CASE DIGESTS FOR CONSTI LAW 2

CASE
DLSU VS. CA (2007)
(under Academic Freedom and
Due Process)

FACTS, ISSUE, RULING

FACTS:
Students who are members of two different fraternities from DLSU were involved in a physical altercation. Said fraternities
involved were Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity and Domino Lux Fraternity. The private respondents herein are members of Tae
Gamma while petitioners who were allegedly attacked by TGP frat members belong to Domino Lux.
One of the members of DL Frat, James Yap, lodged a complaint with the Discipline Board of DLSU charging the private
respondents with direct assault.
The Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to private respondents Aguilar, Bungubung and Valdes, Jr. and
Reverente informing them of the complaints and requiring them to answer to which they responded with their respective
answers. During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28, 1995, private respondents interposed the common
defense of alibi
On May 3, 1995, the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board issued a Resolution18 finding private respondents guilty. They were
meted the supreme penalty of automatic expulsion,19 pursuant to CHED Order No. 4.
On June 5, 1995, private respondent Aguilar filed with the RTC, Manila, against petitioners a petition for certiorariand
injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order. The petition essentially sought to annul the May 3, 1995 Resolution of the
DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board
Judge issued a TRO24 directing DLSU, its subordinates, agents, representatives and/or other persons acting for and in its behalf
to refrain and desist from implementing Resolution dated May 3, 1995 and Letter-Resolution dated June 1, 1995 and to
immediately desist from barring the enrollment of Aguilar
On the other hand, private respondents Bungubung and Reverente, and later, Valdes, filed petitions-in-intervention. Respondent
Judge also issued corresponding temporary restraining orders to compel petitioner DLSU to admit said private respondents.
Petitioners then sought to assail the decisions of the judges which were then denied by the judges.
However, despite the order issued by the judges, Aguilar was still refused enrollment by the university. Aguilar filed with
respondent Judge an urgent motion to cite petitioners (respondents there) in contempt of court. 34 Aguilar also prayed that
petitioners be compelled to enroll him at DLSU in accordance with respondent Judge's Order.
DLSU filed with the CA a petition for certiorari to enjoin the enforcement of respondent Judge's order.
While the CA granted the petitioners prayer for preliminary injunction, CHED issued that Aguilar be reinstated and that the other
respondents were no longer expelled from the university.
Despite the directive of CHED, petitioner DLSU again prevented private respondent Aguilar from enrolling and/or attending his
classes. In view of the refusal of petitioner DLSU to enroll private respondent Aguilar, CHED wrote a letter dated June 26, 1996
addressed to petitioner Quebengco requesting that private respondent Aguilar be allowed to continue attending his classes
Notwithstanding the said directive, petitioner DLSU, through petitioner Quebengco, still refused to allow private respondent
Aguilar to enroll. Thus, private respondent Aguilar's counsel wrote another demand letter to petitioner DLSU.
Eventually, CA granted Aguilars petition for writ of preliminary injunction. He was then allowed to conditionally enroll in petitioner
DLSU, subject to the continued effectivity of the writ of preliminary injunction
However, petitioners requested transfer of case records to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) from the
CHED.46 Petitioners claimed that it is the DECS, not CHED, which has jurisdiction over expulsion cases
ISSUES:
1. Whether it is the DECS or the CHED which has legal authority to review decisions of institutions of higher learning that impose
disciplinary action on their students found violating disciplinary rules.
2. Whether or not petitioner DLSU is within its rights in expelling private respondents.
2.a Were private respondents accorded due process of law?
2.b Can petitioner DLSU invoke its right to academic freedom?
2.c Was the guilt of private respondents proven by substantial evidence?
3. Whether or not the penalty imposed by DLSU on private respondents is proportionate to their misdeed.
RULING:
I.

It is the CHED, not DECS, which has the

power of supervision and review over
disciplinary cases decided by institutions
of higher learning.
-argument of the petitioners was that BP 232 (Education Act of 1982) transferred the jurisdiction toe DECS. They also said that
RA 7722 did not make reference to the right and duty of learning institutions to develop moral character and instill discipline
among its students. The clear concern of R.A. No. 7722 in the creation of the CHED was academic, i.e., the formulation,

recommendation, setting, and development of academic plans, programs and standards for institutions of higher learning. The
enumeration of CHED's powers and functions under Section 8 does not include supervisory/review powers in student disciplinary
cases hence they argued that cases of disciplinary action had to be handled by DECS
-THIS ARGUMENT IS WITHOUT MERIT
- R.A. No. 7722, otherwise known as "An Act Creating the Commission on Higher Education established the following:
-Sec. 8. Powers and functions of the Commission. The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:
xxxx
n) promulgate such rules and regulations and exercise such other powers and functions as may be necessary to carry
out effectively the purpose and objectives of this Act; and
o) perform such other functions as may be necessary for its effective operations and for the continued enhancement
of growth or development of higher education.
Clearly, there is no merit in the contention of petitioners that R.A. No. 7722 did not transfer to the CHED the DECS' power of
supervision/review over expulsion cases involving institutions of higher learning.
Such provisions are already all-embracing. Also to rule that it is the DECS which has authority to decide disciplinary cases
involving students on the tertiary level would render nugatory the coverage of the CHED. CHED also as established under the
policies of RA 7722 is likewise concerned with ensuring and protecting academic freedom and with promoting its exercise and
observance for the continued intellectual growth of students, the advancement of learning and research, the development of
responsible and effective leadership, the education of high-level and middle-level professionals, and the enrichment of our
historical and cultural heritage. HENCE THERE IS THE ASSUMPTION THAT THIS ALSO INVOLVES HANDLING
DISCIPLINARY CASES
- petitioner DLSU cited no authority in its bare claim that the Bureau of Higher Education, which CHED replaced, never had
authority over student disciplinary cases.
- Section 18 of R.A. No. 7722 is very clear in stating that "[j]urisdiction over DECS-supervised or chartered state-supported
post-secondary degree-granting vocational and tertiary institutions shall be transferred to the Commission [On Higher
Education]." This provision does not limit or distinguish that what is being transferred to the CHED is merely the formulation,
recommendation, setting and development of academic plans, programs and standards for institutions of higher learning, as
what petitioners would have us believe as the only concerns of R.A. No. 7722. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemus: Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.
II. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE ACCORDED DUE PROCESS
n administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating school discipline, "[t]here are withal minimum standards
which must be met before to satisfy the demands of procedural due process and these are: that (1) the students must be
informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges
against them and with the assistance if counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall
have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating
committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case."66
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of
deprivation of due process.
Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them by the DLSU-CSB Joint Discipline Board through
petitioner Sales. They were given the opportunity to answer the charges against them as they, in fact, submitted their respective
answers. They were also informed of the evidence presented against them as they attended all the hearings before the Board.
Moreover, private respondents were given the right to adduce evidence on their behalf and they did.
3.

Petitioner DLSU, as an institution of higher learning, possesses academic freedom which includes
determination of who to admit for study.
Section 5(2), Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional
academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain
them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public interest calls for some
restraint.74 According to present jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the independence of an academic institution to
determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study.
the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in the freedom "what to teach."76 Indeed, while it is categorically stated
under the Education Act of 1982 that students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and
to continue their course therein up to graduation,"77 such right is subject to the established academic and disciplinary standards
laid down by the academic institution. Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can very well exercise its academic freedom, which includes
its free choice of students for admission to its school.
THE GUILT OF RESPONDENTS WERE PROVEN WITH SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
- in order that alibi may succeed as a defense, "the accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence (a) his presence at

another place at the time of the perpetration of the offense and (b) the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the
crime.
-t he defense of alibi may not be successfully invoked where the identity of the assailant has been established by
witnesses.79 Positive identification of accused where categorical and consistent, without any showing of ill motive on the part of
the eyewitness testifying, should prevail over the alibi and denial of appellants whose testimonies are not substantiated by clear
and convincing evidence.
- We reject the alibi of private respondents Bungubung, Valdes Jr., and Reverente. They were unable to show convincingly that
they were not at the scene of the crime on March 29, 1995 and that it was impossible for them to have been there. Moreover,
their alibi cannot prevail over their positive identification by the victims.
THE COURT ALSO FINDS THAT THE PENALTY OF EXPULSION IS DISPROPORTIONATE TO THEIR MISDEED
-a schools power of discipline does not give them the untrammeled discretion to impose a penalty which is not commensurate
with the gravity of the misdeed.
- We agree with respondent CHED that under the circumstances, the penalty of expulsion is grossly disproportionate to the
gravity of the acts committed by private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and Valdes, Jr. Each of the two mauling incidents
lasted only for few seconds and the victims did not suffer any serious injury. Disciplinary measures especially where they involve
suspension, dismissal or expulsion, cut significantly into the future of a student. They attach to him for life and become a
mortgage of his future, hardly redeemable in certain cases. Officials of colleges and universities must be anxious to protect it,
conscious of the fact that, appropriately construed, a disciplinary action should be treated as an educational tool rather than a
punitive measure
Court orders petitioner DLSU is ordered to issue a certificate of completion/graduation in favor of private respondent
Aguilar. On the other hand, it may exclude or drop the names of private respondents Bungubung, Reverente, and
Valdes, Jr. from its rolls, and their transfer credentials immediately issued.

CALAWAG V UP VISAYAS (2013)

(under Academic Freedom)

FACTS:
Petitioners herein are MS Fisheries Biology students at UP Visayas under a scholarship from DOST. They finished their
first year of study with good grades, and thus were eligible to start their thesis in the first semester of their second year. The
petitioners then enrolled in the thesis program, drafted their tentative thesis titles, and obtained the consent of Dr. Rex Balea to
be their thesis adviser, as well as the other faculty members consent to constitute their respective thesis committees
Petitioners then sent letters to Dean Baylon re: their thesis topic as well as the members of their thesis committee and the
approval of their adviser of their thesis
Dean Baylon subsequently questioned the topic of their thesis saying that the petitioners thesis titles connote a historical and
social dimension study which is not appropriate for the petitioners chosen masters degrees.
The petitioners filed for certiorari and mandamus before RTC for Dean Baylon to approve their thesis comms and their thesis
title. They also issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against Dean Baylon.
The RTC granted a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, which Dean Baylon allegedly refused to follow. UP Visayas
eventually assailed this order before the CA
CAs ruling: The CA issued a TRO against the implementation of the RTCs order, holding that the petitioners had no clear right to
compel Dean Baylon to approve the composition of their thesis committees as a matter of course. As the college dean, Dean
Baylon exercises supervisory authority in all academic matters affecting the college.
Also, their reliance on Article 51 (Art. 51. The composition of the thesis committee shall be approved by the dean of the
college/school upon the recommendation of the chairperson of the major department/division/institute. The GPO shall be
informed of the composition of the thesis committee and/or any change thereof.) of the Graduate Program Manual of the UP
Visayas is misplaced since IT IS CONSTRUED TO MEAN THAT THE DEANS APPROVAL IS NECESSARY PRIOR TO THE
COMPOSITION OF A THESIS COMM
-In addition, CA held that the case presents issues that are purely academic in character, which are outside the courts
jurisdiction. It also noted that Dean Baylon has been accommodating of the petitioners, and that the requirements he imposed
were meant to assist them to formulate a proper thesis title and graduate on time.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION:
- Dean Baylon violated his right to due process when he added to and changed the requirements for the constitution of his thesis
committee, without prior publication of the change in rules. Calawags right to equal protection of the law, on the other hand, was
allegedly violated because only students like him, who chose Dr. Balea for their thesis adviser, were subjected to the additional
requirements imposed by the dean
-he also said that the Deans functions are supposed to be merely administrative hence the CA erred when it construed Article 51
of the manula saying that the dean has supervisory authority over academic matters

ISSUE:
-Whether or not there was a violation of due process
-Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause
-Whether or not Dean Baylon has supervisory authority in denying the thesis topic and thesis comms as submitted by the
petitioners
RULING:
-Court DENIES THE PETITION
- The CA did not err in ruling that the petitioners failed to show a clear and unmistakable right that needs the protection of a
preliminary mandatory injunction. We support the CAs conclusion that the dean has the discretion to approve or disapprove the
composition of a thesis committee, and, hence, the petitioners had no right for an automatic approval and composition of their
thesis committees.
-neither of the laws (EO 628 and RA 9500) cited by petitioner shows that the Dean of a college exercises only admin. Functions.
The laws do not even specify the role and responsibilities of a college dea. Rather, they are outlined in the universitys faculty
manual which details the rules and regulations governing the universitys administration.
Section 11.8.2, paragraph b of the Faculty Manual enumerates the powers and responsibilities of a college dean, which include
the power to approve the composition of a thesis committee:
b. Dean/Director of UP System or UP Diliman-based Programs * The Dean/Director shall be responsible for the planning and
implementation of the graduate programs. In particular, the Dean/Director shall exercise the following powers and responsibilities
based on the recommendations forwarded to him/her, through channels:
xxxx
Approve the composition of the Thesis, Dissertation or Special Project** Committees and Masters or doctoral examination/oral
defense panel for each student
-from the foregoing,it is then implied that the deans power includes POWER TO DISAPPROVE THE COMPOSITION OF A
THESIS COMM UNDER THE UP SYSTEMS FACULTY MANUAL. Hence the dean HAS COMPELETE DISCRETION IN DOING
SO.
- Anent the petitioners argument that Dean Baylon acted arbitrarily in imposing additional requirements for the composition of the
thesis committee, which according to Calawag violated their right to due process, we hold that the deans authority to approve or
disapprove the composition of a thesis committee includes this discretion. We also note the CAs finding that these additional
requirements were meant to assist the petitioners in formulating a thesis title that is in line with the colleges master of fisheries
program.
Verily, the academic freedom accorded to institutions of higher learning gives them the right to decide for themselves
their aims and objectives and how best to attain them.10 They are given the exclusive discretion to determine who can
and cannot study in them, as well as to whom they can confer the honor and distinction of being their graduates. 11
This necessarily includes the prerogative to establish requirements for graduation, such as the completion of a thesis,
and the manner by which this shall be accomplished by their students. The courts may not interfere with their exercise
of discretion unless there is a clear showing that they have arbitrarily and capriciously exercised their judgment
DOMINIC V COMELEC (1999)
(under Fundamental Principles on
Constitutional Law and the Bill of
Rights)

Facts:
-candidacy herein of petitioner Dominic was questioned. He was to run for representatinve of lone legislative district of the
province of sarangani
-On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the Lone Legislative District
of the Province of Sarangani.
-the private respondents herein filed for petitions to cancel the COC of Domino alleging that Domino is not a resident and
registered voter of said district he wishes to represent
-Domino said that he complied with the ONE-YEAR RESIDENCE REQUIREMENT AS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW. In support of
the said contention, DOMINO presented before the COMELEC proof that he has changed residence and moved to sarangani
and that he had cancelled his voters registration in Balara, Quezon City and that he has already become a registered voter of
Sarangani
-On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO disqualified as candidate for the
position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani for lack of the one-year residence requirement
-On 11 May 1998, the day of the election, the COMELEC issued Supplemental Omnibus Resolution No. 3046, ordering that the
votes cast for DOMINO be counted but to suspend the proclamation if winning
ISSUE:
a. Whether or not the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City declaring petitioner as resident of Sarangani and
not of Quezon City is final, conclusive and binding upon the whole world, including the Commission on Elections.
b. Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject congressional district for at least one (1) year immediately

preceding the May 11, 1998 elections; and

c. Whether or not respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition a quo for the disqualification of petitioner.
RULING:
a.

NO. The determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion proceedings as to the right of
DOMINO to be included or excluded from the list of voters in the precinct within its territorial jurisdicton, does not
preclude the COMELEC, in the determination of DOMINO's qualification as a candidate. The COMELEC has
jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, over a petition to deny due course to or
cancel certificate of candidacy
b. NO. He is not a resident of the Province of Sarangani for at least one year immediately preceding the may 11, 1998
election.
-It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective
office, means the same thing as "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. 21 "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return. 22"Domicile" is a question of
intention and circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man
must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man
can have but one residence or domicile at a time
-according to facts established, Dominos original residence is ILOCOS. He acquired a new one at Old Balara QC where he had
run as a rep for the 3rd district of QC.
-A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is
established. 25 To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond with the
purpose
-the contention of the petitioner that he had actual/physical presence in Sarangani is NOT SUFFICIENT. To establish a new
domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. While "residence"
simply requires bodily presence in a given place, "domicile" requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a
declared and probable intent to make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode, one's home.
-In this case, COURT FOUND OUT THAT THERE WAS NO SUFFICIENT PROOF THAT PETITIONER HAD ANY INTENT TO
ABANDON HIS OLD DOMICILE
-In addition, while he had already established residence in Sargani, it still falls short of the one year resideny requirement under
the constitutiom
c.

COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION OVER HIS CASE. Cosidering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as
Congressman-elect in the Lone Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member
of the House of Representatives. Hence, it is the COMELEC and not the Electoral Tribunal which has jurisdiction over
the issue of his ineligibility as a candidate.

PETITION OF DOMINO IS DISMISSED

DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA V
SENATE (2011)
(under Fundamental Principles on
Constitutional Law and the Bill of
Rights)

Facts:
The State, through Sections 15 to 22, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, mandated the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and the Cordilleras. Section 18 of the Article, on the other hand, directed Congress to enact an organic act for these
autonomous regions to concretely carry into effect the granted autonomy.
-two years after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, Congress acted through Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 which is an organic
act granting autonomy to the region of muslim Mindanao
-RA No. 9054 (entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao,
Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as
Amended) was the next legislative act passed. This law provided further refinement in the basic ARMM structure
-after this law, subsequent laws were passed affecting the ARMM structure thereby also resetting the regular elections of
ARMMM
(such laws were RA 9054, RA 9333, and RA 10153)
-With the enactment into law of RA No. 10153, the COMELEC stopped its preparations for the ARMM elections.
-Petitioners are now assailing the constitutionality of such law

ISSUE:
I.

Whether the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections

II. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 violates Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
III. Whether the passage of RA No. 10153 requires a supermajority vote and plebiscite
A. Does the postponement of the ARMM regular elections constitute an amendment to Section
7, Article XVIII of RA No. 9054?
B. Does the requirement of a supermajority vote for amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054
violate Section 1 and Section 16(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the corollary
doctrine on irrepealable laws?
C. Does the requirement of a plebiscite apply only in the creation of autonomous regions
under paragraph 2, Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution?
IV.

Whether RA No. 10153 violates the autonomy granted to the ARMM

V. Whether the grant of the power to appoint OICs violates:

A. Section 15, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
B. Section 16, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
C. Section 18, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
VI.

Whether the proposal to hold special elections is constitutional and legal.

RULING:
-PETITION IS DISMISSED. RA 10153 IS CONSTITUTIONAL
A. Synchronization is a constitutional mandate
-Sections 1, 2 and 5, Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987 Constitution provides for the mandated
synchronization of the elections
-Although called regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be synchronized
as it is a local election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.
A basic rule in constitutional construction is that the words used should be understood in the sense that they have in
common use and given their ordinary meaning, except when technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus
attached to them prevails.
-Understood in its ordinary sense, the word local refers to something that primarily serves the needs of a particular
limited district, often a community or minor political subdivision. [17] Regional elections in the ARMM for the positions of
governor, vice-governor and regional assembly representatives obviously fall within this classification, since they
pertain to the elected officials who will serve within the limited region of ARMM. From the perspective of the
Constitution, autonomous regions are considered one of the forms of local governments.
B. On the urgency to enact RA 10153
-The court held that as established under jurisprudence (Tolentino v Sec. of Finance), the Presidents certification exempted both
the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings requirement. In the present case, the records
show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate
enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections
-RA 9333 and RA 10153 ARE NOT AMENDMENT TO RA 9054. In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153
amends RA No. 9054. As an examination of these laws will show, RA No. 9054 only provides for the schedule of the first ARMM
elections and does not fix the date of the regular elections. A need therefore existed for the Congress to fix the date of
the subsequent ARMM regular elections, which it did by enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these
subsequent laws RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 cannot be considered amendments to RA No. 9054 as they did not
change or revise any provision in the latter law; they merely filled in a gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by
providing the date of the subsequent regular elections.

C.TO DECLARE RA 9054 AS URREPEALABLE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL

-the supermajority (2/3) voting requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 [32] has to be struck down for
giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what the Constitution demands (since Section
16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business)
D. Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 excessively enlarged the plebiscite requirement found in Section 18, Article X of the
Constitution
-Section 18, Article X of the Constitution states that the plebiscite is required only for the creation of autonomous regions and for
determining which provinces, cities and geographic areas (WHICH SHALL COINSIST OF A MAJORITY VOTE)
E.THE ISSUE OF SYNCHRONIZATION
-To achieve synchronization, Congress necessarily has to reconcile the schedule of the ARMMs regular elections
(which should have been held in August 2011 based on RA No. 9333) with the fixed schedule of the national and local elections
(fixed by RA No. 7166 to be held in May 2013).
During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to resolve this problem.
These options are: (1) to allow the elective officials in the ARMM to remain in office in a hold over capacity, pursuant to Section
7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; [38] (2) to hold special elections in
the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; or (3) to
authorize the President to appoint OICs, pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 10153, also until those elected in the synchronized
elections assume office.
-Hence the question on W/N RA 10153 IS CONSTITUTIONAL:
-The constitutional limitations on legislative power are either express or implied. The express limitations are generally provided in
some provisions of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies (Article 2) and in the provisions Bill of Rights (Article 3). Other
constitutional provisions (such as the initiative and referendum clause of Article 6, Sections 1 and 32, and the autonomy
provisions of Article X) provide their own express limitations. Hence, IMPLIED LIMITATIONS WOULD REQUIRE THE
LEGISLATION OR CREATION OF A PARTICULAR LAW OR PROVISION
-HOLDOVER OPTION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL (Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and
bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. )
-The COMELEC has no authority to order special elections (Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides:

Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and the
Members of the House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May. )
-Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011 elections and setting
another date May 13, 2011 for regional elections synchronized with the presidential, congressional and other local elections. By
so doing, Congress itself has made a policy decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special
elections as an adjustment measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by ordering special
elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby supplanting the
legislative decision and effectively legislating
-The Court has no power to shorten the terms of elective officials
-Even assuming that it is legally permissible for the Court to compel the COMELEC to hold special elections, no legal
basis likewise exists to rule that the newly elected ARMM officials shall hold office only until the ARMM officials
elected in the synchronized elections shall have assumed office.
-ot even Congress and certainly not this Court, has the authority to fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM
for less, or more, than the constitutionally mandated three years [71] as this tinkering would directly contravene
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution
-DOES THE PRESIDENT HAVE THE POWER TO APPOINT OICs?
-Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of officials
that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed
law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
-SYNCHRONIZATION DOES NOT VIOLATE AUTNOMY
-while the consti mandates for synchronization of elections, it also allows for autonomy of such regions. However, that
does not mean that there exists a conflict between the two recognized constitutional mandates. A provision of the

constitution should not be construed in isolation from the rest. Rather, the constitution must be interpreted as a whole,
and apparently, conflicting provisions should be reconciled and harmonized in a manner that may give to all of
them full force and effect. [
-CONCLUSION: RA 10153 IS CONSTITUIONAL. PETITION IS DISMISSED