Political Law Set 1

POLITICAL LAW
(STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF THE GOVERNMENT)

I.
IN GENERAL
A. Political Law Defined
POLITICAL LAW has been defined as that branch of public law which deals
with the organization and operation of the governmental organs of the State
and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of its territory People
vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]
Extent of Definition
Case: Bernardita R. Macariola charged respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion of the Court of
First Instance of Leyte."
The complainant alleged that respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the
Code of Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, said corporation having been organized
to engage in business. Said Article provides that:
Article 14 The following cannot engage in commerce, either in person or by proxy, nor can
they hold any office or have any direct, administrative, or financial intervention in commercial or
industrial companies within the limits of the districts, provinces, or towns in which they
discharge their duties:
1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and officials of the department of public prosecution in
active service. This provision shall not be applicable to mayors, municipal judges, and municipal
prosecuting attorneys nor to those who by chance are temporarily discharging the functions of
judge or prosecuting attorney. xxxx
5. Those who by virtue of laws or special provisions may not engage in commerce in a
determinate territory.
It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is incorporated in the Code of
Commerce which is part of the commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the
nature of a political law as it regulates the relationship between the government and certain
public officers and employees, like justices and judges.
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Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II
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Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United
States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed
to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the
Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which deals with the organization and
operation of the governmental organs of the State and define the relations of the state with the
inhabitants of its territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922. Specifically, Article 14
of the Code of Commerce partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it
regulates the conduct of certain public officers and employees with respect to engaging in
business: hence, political in essence. It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce
is the Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, with some modifications made by the "Commission
de Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar," which was extended to the Philippines by the
Royal Decree of August 6, 1888, and took effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.
former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically
abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315, 330, 311 [1912]) that:
By well-settled public law, upon the cession of territory by one nation to another, either
following a conquest or otherwise, ... those laws which are political in their nature and pertain
to the prerogatives of the former government immediately cease upon the transfer of
sovereignty. (Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899).
While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the, laws of the new
sovereign continue in force without the express assent or affirmative act of the conqueror, the
political laws do not. (Halleck's Int. Law, chap. 34, par. 14). However, such political laws of the
prior sovereignty as are not in conflict with the constitution or institutions of the new sovereign,
may be continued in force if the conqueror shall so declare by affirmative act of the commanderin-chief during the war, or by Congress in time of peace. (Ely's Administrator vs. United States,
171 U.S. 220, 43 L. Ed. 142). In the case of American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356 Bales of
Cotton (1 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242), Chief Justice Marshall said:
On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never been held that the relations of the
inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their relations with their former sovereign
are dissolved, and new relations are created between them and the government which has
acquired their territory. The same act which transfers their country, transfers the allegiance
of those who remain in it; and the law which may be denominated political, is necessarily
changed, although that which regulates the intercourse and general conduct of individuals,
remains in force, until altered by the newly- created power of the State.
Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court stated that: "It is a general
principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the
ceded region are totally abrogated. "
There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the aforestated
provision of the Code of Commerce after the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United
States and then to the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the respondent, then Judge of
the Court of First Instance, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. Macariola vs.
Asuncion- 114 SCRA 77, - A.M. No. 133-J May 31, 1982
To Emphasize, as to laws which are not political in nature,
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Case: On May 22, 1944, Herminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao executed a deed of
donation propter nuptias in favor of their son, respondent Benito Locquiao and his then
prospective and eventual bride By the terms of the deed, the donees were gifted with four (4)
Rule: As to whether the Indeterminate Sentence Act was in force during the occupation, the
answer is in the affirmative. A proclamation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces
of January 2, 1942, directed that "so far as the military administration permits, all the laws now
in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be
effective for the time being as in the past." This was nothing more than a confirmation of the
well-known rule of the Law of Nations that municipal laws, as contra-distinguished from laws of
political nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty. (Kim Cham vs. Valdes Tan Keh
and Dizon (75 Phil., 113) The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not a political law. It does not
affect political relations. In fact, it is a part of the Commonwealth's criminal and penal system
directly related to the punishment of crime and the maintenance of public peace and order,
which Article 43 of Section III of the Hague Regulations of 1907 compels the belligerent
occupant to take all steps in his power to reestablish and insure as far as possible. G.R. No. L1352 April 30, 1947 ALFONSO MONTEBON vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
parcels of land, including the land in question, in consideration of the impending marriage of the
donees. Herminigildo and Raymunda died on December 15, 1962.
Years later, the donation was questioned by the Petitioner as allegedly it did not observe the
form required by law as there was no written acceptance on the document itself or in a separate
public instrument. The issue to be threshed out is whether acceptance of the donation by the
donees is required.
Rule: It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable
thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive
effect. Consequently, it is the Old Civil Code which applies in this case since the
donation propter nuptias was executed in 1944 and the New Civil Code took effect only on
August 30, 1950. The fact that in 1944 the Philippines was still under Japanese occupation is of
no consequence. It is a well-known rule of the Law of Nations that municipal laws, as contradistinguished from laws of political nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty. This
Court specifically held that during the Japanese occupation period, the Old Civil Code was in
force. As a consequence, applying Article 1330 of the Old Civil Code in the determination of the
validity of the questioned donation, it does not matter whether or not the donees had accepted
the donation. The validity of the donation is unaffected in either case. G.R. No. 122134 October
3, 2003 ROMANA LOCQUIAO VALENCIA and CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA vs. BENITO A.
LOCQUIAO
B. Scope of Political Law:

a. The law of public administration. This deals with the organization and
management of the different branches of the government
b. Constitutional law. Deals with the guaranties of the constitution to individual
rights and the limitations on governmental action
c. Administrative law. Deals with the exercise of executive power in the making
of rules and the decision of questions affecting private rights
d. The law on public corporations. Deals with the governmental agencies for
local government or for other special purpose
C. Constitutional Law defined
Constitutional law is a term used to designate the law embodied in the
constitution and the legal principles growing out of the interpretation and
application made by courts of the constitution in specific cases. (Sinco, Phil.
Political Law)
It is a body of rules resulting from the interpretation by a high court of cases in
which the validity, in relation to the constitutional instrument, of some act of
governmenthas been challenged. (Bernas)
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Constitutional law consist not only of the constitution, but also of the cases
decided by the Supreme Court on constitutional grounds, i.e., every case where
the ratio decidendi is based on a constitutional provision. (Defensor-Santiago)
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Constitutional law is the study of the maintenance of the proper balance

between authority represented by the three inherent powers of the State and
liberty as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. (Cruz, Constitutional Law)
D. Constitution Defined
A constitution is both a legal document and a political plan. It, therefore,
embodies legal rules as well as political principles. And so when we speak of
constitutional law in the strict sense of the tern, we refer to the legal rules of
the constitution.1
It is a law for the government, safeguarding individual rights, set down in
writing. (Hamilton)
It may be more specifically defined as a written instrument organizing the
government, distributing its powers and safeguarding the rights of the People
(Taada and Fernando)
According to Schwartz, it is seen as an organic instrument, under which
governmental powers are both conferred and circumscribed. Such stress upon
both grant and limitation of authority is fundamental in American theory. The
office and purpose of the constitution is to shape and fix the limits of
governmental activity. (Fernando)
Comprehensive Definition: That body of rules and maxims in accordance with
which the powers of sovereignty are habitually exercised. (Cooley)
[This covers written and unwritten constitutions. (Cruz, Constitutional Law)]
American sense: A constitution is a written instrument by which the
fundamental powers of government are established, limited, and defined and by
which these powers are distributed among several departments, for their more
safe and useful exercise, for the benefit of the body politic. (Justice Miller)
With particular reference to the Philippine Constitution: That written instrument
enacted by direct action of the people by which the fundamental powers of the
government are established, limited and defined, and by which those powers
are distributed among several departments for their safe and useful exercise for
the benefit of the body politic. (Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional Law, p. 6)
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Case: A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration
of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from
which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the
nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the
different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed
principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is
that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which
all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered. Under the
Mendoza Notes
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E. Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy
2015
doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution
that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or
entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force
and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of
the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. G.R. No. 122156 February 3,
1997 MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be
void and the latter shall govern Art 7, New Civil Code
F. Foreign Jurisprudence and Constitutional Law

Case: American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of
dubious application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only
limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the
case of Garcia vs. COMELEC, (227 SCRA 100 (1993).)"[i]n resolving constitutional disputes,
[this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly
applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional settings and
needs." Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United
States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the colorful words of Father
Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord." G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
FRANCISCO, JR. vs THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Case (F)oreign decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in this jurisdiction. At
best, they are persuasive and have been used to support many of our decisions. We should
not place undue and fawning reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable mental
crutches without which we cannot come to our own decisions through the employment of our
own endowments. We live in a different ambience and must decide our own problems in the
light of our own interests and needs, and of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a
people, and always with our own concept of law and justice. Our laws must be construed in
accordance with the intention of our own lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from
the language of each law and the context of other local legislation related thereto. More
importantly, they must be construed to serve our own public interest which is the be-all and
the end-all of all our laws. And it need not be stressed that our public interest is distinct and
different from others. - G.R. No. 167614 March 24, 2009 SERRANO vs. .GALLANT
MARITIME
G. Types of Constitution
1. In relation to the amendment process:
RIGID CONSTITUTION - is one that can be amended only by a formal and
usually difficult process. This may not be amended except through a special
process distinct from and more involved than the method of changing
ordinary laws.
The constitution is rendered difficult to change and thereby acquires a
greater degree of stability;
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It may be changed in the same manner and through the same body that
enacts ordinary legislation. Example: British Constitution.
FLEXIBLE CONSTITUTION - is one that can be changed by ordinary

legislation. (Cruz, Constitutional Law p 5).
2. As to its adaption:
WRITTEN CONSTITUTION - is one whose precepts are embodied in one
document or set of documents. The provisions have been reduced to writing
and embodied in one or more instruments at a particular time.2
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION - consists of rules which have not been
integrated into a single, concrete form but are scattered in various sources,
such as statues of a fundamental character, judicial decisions, commentaries
of publicists, customs and traditions, and certain common law principles.
(Cruz, Constitutional Law pp 4-5) Such has not been committed to writing at
any specific time but is the accumulated product of gradual political and
legal development.3
3. As to its enactment
ENACTED OR CONVENTIONAL CONSTITUTION - is enacted, formally struck
off at a definitive time and place following a conscious or deliberate effort
taken by a constituent body or ruler;
CUMULATIVE OR EVOLVED - is the result of political evolution, not
inaugurated at any specific time but changing by accretion rather than by
systematic method. (Cruz, Constitutional Law p 5)
4. Others:
NORMATIVE - adjusts to norms, those that function more truly as
prescriptive documents, such as the Constitution of the United States, are
called normative constitutions.
NOMINAL not yet fully operational. Constitutions such as that of the
former Soviet Union are called nominal constitutions. The Soviet Constitution
claimed to guarantee Freedom of Speech, press, and assembly, but in
practice the Soviet government continually repressed those who sought to
express those freedoms.
SEMANTIC A Fundamental law for the perpetuation of power. (pseudoconstitution), enforced to formalize and legalize the monopoly of power in
authoritarianism or even totalitarianism.
What is the Philippine Constitution? The Constitution of the Philippines is
written, conventional and rigid
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They have been also called conventional or enacted because they are given definite form by a steadily
constituted body, the constitutional convention, at a particular time. Example: U.S. and Philippine
Constitution ;
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They are also known as cumulative or evolved because they are not formulated at any definite time but are
rather the outcome of a political evolutionary process. Example: English Constitution
H. Qualities of a Good Constitution
Broad. Because it provides for the organization of the entire government

and covers all persons and things within the territory of the State and
also because it must be comprehensive enough to provide for every
contingency. (Cruz, Constitutional Law pp 5-6
Case: A constitution is not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few years but is to
endure through generations for as long as it remains unaltered by the people as ultimate
sovereign, a constitution should be construed in the light of what actually is a continuing
instrument to govern not only the present but also the unfolding events of the indefinite future.
Although the principles embodied in a constitution remain fixed and unchanged from the time of
its adoption, a constitution must be construed as a dynamic process intended to stand for a great
length of time, to be progressive and not static. G.R. No. 196271 February 28, 2012 DATU
MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, vs. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Case: Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary events. They
should be interpreted to cover even future and unknown circumstances. It is to the credit of its
drafters that a Constitution can withstand the assaults of bigots and infidels but at the same time
bend with the refreshing winds of change necessitated by unfolding events. As one eminent
political law writer and respected jurist explains:
The Constitution must be quintessential rather than superficial, the root and not the blossom,
the base and frame-work only of the edifice that is yet to rise. It is but the core of the dream that
must take shape, not in a twinkling by mandate of our delegates, but slowly "in the crucible of
Filipino minds and hearts," where it will in time develop its sinews and gradually gather its
strength and finally achieve its substance. In fine, the Constitution cannot, like the goddess
Athena, rise full-grown from the brow of the Constitutional Convention, nor can it conjure by
mere fiat an instant Utopia. It must grow with the society it seeks to re-structure and march
apace with the progress of the race, drawing from the vicissitudes of history the dynamism and
vitality that will keep it, far from becoming a petrified rule, a pulsing, living law attuned to the
heartbeat of the nation. Taada vs. Angara G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997
Brief. It must confine itself to basic principles to be implemented with

legislative details more adjustable to change and easier to amend. (Cruz,
Constitutional Law pp 4-5)
Definite. To prevent ambiguity in its provisions which could result in

confusion and divisiveness among the people. (Cruz, Constitutional Law
pp 4-5)
I. Essential Parts of a Good Constitution
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Constitution of Liberty. The series of proscriptions setting forth the

fundamental civil and political rights of the citizens and imposing limitations
on the powers of government as a means of securing the enjoyment of
those rights. (Ex. Article III)
Constitution of Government. The series of provisions outlining the

organization of the government, enumerating its powers, laying down
certain rules relative to its administration and defining the electorate. (ex.
Art VI, VII, VIII and IX)
Constitution of Sovereignty. The provisions pointing out the mode or

procedure in accordance with which formal changes in the fundamental law
may be brought about. (Ex. Art XVII)
J. Philosophical View of the Constitution
Case: (T)he Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract
whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common
good. Hence, lest the officers of the Government exercising the powers delegated by the
people forget and the servants of the people become rulers, the Constitution reminds
everyone that "[s]overeignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them. G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989 FERDINAND E. MARCOS, vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS
II.
THE BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION

A- Precedents
Treaty of Paris: (signed December 10, 1898; became effective on April
11, 1899)
The Philippines was ceded by Spain to the U.S. Spain relinquished its
sovereignty over the Philippines Islands, and with this,
All laws of political nature were automatically abrogated.

It provided that the civil and political status of all inhabitants of the
islands were to be determined by the US Congress.
The US Constitution did not apply to the Philippines unless the US
Congress expressly enacted its provisions.
McKinleys Instructions: (issued by Pres. McKinley on April 7, 1900 as

Letter of Instruction to the Second Philippines Commission under Taft)
It set up a divided civil and military government with the existing Military
governor as the Executive and a Philippine Commission, created on
September 1, 1900, as the Legislative. Both represented the US President as
Commander-in-Chief.
It extended to the Philippines all the rights in the Bill of Rights of the
US Federal Constitution except
o
o
This was the first Organic Act (a law which establishes the structure
and limitations of the government) of the Philippines. What it lacked,
as a constitution, were the ratification by the people and the right of
amendment which was reserved solely to the US President)
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the right to bear arms4 and

the rights to a trial by jury5.
The Philippines was then in rebellion

Due to the distrust of the US to Filipinos
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The judiciary was subsequently established on 11 June 1901, with a

Supreme Court, Courts of First Instance, and Justice of Peace Courts
Spooner Amendment:
July 4, 1901: The Spooner Amendment, was actually a rider to the Army
and Navy Appropriation Act,
It changed the then divided military and civil government into a fully
civil government under the US Congress. All acts of the Philippines
Commission would now begin: Be it enacted by the authority of the
US government, and no longer by authority of the US President.
Philippine Bill of 1902: (Philippines organic act from 1902 to 1906)

The Governor-General retained all executive power, including the
power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus upon recommendation of
the Philippine Commission.
The Philippine Commission was the upper house. It established an
elective lower house called the Philippines Assembly, composed
entirely of Filipinos.
It defined for the first time who are the citizens of the Philippines.
They were all the inhabitants of the Philippine islands who were
subjects of Spain as of April 11, 1989, who continued to reside
therein, and all the children subsequent thereto.
Jones Law (or the Philippine Autonomy Act): (passed on August 29, 1916
by the US Congress)
It established a tripartite government with real separation of powers;

this was the prototype of our present set-up. *
o
The executive power was in the hands of an American

Governor-General, who was independent of the Legislature, and
who was given the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus
and impose martial law without the recommendation of the
Legislature. The Legislature was composed of the Senate and
the House of Representatives, all composed of Filipinos. The
judiciary continued to be made up of the Supreme Court, the
CFIs and Justice of Peace Courts.
Under this set-up, while the Filipinos has all the legislative
power, the Americans had all the executive power and thus,
also the control of the government
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It is an enabling statute that provided the mechanism whereby the

constitution of an independent Philippines could be adopted.
Tydings-McDuffie Law: (not an organic act)
This provided for:

1. The calling of Constitutional Convention to draft our Constitution.
2. The adoption of a Constitution that established a republican government,
with a Bill of Rights and a separation of Church and state.
3. Submission of the draft to the US President for certification that the
Constitution was in conformity with the condition set by the TydingsMcDuffie Law.
4. Its ratification by the people in a plebiscite.
Complete independence was to take place ten (10) years after its effectivity.
1935 Constitution: (took effect on November 15, 1935)
This served as the charter of the Commonwealth and upon withdrawal

of US sovereignty, of the Republic.
It provides for a tripartite government, with the executive lodged in
the President who had a 6-year term, the legislative in a unicameral
National Assembly and the judiciary in a Supreme Court, CFIs, and
Justice of Peace Courts.
Amendments:
1. 1940. Provided a bicameral Congress, a term of 4 years for the President
with re-election, and establishment of Commission on Elections
2. 1947. Included Parity Rights Agreement which stated that Congress
acting as constituent body, needed vote to propose an amendment to
the Constitution
3. 1967. Provided the amendment of the Constitution by a Convention
1973 Constitution:
This was ratified by the citizens assembly (January 10-15, 1973 which was
called by Pres. Marcos during the Martial Law. After the ratification,
Proclamation No. 1102 on 17 January 1973, certified and proclaimed that
the Constitution proposed by the Constitutional Convention of 1971 had
been ratified by the Filipino people and thereby come into effect.
Relevant Law: PROCLAMATION NO. 1102
ANNOUNCING THE RATIFICATION BY THE FILIPINO PEOPLE OF THE CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1971
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION.
WHEREAS, the said Citizens Assemblies were established precisely to broaden the base of citizen participation in the
democratic process and to afford ample opportunity for the citizenry to express their views on important national issues;
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WHEREAS, Citizens Assemblies were created in barrios, in municipalities and in districts/wards in chartered cities pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 86, dated December 31, 1972, composed of all persons who are residents of the barrio, district or
ward for at least six months, fifteen years of age or over, citizens of the Philippines and who are registered in the list of Citizen
Assembly members kept by the barrio, district or ward secretary;
10
WHEREAS, the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred seventy-one Constitutional Convention is subject to
ratification by the Filipino people;
WHEREAS, responding to the clamor of the people and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86-A, dated January 5, 1973, the
following questions were posed before the Citizens Assemblies or Barangays: Do you approve of the New Constitution? Do
you still want a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution?
WHEREAS, fourteen million nine hundred seventy-six thousand five hundred sixty-one (14,976,561) members of all the
Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) voted for the adoption of the proposed Constitution, as against seven hundred forty-three
thousand eight hundred sixty-nine (743,869) who voted for its rejection; while on the question as to whether or not the people
would still like a plebiscite to be called to ratify the new Constitution, fourteen million two hundred ninety-eight thousand eight
hundred fourteen (14,298,814) answered that there was no need for a plebiscite and that the vote of the Barangays (Citizens
Assemblies) should be considered as a vote in a plebiscite;
WHEREAS, since the referendum results show that more than ninety-five (95) per cent of the members of the Barangays
(Citizens Assemblies) are in favor of the new Constitution, the Katipunan ng Mga Barangay has strongly recommended that
the new Constitution should already be deemed ratified by the Filipino people;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me vested by the
Constitution, do hereby certify and proclaim that the Constitution proposed by the nineteen hundred and seventy-one (1971)
Constitutional Convention has been ratified by an overwhelming majority of all of the votes cast by the members of all the
Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) throughout the Philippines, and has thereby come into effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 17th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-three.
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
"President of the Philippines
"By the President:
"ALEJANDRO MELCHOR
"Executive Secretary"
Amendments:
1. 1976. Gave the President legislative powers even if the Interim
Batasang Pambansa was already operating.
2. 1980. Raised the retirement of justices from 65 to 70.6
3. 1980. Changed the form of government from Parliamentary to
Presidential.
4. 1984. Provided for a Vice President.
B- The 1986 Revolution
Constitution
and
proclamation
of
the
provisional
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The alleged electoral fraud in the snap presidential election in February

7, 1986, sparked demonstrations with the demands for the ouster of
Marcos. Then Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and the Armed Forces
Vice-Chief of Staff command of Fidel V. Ramos, who barricaded
themselves at Camp Crame and Camp Aguinaldo, withdrew their support
from the Marcos government and called for the resignation of the late
president. With the support of the church and mass media, thousands of
Filipinos to march the street of EDSA.
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1. Proclamation of the Freedom Constitution.

To extend the terms of presidential allies
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a. Proclamation No. 1 February 25, 1986 (Provisional Government)

Announced the assumption of power of Aquino and Laurel
This supposed to have established the Provisional Government but
Proclamation No. 3 seemed to suggest that it was a revolutionary
government since in one of its whereases it announced that the new
government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of
the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces,
referring to the EDSA revolution.
The popular view was that the Aquino government was not an
offshoot of the 1973 Constitution for under that Constitution a
procedure was given for the election of the President proclamation
by the Batasan and the candidate proclaimed was Marcos. Was the
Aquino Government legitimate? This was said to be not a justiceable
matter. This view was affirmed in Lawyers League v Aquino where the
legitimacy of the Aquino government is questioned on the ground that
it was not established pursuant to the 1973 Constitution
Case:. The SC ruled that petitioners had no personality to sue and their petition states
no cause of action. "For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable
matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the
judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of
President Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely
a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the
community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government. All the
eleven members of this Court as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental
law of the Republic under her government."
The Aquino government was a result of a "direct state action." It was not as if a small
group revolted and succeeded in wresting power in the end. Rather, the entire state
revolted and overthrew the government, so that right from the beginning, the installation
7
was already lawful and the government was at all times de jure. - Lawyers League v
Aquino (GR Nos. 73748, 73972 & 73990, May 22, 1986
Case: Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action.
For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the
realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge. And the people
have made the judgment; they have accepted the government of President Corazon C.
Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de
8
facto government but in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community of
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In this regard, it must be noted that there is no such thing as a constitutional right of revolution. A revolution,
from the point of view of a State, is always lawful since a State can never go wrong; it can change its
government in whatever way the sovereign sees fit. But this right of revolution, inherent in sovereignty,
cannot be recognized in a Constitution, for this would be self-destructive. The nature of a Constitution is to
set-up a government and provide for an orderly way to change this government. A revolution contradicts this
nature.
8
Kinds of de facto government: 1. The government that gets possession and control of or usurps, by force or
by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal government and maintains itself against the will of the latter. 2.
That established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection
against the parent state. 3. That which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and
12
nations has recognized the legitimacy of tlie present government. All the eleven
members of this Court, as reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the
Republic under her government. (Joint Resolution of May 22, 1986 in G.R. No. 73748
[Lawyers League for a Better Philippines, etc. vs. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.];
G.R. No. 73972 [People's Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution. etc. vs. Mrs. Cory
Aquino, et al.]; and G.R. No. 73990 [Councilor Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino,
et al.])
For the above-quoted reason, which are fully applicable to the petition at bar, mutatis
9
mutandis , there can be no question that President Corazon C. Aquino and VicePresident Salvador H. Laurel are the incumbent and legitimate President and VicePresident of the Republic of the Philippines for the above-quoted reasons, which are
fully applicable to the petition at bar, G.R. No. 76180 October 24, 1986 IN RE:
SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ
b. Proclamation No. 3 March 25, 1986 (Provisional Constitution),

announced the promulgation of the Provisional (Freedom)
Constitution, pending the drafting and ratification of a new
Constitution.
It abrogated the legislative provisions of the 1973
Constitution, modified the provision regarding the executive
department, and totally reorganized the government.
It adopted certain provisions in the 1973 Constitution, contained
additional articles on the executive department, on government
reorganization, and on existing laws. It provided for the calling of a
Constitution Commission composed of 30 to 50 members appointed
by the President within 60 days.
C- Adoption and Effectivity of the Present Constitution
1. Adoption of the Constitution.
o
o
o
Proclamation No. 9, creating the Constitutional Commission of

50 members
October 15, 1986 - Approval of the draft Constitution by the
Constitutional Commission
February 2, 1987 - Plebiscite held for the present constitution
2. Article V of the Provisional Constitution

Provisional Const., Art. V
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occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war and which is denominated as a government of
paramount force, like the 2nd Republic of the Philippines established by the Japanese belligerent.
Characteristics: a. Its existence is maintained by active military power within the territories and against the
rightful authority of an established and lawful government. b. During its existence, it must necessarily be
obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force,
do not become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful
government.
9
With necessary changes in points of detail (Blacks Law Dictionary)
13
Section 1: Within sixty (60) days from date of this Proclamation, a Commission shall be
appointed by the President to draft a New Constitution. The Commission shall be composed
of not less than thirty (30) nor more than (50) natural born citizens of the Philippines, of
recognized probity, known for their independence, nationalism and patriotism. They shall be
chosen by the President after consultation with various sectors of society.
Section 2: The Commission shall complete its work within as short a period as may be
consistent with the need both to hasten the return of normal constitutional government and
to draft a document truly reflective of the ideals and aspirations of the Filipino people.
Section 3: The Commission shall conduct public hearings to insure that the people will have
adequate participation in the formulation of the New Constitution
Section 4: The plenary sessions of the Commission shall be public and recorded.
Section 5: The New Constitution shall be presented by the Commission to the President who
shall fix the date for the holding of a plebiscite. It shall become valid and effective upon
ratification by a majority of the votes cast in such plebiscite which shall be held within a
period of 20 days following its submission to the President.
3. Section 27. Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution

This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.
The foregoing proposed Constitution of the Republic of the
Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the twelfth day of
eighty-six, and accordingly signed on the fifteenth day of
eighty-six at the Plenary Hall, National Government
Commissioners whose signatures are hereunder affixed.
Philippines was approved by the

October, Nineteen hundred and
October, Nineteen hundred and
Center, Quezon City, by the
4. Proclamation No. 58 February 11, 1987 - proclaiming the ratification

of the Constitution
Case: The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date,
therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having
become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III,
thereof
By virtue of the provision of Article XVIII, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution that it "shall
take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held
for the purpose," the 1987 Constitution took effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its
ratification in the plebiscite held on that same date.
So that is the date of the ratification" and that "the canvass thereafter [of the votes] is merely
the mathematical confirmation of what was done during the date of the plebiscite and the
proclamation of the President is merely the official confirmatory declaration of an act which
was actually done by the Filipino people in adopting the Constitution when they cast their
votes on the date of the plebiscite- DE LEON vs. ESGUERRA G.R. No. 78059 August 31,
1987
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Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless
it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one
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Context:
14
(As compared to the effectivity and the Publication of laws: Taada vs. Tuvera
136 SCRA 27 - 1985)
year after such publication. (New Civil Code)

Case: Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for
their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall
within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption
that they have been circularized to all concerned.
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound
by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not
been published, shall have no force and effect. (Taada vs. Tuvera G.R. No. L-63915 April 24,
1985)
Case: After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the
original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion and so hold, that the
clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its
previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the
usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of
President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law
does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The
subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may
question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law
without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation
10
or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public
interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only,
and to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless
a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
10
Beyond the powers or if within the powers are not binding due to lack of consent of stakeholders
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15
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President
in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or,
at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must a also
be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel
of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication
required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the
rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a
portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential
decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored
individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the
Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the
details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social
Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head
of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office
uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local
Government Code.
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere
mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g.,
"with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official
Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This
was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential
decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos
administration. The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital
law.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows
with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be
recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication
intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
It is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as
soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only
after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in
accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code. Taada vs. Tuvera G.R. No. L-63915 December 29,
1986
Law: E.O. 200 June 18, 1987 Amending Article 2 of the Civil Code
Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either
in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is
otherwise provided.
III.
Judicial Elaboration of the Constitution
Case: The controversy arose when respondent GSIS, decided to sell through public bidding
30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC (Manila Hotel). In a close
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- IN CASE OF DOUBT, THE CONSTITUTION SHOULD BE

CONSIDERED SELF-EXECUTING RATHER THAN NONSELF-EXECUTING
16
A. Construction
bidding only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share,
and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the
same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the
execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28
September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad and
subsequently sent a manager's check Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group,
which respondent GSIS refused to accept. Hence, the case.
Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the
Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical
monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of
an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence
and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and
purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony Petitioner also argues that since 51%
of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is
owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business
of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national
economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly
covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987
Constitution, applies.
11
Rule: Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules
for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their
provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who
merely establish an outline of government providing for the different departments of the
governmental machinery and securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. A
provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which
supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is selfexecuting. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right
conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating
that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.
In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State
shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. (NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY)
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11
17
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate
the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a
provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for
the protection of the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards
around the exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or
prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render
such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution
of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an
indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision
of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any
legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right
and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the
subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. (G.R. No. 122156 February 3,
1997 MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM)
Also the case of GAMBOA VS TEVES* reiterates the ruling of Manila Prince Hotel v.
GSIS
Case: Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, like other provisions of the Constitution
expressly reserving to Filipinos specific areas of investment, such as the development of natural
resources and ownership of land, educational institutions and advertising business, is selfexecuting. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions of the
Constitution. The rationale why these constitutional provisions are self-executing was explained
in Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, thus:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce
a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution
are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation
instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically
nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the
prevailing view is, as it has always been, that
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than
non-self-executing. . . .Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the
Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the
legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These
provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make
them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.
In Manila Prince Hotel, even the Dissenting Opinion of then Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno,
later Chief Justice, agreed that constitutional provisions are presumed to be self-executing.
Justice Puno stated that Courts as a rule consider the provisions of the Constitution as selfexecuting, rather than as requiring future legislation for their enforcement. The reason is not
difficult to discern. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental
law ratified by the sovereign people can be easily ignored and nullified by Congress. Suffused
with wisdom of the ages is the unyielding rule that legislative actions may give breath to
constitutional rights but congressional inaction should not suffocate them. G.R. No. 176579,
June 28, 2011, WILSON P. GAMBOA vs. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES
Case: Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines "to place nationals and products
of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products" and (2) that the WTO
"intrudes, limits and/or impairs" the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme
Court, the instant petition before this Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate
of the 1987 Constitution to "develop a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the
preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods."
Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippine participation in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization? Does it proscribe Philippine integration into a global
economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized? These are the main questions raised in
this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
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Section 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Rule: Declaration of Principles, Not Self-Executing
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Issue: Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
contravene the provisions of Sec. 19, Article II,
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." The
12
counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution is called the "basic political creed of the
13
nation" by Dean Vicente Sinco.
These principles in Article II are not intended to be self14
executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary
as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its
15
enactment of laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the
principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are not
"self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts.
They do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation."
In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor that broad constitutional principles need
legislative enactments to implement Taada vs. Angara G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997
Case: Petitioner questions his being declared a nuisance candidate
Rule: Implicit in the petitioners invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access
to opportunities for public office" is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold
public office and, particularly in his case, to seek the presidency. There is none. What is
recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the
Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable
right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or
justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled
"Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally
considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a different
treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II,
the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies
a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to
any cause of action before the courts.
As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected
to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found
in the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6452 dated December 10, 2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC
may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. G.R. No.
161872 April 13, 2004 PAMATONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
OTHERS;
There are three well-settled principles of constitutional construction:
First, VERBA LEGIS, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the
Constitution should be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed;
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Also entitled "Declaration of Principles." The nomenclature in the 1973 Charter is identical with that in the
1987's.
13
Philippine Political Law, 1962 Ed., p. 116.
14
Bernas, The Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary, Vol. II, 1988 Ed., p. 2. In the very recent case
of Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997, p. 8, it was held that "A provision which
lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not selfexecuting."
15
246 SCRA 540, 564, July 17, 1995. See also Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455 and
consolidated cases, August 25, 1995.
19
12
Second, where there is ambiguity, RATIO LEGIS EST ANIMA, meaning that
the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the
intent of its framers; and
Third, UT MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT, meaning that the Constitution is to
be interpreted as a whole.16
1. The Constitution has to be Interpreted
as a Whole (UT MAGIS VALEAT QUAM
PEREAT)
Rule: Economic Nationalism should be read with other constitutional mandates to attain
Balanced Development of Economy.
It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service Insurance
System, et al., this Court held that "Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines
or implementing laws or rule for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not
require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable." However, as the
constitutional provision itself states, it is enforceable only in regard to "the grants of rights,
privileges and concessions covering national economy and patrimony" and not to every aspect
of trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions rather than the rule. The issue here is not whether
this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a
17
rule, there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the
Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.
All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor
and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of
the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only
against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. The Constitution did not intend to
pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the
development of the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited
entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them
either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on
foreign competition that is unfair. Taada vs. Angara G.R. No. 118295 May 2, 1997
Other cases on the construction of the Constitution
16
Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003.

Secs. 1 and 13
Sec. 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and
wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of
the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially the
underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and
agrarian reform, through industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and
which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino
enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum
opportunity to develop. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and
arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity.
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17
2. Plain Meaning Rule. Whenever Possible

the Words Used in the Constitution
Must Be Given their Ordinary Meaning
Except When Technical Terms are
Employed. (VERBA LEGIS)
Verba legis non est recedendum from the words of a statute there should
be no departure.18
Rule: In construing provisions of the Constitution, the first rule is verba legis, "that is, wherever
possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed." G.R. No. 196271 February 28, 2012 DATU MICHAEL ABAS
KIDA, vs. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Case: Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject congressional district for at
least one (1) year immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections.
Allegedly, counting, from the day after June 22, 1997 when respondent registered at Precinct
No. 4400-A, up to and until the day of the elections on May 11, 1998, respondent lacks the one
(1) year residency requirement provided for candidates for Member of the House of
Representatives under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.
Rule: Records show that petitioner's domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that
sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old
Balara, Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of representative of
the 3rd District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had
effectively abandoned his "residence" in Quezon City and has established a new "domicile" of
choice at the Province of Sarangani.
It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications
for suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as "domicile," which imports not only
an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
19
conduct indicative of such intention . "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which,
whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to
return. "Domicile" is a question of intention and circumstances. In the consideration of
circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must have a residence
or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and
(3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time.
As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality involved
and intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile. No
change of domicile will result if either of these elements is absent. Intention to acquire a domicile
without actual residence in the locality does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact
of physical presence without intention
Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, supra note 31 at 885, citing J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land
Tenure Administration, L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413.
19
Verba Legis - Plain meaning rule. Whenever possible the words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except when technical terms are employed.
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18
21
The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately support a
change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of DOMINO's intention to reside in
Sarangani but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of
one's original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter
how long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus
the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot located in the province of Sarangani, i.e., 15
January 1997, cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period
of the one-year residence requirement.
Further, Domino's lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is further
strengthened by his act of registering as voter in one of the precincts in Quezon City. While
voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence
especially in this case where DOMINO registered in his former barangay. Exercising the right of
election franchise is a deliberate public assertion of the fact of residence, and is said to have
decided preponderance in a doubtful case upon the place the elector claims as, or believes to
be, his residence. G.R. No. 134015 July 19, 1999 JUAN DOMINO vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
3. The words of the Constitution should

be interpreted in accordance with the
intent of its framers (RATIO LEGIS ET
ANIMA)
Still, it is a basic principle in statutory construction that the law must be
given a reasonable interpretation at all times20. The Court may, in some
instances, consider the spirit and reason of a statute, where a literal
meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, or injustice, or would defeat
the clear purpose of the law makers.21 Applying a verba legis or strictly
literal interpretation of the constitution may render its provisions
meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation, or an injustice.
To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent
or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be made to the rule
that the spirit of the law controls its letter.22
Interpretation according to spirit. The words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of the framers.
Rule: Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read
according to its spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not
within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute.
Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute
as if within the letter, and that which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute
unless within the intent of the lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not
accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators. G.R. No.
180050 April 12, 2011 RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O.
23
MEDINA vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA
Rule: Truly, law must be understood not by "the letter that killeth but by the spirit that giveth life."
Law should not be read and interpreted in isolated academic abstraction nor even for the sake of
logical symmetry but always in context of pulsating social realities and specific environmental
facts. Truly, "the real essence of justice does not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal
technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as a brick
20
Millares v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 110524, July 29, 2002.
People v. Manantan, G.R. No. 14129, July 31, 1962, citing Crawford, Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 78, p.
294
22
Navarro v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010
23
Citing League of Cities of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499, and
178056, December 21, 2009, 608 SCRA 636, 644-645
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21
in the ultimate development of the social edifice." Frivaldo vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 120295, p.
56, June 28, 1996
Rule: As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyers document, it being essential for the rule of
law to obtain that it should ever be present in the peoples consciousness, its language as much
as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says
according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the
power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what
they say. Thus these are cases where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.
However, where there is ambiguity or doubt, the words of the Constitution should be interpreted
in accordance with the intent of its framers or ratio legis et anima. A doubtful provision must be
examined in light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances surrounding
the framing of the Constitution. In following this guideline, courts should bear in mind the object
sought to be accomplished in adopting a doubtful constitutional provision, and the evils sought to
be prevented or remedied. Consequently, the intent of the framers and the people ratifying the
constitution, and not the panderings of self-indulgent men, should be given effect. Atty. Romulo
A. Macalintal v. Presidential Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 191618, November 23, 2010, 635
SCRA 783, 797-799. cited in G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C.
TUPAS, JR.,
- OTHER CASES
Case: Petitioners allege that the HSRA should be declared void, since it runs counter to the
aspiration and ideals of the Filipino people as embodied in the Constitution. They claim that the
HSRAs policies of fiscal autonomy, income generation, and revenue enhancement violate
Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 of Article II, Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of
Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV of the 1987 Constitution. Such policies allegedly
resulted in making inaccessible free medicine and free medical services. This contention is
unfounded.
Rule: As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do
not require future legislation for their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing,
the mandate of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of
Congress. However, some provisions have already been categorically declared by this Court as
non self-executing.
o
In Tanada v. Angara, the Court specifically set apart the sections found under Article II of the
1987 Constitution as non self-executing and ruled that such broad principles need legislative
enactments before they can be implemented:
In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, this Court declared that
Sections 11, 12, and 13 of Article II; Section 13 of Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of
the 1987 Constitution are not self-executing provisions. In Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, the Court referred to Section 1 of Article XIII and Section 2 of Article XIV of the
Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights. These
provisions, which merely lay down a general principle, are distinguished from other
constitutional provisions as non self-executing and, therefore, cannot give rise to a cause of
action in the courts; they do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights
Page
23
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." x x
x. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the
exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.
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Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken from Article II of
the Constitution -- specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 -- the provisions of which the
Court categorically ruled to be non self-executing in the aforecited case of Taada v. Angara.
Moreover, the records are devoid of any explanation of how the HSRA supposedly violated the
equal protection and due process clauses that are embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the
Constitution. There were no allegations of discrimination or of the lack of due process in
connection with the HSRA. Since they failed to substantiate how these constitutional guarantees
were breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of this provision to the
petition, and consequently, in annulling the HSRA.
In the remaining provisions, Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII and Sections 1 and 3 of Article XV,
the State accords recognition to the protection of working women and the provision for safe and
healthful working conditions; to the adoption of an integrated and comprehensive approach to
health; to the Filipino family; and to the right of children to assistance and special protection,
including proper care and nutrition. Like the provisions that were declared as non self-executory
in the cases of Basco v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation and Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance, they are mere statements of principles and policies. As such, they are
mere directives addressed to the executive and the legislative departments. If unheeded, the
remedy will not lie with the courts; but rather, the electorates displeasure may be manifested in
their votes.
The rationale for this is given by Justice Dante Tinga in his Separate Opinion in the case of
Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission :
x x x However, to declare that the constitutional provisions are enough to guarantee the full
exercise of the rights embodied therein, and the realization of the ideals therein expressed,
would be impractical, if not unrealistic. The espousal of such view presents the dangerous
tendency of being overbroad and exaggerated. x x x Subsequent legislation is still needed to
define the parameters of these guaranteed rights. x x x Without specific and pertinent legislation,
judicial bodies will be at a loss, formulating their own conclusion to approximate at least the aims
of the Constitution.. G.R. No. 167324 July 17, 2007 TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
B. Theory of Judicial Review

The power of judicial review is an aspect of judicial power that allows this
Court every opportunity to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.24
Mostly, Judicial Review is sparingly used by the courts because of deference
or respect for the other branches of government.
24
G.R. No. 138268 May 26, 1999 JURRY ANDAL, RICARDO ANDAL and EDWIN MENDOZA, vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES
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As to government actions: Sovereignty belongs to the people, and the
24
As to laws: A Bill before becoming a law passes the necessary readings

as well as the assessment of the President. Hence, the presumption of
Constitutionality.
Constitution is the written instrument through which the people entrust

to government a measure of its own sovereignty and no more., What is
entrusted to government is limited power.
Hence every act of
government must conform to the terms of the empowerment (Bernas)
Constitutional Basis of Judicial Review.
All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive
agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other
cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including
those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be
decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in
the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. (Article VIII Section 4
(2)
1. Judicial Review and Separation of Powers

Case: For resolution are the consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the
Disbursement Acceleration Program(DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and
related issuances of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) implementing the
DAP. This followed after Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech in the
Senate of the Philippines to reveal that some Senators, including himself, had been allotted
an additional P50 Million each as "incentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief
Justice Renato C. Corona.
The DBM issued a public statement explaining that the funds released to the Senators had
been part of the DAP, a program designed by the DBM to ramp up spending to accelerate
economic expansion. DBM cited that this had been sourced from savings generated by the
Government, and from unprogrammed funds; and that the savings had been derived from
(1) the pooling of unreleased appropriations and 2) the withdrawal of unobligated allotments
also for slow-moving programs and projects that had been earlier released to the agencies
of the National Government.
At the core of the controversy is Section 29(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, a
provision of the fundamental law that firmly ordains that "[n]o money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." The tenor and context of
the challenges posed by the petitioners against the DAP indicate that the DAP contravened
this provision by allowing the Executive to allocate public money pooled from programmed
and unprogrammed funds of its various agencies in the guise of the President exercising his
constitutional authority under Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution to transfer funds out of
savings to augment the appropriations of offices within the Executive Branch of the
Government. But the challenges are further complicated by the interjection of allegations of
transfer of funds to agencies or offices outside of the Executive.
Nine petitions assailing the constitutionality of the DAP and the issuances relating to the
DAP were filed. All the petitions are filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and include
applications for the issuance of writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction or temporary
restraining orders.
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Rule: The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the
nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
25
Issue: Whether or not certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are proper remedies to assail
the constitutionality and validity of the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP),
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
department; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts
the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth
all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of
judicial review under the Constitution. x x x
What are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government may be
determined under the Constitution?
The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the special
civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65. A similar
remedy of certiorari exists under Rule 64, but the remedy is expressly applicable only to the
judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the
Commission on Audit.
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily
broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct
errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial
or ministerial functions.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional
issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.
Necessarily, in discharging its duty under the law to set right and undo any act of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, the Court is not at all precluded from making the inquiry
provided the challenge was properly brought by interested or affected parties. The Court has
been thereby entrusted expressly or by necessary implication with both the duty and the
obligation of determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or
executive action. This entrustment is consistent with the republican system of checks and
balances G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014, MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO vs. BENIGNO
SIMEON C. AQUINO III
Case: In the elections of September 17, 1935, petitioner was proclaimed as member
elect of National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. He took his
oath of office on November 15, 1935. On December 3, 1935, the National Assembly
passed a Resolution No. 8 confirming the election of its members against whom no protest
had thus far been filed. On the other hand, the electoral commission adopted a resolution
on December 9, 1935 fixing said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the
election, returns and qualifications of members of National Assembly, notwithstanding the
previous confirmation made.
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Issues: 1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
26
Prior to December 9, or on December 8, 1935, respondent Ynsua, a defeated candidate,

filed a motion of protest, being the only protest filed after the passage of resolution No. 8,
asking for the nullification of petitioners election. The motion to dismiss the protest' filed by
petitioner was denied. Hence, this present petition for the issuance of a writ of prohibition.
2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in
assuming to the cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner
notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National
Assembly?
Rule: Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the
admitted facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission
and the subject matter of the present controversy for the purpose of determining the
character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the National Assembly."
The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro
Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of
the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 cannot in any manner toll the time for filing
protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral
Commission might prescribe.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains
not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of
the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept
separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks
and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government. For example, the Chief Executive under our Constitution is so far made a check
on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws. This, however,
is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the
President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the
National Assembly. The President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special
session whenever he chooses. On the other hand, the National Assembly operates as a
check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on
Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a
majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power
to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their
jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the
judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of
trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter,
effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law,
and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
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The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature,
scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality
of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
27
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines,
allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government. The overlapping and interlacing of functions and duties between the several
departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one leaves off and
the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of
the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of
conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the
integral or constituent units thereof.
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under

the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is
termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the
Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited
further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts
accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the
legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the
people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the governments of the government.. G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936 JOSE
A. ANGARA vs. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO
and DIONISIO C. MAYOR
Rule: The cardinal postulate explains that the three branches must discharge their
respective functions within the limits of authority conferred by the Constitution. Under the
principle of separation of powers, neither Congress, the President, nor the Judiciary may
encroach on fields allocated to the other branches of government. The legislature is
generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws, and the
judiciary to their interpretation and application to cases and controversies
The role of the Courts is to ascertain whether a branch or instrumentality of the Government
has transgressed its constitutional boundaries. But the Courts will not interfere with
executive or legislative discretion exercised within those boundaries. Otherwise, it strays into
the realm of policy decision-making.
In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, the Court added;
x x x [A] court is without power to directly decide matters over which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government. It is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of Congress
or of the President. It may, however, look into the question of whether such exercise
has been made in grave abuse of discretion.
In Francisco, Jr. v. UEM-MARA Philippines Corporation, the Court elucidated the co-equal
status of the three branches of government:
Considering the co-equal status of the three branches of government, courts may
not tread into matters requiring the exercise of discretion of a functionary or office in
the executive and legislative branches, unless it is clearly shown that the
government official or office concerned abused his or its discretion. x x x
Furthermore,
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Corollary to the principle of separation of powers is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction that
the courts will DEFER to the decisions of the administrative offices and agencies by reason
of their expertise and experience in the matters assigned to them. Administrative decisions
28
"x x x courts, as a rule, refuse to interfere with proceedings undertaken by

administrative bodies or officials in the exercise of administrative functions. This is
so because such bodies are generally better equipped technically to decide
administrative questions and that non-legal factors, such as government policy on
the matter, are usually involved in the decisions."
on matters within the jurisdiction of administrative bodies are to be respected and can only
be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law.
The only instance when the Courts ought to interfere is when a department or an agency has
acted with grave abuse of discretion or violated a law. G.R. Nos. 177857-58 September
17, 2009 PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED), vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
While each branch of government is governed by the Separation of

Powers, the supremacy of the Constitution may allow the Courts to look
into transgressions of the Fundamental Law in the carrying out of their
official mandates.
Rule: There is no "reasonable and legitimate" ground to violate the Constitution. The
Constitution should never be violated by anyone. Right or wrong, the President, Congress,
the Court. have no choice but to follow the Constitution. Any act, however noble its
intentions, is void if it violates the Constitution. This rule is basic.
In Social Justice Society, the Court held that, "In the discharge of their defined functions, the
three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of
the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed." In Sabio, the Court held
that, "the Constitution is the highest law of the land. It is the basic and paramount law to
which x x x all persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. No act shall be
valid, however noble its intentions, if it conflicts with the Constitution." In Bengzon v. Drilon,
the Court held that, "the three branches of government must discharge their respective
functions within the limits of authority conferred by the Constitution." In Mutuc v.
Commission on Elections, the Court held that, "The three departments of government in the
discharge of the functions with which it is [sic] entrusted have no choice but to yield
obedience to [the Constitutions] commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed."
Police power does not include the power to violate the Constitution. Police power is the
plenary power vested in Congress to make laws not repugnant to the Constitution. This rule
is basic.
In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., the Court
held that, "Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, and
establish wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, not repugnant to the
Constitution." In Carlos Superdrug Corp. v. Department of Social Welfare and Development,
the Court held that, police power "is the power vested in the legislature by the constitution to
make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and
ordinances x x x not repugnant to the constitution." In Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority v. Garin, the Court held that, "police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty,
is the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances x x x not repugnant to
the Constitution."
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In Strategic Alliance Development Corporation v. Radstock Securities Limited, the Court

held that, "This Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution." In
Bengzon, the Court held that, "The Constitution expressly confers on the judiciary the power
to maintain inviolate what it decrees." In Mutuc, the Court held that:
29
When the effect of a law is unconstitutional, it is void. In Sabio, the Court held that, "A
statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to
enact; or it creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or
its purpose or effect violates the Constitution or its basic principles." The effect of Section 47
violates the Constitution, thus, it is void.
The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the
validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest
functionary, is a postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule
of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy.
The three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is [sic]
entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes
must be observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the
restrictions on its authority, whether substantive or formal, be transcended. The Presidency
in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying
the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain
inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law. Even its power of judicial review to pass
upon the validity of the acts of the coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is a
logical corollary of this basic principle that the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any
governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of
its being the supreme law. G.R. No. 166471 March 22, 2011 TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE
COOPERATIVE vs. LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT
In the absence of any transgression of the Constitution by the other

branches of government, Courts must respect the boundaries established
by the Fundamental Law
Rule: The courts could intervene in the Secretary of Justices determination of probable
cause only through a special civil action for certiorari. That happens when the Secretary of
Justice acts in a limited sense like a quasi-judicial officer of the executive department
exercising powers akin to those of a court of law. But the requirement for such intervention
was still for the petitioner to demonstrate clearly that the Secretary of Justice committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Unless such a clear
demonstration is made, the intervention is disallowed in deference to the doctrine of
separation of powers. G.R. No. 191567 March 20, 2013 MARIE CALLO-CLARIDAD vs.
PHILIP RONALD P. ESTEBAN and TEODORA ALYN ESTEBAN
Rule: Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide
matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive Branch of
the Government, or to substitute their own judgments for that of the Executive Branch,
represented in this case by the Department of Justice. The settled policy is that the courts
will not interfere with the executive determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing
an information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. That abuse of discretion must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. x x
x Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. (Metrobank) v. Tobias III G.R. No. 177780 January 25,
2012
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When confronted with a constitutional question, it is elementary that

every court must approach it with grave care and considerable caution
bearing in mind that every statute is presumed valid and every
reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. The
policy of our courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to
presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the
absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is
to sustain, this presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of
powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the
acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of
30
2. Judicial Review and Presumption of Constitutionality
Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully
studied, crafted and determined to be in accordance with the
fundamental law before it was finally enacted.25
Case: PETITIONER Zenon R. Perez seeks a review of his conviction by the
Sandiganbayan for malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Petitioner contends that the law relied upon in convicting the him and the sentence imposed
is cruel and therefore violates SECTION 19 OF ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS) OF THE
CONSTITUTION, considering that there was already payment of the shortaged amount.
Rule: First. What is punished by the crime of malversation is the act of a public officer who,
by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall
appropriate the same, or shall take and misappropriate or shall consent, or through
abandonment or negligence shall permit any other person to take such public funds or
property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or
malversation of such funds or property.
Payment or reimbursement is not a defense for exoneration in malversation; it may only be
considered as a mitigating circumstance. This is because damage is not an element of
malversation.
Second. There is strong presumption of constitutionality accorded to statutes.
It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible in harmony
with, rather than in violation of, the Constitution. The presumption is that the legislature
intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may
be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. It is presumed that the legislature
has acted within its constitutional powers. So, it is the generally accepted rule that every
statute, or regularly accepted act, is, or will be, or should be, presumed to be valid and
constitutional.
He who attacks the constitutionality of a law has the onus probandi to show why such law is
repugnant to the Constitution. Failing to overcome its presumption of constitutionality, a
claim that a law is cruel, unusual, or inhuman, like the stance of petitioner, must fail. G.R.
No. 164763 February 12, 2008 ZENON R. PEREZ vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
and SANDIGANBAYAN
Should there be no transgression, the Court shall not declare a law to be

constitutional as it enjoys that presumption, It shall only declare the
same to be not unconstitutional
Further reference: Annotation: Judicial Review, 583 SCRA 142
C. Conditions for the Exercise of Judicial Review
25
G.R. No. 169364

SACIL
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Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
31
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

- Article VIII, 1987 Constitution
1. JUDICIAL POWER
The Constitution states that judicial power includes the duty of the courts
of justice not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable" but also "to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government." It has thereby expanded the concept of judicial power,
which up to then was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual
controversies involving rights that were legally demandable and
enforceable.26
Rule: Judicial power is "the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse
litigants - Muskrat vs. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
Rule: Judicial power is the authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving
rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of
wrongs for violations of such right. G.R. No. L-25716 July 28, 1966 FERNANDO LOPEZ vs.
GERARDO ROXAS and PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
2. GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION Rule: By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. G.R. No. 101251
November 5, 1992 SINON vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Broad definition - There is grave abuse of discretion

(1) when an act is done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence; or
26
G.R. No. 209287 July 1, 2014, MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III
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Rule: We have previously ruled that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower
court or tribunal violates and contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must
be grave, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at
all in contemplation of law. The word "capricious," usually used in tandem with the term
"arbitrary," conveys the notion of willful and unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the
corrective hand of certiorari, a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise
of discretion is imperative. G. R. No. 174350
August 13, 2008 BALANGAUAN vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS*
32
(2) when it is executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or
personal bias. G.R. No. 159139 January 13, 2004 Infotech foundation vs. COMELEC
3. ACTUAL CASE AND CONTROVERSY In People v Vera, 66 Phil 56 (1937), J. Laurel laid down the doctrine
that judicial review can only be exercised in an actual case and
controversy.
According to Fr. Bernas;
-
The Court cannot pass upon issues of constitutionality

advisory opinions
through
Courts cannot resolve feigned or hypothetical constitutional problems
Courts cannot resolve friendly suits collusively arranged between

parties without real adverse interests
Moot cases, as they have no more flesh and blood
The following must be avoided: (i) political questions, (ii) advisory opinions, (iii) moot
and academic issues, and (iv) no standing.
Rule: The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine
the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for
the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates
to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is
the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial
review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity
of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the
very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its
function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice
or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed
to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual
cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed
through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
governments of the government.. G.R. No. L-45081 July 15, 1936 JOSE A. ANGARA,
vs. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and
DIONISIO C. MAYOR
Actual case and controversy requires the following;

(1) a party with a personal and substantial interest,
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(3) a constitutional question raised at the earliest possible time, and
33
(2) an appropriate case,
(4) a constitutional question that is the very lis mota of the case, i.e.
an unavoidable question.
To elaborate;
(1) A PARTY WITH A PERSONAL AND
SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST
General Concept:
A party has a standing in a case if his interest is such that he stands to

be benefited if the case is resolved in his favor, and he stand to be really
injured if it is decided against him. Standing is established by two
nexuses: the party's status and the type of legislative act being
questioned, or his status and the precise nature of the constitutional
infringement. The test of standing is whether the party has alleged such
a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure such
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions27.
A lesser but not insignificant reason for screening the standing of persons
who desire to litigate constitutional issues is economic in character. Given
the sparseness of our resources, the capacity of courts to render efficient
judicial service to our people is severely limited. For courts to
indiscriminately open their doors to all types of suits and suitors is for
them to unduly overburden their dockets, and ultimately render
themselves ineffective dispensers of justice.
The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a
statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement28. A person has standing to challenge the governmental act
only if he has a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement.29
General the elements of standing:
Rule:: Indeed, a citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when
1. He can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result
of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government;
Baker v Carr 369 U.S. 186, 7 L. Ed. 2d 633 [1962]

G.R. No. L-45685 November 16, 1937 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG
& SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION vs. JOSE O. VERA
29
Mendoza Notes
28
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27
34
2. The injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
3. The injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy brought about by the party. G.R. No.
132922 April 21, 1998 TELECOMMUNICATIONS BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Case: Petitioners, holders of permits, contend that the right of a citizen to own and operate a
school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental
approval or permit, as in the case of the questioned law (Act 2706) before such person could
exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our
system of law and government.
Rule: None of the petitioners has cause to present this issue, because all of them have
permits to operate and are actually operating by virtue of their permits.
Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one who fails to
show that he is injured by its operation.
The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests of
litigant require the use of that judicial authority for their protection against actual interference,
a hypothetical threat being insufficient. G.R. No. L-5279 October 31, 1955 PHILIPPINE
ASSOCIATION OF COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES vs. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
Case: All thirty-five (35) art lovers, petitioners in this Special Civil Action for Prohibition and
Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order seek to enjoin the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) from proceeding with the auction
sale scheduled on 11 January 1991 by Christie's of New York of the Old Masters Paintings
and 18th and 19th century silverware seized from Malacaang and the Metropolitan
Museum of Manila and placed in the custody of the Central Bank, the same being part of
Filipino heritage.
Rule: The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it
by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal
standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by
the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on
a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party.
They themselves allege that the paintings were donated by private persons from different
parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit
and non-stock corporations established to promote non-Philippine arts. The foundation's
chairman was former First Lady Imelda R. Marcos, while its president was Bienvenido R.
Tantoco. On this basis, the ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or
corporation or the members thereof, although the public has been given the opportunity to
view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed on exhibit.
Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces
have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to
question their alleged unauthorized disposition. G.R. No. 96541 August 24, 1993, JOYA vs.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG)
Standing of Taxpayers, Voters

Legislators, and Citizens
Page
35
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In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo30, the Court laid out the bare minimum

norm before the so-called "non-traditional suitors" may be extended
standing to sue, thusly: If in cases involving constitutional issues;
1.) For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public
funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
2.) For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the
validity of the election law in question;
3.) For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues
raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early;
and
4.) For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action
complained of infringes their prerogatives as legislators.
Case: In this case, petitioner seeks judicial intervention, in questioning the composition of
the JBC, as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a nominee to the position of Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court. As a taxpayer, petitioner invokes his right to demand that the taxes he
and the rest of the citizenry have been paying to the government are spent for lawful
purposes. According to petitioner, "since the JBC derives financial support for its functions,
operation and proceedings from taxes paid, petitioner possesses as taxpayer both right and
legal standing to demand that the JBCs proceedings are not tainted with illegality and that
its composition and actions do not violate the Constitution."
Rule: Anent locus standi, the question to be answered is this: does the party possess a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that there is real, concrete
and legal conflict of rights and duties from the issues presented before the Court? In David v.
Macapagal-Arroyo (522 Phil. 705 in 2006), the Court summarized the rules on locus standi
as culled from jurisprudence. There, it was held that taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens,
and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following requirements
are met: (1) cases involve constitutional issues; (2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of
illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; (3) for voters,
there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question; (4)
for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental
importance which must be settled early; and (5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the
official action complained of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.
In public suits, the plaintiff, representing the general public, asserts a "public right" in
assailing an allegedly illegal official action. The plaintiff may be a person who is affected no
differently from any other person, and can be suing as a "stranger," or as a "citizen" or
"taxpayer." Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public
funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. Of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of
public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an
invalid statute.
30
G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 161.
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Clearly, petitioner has the legal standing to bring the present action because he has a
personal stake in the outcome of this controversy.
The Court disagrees with the respondents contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue
because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a
"personal stake" on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only
official nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC
composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other
members of the Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBCs duty is not at all
limited to the nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants
to judicial posts all over the country may be affected by the Courts ruling. More importantly,
the legality of the very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus
of the controversy. The Court considers this a constitutional issue that must be passed upon,
lest a constitutional process be plagued by misgivings, doubts and worse, mistrust. Hence, a
citizen has a right to bring this question to the Court, clothed with legal standing and at the
same time, armed with issues of transcendental importance to society. The claim that the
composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just for a
nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention
for rectification of legal blunders.
With respect to the question of transcendental importance, it is not difficult to perceive from
the opposing arguments of the parties that the determinants established in jurisprudence are
attendant in this case: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2)
the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the
public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other
party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being raised. The allegations of
constitutional violations in this case are not empty attacks on the wisdom of the other
branches of the government. The allegations are substantiated by facts and, therefore,
deserve an evaluation from the Court. The Court need not elaborate on the legal and
societal ramifications of the issues raised. It cannot be gainsaid that the JBC is a
constitutional innovation crucial in the selection of the magistrates in our judicial system.
G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012 FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.
Case: Before us is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to nullify and enjoin the
implementation of Executive Order No. (EO) 7 issued by the Office of the President on
September 8, 2010. Petitioner Jelbert B. Galicto asserts that EO 7 is unconstitutional for
having been issued beyond the powers of the President and for being in breach of existing
laws.
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Heeding the call of Congress, Pres. Aquino, on September 8, 2010, issued EO 7, entitled
"Directing the Rationalization of the Compensation and Position Classification System in the
[GOCCs] and [GFIs], and for Other Purposes." EO 7 provided for the guiding principles and
framework to establish a fixed compensation and position classification system for GOCCs
and GFIs. A Task Force was also created to review all remunerations of GOCC and GFI
employees and officers, while GOCCs and GFIs were ordered to submit to the Task Force
information regarding their compensation. Finally, EO 7 ordered (1) a moratorium on the
increases in the salaries and other forms of compensation, except salary adjustments under
EO 8011 and EO 900, of all GOCC and GFI employees for an indefinite period to be set by
the President, and (2) a suspension of all allowances, bonuses and incentives of members
of the Board of Directors/Trustees until December 31, 2010.
37
Based on the findings of the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises that "officials and governing boards of various [GOCCs] and [GFIs] x x x have
been granting themselves unwarranted allowances, bonuses, incentives, stock options, and
other benefits [as well as other] irregular and abusive practices," the Senate issued Senate
Resolution No. 17 "urging the President to order the immediate suspension of the unusually
large and apparently excessive allowances, bonuses, incentives and other perks of
members of the governing boards of [GOCCs] and [GFIs]."
The petitioner claims that as a PhilHealth employee, he is affected by the implementation of

EO 7, which was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Rule: Petitioner lacks locus standi. To support his claim that he has locus standi to file the
present petition, the petitioner contends that as an employee of PhilHealth, he "stands to be
prejudiced by [EO] 7, which suspends or imposes a moratorium on the grants of salary
increases or new or increased benefits to officers and employees of GOCC[s] and x x x
curtail[s] the prerogative of those officers who are to fix and determine his compensation."
The petitioner also claims that he has standing as a member of the bar in good standing who
has an interest in ensuring that laws and orders of the Philippine government are legally and
validly issued and implemented.
In the present case, we are not convinced that the petitioner has demonstrated that he has a
personal stake or material interest in the outcome of the case because his interest, if any, is
speculative and based on a mere expectancy. In this case, the curtailment of future
increases in his salaries and other benefits cannot but be characterized as contingent events
or expectancies. To be sure, he has no vested rights to salary increases and, therefore, the
absence of such right deprives the petitioner of legal standing to assail EO 7.
If the asserted injury is more imagined than real, or is merely superficial and insubstantial,
then the courts may end up being importuned to decide a matter that does not really justify
such an excursion into constitutional adjudication.
Neither can the lack of locus standi be cured by the petitioners claim that he is instituting the
present petition as a member of the bar in good standing who has an interest in ensuring
that laws and orders of the Philippine government are legally and validly issued. This
supposed interest has been branded by the Court in Integrated Bar of the Phils. (IBP) v.
Hon. Zamora, "as too general an interest which is shared by other groups and [by] the whole
citizenry." Thus, the Court ruled in IBP that the mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to
preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it
with standing in that case G.R. No. 193978 February 28, 2012 JELBERT B. GALICTO vs.
H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III
- As Legislators:
Rule: In Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Morato (246 SCRA 540 [1995]), we held that members of
Congress may properly challenge the validity of an official act of any department of the
government only upon showing that the assailed official act affects or impairs their rights and
prerogatives as legislators. G.R. No. 138298 June 19, 2001 RAOUL B. DEL MAR vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, ET. AL (OPINION of MELO,
J.
Rule To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member
thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.
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Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to
question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives
as legislator G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010 LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, vs.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
38
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but
nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such
a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.
- As Taxpayers:
A taxpayer has a standing to sue if
1. He has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of

moneys raised by taxation
2. He will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement.
Rule: Yet, there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws
providing for the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that "the expenditure of
public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering
an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds," which may be
enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987 DEMETRIA
vs. ALBA
Case: For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the
constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General
Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004). Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and
Poverty (LAMP), a group of lawyers who have banded together with a mission of
dismantling all forms of political, economic or social monopoly in the country, also
sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order to
enjoin respondent Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) from
making, and, thereafter, releasing budgetary allocations to individual members of
Congress as "pork barrel" funds out of PDAF. LAMP likewise aimed to stop the National
Treasurer and the Commission on Audit (COA) from enforcing the questioned provision.
The GAA of 2004 contains the following provision subject of this petition:
PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FUND
For fund requirements of priority development programs and projects, as indicated hereunder P
8,327,000,000.00
xxxx
Special Provision
1.
Use and Release of the Fund. The amount herein appropriated shall be used to fund priority programs
and projects or to fund the required counterpart for foreign-assisted programs and projects: PROVIDED,
That such amount shall be released directly to the implementing agency or Local Government Unit
concerned: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the allocations authorized herein may be realigned to any
expense class, if deemed necessary: PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, That a maximum of ten percent
(10%) of the authorized allocations by district may be used for procurement of rice and other basic
commodities which shall be purchased from the National Food Authority.
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In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional

statute, as citizens and taxpayers. According to LAMP, the practice of direct allocation
and release of funds to the Members of Congress and the authority given to them to
propose and select projects is the core of the laws flawed execution resulting in a
serious constitutional transgression involving the expenditure of public funds.
Undeniably, as taxpayers, LAMP would somehow be adversely affected by this. A
finding of unconstitutionality would necessarily be tantamount to a misapplication of
39
According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an automatic
or direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the funding
of projects. It does not empower individual Members of Congress to propose, select and
identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF.
public funds which, in turn, cause injury or hardship to taxpayers. This affords "ripeness"
to the present controversy.
Further, the allegations in the petition do not aim to obtain sheer legal opinion in the
nature of advice concerning legislative or executive action. The possibility of
constitutional violations in the implementation of PDAF surely involves the interplay of
legal rights susceptible of judicial resolution. For LAMP, this is the right to recover public
funds possibly misapplied by no less than the Members of Congress. Hence, without
prejudice to other recourse against erring public officials, allegations of illegal
expenditure of public funds reflect a concrete injury that may have been committed by
other branches of government before the court intervenes. The possibility that this injury
was indeed committed cannot be discounted. The petition complains of illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient reason to say
that there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the
Court.
Issues: Whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are
met in this case;
Here, the sufficient interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by
taxation required in taxpayers suits is established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds
have been illegally disbursed and wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.
Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount
public interest. The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of
PDAF deserves the consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction
over the petition. G.R. No. 164987 April 24, 2012 LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY
AND POVERTY (LAMP) vs. THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
Case: This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order pursuant to Section 7, Article IX-D of
the 1987 Constitution, seeking to annul and set aside Commission on Audit (COA)
Circular No. 89-299, which lifted its system of pre-audit of government financial
transactions.
The rationale for the circular was, first, to reaffirm the concept that fiscal responsibility
resides in management as embodied in the Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines; and, second, to contribute to accelerating the delivery of public services and
improving government operations by curbing undue bureaucratic red tape and ensuring
facilitation of government transactions, while continuing to preserve and protect the
integrity of these transactions.
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Rule: Standing - This Petition has been filed as a taxpayers suit. A taxpayer is deemed
to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public
funds from taxation have been disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the
Constitution. Petitioner claims that the issuance of Circular No. 89-299 has led to the
dissipation of public funds through numerous irregularities in government financial
transactions. These transactions have allegedly been left unchecked by the lifting of the
pre-audit performed by COA, which, petitioner argues, is its Constitutional duty. Thus,
40
As a taxpayer, Petitioner filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. He alleges that
the pre-audit duty on the part of the COA cannot be lifted by a mere circular, considering
that pre-audit is a constitutional mandate enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the
1987 Constitution. He further claims that, because of the lack of pre-audit by COA,
serious irregularities in government transactions have been committed, such as the
P728-million fertilizer fund scam, irregularities in the P550-million call center laboratory
project of the Commission on Higher Education, and many others.
petitioner has standing to file this suit as a taxpayer, since he would be adversely
affected by the illegal use of public money. G.R. No. 180989 February 7, 2012
Gualberto J. Dela Llana vs. The Chairperson, Commission on Audit, The Executive
Secretary and the National Treasurer
- As Citizens
1. When the issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when
the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public
2. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by
any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension
thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from
its filing. Section 18, Article VII, 1987 Constitution
3.The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis. for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such stations as may be provided by law.
(Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution) Access to public documents
and records is a public right, and the real parties in interest are the
people themselves. G.R. No. 130716 December 9, 1998 FRANCISCO
I.
CHAVEZ vs.
PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION
ON
GOOD
GOVERNMENT (PCGG)
Case: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to permanently enjoin the sale
of the Angat Hydro-Electric Power Plant (AHEPP) to Korea Water Resources Corporation
(K-Water) which won the public bidding conducted by the Power Sector Assets and
Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) a government-owned and controlled
31
corporation created by virtue of Republic Act No. 9136 (EPIRA).
Sometime in August 2005, PSALM commenced the privatization of the 246-megawatt (MW)
AHEPP located in San Lorenzo, Norzagaray, Bulacan. After a post-bid evaluation, PSALMs
Board of Directors approved and confirmed the issuance of a Notice of Award to the highest
bidder, K-Water.
As such, the present petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ
of preliminary injunction was filed by The Petitioners
Petitioners contend that PSALM gravely abused its discretion when, in the conduct of the
bidding it disregarded and violated the peoples right to information guaranteed under the
Constitution, as the same was granted sans any transparency.
"Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 - Said law mandated PSALM to manage the orderly sale,
disposition, and privatization of NPC generation assets, real estate and other disposable assets, and
Independent Power Producer (IPP) contracts with the objective of liquidating all NPC financial obligations
and stranded contract costs in an optimal manner,
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41
Petitioners reiterate their legal standing to file the present suit in their capacity as taxpayers,
or as Filipino citizens asserting the promotion and protection of a public right, aside from
being directly injured by the proceedings of PSALM.
Issues: Legal standing of petitioners;

Rule: We rule that petitioners possess the requisite legal standing in filing this suit as
citizens and taxpayers.
"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged, alleging more than a generalized grievance. The
gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions." This Court, however, has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a
petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the
people, as when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public. Thus, when
the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that the petitioner is a
citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
There can be no doubt that the matter of ensuring adequate water supply for domestic use is
one of paramount importance to the public. That the continued availability of potable water in
Metro Manila might be compromised if PSALM proceeds with the privatization of the
hydroelectric power plant in the Angat Dam Complex confers upon petitioners such personal
stake in the resolution of legal issues in a petition to stop its implementation.
Moreover, we have held that if the petition is anchored on the peoples right to information on
matters of public concern, any citizen can be the real party in interest. The requirement of
personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore,
part of the general public which possesses the right. There is no need to show any special
interest in the result. It is sufficient that petitioners are citizens and, as such, are interested in
the faithful execution of the laws. G.R. No. 192088 October 9, 2012 INITIATIVES FOR
DIALOGUE AND EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ALTERNATIVE LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
(IDEALS, INC.), vs. POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION (PSALM)
- More cases, and instances on standing;

a.
Transcendental Importance and Paramount Public Interest

Case: Section 4 of BP 52 provided that any retired elective local official who had
received retirement pay to which he was entitled under the law and who have been
65 years old at the commencement of the term of office to which he sought to be
elected, was not qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he had
retired.
Dumlao filed for prohibition to enjoin the enforcement of the law, claiming that this
was directed at him as former governor of Nueva Vizcaya.
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Case: This is a special civil action for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, which seeks to prohibit and
restrain the implementation of the "Contract of Lease" of an on-line lottery system for
42
Rule: The SC held that (a) he had no standing, since he had not been injured by the
operation of the law, no petition for his disqualification having been filed and (b) the
action was a request for advisory opinion. And yet, the SC upheld the validity
"because of paramount public interest", declaring that the legislative purpose of
infusing younger blood in local government was valid. Dumlao v COMELEC (95
SCRA 392)
the PCSO executed by the latter and the Philippine Gaming Management
Corporation (PGMC).
Petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated (KILOSBAYAN) avers that it is a non-stock
domestic corporation composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and
lay leaders who are committed to the cause of truth, justice, and national renewal.
The rest of the petitioners, except Senators Freddie Webb and Wigberto Taada
and Representative Joker P. Arroyo, are suing in their capacities as members of the
Board of Trustees of KILOSBAYAN and as taxpayers and concerned citizens.
Senators Webb and Taada and Representative Arroyo are suing in their capacities
as members of Congress and as taxpayers and concerned citizens of the
Philippines.
Rule: We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public.
The issues it raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even higher
than those involved in many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such
issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people
even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and
retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as
the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners
deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby
brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage
of. G.R. No. 113375 May 5, 1994 KILOSBAYAN vs. GUINGONA
b. Intergenerational Responsibility
Case: This case, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that
they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no
difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for
the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of
nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. G.R. No. 101083 July 30,
1993 OPOSA VS. FACTORAN
More cases
Case: This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from implementing
and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 93352 (Attrition Act of 2005) which intends to
encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by
providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and
Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board.
Page
Rule: The Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of
constitutionality in favor of RA 9335.
43
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335, tax reform legislation. They contend that, by
establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as
they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of
rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally
mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
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An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of

32
opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial adjudication. A closely related
requirement is ripeness, that is, the question must be ripe for adjudication. And a
constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the governmental act being
33
challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. Thus, to be
ripe for judicial adjudication, the petitioner must show a personal stake in the
outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable
34
decision of the Court.
In this case, aside from the general claim that the dispute has ripened into a judicial
controversy by the mere enactment of the law even without any further overt act,
petitioners fail either to assert any specific and concrete legal claim or to
demonstrate any direct adverse effect of the law on them. They are unable to show
a personal stake in the outcome of this case or an injury to themselves. ABAKADA
vs. HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008
(2) AN APPROPRIATE CASE

Political Question. An issue is a political question when it does not deal
with the interpretation of a law and its application to a case, but with the
very wisdom of the law itself. When a judge attempts to resolve a political
question, he is not exercising a judicial function, but is rather supplanting
his conscience to that of the political branch of the government.
Baker v. Carr, 369 US 186 (1962) has attempted to formulate some
guidelines for determining whether a question is political or not.
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found;
-
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a

political department;
or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for

resolving it;
or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination

of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion;
or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution

without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government;
or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision

already made, or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.
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Cruz, Isagani, Philippine Constitutional Law, 1995 edition, p. 23.

Bernas, Joaquin, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 edition,
pp. 848-849.
34
Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, 400 Phil. 904 (2000). (Vitug, J., separate
opinion)
33
44
32
Advisory Opinion. A case becomes an advisory opinion when there is no

actual case and controversy that demands constitutional construction for
its resolution. It is not wise for the court to engage in an advisory opinion
because:
a) This only leads to dialectics, to abstract legal arguments and sterile
conclusions (Laurel quoting Frankfurter)
b) The judicial function is impoverished since it thrives on facts that
draw out the meaning of the law.
Advisory Opinion vs. Declaratory Relief.
Rule 63 (Rules of Court)
Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies Section Who may file petition.
Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before
breach or violation thereof bring an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising,
and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder. (Bar Matter No.
803, 17 February 1998)
Now, an action for declaratory relief is only proper when the following
requisites are present:
1. there must be a justiciable controversy;
2. the controversy must be between persons whose interests are
adverse;
3. the person seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest
in the controversy; and
4. the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.
Case: Petitioners resort to certiorari is improper. Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against
respondents who do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is clear:
Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or
Officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or
his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require. G.R. No. 178552 October 5, 2010, SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE
ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC. vs. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL
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(3) A CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION

RAISED AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE
TIME
Ripeness. A constitutional question may come to the court either too

early or prematurely, so that it is still abstract (advisory opinion), or too
late, so that the court's decision would no longer affect the parties
(mootness). The court must resolve constitutional issues only when they
come to it at the right time.
Rule: The general rule is that the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity, so that if it is not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the
trial; and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. APEX MINING
CO., INC., vs. SOUTHEAST MINDANAO GOLD MINING CORP, G.R. Nos. 152613 &
152628 November 20, 2009
Mootness. A case becomes moot when there are facts, injuries and
heated arguments but for some reason the legal problem has become
stale. When a case is moot and academic, it ceases to be a case and
controversy. Any decision reached by the court would not be conclusive
on the parties. Although moot, the Court may still resolve the issue if the
question is capable of repetition and evasive of review; if there exists a
mere possibility of collateral legal consequences if the court does not act;
if by voluntary cessation from the wrongful act by the defendant, if he is
free to return to his old ways.
Rule: For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or
controversy one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal
claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on
extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case
becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, such as the case before
us. G.R. No. 185053 February 15, 2012 EUSTAQUIO CANDARI vs. ROLAND DONASCO
Rule: In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to
the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has
had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. An alternative road to review
similarly taken would be to determine whether an action has already been accomplished or
performed by a branch of government before the courts may step in.. G.R. No. 187883,
June 16, 2009 ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J. LOZANOENDRIANO, vs. SPEAKER PROSPERO C. NOGRALES
Page
Rule: We resolve to DISMISS the petition for its patent formal and procedural infirmities, and
for having been mooted by subsequent events. The petition has been mooted by
supervening events. - Because of the transitory nature of EO 7, it has been pointed out that
the present case has already been rendered moot by these supervening events: (1) the
lapse on December 31, 2010 of Section 10 of EO 7 that suspended the allowances and
bonuses of the directors and trustees of GOCCs and GFIs; and (2) the enactment of R.A.
No. 10149 amending the provisions in the charters of GOCCs and GFIs empowering their
board of directors/trustees to determine their own compensation system, in favor of the grant
of authority to the President to perform this act.
46
Case: Before us is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to nullify and enjoin the
implementation of Executive Order No. (EO) 7 issued by the Office of the President on
September 8, 2010. Petitioner Jelbert B. Galicto asserts that EO 7 is unconstitutional for
having been issued beyond the powers of the President and for being in breach of existing
laws.
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All told, in view of the supervening events rendering the petition moot, as well as its patent
formal and procedural infirmities, we no longer see any reason for the Court to resolve the
other issues raised in the certiorari petition. G.R. No. 193978 February 28, 2012 JELBERT
B. GALICTO, vs. H.E. PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III
Case: The petition asks whether private respondent Joseph Ejercito Estrada is covered by
the ban on the President from "any reelection." Private respondent was elected President of
the Republic of the Philippines in the general elections held on May 11, 1998. He sought the
presidency again in the general elections held on May 10, 2010. Petitioner Atty. Evillo C.
Pormento opposed private respondents candidacy and filed a petition for disqualification.
Private respondent was not elected President the second time he ran.
Rule: Since the issue on the proper interpretation of the phrase "any reelection" will be
premised on a persons second (whether immediate or not) election as President, there is no
case or controversy to be resolved in this case. No live conflict of legal rights exists. There is
in this case no definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy that touches on the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests. No specific relief may conclusively be
decreed upon by this Court in this case that will benefit any of the parties herein. As such,
one of the essential requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review, the existence
of an actual case or controversy, is sorely lacking in this case.
As a rule, this Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is not
empowered to decide moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or
rules of law which cannot affect the result as to the thing in issue in the case before it. In
other words, when a case is moot, it becomes non-justiciable.
An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because
the issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has
already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue
is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as
the determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events G.R. No. 191988
August 31, 2010, ATTY. EVILLO C. PORMENTO, vs. JOSEPH "ERAP" EJERCITO
ESTRADA and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Case: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to permanently enjoin the sale
of the Angat Hydro-Electric Power Plant (AHEPP) to Korea Water Resources Corporation
(K-Water) which won the public bidding conducted by the Power Sector Assets and
Liabilities Management Corporation (PSALM) a government-owned and controlled
35
corporation created by virtue of Republic Act No. 9136 (EPIRA).
Sometime in August 2005, PSALM commenced the privatization of the 246-megawatt (MW)
AHEPP located in San Lorenzo, Norzagaray, Bulacan On after a post-bid evaluation,
PSALMs Board of Directors approved and confirmed the issuance of a Notice of Award to
the highest bidder, K-Water.
As such, the present petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ
of preliminary injunction was filed by The Petitioners
"Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 - Said law mandated PSALM to manage the orderly sale,
disposition, and privatization of NPC generation assets, real estate and other disposable assets, and
Independent Power Producer (IPP) contracts with the objective of liquidating all NPC financial obligations
and stranded contract costs in an optimal manner,
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Petitioners contend that PSALM gravely abused its discretion when, in the conduct of the
bidding it disregarded and violated the peoples right to information guaranteed under the
Constitution, as the same was granted sans and transparency.
Petitioners reiterate their legal standing to file the present suit in their capacity as taxpayers,
or as Filipino citizens asserting the promotion and protection of a public right, aside from
being directly injured by the proceedings of PSALM.
Issues: Mootness of the petition;
Rule: PSALMs contention that the present petition had already been mooted by the
issuance of the Notice of Award to K-Water is misplaced. Though petitioners had sought the
immediate issuance of injunction against the bidding commenced by PSALM -- specifically
enjoining it from proceeding to the next step of issuing a notice of award to any of the
bidders -- they further prayed that PSALM be permanently enjoined from disposing of the
AHEPP through privatization. The petition was thus filed not only as a means of enforcing
the States obligation to protect the citizens "right to water" that is recognized under
international law and legally enforceable under our Constitution, but also to bar a foreign
corporation from exploiting our water resources in violation of Sec. 2, Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution. If the impending sale of the AHEPP to K-Water indeed violates the Constitution,
it is the duty of the Court to annul the contract award as well as its implementation. As this
Court held in Chavez v. Philippine Estates Authority, "supervening events, whether intended
or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation
of the Constitution." G.R. No. 192088 October 9, 2012 INITIATIVES FOR DIALOGUE AND
EMPOWERMENT THROUGH ALTERNATIVE LEGAL SERVICES, INC. (IDEALS, INC.)
vs. POWER SECTOR ASSETS AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
(PSALM)
Case: In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65, Dennis A. B. Funa
challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar as Chairman of the
Commission on Audit and accordingly prays that a judgment issue "declaring the
unconstitutionality" of the appointment.
Villar, insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of seven (7)
years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term of office, as such chairman,
is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was
appointed to that position.
Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February 22, 2011
addressed to President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention to step down from office
upon the appointment of his replacement. True to his word, Villar vacated his position when
President Benigno Simeon Aquino III named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan (Chairman Tan) COA
Chairman. This development has rendered this petition and the main issue tendered therein
moot and academic.
Rule: A case is considered moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, or when
it ceases to present a justiciable controversy owing to the onset of supervening events, so
that a resolution of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or
use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled
to, and which will anyway be negated by the dismissal of the basic petition. As a general
rule, it is not within Our charge and function to act upon and decide a moot case. However,
in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, We acknowledged and accepted certain exceptions to the
issue of mootness, thus:
The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade
the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:
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second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved,
48
first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution,
third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to

guide the bench, the bar, and the public, and
fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.
Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman Tan and the
resignation of Villar, We consider the instant case as falling within the requirements for
review of a moot and academic case, since it asserts at least four exceptions to the
mootness rule discussed in David, namely: there is a grave violation of the Constitution; the
case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public interest; the
constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar and the public; and the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. The
situation presently obtaining is definitely of such exceptional nature as to necessarily call for
the promulgation of principles that will henceforth "guide the bench, the bar and the public"
should like circumstance arise. Confusion in similar future situations would be smoothed out
if the contentious issues advanced in the instant case are resolved straightaway and settled
definitely. There are times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it
nevertheless cries out to be addressed. To borrow from Javier v. Pacificador, "Justice
demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but
also for the guidance of and as a restraint in the future." G.R. No. 192791 April 24, 2012
DENNIS A. B. FUNA vs. THE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REYNALDO A.
VILLAR
(4) A CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION

THAT IS THE VERY LIS MOTA OF THE
CASE,
I.E.
AN
UNAVOIDABLE
QUESTION.
In constitutional law terms, this means that we ought to refrain from
resolving any constitutional issue "unless the constitutional question is
the lis mota of the case."
Case: Before the Court are the Consolidated Petitions for Quo Warranto, and Certiorari
and/or Prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction filed by General. The petitioner seeks to declare unconstitutional the
appointments of Urro, de Guzman and Escueta as NAPOLCOM, and to prohibit then
Executive Secretary and Department of Interior and DILG Secretary from enforcing the
respondents oath of office. Particularly, the petitioner asks that respondent Urro be ousted
as NAPOLCOM Commissioner and he be allowed to continue in office.
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In the present case, the constitutionality of the respondents appointments is not the lis mota
of the case. From the submitted pleadings, what is decisive is the determination of whether
the petitioner has a cause of action to institute and maintain this present petition a quo
warranto against respondent Urro. If the petitioner fails to establish his cause of action for
quo warranto, a discussion of the constitutionality of the appointments of the respondents is
rendered completely unnecessary. The inclusion of the grounds for certiorari and/or
prohibition does not alter the essential character of the petitioners action since he does not
even allege that he has a personal and substantial interest in raising the constitutional issue
insofar as the other respondents are concerned. G.R. No. 191560 March 29, 2011 HON.
49
Rule: Lis mota literally means "the cause of the suit or action." This last requisite of judicial
review is simply an offshoot of the presumption of validity accorded the executive and
legislative acts of our co-equal branches of the government. Ultimately, it is rooted in the
principle of separation of powers. Given the presumed validity of an executive act, the
petitioner who claims otherwise has the burden of showing first that the case cannot be
resolved unless the constitutional question he raised is determined by the Court.
LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL, Commissioner, National Police Commission vs. HON.

ALEJANDRO S. URRO*
Rule: As a rule, the courts will not resolve the constitutionality of a law, if the controversy
can be settled on other grounds. The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional
questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid, absent a clear
and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based
on the doctrine of separation of powers. This means that the measure had first been
carefully studied by the legislative and executive departments and found to be in accord with
the Constitution before it was finally enacted and approved.
The present case was instituted primarily for accounting and specific performance. The
Court of Appeals correctly ruled that PNB's obligation to render an accounting is an issue,
which can be determined, without having to rule on the constitutionality of P.D. No. 579. In
fact there is nothing in P.D. No. 579, which is applicable to PNB's intransigence in refusing
to give an accounting. The governing law should be the law on agency, it being undisputed
that PNB acted as petitioners' agent. In other words, the requisite that the constitutionality of
the law in question be the very lis mota of the case is absent. Thus we cannot rule on the
constitutionality of P.D. No. 579. G.R. No. 128448 February 1, 2001 SPOUSES.
MIRASOL vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND

THE POWER TO REVIEW
Case: Petitioner, an association of real estate developers and builders in the Philippines
assails the validity of the imposition of minimum corporate income tax (MCIT) on
corporations and creditable withholding tax (CWT) on sales of real properties classified as
ordinary assets.
Whether or not this Court should take cognizance of the present case;
Rule: Courts will not assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question unless the following
requisites are satisfied: (1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial
review; (2) the question before the court must be ripe for adjudication; (3) the person
challenging the validity of the act must have standing to do so; (4) the question of
constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity and (5) the issue of
36
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case
Respondents aver that the first three requisites are absent in this case. According to them,
there is no actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power and it is not yet ripe for
adjudication because [petitioner] did not allege that CREBA, as a corporate entity, or any of
its members, has been assessed by the BIR for the payment of [MCIT] or [CWT] on sales of
real property. Neither did petitioner allege that its members have shut down their businesses
as a result of the payment of the MCIT or CWT. Petitioner has raised concerns in mere
abstract and hypothetical form without any actual, specific and concrete instances cited that
the assailed law and revenue regulations have actually and adversely affected it. Lacking
empirical data on which to base any conclusion, any discussion on the constitutionality of the
MCIT or CWT on sales of real property is essentially an academic exercise.
36
Jumamil v. Cafe, G.R. No. 144570, 21 September 2005, 470 SCRA 475, 486-487. Citations omitted.
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An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite

legal claims which is susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or
50
Perceived or alleged hardship to taxpayers alone is not an adequate justification for

adjudicating abstract issues. Otherwise, adjudication would be no different from the giving of
advisory opinion that does not really settle legal issues.
abstract difference or dispute. On the other hand, a question is considered ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it.
Contrary to respondents assertion, we do not have to wait until petitioners members have
shut down their operations as a result of the MCIT or CWT. The assailed provisions are
already being implemented. As we stated in Didipio Earth-Savers Multi-Purpose
Association, Incorporated (DESAMA) v. Gozun:
By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged act, the
dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act.
Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken
judicial duty.
If the assailed provisions are indeed unconstitutional, there is no better time than the present
to settle such question once and for all.
Respondents next argue that petitioner has no legal standing to sue:
Petitioner is an association of some of the real estate developers and builders in the
Philippines. Petitioners did not allege that [it] itself is in the real estate business. It did not
allege any material interest or any wrong that it may suffer from the enforcement of [the
1
assailed provisions].
Legal standing or locus standi is a partys personal and substantial interest in a case such
that it has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act being
challenged.
In any event, this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy
the requirements of an actual case, ripeness or legal standing when paramount public
interest is involved. The questioned MCIT and CWT affect not only petitioners but practically
all domestic corporate taxpayers in our country. The transcendental importance of the issues
raised and their overreaching significance to society make it proper for us to take cognizance
of this petition. G.R. No. 160756 March 9, 2010 CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND
BUILDERS' ASSOCIATIONS, INC. vs. THE HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO
ROMULO
D. Functions of Judicial Review

1. Checking - invalidating a law or an executive act that is found to be
contrary to the Constitution.
Rule: The acts complained of in this case pertain to the HRETs exercise of its discretion, an
exercise which was well within the bounds of its authority.
Page
In the exercise of its checking function, the Court should merely test whether or not the
governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction,
not that it erred or had a different view. G.R. No. 185401 July 21, 2009 HENRY "JUN"
DUEAS, JR., Petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
and ANGELITO "JETT" P. REYES
51
The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of
independent branches of the Government. It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial
of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the
Constitution calls for remedial action.
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2. Legitimating (legitimizing) - upholding the validity of the law which

results from a mere dismissal of a case challenging the validity of that
law.
When the Court exercises this function, it uses the double negative by
declaring that the law is "not unconstitutional". This is no mere
semantics. The Court cannot declare the law constitutional for it enjoys
the presumption of constitutionality, so that a declaration to that effect
by the court would not make it more constitutional. On the other hand,
anyone who challenges the validity of a law has the burden of proof to
show its invalidity. Declaring that the law is not unconstitutional is
tantamount to saying that the challenger has not met the burden
required.37
3. Symbolic - to educate the bench and bar as to the controlling
principles and concepts on matters of great public importance
Rule: The petitioner went to the Comelec to question the canvass of the election returns. His
complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the said
body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void
because made only by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc.
The case was still being considered by this Court when on February 11, 1986, the petitioner
was gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight. The nation, already indignant over the
obvious manipulation of the presidential elections in favor of Marcos, was revolted by the
killing, which flaunted a scornful disregard for the law by the assailants who apparently
believed they were above the law. This ruthless murder was possibly one of the factors that
strengthened the cause of the Opposition in the February revolution that toppled the Marcos
regime and installed the present government under President Corazon C. Aquino.
The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute
between the petitioner and the private respondent-both of whom have gone their separate
ways-could be a convenient justification for dismissing this case. But there are larger issues
involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal ambiguities
here raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible terms that
this Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant
pretext that the case has become moot and academic.
37
Page
Rule: A moot case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.
Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
However, Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the
Mendoza notes
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The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience
of the government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice.
The two are not always the same. There are times when we cannot grant the latter because
the issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible according to the law. But there
are also times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless
cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the
outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.
G.R. Nos. L-68379-81 September 22, 1986 EVELIO B. JAVIER vs. THE COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR
2015
paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth,
the case is capable of repetition yet evading review, none of which are present in the instant
case. Hence, since what is sought to be done by COMELEC has been accomplished, there
is nothing else that the Court can order the COMELEC to perform. G.R. No. 177927
February 15, 2008 FLORANTE S. QUIZON vs HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
Case: On April 21, 1998, the Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc issued
Resolution No. 98-1419 to wit;
RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any
other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey and to
authorize the Honorable Chairman to issue the same.
The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from a reliable
source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct
radio-TV coverage of the elections . . . and to make an exit survey for the elections for
national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be
broadcasted immediately." The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with
the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for
Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized Petitioner ABSCBN to undertake the exit survey.
The solicitor general contends that the petition is moot and academic, because the May 11,
1998 election has already been held and done with. Allegedly, there is no longer any actual
controversy before us.
Issue: Whether or not the case is moot.
The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to the May
11, 1998 election, its implications on the people's fundamental freedom of expression
transcend the past election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our
democratic government. By its very nature, exit polling is tied up with elections. To set aside
the resolution of the issue now will only postpone a task that could well crop up again in
future elections
In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Pao, the Court had occasion to reiterate that it "also has
the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or
rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection
38
given by constitutional guarantees." Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the
press are being invoked here, we have resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity,
whether they likewise protect the holding of exit polls and the dissemination of data derived
39
therefrom.
G.R. No. 133486
January 28, 2000 ABS-CBN BROADCASTING
CORPORATION, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
E. All Courts Can Exercise Judicial Review

According to Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution
38
134 SCRA 438, 463, February 18, 1985; per Gutierrez Jr., J.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, ... Assailed Minute Resolution No. 98-1419 issued by the
Comelec en banc on April 21, 1998 is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
39
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Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
53
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
xxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any
penalty imposed in relation thereto.
c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
The review power of the SC implies that it has appellate jurisdiction over
final judgments of lower courts on cases with constitutional issues. If so,
inferior courts have original jurisdiction over constitutional cases although
they decide the case only at first instance, their decision being always
reviewable by the SC.
Rule: Plainly the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have
jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of
appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such
constitutionality happens to be in issue. G.R. No. L-18128 December 26, 1961 J. M.
TUASON & CO., INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
In Ynot v IAC, 148 SCRA 659, the SC reversed the RTC's holding that it
had no authority to rule on the validity of EO 626-A, banning the
transporting of carabaos from one province to another. The Court pointed
out, that since it has jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or
affirm final judgments of lower courts in constitutional cases, then the
lower courts can pass upon the validity of a statute in the first instance.
Rule: This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming
modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from
resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal.
We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm
on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final judgments and
orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain
measures. G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987 YNOT vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT
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Case: For resolution are the consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the
Disbursement Acceleration Program(DAP), National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and
related issuances of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) implementing the
DAP. This followed after Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech in the
Senate of the Philippines to reveal that some Senators, including himself, had been allotted
an additional P50 Million each as "incentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief
Justice Renato C. Corona.
54
However, such decisions of the lower courts only bind the parties. Only
decisions of the Supreme Court becomes part of the legal system of the
Philippines.
In their memorandum, the respondents further contend that there is no authorized

proceeding under the Constitution and the Rules of Court for questioning the validity of any
law unless there is an actual case or controversy the resolution of which requires the
determination of the constitutional question; that the jurisdiction of the Court is largely
appellate; that for a court of law to pass upon the constitutionality of a law or any act of the
Government when there is no case or controversy is for that court to set itself up as a
reviewer of the acts of Congress and of the President in violation of the principle of
separation of powers; and that, in the absence of a pending case or controversy involving
the DAP and NBC No. 541, any decision herein could amount to a mere advisory opinion
that no court can validly render
The respondents argue that it is the application of the DAP to actual situations that the
petitioners can question either in the trial courts or in the COA; that if the petitioners are
dissatisfied with the ruling either of the trial courts or of the COA, they can appeal the
decision of the trial courts by petition for review on certiorari, or assail the decision or final
order of the COA by special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court
Rule: The respondents arguments and submissions on the procedural issue are bereft of
merit.
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Thus, the Constitution vests judicial power in the Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. In creating a lower court, Congress concomitantly determines the
jurisdiction of that court, and that court, upon its creation, becomes by operation of the
Constitution one of the repositories of judicial power. However, only the Court is a
constitutionally created court, the rest being created by Congress in its exercise of the
legislative power.
Necessarily, in discharging its duty under the Rules, to set right and undo any act of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, the Court is not at all precluded from making the inquiry
provided the challenge was properly brought by interested or affected parties. The Court has
been thereby entrusted expressly or by necessary implication with both the duty and the
obligation of determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or
executive action. This entrustment is consistent with the republican system of checks and
balances.
Following our recent dispositions concerning the congressional pork barrel, the Court has
become more alert to discharge its constitutional duty. We will not now refrain from
exercising our expanded judicial power in order to review and determine, with authority, the
limitations on the Chief Executives spending power. G.R. No. 209287
July 1, 2014,
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO vs. BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III
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Case This case originated from a complaint filed by private respondents against petitioner
on Regional Office of the MOLE, Region XI, Davao City for non-compliance with the
provisions of Wage Order No. 5. After due healing the Regional Director rendered a decision
55
In another case;
dated November 16, 1984 in favor of private respondents. Judgment having become final
and executory, the Regional Director issued a Writ of Execution whereby some movable
properties of the hospital (petitioner herein) were levied upon and its operating expenses
kept with the bank were garnished. The levy and garnishment were lifted when petitioner
hospital paid the claim of the private covering the period from June 16 to October 15, 1984.
After making said payment, petitioner hospital failed to continue to comply with Wage Order
No. 5 and likewise, failed to comply with the new Wage Order No. 6 which took effect on
November 1, 1984, prompting private respondents to file against petitioner another
complaint, which is now the case at bar.
Issues having been joined, the Regional Director rendered a decision on April 12, 1985 in
favor of the complainants (private respondents herein) declaring that petitioner (respondent
therein) is estopped from questioning the acquisition of jurisdiction because its appearance
in the hearing is in itself submission to jurisdiction and that this case is merely a continuance
of a previous case where the hospital already willingly paid its obligations to the workers on
orders of the Regional Office. On the matter of the constitutionality of the Wage Order Nos. 5
and 6, the Regional Director declared that only the court can declare a law or order
unconstitutional and until so declared by the court, the Office of the Regional Director is duly
bound to enforce the law or order.
Rule Anent the issue involved in the instant case, petitioner's contention that the
constitutionality of Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6 should be passed upon by the National Labor
Relations Commission, lacks merit. The Supreme Court is vested by the Constitution with
the power to ultimately declare a law unconstitutional. Without such declaration, the assailed
legislation remains operative and can be the source of rights and duties especially so in the
case at bar when petitioner complied with Wage Order No. 5 by paying the claimants the
total amount of P163,047.50, representing the latter's minimum wage increases up to
October 16, 1984, instead of questioning immediately at that stage before paying the amount
due, the validity of the order on grounds of constitutionality. The Regional Director is plainly
,without the authority to declare an order or law unconstitutional and his duty is merely to
enforce the law which stands valid, unless otherwise declared by this Tribunal to be
unconstitutional. On our part, We hereby declare the assailed Wage Orders as
constitutional, there being no provision of the 1973 Constitution (or even of both the
Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution) violated by said Wage Orders, which
Orders are without doubt for the benefit of labor. G.R. No. 74621 February 7, 1990
BROKENSHIRE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC. vs. THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF
LABOR & EMPLOYMENT AND BROKENSHIRE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES
AND WORKER'S UNION-FFW
Case: Due to the imposition of Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, Respondent wrote a letter to
petitioners informing them that they were occupying stalls in the newly renovated municipal
public market without any lease contract, as a consequence of which, the stalls were
considered vacant and open for qualified and interested applicants. Municipal Ordinance No.
98-01 was the Municipal Revised Revenue Code." The Code contained a provision for
increased rentals for the stalls and the imposition of goodwill fees for stalls. The same Code
authorized respondent to enter into lease contracts over the said market stalls, and
incorporated a standard contract of lease for the stall holders at the municipal public market.
The RTC ruled for the respondents

Upon the appeal of the losing party, The Court of Appeals held that petitioners resort to a
petition for prohibition was improper, since respondents acts in question herein did not
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This prompted petitioners, together with other similarly situated stall holders at the municipal
public market, to file before the RTC a Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus, with Prayer for
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, against
respondent.
involve the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions, as required under

Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Also, the filing by petitioners of the Petition for
Prohibition/Mandamus before the RTC was premature, as they failed to exhaust
administrative remedies prior thereto.
Rule: The rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies is intended to preclude a court
from arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is
initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. Thus, a case where the
issue raised is a purely legal question, well within the competence; and the jurisdiction of the
court and not the administrative agency, would clearly constitute an exception. Resolving
questions of law, which involve the interpretation and application of laws, constitutes
essentially an exercise of judicial power that is exclusively allocated to the Supreme Court
and such lower courts the Legislature may establish.
In this case, the parties are not disputing any factual matter on which they still need to
present evidence. The sole issue petitioners raised before the RTC in Civil Case No. 25843
was whether Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 was valid and enforceable despite the absence,
prior to its enactment, of a public hearing held in accordance with Article 276 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code. This is undoubtedly a
pure question of law, within the competence and jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve.
Paragraph 2(a) of Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, expressly establishes the
appellate jurisdiction of this Court, and impliedly recognizes the original jurisdiction of lower
courts over cases involving the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules
of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question. (Emphases ours.)
In J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, and
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Santos, the Court has affirmed the jurisdiction of the
RTC to resolve questions of constitutionality and validity of laws (deemed to include local
ordinances) in the first instance, without deciding questions which pertain to legislative
policy. G.R. No. 182065
October 27, 2009 EVELYN ONGSUCO and ANTONIA
SALAYA vs HON. MARIANO M. MALONES
F. Effect of a Declaration of Unconstitutionality
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Rule: Where the assailed legislative or executive act is found by the judiciary to be contrary to
the Constitution, it is null and void. As the new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law
to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution." The above provision of the Civil Code reflects the
orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, whether legislative or executive, is not a law, confers
no rights, imposes no duties, and affords no protection. This doctrine admits of qualifications,
however. As the American Supreme Court stated: "The actual existence of a statute prior to such
a determination [of constitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
57
Civil Code, Art. 7. - When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect to particular regulations,
individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official."
The orthodox view finds support in the well-settled doctrine that the Constitution is supreme and
provides the measure for the validity of legislative or executive acts. Clearly then, neither the
legislative nor the executive branch, and for that matter, much less, this Court, has power under
the Constitution to act contrary to its terms. Any attempted exercise of power in violation of its
provisions is to that extent unwarranted and null.
The growing awareness of the role of the judiciary as the governmental organ which has the final
say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid leads to a more appreciative
attitude of the emerging concept that a declaration of nullity may have legal consequences which
the more orthodox view would deny. That for a period of time such a statute, treaty, executive
order, or ordinance was in "actual existence" appears to be indisputable. What is more
appropriate and logical then than to consider it as "an operative fact." G.R. No. L-21114
November 28, 1967 FEDERICO FERNANDEZ, vs. P. CUERVA and CO.
The effect of a declaration that a law is unconstitutional is to make the law

either void or voidable.
First View (Orthodox view) GENERAL RULE - It is void if on its face, it does not
enjoy any presumption of validity. As such, it produces no effect whatsoever,
creates no right or office, it imposes no duty. Whatever penalty was paid during
the period of its operation must be remitted.
Rule: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, inoperative, as if it had not been
passed. It is therefore stricken from the statute books and considered never to have existed at
all. Not only the parties but all persons are bound by the declaration of unconstitutionality which
means that no one may thereafter invoke it nor may the courts be permitted to apply it in
subsequent cases. It is, in other words, a total nullity. G.R. No. 102232 March 9, 1994 Violeta
Aldovino, et al. vs. Rafael Alunan III, et al.
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In Serrano de Agbayani v PNB, 38 SCRA 429 (1971), the period from 1945
when the law was promulgated, to 1953 when it was declared unconstitutional
should not be counted for the purpose of prescription since the Debt
Moratorium Law was operative during this time. In effect, only 7 years had
elapsed (1944-45, 1953-59). Indeed, it would be unjust to punish the creditor
who could not collect prior to 1953 because the Debt Moratorium Law was
effective, only to be told later that his respect for an apparently valid law made
him lose his right to collect.
58
Second View (Unorthodox view) - But a law declared unconstitutional is only

voidable if, on its face, it enjoys the presumption of validity. In this case, it
becomes inoperative only upon the judicial declaration of its invalidity. And
even so, the invalidation produces no retroactive effect, since it would be unjust
to hold that the law did not produce any effect at all prior to its nullification.
From the time the law was promulgated to the time it was declared invalid,
people would have entered into various transactions and relations, expecting
and in fact compelled to presume that the law is valid. Thus, to now hold that
the law never produced any effect would penalize those who in faith believed
the laws passed by their representatives to be in accordance with their solemn
duty under the Constitution.
Case: The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of
Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
40
Authority (SBMA) , is challenged in this original petition with prayer for prohibition, preliminary
injunction and temporary restraining order "to prevent useless and unnecessary expenditures of
public funds by way of salaries and other operational expenses attached to the office
Rule: Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides:
No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public
office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official
shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of
Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto pursuant to a
legislative act that contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of
Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be
considered a de facto officer, "one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon
principles of policy and justice, will hold valid so far as they involve the interest of the public and third
persons, where the duties of the office were exercised . . . . under color of a known election or
appointment, void because the officer was not eligible, or because there was a want of power in the
electing or appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such
ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to the public . . . . [or] under color of an election,
or appointment, by or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be
such (State vs. Carroll, 38 Conn., 499; Wilcox vs. Smith, 5 Wendell [N.Y.], 231; 21 Am. Dec., 213;
Sheehan's Case, 122 Mass, 445, 23 Am. Rep., 323)."
Conformably with our ruling in Civil Liberties Union, any and all per diems, allowances and other
emoluments which may have been received by respondent Gordon pursuant to his appointment may
be retained by him. G.R. No. 104732 June 22, 1993 ROBERTO A. FLORES, DANIEL Y.
FIGUEROA, ROGELIO T. ALO, DOMINGO A. JADLOC, CARLITO T. CRUZ and MANUEL P.
REYES, , vs. HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, Executive Secretary, and RICHARD J. GORDON
THE OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE

Rule: Pertinently, the "operative fact" doctrine realizes that, in declaring a law or executive action
null and void, or, by extension, no longer without force and effect, undue harshness and resulting
unfairness must be avoided. This is as it should realistically be, since rights might have accrued in
favor of natural or juridical persons and obligations justly incurred in the meantime. The actual
existence of a statute or executive act is, prior to such a determination, an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot justly be ignored; the past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration.
40
Respondent Gordon appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA is
questioned here
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59
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: "The actual existence of a statute, prior to
such a determination of [unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect
of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects,with respect
to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official." x x x
That the operative fact doctrine squarely applies to executive actsin this case, the approval by
PARC of the HLI proposal for stock distribution.
The "operative fact" doctrine is embodied in De Agbayani v. Court of Appeals, wherein it is stated
that a legislative or executive act, prior to its being declared as unconstitutional by the courts, is valid
and must be complied with. G.R. No. 171101 July 5, 2011 HACIENDA LUISITA INCORPORATED
vs. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL
However, in another case;

Rule: In Yap v. Thenamaris Ships Management (G.R. No. 179532, May 30, 2011), the Operative
Fact Doctrine was discussed in that:
As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. The
general rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance
shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary.
The doctrine of operative fact serves as an exception to the aforementioned general rule. In Planters
Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, we held:
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity
and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a
statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on
those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration
of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done
by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it. (Yap v. Thenamaris Ships Management, G.R.
No. 179532, May 30, 2011)
. the Operative Fact Doctrine will not be applied as an exception when to rule otherwise would be
iniquitous and would send a wrong signal that an act may be justified when based on an
unconstitutional provision of law. (See e.g. Yap v. Thenamaris Ships Management, G.R. No.
179532, May 30, 2011)
The Court had the following disquisition on the concept of the Operative Fact Doctrine in the case of
Chavez v. National Housing Authority (G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007, 530 SCRA 235.):
The "operative fact" doctrine is embodied in De Agbayani v. Court of Appeals, wherein it is stated
that a legislative or executive act, prior to its being declared as unconstitutional by the courts, is valid
and must be complied with, thus:
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Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It may not however be
sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged
legislative or executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until
after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and
60
As the new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts,
orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution."
It is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any
legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot survive.
respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have changed their positions. What could be more
fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such legislative
or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a
doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely
to reflect awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the
final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period of time may have
elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It
would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of
what had transpired prior to such adjudication.
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: "The actual existence of a statute, prior to
such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect
of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, with respect
to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and official." This
language has been quoted with approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill and the decision in Manila
Motor Co., Inc. v. Flores. An even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking
for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (Emphasis supplied.)
The principle was further explicated in the case of Rieta v. People of the Philippines, thus:
In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in
Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties,
and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. It is quite clear, however, that such broad
statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications.
The actual existence of a statute, prior to [the determination of its invalidity], is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a
new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of
rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and
acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those
which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous
decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
justified.
Moreover, the Court ruled in Chavez that:
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From the foregoing, it is highly inappropriate to apply the operative fact doctrine to the UCPB shares.
Public funds, which were supposedly given utmost safeguard, were haphazardly distributed to
private individuals based on statutory provisions that are found to be constitutionally infirm on not
only one but on a variety of grounds. Worse still, the recipients of the UCPB shares may not actually
be the intended beneficiaries of said benefit. Clearly, applying the Operative Fact Doctrine would not
61
Furthermore, when petitioner filed the instant case against respondents on August 5, 2004, the JVAs
were already terminated by virtue of the MOA between the NHA and RBI. The respondents had no
reason to think that their agreements were unconstitutional or even questionable, as in fact, the
concurrent acts of the executive department lent validity to the implementation of the Project. The
SMDRP agreements have produced vested rights in favor of the slum dwellers, the buyers of
reclaimed land who were issued titles over said land, and the agencies and investors who made
investments in the project or who bought SMPPCs. These properties and rights cannot be disturbed
or questioned after the passage of around ten (10) years from the start of the SMDRP
implementation. Evidently, the "operative fact" principle has set in. The titles to the lands in the
hands of the buyers can no longer be invalidated.
only be iniquitous but would also serve injustice to the Government, to the coconut industry, and to
the people, who, whether willingly or unwillingly, contributed to the public funds, and therefore expect
that their Government would take utmost care of them and that they would be used no less, than for
public purpose. G.R. Nos. 177857-58 January 24, 2012 PHILIPPINE COCONUT, PRODUCERS
FEDERATION, INC. (COCOFED) vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G. Political Question vs. Justiciable Question

Political Questions
In PBA v COMELEC, 140 SCRA 455, we see a reversal of judicial review.
The case was clearly a justiciable controversy. Is the resignation submitted
by Marcos, which was conditioned on the election, proclamation and
assumption into office by the elected President, a valid resignation as to
authorize the Batasan to pass a Snap Election Law? The Court could have
validly issued an injunction to stop the COMELEC from proceeding with the
preparations for the election. But it did not, citing its delay in deciding the
case and the sentiments of the people that developed in the meantime as
reason for its inaction. According to the court, what at first was a legal
question became a political question because it was overtaken by events.
Rule: Political questions, as defined in Taada v. Cuenco, refer to:
those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the legislature or the executive branch of the Government.
Simply put, the political question doctrine applies when the question calls for a ruling on the
wisdom, and not the legality, of a particular governmental act or issuance.
The political question doctrine has no application in the case here. In the privatization of AHEPP,
PSALMs discretion is circumscribed not only by the provisions of EPIRA and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR), but also by pertinent laws that are consequential and relevant to
its mandate of privatizing the power generation assets of NPC. Needless to stress, PSALM is
duty bound to abide by the parameters set by the Constitution. In case it violates any existing
law or the Constitution, it cannot hide behind the mantle of the political question doctrine,
because such violation inevitably calls for the exercise of judicial review by this Court. G.R. No.
192088 October 9, 2012 INITIATIVES FOR DIALOGUE AND EMPOWERMENT THROUGH
ALTERNATIVE LEGAL SERVICES, INC. (IDEALS, INC.), vs. POWER SECTOR ASSETS
AND LIABILITIES MANAGEMENT CORPORATION (PSALM)
Case: Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department
through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese
officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the "comfort women" stations in
the Philippines. However, officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners,
and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had
already been fully satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the
Philippines and Japan.
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Baker v. Carr remains the starting point for analysis under the political question doctrine. There
the US Supreme Court explained that:
62
Rule: From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive
prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan.
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on question.
In Taada v. Cuenco, we held that political questions refer "to those questions which, under
the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure."
Certain types of cases often have been found to present political questions. One such category
involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that "[t]he conduct of the foreign
relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative--'the
political'--departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise
of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision."
However, the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals
against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is
demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this
case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best interest of the country
to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951.
The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question. Neither could petitioners herein
assail the said determination by the Executive Department via the instant petition for certiorari.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be inimical to
our countrys foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating
serious implications for stability in this region. For us to overturn the Executive Departments
determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate
political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed.
G.R. No. 162230 April 28, 2010 ISABELITA C. VINUYA, vs. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO
Justiciable Question
Rule: A justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or
ripe for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. The SJS Petition
for Declaratory Relief fell short of this test. It miserably failed to allege an existing controversy or
dispute between the petitioner and the named respondents therein. Further, the Petition did not
sufficiently state what specific legal right of the petitioner was violated by the respondents
therein; and what particular act or acts of the latter were in breach of its rights, the law or the
Constitution.
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An initiatory complaint or petition filed with the trial court should contain "a plain, concise and
direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim x x x." Yet,
the SJS Petition stated no ultimate facts.
63
As pointed out by Brother Eliseo F. Soriano in his Comment, what exactly has he done that
merited the attention of SJS? He confesses that he does not know the answer, because the SJS
Petition (as well as the assailed Decision of the RTC) "yields nothing in this respect." His
Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, adds that, at the time SJS filed its Petition on January 28, 2003,
the election season had not even started yet; and that, in any event, he has not been actively
involved in partisan politics.
Indeed, SJS merely speculated or anticipated without factual moorings that, as religious leaders,
the petitioner and his co-respondents below had endorsed or threatened to endorse a candidate
or candidates for elective offices; and that such actual or threatened endorsement "will enable
[them] to elect men to public office who [would] in turn be forever beholden to their leaders,
enabling them to control the government"[;] and "pos[ing] a clear and present danger of serious
erosion of the peoples faith in the electoral process[;] and reinforc[ing] their belief that religious
leaders determine the ultimate result of elections," which would then be violative of the
separation clause.
Such premise is highly speculative and merely theoretical, to say the least. Clearly, it does not
suffice to constitute a justiciable controversy. The Petition does not even allege any indication or
manifest intent on the part of any of the respondents below to champion an electoral candidate,
or to urge their so-called flock to vote for, or not to vote for, a particular candidate. It is a timehonored rule that sheer speculation does not give rise to an actionable right. G.R. No. 159357
April 28, 2004 Brother MARIANO "MIKE" Z. VELARDE, , vs.SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY
Judicial Power and Political Questions

Rule: Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government
is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-avis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be
emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the
exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative
actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz,
a distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the
settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden
territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the
power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to
declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very
elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson,
23
Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
Page
64
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive.
The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in
nature, we would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII,
Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993 OPOSA VS.
FACTORAN
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POLITICAL LAW

(STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF THE GOVERNMENT)

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

To Emphasize, as to laws which are not political in nature,

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

B. Scope of Political Law:

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

Constitutional law is the study of the maintenance of the proper balance

E. Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

F. Foreign Jurisprudence and Constitutional Law

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

FLEXIBLE CONSTITUTION - is one that can be changed by ordinary

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

H. Qualities of a Good Constitution

Broad. Because it provides for the organization of the entire government

Brief. It must confine itself to basic principles to be implemented with

Definite. To prevent ambiguity in its provisions which could result in

I. Essential Parts of a Good Constitution

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

Constitution of Liberty. The series of proscriptions setting forth the

Constitution of Government. The series of provisions outlining the

Constitution of Sovereignty. The provisions pointing out the mode or

THE BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION

All laws of political nature were automatically abrogated.

McKinleys Instructions: (issued by Pres. McKinley on April 7, 1900 as

the right to bear arms4 and

The Philippines was then in rebellion

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

The judiciary was subsequently established on 11 June 1901, with a

Philippine Bill of 1902: (Philippines organic act from 1902 to 1906)

It established a tripartite government with real separation of powers;

The executive power was in the hands of an American

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

It is an enabling statute that provided the mechanism whereby the

Tydings-McDuffie Law: (not an organic act)

This provided for:

This served as the charter of the Commonwealth and upon withdrawal

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

The alleged electoral fraud in the snap presidential election in February

1. Proclamation of the Freedom Constitution.

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

a. Proclamation No. 1 February 25, 1986 (Provisional Government)

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

b. Proclamation No. 3 March 25, 1986 (Provisional Constitution),

Proclamation No. 9, creating the Constitutional Commission of

2. Article V of the Provisional Constitution

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

3. Section 27. Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution

Philippines was approved by the

4. Proclamation No. 58 February 11, 1987 - proclaiming the ratification

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

year after such publication. (New Civil Code)

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

Judicial Elaboration of the Constitution

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

- IN CASE OF DOUBT, THE CONSTITUTION SHOULD BE

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II

Other cases on the construction of the Constitution

Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003.

Atty. Edgar B. Pascua II