Filing # 48915708 E-Filed 11/15/2016 02:37:59 PM

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48915708
11/15/2016 02:37:59 PM ET
Charles William Dodson 850-606-4307
Second Judicial Circuit in and for Leon County, Florida
372016CA002478XXXXXX
2016 CA 002478
GILLESPIE, NEIL J vs. DETZNER, KENNETH

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NOTE: The Order of Dismissal of Judge Dodson Nov-15-2016 states in the opening sentence,
"THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Petitioner's "Petition for Writ of Mandamus,"
which was transferred to this Court from the First District Court of Appeal on November 10, 2016."
Tellingly, a search of the case docket in the First District Court of Appeal does not show any case for Neil
Gillespie. My "Petition for Writ of Mandamus [and Constitutional Challenge]" was somehow transferred from
the Supreme Court of Florida, the state's highest court, to the Second Judicial Circuit Court, Leon County.

11/18/2016 1:25 AM

Filing # 48767618 E-Filed 11/10/2016 03:17:07 PM

Supreme Court of Florida

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 10, 2016
CASE NO.: SC16-2031
NEIL J. GILLESPIE
Petitioner(s)

vs.

KENNETH J. DETZNER,
SECRETARY
Respondent(s)

The petition for writ of mandamus is hereby transferred, pursuant to Harvard

v. Singletary, 733 So. 2d 1020 (Fla. 1999), to the Circuit Court of the Second
Judicial Circuit, in and for Leon County, Florida. The transfer of this case should
not be construed as an adjudication or comment on the merits of the petition, nor as
a determination that the transferee court has jurisdiction or that the petition has
been properly denominated as a petition for writ of mandamus. The transferee
court should not interpret the transfer of this case as an indication that it must or
should reach the merits of the petition. The transferee court shall treat the petition
as if it had been originally filed there on the date it was filed in this Court and is
instructed to consider expediting the petition as it appears to be time sensitive
based upon the allegations; however, a determination to expedite consideration is
at the discretion of the transferee court. Any determination concerning whether a
filing fee shall be applicable to this case shall be made by the transferee court.
Any and all pending motions in this case are hereby deferred to the transferee
court.
Any future pleadings filed regarding this case should be filed in the above
mentioned circuit court at

CASE NO.: SC16-2031

Page Two
Attn: Special Processes Division, 301 South Monroe Street, #100, Tallahassee,
Florida 32301.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND,
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
A True Copy
Test:

two
Served:
ADAM SCOTT TANENBAUM
NEIL J. GILLESPIE
HON. LEE E. GOODMAN, COMMISSIONER
HON. ELLEN L. WEINTRAUB, COMMISSIONER
HON. MATTHEW S. PETERSEN, CHAIRMAN
HON. CAROLINE C. HUNTER, COMMISSIONER
HON. BOB INZER, CLERK
DAVID HUYNH
CHRISTINA SCHAENGOLD
HON. STEVEN WALTHER, COMMISSIONER
HON. ANN M. RAVEL, COMMISSIONER

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17250018518994391961&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr

733 So.2d 1020 (1999)

William Gary HARVARD, a/k/a/ Darrell Small, Petitioner,

v.
Harry K. SINGLETARY, etc., Respondent.
No. 93,877.
Supreme Court of Florida.
May 6, 1999.
1021 *1021 William Gary Harvard, a/k/a Darrell Small, pro se, Milton, Florida, for Petitioner.

No appearance, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.
Petitioner William Gary Harvard filed an "Emergency Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus." Petitioner Harvard,
who is incarcerated at Martin Correctional Institution, claims to have been incorrectly assigned to Close
Management status, a restrictive level of confinement, and seeks to be reassigned to a less restrictive
confinement status. In support of his claim, he sets forth numerous factual allegations.[1] Although we have
original jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus, prohibition, mandamus, and quo warranto, our jurisdiction
is discretionary. See art. V, 3(b)(7),(8),(9), Fla. Const. Our jurisdiction is also concurrent with the jurisdiction
of the district courts of appeal and the circuit courts. See art. V, 4(b)(3), 5(b); see generally State ex rel.
Scaldeferri v. Sandstrom, 285 So.2d 409, 411 (Fla. 1973). For the reasons that follow, we decline to
exercise our jurisdiction in this case and elect to transfer the petition to a more appropriate court. By doing
so, we are exercising the discretion granted to us by the Florida Constitution.
We take the opportunity to explain that, in the future, we will likewise decline jurisdiction and transfer or
dismiss writ petitions which, like the present one, raise substantial issues of fact or present individualized
1022 issues that do not require immediate resolution by this Court, or are not *1022 the type of case in which an

opinion from this Court would provide important guiding principles for the other courts of this State. If,
however, we are able to determine on the face of the petition that the claim is successive or procedurally
barred, we will continue our practice of denying those petitions.
In the last year alone, this Court has received well over 500 petitions for extraordinary relief. The
overwhelming majority of these petitions were filed by prisoners seeking to invoke this Court's original writ
jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(7), (8) and (9) of the Florida Constitution. This case is but one
example.
As is true of many of these writ petitions, a review of the instant petition suggests that the resolution of this
case could very well require fact-finding, a task this Court is ill-equipped to handle. See State ex rel. Watkins
v. Fernandez, 106 Fla. 779, 788, 143 So. 638, 641 (1932). Clearly, such cases should be handled by the
circuit courts because they often concern issues specifically related to matters occurring in the circuit and
the circuit court would be in the best position to quickly and efficiently resolve such problems.
In the past, this Court has declined to exercise its jurisdiction over extraordinary writ petitions raising

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17250018518994391961&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr

substantial issues of fact and has dismissed without prejudice or transferred such cases to the appropriate
circuit court. See, e.g., State ex rel. International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 2019 v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 254 So.2d 195, 196 (Fla.1971)(transferring petition to the circuit court due to the need for
fact-finding); State ex rel. Harris v. Gautier, 108 Fla. 390, 415-16, 147 So. 846, 847 (1933)(dismissing
mandamus petition without prejudice to pursuing remedy in circuit court because, although Court has
concurrent jurisdiction, it has no facilities to take testimony and determine disputed material questions of
fact); see also State ex rel. Clark v. Klingensmith, 126 Fla. 124, 129-30, 170 So. 616, 618 (1936)(noting
"three acknowledged methods of disposing of an original case in quo warranto [in an appellate court] where
there are issues of fact to be tried:" (1) decline jurisdiction without prejudice to filing in the circuit court, (2)
dismiss without prejudice to proceeding in the circuit court, and (3) appoint a commissioner of the court "to
take testimony and refer it back to the appellate court, together with his findings, which are advisory only").
Indeed, in Watkins, 106 Fla. at 788, 143 So. at 641, this Court stated:
While we hold that the relator brought the proper action ... we think that there are patent reasons
why we should not retain jurisdiction of the cause. In the first place, the Circuit Court has
coordinate jurisdiction with this Court to grant the writ, the issues are such that testimony will
have to be taken ... and ... [t]his Court ... has no facilities for taking testimony. It was never
intended that it perform the function of a nisi prius court; this being peculiarly within the province
of the Circuit Court. If we take original jurisdiction in this contest, other matters of similar
character will press us for attention to such an extent that the appellate work will be very much
delayed.
We now reiterate and reaffirm this longstanding practice.
In addition to declining to exercise jurisdiction because the appropriate disposition of this case will likely
require the resolution of disputed issues of fact, we also decline to exercise our jurisdiction in this case
because it presents individualized issues that do not require immediate resolution by this Court and are not of
the type requiring guidance from this Court in order to be properly resolved.
In the past, with a view toward alleviating the burden on the trial courts, we have often chosen to exercise the
1023 original writ jurisdiction we share with the circuit courts and district courts and have reviewed *1023 and

disposed of petitions which, like Harvard's, present issues of very little significance to the state of the law in
Florida as a whole. It has become apparent, however, that our efforts are neither timesaving nor efficient.
Many prisoner petitions are successive, and a large number are completely without merit. Moreover, there is
no assurance that a petitioner who files a claim in this Court has not already filed similar claims in the trial
and appellate courts or that the petitioner will not file a similar claim in another of this State's courts after filing
here.
The very review of these petitions by this Court to make these preliminary determinations requires the
expenditure of substantial time that would otherwise be devoted to the performance of our unique duties as
the State's highest court. Meanwhile, the number of original writ petitions filed in this Court continues to rise.
Common sense dictates that we reserve our exercise of original writ jurisdiction for cases which require this
Court's specific or immediate attention.[2] As with our policy of transferring petitions raising substantial issues
of fact, this is not a new concept. We have declined jurisdiction over writ petitions and other analogous
proceedings in the past for similar reasons.[3] We have done so even in ongoing capital cases. For example,
in State v. Preston, 376 So.2d 3, 4-5 (Fla.1979), a capital case where the death penalty had not yet been

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17250018518994391961&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr

imposed, we declined jurisdiction and transferred an interlocutory appeal, which we treated as a petition for
writ of certiorari, because the issues raised were not unique to death cases and there was no compelling
reason that they could not be reviewed in the district court. Based on the rationale in Preston, in Sybers v.
State, No. 91,198 (Fla. Oct. 10, 1997), by unpublished order, we transferred to the district court a writ of
prohibition seeking the disqualification of a trial judge in an ongoing capital case. In light of the fact that we
have declined to address routine issues in cases where the death penalty could be imposed, it makes little
sense to continue addressing such issues in other contexts.
By announcing a policy to be applied generally to all similar types of cases, we are not engaging in an entirely
new practice. We have announced policies for handling particular types of cases before. In Baggett v.
Wainwright, 229 So.2d 239, 243-44 (Fla.1969), for example, this Court discussed the importance of directing
petitions to the most appropriate court and announced a policy of transferring habeas petitions seeking relief
on the basis of a deprivation of the right to appeal to the district court empowered to provide full appellate
review. The Court recognized that its jurisdiction over habeas petitions was not exclusive and explained that
1024 the transfer of such a petition was the best way to achieve an "effective but expedient *1024 procedural
machinery for spreading the judicial labor so as not to overburden any particular court or judicial body." Id. at
243.
To further these same objectives, we now wish to reaffirm our policy of declining to exercise jurisdiction over
writ petitions that do not raise issues which require resolution by this State's highest Court. Accordingly, we
have determined that transfer to the proper circuit court is the most appropriate disposition of this case. We
emphasize that by transferring this case, we are not dismissing petitioner's cause of action, or in any way
defeating his ability to bring his claims before a court. We are simply transferring petitioner's case to a more
appropriate court, due to the nature of the issues presented.
We also wish to emphasize that we are not transferring the instant petition because we deem petitioner's
claim to lack significance. We simply find that his claims are more appropriately dealt with in the circuit court.
In addition, as with every case we transfer, we have confidence that our circuit and district courts will
endeavor to ensure that every litigant's case is carefully and promptly reviewed, and we believe that the
transferee court will resolve this case with as much care and diligence as due process dictates.
Finally, we emphasize that this Court has not curtailed its own writ jurisdiction by this decision. On the
contrary, we will continue to be vigilant to ensure that no fundamental injustices occur. If we determine that
such an injustice may be occurring which cannot be appropriately addressed by transferring the petition, we
may decide that action by this Court is necessary. In this case, however, whether petitioner Harvard was
improperly assigned to Close Management does not present such an issue.
Therefore, in the instant case, we hereby decline to exercise our jurisdiction and elect to transfer the petition
to the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit Court, in and for Martin County.[4] The transfer of this case should not be
construed as an adjudication or comment on the merits of the petition, a determination as to the transferee
court's jurisdiction, or a determination that the petition has been properly titled as a petition for writ of habeas
corpus. Further, if it is determined that a filing fee is applicable to this petition, and if the petitioner wishes to
proceed in forma pauperis in the transferee court, an affidavit of indigency and accompanying documentation
shall be filed by the petitioner in the transferee court.
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., SHAW, ANSTEAD and PARIENTE, JJ., and KOGAN, Senior Justice, concur.

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17250018518994391961&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr

WELLS, J., concurs in result only.

OVERTON, Senior Justice, dissents with an opinion.
OVERTON, Senior Justice, dissenting. I dissent.
By this opinion, the majority has substantially reduced the access to this Court for habeas corpus petitioners.
It has, by this opinion, rewritten article V, section 3(b)(9), Florida Constitution. That provision provides as
follows:
(b) JURISDICTION.-The supreme court:
....
(9) May, or any justice may, issue writs of habeas corpus returnable before the supreme court or
any justice, a district court of appeal or any judge thereof, or any circuit judge.
The majority opinion states that this Court will not accept jurisdiction in habeas corpus petitions "that do not
1025 require immediate resolution by this Court" and explains that these petitions may be heard by other *1025
courts. Majority op. at 2. To me, this is a clear restriction on this Court's habeas corpus jurisdiction.
The habeas corpus provision is not like our mandamus or quo warranto jurisdiction that contains specific
language limiting the Court's jurisdiction. In section 3(b)(8), those writs are limited only to "state officers and
state agencies," this Court having no jurisdiction to issue writs to any local governmental entities, e.g.,
counties, municipalities, school boards or special districts.
Habeas corpus jurisdiction is basic to our legal heritage. It is so basic that the authors of our habeas corpus
jurisdiction made it unique with regard to this Court because it states that habeas corpus jurisdiction may not
only be exercised by the entire Court, but it may also be exercised by a single justice. It is the only
jurisdictional provision that gives authority to an individual justice. The provision also takes particular care to
address the problem of resolving substantial issues of fact, a concern of the majority, by allowing the Court or
any justice to make the writ returnable to "any circuit judge."
My deep concern is that the effect of the majority opinion will be to deny habeas corpus jurisdiction to
individual petitioners who file these petitions without the help of a lawyer. It appears to me that from now on
the only habeas corpus petitions this Court will consider will be those filed by attorneys for their clients.
Further, I disagree with the analysis. I do not believe it proper to include cases of other extraordinary writ
remedies in with the analysis of habeas corpus cases. For instance, mandamus is already limited in the
constitution to state officials or state agencies in addition to the fact that mandamus is limited to issues of
law, not to matters of discretion, and consequently, fact finding is not involved with that process. Habeas
corpus is different and very distinct from other extraordinary writs.
I believe this Court is sending the wrong message to the public in restricting its citizens in seeking habeas
corpus access through the constitutionally provided jurisdiction given to this Court. While it is true that a great
number of these types of petitions are denied, it is also true that some of these petitions are resolved after
this Court only asks for a response from the party holding the petitioner.
In conclusion, I dissent from the substantial restrictions imposed by the majority on this Court's habeas
corpus jurisdiction. It will have the effect of denying access to this Court.

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17250018518994391961&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr

[1] Harvard alleges that he has exhausted available administrative remedies. If he had not, we would have dismissed his petition. See
generally Shevin ex rel. State v. Public Service Comm'n, 333 So.2d 9, 12 (Fla.1976)(explaining that the extraordinary remedy of
mandamus is unavailable unless no other adequate remedy exits); Sutton v. Strickland, 485 So.2d 25 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (holding that a
petitioner's challenge to his confinement status through writ of habeas corpus was subject to dismissal where the petitioner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies through the Department of Corrections' inmate grievance procedure).
[2] We will, of course, continue to exercise our jurisdiction in cases where, despite the individualized nature of the claim, the petition raises
matters within this Court's exclusive jurisdiction. See, e.g., State v. Fourth Dist. Court of Appeal, 697 So.2d 70 (Fla.1997)(holding this Court
has exclusive jurisdiction over collateral proceedings in death penalty cases).
[3] Compare State v. Preston, 376 So.2d 3, 4-5 (Fla.1979)(transferring to district court an interlocutory appeal, treated as a petition for writ
of certiorari, in a capital case where death penalty had not yet been imposed because issues involved were not unique to death cases and
there was no compelling reason this Court should hear the case), and State ex rel. Ake v. Swanson, 116 Fla. 464, 464, 156 So. 481, 481
(1934)(denying writ of mandamus without prejudice and with leave to prosecute same in circuit court where it appeared "that no sufficient
reason exists why the Supreme Court should take original jurisdiction of this matter"), with Brown v. Firestone, 382 So.2d 654, 662
(Fla.1980)(finding constitutional questions surrounding the governor's vetoes to be an important issue justifying the Court's exercise of
discretion), and Division of Bond Fin. v. Smathers, 337 So.2d 805, 807 (Fla.1976)(exercising writ jurisdiction due to the importance of
immediately determining the constitutionality of the current general appropriations act).
[4] See Alachua Reg'l Juvenile Detention Ctr. v. T.O., 684 So.2d 814, 816 (Fla.1996) (finding that proper circuit court venue for habeas
petition is in county where prisoner is held).

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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA

NEIL J. GILLESPIE,

Petitioner,

v.

CASE NO.: 2016 CA 2478

KENNETH J. DETZNER, SECRETARY,

Respondent.

---------------I
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Petitioner's "Petition for Writ of Mandamus,"
which was transferred to this Court from the First District Court of Appeal on November 10, 2016.
This Court, having considered the petition and the applicable law, and being otherwise advised in the
premises, makes the following findings and rulings:
Petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie showing of a clear legal right to perfonnance of a
clear legal duty. Furthennore, the conclusory statements in the petition are insufficient to warrant the

issuance of a Sllow-cause order. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.030 and Diehl v. 'Afoore, 767 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 1st

DCA 2000). Accordingly, the iiIopetition for Writ of Mandamus,'l'l is hereby DISMISSED. No motion
for rehearing or reconsideration will be entertained.

DONE and ORDERED

tJD\J~

C"opies to:

Neil J. Gillespie

8092 SW 115th Loop

Ocala, FL 34481

'f
in Chambers, Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this IS", day of
,2016.

L~

-----

IIRe?'=:I.

W Dodson, Circuit Judge

Charles.
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Leon County C~~rt ~ ~ Rm 36S-C
301 S. Monroe. tf:e:.
Tallahassee, Fionaa U301

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Neil J. Gillespie
8092 SW 11 5th Loop
Ocala, FL 34481
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0004279907
NOV152016
MAIlED FROM ZIP CODE 32301

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https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11898050468521403342&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr

767 So.2d 615 (2000)

Joseph John DIEHL, Appellant,

v.
Michael W. MOORE, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Appellee.
No. 1D99-749.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
September 15, 2000.
616

*616 James W. Cook, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Susan Schwartz, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Corrections, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.
We grant appellee's motion for correction, withdraw our opinion filed August 9, 2000, and issue this corrected
opinion in its stead.
Joseph Diehl appeals an order denying his petition for writ of mandamus, wherein he requested the lower
court to order appellee, the Department of Corrections, pursuant to Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 117 S.Ct.
891, 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997), to restore administrative gaintime and provisional credits that had been
canceled under section 944.277, Florida Statutes (Supp.1992), Florida Attorney General Opinion 92-96
(1992), and section 944.278, Florida Statutes (1993). Diehl claims the trial court erred in denying his petition
based upon department affidavits without conducting an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the prison
system had reached 99 percent capacity at the time Diehl was awarded the gaintime and credits. We affirm
for a different reason, because appellant failed to allege legally sufficient grounds for relief.
Diehl committed the offenses for which he was incarcerated between October 30, 1986, and December 29,
1986. During that time, the Florida Emergency Gaintime Law was in effect, which was triggered once the
prison population exceeded 99 percent of lawful capacity. Under an ex post facto analysis, Diehl would thus
be entitled to reinstatement of his gaintime only if lawful capacity had exceeded 99 percent when he received
his awards. See Meola v. Department of Corrections, 732 So.2d 1029 (Fla.1998). He had apparently been
awarded administrative gaintime and provisional credits between February 1, 1987, and January 31, 1991,
pursuant to statutes that were triggered at 97 and 98 percent. Diehl claims on appeal that the trial court
erred in relying on department affidavits in which personnel averred that 99 percent of capacity was never
achieved.
Diehl may have been entitled to an evidentiary hearing, had his petition been legally sufficient. If a petitioner
seeking a writ of mandamus makes a prima facie showing of a clear legal right to performance of a clear legal
duty and raises disputed factual issues in response to an order to show cause, "a trial to resolve such
disputes is appropriate." Holcomb v. Department of Corrections, 609 So.2d 751, 753 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=11898050468521403342&hl=en&as_sdt=6&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr

617

Diehl, however, never made a prima facie showing that cancellation of his *617 administrative gaintime and
provisional credits violated the ex post facto clause. He claimed only that under Lynce, he had a vested
liberty interest in the gaintime he had been awarded. A trial court is not required to issue an order to show
cause or grant an evidentiary hearing simply because an inmate's petition contained a conclusory allegation
of entitlement to relief. The petitioner must instead make "detailed factual allegations" supporting the claim. Id.
at 755 (quoting Roberts v. Brierton, 368 So.2d 117, 118 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)).
Because Diehl only asserted conclusory statements in his petition that were insufficient to warrant a
show-cause order, we affirm the trial court's denial of the petition, without prejudice to Diehl's right to file a
new petition.
AFFIRMED.
ERVIN, LAWRENCE and BROWNING, JJ., CONCUR.

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37 2016 CA 002478 - GILLESPIE, NEIL J vs DETZNER, KENNETH

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CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
JUDGE DODSON, CHARLES W: ASSIGNED
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11/10/2016

CFLL

CIVIL FEE LATE LETTER

BM

11/15/2016

ORDS

-Req
-Req

ORDER OF DISMISSAL - Recorded (OR 4997.596 /

20160075167)

4997

596

BM
Top of Page

Event

Date

Start

Location

Judge

Result

Source
Top of Page

Docket Application
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
EXTRA DEFENDANT

Owed
$400.00
$2.50

Paid
$0.00
$0.00

Dismissed
$0.00
$0.00

Due
$400.00
$2.50
Top of Page

Ordered Amt
$402.50

Paid
$0.00

Ar Plan
Dismissed
$0.00

Balance
$402.50

Delinquent
$0.00
Top of Page

Schedule Date
2/10/2017

Ar Schedule
Amt Owed
Amt Paid
$402.50
$0.00

Paid Date
Top of Page

11/20/2016 7:21 PM

http://2ndcircuit.leoncountyfl.gov/dodson.php

Point, NY and Florida State University. He graduated from Florida State University
College of Law with high honors in 1976 and practiced civil trial law for 31 years before
becoming a circuit judge. He was a Florida Bar Board Certified civil trial lawyer for 25
years before his election to the bench in 2008.
In 2009 and 2010 he presided over the juvenile delinquency docket in Leon County, in
addition to handling a substantial case load on the family law docket. In 2011 and 2012
he presided over a felony division in Leon County. In 2012-2014 he was assigned to all
Wakulla County circuit criminal and civil cases.
From 2014-2015, he was assigned to the juvenile delinquency docket in Leon County, in
addition to handling a substantial case load in the civil division.
He is currently assigned to the civil division in Leon County.

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11/18/2016 1:42 AM

https://www.floridabar.org/wps/portal/flbar/home/attysearch/mprofile/!ut/p/z1/jY_LDoIwFEQ_qdMKLSyvBkmLWOMDoRvTFWmi6ML4_ZLGjQvQ...

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Charles William Dodson

Member of the Judiciary
Bar Number:

Mail Address:

228931
Circuit Judge Leon County Courthouse
301 S Monroe St # 365-C
Tallahassee, FL 32301-1861
United States
Office: 850-577-4307

Email:

Fax: 850-922-0327
dodsonc@leoncountyfl.gov

Personal Bar URL:

www.floridabar.org/mybarprofile/228931

vCard:

County:

Leon

Circuit:

Admitted:

05/31/1977

Judicial Position:

Circuit Court

10-Year Discipline
History:

None

Law School:

The Florida State University College of Law

The Find a Lawyer directory is provided as a public service. The Florida Bar maintains limited basic information about lawyers licensed to practice in the state (e.g., name, address, year of birth,
gender, law schools attended, admission year). However, The Florida Bar allows individual attorneys the opportunity to add personal and professional information to the directory. The lawyer is
solely responsible for reviewing and updating any additional information in the directory. The lawyers added information is not reviewed by The Bar for accuracy and The Bar makes no
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11/18/2016 1:49 AM

Bob Inzer
Clerk of Circuit Court and Comptroller
www.clerk.leOD.fl.U5
Clerk of Courts .:. Clerk of County Commission .:. Auditor .:. Treasurer .:. Recorder .:. Custodian of County Funds

November 10,2016
Neil J Gillespie
C/O Gillespie, Neil J
8092 Sw 115Th Loop
Ocal~ Fl 34481
Re: Case # 2016 CA 002478
Dear SirlMadam:
On 1III 0/20 16, you filed a new case or reopen motion or requested services like copies or recording with
this office in the above case. The paperwork has been processed, but you have not paid the statutorily
required fees of $402.50. Please submit payment to this office within 90 days of the date of this letter.
Ifwe have not received your payment by the date noted, a $25.00 administrative set up fee per FS
28.24(26) will be assessed. In addition, pursuant to FS 28.246(6), this matter may be referred to a
collection law firm, which could add 400/0 to the amount owed.
Please submit your payment in person or mail payment to the address noted below. Make sure to
reference your case number when presenting payment.
Thank you for your immediate attention to this issue.
Sincerely,

Deputy Clerk

301 S. MONROE STREET SUITE 100

TALLAHASSEE, FL 32301

PHONE (850) 577-4000

Bob Inzer
Clerk of the Circuit Court and Comptroller

AnN: Civil Customer Assistance Division

301 South Monroe Street, #100
Tallahassee,FL 32301

$000.46 2
IP 32301
011011652275

Neil J Gillespie
C/O Gillespie, Neil J
8092 Sw 115Th Loop
Ocala, FI 34481
Re: Case # 2016 CA 002478

3448i $3567 F?CiS 7

1//1//" 11/" iii 1111/ ill/ il //,/," /1/ illl l ,J//1 J1/1/ iJ/1//1 JJ

///1

https://cvweb.clerk.leon.fl.us/public/login.asp

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A BRIEF BIOGRAPHY OF THE CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT AND COMPTROLLER: BOB INZER

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Bob Inzer: Clerk of the Circuit Court and Comptroller

As a long-time resident of Tallahassee, it is my privilege and honor to represent the citizens of Leon County as
their Clerk & Comptroller. I do not think of myself as a politician but rather a professional manager. And as a
professional manager campaigning for a locally elected constitutional office, I said I would work hard to
accomplish the following goals:
Focus on customer service and never forget it is our job to understand and meet your needs and exceed
your expectations;
Reach out to citizens and make the Clerk's Office, services and information available to all citizens in our
community;
Serve you in your home and office 24 hours a day, 7 days a week through the delivery of services over
the internet;
Improve efficiency and customer service through technology;
Work with the County Commission to improve the financial health of the Leon County government;
Insure the County's monies are wisely invested in a manner that maximizes interest income at an
acceptable level of risk;
Work to build bridges and repair relationships between the City of Tallahassee and Leon County
governments;
Work hard to make the Leon County Clerks Office one of the best in the country;
Promote within the Clerk's Office the highest level of ethical standards and to personally conduct myself
in such a way that I set an example for my employees; and
Operate the Clerk's Office as a professional governmental office hiring and retaining the best and
brightest workers available and to provide the motivation to insure they deliver world class services.
You should hold me accountable for my efforts in accomplishing these goals. Your suggestions as to how we
can improve our performance and serve you better is appreciated. Please contact me at
BBInzer@leoncountyfl.gov or call me at (850) 577-4000.
I would also like to tell you a little bit about my background and experience. I am and have been an active
participant in the Leon County community for more than 30 years. I have an abiding interest in good
government and believe that public service is the most honorable profession. So that you can know me better,
here is a brief outline of my personal and professional background.
Work Experience
Served as the Leon County Clerk of Courts since January 2001