REMIENDO y SIBLAWAN vs PEOPLE

G.R. No. 184874

October 9, 2009
By: Leslie Sabac

remembered what had happened. The

fact that she was able to narrate what
happened and who raped her suggested
that she was on her conscious level at
such time.

FACTS:
On or about of March 1997, accused
Roberto Remiendo y Siblawan, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of
AAA, a girl below 12 years of age. The
same thing happened on the month of
May of the same year.
The complainant was a minor below
12 years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense, having been
born on February 16, 1986. Sometime in
March 1997, AAA was sexually abused in
her house by the accused. In May 1197,
AAA was again sexually abused by the
accused which took place in the house of
the latter.
Dr. Ronald R. Bandonilli, Medico-Legal
Officer,
physically
examined
the
complainant on January 2, 1998. He
testified that AAA, upon examination of
her genital area, found old lacerations of
the hymen, which meant that her hymen
was altered by a hard rigid instrument.
The lacerations were done more than
three
(3)
months
prior
to
the
examination. He also noted that the
vagina walls were lax and the ridges
inside were smothered.
Dr. Elsie I. Caducoy, a psychiatrist,
conducted an examination of the mental
condition of the complainant. The result
showed that AAA is suffering from
psychosis and organicity.
Having
psychosis meant that her brain is
afflicted with a disease. Organicity, on
the other hand, means that AAA suffers
from a cloud of memory, upward rolling
of the eyeballs, stiffening of the
extremities, loss of consciousness and
epileptic seizures, in which her psychosis
occurs after having a seizure.
The
psychiatrist also opined that during the
rape, she did not have a seizure because
if she had, she would not have

The RTC found Remiend y Siblawan

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two
(2) counts of statutory rape.
Remiendo y Siblawan interposed his
appeal before the CA but the CA affirmed
the decision of the RTC, modifying the
civil liability.
Remiendo y Siblawan
moved to reconsider but then again was
denied by the CA.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the CA gravely erred
in affirming the decision of the RTC
convicting Remiendo y Siblawan of
statutory rape despite the absence of
evidence to prove the true and real age
of the complainant; and whether or not
the CA gravely erred in not giving
Remiendo y Siblawan the benefit
accorded to him by RA 9344 or the
Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006.
HELD:
First Issue
No. The CA did not erred in affirming
the decision of the RTC.
Under the law, in appreciating the
age of a rape victim, one of the
guidelines to be followed as stated by
the court in the case of People vs Pruna
is that: The best evidence to prove the
age of the offended party is an original or
certified true copy of the certificate of
live birth of such party.
In the present case, a certified true
copy of AAAs Certification of Live Birth is
presented/offered
as
part
of
the
testimonies of AAA and her mother that
AAA was indeed born on February 21,
1986.

Therefore, the CA did not erred in

affirming the decision of the RTC.
Second Issue
No. The CA did not erred in not
giving Remiendo y Siblawan the benefit
of RA 9344.
Under the act, discernment is the
mental capacity to understand the
difference between right and wrong. The
surrounding
circumstances
must
demonstrate that the minor knew what
he was doing and that it was wrong.
Such
circumstance
includes
the
gruesome nature of the crime and the
minors cunning and shrewdness.
In the present case, Remiendo y
Siblawan acted with discernment. He
knew fully well the consequences of his
acts against AAA. Remiendo y Siblawan,
being above 15 and under 18 years of
age at the time he committed the rape,
and having acted with discernment, but
having reached 21 years of age at the
time of the imposition of his sentence by
the trial court, his claim for the benefits
of RA 9344 is rendered moot and
academic. Remiendo y Siblawan was
already 22 years old when the joint
judgment was promulgated on October
27, 2004, which meant that he could no
longer be considered a child for the
purposes of the application of RA 9344.
PEOPLE V JACINTO
By: Kareen Mae Baucan
FACTS:
The accused-appellant was
convicted of raping a five-year old girl.
Because he committed the crime when
he was still 17 years old, the trial court
appreciated the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority and the court
reduced the penalty from death to
reclusion perpetua. The appellate court
affirmed the decision of the trial court
but modified the penalty and imposed
the Indeterminate penalty of six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of
prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen

(17) and four (4) months of reclusion

temporal, as maximum.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is
still entitled to automatic suspension of
sentence?
HELD: Republic Act No. 9344 warrants
the suspension of sentence of a child in
conflict with the law notwithstanding that
he/she has reached the age of majority
at the time the judgment of conviction is
pronounced. The said law makes no
distinction as to the nature of the offense
committed by the child in conflict with
the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No.
02-1-18-SC. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not
distinguish between a minor who has
been convicted of a capital offense and
another who has been convicted of a
lesser offense, the Court should also not
distinguish and should apply the
automatic suspension of sentence to a
child in conflict with the law who has
been found guilty of a heinous crime.
In this case, the benefits of a suspended
sentence can no longer apply to
appellant. The suspension of sentence
lasts only until the child in conflict with
the law reaches the maximum age of
twenty-one (21) years. Unfortunately,
appellant is now twenty-five (25) years
old.
However, the promotion of the welfare of
a child in conflict with the law is
extended even to one who has exceeded
the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so
long as he/she committed the crime
when he/she was still a child. The
offender shall be entitled to the right to
restoration,
rehabilitation
and
reintegration in accordance with the Act
in order that he/she is given the chance
to live a normal life and become a
productive member of the community.
The age of the child in conflict with the
law at the time of the promulgation of
the judgment of conviction is not
material. What matters is that the
offender committed the offense when
he/she was still of tender age.
Thus, appellant may be confined in an
agricultural camp or any other training
facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of
Republic Act No. 9344. The case is
remanded to the court of origin to effect

appellants
agricultural
facility.

confinement
in
an
camp or other training

People v Urban Salcedo et al

GR No. 186523
June 22, 2011
Peralta, J.
By: Terry Louise Boligor
Facts: On June 2, 2001 around 12:30
midnight the Abu Sayaff Group (ASG) led
by Khadaffy Janjalani and Abu Sabaya
with their 30 armed followers took over
Jose Maria Torres Memorial Hospital in
Limitan, Basilan. The authorities and the
ASG exchanged fires leading to the
scattering of people, breaking of glasses,
frenzied shouting and the herding of
hostages. The ASG escaped through the
back door of the hospital bringing with
them some of the hostages.
The ASG held the hostages for 6 days
and ordered ransom for their release.
One was beheaded for the families to
render compliance with the ransom.
When their conditions were met, the
hostages were released and some ASG
members were arrested.
The accused are charged with Reclusion
Perpetua and Death for kidnapping and
serious illegal detention with ransom of
Joe Guillo, Reina Malonzo, Shiela Tabuag
and Ediborah Yap. The case was put on
automatic review and the CA found no
reason to reverse the ruling of the court
but lowered the sentence of death to
Reclusion Perpetua. However, four of the
accused-appellants claimed that they
were minors during the commission of
the crime. But the only defense they
could offer were denial and alibi.
Issue: Can the four accused appellants
avail of their minority in order to evade
their sentence?
Ruling: In the face of all that evidence,
the only defense accused-appellants
could muster are denial and alibi, and for
accused-appellants Iblong, Mandangan,

Salcedo and Jaafar, their alleged

minority. Accused-appellants' proffered
defense are sorely wanting when pitted
against the prosecutions evidence. It is
established jurisprudence that denial and
alibi cannot prevail over the witnesses'
positive identification of the accusedappellants. More so where, as in the
present case, the accused-appellants
failed to present convincing evidence
that it was physically impossible for them
to have been present at the crime scene
at the time of the commission thereof. It
should be noted that the defense
absolutely
failed
to
present
any
document showing accused-appellants'
date of birth, neither did they present
testimonies of other persons such as
parents or teachers to corroborate their
claim of minority.

PEOPLE vs BAYOTAS
G.R. No. 102007
September 2, 1994
ROMERO, J.:
By: Michelle Alaba
Facts: Rogelio Bayotas was charged and
eventually convicted with rape by the
trial court. Pending appeal of his
conviction, Bayotas died due to cardiac
arrest. The Supreme Court dismissed the
criminal aspect of the appeal. However,
it required the Solicitor General (SG) to
file its comment with regard to Bayotas'
civil liability arising from his commission
of the offense charged. The SG said that
the death of Rogelio did not extinguish
his civil liability as a result of his
commission of the offense charged.
Issue: Whether or not the death of the
Rogelio pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his civil liability
Held:
Yes,
the
civil
liability
is
extinguished.
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that by death of the convict
personal liabilities are extinguished, as to
pecuniary penalties liability therefore is
extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment.

Thus the court made a ruling as follows:

Death of the accused pending appeal of
his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based
solely thereon;

Does the death of appellant Florencio

extinguish
his
criminal
and
civil
liabilities?

Corollarily, the claim for civil liability

survives notwithstanding the death of
the accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation
other than delict. Aricle 1157 of the Civil
Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability
may arise as a result of the same act or
omission:
Law,
Contracts,
Quasicontracts, Delicts,Quasi-delicts;

The death of Florencio prior to the final

judgment extinguishes his Criminal
Liability and Civil Liability Ex Delicto.
Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code
provides that criminal liability is totally
extinguish 1. By the death of the convict,
as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment.
It is also settled that upon the death of
the accused pending appeal of his
conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished since there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused; civil
liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the
criminal.
While Florencio died way back on
February 7, 2007, the said information
was not timely relayed to the Court, such
that they were unaware of the same
when they rendered the December 14,
2011 Decision. Due to this, Florencio 's
criminal liability as well as his civil
liability ex delicto are extinguished by his
death.

Where the civil liability survives, an

action for recovery therefore may be
pursued but only by way of separate civil
action and may be enforced either
against the executor/administrator of the
estate of the accused, depending on the
source of obligation aside from delicts;
In the case at bar, the death of Bayotas
extinguished his criminal and civil
liability based solely on the act of rape.
Hence, his civil liability also extinguished
together with his criminal liability upon
his death. The appeal of the late Rogelio
Bayotas is dismissed with costs de oficio.

PEOPLE VS. FLORENCIO AGACER ET. AL.

G.R. NO. 177751
JANUARY 7, 2013
By: Zusmitha Salcedo
FACTS:
Appellants here filed a Motion for
Reconsideration regarding the decision
on December 14, 2011 affirming their
conviction for the murder of Cesario
Agacer. However, on June 8, 2012, the
Officer-in-Charge of the New Bilibid
Prison, informed that appellant Florencio
Agacer died on February 17, 2007 due to
cardio pulmonary arrest.
ISSUE:

HELD:

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

ANASTACIO AMISTOSO Y BROCA
G.R. No. 201447
August 28, 2013
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.
By: Rielle Veda Alterado
Facts:On March 23, 2006, Anastacio
Amistoso y Broca was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and a civil indemnity for moral and
exemplary damages for raping his then
twelve-year-old daughter. Insisting upon
his innocence, Amistoso appealed to the
Court but was later denied in its decision
dated January 9, 2013. However, in a
letter dated February 7, 2013, the
Officer-in-Charge of Inmate Documents

and Processing Division of the Bureau of

Corrections informed the Court that
Amistoso had died on December 11,
2012 at the New Bilibid Prison (NBP),
Muntinlupa City.
Issue:Whether or not the civil and
criminal liability is extinguished upon the
death of the accused.
Held:Yes. Article 89, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code states that, Criminal
liability is totally extinguished by the
death of the convict, as to the personal
penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefore is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment. Given the
foregoing, it is clear that the accused
died before the final judgement which
extinguishes
his
criminal
liability
inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused, as
well as his civil liability, grounded as it is
on the criminal case.
Reodica v. CA
292 SCRA 87
July 8, 1998
By: Angelle Mae Gambuta
Article 90
Facts:
Isabelita Reodica was allegedly recklessly
driving a van and hit Bonsol causing him
physical injuries and damage to property
amounting to P 8,542.00. Three days
after the accident a complaint was filed
before the fiscals office against the
petitioner. She was charged of "Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property with Slight Physical Injury." After
pleading not guilty trial ensued. RTC of
Makati rendered the decision convicting
petitioner of "quasi offense of reckless
imprudence, resulting in damage to
property with slight physical injuries"
with arresto mayor of 6 months
imprisonment and a fine of P 13,542.00.
Petitioner made an appeal before the CA
which re-affirmed the lower courts
decision.
In
its
motion
for
reconsideration, petitioner now assails
that Reversal of decision is still possible

on ground of prescription or lack of

jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether the
prescribed.

quasi

offenses

already

Held:
Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised
Penal
Code,
reckless
imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries, being
a light felony, prescribes in two
months. On the other hand, reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to
property in the amount of P8,542.00,
being a less grave felony whose penalty
is arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods, prescribes in five years.
To resolve the issue of whether
these quasi offenses
have
already
prescribed, it is necessary to determine
whether the filing of the complaint with
the fiscals office three days after the
incident in question tolled the running of
the prescriptive period.
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:
ART. 91. Computation of prescription of
offenses. -- The period of prescription
shall commence to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their
agents, and shall be interrupted by the
filing of the complaint or information,
and shall commence to run again when
such proceedings terminate without the
accused being convicted or acquitted, or
are unjustifiably stopped by any reason
not imputable to him.
Thus, the prescriptive period for the
quasi
offenses
in
question
was
interrupted by the filing of the complaint
with the fiscals office three days after the
vehicular mishap and remained tolled
pending the termination of this case. We
cannot, therefore, uphold petitioners
defense of prescription of the offenses
charged in the information in this case.
Cabral v. Puno

G.R. No. L-41692

April 30, 1976
Antonio, J.:
By: Janine Louise Nenaria
FACTS: Private Respondent Silvino San
Diego accused Petitioner Eugenio Cabral
of the crime of Falsification of Public
Document for allegedly falsifying the
signature of the former in a deed of sale
of a parcel of land. Petitioner moved to
quash the Information on the ground of
prescription, as the said document of
sale was notarized on August 14, 1948,
registered with the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan on August 26, 1948 and as a
consequence the original certificate of
title was cancelled and a new transfer of
certificate of title was issued, and since
then Eugenio Cabral had publicly and
continuously possessed said property
and exercised acts of ownership thereon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint filed
by Private Respondent is barred by
prescription
HELD: Yes. Petitioner committed the
crime of falsification of public document
which prescribes in ten years; the
document was registered in the Register
of Deeds on August 26, 1948. The
complaint of respondent was filed on
September 24, 1974 or 26 years after.
The complaint was dismissed on the
ground
of
prescription
since
the
respondent had actual if not constructive
notice of the alleged forgery upon its
registration in the Register of Deeds.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MIZPAH

R. REYES
G.R. Nos. 74226-27
July 27, 1989
CORTES, J.:
By: Amy Elvinia Tesorero
FACTS:
The spouses Julio Rizare and Patricia
Pampo owned a parcel of land located in
Lipa City registered in their names. Both
are now deceased. They were survived

by their 4 daughters, one of them is the

accused Mizpah Reyes and the other 3
daughters are the complainants.
In June 1983, the complainants
discovered from the records of the
Register of Deeds, that the property of
their
parents
had
already
been
transferred in the name of Mizpah Reyes,
single, of legal age, Filipino and resident
of the City of Lipa.
They further discovered that the
conveyance was effected through a
notarized deed of sale executed and
signed on May 19, 1961 by their parents
and was registered on the May 26, 1961.
Upon examination of the document,
they found that the signature of their
parents were allegedly falsified and that
the accused also made an untruthful
statement that she was single although
she was married to one Benjamin Reyes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not its discovery may be
deemed to have taken place fro the time
the document was registered with the
Register of Deeds.
HELD:
Yes. The prescriptive period of
registered document must start to run
from the date the same was annotated in
the Register of Deeds. The rule is wellestablished that registration in public
registry is a notice to the whole world.
In this case, the prescriptive period of
ten (10) years should have started from
May 26, 1961. Considering the lapse of
more than twenty (20) years before the
two informations were filed, the crimes
for which the accused, Mizpah Reyes, are
charged have already prescribed.

SERMONIA V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 109454
June 14, 1994
BELLOSILLO, J

By: Pauline Jane Macas

ART. 90 PRESCRIPTION
FACTS:
On 26 May 1992, petitioner Jose C.
Sermonia was charged with bigamy for
contracting marriage with Ma. Lourdes
Unson on 15 February 1975 while his
prior marriage to Virginia C. Nievera
remained valid and subsisting.
Petitioner contends that his criminal
liability
for
bigamy
has
been
extinguished by prescription. He avers
that since the second marriage contract
was duly registered with the Office of the
Civil Registrar in 1975, such fact of
registration makes it a matter of public
record and thus constitutes notice to the
whole world. The offended party
therefore is considered to have had
constructive notice of the subsequent
marriage as of 1975; hence, prescription
commenced to run on the day the
marriage contract was registered. For
this
reason,
the
corresponding
information for bigamy should have been
filed on or before 1990 and not only in
1992.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution of Jose C.
Sermonia for bigamy has already
prescribed.
HELD:
To compute the prescriptive period for
the offense of bigamy from registration
thereof
would
amount
to
almost
absolving the offenders thereof for
liability. While the celebration of the
bigamous marriage may be said to be,
open and made of public record by its
registration, the offender however is not
truthful as he conceals from the
officiating authority, his spouse and

those concerned the existence of his

previous subsisting marriage. And for
this, he contracts the bigamous marriage
in a place where he is not known to be
still a married person. And such a place
may be anywhere, the discovery of the
bigamous marriage is rendered quite
difficult and would take time. It is
therefore
reasonable
that
the
prescriptive period for the crime of
bigamy should be counted only from the
day on which the said crime was
discovered by the offended party, the
authorities or their agency.

PEOPLE v. MANEJA
G.R. No. L-47684
June 10, 1941
Moran, J.:
By: Gridlin Matilac
FACTS:
Dionisio Maneja was charged of false
testimony. He did such act on 1933. The
case he testifed to became final in 1938.
Maneja contends that his offense has
prescribed.
ISSUE:
Whether the crime has prescribed.
RULING:
The
SC
ruled
that
the
period
of prescripton shall start from the day
the crime was discovered by the
offended party, the authorities or their
agents. With false testimony, it is not
an actionable offense until the case is
decided. For one to be judged of falsely
testifying, there should a decision on the
case he testified to. In short, there is
no prescription present yet.The SC
reversed the dismissal and remanded it
to the court of origin