blotter. Appellant sought the help of a certain Naem to help settle the
case with appellee's parents.
On the same day, appellee was released and her parents brought her to a hospital where the
examination showed hymenal opening was in stellate shape and that there was a laceration,
which shows that appellee had participated in sexual intercourse, though the examiner could not
verify if intercourse was forced as there were no signs of bruises or injuries but only a week-old
laceration.
Later, at the office of the Provincial Prosecutor, appellant's mother offered P30,000 for the
settlement of the case which the parents of appellee accepted and an affidavit of desistance was
executed and sworn to before a prosecutor.
In the case of the appellant, a different version occurred.
Before the alleged rape occurred, appellee would often say that she loved appellant. While what
started as a joke eventually developed into a relationship, despite appellant being married. It
was on Dec. 20, 1993 when they had their first sexual intercourse as lovers.
In many different occasions, witnesses would see appellant and appellee together in intimate
scenarios, such as being caught together in dark and isolated places at unholy hours.
It was even appellee's idea to stay at Sunset Garden with appellant. To be noted is that it was
appellee who arranged for the registration and paid for the bill with the funds they solicited. That
evening, appellant excused himself from appellee and went to appellee's parents stating that
appellee was staying in Sunset Garden.

On Jan. 27, 1994, appellant was met by the Chief of Police who invited him to the station. While
detained, appellant did not have the opportunity to talk with appellee.
During trial, appellee made general denials to most testimonies given by witnesses. To note
though was the letter delivered by appellee's cousin which she denied to be made by her but
upon cross-examination, she admitted that the signature was hers as well as her handwriting.
On Feb. 4, 1994, the MTC resolved, on both cases, found the existence of a prima facie case
against appellant. Despite the execution of an affidavit of desistance withdrawing the charges
against the illegal kidnapping, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor file 2 informations for rape
and illegal kidnapping against appellant. The court a quo rendered that appallent was guilty by
proof beyond reasonable doubt on May 20, 1994.
ISSUE:
Will the defense of appellant that both he and appellee were lovers, be a reasonable defense
against the charges of rape and illegal kidnapping?
RULING:
GR: No ER: While the "sweetheart theory" does not often gain favor with this Court, such is not
always the case if the hard fact is that the accused and the supposed victim are, in truth,
intimately related except that, as is usual in most cases, either the relationship is illicit or the
victim's parents are against it. It is not improbable that in some instances, when the relationship
is uncovered, the alleged victim or her parents for that matter would rather take the risk of
instituting a criminal action in the hope that the court would take the cudgels for them than for
the woman to admit to her own acts of indiscretion.
The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in the Philippines, young ladies
are strictly required to act with circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that
their reputations shall remain untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings dishonor to their
character humiliates their entire families. It could precisely be that complainant's mother wanted
to save face in the community where everybody knows everybody else, and in an effort to
conceal her daughter's indiscretion and escape the wagging tongues of their small rural
community, she had to weave the scenario of this rape drama.
BPI SAVINGS VS CTA 330 S 507
FACTS:
Case involves a claim for tax refund in the amount of P112, 491 representing BPIs tax withheld
for 1989. Petitioner had total refundable amount of P297, 492 inclusive of the P112, 491.00 being
claimed as tax refund in the present case. However, petitioner declared in its 1989 Income Tax
Return that the said refundable amount of P297, 492 will be applied as tax credit to the
succeeding taxable year.
On October of 1990, petitioner filed written claim for refund in the amount of P112, 491 with
respondent CIR alleging that it did not apply the 1989 refundable amount of P297, 492 to its
1990 Annual Income Tax Return or other tax liabilities due to the alleged business losses it
incurred for the same year. Without waiting for respondent CIR to act on the claim for refund,

petitioner filed a petition for review with respondent Court of Tax Appeals, seeking refund of the
amount of P112, 491.
CTA dismissed petitioners petition on the ground that petitioner failed to present as evidence its
Corporate Annual Income Tax Return for 1990 to establish the fact that petitioner had not yet
credited the amount of P297, 492 to its 1990 income tax liability. CA affirmed the decision of the
CTA.
Petitioner calls the attention of the Court, to a Decision rendered by the Tax Court in CTA Case
No. 4897, involving its claim for refund in the year 1990. In that case, the Tax Court held that
petitioner suffered a net loss for the taxable year 1990. Respondent, however, urges this Court
not to take judicial notice of the said case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court can take judicial notice of such case.
HELD:
As a rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other
cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and
notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or actually pending before the
same judge.
Be that as it may, Section 2, Rule 129 provides that courts make take judicial notice of matters
ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. In this case, the Court notes that
a copy of the Decision in CTA Case No. 4897 was attached to the Petition for Review fled before
this Court. Significantly, respondents do not claim at all that the said Decision was fraudulent or
nonexistent. Indeed, they do not even dispute the contents of the said Decision, claiming merely
that the Court cannot take judicial notice thereof.