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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
RAMIRO ALEGRE y CERDONCILLO, MARIO COMAYAS y

CUDILLAN, MELECIO CUDILLAN y ARCILLAS, and JESUS MEDALLA y CUDILLAN, Defendants-Appellants.
DECISION
ANTONIO, J.:
This is an automatic review of a decision of the court of First Instance of Rizal, Seventh Judicial District, Branch VII, Pasay
City, finding all the accused, namely, Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas y Cudillan, Melecio Cudillan y Arcillas and
Jesus Medalla y Cudillan, guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing them as follows:
jgc:chanrobles.com .ph
"WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Melecio Cudillan, Jesus Medalla, Ramiro Alegre, and Mario Comayas guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE:, committed with four (4) aggravating circumstances, not offset by any
mitigating circumstance, and hereby sentences all of them to suffer the penalty of death, to be carried out pursuant to the
applicable provisions of law, to indemnify jointly and severally, the heirs of Adlina Sajo in the amount of P350,000.00,
representing the value of the pieces of jewelry unrecovered, to pay jointly and severally also the heirs of Adelina Sajo the
amount of P12,000.00, and to pay the costs.
"With or without appeal, let this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for review, pursuant to law."
cralaw virtua1aw library
During the pendency of this appeal, Melecio Cudillan died on arrival at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital on August 16, 1970,
and the case as against the said accused, insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, was dismissed on August 29, 1974.
This decision, therefore, is limited to appellants Ramiro Alegre, Mario Comayas and Jesus Medalla.
This case arose from the death of Adelina Sajo y Maravilla, Spinster, 57 years old, whose body was found in her bathroom
inside her house at the Maravilla compound, Ignacio Street, Pasay City, in the early morning of July 26, 1966. According to
the Necropsy Report, she died of asphyxia by manual strangulation, and the time of her death was placed between eighteen
to twenty-two hours before 12:30 p.m. of July 26, 1966.
Her bedroom was in "shambles," evidently indicating that it was ransacked. The drawers and several cabinets were open, and
some personal garments, handbags and papers were scattered on the floor. No witness saw the commission of the crime.
Appellant Ramiro Alegre, who was then living with relatives in one of the rented rooms on the ground floor of the victims
house, was taken to the Pasay City police headquarters for investigation in connection with the case, but was later released
that same day for lack of any evidence implicating him in the crime.
During the latter part of July 1966, Melecio Cudillan was apprehended in Tacloban City, Leyte, in the act of pawning a
bracelet, one of the pieces of jewelry taken from the victim. In explaining how he came into possession of the stolen pieces
of jewelry, he admitted his participation in the killing and robbery of Adelina Sajo. This appears in his extrajudicial confession
before the police authorities of Tacloban City on July 29, 1966 (Exhibits "F", "F-1" and "F-2"). In this statement, which was
written in the English language, Melecio Cudillan implicated a certain "Esok" of Villalon, Calubian, Leyte; Jesus Medalla, of
Villahermosa, Calubian, Leyte; Mario Cudillan, also of Villahermosa, Calubian, Leyte; one "Danny" Fernandez, of Balaquid,
Cabucgayan, Biliran Subprovince; and one "Rammy," another Leyteo. When brought to Metro Manila and while he was
inside the Pasay City police headquarters, Melecio Cudillan again executed an extrajudicial confession (Exhibits "A", "A-1" to
"A-6") on July 31, 1966. This was sworn to before the Assistant City Fiscal of Pasay City on August 1, 1966. In this second
statement, he narrated in detail the participation in the commission of the crime of Jesus Medalla, "Celso" Fernandez, "Rami"
and "Mario." According to said statement, the declarant went near the cell within the Office of the Investigation Section,
Secret Service Division, and identified Ramiro Alegre, Jesus Medalla and Mario Comayas as the persons he referred to as
Jesus Medalla, "Rami" and "Mario" in his declaration. On the basis of the aforementioned extrajudicial confession of Melecio
Cudillan, an Information for Robbery with Homicide was filed by the Special Counsel of Pasay City against Celso Fernandez,
alias "Esok," Jesus Medalla y Cudillan, Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas y Cudillan, Melecio Cudillan y Arcillas, and
one "John Doe."
When arraigned on August 10, 1966, Mario Comayas, Melecio Cudillan, Jesus Medalla and Ramiro Alegre entered a plea of
not guilty. The prosecution presented nine (9) witnesses. None of them, however, testified on the actual commission of the
crime. The recital of facts contained in the decision under review was based principally and mainly on the extrajudicial
confessions of Melecio Cudillan. Thus, the details of the planning and the execution of the crime were taken from the "Pasay
Sworn Statement" (Exhibits "A", "A-1" to "A-6"). The only evidence, therefore, presented by the prosecution to prove the
guilt of appellants are the testimonies of Sgt. Mariano Isla and Hernando Carillo.
The testimony of Sgt. Mariano Isla of the Pasay City police is to the effect that when he was investigating Melecio Cudillan,
the latter pointed to Ramiro Alegre, Mario Comayas and Jesus Medalla as his companions in the commission of the crime.
According to him, said appellants "just stared at him (Melecio Cudilla) and said nothing."
"Q. In what particular place in the Police Department did you have to confront the accused Melecio Cudillan with the other
suspects?
A. In the office of the Secret Service Division.

Q. When you said there was a confrontation between the accused Melecio Cudillan and other suspects whom do you refer to
as other suspects?
A. Jesus Medalla, Celso Fernandez, Rosario Dejere and Mario. There was another person Eduardo Comayas. He was also one
of those suspects but Melecio Cudillan failed to point to him as his companion.
Q. Who were those persons or suspects pointed to by Melecio Cudillan in the Police Department of Pasay City as his
companions?
A. To Jesus Medalla, Ramiro Alegre and Mario Comayas.
Q. When Melecio Cudilla pointed to these persons what did these three persons do?
A. They just stared at him and said nothing." (t.s.n., pp. 15-16, Hearing of October 28, 1966).
According to the trial court, had the appellants "really been innocent (they) should have protested vigorously and not merely
kept their silence."
Hernando Carillo, a detention prisoner in the Pasay City jail, declared that the three (3) appellants admitted to him that they
took part in the robbery and homicide committed in the residence of the deceased, viz.:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"ATTY. DEPASUCAT:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q. Do you know the other accused Ramiro Alegre?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. If he is inside the courtroom, will you please point him out?
INTERPRETER:
Witness points to the fellow in the second row, fourth from the left who, upon being asked, gave his name as Ramiro Alegre.
ATTY. DEPASUCAT:
Q. Did you have any occasion to talk to Ramiro Alegre?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where?
A. In the city jail because our cells are also near each other.
Q. And what did you and Ramiro Alegre talk about?
A. Concerning his case and he told me that he has also participated in the commission of the killing of Adelina Sajo.
Q. By the way, when did you talk with Ramiro Alegre, more or less?
A. About the middle of June.
Q. And what else did Ramiro Alegre tell you, if any?
A. That he was also inside the room when they killed Adelina Sajo.
Q. Now, regarding that conversation you had with the accused Jesus Medalla, when did that take place, more or less?
A. About that month also of June, about the middle of June.
Q. What year?
A. 1967.
Q. Do you know the other accused Mario Comayas?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why do you know him?

A. He is also one of the prisoners and our cells are near each other.
Q. If he is inside the courtroom, will you please point him out?
INTERPRETER:
Witness indicating to the fellow who gave his name as Mario Comayas.
ATTY. DEPASUCAT:
Q. Did you have any occasion to talk with the accused Mario Comayas?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. When was that, more or less?
A. In the month of June, about the middle part also of June.
Q. And what did you talk about?
A. Regarding this case of Adelina Sajo and he admitted to me that he was one of those who planned and killed Adelina Sajo.
Q. I see! And what else did he tell you, if any?
A. That while the killing was being perpetrated upstairs he was told to guard by the door.
Q. How about the other accused Melecio Cudillan, do you know him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. If he is in court, will you please point him out?
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to the accused who gave his name as Melecio Cudillan.
ATTY. DEPASUCAT:
Q. Why do you know Melecio Cudillan?

A. Because he is with me in one cell.
Q. Were you able also to talk with Melecio Cudillan?
A. Most of the time because we used to talk about our case.
Q. When have you talked with Melecio Cudillan, more or less?
A. Three days after my confinement and subsequently thereafter up to about the first week of June, 1967.
Q. And what did the accused Melecio Cudillan tell you about this case?
ATTY. RAMIREZ:
Objection, Your Honor, leading.

COURT:
Witness may answer, there is already a basis.

A. That they were the ones who planned and killed Adelina Sajo." (t.s.n., pp. 286-289, Hearing of July 21, 1967).
However, during the trial, Melecio Cudillan repudiated both the Tacloban City and Pasay City sworn statements as the product
of compulsion and duress. He claimed that he was not assisted by counsel when he was investigated by the police. Appellants
Jesus Medalla and Mario Comayas denied any involvement in the crime. They testified that at the time of the incident in
question, they were attending the internment of the deceased child of Ciriaco Abobote. According to Jesus Medalla, he and
his companions left the Maravilla compound at 10:00 oclock in the morning of July 25, 1966 to attend the internment. They
left the cemetery at about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon and proceeded directly to his house at Leveriza Street where he
stayed the whole night. Mario Comayas confirmed that he and Jesus Medalla were at the house of Ciriaco Abobote in the
morning of July 25, 1966, until after 5:00 oclock in the afternoon when he returned to the bakery where he was employed to
resume his work.
Appellant Ramiro Alegre did not testify but presented three (3) witnesses to support his defense. Thus, Urbano Villanueva
testified that he was a sub-contractor of Jose Inton for the welding project of David M. Consunji at the Sheraton Hotel
construction; that Ramiro Alegre began working at the construction as a welder on July 13, 1966, and that from 7:00 oclock
in the morning to 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, Alegre worked in the project and that he knew this because he is the
foreman and timekeeper in the project. He identified the Time Record of Ramiro Alegre (Exhibit "1"). Rodolfo Villanueva and
Romeo Origenes testified that from 7:00 oclock in the morning up to 4:00 oclock in the afternoon of July 25, 1966,
appellant Ramiro Alegre was at the Sheraton Hotel construction at Roxas Boulevard. Their testimony is confirmed by the
Time Record of Ramiro Alegre (Exhibit "1") which contained the number of hours he actually worked at the Sheraton Hotel
construction project.
Appellants now contend that the lower court erred in utilizing the extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan (now
deceased) as evidence against herein appellants; in concluding from the alleged "silence" of appellants when allegedly
pointed to by Melecio Cudillan as "his companions" in the commission of the crime, an admission of guilt; and in giving undue
weight and credence to the testimony of an inmate of the Pasay City Jail that appellants admitted to him their participation in
the crime.
I
The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan (Exhibits "A", "A-1" to "A-6" and "F", "F-1 and "F-2"), on the basis of which
the trial court was able to reconstruct how Melecio Cudillan committed the crime in question, cannot be used as evidence and
are not competent proof against appellants Ramiro Alegre and Jesus Medalla, under the principle of "res inter alios acta alteri
nocere non debet, "1 there being no independent evidence of conspiracy.2 As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of
an accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have probative value against his co-accused. It is
merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are concerned.3 While there are recognized exceptions to this rule, the
facts and circumstances attendant in the case at bar do not bring it within the purview of such exceptions. The only evidence,
therefore, linking the appellants to the crime would be their purported tacit admissions and/or failure to deny their
implications of the crime made by Melecio Cudillan, and/or their purported verbal confessions to Hernando Carillo, an inmate
of the Pasay City jail.
chanroble s virtual lawlibrary
II
The next question to be resolved is whether or not the silence of appellants while under police custody, in the face of
statements of Melecio Cudillan implicating them as his companions in the commission of the crime, could be considered as
tacit admission on their part of their participation therein.
The settled rule is that the silence of an accused in criminal cases, meaning his failure or refusal to testify, may not be taken
as evidence against him,4 and that he may refuse to answer an incriminating question.5 It has also been held that while an
accused is under custody, his silence may not be taken as evidence against him as he has a right to remain silent; his silence
when in custody may not be used as evidence against him, otherwise, his right of silence would be illusory.6 The leading case
of Miranda v. Arizona7 held that the prosecution may not use at trial the fact that an individual stood mute, or claimed his
privilege against self-incrimination, in the face of an accusation made at a police custodial interrogation. Prior to Miranda, it
was the view of many authorities that a man to whom a statement implicating him in a crime is directed may fail to reply if
he is in custody under a charge of the commission of that crime, not because he acquiesces in the truth of the statement, but
because he stands on his constitutional right to remain silent, as being the safest course for him to pursue and the best way
out of his predicament.8 Other courts have held that the circumstance that one is under arrest by itself does not render the
evidence inadmissible, and that an accusation of a crime calls for a reply even from a person under arrest or in the custody
of an officer, where the circumstances surrounding him indicate that he is free to answer if he chooses.9
We hold that the better rule is that the silence of an accused under custody, or his failure to deny statements by another
implicating him in a crime, especially when such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to such implications or
accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit confession of his participation in the commission of the crime. Such an inference
of acquiescence drawn from his silence or failure to deny the statement would appear incompatible with the right of an
accused against self-incrimination.
The right or privilege of a person accused of a crime against self-incrimination is a fundamental right. It is a personal right of
great importance and is given absolutely and unequivocably. The privilege against self-incrimination is an important
development in mans struggle for liberty. It reflects mans fundamental values and his most noble of aspirations, the
unwillingness of civilized men to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or
contempt; the fear that self-incriminating statements may be obtained by inhumane treatment and abuses, and the respect
for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a
private life. "10
In the words of Chavez v. Court of Appeals:11

". . . this right is not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of which is left to the discretion of the court; it is
mandatory; it secures to a defendant a valuable and substantive right; it is fundamental to our scheme of justice. . . .
x
"Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendants own lips and against his will an admission of his guilt. Nor may a
court as much as resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts usable against him as a confession of the
crime or the tendency of which is to prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is his right to forego testimony, to remain
silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine will."
It must be stressed here that even under a regime of martial law, the operations of our laws governing the rights of an
accused person are not open to doubt. Under the code for the administration of detainees, all officers, civilian and military
personnel are sworn to uphold the rights of detainees. Among such fundamental rights are the right against compulsory
testimonial self-incrimination, the right, when under investigation for the commission of an offense, to remain silent, to have
counsel, and to be informed of his rights; the right not to be subjected to force, violence, threats, intimidation and degrading
punishment or torture in the course of ones detention, and the safeguard that any confession obtained in violation of the
foregoing rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.12 The 1973 Constitution gives explicit constitutional sanction to the right
to silence. Thus, in Section 20 of Article IV of the Constitution, there is this categorical mandate: "Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him.
Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence."
This privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Constitution protects, therefore, the right of a person to remain
silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty for such silence.13 This
aspect of the right has been comprehensively explained by then Associate Justice Enrique M. Fernando, now Chief Justice, in
Pascual Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners,14 thus:
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"The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. As far back as 1905, we had occasion to declare: The
accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt. Only last year, in
Chavez v. Court of Appeals, speaking through Justice Sanchez, we reaffirmed the doctrine anew that it is the right of a
defendant to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted, unfettered
exercise of his own free, genuine will."
Identifying the right of an accused to remain silent with right to privacy, this Court, in Pascual, explained that the privilege
against self-incrimination "enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to surrender to its
detriment."
We hold, therefore, that it was error for the trial court to draw from appellants silence while under police custody, in the face
of the incriminatory statements of Melecio Cudillan, the conclusion that the aforesaid appellants had tacitly admitted their
guilt. We hold, further, that in view of the inadmissibility of the extrajudicial confession of Melecio Cudillan implicating herein
appellants, the remaining evidence against them, consisting in the testimonies of Sgt. Mariano Isla and Hernando Carillo, is
insufficient to sustain the judgment of conviction. Indeed, it is inherently improbable that herein appellants would have
readily confessed their participation in the commission of a heinous crime to a casual acquaintance in a prison detention cell,
considering that on the same occasion they strongly denied any involvement in such crime before the police authorities.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and appellants Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas y Cudillan
and Jesus Medalla y Cudillan are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime with which they are charged. Their immediate release from
detention is ordered, unless they or any one of them is otherwise held for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 133188 : July 23, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. ELIZAR TOMAQUIN, Appellant.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Once again, the Court is confronted with the issue of the admissibility of an extrajudicial confession. This
appeal particularly involves the question of whether a barangay captain who is a lawyer can be considered
an independent counsel within the purview of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
On December 17, 1996, the Cebu City Prosecutor filed an Information charging appellant with Murder,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of December, 1996, about 2:30 a.m., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a bladed instrument (tres
cantos), with deliberate intent, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there suddenly and unexpectedly attack, assault and use personal violence upon one Jaquelyn Luchavez
Tatoy, by stabbing her with said bladed instrument, hitting her on the vital parts of her body, thereby
inflicting upon her physical injuries causing:
"CARDIO RESPIRATORY ARREST DUE TO SHOCK & HEMORRHAGE SEC. TO STAB WOUNDS TO THE TRUNK
(POSTERIOR ASPECT)"
as a consequence of which, Jaquelyn Luchavez Tatoy died almost instantaneously.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
On arraignment, appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the charge, 2 and trial thereafter ensued.
There were no eyewitnesses to the incident, and the prosecution's evidence, aside from appellant's
extrajudicial confession, was mainly circumstantial.
As presented by the prosecution, the facts are as follows:
At around 11:00 in the evening of December 14, 1996, appellant Elizar Tomaquin @ Hapon, together with
Rico and Romy Magdasal, Noel Labay, and a certain Cardo, were drinking "Red Horse" beer in Itom Yuta,
Lorega, Cebu City. Appellant left the group at around 1:00 in the morning,
saying he has a headache. At the behest of Rico Magdasal, the group transferred to Lorega proper. A few
minutes later, they heard Rustica Isogan shouting for help as the latter heard Jaquelyn 3 Tatoy, her
goddaughter, asking for help. Isogan got two flashlights and they proceeded upstairs to Jaquelyn's house.
The first to go up was a certain Moises, followed by the brothers Rico and Romy Magdasal, while Noel and
Cardo remained downstairs. Rico noticed that the hinge and the "walling" of the main door were damaged,
as if it were kicked open, and only the light in the kitchen was turned on. Rico also saw a black shoe on the
stairs and another in the sala, which he claims belong to appellant. When they went into the kitchen, they
saw Jaquelyn bloodied and sprawled face-up on the floor, with her head inside a plastic container. Jaquelyn
was brought to the hospital, where she expired. A neighbor later found a tres cantos with blood on it by the
stairs, which Rico also identified to be appellant's.4 A certain Rey got the black pair of shoes and tres
cantos for safekeeping which were later turned over to Policeman Tariao of the Homicide Section, Ramos
Police Station. The person who turned over the objects to Policeman Tariao was not identified. 5
At around 12:00 in the afternoon of December 15, 1996, barangay tanods Julius Yosores and Armando
Zabate of Lorega, Cebu City, searched for appellant because of the information given by Rico Magdasal
that the shoes and tres cantos found in the scene of the crime belonged to appellant. Together with Rico,
they went to the house of Wilson Magdasal where appellant was temporarily staying, and found him
sleeping. Appellant was wearing a bloodstained maong shorts. The tanods told appellant that he is a
suspect in the killing of Jaquelyn, and brought him to the house of barangaycaptain Atty. Fortunato
Parawan. There, appellant was asked about the shirt he was wearing and he told them that it was in Wilson
Magdasal's house. It was Edgar Magdasal who found his shirt, wet and bloodstained, among the soiled
clothes. Atty. Parawan then told his tanods to take appellant to the police station. 6
In the morning of the next day, December 16, 1996, appellant was investigated by SPO2 Mario Monilar of
the Homicide Section, Ramos Police Station in Cebu City. After being apprised of his constitutional rights,
appellant told SPO2 Monilar that he was willing to confess and asked for Atty. Parawan,
the barangay captain, to assist him. SPO2 Monilar called Atty. Parawan but the latter told him that he will
be available in the afternoon. When Atty. Parawan arrived at 2:00 in the afternoon, he conferred with
appellant for around fifteen minutes. Atty. Parawan then called SPO2 Monilar and told him that appellant
was ready to give his statement.7 Appellant's extrajudicial confession, which was taken down completely in
the Cebuano dialect,8 reads:
Pasiuna: Mr. ELIZAR TOMAQUIN, pahibaloon ko ikaw nga ubos sa atong batakang balaod (Constitution) aduna kay katungod nga
pahibaloon sa imong mga katungod, sama sa imong katungod sa pagpakahilum, ingon man duna kay katungod sa
pagdamgop/pagpilig sa abogado o manlalaban aron motabang kanimo niining maong imbestighasyon nga may kalabutan sa
kamatayon ni Jaqueline Tatoy niadtong mga alas 2:30 sa kaadlawon kapin kongkulang niadtong petsa 15 sa bulan sa Disyembra
1996, didto sa Brgy Lorega proper, Siyudad sa Sugbo. Kong ugaling dili ka maka-abot pagbayad o pagpangitago abogado aron
motabang kanimo karon, ako isip negrepresenttar sa Estado mohatag akong abogado kanimo. Nasabtan ba kini nimo?
Tubag: OO, nasabtan ka ang akong katungod?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Pangutana: Pahabloon ko usab ikaw nga sumala usab sa atong Batakang Balaod, anfg tanan nga imong isulti karon dinhi, mahimong
magamit ebedensya pabor o batok kanimo sa bisan asaing husgado sa atong nasud. Nasabtan be usab kini nimo?
Tubag: OO, nasabtan ko usab kanang taan.
Pangutana: Tinuod ba gayod nga nasabtan pag-ayo nimo anf mao nimong mga katungod ug anadam ka ba nga moperma karon dinhi
timailhan sa imong tina-aw nga nga pagsabut? ingon man andam ka ba sa pagsulti sa matuod walay lain kon kili ang matuod lamang
gayud?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Tubag: O
Tubag: Oo, andam ako nga mpemar Sir ug ania karon dinhi ai Atty Parawan ang among Brgy Captain nga maoy akong giisip nga
abogado nga akong pinili nga maoy motabang kanako karon. Aron sa pagmatuod, ako kining pirmahan ning ika petsa 16 sa bulan sa
Disyembre 1996.
...
Pangutana: Sunlion ko, andama bas a pagsulti sa matuod Elizar Tomaquin kon dili ang matuod lamang gayud? Ingon man andam ka
ba nga modawat sa resulta o linugdangan niini?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Tubag: Oo, andam gyud ako.
Pangutana: Palihog isulti ang imong ngalan inong man ang tanan nga circumstacia o rmay kalambigitan sa imong pagkatawo, sa
imong grado, imong trabaho, imong pinuy-anan ug uban pa?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Tubag: Ako si Elizar Tomaquin kinsa nagdala sa bansagon o apelyedo sa akong mama sanglit dili man kasado and akong mama ug
papa. Ang apelyedo sa akong papa, Cabagui ug and akon angga Hapon. Ako 19 anyos ang panuigon, ulitawo ug kasamtangan nga
nagpuyo sa Brgy Lorega proper duol sa kapilaya San Roque apan ako lumad nga taga Bo. Tunga, Moalboal, Cebu diin didto ano
nakatungha sa grade six.
Pangutana: Niadtong kaadlawon sa petsa 15 sa bulan sa Disyembre 1996, diin ka man?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Tubag: Sa sinugdanan nianang mga ala una kapin kon kulang kauba ko sa pag-inom si Rico Magdasal didito sa Brgy Lorega Proper ug
taodtaod niadto nilakaw ako libot sa sitio Itom Tuta ug dayon nakong saka sa balay nila ni Jaqueline Tatoy sa Brgy Lorega nianang
pagka mga alas 2:20 sa maong petsa/kadlawon agii sa aberto nga bentana sa akong tuyo sa pagkawat sa ilang colored nga TV.
Pangutana: Nganong nakahiabwo ka man na duna silay TV nga colored?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Tubag: Suweto man ko kay permi ko magtan-awan sa ilang colored TV.
Pangutana: Niadtong niagi ka sa ilang bentana aron pagkawat sa ilang TV, diin ka man punta deretso.
Tubag: Deretso ako sa may lamesa sa ilang sala diin didto gibutang ilang TV.
Pangutana: Nakuha ba gayod nimo anf maong TV?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Tubag: Wala, kay sa akong pag-alsa sa among TV nisyagit man si Jaqueline Tatoy nga naghidga sa ilang may terrace ug nidagan siya
padulong sa kusina nila ug diha-diha akong siyang ginsunod, gilayog ug gidunggab makadaghan pinaagi sa akong tres kantps nga
hinagiban (Gidtudo ni Eliza rang Tres Kantos nga nakit-an didto sa patyang lawas nga Jaqueline Tatoy).
Pangutana: Kapila nimo dunggaba ug diin maigo si Jaqueline Totay?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Tubag: Dili na ko nakahinumdom, ingon man dili sba ko makahinumdom kon diin to siya maigo. Basta manadaghan to nako siya
dunggaba ginamit ko ang akong Tres kantos.
Pangutana: Gawas nga imo to siyang gidunggab, wala ba nimo pahimudsi and iyang pagkapbabye o wala ka bay plano sa pag rape
kaniya niadtong higayona?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Tubag: Wala gyud to nako siya pahimudsi og wala gyud koy tuyo sa pag rape niya. Ang ako ra gyud nga tuyo mao ra gyud and
pagkawat sa ilang TV apan kay nisiyagit man siyang nakaila man kayo siya nako, nahadlok kong mahibaw-an sa ako untang pagkawat
sa ilang TV, hinungdan nga ako siyang gilayog ug gidunggab makadaghan.
Pangutana: Nganog nakahibawo or nakaila ka man nga si Jaqueline Tatoy tong naisiyagit ug imong gidunggab?
Tubag: Duna ma hayag nga suga sa elektresidad sa ilang may kusina.
Pangutana: Kaila ba nimong daan si Jaqueline Tatoy?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Tubag: Oo, Sir ka saw ala pa ang among hitabo permi man kong nagtan-awan sa ilang TV.
Pangutana: Human nim dunggaba si Jaqueline Tatoy unsa may sunod nimonh gibuhat?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Tubag: Dihang sa akong pagtoo nga patay na siya, ako naidagan agi sa pultahan nga akong gisikaran dayon kanaog subay sa hagdan
didto nabiyaan nako ang akong sapatos.
Pangutana: Diin ka man paduiong dagan?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Tubag: Didto ako padulong sa akong gipuya-an sa ilang Wilson Magdasal sa maong Brgy.
Pangutana: Unya unsa may sunod nimonh gibuhat og nahibaw-an?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Tubag: Niadtong hapon sa petsa 15 sa bulan sa Disyembre 1996, didtoy mga Brgy Tanods sa balay ni Wilson Magdasal diin ila akong
gipangutaan tali sa maong hitabo og igo lan ako nitudlo sa akong white Slave shirt nga akong gihumulan ug tubig sa planggana sa
tumong nga makuha ang mansa sa dugo nga pinisik sa akong paggdunggab patay ni Jaqueline Tatoy.
Pangutana: Ngano ug unsa may diay kalabutan niadtong maong slaveless white shirt nimo?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Tubag: Mao na ang akong gisul-ob dihang akog kawaton unta ang TV nila ni Jaqueline ug sa iyang pagsiyagit ako siyang gidunggabdunggab patay. (Elizar Yomaquin postivo nga nitudlo ug niangkon sa maong whitel sleve less shirt)
Pangutana: Kinign nia karon dinhi nga sapatos itom nga nakuha didto so hagdan sa balay nila ni Jaqueline Tatoy human siya nakit-i
nga patay, unsa may imong ikasulti niini?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Tubag: Mao kana ang akong sapatos nga nabiyaan didto sa ilang hagdan human sa hitabo ug gain sa akong pagdagan akong
napatiran kadtong ilang container.
Pangutana: Sa pagkakaron, wala na akoy ipangutana kanimo. Ikay aduna ka pa bay ikasul ti o bakwion ba hinoon sa mao nimong
gipamahayag nga naglangkob sa duha ka pahina lakip niining maong pahina?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Tubag: Wala na akoy ikadugang pagsulti ni bakwion ba hinnon. Nao kana ang tanan.
Pangutana: Andam ka ba pagperme niini sa pagmatuod nga wlay tawo nga nagpugos, naghulga, nagsaad ug gnate o nag hadlok ba
hinoon kon dili sa imong kaugalingon nga kabubut-on lamang.
Tubag: Oo, andam ako pageram. Aron matuoron kining tanan kini akong permaahn ning petsa 16 sa Diusyembre 1996, Siyudad
Sugbo, Pilipinas.9
On the witness stand, appellant did not deny that he had a drinking spree with Rico Magdasal and three
other persons. His version of the incident is that it was Rico who committed the crime and not him.
Appellant testified that Rico asked his help in stealing the television set from the Tatoy's residence. When
Jacquelyn saw them, she ran towards the kitchen but she did not reach it as Rico had stabbed her on the
back with the tres cantos. Appellant claims that it was Rico who owns the tres cantos, as well as the pair of
shoes, left inside Tatoy's house. Afraid of what happened, appellant went home to Wilson Magdasal's house
and slept there. He was awakened the next morning bybarangay tanod Julius Yosores who kicked him.
Yosores also boxed and poked a gun at him. Appellant claims that Rico and Edgar Magdasal maltreated him
in the presence of barangay captain Atty. Fortunato Parawan when he was brought to the latter's house. He
was made to admit committing the crime because Rico has a family while he is single. 10
Appellant also repudiated his extrajudicial confession, saying that Atty. Parawan merely asked him to sign a
blank sheet of paper and in exchange, Atty. Parawan promised to assist and help him with his expenses. 11
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (Branch 18) (RTC for brevity) rendered its decision on
October 24, 1997, convicting appellant of the crime of Murder, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, accused Elizar Tomaquin is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and is hereby imposed the penalty of RECLUSION PERPERTUA,
with the accessory penalties of the law; to indemnify the heirs of Jaquelyn Tatoy in the sum of P50,000.00
and to pay the costs. The accused is, however, credited in full during the whole period of his detention
provided he will signify in writing that he will abide by all the rules and regulations of the penitentiary.
SO ORDERED.12
Hence, this appeal.
In his Brief, appellant raises the following Assignment of Errors:
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN SHE (SIC) CONVICTED ACCUSED-APPELLANT BASED ON HIS
UNCOUNSELLED CONFESSION;
2. THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE ERRED WHEN SHE (SIC) GAVE FULL CREDENCE AND FULL FAITH ON THE
TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES;13
Appellant's extrajudicial confession was taken and transcribed entirely in the Cebuano dialect. Rule 132,
Section 33 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
Sec. 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial language. - - Documents written in an unofficial language
shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into English or Filipino. To avoid
interruption of proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to have such translation prepared before
trial.
The rule is that when there is presented in evidence an exhibit written in any language other than the
official language (Filipino or English), if there is an appeal, that exhibit should be translated by the official
interpreter of the court, or a translation should be agreed upon by the parties, and both original and
translation sent to this court.14 In this case, there is no official translation of appellant's extrajudicial
confession in the Filipino or English language. If the Court were to strictly follow the rule, then appellant's
extrajudicial confession should not have been admitted by the trial court as evidence for the prosecution.
Nevertheless, considering that appellant did not interpose any objection thereto, and the parties and the
judicial authorities or personnel concerned appeared to be familiar with or knowledgeable of Cebuano in
which the document was written,15 such extrajudicial confession was appropriately considered by the trial
court as evidence for the prosecution.
As stated at the outset, the crucial issue in this case is whether or not the extrajudicial confession
executed by appellant, with the assistance of Atty. Fortunato Parawan, is admissible in evidence against
him. There is no need at this point to secure an official translation of the confession to English.
Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If
the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
The words "competent and independent counsel" in the constitutional provision is not an empty rhetoric. It
stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial
investigation, an informed judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent and capable lawyer. 16
As heretofore stated, Atty. Fortunato Parawan, at that time, was the barangay captain of Barangay Lorega,
Cebu City. Under the 1991 Local Government Code, a barangay captain performs the following duties and
functions:
(a) The punong barangay, as the chief executive of the barangay government, shall exercise such powers
and perform such duties and functions, as provided by this Code and other laws.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance, the purpose of which is the general welfare of the
barangay and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the punong barangay shall:
(1) Enforce all laws and ordinances which are applicable within the barangay;
...
(3) Maintain public order in the barangay and, in pursuance thereof, assist the city or municipal mayor and
the sanggunian members in the performance of their duties and functions; . . . 17
Simply put, Atty. Parawan, as barangay captain, is called upon to enforce the law and ordinances in
his barangay and ensure peace and order at all times.
In fact, as barangay captain, Atty. Parawan is deemed a person in authority under Article 152 of the
Revised Penal Code, to wit:
ART. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority. - Who shall be deemed as such. - In
applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any person directly vested with
jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or government corporation, board, or
commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barrio captain and a barangay chairman shall also be
deemed a person in authority.
On these bases, it is not legally possible to consider Atty. Parawan as an independent counsel of appellant.
In People v. Culala,18 the Court reiterated the rule that a municipal attorney cannot be an independent
counsel because as a legal officer of the municipality, he provides legal assistance and support to the
mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people,including the
maintenance of peace and order, and it was seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the
defense of the accused without running into conflict of interests. Thus, the Court held that he is no better
than a fiscal or a prosecutor who cannot represent the accused during custodial investigations. 19
This is reiterated in People v. Taliman,20and People v. Velarde,21where we further ruled that a municipal
mayor cannot likewise be an independent counsel as required by the Constitution.
Similarly in this case, considering that Atty. Parawan's role as a barangay captain, was a peacekeeping
officer of his barangay and therefore in direct conflict with the role of providing competent legal assistance
to appellant who was accused of committing a crime in his jurisdiction, Atty. Parawan could not be
considered as an independent counsel of appellant, when the latter executed his extrajudicial confession.
What the Constitution requires is the presence of an independent and competent counsel, one who will
effectively undertake his client's defense without any intervening conflict of interest. 22
Neither does Atty. Parawan qualify as a competent counsel, i.e., an effective and vigilant counsel. An
"effective and vigilant counsel" necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to
advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the
investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. As held in People v. Velarde:23
. . . The competent and independent lawyer so engaged should be present at all stages of the interview,
counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the interrogation
once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he may either continue, choose to remain silent or
terminate the interview.24
Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain that the confession is made voluntarily and that the person under
investigation fully understands the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation to
his constitutional rights. A contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional rights to
remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent. 25
The assistance rendered by Atty. Parawan to appellant cannot be fittingly described as effective and
vigilant. As testified by Atty. Parawan, hereinbelow quoted verbatim, this was what transpired when he
went to the Ramos police station to assist appellant during the investigation:
Q What happened when you arrived at the Ramos Police Station at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
December 16, 1996?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A I go (sic) to the room where Policeman Monilar and the accused and had a conversation with the
accused.
Q What transpired during that conversation with the accused.
A I asked him. Are you going to get me as your lawyer?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Q And may we know what did he answer?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A Yes, Cap. Okay Cap.
Q When you said "Cap" what did he mean by that word "Cap."
A Being a Barangay Captain.
Q After the accused told you that you were his counsel of choice. What did you do next if any?
A I informed Elizar Tomaquin that do you know what will be the implication of your admission, you will be
imprisoned.
Q After you asked him whether he knew of the implication of his confession that could be - because of that
confession. What was his reaction?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A Yes Cap. I know. And then I told him as follows: "Because of this confession you will be imprisoned."
Q And what did he say after you told him again that if he would execute that affidavit of confession he
would surely be imprisoned?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A No I even continue that "why did he do that?"
Q And what did he answer?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A He answered to me that he was drunk at that time.
Q And so what transpired next?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A So I told him are you willing now to give your confession, then policeman Monilar went inside the room
and we had that investigation.
Q Now how was the investigation of the accused done?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A It was made in a question and answer form.
Q And in what language were the questions framed?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A In the vernacular, vesaya.
Q What did you do during the question and answer form of investigation?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A I just observed them.
Q But did you stay there until the whole taking of the confession was over?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A Yes I was there in the presence of two persons coming from my Barangay.
...
Q When you arrived and saw Mr. Monilar with the accused as an Attorney did you immediately inquire what
had happened before you arrived like; Did you start the investigation? did you inquire from that from Mr.
Monilar?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A He was already preparing this top portion here.
INTERPRETER:
Q Witness pointing to the upper portion of the certification up to the signature to that portion above the
names typewritten thereon.
...
Q And that means to say that when he prepared this from the top most portion to that portion immediately
right before the typewritten name Elizar Tomaquin and Atty. Fortunato Parawan you were not around.
Correct?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A I was not around but we have already a conversation earlier with Monilar. 26
Records also show that appellant was presented to SPO2 Monilar in the morning of December 16, 1996.
When appellant intimated that he was willing to confess and requested the presence of Atty. Parawan,
SPO2 Monilar called up Atty. Parawan and informed him of appellant's decision. Atty. Parawan arrived at the
Ramos Police Station only at 2:00 in the afternoon.27 By the time Atty. Parawan arrived, the investigation
had already started and SPO2 Monilar had already asked and elicited information from appellant. Worse,
Atty. Parawan merely "observed" during the entire investigation and failed to advise or explain to appellant
the questions being propounded by SPO2 Monilar. He did not even bother to ask appellant if the
extrajudicial confession he was about to execute was being voluntarily given.
Moreover, that Atty. Parawan is not an effective and vigilant counsel is bolstered by his own testimony that
he already suspected appellant as having committed the crime when the latter was brought to his house
by the barangay tanods, viz.:
Q Being an attorney naturally your first question to your arresting tanods was where was he arrested and
how was he arrested and what is the reason why he was arrested. Correct?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A Yes.
...
Q You are telling this Court now Atty. Parawan that before the Barangay Tanods could explain to you the
circumstances of his arrest you already started to ask questions like; Why did you have blood in your
pants. Where is your t-shirt you wore. Where did you get that information since you were not in the house
of Jaqueline Tatoy when she was killed?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A It was like this. I heard that the victim suffered multiple stab wounds. So when I saw blood stains with all
probability it might come from the victim. It was conclusion something like when I saw that t-shirt stained
with blood.
Q So you mean to this Court that you already reached the conclusion of mine (sic) that Elizar Tomaquin one
of your constituents in the Barangay was already on your conclusion in mine (sic) the killer of Jacquilyn
Tatoy before your tanods turned it over to the police for investigation. Is that what you are telling Atty.
Parawan?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A It is somewhat like that. That is why I ordered my tanod to bring him to the Homicide. 28
The Court cannot imagine how Atty. Parawan could have effectively safeguarded appellant's rights as an
accused during the investigation when he himself entertained the suspicion that appellant is guilty of the
crime charged, and naturally, he would want appellant to admit having committed it.
It was posited that appellant cannot challenge Atty. Parawan's qualification as a competent and
independent counsel because he was his choice.
As provided in Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, "(A)ny person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right - to have competent and independent counselpreferably of
his own choice. Ideally, the lawyer called to be present during such investigations should be as far as
reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning, but the word "preferably" does
not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to
preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his defense. 29 What is
imperative is that the counsel should be competent and independent. That appellant chose Atty. Parawan
does not estop appellant from complaining about the latter's failure to safeguard his rights.
It appears that appellant chose Atty. Parawan because he was the barangay captain of Brgy. Lorega where
appellant resides, and apparently, appellant trusts Atty. Parawan to protect his rights. The latter, however,
fell short in tending to the trust reposed on him. Appellant did not finish Grade 1 and does not know how to
read and write.30 As between him and Atty.
Parawan who presumably knows the intricacies of the law and appellant's predicament, Atty. Parawan
should have known better and exercised his sound judgment before conceding to appellant's choice. But it
did not occur to him to inhibit himself from acting as appellant's counsel and instead, he even let appellant
go through the investigation and execute the extrajudicial confession knowing fully well that he was biased
as regards appellant's innocence. Quoted verbatim, Atty. Parawan testified thus:
Q Atty. Parawan comparing yourself to the accused who is a graduate of Batchelor (sic) of Law compared to
your constituent who is jobless, illiterate [and] of low intelligence. The question is this: It did not occur to
your mine (sic) to inhibit yourself despite the request by telling the accused as barangay Captain there
could be a conflict of interest and bias that I would not be in (sic) effective counsel or assistance to you.
Did it not occur toy our mine (sic) or not?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A It did not occur to my nime (sic).
...
Q But as experienced attorney you know very well that when you assist a suspect in the police station and
the circumstances he was arrested the best assistance a lawyer could give is would be to tell the accused
to remain silent. Would you agree?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
...
A It did not occur to my mine (sic) that time.31
Clearly, Atty. Parawan failed to meet the exacting standards of an independent and competent counsel as
required by the Constitution. Thus, the extrajudicial confession executed by appellant, even if gospel truth,
is deemed an uncounselled confession and therefore, inadmissible in evidence.
In this regard, it may not be amiss to repeat the declaration of the Court in People v. Deniega,32stressing
the role of the courts in ascertaining that extrajudicial confessions meet the exacting standards of the
Constitution:
Every so often, courts are confronted with the difficult task of taking a hard look into the sufficiency of
extra-judicial confessions extracted by law enforcement authorities as the sole basis for convicting accused
individuals. In cases of crimes notable for their brutality and ruthlessness, the impulse to find the culprits
at any cost occasionally tempts these agencies to take shortcuts and disregard constitutional and legal
safeguards intended to bring about a reasonable assurance that only the guilty are punished. Our courts,
in the process of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, play a central role in bringing
about this assurance by determining whether or not the evidence gathered by law
enforcement agencies scrupulously meets exacting standards fixed by the Constitution. If the
standards are not met, the Constitution provides the corresponding remedy by providing a
strict exclusionary rule, i.e., that "[a]ny confession or admission obtained in violation of
(Article III, Section 12(1) . . . hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence."
Without appellant's extrajudicial confession, the prosecution's case now teeters precariously on
circumstantial evidence, namely:
(1) Rico Magdasal's testimony that:
(a) appellant left their drinking session at 1:00 in the morning of December 16, 1996;
(b) the tres cantos and pair of shoes found inside Jaquelyn's residence belongs to appellant;
andcralawlibrary
(c) appellant was wearing a pair of maong shorts and white sando shirt on the night of the crime, which
blood-stained shirt was found among the soiled clothes in Wilson Magdasal's house;
(2) Medical Technologist Jude Daniel Mendoza's testimony that the blood stains on appellant's sando shirt
and the tres cantos was of human origin.33
These circumstances, however, are not sufficient to demonstrate positively and convincingly that it was
appellant who killed Jaquelyn.
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to convict if (a)
there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.34 As jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be
upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, i.e., the
circumstances proven must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused
is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty. 35
The circumstantial evidence in this case does not constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and
reasonable conclusion that appellant is the guilty person.
For one, appellant's act of leaving the drinking session at 1:00 in the morning does not establish
appellant's whereabouts at the time the crime was committed. There is nothing in the testimony of Rico
Magdasal and the other prosecution witnesses that will show if appellant indeed went to Jaquelyn's house
after he left the group. No one saw him enter or leave her residence. If at all, what was proved is that
appellant was found by the barangay tanods sleeping at home in the afternoon of the same day.
Added to that is the prosecution's failure to establish the chain of custody of these valuable pieces of
evidence.
Prosecution witness Armando Zabate testified that the pair of black shoes and tres cantos were given to a
certain Rey for safekeeping. These were later turned over to a Policeman Tariao of the Ramos Police
Station. Zabate, however, did not identify the person who turned over the objects to the police. 36 There
was no showing who turned over those articles to the police and Rey was not presented to identify if these
were the same pair of shoes and tres cantos found in Jaquelyn's house and turned over to the police.
Policeman Tariao was not called to the witness stand so as to confirm if those articles were the same
evidence turned over to him and later presented in court. Ordinarily, it would not be indispensable for the
prosecution to allege and prove every single fact of the case. But in this case, the pieces of evidence are
crucial to the prosecution's case. Also, the fact that a civilian obtained and received the evidence, the
possibility that the integrity of these articles could have been compromised cannot be ignored. The Court
even noted that during his direct examination, SPO2 Monilar was confused as to whether the pair of shoes
presented in court was the same ones that were turned over to the police. It turned out that the marking
he made on the shoes were washed off because at one time, the shoes fell in the canal located in front of
the police station and they had to clean and wash the shoes!37 Such sloppy handling renders the chain of
custody of those pieces of evidence dubious, and damaging to the prosecution's case.
And even if appellant did own the pair of shoes and tres cantos, the fact that it was found in the scene of
the crime merely proved that he was in the residence of Jaquelyn at some point in time. But it does not
prove when particularly he was there, his authorship of the crime or his motive for being
there. While the motive of an accused in a criminal case is generally held to be immaterial, not being an
element of the crime, motive becomes important when, as in this case, the evidence of the commission of
the crime is purely circumstantial.38
The prosecution's evidence that is perceived to be conclusive of appellant's guilt is mainly the testimony of
Rico Magdasal. Such testimony, however, is uncorroborated. The rule is that the testimony of one witness
is sufficient to sustain a conviction, if such testimony positively establishes the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.39 Moreover, the doctrine of long standing that the testimony of a
lone witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict an accused applies only to eyewitnesses.
Thus, an uncorroborated circumstantial evidence is certainly not sufficient for conviction when the
evidence itself is in serious doubt.40 Rico's lone testimony is not sufficient to establish appellant's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
In addition, appellant vehemently denied Rico's allegations. According to appellant, it was Rico who
actually owns the pair of shoes and tres cantos; that it was he who bid appellant to go to the Tatoys'
residence and lift their TV set; and that it was Rico who stabbed Jaquelyn. Considering appellant's denial
and his different version of the incident, it became incumbent upon the prosecution to rebut appellant's
allegations with further evidence to corroborate the statement of Rico. It must be noted that there were
other persons present during their drinking spree, namely, Romy Magdasal, Noel Labay, and a certain
Cardo. These persons could have been presented as witnesses to back up Rico's claim but the prosecution
did not do so. Rico testified that appellant owned the tres cantos found by the stairs; but Rico also stated
he only "heard" that the tres cantos was found by the stairs.41 Who found the tres cantos that was
supposed to have been used to stab Jaquelyn? The neighbor who allegedly found it by the stairs was not
presented in court to identify if the tres cantos presented by the prosecution was the alleged weapon in
the stabbing of Jaquelyn. Such failure of the prosecution to corroborate the material points of Rico's
testimony weakened their case.
The Court also has serious misgivings on the probative value of the white sando shirt that appellant was
allegedly wearing at the time of stabbing Jaquelyn, which Edgar Magdasal later found bloodstained among
the soiled clothes.
First, when appellant was asked by the barangay tanods about the shirt he was wearing, he told them that
it was in Wilson Magdasal's house. According to barangay tanod Armando Zabate, it was Edgar Magdasal
who found the shirt, "somewhat wet and bloody," among the soiled clothes. 42 Edgar Magdasal, however,
was not presented to testify as to where he found the shirt, the state the shirt was in when he found it, and
how he knew that it was the shirt worn by appellant.
Second, Medical Technologist Jude Daniel Mendoza testified that the bloodstains on appellant's sandoshirt,
as well as the tres cantos, were human blood.43 Mendoza, however, did not conduct further tests to
ascertain the type of blood found on these pieces of evidence nor did he match it with the victim's blood
type,44 hence, it does not connect the bloodstains to the herein victim. In People v. Rodriguez, the Court
ruled that the maong pants allegedly belonging to appellant and found positive of type O blood has no
probative value since the blood type of appellant and the victim were not taken for purposes of
comparison.45
The same ruling applies with regard to the bloodstains found on the tres cantos.
Appellant enjoys in his favor the presumption of innocence until the contrary is proven. Proof of the guilt of
the accused should not be tainted with ambiguity. Although appellant's defense is weak, conviction must
come from the strength of the prosecution's evidence and not from the weakness of the defense. In this
case, the prosecution's evidence is not strong enough to justify a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.46 Acquittal, therefore, is inevitable.
WHEREFORE, appellant Elizar Tomaquin is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED immediately,
unless he is being detained for some other legal cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of appellant unless he
is being lawfully held for another cause, and to inform this Court of the date of his release, or the ground
for his continued confinement, within ten (10) days from notice of herein decision.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, J., Chairman, Callejo, Sr., TINGA, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILFREDO ROJAS, TEODORO VILLARIN,

SOLOMON TOTOY, GREGORIO TUNDAG and SINFROSO MASONG, Defendants-Appellants.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Gregorio R. Castillo for defendants-appellants Rojas, Villarin, Tundag and Masong.
Angel P. Purisima for defendant-appellant Solomon Totoy.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The people of Digon in Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur must still be talking every now and then of the
strange killings that shook their barrio on that tragic morning of May 23, 1973, when three girls were slain,
the youngest only five years old, under the most mystifying and shocking circumstances. Even now the
townsfolk are probably still asking, not without a tinge of superstitious fear, the nagging, unanswered
questions in this macabre case: Why? Why the blameless victims? And why the ruthless manner of their
slaying?
Consider the carnage and the girls who fell before the bloodied knife: Zenaida Nastae, 21 years old,
stabbed once to death, ears severed; Canda Carluman, 7 years old, stabbed once, hemorrhaging to death;
and Mona Carluman, 5 years old, stabbed twice to death, ears severed. 1 These were Natures creatures
still on the threshold of their lives, and yet they were cut down in the innocence of their youth without
mercy and without reason.
The day following the massacre, prodded perhaps by a sense not only of duty but also of outrage, a joint
PC-police posse arrested seven persons in Barrio Talanusa, to wit: Teodoro Villarin, Saturnino Totoy,
Solomon Totoy, Gregorio Tundag, Sinfroso Masong, Mohamod Esmael and Balbino Estrera, all suspected of
the killings. 2 Found in their possession and confiscated were two home-made shotguns, one .38 caliber
homemade pistol with two live bullets, five hunting knives with scabbards, an undershirt with Latin words
arranged in a mystic design, a pair of trousers, four bottles of oil and two human ears. 3 Wilfredo Rojas,
their alleged leader, was arrested later in Malangas, also of Zamboanga del Sur, and turned over to the
Margosatubig police. 4
After investigation, all the suspects were charged with the murder of the above-named victims in three
separate informations to which they all pleaded not guilty. 5 Later, on motion of the prosecution and over
the objection of the other defendants, Esmael and Estrera were discharged so they could be used as state
witnesses. 6 Every one of the remaining defendants was provided with counsel de oficio 7 An extended
trial followed and decision was finally rendered on January 27, 1975, convicting all of them and sentencing
them to death. 8 The lone exception was Saturnino Totoy, who, because of the mitigating circumstance of
minority, was meted out the lesser penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor to fourteen years,
eight months and one day of reclusion temporal. 9 All the accused were also held solidarily liable for the
civil indemnity of P12,000.00, to be paid to the heirs of each of the three victims. 10
The sentence of death has brought the case to this Court on automatic review. The records are
voluminous. The accused-appellants are raising factual and legal questions which opposing counsel have
discussed knowledgeably and with commendable spirit and earnestness. We shall rule upon these issues
presently.chanrobles law library
On the basis of the testimonial and documentary evidence presented at the trial, the following is
substantially what happened before and during the tragic incident, as the lower court saw it.
Sometime in January 1973 there arrived in Barrio Talanusa, Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur, a stranger
from Barrio Tuboran, Malangas, of the same province, bringing with him wordly wares and presumably also
his own concept of the spirit. His name was Wilfredo Rojas. During his stay, he befriended the other
accused, whom he taught to pray the "Our Father," the "Hail Mary," and the "I Believe," in profession of the
Christian faith as he understood it. He also sold them on credit what he called "anting-anting" oil which, he
claimed, would, when rubbed on their bodies, protect them from injury. 11
Rojas returned to Talanusa in April of the same year, staying there for two weeks, and then again in May,
joining his new-found friends as usual in drinking wine and in reciting the prayers he had taught them. 12
All this was leading to the tragic events that would transpire later that month by the sea in Digon.
On that fateful morning of May 23, 1973, Rojas and his companions went to the church in Talanusa, where
they prayed, rubbed the amulet oil on their bodies, and girded themselves as if preparing for battle. Rojas
was armed with a shotgun and a knife. Estrera also had a shotgun and a knife. Tundag carried a revolver
and a knife. Esmael, Masong, Solomon Totoy and Saturnino Totoy were armed with knives. Villarin alone
had no weapons. Rojas told them they were going to Digon. 13
Together, these eight men proceeded to their destination, about a half-hours walk away. Arriving at the
seashore where the massacre was soon to take place, they immediately surrounded the copra kiln to
prevent escape of the persons in the enclosure. In the "tapahan" were Zenaida Nastae, the eldest in the
group, and the Carluman sisters, Dalma, Canda, Mona and Lina, their ages ranging from ten years to one.
Rojas approached Zenaida and pretended to be looking for a person named Yoyong, continuing in casual
conversation when he received a negative answer. The girls did not appear to be apprehensive as yet.
Suddenly and without warning, Solomon Totoy fired at Dalma, but his gun jammed. Rojas then pulled out
his knife and swung at Zenaida, fatally wounding her in the left side of her body with one stab. The second
victim was Canda, whom Rojas stabbed (or shot?) in the head, resulting in her bleeding to death. Rojas
finally turned on the smallest girl in the group, the terrified Mona, whom he stabbed twice in the stomach
and in the back, also killing her. It is not certain when this actually happened whether before or after
they had died but to make the gory crimes even more bizzarre, the ears of Zenaida and Mona were
severed, by whom it is also not clear. At any rate, after the butchery was done, Rojas ordered the group to
run, and run they did together from the bloody sands. 14
They had not reckoned with Dalma who, with her sister Lina, had escaped the killing by fleeing to the
nearby sea and hanging on to a log until the men had left. 15 She would live to tell about the terrible
bloodbath she had seen and survived and to point to the accused as the brutal killers.
It was Dalma and the two state witnesses, Esmael and Estrera, who supplied the details in the above
narration. 16 Although there are a number of inconsistencies in their testimony, due probably to the
general confusion that characterized the incident, we accept the factual findings of the trial judge. The trial
judge has a superior competence in this regard. After all, as we remarked in an earlier case, 17 it is the
trial judge who has the opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their demeanor, to mark every
nuance of tone or pause of hesitation or flush of face, and to determine, by the totality of his impressions
and the plausibility of their testimony, if what they are saying should be rejected or believed.chanrobles
law library
The trial judge described Dalma as sincere and straightforward, relating her story without hesitation and
sticking to it despite rigid cross-examination. 18 The naivet of the ten-year old girl was especially
impressive and, together with her detailed remembrance of her harrowing experience, convinced the court
that she was telling the truth. As for state witnesses Esmael and Estrera, while it has been argued that
their testimony came from a polluted source, they being themselves co-conspirators with the accused, it is
noteworthy that their own respective accounts of the tragedy were consistent with each other and tallied
essentially with Dalmas narration. 19
Thus settling the factual issues, we now address ourselves to the several legal questions raised by the
accused-appellants in their assignment of errors. Specifically, they claim that the lower court erred in
finding that there was a conspiracy among them; in imposing upon them collectively the sentence of
death; and in considering against them the aggravating circumstances of cuadrilla, dwelling and evident
premeditation. 20 Additionally, Solomon Totoy challenges his supposed confession on the ground that it
was taken in violation of the Bill of Rights. 21
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a crime and decide to
commit it. 22 While it is desirable that the conspiracy be proved by direct evidence, like an express
understanding among the plotters affirming their commitment and defining their respective roles, it may
nevertheless be established at times by circumstantial evidence only. 23 Thus, to repeat established
doctrine, where the accused move in concert toward a common purpose, conspiracy may be inferred from
their joint acts and design, without need of direct evidence of the criminal agreement. 24 We have held in
many cases that the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, are
circumstances that can show whether or not there was a conspiracy among them.25cralaw:red
In the case at bar, it is not disputed that the accused, in the morning of the killings, gathered at the church
in Talanusa and observed what might be compared to the ceremonies of warriors before a battle: prayers
for victory, anointing with oil against injury and death, and girding for combat. 26 Surely, one does not
make such solemn preparations if the destination were a harmless party, as claimed by the accused. 27
The record shows that Rojas, the "commander" as he was called, simply told the group they were going to
Digon, but he did not have to spell out their mission. If only because of the formidable arsenal they were
carrying, the accused could not but have known that their object was more sinister than merrymaking and
drinking and feasting at a social gathering. There was certainly a more deadly purpose, and all of them
were aware of this.
It has been established that upon their arrival in the "tapahan" at Digon at about eleven oclock of that
fatal morning, the accused immediately positioned themselves around the copra kiln enclosure,
surrounding it to prevent the five girls inside from leaving. 28 One wonders why, if they were not acting in
concert, they at once so placed themselves as to form a ring around the structure in an veritable siege of
their defenseless and unsuspecting prey. Notably, every one took his spot as if by prearrangement, without
need of the leader assigning to them their respective positions, in what some if they had a sense of the
occult would call a circle of death.
There is no evidence that when Solomon Totoy suddenly attempted to shoot Dalma, the rest of the group
was surprised, objected or remonstrated. Nobody stopped Rojas when he started killing the astonished and
terrified victims. There was no protest either when the ears of Zenaida and Mona were cut off on Rojass
orders and wrapped in leaves for safekeeping. 29 Everything was done apparently according to a
preconceived design. The group knew beforehand what was going to happen for, indeed, they had planned
it that way. In fact, as a final touch, after the massacre was over, Rojas ordered the men to run, and
obediently they did, fleeing the scene of the crimes at the same time and together. 30
It is the above acts of the accused, and not necessarily the testimony of Esmael and Estrera as coconspirators, that have established the conspiracy. These two state witnesses merely corroborated the
principal account given by the unhesitant Dalma, who had seen everything and told it in every harrowing
unforgettable detail.
The conspiracy having been established, it must now visit equal punishment on all the conspirators, on the
legal theory that the act of one is the act of all. 31 This is settled jurisprudence. There is no need to harp
on it. Indeed, even if it be argued that some did less than the others, it cannot be denied that their very
participation in the conspiracy added to its strength, emboldened the actual killer, and contributed to the
success of the common design. In the eyes of the law, each conspirator is a co-principal and equally guilty
with the other members of the plot. 32
It is true that in People v. Nierra, 33 this doctrine was relaxed in favor of the two accused who, although
adjudged as co-conspirators, were nonetheless held to be accomplices only and so entitled to a lesser
penalty than that imposed on the other defendants. In that case, however, the participation of one was
limited to introducing the killer to the other plotters and delivering the murder weapon to him and the
other merely acted as look-out while the crime was being committed. In the instant case, however, every
one of the accused acted in concert and was present at the scene of the crime while it was being
committed and as an equal partner of the rest performed his designated part to complete its
execution.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
There is no question that the killings were committed with treachery, to qualify the crimes to murder.
Treachery exists when the offender commits any crime against persons, employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from any defense which the offended party might make. 34 In the instant case, the
offended parties were young defenseless girls confronted by eight full-grown men armed with guns and
knives who, to make a surprise attack, pretended to be looking for someone. Three bloody corpses, the
victim of their guile and their superior strength and number, attested to the success of their wicked plot.
We reject the finding by the trial court of dwelling and band as separate aggravating circumstances. 35
Even the Solicitor General believes that dwelling should not have been considered because the "tapahan"
in which the murders were committed was a separate structure and did not form part of the building where
the victims were residing. 36 As for band, it is unquestionable that cuadrilla is absorbed by treachery since
its employment was consciously adopted to insure the execution of the plot without risk to the criminals,
by reason of their number, let alone their strength, from any defense the offended parties might make. 37
But evident premeditation is another matter and is correctly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance
that will increase the penalty. The rule is that under normal conditions, when the conspiracy is directly
established with proof of the attendant deliberation and selection of the method, time and means of
executing the crimes, the existence of evident premeditation may be taken for granted. 38 In case of
implied conspiracy, however, there must be proof as to how and when the plan was hatched and the time
that elapsed before it was carried out, so it can be determined if the accused had sufficient time between
its inception and its fulfillment to dispassionately consider the commission of the crime and its
consequences. 39 As this Court has repeatedly held, there should be a showing that the accused had the
opportunity for reflection, that he had the chance to weigh the pros and cons of the deed he was planning,
and that he nonetheless persisted in carrying out his criminal design. 40
From the facts found by the lower court, there was such a showing. It would appear that the plan to murder
the girls was conceived perhaps as early as during the meetings in April and May between Rojas and the
other members of the group, or at the very latest when they all assembled in the church at Talanusa before
they made the trip to Digon. Even as they were mouthing their prayers, they had already made up their
minds, or perhaps were only affirming a decision reached earlier, to kill the girls in Digon. They knew then
where they were going. They knew what they were going to do. Between the time they left the church in
Talanusa and until they arrived in Digon a good thirty minutes walk over a two-kilometer stretch during
which they would have had nothing in mind but their mission they had sufficient time to reflect on the
acts they were about to commit, to consult their conscience on the justification for the crime they were
planning, and to desist, if they wanted to, from carrying out their deadly purpose.
Coming now to Solomon Totoys extrajudicial confession which he asks us to invalidate, all we have to do is
test it against the requirements of Article IV, Section 20, of the 1973 Constitution. This statement was
obtained from him on May 28, 1973. It is therefore covered by Magtoto v. Manguera 41 and other
subsequent cases 42 holding that this section should be given only prospective operation from January 17,
1973, when the Constitution was ratified.
The said provision categorically states that "any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the light to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such right." The record
does not show that this requirement was observed. On the contrary, there merely appears in the opening
paragraph of the said confession the vague statement that:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"The affiant has been informed of his rights under the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, and
under the state of Martial Law, and the nature of the investigation, and without violence, intimidation,
force nor reward the affiant declared as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x
This surely does not suggest compliance with the constitutional mandate, the rights which Totoy was
entitled to know were not specifically communicated to him. Being informed of his "rights under the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines" did not mean he was informed particularly of his right to
remain silent and to be assisted by counsel during his custodial investigation. He was not told he did not
have to answer if he did not feel like answering. He was not told he had a right to be assisted by counsel.
He was not given a chance to retain counsel de parte if he wanted to, and neither was he offered the
services of counsel de oficio. Not knowing about his right to counsel, he could not have waived it; and in
any case, the waiver, to be valid, would have needed the assistance of counsel under the ruling announced
in People v. Galit, 43 which is still the prevailing doctrine notwithstanding the reservations of some
members of this Court.
In fine, what we see here is a superficial observance of the requirements of the Bill of Rights through a
mere recitation by rote of the sacramental advise, which was inadequate to begin with. There was no
sincere effort or desire to apply the guarantees of Section 20 that could have protected the suspect from
the rash and uncounseled statements he subsequently made, knowing no better. That statement is, of
course, not admissible against him. 44
We end on this note of perplexity and regret. From the legal viewpoint, motive need not be established as
long as the defendants have been directly identified, as in this case. 45 Even so, the townspeople of
Margosatubig, mindless of such legal niceties, are probably still musing over the bloody attack on that
pleasant morning in May thirteen years ago when three young girls perished by the seashore in Digon at
the hands of eight intruders.
Was there perhaps a ritual killing on that tragic shore? There are those who suggest the hand of a fanatic
religious group animated by a deadly hostility to Muslims, including innocent girls and children like the
victims in this case. 46 Others see hidden meanings in the Latin inscriptions and cryptic designs on the
shirt Rojas was wearing that fateful morning when, as one possessed, he slew and slew and slew. 47 The
severed ears are especially intriguing and could perhaps reveal an esoteric purpose behind the savage
knives the killers wielded in cold blood against their innocent prey. Still the question probes and lingers:
Why? The answer lies in the warped mind of the stranger from Tuboran who came with his magic amulet oil
and taught his believing followers to pray with him - and kill.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
All the accused-appellants are guilty of the three crimes of murder, qualified by treachery and aggravated
by evident premeditation. Rejected as aggravating circumstances are band, because it is already absorbed
by treachery; dwelling, because the "tapahan" was not part of the victims residence; and cruelty, because
it has not been shown that the ears of the two victims were severed while they were still alive.
WHEREFORE, as above modified, the judgment of conviction is affirmed and the sentence of death is
imposed on all the accused-appellants for each of the murders. The civil indemnity, for which they are
solidarily liable, is increased to P30,000.00 for the heirs of each of the victims. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras and
Feliciano, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. L-59378. February 11, 1986.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NELIA NICANDRO y VELARMA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PLANA, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VIII, convicting the accused Nelia
Nicandro y Velarma of violation of Section 4, Article II, in relation to Section 2(e), (f), (l), (m), and (o), Article I, of Republic
Act 6425, as amended (Dangerous Drugs Act), upon an information which reads:
jgc:chanroble s.com.ph
"That on or about November 6, 1981, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not having been authorized by law
to sell, deliver, give away to another or distribute any prohibited drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly
sell or offer for sale four (4) sticks of marijuana cigarettes, marijuana flowering tops wrapped in a piece of newspaper, one
(1) roach marijuana cigarette and marijuana seeds and ashes contained in a white plastic bag, which are prohibited drugs."
cralaw virtua1aw
library
The Peoples version of the facts is as follows:
"Not long before November 6, 1981, the Drug Enforcement Unit of Police Station No. 5, Western Police District, Metropolitan
Police Force, Manila, received complaints from concerned citizens regarding the illegal sale of prohibited drugs by one alias
Nel in the Commodore Pension House at Arquiza Street, Ermita, Manila (p. 4, tsn, Dec. 8, 1981). It was also informed that
the use of prohibited drugs in said place was rampant (pp. 3, 18-19, tsn, ibid.).
"Responding to said complaints and reports, Cpl. Salvador Guitan and Pfc. Romeo Joves of the Drug Enforcement Unit of said
Police Station No. 5 placed the Commodore Pension House and its surroundings under surveillance for about a week (pp. 4-5,
tsn, ibid.). After the complaints and reports were verified to be true, an entrapment with the confidential informant acting as
the buyer of marijuana was organized. (pp. 5-6, 29-30, tsn, ibid.).
"At about 9:00 p.m. on November 6, 1981, the police team formed to carry out the entrapment plan was alerted of the
presence of the drug pusher, alias Nel, at room 301 of the Commodore Pension House, selling marijuana to drug users (pp.
6, 32-33, tsn, ibid.). Immediately Cpl. Salvador Guitan, Pat. Proceso Federes, Pat. Aurora Gomez and Pfc. Romeo Joves
proceeded to the said Commodore Pension House and met the female confidential informant at the corner of Arquiza Street
and M.H. del Pilar Street, Ermita, Manila (pp. 6, 23, 33, tsn, Dec. 8, 1981; pp. 15-16, tsn. Dec. 9, 1981). Pfc. Joves gave the
informant two (2) P5.00 bills, marked Exhibits "D" and "E", with his initial thereon, marked Exhibits "D-1", and "E-1" (Exhs.
"D", "D-1", "E" and "E-1", pp. 3-4, Folio of Exhs.; pp. 6, 8, 35, tsn, Dec. 8, 1981; p. 16, tsn, Dec. 9, 1981). They instructed
her to follow them to the Commodore Pension House (p. 33, tsn, Dec. 8, 1981).
"Following later, the informant went to room 301 of the Commodore Pension House (p. 6, tsn, Dec. 8, 1981; p. 17, tsn, Dec.
9, 1981). Upon a given signal, she knocked on the door of the room. Appellant Nelia Nicandro y Velarma, alias Nel, opened
the door (p. 6, tsn, Dec. 8, 1981). The informant asked to buy some marijuana cigarette and gave appellant the two (2)
marked P5.00 bills (p. 6, tsn, Dec. 8, 1981; p. 17, tsn, Dec. 9, 1981). Thereupon, the appellant delivered to informant four
(4) sticks of marijuana cigarette (pp. 7, 25, tsn; Dec. 8, 1981; p. 8, tsn; Dec. 9, 1981).
"Immediately the police team closed in and nabbed appellant (p. 7, tsn, Dec. 8, 1981; p. 17, tsn, Dec. 9, 1981). Pat. Gomez
frisked appellant and got from the right front pocket of her pants the two (2) marked P5.00 bills (Exhs. "D" & "E") and from
the left pocket of her pants marijuana flowering tops wrapped in a piece of newspaper (pp. 8-9, 12, 34, tsn, Dec. 8, 1981;
pp. 9-10, 17-19, tsn. Dec. 9, 1981). Appellant tried to escape by entering her rented room 301 but was immediately collared
(pp. 8-9, tsn, Dec. 9, 1981).
x
"Upon being investigated and after having been duly apprised of her constitutional rights, appellant orally admitted having
sold the four (4) sticks of marijuana cigarettes and the ownership of the marijuana flowering tops taken from her pocket, but
refused to reduce her confession to writing (pp. 12-13, tsn; Dec. 8, 1981 . . ." (Peoples Brief, pp. 3-6, 8.)
To support the charges, the prosecution relied principally on Pat. Joves, who testified that he saw the accused sell marijuana
cigarettes to the unnamed police informant, which allegedly the accused verbally admitted when she was under custodial
investigation. Pat. Joves declared:
chanroble s law library : red
"Q Where were you when the informant handed the two P5.00 bills to the accused?
A We were hidden within the vicinity of Room 301 sir.
Q After your confidential informant have handed the two P5.00 bills to the accused, what happened next?
A The accused in turn handed one small plastic bag containing suspected marijuana leaves. I beg to correct sir. I think it was
four sticks of marijuana cigarettes sir. It is not a plastic bag sir.
Q What did you do when you saw the accused hand over to the confidential informant the four sticks of cigarettes containing
marijuana?
A When we saw the accused handed the four sticks of suspected marijuana cigarettes to our confidential informant, and after
a prearranged signal was given by the confidential informant that the accused had already sold her the marijuana
cigarettes, we immediately nabbed said suspect and at the same time we identified ourselves as police officers." (TSN, Dec.
8, 1981, p. 7.)
x
"Q You also conducted the investigation of this accused and confiscation of the articles of the crime?
A Yes, sir.
Q How did you conduct the investigation?
A The first thing I did was I informed the accused of her constitutional rights.
Q What next?
A Then I questioned her about the marijuana cigarettes and leaves that were confiscated and also the marked money and
she verbally admitted that she sold the four sticks of suspected marijuana cigarettes and possession and ownership of the
other marijuana leaves which was confiscated from her possession.
Q Did you place that in writing?
A The accused refused to place her statement in writing, sir." (Ibid., pp. 12-13.).
x
CROSS EXAMINATION
"Q And who were your companions in apprehending the accused?
A I was with Police Cpl. Salvador Guitan, Pat. Federis and Policewoman Aurora Gomez, sir.
Q When you posted yourselves and other companions at the third floor of Commodore Pensione House, were there any other
persons present in the premises, Pat. Joves?
A There were other persons passing by or walking in the place from where we were posted sir.
Q In fact, there were several or many persons in that place because there is a lodging house Pat. Joves when you posted
yourselves there? There were several persons present there?
A There are several persons present but they are just passing by or walking towards their rooms, sir.
Q And you want this Court to believe that in spite of the presence of these people walking and passing to the place where
you made the apprehension, you want this Court to believe that the accused was then selling the alleged marijuana sticks?
WITNESS:
Please repeat the questions?

ATTY. CARINGAL:
Q You want the Court to believe that the accused was selling the prohibited drug in public because according to you there
were several persons present then?
A There were several persons passing by sir at that place.
Q You testified a while ago Pat. Joves that you have seen the accused handing a plastic bag to your confidential informant.
How big is that plastic bag?
A It was not a plastic bag, sir but four sticks of marijuana cigarettes, sir.
Q Do you want to impress this Honorable Court that the accused was selling this marijuana cigarette in the open?
A The accused sold marijuana cigarettes also in a way that she will not be noticed by other persons sir.
Q How were you able to say that the things handed by the accused to your confidential informant were four sticks of
marijuana cigarettes when you have just said that the transactions was done secretly?
A She was handing the marijuana cigarette secretly, sir.
Q How were you able to say and how were you able to determine that the things handed to your confidential informant were
four sticks of marijuana cigarettes?
A We saw and observed that the accused handed sticks of suspected marijuana cigarettes and we also have a prearranged
signal from the confidential informant that the marijuana was already sold by the accused, sir." (Ibid., pp. 23-25.)
Policewoman Aurora Gomez also testified but her testimony was limited to events subsequent to the alleged sale of
marijuana cigarettes. She did not witness the sale. (TSN, Dec. 9, 1981. pp. 17-18, 21.) Neither did Cpl. Guitan or Pat.
Federis.
After trial, the trial court convicted the accused as aforesaid and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of
P20,000.00.
In the instant appeal, Defendant-Appellant has assigned the following errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE II IN
RELATION TO SECTION 2(e), (l), (f) and (o), ARTICLE 1, R.A. 6425, AS AMENDED BY P.D. NO. 44 AND FURTHER AMENDED
BY P.D. NO. 1675.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING PROBATIVE VALUE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF ALL POLICE OFFICERS WHICH
ARE HEARSAY.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING PROSECUTION EVIDENCE WHICH WERE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF
ACCUSED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
IV
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED MORE PARTICULARLY THE RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION AND TO CROSSEXAMINE WITNESS AGAINST HER HAS BEEN VIOLATED.
Numerous factors combine to make the appeal meritorious.
The prosecution evidence leaves much to be desired. It is at best uncertain whether any prosecution witness really saw the
alleged sale of marijuana cigarettes. Patrolman Joves allegedly was an eyewitness. He testified that he saw the appellant sell
marijuana cigarettes to the police informant, as the transaction took place openly just outside room 301, in the presence of
several persons "passing by or walking in the place." But when his attention was called to the improbability that an illegal
merchandise would openly be sold, he qualified his story by saying that appellant handed the marijuana cigarettes to
appellant "secretly."
Pat. Joves was not certain as to what he saw. At first, he said that after the police informant had paid appellant, the latter
handed to the former "one small plastic bag containing suspected marijuana leaves." Then he corrected himself by saying: "I
think it was four sticks of marijuana cigarettes sir. It is not a plastic bag sir."
It is probable that Pat. Joves really did not see either the alleged delivery of the marijuana cigarettes or the supposed
payment therefor. After all, according to him, the transaction was effected "secretly." On the other hand, if the sale was made
within the view of Pat. Joves and his companions, there would have been no need for them to wait for a signal from the
police informant to indicate that the transaction had been completed, before closing in and arresting Appellant.
With the testimony of Pat. Joves seriously placed in doubt, there is not much left of the prosecution evidence. Note that the
police informant was not presented as a witness, prompting the accused to invoke with reason the presumption that evidence
willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. (Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 5(e).]
In convicting the appellant, the trial court relied partly on her alleged oral admission during custodial investigation, as
testified to by Pat. Joves. This reliance is assailed as violative of Section 20 of Article IV of the Constitution which reads:
chanroble s.com.ph : virtual law library
"No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of
this section shall be inadmissible in evidence."
The above provision is an expanded version of the guarantee against self-incrimination, formally incorporating the doctrine in
the landmark American case of Miranda v. Arizona
". . . Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow, but briefly stated, it is this: the
prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the
defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.
By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be
employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a
continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of
those rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and
at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning.
Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not
question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does
not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and
thereafter consents to be questioned." [384 U.S. 436, 444-445. Incidentally, the Miranda doctrine rests on just one broad
guarantee in the U.S. Constitution, i.e., that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself. (Fifth Amendment.)]
When the Constitution requires a person under investigation "to be informed" of his right to remain silent and to counsel, it
must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a rule, therefor, it would not be sufficient for a police officer
just to repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution. He is not only
duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical terms,
e.g., what the person under interrogation may or may not do, and in a language the subject fairly understands. (See People
v. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312; People v. Caguioa, 96 SCRA 2.) In other words, the right of a person under interrogation "to be
informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective
communication that results in understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly
be said that the person has been "informed" of his rights. Now, since the right "to be informed" implies comprehension, the
degree of explanation required will necessary vary, depending upon the education, intelligence and other relevant personal
circumstances of the person under investigation. Suffice it to say that a simpler and more lucid explanation is needed where
the subject is unlettered.

Thus, in the cited case of People v. Ramos, this Court said:
"In the case at bar, appellant has only finished Grade VI, which means that he is not adequately educated to understand
fairly and fully the significance of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel. As mandated, it is not enough that the
police investigator merely informs him of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel, and then taking his statements
down, the interrogating officer must have patience in explaining these rights to him. The records do not reveal that these
requirements have been fully complied with, nor was there any showing that appellant has been represented by counsel
during custodial investigation. In consonance with Section 20 of the Bill of Rights which states that any confession obtained
in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence, We hold that the verbal admissions of appellant during custodial
investigation may not be taken in evidence against him." (pp. 321-322.)
Like other constitutional rights, the right against self-incrimination, including the right of a person under investigation to
remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right, may be waived. To be valid, however, a waiver of the right
must not only be voluntary; it must be made knowingly and intelligently (People v. Caguioa, supra), which presupposes an
awareness or understanding of what is being waived. It stands to reason that where the right has not been adequately
explained and there are serious doubts as to whether the person interrogated knew and understood his relevant
constitutional rights when he answered the questions, it is idle to talk of waiver of rights.
Going to the instant case, Pat. Joves testified that he conducted the custodial investigation of appellant. As to the manner of
investigation, he tersely testified:
chanroble s law library : red
"Q How did you conduct the investigation?

A The first thing I did was I informed the accused of her constitutional rights.
Q What next?
A Then I questioned her about the marijuana cigarettes and leaves that were confiscated and also the marked money and
she verbally admitted that she sold the four sticks of suspected marijuana cigarettes and possession and ownership of the
other marijuana leaves which was confiscated from her possession." (TSN, December 8, 1981, pp. 12-13.)
According to Pat. Joves, he informed appellant of her constitutional rights when she was under custodial investigation. What
specific rights he mentioned to appellant, he did not say. Neither did he state the manner in which the appellant was advised
of her constitutional rights so as to make her understand them. This is particularly significant in the instant case because
appellant is illiterate and cannot be expected to be able to grasp the significance of her right to silence and to counsel upon
merely hearing an abstract statement thereof.
As it is the obligation of the investigating officer to inform a person under investigation of his right to remain silent and to
counsel, so it is the duty of the prosecution to affirmatively establish compliance by the investigating officer with his said
obligation. Absent such affirmative showing, the admission or confession made by a person under investigation cannot be
admitted in evidence. As broadly stated in the Miranda case and quoted with approval by the then Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando in People v. Caguioa, supra,
". . . the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial investigation of
the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against selfincrimination." (95 SCRA 2, 9. Emphasis supplied.)
The reason is not difficult to see. A constitutional guarantee should be liberally construed with a view to promoting its object.
". . . Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate
them.
x
"In dealing with custodial interrogation, we will not presume that a defendant has been effectively apprised of his rights and
that his privilege against self-incrimination has been adequately safeguarded on a record that does not show that any
warnings have been given or that any effective alternative has been employed. Nor can a knowing and intelligent waiver of
these rights be assumed on a silent record . . ." (Miranda case, 384 U.S. 436, 491, 498-499.)
Thus, in People v. Ramos, supra, the Court ruled that the verbal admission of the accused during custodial investigation was
inadmissible, although he had been apprised of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel, for the reason that the
prosecution failed to show that those rights were explained to him, such that it could not be said that "the apprisal was
sufficiently manifested and intelligently understood" by the accused.
Similarly, in People v. Caguioa, the Court sustained the rejection by the trial court of the extrajudicial admission made by the
accused during custodial investigation, there being no showing by the prosecution that there was sufficient compliance with
the constitutional duty to inform the accused of his rights to silence and to counsel, without which there could be no
intelligent waiver of said rights. In said case, the accused a native of Samar was interrogated in Tagalog. The
prosecution did not show that the accuseds acquaintance with Tagalog was such that he could fully understand the questions
posed to him.
chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanroble s.com :chanrobles.com .ph
All considered, we hold that the guilt of appellant has not been established beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and set aside, and the appellant is hereby acquitted on the basis of
reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 130612. May 11, 1999.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BERNARDINO DOMANTAY, @ "JUNIOR OTOT", AccusedAppellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This case is here on appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City (Branch 57), finding accusedappellant guilty of rape with homicide and sentencing him to death, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P480,000.00, and to pay the costs.
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The facts hark back to the afternoon of October 17, 1996, at around 4 oclock, when the body of six-year old Jennifer
Domantay was found sprawled amidst a bamboo grove in Guilig, Malasiqui, Pangasinan. The childs body bore several stab
wounds. Jennifer had been missing since lunch time.
The medical examination conducted the following day by Dr. Ma. Fe Leticia Macaranas, the rural health physician of Malasiqui,
showed that Jennifer died of multiple organ failure and hypovolemic shock secondary to 38 stab wounds at the back. Dr.
Macaranas found no lacerations or signs of inflammation of the outer and inner labia and the vaginal walls of the victims
genitalia, although the vaginal canal easily admitted the little finger with minimal resistance. Noting possible commission of
acts of lasciviousness, Dr. Macaranas recommended an autopsy by a medico-legal expert of the NBI. 2
The investigation by the Malasiqui police pointed to accused-appellant Bernardino Domantay, a cousin of the victims
grandfather, as the lone suspect in the gruesome crime. At around 6:30 in the evening of that day, police officers
Montemayor, de la Cruz, and de Guzman of the Malasiqui Philippine National Police (PNP) picked up accused-appellant at the
Malasiqui public market and took him to the police station where accused-appellant, upon questioning by SPO1 Antonio
Espinoza, confessed to killing Jennifer Domantay. He likewise disclosed that at around 3:30 that afternoon, he had given the
fatal weapon used, a bayonet, to Elsa and Jorge Casingal, his aunt and uncle respectively, in Poblacion Sur, Bayambang,
Pangasinan. The next day, October 18, 1996, SPO1 Espinoza and another policeman took accused-appellant to Bayambang
and recovered the bayonet from a tricycle belonging to the Casingal spouses. The police officers executed a receipt to
evidence the confiscation of the weapon. 3
On the basis of the post-mortem findings of Dr. Macaranas, SPO4 Juan Carpizo, the Philippine National Police chief
investigator at Malasiqui, filed, on October 21, 1996, a criminal complaint for murder against accused-appellant before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Malasiqui. On October 25, 1996, Dr. Ronald Bandonill, medico-legal expert of the NBI,
performed an autopsy on the embalmed body of Jennifer. The result of his examination of the victims genitalia indicated that
the childs hymen had been completely lacerated on the right side. Based on this finding, SPO4 Carpizo amended the criminal
complaint against accused-appellant to rape with homicide. Subsequently, the following information was filed: 4
That on or about the 17th day of October, 1996, in the afternoon, in barangay Guilig, Municipality of Malasiqui, province of
Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design and
armed with a bayonet, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with Jennifer
Domantay, a minor of 6 years old against her will and consent, and on the same occasion, the said accused with intent to kill,
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab with the use of a bayonet, the said Jennifer Domantay, inflicting upon
her multiple stab wounds, which resulted to her death, to the damage and prejudice of her heirs.
At the trial, the prosecution presented seven witnesses, namely, Edward, Jiezl, Lorenzo, all surnamed Domantay, Joselito
Mejia, Antonio Espinoza, Celso Manuel, and Dr. Ronald Bandonill, to establish its charge that accused-appellant had raped
and killed Jennifer Domantay.
Edward Domantay testified that in the morning of October 17, 1996, Accused-appellant and his two brothers-in-law, Jaime
Caballero and Daudencio Macasaeb, had a round of drinks in front of the latters house in Guilig, Malasiqui, Pangasinan.
Edward Domantay said that he was in front of Macasaebs house, tending to some pigeons in his yard. 5 After the group had
consumed several bottles of San Miguel gin, Accused-appellant gave money to Edward Domantay and asked him to buy two
bottles of gin and a bottle of Sprite. 6 Edward said he joined the group and sat between Daudencio Macasaeb and AccusedAppellant. 7 Edward said that accused-appellant, who, apparently had one too many then, rolled up his shirt and said: "No
diad Antipolo tan L(i)pa et walay massacre, diad Guilig wala, walay massacren kod dia, walay onakis-akis" ("In Antipolo and
Lipa, there were massacres; here in Guilig, there will also be a massacre. I will massacre somebody here, and they will cry
and cry"). Edward Domantay saw that tucked in the left side of accused-appellants waistline was a bayonet without a cover
handle. 8 It was not the first time that Edward had seen accused-appellant with the knife as the latter usually carried it with
him. 9
Jiezl Domantay, 10, likewise testified. She said that, at about 2 oclock in the afternoon on October 17, 1996, she and four
other children were playing in front of their house in Guilig, Malasiqui, Pangasinan. Jiezl saw accused-appellant and Jennifer
Domantay walking towards the bamboo grove of Amparo Domantay where Jennifers body was later found. Accusedappellant was about two meters ahead of Jennifer. The bamboo grove was about 8 to 10 meters from the house of Jiezl
Domantay. 10
Lorenzo Domantay, a relative of the victim, corroborated Jiezls testimony that accused-appellant had gone to Amparo
Domantays bamboo grove in the afternoon of October 17, 1996. Lorenzo said that that afternoon, on his way to his farm, he
saw accused-appellant about 30 meters away, standing at the spot in the bamboo grove where Jennifers body was later
found. Accused-appellant appeared restless and worried as he kept looking around. However, as Lorenzo was in a hurry, he
did not try to find out why accused-appellant appeared to be nervous. 11
Prosecution witness Joselito Mejia, a tricycle driver, said that, in the afternoon of October 17, 1996, he was about to take his
lunch at home in Alacan, a neighboring barangay about half a kilometer from Guilig, when accused-appellant implored Mejia
to take him to Malasiqui at once. Mejia told accused-appellant that he was going to take his lunch first, but the latter pleaded
with him, saying they will not be gone for long. Mejia, therefore, agreed. Mejia noticed that accused-appellant was nervous
and afraid. Accused-appellant later changed his mind. Instead of going to the town proper, he alighted near the Mormons
church, outside Malasiqui. 12
In addition, the prosecution presented SPO1 Antonio Espinoza and Celso Manuel who testified that, on separate
occasions, Accused-appellant had confessed to the brutal killing of Jennifer Domantay.
SPO1 Espinoza testified that he investigated accused-appellant after the latter had been brought to the Malasiqui police
station in the evening of October 17, 1996. Before he commenced his questioning, he apprised accused-appellant of his
constitutional right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, in English, which was later translated
into Pangasinense. 13 According to SPO1 Espinoza, Accused-appellant agreed to answer the questions of the investigator
even in the absence of counsel and admitted killing the victim. Accused-appellant also disclosed the location of the bayonet
he used in killing the victim. 14 On cross-examination, Espinoza admitted that at no time during the course of his questioning
was accused-appellant assisted by counsel. Neither was accused-appellants confession reduced in writing. 15 Espinozas
testimony was admitted by the trial court over the objection of the defense.
Celso Manuel, for his part, testified that he is a radio reporter of station DWPR, an AM station based in Dagupan City. He
covers the third district of Pangasinan, including Malasiqui. Sometime in October 1996, an uncle of the victim came to
Dagupan City and informed the station about Jennifer Domantays case. 16 On October 23, 1996, Manuel went to Malasiqui
to interview accused-appellant who was then detained in the municipal jail. He described what transpired during the
interview thus: 17
PROS. QUINIT:
Q Did you introduce yourself as a media practitioner?

A Yes, sir.
Q How did you introduce yourself to the accused?
A I showed to Bernardino Domantay alias "Junior Otot" my I.D. card and I presented myself as a media practitioner with my
tape recorder [in] my hand, sir.
Q What was his reaction to your request for an interview?
A He was willing to state what had happened, sir.

Q What are those matters which you brought out in that interview with the accused Bernardino Domantay alias "Junior
Otot" ?
A I asked him what was his purpose for human interests sake as a reporter, why did he commit that alleged crime. And I
asked also if he committed the crime and he answered "yes." Thats it.
x
PROS. QUINIT:
Q You mentioned about accused admitting to you on the commi[ssion] of the crime, how did you ask him that?
A I asked him very politely.
Q More or less what have you asked him on that particular matter?
A I asked "Junior Otot," Bernardino Domantay, "Kung pinagsisisihan mo ba ang iyong ginawa?" "Opo" sabi niya, "Ibig mo
bang sabihin Jun, ikaw ang pumatay kay Jennifer?", "Ako nga po." The [l]ast part of my interview, "Kung nakikinig ang mga
magulang ni Jennifer, ano ang gusto mong iparating?", "kung gusto nilang makamtan ang hustisya ay tatanggapin ko." That
is what he said, and I also asked Junior Otot, what was his purpose, and he said, it was about the boundary dispute, and he
used that little girl in his revenge.
On cross-examination, Manuel explained that the interview was conducted in the jail, about two to three meters away from
the police station. An uncle of the victim was with him and the nearest policemen present were about two to three meters
from him, including those who were in the radio room. 18 There was no lawyer present. Before interviewing accusedappellant, Manuel said he talked to the chief of police and asked permission to interview Accused-Appellant. 19 On
questioning by the court, Manuel said that it was the first time he had been called to testify regarding an interview he had
conducted. 20 As in the case of the testimony of SPO1 Espinoza, the defense objected to the admission of Manuels
testimony, but the lower court allowed it.
Dr. Bandonill, the NBI medico-legal who conducted an autopsy of the victim on October 25, 1996, testified that Jennifer
Domantay died as a result of the numerous stab wounds she sustained on her back, 21 the average depth of which was six
inches. 22 He opined that the wounds were probably caused by a "pointed sharp-edged instrument." 23 He also noted
contusions on the forehead, neck, and breast bone of the victim. 24 As for the results of the genital examination of the
victim, Dr. Bandonill said he found that the laceration on the right side of the hymen was caused within 24 hours of her
death. He added that the genital area showed signs of inflammation.25
cralaw:re d
Pacifico Bulatao, the photographer who took the pictures of the scene of the crime and of the victim after the latters body
was brought to her parents house, identified and authenticated the five pictures (Exhibits A, B, C, D, and E) offered by the
prosecution.
The defense then presented accused-appellant as its lone witness. Accused-appellant denied the allegations against him. He
testified he is an uncle of Jennifer Domantay (he and her grandfather are cousins) and that he worked as a janitor at the
Malasiqui Municipal Hall. He said that at around 1 oclock in the afternoon of October 17, 1996, he was bathing his pigs
outside the house of his brother-in-law Daudencio Macasaeb in Guilig, Malasiqui, Pangasinan. He confirmed that Daudencio
was then having drinks in front of his (Macasaebs) house. Accused-appellant claimed, however, that he did not join in the
drinking and that it was Edward Domantay, whom the prosecution had presented as witness, and a certain Jaime Caballero
who joined the party. He also claimed that it was he whom Macasaeb had requested to buy some more liquor, for which
reason he gave money to Edward Domantay so that the latter could get two bottles of gin, a bottle of Sprite, and a pack of
cigarettes. 26 He denied Edward Domantays claim that he (accused-appellant) had raised his shirt to show a bayonet tucked
in his waistline and that he had said he would massacre someone in Guilig. 27
Accused-appellant also confirmed that, at about 2 oclock in the afternoon, he went to Alacan passing on the trail beside the
bamboo grove of Amparo Domantay. But he said he did not know that Jennifer Domantay was following him. He further
confirmed that in Alacan, he took a tricycle to Malasiqui. The tricycle was driven by Joselito Mejia. He said he alighted near
the Mormon church, just outside of the town proper of Malasiqui to meet his brother. As his brother did not come, Accusedappellant proceeded to town and reported for work. That night, while he was in the Malasiqui public market, he was picked
up by three policemen and brought to the Malasiqui police station where he was interrogated by SPO1 Espinoza regarding the
killing of Jennifer Domantay. He denied having owned to the killing of Jennifer Domantay to SPO1 Espinoza. He denied he
had a grudge against the victims parents because of a boundary dispute. 28 With respect to his extrajudicial confession to
Celso Manuel, he admitted that he had been interviewed by the latter, but he denied that he ever admitted anything to the
former. 29
As already stated, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of its decision reads: 30
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the Court hereby finds the accused, Bernardino Domantay @ "Junior Otot" guilty
beyond reasonable doubt with the crime of Rape with Homicide defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code in relation and as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 and accordingly, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of death by lethal injection, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the total amount of Four Hundred Eighty
Thousand Pesos (P480,000.00), 31 and to pay the costs.
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SO ORDERED.
In this appeal, Accused-appellant alleges that: 32
I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION[S] MADE BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
II.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
First. Accused-appellant contends that his alleged confessions to SPO1 Antonio Espinoza and Celso Manuel are inadmissible in
evidence because they had been obtained in violation of Art. III, 12(1) of the Constitution and that, with these vital pieces
of evidence excluded, the remaining proof of his alleged guilt, consisting of circumstantial evidence, is inadequate to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 33
Art. III, 12 of the Constitution in part provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
x
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this section or section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence.
This provision applies to the stage of custodial investigation, that is, "when the investigation is no longer a general inquiry
into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect." 34 R.A. No. 7438 has extended the
constitutional guarantee to situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been "invited" for
questioning. 35
Decisions 36 of this Court hold that for an extrajudicial confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the following
requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3)
it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.
In the case at bar, when accused-appellant was brought to the Malasiqui police station in the evening of October 17, 1996,
37 he was already a suspect, in fact the only one, in the brutal slaying of Jennifer Domantay. He was, therefore, already
under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed in Art. III, 12(1) of the Constitution applied to him. SPO1 Espinoza
narrated what transpired during accused-appellants interrogation: 38
[I] interrogated Bernardino Domantay, prior to the interrogation conducted to him, I informed him of his constitutional right
as follows; that he has the right to remain silent; that he has the right to a competent lawyer of his own choice and if he can
not afford [a counsel] then he will be provided with one, and further informed [him] that all he will say will be reduced into
writing and will be used the same in the proceedings of the case, but he told me that he will cooperate even in the absence
of his counsel; that he admitted to me that he killed Jennifer Domantay, and he revealed also the weapon used [and] where
he gave [it] to.
But though he waived the assistance of counsel, the waiver was neither put in writing nor made in the presence of counsel.
For this reason, the waiver is invalid and his confession is inadmissible. SPO1 Espinozas testimony on the alleged confession
of accused-appellant should have been excluded by the trial court. So is the bayonet inadmissible in evidence, being, as it
were, the "fruit of the poisonous tree." As explained in People v. Alicando: 39
. . . According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or
derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as
a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally seized
evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should
not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegal obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.
We agree with the Solicitor General, however, that accused-appellants confession to the radio reporter, Celso Manuel, is
admissible. In People v. Andan, 40 the accused in a rape with homicide case confessed to the crime during interviews with
the media. In holding the confession admissible, despite the fact that the accused gave his answers without the assistance of
counsel, this Court said: 41
[A]ppellants [oral] confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution.
The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the
relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its
agents.
Accused-appellant claims, however, that the atmosphere in the jail when he was interviewed was "tense and intimidating"
and was similar to that which prevails in a custodial investigation. 42 We are not persuaded. Accused-appellant was
interviewed while he was inside his cell. The interviewer stayed outside the cell and the only person beside him was an uncle
of the victim. Accused-appellant could have refused to be interviewed, but instead, he agreed. He answered questions freely
and spontaneously. According to Celso Manuel, he said he was willing to accept the consequences of his act.
Celso Manuel admitted that there were indeed some police officers around because about two to three meters from the jail
were the police station and the radio room. 43 We do not think the presence of the police officers exerted any undue
pressure or influence on accused-appellant and coerced him into giving his confession.
Accused-appellant contends that "it is . . . not altogether improbable for the police investigators to ask the police reporter
(Manuel) to try to elicit some incriminating information from the accused." 44 This is pure conjecture. Although he testified
that he had interviewed inmates before, there is no evidence to show that Celso was a police beat reporter. Even assuming
that he was, it has not been shown that, in conducting the interview in question, his purpose was to elicit incriminating
information from Accused-Appellant. To the contrary, the media are known to take an opposite stance against the
government by exposing official wrongdoings.
chanroble svirtuallawlibrary
Indeed, there is no showing that the radio reporter was acting for the police or that the interview was conducted under
circumstances where it is apparent that accused-appellant confessed to the killing out of fear. As already stated, the
interview was conducted on October 23, 1996, 6 days after accused-appellant had already confessed to the killing to the
police.
Accused-appellants extrajudicial confession is corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti, namely, the fact of death of
Jennifer Domantay. In addition, the circumstantial evidence furnished by the other prosecution witnesses dovetails in
material points with his confession. He was seen walking toward the bamboo grove, followed by the victim. Later, he was
seen standing near the bamboo grove where the childs body was found. Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
provides:
3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction. An extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not
be sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
4. Evidence necessary in treason cases. No person charged with treason shall be convicted unless on the testimony of
two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.
Accused-appellant argues that it was improbable for a brutal killing to have been committed without the children who were
playing about eight to ten meters from Amparo Domantays grove, where the crime took place, having heard any commotion.
45 The contention has no merit. Accused-appellant could have covered the young childs mouth to prevent her from making
any sound. In fact, Dr. Bandonill noted a five by two inch (5" x 2") contusion on the left side of the victims forehead, which
he said could have been caused by a hard blunt instrument or by impact as her head hit the ground. 46 The blow could have
rendered her unconscious, thus precluding her from shouting or crying.
Accused-appellant also contends that the testimony of Jiezl Domantay contradicts that of Lorenzo Domantay because while
Jiezl said she had seen accused-appellant walking towards the bamboo grove, followed by the victim, at around 2 oclock in
the afternoon on October 17, 1996, Lorenzo said he saw accused-appellant standing near the bamboo grove at about the
same time.
These witnesses, however, did not testify concerning what they saw at exactly the same time. What they told the court was
what they had seen "at around" 2 oclock in the afternoon. There could have been a difference in time, however little it was,
between the time Jiezl saw accused-appellant and the victim walking and the time Lorenzo saw accused-appellant near the
place where the victims body was later found. Far from contradicting each other, these witnesses confirmed what each had
said each one saw. What is striking about their testimonies is that while Jiezl said she saw accused-appellant going toward
the bamboo grove followed by the victim "at around" 2 oclock in the afternoon on October 17, 1996, Lorenzo said he had
seen accused-appellant near the bamboo grove "at around" that time. He described accused-appellant as nervous and
worried. There is no reason to doubt the claim of these witnesses. Lorenzo is a relative of Accused-Appellant. There is no
reason he would testify falsely against the latter. Jiezl, on the other hand, is also surnamed Domantay and could also be
related to accused-appellant and has not been shown to have any reason to testify falsely against Accused-Appellant. At the
time of the incident, she was only 10 years old.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court is convinced of accused-appellants guilt with respect to the killing of the child. It is clear
that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant is guilty of homicide. Art. 249 of the
Revised Penal Code provides:
Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 [parricide] shall kill another without the attendance of any of
the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article [murder], shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by
reclusion temporal.
The killing was committed with the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The record shows that
the victim, Jennifer Domantay, was six years old at the time of the killing. She was a child of small build, 46" in height. 47 It
is clear then that she could not have put up much of a defense against accused-appellants assault, the latter being a fully
grown man of 29 years. Indeed, the physical evidence supports a finding of abuse of superior strength: accused-appellant
had a weapon, while the victim was not shown to have had any; there were 38 stab wounds; and all the knife wounds are
located at the back of Jennifers body.
But we think the lower court erred in finding that the killing was committed with cruelty. 48 The trial court appears to have
been led to this conclusion by the number of wounds inflicted on the victim. But the number of wounds is not a test for
determining whether there was cruelty as an aggravating circumstance. 49 "The test . . . is whether the accused deliberately
and sadistically augmented the victims suffering thus . . . there must be proof that the victim was made to agonize before
the [the accused] rendered the blow which snuffed out (her) life." 50 In this case, there is no such proof of cruelty. Dr.
Bandonill testified that any of the major wounds on the victims back could have caused her death as they penetrated her
heart, lungs and liver, kidney and intestines. 51
Second. There is, however, no sufficient evidence to hold accused-appellant guilty of raping Jennifer Domantay. Art. 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in part provides:
ARTICLE 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of
the following circumstances.
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
As the victim here was six years old, only carnal knowledge had to be proved to establish rape. Carnal knowledge is defined
as the act of a man having sexual intercourse or sexual bodily connections with a woman. 52 For this purpose, it is enough if
there was even the slightest contact of the male sex organ with the labia of the victims genitalia. 53 However, there must be
proof, by direct or indirect evidence, of such contact.
Dr. Ronald Bandonills report on the genital examination he had performed on the deceased reads: 54
GENITAL EXAMINATION; showed a complete laceration of the right side of the hymen. The surrounding genital area shows
signs of inflammation.
x
REMARKS: 1) Findings at the genital area indicate the probability of penetration of that area by a hard, rigid instrument.
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Hymenal laceration is not necessary to prove rape; 55 neither does its presence prove its commission. As held in People v.
Ulili, 56 a medical certificate or the testimony of the physician is presented not to prove that the victim was raped but to
show that the latter had lost her virginity. Consequently, standing alone, a physicians finding that the hymen of the alleged
victim was lacerated does not prove rape. It is only when this is corroborated by other evidence proving carnal knowledge
that rape may be deemed to have been established. 57
This conclusion is based on the medically accepted fact that a hymenal tear may be caused by objects other than the male
sex organ 58 or may arise from other causes. 59 Dr. Bandonill himself admitted this. He testified that the right side of the
victims hymen had been completely lacerated while the surrounding genital area showed signs of inflammation. 60 He
opined that the laceration had been inflicted within 24 hours of the victims death and that the inflammation was due to a
trauma in that area. 61 When asked by the private prosecutor whether the lacerations of the hymen could have been caused
by the insertion of a male organ he said this was possible. But he also said when questioned by the defense that the
lacerations could have been caused by something blunt other than the male organ. Thus, he testified: 62
PROS. F. QUINIT:
Q Now, what might have caused the complete laceration of the right side of the hymen, doctor?
A Well, sir, if you look at my report there is a remark and it says there; findings at the genital area indicated the probability
of penetration of that area by a hard rigid instrument.
Q Could it have been caused by a human organ?

A If the human male organ is erect, fully erect and hard then it is possible, sir.
x
ATTY. VALDEZ:
Q In your remarks; finding at the genital area indicates the probability of penetration of that area by a hard rigid instrument,
this may have also been caused by a dagger used in the killing of Jennifer Domantay is that correct?
A Well, sir when I say hard rigid instrument it should not be sharp pointed and sharp rigid, it should be a hard bl[u]nt
instrument.
Q Do you consider a bolo a bl[u]nt instrument, or a dagger?
A The dagger is a sharp rigid but it is not a bl[u]nt instrument, sir.
Q This Genital Examination showed a complete laceration of the right side of the hymen, this may have been possibly caused
by a dagger, is it not?
A No, sir. I wont say that this would have been caused by a dagger, because a dagger would have made at its incision . . .
not a laceration, sir.
Q But this laceration may also have been caused by other factors other than the human male organ, is that correct?
A A hard bl[u]nt instrument, sir could show.
Q My question is other than the human male organ?
A Possible, sir.
x
COURT:
Q You mentioned that the hymen was lacerated on the right side?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q And if there is a complete erection by a human organ is this possible that the laceration can only be on the right side of the
hymen?
A Yes, your Honor, its possible.
Q How about if the penetration was done by a finger, was it the same as the human organ?
A Well, it depends on the size of the finger that penetrat[es] the organ, if the finger is small it could the superficial laceration,
and if the finger is large then it is possible your honor.
Q How about two fingers?
A Possible, sir.
To be sure, this Court has sustained a number of convictions for rape with homicide based on purely circumstantial evidence.
In those instances, however, the prosecution was able to present other tell-tale signs of rape such as the location and
description of the victims clothings, especially her undergarments, the position of the body when found and the like. 63 In
People v. Macalino, 64 for instance, the Court affirmed a conviction for the rape of a two year-old child on the basis of
circumstantial evidence: 65
The Court notes that the testimony or medical opinion of Dr. Gajardo that the fresh laceration had been produced by sexual
intercourse is corroborated by the testimony given by complainant Elizabeth that when she rushed upstairs upon hearing her
daughter suddenly cry out, she found appellant Macalino beside the child buttoning his own pants and that she found some
sticky fluid on the childs buttocks and some blood on her private part. (Emphasis in the original)
In contrast, in the case at bar, there is no circumstantial evidence from which to infer that accused-appellant sexually abused
the victim. The only circumstance from which such inference might be made is that accused-appellant was seen with the
victim walking toward the place where the girls body was found. Maybe he raped the girl. Maybe he did not. Maybe he
simply inserted a blunt object into her organ, thus causing the lacerations in the hymen. Otherwise, there is no circumstance
from which it might reasonably be inferred that he abused her, e.g., that he was zipping up his pants, that there was
spermatozoa in the girls vaginal canal.
Indeed, the very autopsy report of Dr. Bandonill militates against the finding of rape. In describing the stab wounds on the
body of the victim, he testified: 66
[A]fter examining the body I took note that there were several stab wounds . . . these were all found at the back area sir . . .
extending from the back shoulder down to the lower back area from the left to the right.
Considering the relative physical positions of the accused and the victim in crimes of rape, the usual location of the external
bodily injuries of the victim is on the face, 67 neck, 68 and anterior portion 69 of her body. Although it is not unnatural to
find contusions on the posterior side, these are usually caused by the downward pressure on the victims body during the
sexual assault. 70 It is unquestionably different when, as in this case, all the stab wounds (except for a minor cut in the
lower left leg) had their entry points at the back running from the upper left shoulder to the lower right buttocks.
It is noteworthy that the deceased was fully clothed in blue shorts and white shirt when her body was brought to her parents
house immediately after it was found. 71 Furthermore, there is a huge bloodstain in the back portion of her shorts. 72 This
must be because she was wearing this piece of clothing when the stab wounds were inflicted or immediately thereafter, thus
allowing the blood to seep into her shorts to such an extent. As accused-appellant would naturally have to pull down the girls
lower garments in order to consummate the rape, then, he must have, regardless of when the stab wounds were inflicted,
pulled up the victims shorts and undergarments after the alleged rape, otherwise, the victims shorts would not have been
stained so extensively. Again, this is contrary to ordinary human experience.
Even assuming that Jennifer had been raped, there is no sufficient proof that it was accused-appellant who had raped her. He
did not confess to having raped the victim.
From the foregoing, we cannot find that accused-appellant also committed rape. In the special complex crime of rape with
homicide, both the rape and the homicide must be established beyond reasonable doubt. 73
Third. The trial court ordered accused-appellant to pay the heirs of Jennifer Domantay the amount of P30,000.00 as actual
damages. However, the list of expenses produced by the victims father, Jaime Domantay, only totaled P28,430.00. Of this
amount, only P12,000.00 was supported by a receipt. Art. 2199 of the Civil Code provides that a party may recover actual or
compensatory damages only for such loss as he has duly proved. Therefore, the award of actual damages should be reduced
to P12,000.00.
In addition, the heirs of Jennifer Domantay are entitled to recover exemplary damages in view of the presence of the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Art. 2230 of the Civil Code provides for the payment of exemplary
damages when the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstance. An amount of P25,000.00 is deemed
appropriate. 74
In accordance with our rulings in People v. Robles 75 and People v. Mengote, 76 the indemnity should be fixed at P50,000.00
and the moral damages at P50,000.00. 77
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is SET ASIDE and another one is rendered FINDING accused-appellant guilty of
homicide with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength and sentencing him to a prison term of 12 years of
prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ORDERING him to pay the heirs of Jennifer
Domantay the amounts of P50,000.00, as indemnity, P50,000.00, as moral damages, P25,000.00, as exemplary damages,
and P12,000.00, as actual damages, and the costs.
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SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes and
Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Purisima and Buena, JJ., took no part in the deliberations.

Loui

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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

RAMIRO ALEGRE y CERDONCILLO, MARIO COMAYAS y

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A. In the office of the Secret Service Division.

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Q. Do you know the other accused Ramiro Alegre?

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Q. Did you have any occasion to talk to Ramiro Alegre?

Q. Why do you know him?

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Q. Why do you know Melecio Cudillan?

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Objection, Your Honor, leading.

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Witness may answer, there is already a basis.

In the words of Chavez v. Court of Appeals:11

Pangutana: Kapila nimo dunggaba ug diin maigo si Jaqueline Totay?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WILFREDO ROJAS, TEODORO VILLARIN,

Angel P. Purisima for defendant-appellant Solomon Totoy.

[G.R. No. L-59378. February 11, 1986.]

The Peoples version of the facts is as follows:

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Please repeat the questions?

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the subject is unlettered.

"Q How did you conduct the investigation?

G.R. No. 130612. May 11, 1999.]

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Q Did you introduce yourself as a media practitioner?

A He was willing to state what had happened, sir.

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Q Could it have been caused by a human organ?

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