Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
COMELEC
88 SCRA 251
FACTS: On April 7, 1978, election for the position of Representative to the Batasang
Pambansa were held throughout the Philippines. The cases at bar concern only the results of
the elections in Region XII which comprises the provinces of Lanao Del Sur, Lanao Del Norte,
Maguindanao, North Cotabato and Sultan Kudarat, and the cities of Marawi, Iligan and
Cotabato. Tomatic Aratuc sought the suspension of the canvass then being undertaken by
Regional Board of Canvassers in Cotabato City and in which, the returns in 1,966 out of 4,107
voting centers in the whole region had already been canvassed showing partial results. A
Supervening Panel headed by Commissioner of Election Hon. Venancio S. Duque had
conducted the hearings of the complaints of the petitioners therein of the alleged irregularities in
the election records of the mentioned provinces. On July 11, 1978, the Regional Board of
Canvassers issued a resolution, over the objection of the Konsensiya ng Bayan candidates,
declaring all the eight Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan candidates elected. Appeal was taken by the
KB candidates to the Comelec. On January 13, 1979, the Comelec issued its questioned
resolution declaring seven KBL candidates and one KB candidate as having obtained the first
eight places, and ordering the Regional Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning
candidates. The KB candidates interposed the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Comelec has committed grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
HELD: As the Superior administrative body having control over boards of canvassers, the
Comelec may review the actuations of the Regional Board of Canvassers, such as by extending
its inquiry beyond the election records of the voting centers in questions.
The authority of the Commission is in reviewing such actuations does not spring from any
appellant jurisdiction conferred by any provisions of the law, for there is none such provision
anywhere in the election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct control and
supervision endowed to it by the provisions in Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too
well settled postulate to need any supporting citation here, that a superior body or office having
supervision and control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought
to have done.
qualification requirements (PRE-C1) was 2 December 1988, and that the bids would be opened
on 12 December 1988 at 3 pm. Petitioners Malaga and Najarro submitted their PRE-C1 at 2pm
of 2 December 1988 while petitioner Occena submitted on 5 December 1988. All three were not
allowed to participate in the bidding because their documents were considered late, having
been submitted after the cut-off time of 10 am of 2 December 1988. On 12 December,
petitioners file a complaint with the RTC against the chairman and PBAC members, claiming
that although they submitted their PRE-C1 on time, the PBAC refused without just cause to
accept them. On the same date, respondent Judge Labaquin issued a restraining order
prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and awarding the project. On 16 December,
defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that the Court was prohibited
from issuing restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and preliminary mandatory injunctions by
PD No. 1818, which provides: Section 1. No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to
issue any restraining order in any case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure
project of the government to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official
from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or implementation of any such project
Plaintiffs argue against the applicability of PD No. 1818, pointing out that while ISCOF was a
state college, it had its own charter and separate existence and was not part of the national
government or of any local political subdivision; that even if PD No. 1818 were applicable, the
prohibition presumed a valid and legal government project, not one tainted with anomalies like
the project at bar. On 2 January 1989, the RTC lifted the restraining order and denied the
petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be constructed was an
infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage of PD 1818.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ISCOF is considered a government instrumentality such that it
would necessarily fall under the prohibition in PD 1818.
HELD: Yes, the 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some
if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy,
usually through a charter. This includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and
GOCCs. The same Code describes a chartered institution thus: Chartered Institutionrefers to
any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law with functions
relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This includes state universities and
colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. It is clear from the above definitions that
ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered by PD 1818. HOWEVER, it is apparent
that the present controversy did not arise from the discretionary acts of the administrative body
nor does it involve merely technical matters. What is involved here is non-compliance with the
procedural rules on bidding which required strict observance. PD 1818 was not intended to
shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed by administrative agencies such as the
anomalies in the present case. Hence, the challenged restraining order was not improperly
issued by the respondent judge and the writ of preliminary injunction should not have been
denied.
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Consequently they were preventively
suspended for the charges. After preliminary investigation conducted by the district attorney for
region X, administrative case no. 11-04-88 was considered closed for lack of merit. On
December 13, 1988 another administrative case was filed against Beja by the PPA manager
also for dishonesty grave misconduct violation of office rules and regulations, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for being notoriously undesirable. Beja was
also placed under preventive suspension pursuant to sec. 412 of PD No. 807. The case was
redocketed as administrative case n o. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 and thereafter, the PPA indorsed it
to the AAB for appropriate action. The AAB proceeded to hear the case and gave Beja an
opportunity to present evidence. However, on February 20, 1989, Beja filed petition for
certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental. Two
days later, he filed with the ABB a manifestation and motion to suspend the hearing of
administrative case no. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 on account of the pendency of the certiorari
proceeding before the court. AAB denied the motion and continued with the hearing of the
administrative case. Thereafter, Beja moved for the dismissal of the certiorari case and
proceeded to file before the Court for a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order.
ISSUE: Wether or not the Administrative Action Board of DOTC has jurisdiction over
administrative cases involving personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager of the
Philippine Ports Authority, an attached agency of DOTC.
HELD: The PPA General Manager is the disciplining authority who may, by himself and without
the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, subject a respondent in an administrative case to
preventive suspension. His disciplining powers are sanctioned not only by Sec.8 of PD no. 857
but also by Sec. 37 of PD no. 807 granting the heads of agencies the Jurisdiction to investigate
and decide matters involving disciplinary actions against officers and employees in the PPA.
With respect to the issue, the Court qualifiedly rules in favor of the petitioner. The PPA was
created through PD no. 505 dated July 1974. Under the Law, the corporate powers of the PPA
were vested in a governing Board of Directors known as the Philippine Ports Authority Council.
Sec. 5(i) of the same decree gave the council the power to appoint, discipline and remove, and
determine the composition of the technical staff of the authority and other personnel. On
December 23, 1975, PD no. 505 was substituted by PD no. 857 sec. 4(a) thereof created the
Philippine Ports Authority which would be attached to the then Department of Public Works,
Transportation and Communication. When Executive order no. 125 dated January 30, 1987
reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and Communication was issued, the PPA retained its
attached status. Administrative Code of 1987 classiffied PPA as an attached agency to the
DOTC. Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, the other two being supervision and control
and administrative supervision, Attachment is defined as the lateral relationship between the
department or its equivalent and the attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and
program coordination. An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the
Department to which it is attached than one which is under departmental supervision and
control or administrative supervision. This is borne out by the lateral relationship between the
Department and the attached agency. The attachment is merely for policy and program
coordination. With respect to administrative matters, the independence of an attached agency
from the department control and supervision is furthermore reinforced by the fact that even an
agency under a Departments administrative supervision is free from Departmental interference
with respect to appointments and other personnel actions in accordance with the
decentralization of personnel functions under the administrative Code of 1987. The Law
impliedly grants the general Manager with the approval of the PPA board of Directors the power
to investigate its personnel below the rank of Assistant Manager who may be charged with an
administrative offense. During such investigation, the PPA General Manager, may subject the
employee concerned to preventive suspension. The investigation should be conducted in
accordance with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of PD no. 807. The Decision of the Court of
Appeal is AFFIRMED as so far as it upholds the power of the PPA General Manager to to
subject petitioner to preventive suspension and REVERSED insofar as it validates the
jurisdiction of the DOTC and/or the AAB to act on administrative case no. PPA AAB-1-049-89.
The AAB decision in said cased is hereby declared NULL and VOID and the case is
REMANDED to the PPA whose General Manager shall conduct with dispatch its reinvestigation.
the Administrative Code of 1987 allegedly conferring on the Commission the power and
authority to effect changes in its organization as the need arises. Said resolution states:
Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall now be known as the Office for
Career Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel,
budget, properties and equipment of the Career Executive Service Board shall now form part of
the Office for Career Executive Service.
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service Board
which recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed the petition at
bench to annul, among others, said resolution.
ISSUE: WON CSC given the authority to abolish the office of the CESB
HELD: the petition is granted and Resolution of the respondent Commission is hereby annulled
and set aside
NO
1. The controlling fact is that the CESB was created in PD No. 1 on September 1, 1974. It
cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by
the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of
public offices is primarily a legislative function
In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the
CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature
has set aside funds for the operation of CESB.
Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of
the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the CESB.
But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together
with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under the respondent
Commission.
As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commissions power to
reorganize is limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16..
2. . From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit
administratively attached to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization
Committee the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view the problem of building up
executive manpower in the government with a broad and positive outlook.
The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to
respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of
respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one
functionally inter-related government agency to another is to attain policy and program
coordination. This is clearly etched out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited
Code, to wit:
(3) Attachment. (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its
equivalent and attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination.
The coordination may be accomplished by having the department represented in the governing
board of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without
voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency
comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and
projects; and having the department or its equivalent provide general policies through its
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representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the
attached corporation or agency.
De la Lalana V. Alba
FACTS:In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, was passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a
judge in Olongapo, was assailing its validity because, first of all, he would be one of the judges
that would be removed because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would
contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure of judges of the
courts. He averred that only the Supreme Court can remove judges NOT the Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly removed by the
legislature by such statute (BP 129).
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HELD: Yes. The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is empowered to discipline
judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal. Thus it
possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who
was vested with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by
virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the
abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant
who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the
question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents
of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists
between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He
ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation,
therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that
as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view
be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to
accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No
question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say
prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by
way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion
into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains
in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from
the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal
interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded
power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested
in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any
unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it
with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that
in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate
a statute, the former is to be preferred.
18, 1978 when Dr. Honorato G. Mackay was promoted to assistant hospital administrator from
his previous position of Resident Physician, he was next in rank to the said higher position by
reason of his having completed all academic requirements for the certificate in Hospital
administration contrary to the claim of Dr. Eustaquio Medalla, Jr. in his letter of May 2, 1978.
ISSUE: Whether or not that appointment of Dr. Honorato G. Mackay as assistant hospital
Administrator is valid
HELD: when a presidential act is challenged before the court of justice, it is not to be implied
there from that the executive is being made subject and subordinate to courts the legality of his
acts are under judicial review, not because the executive is inferior to the courts, but because
the law is above the chief executive himself, and the court seek only to interpret, apply or
implement it a judicial review of the President decision of a case of an employee decided by the
civil service board of appeals should be viewed in this light and the bringing of the case to the
courts should be governed by the same principles as govern the judicial review of all
administrative act of all administrative officer. The court may always examine into the exercise of
power by a ministerial officer to the extent of determining whether it is a legal power that could
have been granted to him and whether it has been exercised in a legal manner. And under the
civil service section 19 (3) of the civil service PD no. 807 the recruitment of selection of
employees for promotion is drawn from the nix-in-rank.
ISSUE: Whether or not there that the case at bar requires a need to exhaust administrative
remedies before seeking for affirmative relief in court?
HELD: The doctrine of exhaustion, of administrative remedies requires where an administrative
remedy is provided by statute, as in this case, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy
before the courts will act. (42 Am. Jur. 580-581.) the doctrine is a device based on
considerations of comity and convenience. If a remedy is still available within the administrative
machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts, not only to give
the administrative agency opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but also to prevent
unnecessary and premature resort to the courts.
FACTS:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through Republic Act No. 4850. It
was granted, inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for
any project or activity in or affecting the said region including navigation, construction, and
operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna
Lake region interpreted its provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal
governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters.
ISSUE:
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Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance
of permits for fishing privileges is concerned, the LLDA or the towns and municipalities
comprising the region?
HELD:
LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the Local
Government Code of 1991. The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a
general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is
a general law, cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. The special law is to be
taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a
contrary conclusion.
In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose of
protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government Code,
which grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for revenue purposes.
Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local
Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
FACTS: In August, 1977, herein private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was hired by herein
petitioner Rizal Empire Insurance Group as a casual employee with a salary of P10.00 a day.
On January 1, 1978, he was made a regular employee, having been appointed as clerk-typist,
with a monthly salary of P300.00. Being a permanent employee, he was furnished a copy of
petitioner company's "General Information, Office Behavior and Other Rules and Regulations."
In the same year, without change in his position-designation, he was transferred to the Claims
Department and his salary was increased to P450,00 a month. In 1980, he was transferred to
the Underwriting Department and his salary was increased to P580.00 a month plus cost of
living allowance, until he was transferred to the Fire Department as filing clerk. In July, 1983, he
was made an inspector of the Fire Division with a monthly salary of P685.00 plus allowances
and other benefits. On October 15, 1983, private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was dismissed
from work, allegedly, on the grounds of tardiness and unexcused absences. Accordingly, he filed
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a complaint with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), and in a Decision dated March
14, 1985 (Record, pp. 80-87), Labor Arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz reinstated him to his position with
back wages. Petitioner filed an appeal with the National labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
but, in a Resolution dated November 15, 1985 (Ibid, pp. 31-32), the appeal was dismissed on
the ground that the same had been filed out of time. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: WON it is wthin the jurisdiction of SC to review the case
HELD. No Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission on
appeal, provides: SECTION 1. (a) Appeal. Decision or orders of a labor Arbiter shall be final
and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both of the parties within ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of notice thereof. xxx xxx xxx SECTION 6. No extension of period.
No motion or request for extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal shall be
entertained. Pursuant to the "no extension policy" of the National Labor Relations Commission,
aforesaid motion for extension of time was denied in its resolution dated November 15, 1985
and the appeal was dismissed for having been filed out of time. The Revised Rules of the
National Labor Relations Commission are clear and explicit and leave no room for
interpretation. Moreover, it is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative
regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are
entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect. Under the abovequoted provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules, the decision appealed from in this case has
become final and executory and can no longer be subject to appeal.
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