Dear friend,

The following material is a cony of a reply I have made to concerns and criticisms
regarding theonomic ethics which have been expressed to Dan horse by lain Murray
(of the Banner of Truth organization). You will likely have an interest in the
content of this discussion.
Because the following letter is so lengthy, I have thought it helpful to outline
its basic contents by paragraph fen 70U. I hope that you can benefit from this
personal and theological interaction, and I trust that the issue of theonomic
ethics will he clarified as
Greg L. Eahnsen

THE CO:It:ERN FOR RE,IMP.TD

I. Introduction to the letter. (par. 1)
II. The concern for unity and moderate discussion is shared (oar. 2)
III.Suggestions for accomplishing those goals (par. 3)
IV. Introduction to a sharing of impressions and resnonses (par. 4)
V. Why it has appeared that manner of Truth sought division: lain 'inrray (par.
Continued: Walter Chantry (par. 6)
VI. Hope now for a change (par. 7)
THE CRITIQUE OF

ONCI ETHICS

Introduction and Summary of Murray's five objections (par. 8-9)

I. That Theonomv fails to distinguish the real issue is disproven from the
book itself (par. 10)
Note: amlAnuity and lack of consistent reflection hinder rrs remarks:
attention is given to ri's opinion as to the lawlessness of the nation: (pry:
IL' That I misuse authorities is a charge shown to be without evidence (pnr. 12)
III. Summary of the response to Pt's allegation that theonomy is outside of the
reformed tradition (par. 13)
A. Tradition is not theologically authoritative (par. 14)
B. The claim not to know of an adherent is disproved from FA's own
words (e.g., about Knor) (par. 15)
C. Evidence of theonomic vien's in reformed tradition: Bullinner (par. 16)
Continued: English reformers and Puritans, up to T.;estminster (par. 17)
Continued: American Puritans of the 1,:estminster period (par. JX)
D. El's purported evidence of contrary opinions are lonicallv irrelevant
to the charge that no positive opinions existed in the past (par. 19)
E. M's purported evidence of antitheonomic sentiment is mistaken or
unclear (par. 2'l)
A:20:14 (nar. 21); 4:2f1:16 (par. 22)
1. Calvin, Institut
Summary, and rn!,cer noted (nar. 23)
2. Owen, Gil eSpie, and Rutherford: also Purgess, Dickson (par. 210
IV. That theonomy has already been adequately refuted is challenged'
A. The critical issues have not been skirted
B. A Challerre to clearly state: this aliened refutation (nar. 25)
C. The "theocratic' argument adduced is too easily defeated: as nonscriptural, mere opinion, and nmiguous (e.n. "freedom of religion"
issue is analyzed) (par. 20
Continued: the invalidity of arnuments from lt'Crie and Peck '(par. 27)
V. That theonomic views can he taken to absurd ends is shown fallacious (par. 2.n)

Dr. Greg L. Bahnsen

1219 Pineview Drive
Clinton, M.S 39056
Iain Murray
The Grey House
3 Murrayfield Road
Edinburgh E1112 GEL
Scotland
January 27, 1979
Dear Mr. Murray,
Yesterday I received in the mail copies of correspondence between my flood
friend, Dan Morse, and yourself, dating from October to January. I was initially
inclined to scan them quickly and then file them for later consideration. I tire
easily these days due to recuperation from heart surgery, and I am somewhat tirad
emotionally with the antagonism to theonomic ethics emanating from certain quarters
since last Sumner. However I was unable to dispatch your corresnondence with
brevity and ease, as planned, because of something which caught my eve--sonething
which calls for a response from me if I am to be true to my heart and avoid guilt
acquired through inaction.
I refer specifically to your evident concern that controversy over theonomic
ethics will have grcvious consequences, threatening to divide Reformed unity in
our day. Your statements captured my attention because 1 have long felt the same
concern with great intensity. I have expressed that concern and prayed about it
often. When you go on to say that we need an atmosphere of moderate discussion
and that we need to stay together as those committed to experimental Calvinism,
I was absorped in reflection, for this is what I have counseled for such a long
time. Accordingly I have felt duty bound to write to You, expressing my heartfelt agreement with such words, in order to find out if there might be anything
that we might do in concert to accomplish the goals you admirably set forth. I
have insisted in the past that the strong Calvinism of both the Banner of Truth
and the Chalcedon Foundation make them obvious allies and that their respective
emphases are complementary. I have encouraged people!to look upon disagreements
over theonomic distinctives as intramural in character--a subordinate vet theologically significant discussion among friends and fellow-workers in the kingdom.
I have sought unity wherever possible, moderation and openness in discussion of
differences. Therefore I could not remain silent in the face of your evidently
sincere letter to Dan. If you and I genuinely want to preserve Reformed unity
and not have controversy over theonomic ethics (or other distinctives) divide
the Reformed movement of this day (a movement swelled by the mutual efforts of
the Banner of Truth and Chalcedon Foundation, among others), then we ought to
do whatever possible to preserve that unity. What might we do together?
Well, it cannot hurt to begin by hearing each other out in response to
criticisms that have been made back and forth or regarding grievances entertained
toward each other. I think the nature of the dispute in the case of theonomy,
for example, is sorely misconstrued. Secondly, efforts at moral persuasion can
be mutually made toward those who would use subordinate matters of theological
disagreement to agitate the Reformed community and divide its witness. Thirdly,
we can sponsor a forum of discussion on our distinctives which will exemplify the
fruit of the Spirit and which will be. constantly presented in the context of
overall agreement in fundamental theology and loving commitment to each other as
brothers. Fourthly and most explicitly, in the present turmoil we could--you and

i 3)

I, as undisputed representatives of the Banner of Truth and Chalcedon movements-issue a joint declaration which calls for unity among Reformed brothers as they
politely and scripturally discuss matters of theological difference. Such a
joint publication would go far, I am convinced, in returning the theonomy dispute
in our circles to its proper place and perspective. Perhaps you can think of other,
better avenues to achieve the aims you express in the letter to Dan, but certainly
something should and could he done by us both if our similarly stated concerns
are really genuine. Please write to me if you are willing to take steps with me
"to stay. together," as you say, and to promote moderate discussion among friends
who can speak across differences of opinion to each other;
As I indicated above,. I believe we need to Start by understanding how we
each feel in response to one another. By sharing such impressions or reactions
they might hopefully be corrected or redirected. In any event, I feel that I
should make an effort to express myself to you in reply to your correspondence
with Dan. I want for you to see more accurately where I stand and be able to
interact more profitably with my ethical outlook: I'd like you to understand me,
my feelings, and my theology. And even apart from that, there are simply some
matters in your letters that call for something of an answer, lest your thinking
and reasoning should wander. So if you do not mind, let me take the first step
toward getting through the present controversy, past mistaken portrayals and
arguments, beyond personal anamosity, and to a condition of peaceful and moderate
exchange between. theonomic and nontheonomic Calvinists in our circles of accuaintance
I probably should begin with some personal impressions that bear on the occasion
for this letter: namely, the threatened unity among_ Reformed people over the question
of theonomic ethics. Until I came into possession of your letters to Dan, I did
not feel an incentive to write an appeal to you such as is found above, and you
should understand the reasons for that. To begin with, the Chalcedon Foundation
has not made it a policy in the past to inspect, detect, and expose errors and
failings on the part of the Banner of Truth and its writers. Questions and misgivings have arisen from time to time--for instance, over the apparently worldand-life-view depreciation sensed in some publications and especially in the
declining of the Van Til essays by BT--and yet the Chalcedon scholars were content
to let the Reformed witnessof the two groups complement each other and stay out
of in-fighting. Then your associate editor, Walter Chantry, broke the ice with
an uncharitable, paranoid, and irresponsible review of a Rushdoony booklet--one
which ignores (as has your magazine) Rushdoonv's other major works in understanding
his viewpoint, one which falsely assumes that some admittedly harsh language is
directed at persons in our circle of friends, one which draws others into the
picture in an unscholarly fashion, and one which impolitely suggests that we
should be at odds with each other. You can hardly blame theonomists for being
put out at this kind of journalism and intolerance. Last Summer when we two
spoke with each other briefly, I encouraged you to pursue unity and mutual
respect between the two camps (Chalcedon and BT)---to correct the Chantry damage,
perhaps print a peace-promoting article by someone who respects both camps
and can fairly portray their minor differences, and represent Rushdoony and
theonomic ideas accurately by reading further in the relevant literature. It
did not appear at the time or subsequently that you cared to do any of these
things; rumors continued to reach me from. places where you visited in the States
about suspicions you continued to raise with people about me .and my theology
(admittedly, the rumors may have been outright mistakes). So I concluded that

you personally were not of a mind to pursue the fair-minded peace I wished to
have. Such an impression is also given by the remarks you have made against
Rushdoony in your letters, accusing him of wild, ideas espoused by completely
different individuals and alleging that "his emphases" (however they are to be
ascertained with accuracy!) are different from historical Calvinism--as though
you are an expert in tradition and from that stance can censure Rushdoony for
placing the weight of his publications in the wrong places. He is "too different"
from your circle of friends with their consensus of "emphases" to be trusted:
he violates your traditions. Therefore, having said you want Reformed unity, you
still claim that it is necessary to denounce Rushdoony in nrint. One could only
conclude that--given your methods and standards--Rushdoony must be deemed as
actually unReformed, despite reputation, appearance, and effects of his ministry
around the globe: Rushdoony may say he is Reformed and write in defense and
application of that theological commitment, but the DT writers know better: they
are so concerned for the church, moreover, they have decided to warn the
undiscerning against Rushdoony's unReformed character and "emphases." This cannot
help but give a poor impression to others, not only because it is baseless (even
given your historical standard of acceptability) but because it is an unworthy
way to judge a brother. Although I have heard you say (with others) that Chantry
should not have dealt with me as be did in the "review," you, (and others) continua
to defend the assault on Rushdoony---even though his theology is terribly misrepresented and you (as Jim Jordan's correspondence indicates) should have known
better. These matters are the kinds of things that discouraged me from writing
to you in pursuance of a continuing peace and unity within Reformed circles among
admirers of the Puritans. They are the hinds of things that have stimulated the
editor of the. Journal of Christian Reconstruction to discredit in print the
preposterous claims made by sonic (including yourself) that theonomic distinctive
fall outside the historical tradition of Reformed thought--to discredit the
apparent reading of the Puritans "with one eye closed," overlooking their obvious
social_ theory and influence. Comments (spoken and written) by BT writers, you
see, continue to provoke division and to bait controversy, it seems to me.
Further discouragement of my hopes for peace and unity among us (even while
discussing theological differences) has come in my interaction with other BT
men beside yourself. In addition to the subtle and sometimes not-so-subtle
opposition or criticism that has been directed against me and my perspective
at the seminary and within certain PCA circles.by close associates of DT, there
is my correspondence with Walter Chantry to consider. It too suggests that
BT men have little or no desire to preserve Reformed unity and to promote a
moderate discussion of subordinate issues. It was, in my opinion, inflammatory
of Chantry to affiliate my name and book with a series of distinctives that I
do not endorse (even as Rushdoony does not), especially to say that I push a
"new legalism with a vengeance." I wrote to him ahout this in a letter of
April 25, 197S, stressing that there was little difference between us and
disapprobating discord among us. he wrote hack to me and insisted on the
outlandish charge of legolism against my book (May 6, p. 1). On May 11 I
wrote again and, even granting minor disagreements, called for a united
stand and expressed disapproval of intemperate language (p.1). The last
paragraph of that letter (p. 4) bears repeating for you here: I said:
I am quite hopeful that we can work toward better understanding of
each other in those few minor areas where we might disagree. It
certainly would be injudicious for those who agree so extensively
(such as Banner of Truth and Chalcedon do), who have so many common

L/0

goals, and who are challenging so many common foes, to fall apart over
their intramural differences of opinion on some specific points. Let
us see to it that we keep the unity of the Spirit in a peaceful bond!
Let us work toward edifying (even correcting) each other, without presenting
a divided and bickering front to the world. Let us be sure we have
sympathetically and properly understood each other before carrying out
debate (especially in public). Let us, when necessary, agree to disagree
over minor subpoints in the Reformed witness. Let us advance and riot
hinder each other's work in the Kingdom. Otherwise, we shall all
answer to our gracious King!
With mutual esteem, I am...Your Brother
in the Lord, (signed).

I really. believe that such an expression as this shows my deep desire that our
Reformed unity not be fractured by such writings as Chantry's in your magazine.
Nevertheless, Chantry would have nothing of it, but came back all the stronger
against me----insisting (after redefinition) agein on the charge of legalism
(June 14, p. 1) and in the course of the letter calling me or my viewpoint:
a deflection from biblical teaching, externalistic (Pharisaical), holding an
alarmingly dangerous error on a major point of doctrine, perilous, stupid,
false, unfair, unreformed, totally confused, completely muddled, clever,
evasive, and missing the obvious. I have rarely experienced' such ungracious
and deprecating correspondence. He attempts to correct me about the differences
between Chalcedon and Banner of Truth; according to him they are not minor and
intramural but very sienificant (pp. 1-2). There is little love for, or desire
to promote, Reformed unity in such an attitude. i wrote back, hooever, and
. expressed regret that our correspondence was not clearing up disaffection
(June 22, p. 1). I repeat that the differences are actually minor (p. 3), ask
for the rhetoric to be toned down and study to take place (p. 4), warn against
a dividing of ways among Reformed people (p. 5), indicate that earlier I had
sought reconciliation and peace only to he answered with name-calling and
antagonism (p. 6), and then end the letter with the hope and prayer for a more
peaceful interchange in the future (p. 7). Judging from Chantry's last letter
to me (July 12), my overtures and challenges were simply despised; he sarcasticall
says that he is not convinced that any thorough answer is required for my position
and then "bids" me "adieu" without an effort to secure our peace and unity. Such
experiences as these have thwarted my hope that men associated with the Banner of
Truth really care for unity. It has seemed to me and others, given the informatics
in the last three pages of my letter, that BT men were either pursuing or reckless
about a head-on collision with those adhering to theonomic distinctives or the
general concerns of Chalcedon.

-7

Your letters to Dan have now given me some hope that the impression rehearsed
for you above is now incorrect, despite previous appearances. Thus I have written
to you seeking the same unity you desioe, but wishing for von to see things throug
my eyes so that the past build-up to the present distress might he better understc
and corrected.
At this point let me change gears and respond to your critique of my book
as it is found in the letters to Dan. It is important, I think, that you better
understand what my position actually is, and that you see how weak and irrelevant
your kind of rebuttal appears to us-of theonomic persuasion. "sly aim is to pursue
the polite., moderate, and vet rigorous discussion of these issues that is needed
among us all in the circle of Reformed commitment today. Hopefully my remarks cal
advance the healthy debate on theonomy which you indicate you Want to see.

To summarize, your letters of October 27 and December 21 bring five

objections against my book: (1) it does not clearly distinguish the real
issue; (2) it misuses Reformed authorities in quoting or citing them: (3) its
distinctive position is outside of the Reformed tradition; (4) it does not
address the reasons already sufficiently offered by Reformed authors--taken
from a consideration of the O.T. theocracy's uniqueness--for disagreeing with
its (istinctive viewpoint: and (5) if its distinctives were thought to be true,
they would be abused and lead to unacceptable ideas or actions. I will take up
each one of these reproaches in order and try to set the record straight.
You say that your principal objection to my book is that it does not clearly
distinguish the real issue. Your immediate suggestion is that the book makes
the key issue whether civil rulers are responsible to uphold God's moral law,
not focusing on the real issue of whether the judicial enactments and penalties
of the Jewish law are now given to the nations to obey. But this is simply
inaccurate. True, I do discuss and argue for the responsibility of rulers to
obey God's moral law, but that is only one major premise in the sustained argumeat
used to answer what I explicitly lay down as the key issue before us: namely,
"Ought the civil magistrate to obey and enforce the Older Testament law of God
(particularly its penal sanctions?" (Theonomy, p. 317; cf. p. 469). I distinguish
the "real issue' preCisely as you set it forth! Indeed, the logic of the book
(which I openly discuss, e.g. on pp. 317-319, 469-470) is aimed right at developing
.a biblical answer to the question which you say is oaramount. First I give sustaine r
exegetical and theological reasons to suppose that the entire 0.T. law is binding
on all men today and in every area of life. Then I attempt to demonstrate that an
inductive study of Scripture does not justify our positing a moral uniqueness about
O.T. magistrates in contrast to Gentile or N.T. rulers. Then I advance to the
assumed point of theocratic uniqueness, the (mistakenly) alleged lack of a church/stz
separation in the O.T. civil economy. Finally I bring all the previous data to
hear on the pinpointed question of the use of the penal sanctions of the O.T. today.
What more could you legitimately ask of me? I directly address the real issue
which you distinguish, and I do it explicitly--which should be clear enough for
any reader.
In passing I should remark on a couple of items related to the objection
which is rebutted above. First, in the course of discussing this objection you
at one point give a striking example of the kind of vague and ambiguous--and
thus easily misleading--thinking which seems to inform BT-type criticisms of
theonomic ethics. In summarizing your objection (Oct. 27, p. 2) you say: "the
whole point is whether or not that duty (of the civil magistrate to the moral
law) stands upon the same grounds as those operative in the theocracy." it is
extremely difficult to give any analytical precision to this question--which is
all the more ironic because it is found in a cavil against my supposed failure
to distinguish things clearly! How do duties "stand upon grounds"? flow are
grounds "operative" and inoperative? flow do yeti tell when a duty's grounds
are the same or different in operation? Even if there were different grounds
for the duty, isn't the question whether the duty is the sane or not--thus
making the (confused) issue of "grounds" morally irrelevant? My second remark
pertains to your short and unargued statement of perspective on God's law among
the nations (thus giving your answer to the "real" issue posed above) as found
in the Dec. 21 l6tter. Dan had asked you whether your repudiation of the

theonomic outlook would not leave the nations lawless. You deny that it would,
and then you explain this denial in a way which reveals (it seems to me) how little
you have thought through the precise issue that is before us. Not only do you
offer no answer to my own extensive and detailed argumentation in the book, and
not only do you fail to offer any analysis and argumentation for your own stated
position, but your very answer shows how thoughtlessly and prematurely von have
dismissed the theonomic alternative. You say that the nations will not be left
lawless for the reasons stated in Romans 2. Yet Paul's point there is precisely
that the Gentiles who have not the advantage of the specially revealed law of Cod
nevertheless have the requirements of the law written on their hearts; the same
law-requirements are binding on Jew and Gentile. Moreover, those requirements
cannot be thought to go no further than the generalized expression of the
decalogue, as Paul clearly indicates in Rom. 1:32. Even the moral principles
of the case-law can be found in the Gentile's heart. Thus it turns out that
what you have said in answer to Dan strongly supports the theonomic position,
upon reflection: indeed, some of the Puritans utilized such an argument from
Romans 2 to show why all the nations today must obey the equity of the O.T.
judicinls! Let me note further that in your answer to Dan you say that the
antitheonomic position does not leave the nations' (magistrates) lawless, and
yet that penalties to be inflicted are not laid down by God in the moral law
which instructs magistrates. Stop and think about that. First, just how do
you justify cutting the penal commandments out of the law of God--or to put
it another way', what is the exegetical justification for your dividing up the
law so that the penal sanctions arc not of perpetual obligation? Neither you
numment nor your colleagues have spoken a word in answer to this most crucial
of questions, and vet in the end you must have biblical grounds for your
theological conclusions if you are to honor the Reformation nrinciple of sole
Scriptura. Second, if you review your Philosophy of law, jurisprudence, or
politics, you will soon recall that the use of penal sanctions is precisely
at the heart of the magistrate's function and duties: without them, there is
no civil law and-authority. Indeed, Paul capsulates the function of the magistrate
in the symbol of "the sword" (Rom. 13:4). Moreover, according to Pauline
theology, only when that sword is used with the understanding that its user
is a "minister of Cod," is it not used "in vain." But now you tell us that
God gives no direction to the magistrate concerning penalties--that God does
not direct His ordained minister how to wield the sword in a way which is not
vain. Well if that is true, and if God holds no penal requirements over
magistrates but leaves them directionless in their key function, then contrary
to your claim you do in fact leave the magistrate (or nations) lawless. On
your theory a magistrate might execute those with parking violations and let
murderers go with a light fine--and in neither case would he be transgressing
God's revealed will! For there is no relevant and binding, revealed will of
Cod to him on such a subject. Mr. Murray, you really must think through the
issue more clearly and consistently--and exegetically. In the foregoing two
observations I try to let you see why discussion of the theonomy question
sometimes seems so fruitless and academically immature to many of us when
we deal with HT-men i the discussion lacks analytical precision and matters
do not appear to have been consistently thought through. And there is a
real dearth of exegetical support offered for your opinions on the matter,
to top things off. All in all, it just seems that you are too easily
satisfied with nonexegetical theologizing and poor reasoning.

I will go on to your second objection, noting that it is as baseless as the

first. You maintain that it is a serious defect in me that I "misuse authorities'
by setting them forth as supporting my position when they actually do not (Dec. 21)
and by mixing quotes from reformed authors with my own distinctive position
(Oct. 27, p. 2). However your reproach on my scholarship is undeserved. You
do not indicate even one place in my book where the announced premise or perspective in support of which I quote or cite another author is untrue to that
particular author's point of view. Thus no authority has been misused at all,
as far as available evidence is concerned. It is certainly true that I utilize
a particular author in support of some elements of my book, even though that
author would not agree with all elements of my hook O its particular conclusion
about magistrates and the penal sanctions. But so what? That is perfectly
acceptable in scholarly circles; there is no rule that we may nuote or cite only
men who agree with us on every last point! I. only appeal to authors in support
of those aspects of my argumentation with which they actually agree, and thus
no disservice is done them in the slightest. I do not maintain that every author
cited agrees with the consistent implications of the point of view for which I
cite him -implicationswhich bring me to my particular conclusion, whether he
came along or not. Moreover, such "mixing" of authorities in with the expression
of my own conclusions or point of view is, such a commonplace. practice in written
treatises that T can hardly imagine that you would disapprobate it in me. (Do
you likewise condemn, say, Rutherford for quoting Aristotle to support an aspect
of .the argument in LexRex, even though Aristotle would never have agreed to
Rutherford's own conclusions?) Your "mixing" remark is no proof of "misuse,
and you have no evidence of my appealing to men as supporting an aspect of my
book which they in fact disagree with. The closest you come to offering such
in defense of your reproach against me is the claim that on pp. 550-551 of my
book I say that a certain list of Puritans endorsed my position (specifically,
in context of your letter, the position that the judicial laws and penalties
of the O.T. are valid today). Eut quick reference to my hook will disclose
that I say nothing of the kind. The Puritans cited on those two pages are
utilized to'illustrate a wide, wide variety of different theological points
touching on the law and its continuing validity--not specifically for support
of the "tremendous implications for...civil government" (as they are explicitly
called) in general Puritan thought and practice. For an illustration of that
I have reproduced the work of John Cotton at length. My point is that I do not
claim what you allege that I claim--that all of the men cited on those two pages
would agree completely with my conclusions (as well as those of many Puritans)
about the civil magistrate and the OT penalties. They are enlisted regarding
other aspects of the ouestion of end's law in the life of the believer. Even
you have to admit in your letter that you are putting a construction on my words.
I would hope that you would be gracious enough as a fellow Christian, if not
fair enough as a scholar, to put the best possible construction on your opponent's
words before taking him to task. As it is, you badly misrepresent me and my
intentions--ironically, in the interest of proving me to misrepresent others!
Furthermore, not only do I nowhere claim what you say I do, you weakly attempt
to invalidate such an alleged claim with one mere counter-example, with which
I do not even disagree (as far as I can tell). Having accused me of misusing
a list of authors, you merely nuote one of them (in a wav which is not contrary
to me anyway) and then weakly assert "I believe the same holds true of the others
named." Well then, you do not even' demonstrate your own (erroneous) allegation
against me! As indicated above, then, you have given not one bit of evidence
to show that I "misuse authorities" in my book. The accusation is irresponsible.

The real burden of your objections against my book actually appears in the
third criticism listed above: namely, that my view of the G.T. extradecalooical
commands and penal sanctions "does not belong to the reformed tradition" (Oct.
27, p. 1). You make the remarkable claim that you do not know of even one
Puritan who held my view ()ee. 21) , and You cite a number of past Reformed
writers who von suppose to stand against it. In response, I wish to make the
following series of points: (a) contrary to the thrust and function of your
claims about historical tradition, it is not aleologically authoritative:
(b) your claim not to know of one adherent of my view fs disproved. by your
own words elsewhere: (c) there is readily available and clear evidence of
agreement with my position in "reformed tradition": rani (d) your attempt to
produce evidence of disagreement with my view is irrelevant and cannot substantiate the stronger claim that this view is connletelv outside anything
in the reformed tradition: and (e) the few cases of alleged disagreement are
not telling (even as a historical argument against rn' view) because conflietioi;
testimony is available from the same authors or because
do not in fact disagree
with what you cite them as saving. It will appear, then, that this line of
objection against theonomic ethics is as crippled as can be--theologically,
logically, and historically.

iils

111;4-

First, then, let me respond to your objectionAthat the history of reformed .

thought or the evidence cf reformed tradition is--for a genuine follower of

reformeo distinctivesnnt authoritative or determinative for theological C.G1Calvinists do not pursue systematic theology or arrive at their conclusions by way of the history of doctrine (or I should rather soy that they
ought not to confuse systematic theology with history of doctrine, for in facr
I know of some professing Calvinists who function as though they care little for
the distinction). For whatever may or may not have been said in the east.--even
by our favorite writers--our only standard of faith and practice is the teaching,
of God's infallible word. how then, you might immediately respond that you
certainly agree with all that. Indeed, at the end of your Oct. 27 letter to
Dan you confess, pro 7orma, that reformed tradition is not the authority for von
on this subject (f) 2). The problem, however, is that your actual practice does
not come close to your profession. Your statement, for instance, comes at the
end of a letter where, in actual fact and function, appeal to tradition is your
foremost objection to theonomy. Your letters are filled with this burning concern.
You say it is irrelevant, but you continually press it as your strongest--if not
exclusive--polemic against theonomic ethics. We find no similar attention to or
concern for exegetical matters. It is not sufficient to profess a correct thcoloric;
method: we must inspect the actual tools that are utilized by your method, and when
we do it certainly appears that tradition (reformed though it may be) is a. vital
and significant determinant in your theologizing. history is not as central a
concern as you have made it in your practice, and it is emphatically irrelevant
in polemics against (or for) the theonomic Position. (When the moral consensus
of Western culture is collapsing around our ears, ethical theologians have far
more crucial things to do than to kibitz the fine points of interpreting Puritan
remarks from three centuries ago. Far more important to start addressing the
real issues of our own day, making sure the church's salt has not lost its savor.)
May I add that, as it seems to many of us, the entire DT corps of antagonists to
theonemy is cncumhered with this same problem--a functional and practical coomitent
to what past reformed men have said, far overshadowing what rod may or may not have
said in His word on the subject. I have no doubt that each man would sincerely
deem scripture alone as authoritative, but I have Adoubt where the heart of his
argument neyertheless is--in tradition.
mitment.

r.o.

Second, it must be observed--as we now explore the Incidental question of

what has been said in reformed tradition--that your bold assertion not to know
of even one Puritan who held to the distinctive view of theonomy in political
ethics, and your avowal that theonomy does not belong to the reformed tradition,
is a gross overstatement (which, by the way, jeopardizes Your credibility even
as a scholarly historian in the eyes of some, as is evident from the promotional
sheet on the upcoming Journalof Christian Reconstruction by Cary North--who, it
turns out, is doctored in history, and who specialized precisely in the Puritan
age). You say you have no reason to locate theonomic views within the history
of reformed thought, and yet you say in your own letter (Oct. 27) that "many of
the reformers and earlier Puritans" were not clear regarding the penal sanctions
for violating either table of the moral law! You admit that there was divided
opinion and at least some inclination (in at least some--you say many--of the
reformers and Puritans) to foster those sanctions. You say theonomy does not
belong to the reformed tradition, but then you show us that you really know
much better than to say such a thing. Indeed, in the same letter you openly
admit that Knox, Hooper, "and others" said ido]ators, for instance, could be
legitimately put to death--that the 0,T. sanction was theologically endorsed by
them. Therefore, this bold statement of yours that you know of not one example
of reformed endorsement of the theonomic distinctive is in disproved by your
own words! You contradict your ovn testimony and argument. ;Surely this kind
of overstatement and incoherence ought to be an embarrassment to someone who
makes so much of a negative argument from tradition against his opponent. You
know very well that theonomic convictions belong to the reformed tradition
somewhere. You simply do not agree with or like that element of the tradition.
I think Thomas H'Crie (whom you cite in another regard) showed genuine integrity
of_
as a historian in this matter. In his Life_of
_ John Knox he discusses the reformer's
debate with Maitland, and at one point indicates that there were "principles which
he held in common with the Reformer"--to wit, "both parties held that idolatry
might justly be punished by death. Into this sentiment they were led in consequence
of their having adopted the untenable opinion, that the judicial laws given to
the Jewish nation were bindine upon Christian nations, as to all offences against
the moral law" (p. 216). You see,M'Crie freely admits that Knox was committed
to the theonomic view that the judicial laws of the Jewish nation are still
binding on Christian nations; historical accuracy demanded the admission. However,
M'Crie himself finds this commitment of Knox to be an "untenable opinion." The
fact that he disagreed with it did not lead him to suppress its historical
existence or make overstatements about its absence from all reformed tradition.
Shouldn't you follow his example here? Strenuously ague with and state disagreement
with theonomic views, if you must, but do not eo so far as to make the preposterous
claim that the reformed tradition has never evidenced this kind of thing before.
Even you must recognize that the reformed tradition is divided on the score.
You have claimed that theonomic views are outside of the reformed tradition.
However, the claim is utterly false and easily disproven, whether we endorse that
aspect of the tradition today or not. John Knox, as seen above, is already a
sufficient--indeed significant--example of the location of theonomic sentiments
squarely within the reformed tradition (unless one now resorts to the futile and
viciously circular ploy of dismissing Knox from the reformed tradition on the basis
of his theonomic commitment). Unleas they are defined out of existence as 'reformed'
because of agreeing with theonomy, many past Calvinists have esnoused the distinctivi
viewpoint of theonomic ethics. That is- a historical fact, unaffected by our
sentiments toward it. You may feel that in this the theonomic Calvinists were
infected by the outlook of Roman Catholicism (as speculative and incredible a

10

view as that may be--remember Calvin's own denunciation of Rome's use of the sword
and his efforts to disasSociate his endorsement of the execution of idolators from
that of the Catholics!), and you may rationalize that "their Christian sense was
better than their judgment" (although, as a doctor in epistemology, I would sincerely
like to see that contrast explicated in a convincing and clear fashion, for my
present conviction is that it is a completely misleading pseudo-contrast)--claims
which you make out of embarrassment in your letters--but the fact remains that
they did hold such views. Let re? offer you some further examples. They are not
intended to claim exact conformity With every last detail of my own book, but rather
to illustrate the presence of theonomic themes--indeed, in some cases, agreement
with its distinctive conclusiOn--in accepted reformed authors of the past. We
can begin with Bullinger, who said that "the substance of God's judicial laws is
not taken away or abolished," even though the outward (cultural) form of them may
vary from nation to nation (Decades, p. 282). He saw the judicial laws concerning
civil polity and punishment to be a commentary on the second table of the decalogue
and to be so universally binding as to be written on all men's hearts, even though
more clearly exnressed through Moses so that no man may excuse himself from then
by ignorance (The Old Faith, pn. 47-48). In the Second Helvetic Confession,
Bullinger wrote that God's entire will for every part of life was fully declared
in the law so that no departure from it was allowed (chap. 12), and that the
magistrate must govern by laws made according to God's word,' drawing the sword
against "all those whom God has commanded him to punish or even to execute" (chap. 3r:
I do not know about you, but I believe that Knox and Bullinger are weighty men to
be able to enlist as reformed-tradition theonomists!

1-)

17

Impressive evidence is also found among English Reformers and Puritans.

John Hooper wrote that adultery was rightly punished with death by "both God's
p. 37G). Hugh
laws and man's laws, Christians' and gentiles" (Early
Latimer taught that preachers were to expound the binding_direction of God to
magistrates from the law of Moses, and that rulers where then to enforce it
with the sword (Sermons, n. 85): significantly, this was his conviction when
preaching before Edward IV, thus showing his Christian political ethic in pointed
and practical application. Thomas Becon, affirmine that by God's "expressed
commandment" we are to execute idolaters and false prophets, sets forth the
Mosaic penal code as a model to magistrates of every age (Catechism, pp. 310-312).
Although the circumstances of them may change, the judicial laws of the O.T.
were to be obeyed by magistrates, "keeping the substance and equity of them (as
it were the marrow)," said Thomas Cartwright. He continued, "But to say that
any magistrate can save the life of...(anv such person) which God by his judicial
law bath commanded to he nut to death, I do utterly deny, and am ready to prove"
(cited in Works of John T.n-s,iteift, 1:270). Here we have a clear example from
reformed tradition that says it all: the "equity" of the judicial laws is to be
kept by magistrates today, thus requiring then to enforce the penal code of the
O.T. Moreover, Mr. Murray, if you had lived back then, Cartwright was prepared
to prove the point to you against your disagreement! Your antitheonomic view
would have met (some) strong opposition from reformed tradition. Like Cartwright,
William Perkins argued that, for instance, witches were to be executed today,
"and that by the law of Moses, the equity whereof is perpetual" (to use the
words of Pickering's summary of. Perkins' position). Henry Barrow is quite
pointed in his theonomic expression, speaking of God's O.T. statutes and
judgments (which "endure for ever").as "the true exposition and faithful
execution of his moral law: which laws were not made for the Jews' state
only...but for all mankind, especially for all the Israel of God, from

11

, 1-7)

which laws it is not lawful in judgment to vary or decline either to the one
hand or to the other" (Discovery of the False Church). Philip Stubbs maintained
the validity of the death nenalty for blasphemers according to the O.T. law,

"which law judicial standeth in force to the world's end" (An Anatomie of Abuses:
this and the last citation are from Rogers' Exposition of the Thirty-nine Articles,
pp. 90, 91). With the distressing upsurge of antinomian doctrine in the 1631's,
the House of Commons considered that doctrine and in 1643 requested the Westminster
Assem6ly to compare it with the word of God. In 1645. one of the most esteemed
scholars of the day and a Westtinster divine, Samuel Bolton, published The True
Bounds of Christian Freedom (reprinted, You will recall, by the Banner of Truth),
in which he defends the validity of Cod's law in the era of the New Covenant. In
this treatise which was written while the Westminster Assembly was sitting, Bolton
states the Puritan view of the O.T. judicial law (p. 56)--assuring us that what he
expresses'is "a common maxim," and that with respect to the attitude toward the
judicial law "we find considerable agreement.... We find few dissenters." Bolton's
statement is in perfect harmony with my own theonomic outlook: "As for the judicial
law, which was an appendix to the second table, it was an ordinance containing
precepts concerning the government of the people in things civil, and it served
three purposes: it gave the people a rule of common and public eftuity, it distinguished them from other peoples, and it gave them a type of the government
of Christ. That part of the judicial law which was typical bf Christ's government
has ceased, but that part which is of common and general equity remains still in
force." In political ethics Bolton was likewise theonomic: "A magistrate may
require those things at our hands which are clearly revealed to be the will of
God. In this we obey God in man" (p. 203). Speaking of the Old Testament, Bolton
goes on to say, "The people were bound to obey the magistrates when they commanded
obedience to that which God had commanded": stressing continuity with this
arrangement after the coming of Christ, he then adds, "I conceive that a magistrate
...may require those things to be obeyed which are clearly revealed to be the will
and mind of Christ.... The magistrate tells us what is God's will, not what is
his will" (p. 209). Obviously, for this Westminster divine, civil rulers were
obligated to follow explicitly God',s revealed will for them, and that could be
found in the perpetual equity Of the judicial law touching public and civil matters.
(By the way, although Bolton says these things, the current Publisher's Introduction--which I take to be your wordssays, "The slur of 'legalism' often cast
upon those who framed the Westminster Confession of Faith finds no justification
in this instructive and edifying work" p. 12. Yet your associate editor, Walter
Chantry, has pressed that very "slur of legalism" against me for stating the
same convictions!) In saying these things, Bolton was only agreeing with the
viewpoint of other Westminster divines like Gillespie and Rutherford, and other
Puritans like John Owen (as I will demonstrate below).
10-

It would also be appropriate to draw evidence from the American Puritans

of the Westminster period--which is hiphly significant, not only because they
announce common convictions of that very day, but also because they had more of
a free hand to actually put into practice in a pointed way whatever their political
ethic as Calvinists required. I am confident that you are well aware of the
stature of John Cotton as a reformed theologian of his era. Cotton, perhaps
more than any other writer, directly tackles "the theonomic question" in his
publications. In A Discourse about Civil Government (1663) he wrote that a
theocracy was the proper and best form of government for Christians to endorse.
Moreover, Cotton stated that a theocracy did not break down a proper separation
of church and state, defining a theocracy simply as a government where the laws

12

by which men rule are the laws of God (original ed., pp. 14-15). In 1636 Cotton
was requested by the General Court of the Massachusetts Bay Colony (with others)
to draft laws agreeable to God's word for the new plantation. Later that same
year Cotton presented to the Court his work, Moses his Judicials, which amounted
to the earliest body of laws fraMed in English America. According to argumentation
in the journal of the Massachusetts Historical Society (Oct., 1902, p. 280), the
"Abstract of the Laws of New England" by Cotton (published in London, 1641, and
reprinted for convenient reading in an appendix to my book) is nothing other than
the manuscript, Moses his Judicials.
The Puritan conviction that the O.T. extradecalogical laws were binding on modern societies is incontestably illustrated by
this document; indeed, many of the Moeaiceludicial laws are simply taken over
verbatim into this law code for Massachusetts! Furthermore, in order to facilitate
discussion of his proposed civil constitution, Cotton presented another work
shortly after 1636, entitled How Far Moses' Judicials Bind Massachusetts (also
found in the Mass. Hist. Soc. cited above)--the tenor of which is nicely put in
this sentence from it, "The more any Law smells of man the more unprofitable."
Similar to Bolton's statement above, Cotton distinguishes between temporary laws
(viz., those which foreshadow Christ and the gospel and those which are peculiar
to the Jews regarding the land of Canaan) and Perpetual laws. The question that
he proposes and answers affirmatively is this: "whether we as Christians or as a
people of Cod are not bound to establish the laws and penalties set down in the
Scripture as they were given to the Jews" (note here the explicit mention of
penalties, which are written explicitly into the "Abstract of the Laws of New
England" or Moses his_Judicials). lie offers nine reasons to support his affirmative
answer, not hesitating to take the general continuity of theAv's validity in
the N.T. as substantiating his point (thereby indicating thatAAEcalogue and its
case-law elaborations stood together as "moral law" in his thinking--binding unless
the N.T. taught otherwise). He argues his case from Dent. 4:6,8; these judicial
laws are most righteous (answering to the righteousness of Cod) and should be our
wisdom in the sight of the nations. He argues that God has given no other
revelation of such laws to govern a commonwealth, and yet we are not to he
lawless, and thus obedience to Him requires adherence to the judicial law in
governing society. Because God has placed us in the stead of the Jews, "we
are as much bound to their laws as well as themselves." Moreover, since the
magistrate judges for God in society (indeed, in God's stead), God would have
him judge according to God's own laws. Later on Cotton reasons, "If it was a
dart of the misery of gentiles to he aliens from the commonwealth of Israel
(Eph. 2:12), then tis a part of the hapniness of Christian nations that they are
subject to the laws of that commonwealth of Israel.... Christ is king of church
and commonwealth.... Christ is head of all principalities and powers for the church,
and he will subordinate all kingdoms one day to the church." These theonomic
(and postmillennial!) convictions cannot be expunged from any adequate account
of reformed tradition. especially of the Westminster period. In the same
decade as the Westminster Assembly Thomas Shepherd wrote that the judicial laws
served as fences to safeguard the moral precepts of Cod. According to him,
"those which did safeguard any moral law, (which is perpetual,) whether by
just punishments or otherwise, do still morally bind all nations;...and hence
Cod would have all nations etniniAnom preserve their fences forever.... The morals
abiding, why should not their judicials and fences remain? The learned generally
doubt not to affirm that Noses' iudicials bind all nations, so far forth as they
contain any moral eluity in them"
II1:53-54). Just as Cartwright in
England.was prepared to prove to doubters that the O.T. judicial law was binding
on present day magistrates, so also Shepherd in America tells us that learned

13

people will not in general doubt that position. It must he understood, then, that
theonomic themes were generally and tenaciously upheld by Puritans of this period,
both in England and America; further, those theonomic convictions went so far as
to endorse the judicial penalties of the Mosaic law for magistrates of the day.
Accordingly, the New Haven Colony Records for 1641 read: "And according to the
fundamental agreement, made and published by full and general consent... that the
judicial law of God given by Moses and expounded in other parts of Scripture, so
far as it is a hedge and a fence to the moral law, and neither ceremonial nor
typical nor had any reference to Canaan, path an everlasting equity in it, and
should be the rule of their proceedings." Likewise, in 1644 it was recorded:
"It is ordered that the judicial laws of God, as they were delivered by Moses...
be a rule to all the courts in this jurisdiction in their proceedings against
offenders." Thomas Hutchinson's History of the Mass. Bay Colony informs us
that its courts--in common with English law--followed the Mosaic judicials in
requiring restitution for theft and punished murder, sodomy, witchcraft, rape,
idolatry, blasphemy, adultery, kidnapping, incorrigible delinquency in teenagers
(e.g. striking their paraents unprovoked) with the death penalty (cf. here
Cotton's "Abstract," where even sabbath-breaking is a capital crime). It is
quite evident by this point, is it not, that the claim that theonomy does not
belong to the reformed tradition !s thoroughly unbelievable.; The evidence is
clearly there to support theonomy's important place in traditional reformed
thinking about the O.T. judicial laws and penalties. This place is. solidified
with confessional sanction in the Vestminster. Confession of Faith. We have
already examined significant Puritan statements -from the same century and decade
as the Westminster Assembly; in them is a. common theme concerning the "judicial
law" and its continuity "equity" which binds all nations and magistrates, even
to the- point of the Mosaic penal code. In light of the theology and vocabulary-and actual practice!--of the Puritans of that day, the meaning of chapter 19:4
in the Confession is indubitable. Although the (outward, historical form of the)
judicial laws of the Jews "expired" with the passing of that political state,
they do contain a "general equity" which is "required" and to which tee__
extent we
are "now obligated.
We have observed that important reformers along with English and American
Puritans (especially of the Westminster period) espoused theonomic views, thereby
emptying your traditionalist argument against my book of validity. As a fourth
major response to your letters in this regard it should be added that the
kind of evidence you attempt to adduce against theonomy--evidence taken from
traditional reformed writers which is (allegedly) contrary to theonomy--is
logically irrelevant in substantiating your claim that theonomy is outside
of the reformed tradition. The fact--if it is a fact--that you have found
some negative sentiment regarding theonomic views would not show in any sense
that there was no positive sentiment for theonomy also to be found in the
history of reformed thought! Your (purported) evidence is not, in the nature
of the case, the only evidence that is available. And there is a tremendous
logical leap from "some" reformed writers opposed theonomic views to the claim
that "all" did so--or from the fact that there is "some" evidence of
disagreement to the fact that there is "only" evidence of disagreement.
You see, the negative evidence you set forth cannot in itself support your
strong and exelusivistic claim that not one Puritan was theonomic. This
is a serious logical lapse on your part, I fear, and your evidence is rendered
irrelevant. Thus Dan and others have been given no reason to agree with your
severe historical judgment against theonomy.

14

By this point it should be evident that your historical criticism of my

book is thoroughly impoverished--being theologically irrelevant, overstated
according to Your own words, contrary to strong and clear historical evidence,
and defended with logically irrelevant claims. However I believe that it is
important to press a bit further and consider even that (theologically and
logically irrelevant) evidence which you allege to be contrary to my theonomic
views. I have no doubt that early reformed authors can he found who disagreed
with their contemporaries over theonomic issues, but for the sake of accuracy
I must observe that You have not as yet set forth such authors' cpinions (or
at least, not very clearly). In appealing to the quotations which you do, you
show yourself unfair to the authors considered or unfair to the position taken
by theonomists. That is, I can cite conflicting evidence from these very sane
authors (thus indicating that the whole story has not been considered by you),
or. I can in fact agree with what you portray them saying.(thus indicating that
you Misconstrue the position which you have decided to oppose with such quotations).
Let me begin with a rather striking illustration. You claim Calvin as your
first parade example, saying that he "plainly disowned" my viewpoint in the
Institutes 4:20. At first you apparently appealed to section 14 of that chapter
in support of your claim (cf. Oct. 27, n. 1, where Dan seems; to have cast doubt
on an earlier line of evidence), but even if you did not, Walter Chantry obviously
does so in his letter to me (June 14, p. 2). Chantry says that Calvin there speaks
of those who teach what I do as holding "dangerous errors," and that Calvin deems
my whewpoint as 'perilous, seditious, stupid, and false." For good measure,
Chantry immediately adds this barb, "I share his alarm...." Of course, even
assuming for the moment that Chantry is correct in identifying Calvin's opponents
as theonomists, Chantry would not at all have been fair to the historical Calvin.
Chantry wishes to "share" Calvin's abusive language against my (apparent) viewpoint.,
However, he seems to overlook completely that Calvin elsewhere (and later in his
career) called Christians who would not support or use the penal sanctions of the
Mosaic law "in a well constituted polity": "shameful, remiss, insolent scoundrels'
whose view represents "gross ignorance" and "madness" (see Commentary at Dent.
13:5 & 22:22). My purpose is not to exchange epithets from our revered Calvin
(a great passtime for serious scholars, isn't it?), but to point up how irresponsible
Chantry's historiography is. Frankly, as a theologian, I do not ultimately care
whether Calvin came down on the theonomic distinctive or not: research into his
view here is an incidental, historical curiosity. But it is surely a reproach on
those who argumentatively appeal to Calvin for their authority that they have not
been true to the master's corpus. Chantry appeals smugly to Calvin's hard language
at one point, not bothering to take into account equally hard language to the
opposite effect elsewhere. This is irresponsible scholarship and an injustice to
Calvin. Furthermore, Chantry does me an injustice by wrongly assuming in. the first
place that Calvin was referring at 4:20:14 to people holding a theonomic view
nothing could be further from the truth. Totally disregarding the historical
context of Calvin's remark, Chantry latches onto an apnarent similarity at one
point and jumps to the conclusion that theonomists are being excoriated. What
Calvin says is that there are some who "deny that a commonwealth is duly framed"
if it neglects the political system of Noses in preferring the common laws of
nations: these people are identified as "seditious" and who "dangerously go astray."
Now, in the fitst place theonomists do not deny that a political body is duly
framed when common laws are chosen over Mosaic laws: we have no right to challenge
the legitimate authority of ruling powers when they have departed from the O.T.

15

) 7(

ideal of political justice (cf. Rom. 13:1-2), even if we must work toward a better
social morality. Non-theonomic governments are still duly framed. Secondly, it
cannot be overlooked (a) that Calvin felt that the common laws of nations would
ultimately agree with the Mosaic judicials, and (b) Calvin here deals with the
"political system" of toses and not specifically the substance of his revealed laws.
But thirdly, and far more importantly, Calvin was condemning here those who used
their appeal to the Mosaic political system as a pretext for sedaion--for revolution
against the established authorities. Now do not be blind to Calvin's historical
setting! Because of the alarming boldness of Nicholas Cop's rectorial address in
Nov., 1533,--an address which disturbed the aatiferites and which implicated Calvin-Calvin found it necessary to go into hiding with.the help of the Du Tillet family
in 1534. In Oct. of that year, King Francis I was outraged by the Placards incident,
and in response many adherents of the new movement were imprisoned and burned at
the stake. In Jan., 1535, Calvin sought safety in Basel and was hidden unknown.
Reports reached him of the burnings in France (some of the martyrs being his own
personal friends), as well as reports of. the false charges being circulated by the
French court as a pretense for greater persecutions. These charges portrayed the
protestants as consisting of "Anabaptists and seditious men," to use Calvin's
own words. Calvin then said he felt duty bound to "vindicate from undeserved
insult my brethren." He worked on his book--later published as the Institutes-from Jan. to Aug., 1535, during which time (June, 1535) the revolutionary
Anabaptist movement of Munster was finally and ruthlessly crushed--a movement
which grieved Calvin as discrediting the protestant movement all the more in
Europe. You see how inserisative to the historical circumstance of the Institutes.
Chantry is? The book was not simply a textbook of theology; it was a political
apologetic! The climactic chapter was purposely devoted by Calvin to the subject
of "Civil Government." In his Prefatory Address to King Francis, Calvin wrote:
"May you be not at all moved by those vain accusations with which our adversaries
are trying to inspire terror in you: that by this new gospel (for so they call it)
men strive and seek only after the opportunity for seditions and impunity for all
crimes." Given this historical and literary context, it is plain as day what
Calvin is saying at 4:20:14. True to his intended defense of the martyred
protestants, true to his goal of distinguishing protestants from "Anabaptists
and seditious men," true to his declaration to the king that sedition was a
vain accusation against followers of the Reformation, Calvin denounced in his
final chapter those who would appeal to the Mosaic political system as an
encouragement to sedition. Condemning theonomists (who believe that even. nontheonovic governments must be obeyed with respect) is the furthest thing from
Calvin's aim and wording at this precise point in the Institutes. Yet Chantry
(and apparetnly you too) has not hesitated to thoughtlessly press it into service
against me in his historical argument. This is unfair to Calvin and unfair to
my viewpoint as well.. The already irrelevant historical argument now becomes
an utter shambles. Ironically, I agree with Calvin's denunciation at 4:20:14!

a9..

Similarly, the record needs to be set straight when you appeal to Calvin
at 4:20:16 against my views (Oct. 27, p. 1).. Reading sections 15 & 16, you
will see that Calvin holds--with theonomists--that the judicial commandments
of the Old Testament have a divestible form or outer constitution which can
he altered with circumstances: nevertheless, these commandments have another
feature to consider, namely the "equity" on which they are founded. This
equity, says Calvin, expresses a perpetual duty which must be the same for
all men: "this equity alone must be the goal and rule and limit of all laws."
Consequently, the nations need not have exactly the same expression or form

16

of laws which the O.T. Jews did, but they are to honor the substance of be those
Jewish judicials as having something perpetual in them pertaining to us. So,
speaking of the laws of a nation, Calvin declares (relative to the judicial laws
of- Israel): they indeed vary in form but have the same purpose." Although
prefer a more precise and helpful manner of expression, what Calvin is saying
is agreeable to theonomic .ethics: the underlying equity or substance of the
judicial laws binds all nations, even though the outward form of them may vary
from circumstance to circumstance. Consequently, when you appeal to the
distinction drawn by Calvin in 4:29:16 between moral law and judicial forms,
you have yet to find any significant disagreement with theonomic ethics. I
believe that the constitutional form of civil laws may differ from the Jewish
law, but with Calvin I also believe that the underlying principles of eouity
on which the judicial laws were founded are the same for all men. Thus wherever
possible and relevant, the extradecalogical commandments of the Old Testament
should be observed today. As Calvin says elsewhere about two such laws, "Who
can deny that these two things apply as much to us as to the Jews?" (2:8:32).
It is highly significant that, contrary to the implications of the moral/judicial
distinction which you apparently draw from Calvin, thnt the reformer extensively
used the judicial laws to explain and set forth the duties of the decalogue,
thereby showing that he found the substance of the judicial requirements to be
contained within the summary commands of the decalogue itself. This is again
perfectly agreeable to theonomic thought. Therefore, neither Chantry's appeal
to section 14, nor your appeal to section 16, show Calvin to be at odds with
my perspective. I am somewhat surprised that you would focus on the moral/judicial
distinction in section 16 if you were to use that section against me--not only
because that distinction is not contrary to my view, but especially because there
is a different matter presented by Calvin in the section which is more obviously
relevant to a disagreement with theonomic ethics. I speak here of Calvin's
teaching that the punishments of the Old Testament are not necessary or intended /
for all nations. flowever, leeme save you a third trip to the well, and make
a few remarks about this very short discussion in the Institutes. First, it is
altogether possible that Calvin is thinking here of the deterrent necessity of
penal laws and not about what (non-teleological) retribution would absolutely
require; the context of his discussion is the question of what penalties are
demanded to keep criminals in check (and his answer is that a variety will
do, depending on varying circumstances). Second, and more importantly, the
discussion of Calvin here should not be utilized as though it were all he had
to say on the subject of the O.T. penal sanctions. We must be true to the
entire corpus of his writings. The relevant statements in section 16 to which
I allude above do not appear to he later developments in the text (tile final
edition of which was completed in 1559): they seem to have been composed as
early as the editions. of 1536 or 1539. Yet Calvin had other and later things
to say on the subject before us. In the French Confession of 1559, for instance,
he wrote, "Cod put the sword in the hand of the state to resist not only sins
against the second but also against the first table of the law"--a perspective
set forth in the Institutes as well (4:20:9). This view of penal sanctions
is certainly not that of antitheonomists today (especially those espousing
an unbiblical version of "freedom of religion"). A major function of God's
law, held Calvin, was to protect the community from unjust men (2:7:10). An
appointed end of civil government, correspondingly, was that of forming "our
social behavior to civil righteousness" (4:20:2). Said Calvin (in theonomic
spirit): "1 approve of a civil administration that aims to prevent the true
religion which is contained in God's law from being openly and with public

17

11

sacrilege violated and defiled with impunity" (4:20:3). In 1554 Calvin published
a defense of Geneva's action against the blasphemer, Servetus; you will no doubt
recall that Servetus had the O.T. penalty of death imposed due to his crime--an
action for which Calvin is as popularly known as his doctrine of predestination!
Philip, Schaff (no mediocre historian in his own right) recognized the theolopical
character of Calvin's defense, summarizing it in these words: "Calvin's plea for
the right and duty of the Christian magistrate to punish heresy ley death, stands
or falls with his theocratic theory and the binding authority of the Mosaic code.
His arguments are chiefly drawn from the Jewish laws against idolatry and blasphemy,
and from the examples of the pious kings of Israel" (History of the Christian
Church VIII:792). In his Defensio Calvin.straightforwardly declares: "Whoever
shall now contend that it is unjust to put heretics and blasphemers to death will
knowingly and willing incur their very guilt. This is not laid down on human
authority: it is God who speaks and prescribes a perpetual rule...." It is beyond
me how people can think Calvin to be antitheonomie in light of his obvious use of
the Mosaic judicials (arguing from them .asthough they were currently authoritative)
and his well known practice (putting even the penal sanctions of those judicial
laws into practice). His reasoning and behavior certainly strike most people as
supporting the judicial and penal commands of the Old Testament! He surely cannot
be enlisted as a traditional exponent of your version of "freedom of religion."
Let us look further at Calvin's most extensive and explicit treatment of the Old
Testament law of Moses, his Harmony of the last four books of the Pentateuch.
Calvin's thought did not stop with the Institutes (indeed, even it underwent a
number of successive editions); he continued to reflect and to write. (At the
end of his address "To the Reader" in the Institutes, Calvin says "1 count myself v
one of the number of those who write as they learn and learn as they write.") In
1563, just a year before his death, Calvin finished his Harmony of Exodus-Deuteronomy
It is one of his most respected works, reflecting explicit and mature thought on
the law of God as given through Moses. Unhappily it is often ignored by those who
portray themselves as "following Calvin" in their antagonism to theonony. In
this work he speaks plainly and boldly in favor of the penal sanctions of the
0.T.--the precise issue which you set forth as most crucial in the theonomy
discussion. For instance, he asserts "Capital punishment shall be decreed
against adulterers" (Commentary at Dent. 13:5). Further: "It appears how greatly
God abominates adultery, since He denounces capital punishment against it....
Conjugal faith should be held too sacred to be Violated with impunity" (Commentary
at neut. 22:22). We observed above that Calvin considered Christians who
did not support the penal sanction against blasphemers -God's "perpetual rule"-as incurring their guilt. He was equally as hard on dissenters from the O.T.
punishments in his Harmony. "By the universal law of the Gentiles, the punishment
of death was always awarded to adultery; wherefore it is all the baser and more
shameful in Christians not to imitate at least the heathen. Adultery is punished
no less severely by the Julian law than by that of God: whilst those who boast
themselves of the. Christian name are so tender and remiss, that they visit this
execrable offense with a very light reproof" (ibid). Immediately he mentions
those who attempt "to abrogate God's law" by making spurious appeal to the coming
and example of Christ. Calvin concludes that "their relaxation of the penalty
has flowed from gross ignorance." Calvin is equally a proponent of the Mosaic
penalty in the case of subversive apostasy: "in a well constituted polity, profane
men are by no means to be tolerated" (Comm. at Deut. 13:5). Speaking with respect
to some who oppose the law's penal requirement, Calvin continues: "God commands
the false prophet to be put to death.... Some scoundrel or other gainsays this,
and sets himself against the author of life and death. What insolence is this!"

18

0-i)

23

For Calvin, if God pronounced capital punishment against some crime, the law is
unalterable and settles the matter for us today. "What is the meaning of this
madness, in imposing a law unon God, that He should riot make use of the obedience
of magistrates in this respect? And what avails it to question about the necessity
of this, since so it pleases God?... It is sunerfluous to contend by argument,
when God has once pronounced what is His will, for we must needs abide by His
inviolable decree" (ibid). When God's law is even once pronounced (in the O.T.
even), It cannot be arbitrarily put aside--even by present-day magistrates as
they are instructed regarding penal sanctions.

I must conclude that the incidental question of Calvin's stand on theonomic

issues must be answered, not In favor of the Banner of Truth consensus, but on
the general side of theonomic ethics. He holds that: (1) the whole Old Testament
law is applicable today since Christ's coming took nothing away from it (cf.
Institutes 2:7:13,14): (2) the judicial laws of Israel express an underlying equity
which is our perpetual duty and the standard for all laws of nations; (3) civil
magistrates today are obligated to obey the law of God in its civil demands;
and (4) the penal sanctions of the law are still valid and to be enforced in
the Christian era as God's inviolable law. It is perhaps not surprising that
Calvin should take such a stand. He had great admiration and scholarly respect
for Martin Bucer, who was likewise to exercise influence over English Puritans
when he came. to Cambridge to teach. Chapter 60 of Bucer's De Regno-Christi_ is
an example of his strong theonomic commitment. He writes to the king: "no one
can describe an approach more equitable and wholesome to the commonwealth than
that which God describes in his law"; consequently "it is certainly the duty of
all kings and princes who recognize that Cod has nut them over his people that
they follow most studiously his own method of punishing evildoers." Speaking of
the civil decrees of the law of Moses, Bucer continues: "insofar as the substance
and proper end- of these commandments are concerned, and especially those which
enjoin the discipline that is necessary for the whole commonwealth, whoever does
not reckon that such commandments are to be conscientiously observed is certainly
not attributing to God either supreme wisdom or a righteous care for our salvation.'
Later he says, "And so whoever decides that these misdeeds of impiety and
wickedness are to be kept out or driven from the commonwealth of Christians by
more mitigated punishment than death necessarily makes himself wiser and more
loving than God as regards the salvation of men." The thoroughness of Bucer's
theonomic commitment is revealed in this appeal to the King: "Your Majesty will
prove his trust and zeal for governing the commonwealth in a holy way for Christ
the Lord, our heavenly King, if for every single crime, misdeed, or offense he
establishes and imposes those penalties which the Lord himself has sanctioned."
I say, then, that it is no surprise that Calvin should hold the views that he
did, given his friendship with Bucer and given Bucer's theonomic views. It is
also no surprise that theonomic views should have had such a wide expression
among English reformers and Puritans. When all is said and done, Mr. Murray,
I believe that you rather than myself would undergo strenuous opposition in
your political ethic if Reformers like Calvin, Bucer, Bullinger, and Knox where
present today--not to mention the many others cited above. How can you
seriously and responsibly contend that theonomic views do not belong to the
Reformed tradition? Reformed writers may not have been perfectly consistent
in their writings on these issues (even as I am not, undoubtedly), and the
Reformed tradition may not be uniformly theonomic, but it is beyond question
that theonomic views are an element of the historic, Reformed corpus. The
mistaken appeal to Calvin against theonomy--misconstruing his words and
overlooking important writings--does not bolster your contrary claim in this matter.

19

I will not spend nearly so much time on the rest of your alleged examples
of traditional Reformed opposition to theonomic views. Similar defects to those
noted above invalidate the remainder of your testimony as well. For instance,
you encourage the reading of Owen to find antagonism against the restoration of
the Mosaic judicial law. Yet you obviously overlook some of the most relevant
and telling evidence reeardine Owen's beliefs here--namely, what he preached before
Parliment and encouraged Oliver Cromwell on the subject of "Chrir,t's Kingdom and
the Magistrate's Power." When called upon to give Christian teaching regarding
the direction of civil rulers--teaching given directly to civil rulers--Owen said
what any theonomist might say: apart from the incidental judicial form of the
O.T. laws to magistrates, the moral substance of them is perpetually binding.
He declared: "Although the institutions and examples of the Old Testament, of
the duty of magistrates in the things and about the worship of God, are not, in
their whole latitude and extent, to be drawn into rules that should be obligatory
to all magistrates now, under the administration of the gospel..-.; yet, doubtless,
there is something moral in those institutions, which, being unclothed of their
Judaical form, is still binding to all in the like kind, as to some analogy and
proportion. Subduct from those administrations what was proper to, and lies
upon the account of, the church and nation of the Jews, and what remains upon
the general notion of a church and nation must he everlastingly binding" (Works
8:394). It seems, then, that Owen is a writer to whom appedl cannot legitimately
be made for antitheonomic purposes. Likewise, when you quote George Gillespie
as maintaining that political or civil power is grounded. upon-the law of nature
(the law written in man's heart at his creation), you are not Portraying him as
saying anything contrary to what theonomists could and do say; so what is the
pointf That is, I believe (with Paul in Romans 1:32: 2:1/1-15) that the extradecalogical requirements of the Old Testament are part of the law written on
every man's heart and elaborating the summary nrecepts of the decalogue at Sinai.
Remember here that the moral, ceremonial, judicial distinction is convenient
enough theologically, but it is by no means evident exegetically. Paul's language--"the law" without divisions explicated--as well as Paul's examples--say, homosexualit
clearly indicate that he did not restrict the "law of nature" to the Jewish decalgue,
Thus I have no trouble with Gillespie's statements. However I am troubled with
your easy appeal to Gillespie without an explanation of the theonomic sentiments
in his writings. How can Gillespie be set forth as antitheonomic when he teaches
that Scripture, by instructing us in every good work, shows what is the best
manner of governing a commonwealth (something which you deny Scripture teaches:
Dec. 21 letter)? In the same place he makes it clear that ministers ought to
show the magistrate out of the word of God "in what manner he ought to use the
sword" (CXI Propositions..., 1`47,48). In Aaron's Rod Blossoming Gillespie is
even more explicit. From the previous remark we can see that he endorsed the
use of the O.T. extradeealogical law as binding the magistrate (seeing that it
is in the O.T. that we find instruction on the use of the sword), but more
pointedly now Gillespie says: "I know some divines hold that the judicial law
of. Moses, so far as concerneth the punishments of sins against the moral law,
idolatry, blasphemy, Sabbath-breaking, adultery, theft, etc., ought to be a rule
to the Christian magistrate; and for my part, I wish more respect were had to it,
and that it were more consulteth with" (I:1). Note first that Gillespie would
not have made the extreme claim that theonomic distinctives are outside the
pale of Reformed thinking; he knew divines in his own day who deemed the penal
requirements of the judicial law as. the current magistrate's obligation. Yore
importantly, he sided with them. How then can you portray him as antagonistit
to my viewpoint? It should not be forgotten that Gillespie was also a highly

20

112,#) influential member of the Westminster Assembly, and that his two works cited
here were published in 1644 and 1646 respectively--while the Westminster Assembly
was sitting. It is unthinkable that the Westminster Confession, which Gillespie
had such a hand in writing, would have opposed his theonomic sentiments or condemned
them (as some ridiculously claim today). An inductive examination of the way in
which the divines utilized the judicial commandments of Moses in explicating the
decalogue's requirements when the Larger Catechism was composed will dissuade any
cautious scholar from maintaining that the Westminster Standards were anything
but sympathetic to theonomy's distinctives. il*heutnap It appears from the above
that you have not been fair to Cillespie's point of view as expressed in his
prominent writings. Likewise, I believe that your lengthy quotation from
Rutherford is (a) not clearly opposed to theonomic teaching and (b) oblivious to
what Rutherford had to say elsewhere. Although your quotation shows that
Rutherford doubted that each and every one of the particular penal sanctions
as given to Israel is perpetual, he nevertheless expresses---in agreement with
his Puritan forerunners and contemporaries, as well as with theonomists--the
view that the judicial law as far as its judicial character and as far as it
pertained exclusively to the Jewish Republic is not binding, "though the moral
equity of all those (laws) be not abolished." As we have seen many times above,
the claim is that the form of the judicial laws has passed, but that their equity
is permanently binding. I have no difficulty with that perspective as it stands.
Moreover, if you will consult Rutherford's best known work, Lex Rex. (which was
hailed in the Westminster Assembly upon its publication), you will observe how
thoroughly he is committed to the extradecalogical requirements of the O.T.,
judging from how he argues conclusions about current civil policy from those
0.T. laws directly (e.g., he appeals to the specific command to kings in neut. 17
in order to substantiate his view of "the supreme law" which binds civil magistrates,
It turns out that the only traditional reformed writers to whom you appeal in any
way as appearing opposed to the O.T. judicial laws are Dickson and Burgess. However,
even in their cases, it is far from clear that they wereactually antitheonomic.
No doubt, there have been opponents of theonomic views in history, and these two
writers may turn out to be numbered among them. But that fact--if it is a fact-is not adequately demonstrated from their remarks. Burgess simply says that the
judicial laws ceased with the Jews as a political body. However the same kind of
expression can easily he found among men who were obviously theonomic in outlook
(as seen above): with them Burgess may simply be saying that the judicial form
of the laws expired with Israel, even though their underlying equity is perpetual
On the last point Burgess is simply silent (as far as your quotation goes). He
may have agreed (thus standing with the Westminster Assembly's declaration and
with theonomists), or he may have disagreed: I suspect that it was the former,
and that your quotation does not express all of Burgess' view (whether it appears
explicitly on the cited pages or not, of course, I could not now say). Likewise,
with Dickson's remark we see only that he denied that the whole judicial law of
the Jews "is yet alive and binding all of us." It would not be unreasonable to
interpret this in harmony with so many of his contemporaries, who rightly taught
that certain of the judicial laws were typical of Christ, or pertaining to Canaan,
or peculiarly Jewish as to form, and thus not literally binding on us or kept
in actual practice (thus not "alive"). Those who overlook these important
qualifications and teach that the whole judicial law is alive are wrong according
to Dicksonor so it seems he is saying. Of course, with such a statement I
would be in agreement. Therefore, it,turns.out that you have not actually given
clear evidence of opposition to theonomy among the traditional reformed writers
you cite. Such evidence can be found, as T. have said. But it cannot fairly be
attributed to Calvin, Owen, Gillespie, or Rutherford as you have attempted; it
has not yet be clearly attributed to Dickson'or Burgess. You offer no further gevidi

21

I must conclude that your historical argument against theonomy is without

any telling force. Consequently we come to the fourth objection which you have
spoken against my book, the objection that I have failed to address the traditional
Reformed arguments against my viewpoint which are drawn from considerations of
the uniqueness of Israel's theocracy. You claim that the church has sufficiently
addressed and refuted the theonomic distinctive already, and that from the Bible
itself. Falsely assuming your antitheonomic sentiment to be "traditional," you
say:
think the process by which the reformed school came to its traditional
position is illuminating, the reasons for it are clearly argued from Scripture,
and Greg's book does not address itself to those reasons. I cannot see that it
is an 'open question' to which the Church has somehow failed to give attention
until now" (Oct. 27, p. 2). In response I should say at least three things.
First, when all else has been said and done regarding this criticism of my book,
I would above all directly dispute this allegation by contending that I know
quite well what the central questions of any weight have been against theonomic
ethics-indeed, I have sadly found that I usually know them much better than even
my critics do. Studying under the Westminster Seminary faculty and writing my
dissertation on theonomic political ethics at that school afforded me ample
opportunity to hear, study, and interact with the best critical questioning of
theonomic distinctives that the Reformed tradition has to offer: I also did no
small amount of reading on the subject. And the fact is that the important
considerations that call for an answer were very much addressed by my book: viz.,
extent of legal continuity between the testaments, the uniformity between the 0.T,
Jew's and Gentiles as to the law, the question of N.T. departure from the O.T.
regarding the civil magistrate, the separation of church and state, the biblical
perspective on penal sanctions. Moreover, the book directly tackles the most
respected authors' arguments (e.g., those of John Murray and Meredith Kline).
So let me ask you to reconsider, in the light of Theonomv_s s clear content, the
accuracy of the general charge that I fail to address myself to Reformed reasons
for opposing the theonomic distinctive: the facts will not sustain such a charge.
The strongest line of disagreement has been openly faced and met. If you will
reread the book you. will be forced to admit that I have not skirted the difficult
questions. Secondly, by way of response to your allegation, let me issue a
challenge to you. You contend that clear scriptural reasons have been presented
in traditional reformed literature for disputing theonomy; you portray yourself
as sufficiently acquainted with those reasons to declare the theonomy issue a
closed question in the Church. Well then, let us have you try to re-state those
obvious and telling arguments in negotiable form for the current debate. Tell
me just what the traditional criticisms are in an orderly, precise, and pointed
fashion. It should be easy, seeing how obvious they are and how familiar you are
with them. I will not bother you for bibliographical details (showing me who
stated these objections, when and where, etc.). I am only interested in the
substance of these overwhelming attacks on my position. Forgetting names, just
write and tell me in your own words how the arguments run and how they are drawn
from Cod's word. Rise to the challenge to make good on your claim that the
Church has already heard the refutation of theonomic ethics: repeat it for us-in a way which manifests its depth, cogency, and biblical character. If you
really know of such a refutation, I sincerely wish to hear it. If it is genuine,
I aim to change my conivctions; if it is spurious, it should he laid to rest as
such. So quickly write and tell me what the supporting reasons are for disputing
the theonomic distinctive--don't just - tease us with claiming that such reasons
exist (somewhere...) in the reformed tradition. (But make sure before you write
that my book has not already addressed the reasons you propose to set before us.)
Please prove that Thconoiy fails to encounter the genuine objections against it.

22

My motivation for the second response above was supplied by the character of
the third response, now to be given. I was led to challenge you to state clearly
what the traditional biblical refutation of theonomic ethics has been (one which I
overlooked in my hook) because it is as clear as can be from the opinions you
rehearsed in your letter (Oct. 27, p. 2, and partially repeated Dec. 21) that you
have yet to do so. The "theocratic" considerations which you adduce from some
reformed writers come nowhere close to constituting respectable arguments against
theonomic ethics; they certainly were not such as to call for any published answer
in my book. I was aiming to tackle the real and difficult questions posed for
theonomic ethics, not squandering time on fallacious and short-sighted objections
which any sober reader could defeat. If you think that what you rehearse from
M'Crie and Peck, for instance, stand up as telling reasons for rejecting theonomy,
then I invite you to restate and defend their observations in an understandable
and cogent fashion. Theonomv does not fail to address such thinking; it purposely
omits to do so, not finding it at all required in a scholarly treatise. Such words
are not meant or motivated by pride, but are only intended to press upon you how
baffling it is that you could so severely reproach my book for skirting issues and
then be unable to recite anything but overtly fallacious reasoning. It is stunning
to compare the weightiness of your charge with the lightness of your evidence. Let
me elaborate. First, in your charge you claim that reasons which "are clearly
argued from Scripture" have already been brought against theonomic ethics. Yet
the opinions you rehearse are not at all exegetical or biblical in character or
content; not one passage from God's word is urged against my viewpoint. Second,
in your bharee you say that reasons have been adduced for disagreeing with theonomic
ethics. Yet the historical illustrations which you offer urn at some points (e.g.,
Increase Mather) are nothing more than the expression of an opinion without any
reasons offered for it at all. That someone in the past--even someone special to
reformed enthusiasts--has said that the O.T. penalties cannot be enforced today is
not an argument but merely a personal opinion. Third, some of the "reasons" which
you do set forth are so vague as to have no force at all, except perhaps to restate
in other words the conclusion all over again (thus being circular, although you
seem not to realize it). For instance, your first point is that "The theocracy
allowed no freedom of religion but compelled obedience." (I will here overlook
your failure to specify what sense--from the many available ones--of "theocracy"
you intend; likewise, we will skip the fact that your statement cannot be precisely
interpreted because it claims abortively that obedience was compelled--without
indicating on what matters obedience was compelled, which is most relevant since
spiritual obedience and outward obedience in most matters was in fact not compelled
in the 0.T., and even non-theonomic governments compell obedience in some matters
today. We are left wondering just what you are allegine to be unique and areumentati
relevant about the O.T. social situation, and whether your veiled claim is in fact
true.) In response to your claim we will have to know what you mean by "freedom
of religion," of course, because in many important senses there was a "freedom of
religion" in the O.T. arrangement; those senses are surely not the ones you intend,
for then your argument would be counter-factual. What sense is intended then?
Well, most obviously there was no "freedom" to publicly blaspheme God or to subvert
the community through false presumption to prophecy or anostasy. If it is this
"freedom" which you are saying is improperly excluded if we follow the "theocracy"
today, then you are simply rcstatine that the judicial laws of the O.T. ought not
to be followed by modern societies. But that, sir, is precisely what you were to
prove for us. And if you mean to say that some other kind of "freedom of religion"
that is not explicitly prohibited in the O.T. text is improperly precluded by
following the theocracy today, then your argumentative premise lacks not only
a precise sense, it lacks textual support. Thus this "freedom of religion" issue

23

is bogus through and through. Moreover, you make some remarks in your Dec. 21
letter about the subject that call for further correction. When you allege that
"no kind of theocracy" can exist simultaneously with "freedom of religion," you
are simply lapsing into the same problems noted already with such an argument.
Where, by the way, is your intended sense of "freedom of religion" (whatever it
is) taught as obligatory in the N.T. but prohibited in the O.T.? Your claim that
a true theocracy (whose sense is the true one? Remember, the word is not itself
biblical in origin) makes no distinction between spiritual and civil offenses. I
do not have any reason to think that such a distinction is either obscure or
uncommon (even among non-theonoriic governments), but the most important point is
that if a "true theocracy" makes no such distinction, then the O.T. arrangement
was not truly theocratic. Unlike her neighbors, Israel did not merge kingship
and priesthood. Unlike magical cults, Israel's leaders did not pretend to read
the heart. Unlike ancient tyrannies, the magistrates of Israel could not presume
to govern and direct every single facet of a man's outer life and behavior. And
in the 0.T. social arrangement there was a well known difference between execution
and excommunication ("cutting off" from the people), just as there was an understood
distinction between "matters of Jehovah" (over which the chief priest was placed)
and "matters of the king" (over which the ruler of Judah was placed). A man might
hate his brother in his heart, thes needing sacrificial cleapsing, but: the civil
officials took no note until that man attacked or killed his brother--in which
case, sacrifice apart, he was to be executed. The separation between sin in
general and crime in particular is too patent in the O.T. to need much elaboration.
Consequently, I cannot see that you have given any reason to think that theonomic
political ethics would in any sense "infringe" on the "snirituality" of the church.
By the way, when you said that "the kingdom of God advances by the power of the
gospel in the Church," did you mean to equate the kingdom and church? Also, do
you deny that the advance of the kingdom brings with it progressive conformity to
God's will (revealed in His commandments) and a subduing of all Christ's enemies
(even hostile powers)? Should not gospel prosperity eventually cause even magistrate
to rule more in conformity with God's law? One other random observation. You say
that God's advancing kingdom calls for no laws requiring execution for those who
deny Christ's deity. Theonomists need not disagree, for that is an exegetical
question (first) and a matter of application (second). I am not convinced that
blasphemy in the O.T. civil sense (the only one calling for execution) is committed
by someone who disbelieves or disavows Christ's deity. So your point is superfluous.
But even if the law of God requires this, who are we--without word from the Lawgiverto disagree and dispute the Lord's will today? You still need a biblical argument,
not simply personal sentiment. Finally, when you enlist the Westminster Confession
in Your paragraph promoting "freedom of religion," I thought your reasoning to be
almost too ironic for words. According to the Larger Catechism, one of the duties
required of us today by the second commandment is: "the disapproving, detesting,
and opposing, all false worship: and, according to each one's place and calling,
removing it , and all monuments of idolatry." If your place and calling was that
of civil governing, your duty was to remove false religions from society! Likewise,
the Catechism says that what is forbidden by the second commandment today is
"tolerating a false religion." To add even more damage to your case, the divines
actually cite the O.T. judicial laws in support of these claims, and they appeal
to O.T. prophecy to assure us that such laws would be kept "in that day" (the
N.T. day
. of victory for God's kingdom)! The Confession calls for the power of
the civil magistrate to be used 'against those who -oppose the known principles of
Christianity (20:4). In support they cite the O.T. judicial law again, thus
showing it obvious approval, and they interpret Rom. 13 in this light, thus making

24

I 14)

the law as applicable in this day as it was in the day of, say, Ezra who praised
God that Artaxerxes decreed for God's law to be enforced (even to the point of
it penal sanctions)--an example also cited by the Confession. It further teaches
that civil magistrates are to see to it that "all blasphemies and heresies be
suppressed" (23:3), and it once again goes to the judicial law of Moses to give
scriptural sanction to this view (which is quite theonomic, is it not, in its
theological method). I really think that allusion to the Westmirster Confession
in your attempt to support the "traditional" commitment to "freeoor of religion"
must be judged a false step on your part.
My fourth overall reaction to your supposed arguments against theonomy as
derived from traditional writers will simply be to show their invalidity in as
brief a manner as possible. They are too lightweight to he taken any more
seriously than that. You first cite M'Crie as arguing that the uniqueness of
the theocracy prevents the modern use of its civil laws. (Of course, I perfectly
agree that the O.T. arrangement was in some important ways "unique"--just not in
any such way as to affect the universal validity of God's law as given to Israel
by special revelation, the same law less clearly perceived by the Gentiles in
natural revelation.) M'Crie finds this uniqueness im two matters: (a) the laws
were immediately given from heaven, and (b) an extraordinary providence supported
and punished the system. Now, if the directness of heavenly' revelation invalidates
those laws for our use today, then above all we should not use the decalogue, for
it was most directly revealed to the Jews (being written by the very finger of God).
But reformed theologians are by no means prepared to reject the ten commandments,
so M'Crie's first argument has been reduced to absurdity. Since the moral validity
of those laws is never in Scripture made dependent upon an extraordinary providence,
M'Crie's second argument is rendered irrelevant in the present matter. Moreover,
since an extraordinary providence is likewise operative for the Gentiles and N.T.
believer with respect to the righteousness of God's kingdom (seen in God's law)-whether for judgment (e.g.., Sodom, 2 Peter 2:6-0, or the Canaanite tribes, Lev.
18:24-27) or for blessing (e.g., Prov. 14:34; Nineveh, Luke 11:30-32; or Matthew
6:33), it turns out that M'Crie's second point actually supports the theonomic
position, if anything at all. The next argument that you cite (allegedly from
Owen) is that the Mosaic judicial law would be contrary to the mission of N.T.
church. However you give absolutely no supporting reasons or illustrations to
substantiate this claim; nor do you very clearly indicate what your specific
understanding of the church's mission is. So why should we think that such a
mission would be contrary to God's O.T. law? You do not tell us and thus have
no argument here. Besides, when we look at Christ's own explicit words about
the church's "mission" (Matt. 28:18-20) we do not see Him zealous to dissociate
it from a portion of God's previous revelation (as though that revelation could
now thwart the church's task); rather He gives encouragement regarding the validity
of God's law, saying that whatsoever lie has commanded (cf. Matt. 5:17-20) is to be
enforced in the nations. Moreover, the great apostle dedicated to the church's
mission teaches the "lawful" use of the O.T.. law to restrain .criminal.behavior
in society (I Tim. 1:n-10) and insists on the penal sanctions of the O.T. law
being observed (Acts 25:11: cf. Deut. 21:22 for phraseology). Therefore, Your
"N.T. church's mission" argument is presently devoid of content and force, as
well as not initially plausible. Finally, you appeal to Thomas Peck for an
arguMent (although Peck, the late 19th century writer, is hardly an old "traditional'
reformed theologian of note), but what you come up with is merely name-calling.
Peck says that legal and compulsory methods are papal, but that does not prove
them to'be wrong (after all, the doctrine of Christ's deity is also "papal,"

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727)

although it is also scriptural!). Further, Peck is speaking here of the collection

of tithes. On the one hand, not all theonomists believe that the tithe ought to
be compelled by the civil magistrate (believing, as they do, that it was not thus
enforced in the O.T. either), and on the other hand. Peck surely believed in the
use of civil compulsion on some matters ("papal" though the idea is). The argument
is all the more invalidated then as a polemic against theonomic convictions. Before
closing, let me also take up Peck's article, "The Judicial Law of Moses," for
discussion since you allude to it parenthetically. We have here another example
of your unwitting willingness to lean on a terribly weak reed. The article is
a morass of specious, inconsistent, poor, arbitrary, and unbiblical reasoning,
For instance, Peck speciously areues that the judicial laws were given by Cod
in order to prevent (in vain, confides Peck!) the natural political development
of the Jewish state; yet later he also says that these judicial laws were not
intended entirely to prevent that natural development! Such a mediating position
is comfortable for any scholar: no matter what anybody says against it he can
have his cake and eat it too. But that only points up how trivial or meaningless
the claim is to begin with it can accomodate everything and is qualified out of
significance. Peck falls readily into inconsistency as well. At one point he
contends that the judicial laws were intended to maintain a high and holy standard
in Israel, thus insuring that she would morally differ from the Gentiles; yet
at another point he says the judicial laws were acconodated to the low ethical
character of the Jewish people (thus apparently not distinguishing then from
Gentile ethics at crucial points)! Poor ethical reasoning enters the picture
at Places also. For instance, what sense can be made of Peck's statement that
a "moral" law (i.e., perpetual and universal) is "uniquely applied" in Israel
(i.e., temporary and localized)? If not applicable r.iutis mutandis outside of
Israel, how can this application be rooted in a moral law? This is ethical nonsense.
Elsewhere Peck says that Cod did not make the magistrate in Israel punish all
sins as crimes because of the uncivilized and hardhearted character of the people.
But then, why did He allow the magistrate to punish any sins as crimes? Further,
if even an uncivilized and hardhearted people could be expected to (say) execute
homosexuals, how much more could civilized and regenerated people like ourselves
be expected to do so (when in civil positions of power or influence)? Peck's
argument works like a boomerang against him. lie is not above arbitrary special
pleading in his article also. Arguing for the conclusion that the judicial laws
of the O.T. do not apply to us today, Peck oddly changes direction at one point
and defends the slavery legislation of the O.T. Being a Southern theologian
after the war between the States might have influenced him here! Finally, we
can quickly note some unbiblical premises in Peck's article. lie says that all
sins should really be capital offenses, which is diametrically opposed to the
biblical view of the civil magistrate and his function and prerogatives. Also
Peck asserts that the O.T. penal code was too severe for anything but a theocracy,
thereby being a special heightened requirement of justice in Israel--which is
directly contrary to the teaching of Hebrews 2:2. The just Judge of all the earth
never requires more or less than justice demands, and He does not have a double
standard of justice. If capital. crimes were "worthy of death" (to use biblical
phraseology) in the O.T., they are no less worthy of death today (cf. Acts 25!11).
God is never too severe or morally unjust. The standards made known to Israel
are also known by the (=entiles via natural revelation--even those which teach
that some crimes are "worthy of death" (e.g., Rom. 1:32). I must conclude, now,
that your appeal to Peck--just as your previous-appeals to past "theocratic"
arguments--is unhelpful and without force as a polemic against theonomic ethics.
That is why these "arguments" were not given space in my book. So then, where
is your allegedly "traditional" refutation of theonomy which makes manifest that
it can no longer be thought an "(man nnoqtinn"?

26

Your fifth and final objection to my book was that, supposing my position to
be true, someone might take it to absurd and unacceptable lengths: for instance,
you say, some "fanatic" might reason that since income tax is not required in the
Bible Christians should not pay it, or someone might have gotten so "carried away"
as to abandon his van over "the evil of vehicle insurance" (Dec. 21 letter). I trust
that it will make some difference to you that I can refute the opinion that we
should not pay income tax and the opinion that auto insurance is evil, and I can
do so from the Old and New Testaments, Cod's revealed will. You see, these ideas
are neither theonomic nor the extension of theonomic ideas: they are contrary to
theonomic ideas and practices. So why do you attribute them to my position or
that of Rushdoony? Do you not know our positions well enough to distinguish them
from abuses and erroneous notions that have nothing to do with them? The fact that
Scripture is our only rule does not imply (for theonomists or antitheonomists) that
there is no requirement to which we are hound except those explicitly mentioned in
the Bible; Cod requires me to obey every lawful order of magistrates (submitting
unless they require me to transgress God's own commands), and thus I obey (or
should obey) the traffic regulations of the state, even though such regulations
are not mentioned in Scripture. The fallacy of your hypothetical fanatic has to
do with the logic of our "only rule" being Scripture--not at all with the details
of O.T. law. An antinomian Pentacostalist could as easily make this mistake, and
so there is noAPven anything theonomic in drift about it
(3y the way, when you
mistakenly surmise, "Doesn't the fallacy here lie in the man's understanding of
the purpose of Scripture?," you suggest that for N.T. believers anyway Scripture
is so other-worldly that it is beyond credibility to think that it might have some
moral guidelines regarding so civil a matter as taxation. This kind of remark
has worried many of us that Banner of Truth's Christianity is a stunted form of
"spirituality," revolted by the idea that nod would direct our 'secular" interests
by His word. Does not the purpose of Scripture relate to all areas of life so
that it can equip us unto all good works, as 2 Tim. 3:17 says? Is it beyond
comprehension that some direction on taxation might be included in such a broad,
perfectly equipping purpose?) The example about auto insurance is so unspecified
that I cannot tell why you align it with my viewpoint, except that some friend of
yours has brought Rushdoony's name into the picture--which seems to me to represent
careless or loose reasoning of some sort since Rushdoony himself carries auto
insurance on his vehicles. The "objection" that theonomists might go too far
is no more telling against them than it is against Calvinists or others. How would
you respond to someone that argued in this vein:"some Calvinists have stopped
evangelizing due to their belief in predestination, so you had better not believe
what they do"? That is a classical fallacy of relevance. You cannot refute
Calvinism by attending to abuses of its doctrines. Likewise, you cannot refute
"the Puritan hope" or the "invitation system" or anything at all by looking at
people who have corrupted, misconstrued, or misapplied them. You can only weigh
the merits and demerits of positions for what they actually maintain, and you
can only judge them aright in the light of Cod's word. I really think you know
as much. Surely you have occasionally had to defend your. Calvinism against things
wrongly attributed to it, have you not? Shouldn't you then have the consistency
and sympathy not to use similarly abusive arguments against your own opponents?
Mr. Murray, I would exhort and plead with you not to press into service the
misrepresentations of theonomic ethics that you do in the letters to Dan. To
use them as an objection to my viewpoint is pointless as well as unfair. In the
end, they are not objectionvto my viewpoint, for what you object to is not my viewpoi
That completes a rather thorough examination of the various objections you
have raised.aeainst theonomy. As you can see, not one of them had the slightest

27

) argumentative validity or theological force to them. Now unfortunately there exist

a number of people who would not care in the least that their personal judgments
were defective and weak in this way. Whether or not they are substantiated,
arbitrary, biblical, principled, or fallacious, their opinions are an unassailable,
subjective domain subject to no rules of evidence and logic: thus the refutation
of them can be despised and ignored, if not rationalized by further lapses into
groundless and fallacious thinking. I am presently convinced, Mr. Murray, that
you are not one of these intellectual low-lives, but that you have a Christian
honesty about you as well as the integrity to pursue a question to its proper
end. Accordingly I have not despised your objections by merely casting them
into the trash: instead I have responded to them now at length. I have thought
it important for you to see how theonomists would regard and evaluate your
thinking. I trust that this little "cross-examination" of your remarks will
stimulate you to study the issue again, with more of an open mind toward the
theonomic perspective. Given a regard. for evidence and logic--and especially
for exegetically-based theology--I am convinced that you will not prematurely
put a stop to your thinking on the theonomic issue. Given your fairmindedness,
I likewise am convinced that you will cease prejudicing people against my
point of view with the counter-factual and fallacious objections examined above.
(There is only one thing worse that an illogical or fallacious argument, a
professor used to say: it is a person who knowingly uses it.) Can I maintain
these convictions without fear of disappointment? -I hope you will be able to
respond quickly to this letter, and I hope that you will be willing to promote
unity among reformed people. in our generation by accepting (if not supplementing,
my concrete suggestions above, as well as by agreeing to put aside the misleading
polemic against theonomy which only can arouse hostile feelings in those who
know better. Will you also agree to give my position another look, with a more
sympathetic and interested mind?
With every good wish for the Winter, I remain
Yours in Christ's Bonds,
/471,4,Vi
Dr. Gre4 L. Balinsen

P.S. As I hope to share this paper with interested friends or inquirers. I have
composed a cover letter for it along with a convenient outline (due to the
. length of my discussion). I have appended a copy for you to have as well.
Should you feel any need to share your correspondence with Dan further, I
would appreciate the courtesy if you might include this response as well.