CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW 1 DEANS CIRCLE

2016

less a grave, patent and whimsical abuse of judgment, may be imputed to the President in his act of ratifying
the VFA and referring the same to the Senate for the purpose of complying with the concurrence requirement
embodied in the fundamental law. In doing so, the President merely performed a constitutional task and
exercised a prerogative that chiefly pertains to the functions of his office.

ISABELITA C. VINUYA, et al., v. THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO
G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010,DEL CASTILLO, J.

The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign
relations.

Facts:


Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of
rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.


Petitioners claimed that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA,
and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the
establishment of the comfort women stations in the Philippines. However, officials of the Executive Department declined
to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had
already been fully satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.

Issue:


Whether the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners claims
for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.

Ruling:


NO. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine
whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan. The question whether the Philippine government should espouse
claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably
committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has
already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations
against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question. Neither could
petitioners herein assail the said determination by the Executive Department via the instant petition for certiorari.


In the seminal case of US v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the US Supreme Court held that the President is the sole
organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign relations.The Executive Department
has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be inimical to our countrys foreign policy interests, and could
disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the court to
overturn the Executive Departments determination would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a
coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed.


As a general principle and particularly here, where such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the
treatys conclusion and our consideration the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy
considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those
of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or
necessary.

107 | P a g e

I.

Short Title: Vinuya v. Romulo

II.
Full Title: ISABELITA C. VINUYA, VICTORIA C. DELA PEA, HERMINIHILDA,
MANIMBO, LEONOR H. SUMAWANG, CANDELARIA L. SOLIMAN, MARIA L.
QUILANTANG, MARIA L. MAGISA, NATALIA M. ALONZO, LOURDES M. NAVARO,
FRANCISCA M. ATENCIO, ERLINDA MANALASTAS, TARCILA M. SAMPANG,
ESTER M. PALACIO MAXIMA R. DELA CRUZ, BELEN A. SAGUM, FELICIDAD
TURLA, FLORENCIA M. DELA PEA, FRANCIA A. BUCO, PASTORA C. GUEVARRA,
VICTORIA M. DELA CRUZ, PETRONILA O. DELA CRUZ, ZENAIDA P. DELA CRUZ,
CORAZON M. SUBA, EMERINCIANA A. VINUYA, LYDIA A. SANCHEZ, ROSALINA
M.BUCO, PATRICIA A. ERNARDO, LUCILA H. PAYAWAL, MAGDALENA LIWAG,
ESTER C. BALINGIT, JOVITA A. DAVID, EMILIA C. MANGILIT, VERGINIA M.
BANGIT, GUILLERMA S. BALINGIT, TERECITA PANGILINAN, MAMERTA C. PUNO,
CRISENCIANA C. GULAPA, SEFERINA S. TURLA, MAXIMA B. TURLA, LEONICIA G.
GUEVARRA, ROSALINA M. CULALA, CATALINA Y. MANIO, MAMERTA T. SAGUM,
CARIDAD L. TURLA, et al. In their capacity and as members of the Malaya Lolas
Organization, versus THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G.
ROMULO, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGNAFFAIRS DELIA
DOMINGO-ALBERT, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MERCEDITAS N.
GUTIERREZ, and THE HONORABLE SOLICITOR GENERAL ALFREDO L.
BENIPAYO G.R. 162230, April 28, 2010, J. Del Castillo

III.

Statement of Facts:
This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the
DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, nonprofit organization registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of
providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines
during the Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive
Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing
a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the
establishment of the comfort women stations in the Philippines. But
officials of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and
took the position that the individual claims of the comfort women for

compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japans compliance with

the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals
relative to the war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951
and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956.

On January 15, 1997, the Asian Womens Fund and the Philippine
government signed a Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare
support programs for former comfort women. Over the next five years, these
were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and Development.

IV.

Statement of the Case:

Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that
respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes
against humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel
the respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other
forms of reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) and other international tribunals.

V.

Issue:
Whether or not the Executive Department committed grave abuse of
discretion in not espousing petitioners claims for official apology and other forms
of reparations against Japan.

VI. Ruling:
Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive
Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse
petitioners claims against Japan.
Political questions refer to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative
or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent
upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.

One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign

relations. It is well-established that the conduct of the foreign relations of our
government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislativethe
politicaldepartments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done
in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.
are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and
should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose
welfare they advance or imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions,
and courts certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and
executive agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine
government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign
government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is
demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political
branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it
is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for
reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of
such decision is not for the courts to question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the
conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of
war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the
form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners
cause would be inimical to our countrys foreign policy interests, and could
disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for
stability in this region. To reverse the Executive Departments determination
would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate
political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been
constitutionally committed.
From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general
principle, where such an extraordinary length of time has elapsed between the
treatys conclusion and our consideration the Executive must be given ample
discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim
against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and
those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and
whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.

In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for

individuals to bring a claim within the international legal system has been when
the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the
individuals behalf. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting
to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is
in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect
for the rules of international law.
Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise
diplomatic protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks
fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal
person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately
protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to
national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or
obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the province of municipal law
and do not affect the position internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will
not alter this analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed
by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the
Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of
international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status
of jus cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been
used as a legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the community
of states as a whole. Essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of
a State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis--vis
another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are
the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can
be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
The term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms that command
peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens
norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit
derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent
authority
VII. Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

I. Title: Vinuya vs. Romulo

II. Full Title: ISABELITA C. VINUY A, VICTORIA C. DELA PENA, HERMINIHILDA
MANIMBO, LEONOR H. SUMA WANG, CANDELARIA L. SOLIMAN, MARIA L.
QUILANTANG, MARIA L. MAGISA, NATALIA M. ALONZO, LOURDES M. NAVARO,
FRANCISCA M. ATENCIO, ERLINDA MANALASTAS, TARCILA M. SAMPANG,
ESTER M. PALACIO, MAXIMA R. DELA CRUZ, BELEN A. SAGUM, FELICIDAD
TURLA, FLORENCIA M. DELA PENA, EUGENIA M. LALU, JULIANA G. MAGAT,
CECILIA SANGUYO, ANA ALONZO, RUFINA P. MALLARI, ROSARIO M. ALARCON,
RUFINA C. GULAPA, ZOILA B. MANALUS, CORAZON C. CALMA, MARTA A.
GULAPA, TEODORA M. HERNANDEZ, FERMIN B. DELA PENA, MARIA DELA PAZ
B. CULALA,ESPERANZA MANAPOL, JUANITA M. BRIONES, VERGINIA M.
GUEVARRA, MAXIMA ANGULO, EMILIA SANGIL, TEOFILA R. PUNZALAN,
JANUARIA G. GARCIA, PERLA B. BALINGIT, BELEN A. CULALA, PILAR Q.
GALANG, ROSARIO C. BUCO, GAUDENCIA C. DELA PENA, RUFINA Q.
CATACUTAN, FRANCIA A. BUCO, PASTORA C. GUEVARRA, VICTORIA M. DELA
CRUZ, PETRONILA 0. DELA CRUZ, ZENAIDA P. DELA CRUZ, CORAZON M. SUBA,
EMERINCIANA A. VINUYA, LYDIA A. SANCHEZ, ROSALINA M. BUCO, PATRICIA A.
BERNARDO, LUCILA H. PAYAWAL, MAGDALENA LIWAG, ESTER C. BALINGIT,
JOVITA A. DAVID, EMILIA C. MANGILIT, VERGINIA M. BANGIT, GUILERMA S.
BALINGIT, TERECITA PANGILINAN, MAMERTA C. PUNO, CRISENCIANA C.
GULAPA, SEFERINA S. TURLA, MAXIMA B. TURLA, LEONICIA G. GUEVARRA,
ROSALINA M. CULALA, CATALINA Y. MANIO, MAMERTA T. SAGUM, CARIDAD L.
TURLA, et al. in their capacityand as members of the "Malaya Lolas
Organizations," Petitioners, versus THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
ALBERTO G. ROMULO, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DELIA DOMINGOALBERT, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, and THE HONORABLE SOLICITOR GENERAL
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondents. G.R. 162230, August 13, 2014, J. Bersamin
III. Statement of Facts:
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration, praying that the Court reverse its decision of April 28, 2010,
and grant their petition for certiorari.
In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners argue that our
constitutional and jurisprudential histories have rejected the Courts ruling that
the foreign policy prerogatives of the Executive Branch are unlimited; that under
the relevant jurisprudence and constitutional provisions, such prerogatives are
proscribed by international human rights and international conventions of which
the Philippines is a party; that the Court, in holding that the Chief Executive has
the prerogative whether to bring petitioners claims against Japan, has read the
foreign policy powers of the Office of the President in isolation from the rest of
the constitutional protections that expressly textualize international human rights;
that the foreign policy prerogatives are subject to obligations to promote

international humanitarian law as incorporated into the laws of the land through
the Incorporation Clause.
The court recognized rape as an international crime under international
humanitarian law in its decision in Yamashita v. Styer. In the case of Kuroda v.
Jalandoni, the court declared that even the Philippines is not a signatory of
Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare, the rules
and regulations formed part of the law of the nation by virtue of Incorporation
Clause under Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution which provides "that
the Philippinesadopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations."
In the case of Holy See, v. Rosario, Jr. and U.S. v. Guinto, the Court has
said that international law is deemed part of the Philippine law as a consequence
of Statehood; that in Agustin v. Edu, the Court has declared that a treaty, though
not yet ratified by the Philippines, was part of the law of the land through the
Incorporation Clause.
Petitioners pray that the Court reconsider its April 28, 2010 decision, and
declare: (1) that the rapes, sexual slavery, torture and other forms of sexual
violence committed against the Filipina comfort women are crimes against
humanity and war crimes under customary international law; (2) that the
Philippines is not bound by the Treaty of Peace with Japan, insofar as the waiver
of the claims of the Filipina comfort women against Japan is concerned; (3) that
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Executive Secretary committed
grave abuse of discretion in refusing to espouse the claims of Filipina
comfort women; and (4) that petitioners are entitled to the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction against the respondents.
In their Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners stress that it
was highly improper for the April 28, 2010 decision to lift commentaries from at
least three sources without proper attribution an article published in 2009 in the
Yale Law Journal of International Law; a book published by the Cambridge
University Press in 2005; and an article published in 2006 in the Western
Reserve Journal of International Law and make it appear that such
commentaries supported its arguments for dismissing the petition, when in truth
the plagiarized sources even made a strong case in favour of petitioners claims.

IV: Statement of the Case:

Respondents disagree with petitioners, maintaining that aside from the
statements on plagiarism, the arguments raised by petitioners merely rehashed
those made in their June 7, 2005 Memorandum; that they already refuted such

arguments in their Memorandum of June 6, 2005 that the Court resolved through
its April 28, 2010 decision.
V: Issue:
1. Whether or not that the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Executive
Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to espouse the claims
of Filipina comfort women.
2. Whether or not plagiarism is applicable to decisions promulgated by the
Supreme Court.

VI: Ruling:
1. No. Petitioners did not show that the assailed act was either judicial or quasi-judicial
on the part of respondents.
Petitioners were required to show in their petition for certiorari that the assailed act was
either judicial or quasi-judicial in character. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court requires
such
showing,
to
wit:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and
justice
may
require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order, or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent
thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third
paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.
However, petitioners did not make such a showing.
2. No. In Vinuya, Justice Del Castillo examined and summarized the facts as seen by
the opposing sides in a way that no one has ever done. He identified and formulated the
core of the issues that the parties raised. And when he had done this, he discussed the
state of the law relevant to their resolution. It was here that he drew materials from
various sources, including the three foreign authors cited in the charges against him. He

compared the divergent views these present as they developed in history. He then
explained why the Court must reject some views in light of the peculiar facts of the case
and applied those that suit such facts. Finally, he drew from his discussions of the facts
and the law the right solution to the dispute in the case. On the whole, his work was
original. He had but done an honest work.
The Court will not, therefore, consistent with established practice in the Philippines and
elsewhere, dare permit the filing of actions to annul the decisions promulgated by its
judges or expose them to charges of plagiarism for honest work done.

VII: Dispositive Portion:

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.

G.R. No. 162230.August 12, 2014.*

ISABELITA C. VINUYA, VICTORIA C. DELA PEA,

HERMINIHILDA MANIMBO, LEONOR H. SUMAWANG,
CANDELARIA L. SOLIMAN, MARIA L. QUILANTANG,
MARIA L. MAGISA, NATALIA M. ALONZO, LOURDES
M. NAVARO, FRANCISCA M. ATENCIO, ERLINDA
MANALASTAS, TARCILA M. SAMPANG, ESTER M.
PALACIO, MAXIMA R. DELA CRUZ, BELEN A. SAGUM,
FELICIDAD TURLA, FLORENCIA M. DELA PEA,
EUGENIA M. LALU, JULIANA G. MAGAT, CECILIA
SANGUYO, ANA ALONZO, RUFINA P. MALLARI,
ROSARIO M. ALARCON, RUFINA C. GULAPA, ZOILA B.
MANALUS, CORAZON C. CALMA, MARTA A. GULAPA,
TEODORA M. HERNANDEZ, FERMIN B. DELA PEA,
MARIA DELA PAZ B. CULALA, ESPERANZA MANAPOL,
JUANITA M. BRIONES, VERGINIA M. GUEVARRA,
MAXIMA ANGULO, EMILIA SANGIL, TEOFILA R.
PUNZALAN, JANUARIA G. GARCIA, PERLA B.
BALINGIT, BELEN A. CULALA, PILAR Q. GALANG,
ROSARIO C. BUCO, GAUDENCIA C. DELA PEA,
RUFINA Q. CATACUTAN, FRANCIA A. BUCO,
PASTORA C. GUEVARRA, VICTORIA M. DELA CRUZ,
PETRONILA O. DELA CRUZ, ZENAIDA P. DELA CRUZ,
CORAZON M. SUBA, EMERINCIANA A. VINUYA,
LYDIA A. SANCHEZ, ROSALINA M. BUCO, PATRICIA A.
BERNARDO, LUCILA H. PAYAWAL, MAGDALENA
LIWAG, ESTER C. BALINGIT, JOVITA A. DAVID,
EMILIA C. MANGILIT, VERGINIA M. BANGIT,
GUILERMA S. BALINGIT, TERECITA PANGILINAN,
MAMERTA C. PUNO, CRISENCIANA C. GULAPA,
SEFERINA S. TURLA, MAXIMA B. TURLA, LEONICIA
G. GUEVARRA, ROSALINA M. CULALA, CATALINA Y.
MANIO, MAMERTA T. SAGUM, CARIDAD L. TURLA, et
al., in their capacity and as members of the Malaya Lolas
Organizations, petitioners, vs.
_______________
*EN BANC.

596

596

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vinuya vs. Romulo

THE
HONORABLE
EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY
ALBERTO
G.
ROMULO,
THE
HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS DELIA DOMINGO
ALBERT, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, and THE HONORABLE
SOLICITOR GENERAL ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO,
respondents.
Remedial Law Special Civil Actions Certiorari To establish
the timeliness of the petition for certiorari, the date of receipt of the
assailed judgment, final order or resolution or the denial of the
motion for reconsideration or new trial must be stated in the
petition otherwise, the petition for certiorari must be dismissed.
Petitioners did not show that their bringing of the special civil
action for certiorari was timely, i.e., within the 60day period
provided in Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 4. When and where position filed.The petition shall be
filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of judgment, order
or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is
timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty
(60)day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said
motion. As the rule indicates, the 60day period starts to run from
the date petitioner receives the assailed judgment, final order or
resolution, or the denial of the motion for reconsideration or new
trial timely filed, whether such motion is required or not. To
establish the timeliness of the petition for certiorari, the date of
receipt of the assailed judgment, final order or resolution or the
denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial must be
stated in the petition otherwise, the petition for certiorari must
be dismissed. The importance of the dates cannot be understated,
for such dates determine the timeliness of the filing of the petition
for certiorari.
Same Provisional Remedies Preliminary Injunction Preliminary
injunction is provisional because it constitutes a temporary
measure availed of during the pendency of the action and it is
ancillary because it is a mere incident in and is dependent upon
the result of the main action.Preliminary injunction is merely a
provisional remedy that is adjunct to the main case, and is subject
to the latters outcome. It is not a cause of action itself. It is

provisional because it constitutes a temporary measure availed of

during the pendency of the action and it is ancillary because it is
a mere incident in and is dependent upon the result of the main
action.
597

VOL. 732, AUGUST 12, 2014

597

Vinuya vs. Romulo

Following the dismissal of the petition for certiorari, there is no

more legal basis to issue the writ of injunction sought. As an
auxiliary remedy, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
cannot be issued independently of the principal action.
Same Same Mandatory Injunction A mandatory injunction
requires the performance of a particular act.In any event, a
mandatory injunction requires the performance of a particular
act. Hence, it is an extreme remedy, to be granted only if the
following requisites are attendant, namely: (a) The applicant has
a clear and unmistakable right, that is, a right in esse (b) There
is a material and substantial invasion of such right and (c) There
is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the
applicant and no other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy
exists to prevent the infliction of irreparable injury.
Constitutional Law Foreign Relations The Constitution has
entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of foreign
relations for the Philippines The Supreme Court (SC) cannot
interfere with or question the wisdom of the conduct of foreign
relations by the Executive Department.The Constitution has
entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of foreign
relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to espouse
petitioners claim against the Government of Japan is left to the
exclusive determination and judgment of the Executive
Department. The Court cannot interfere with or question the
wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive
Department. Accordingly, we cannot direct the Executive
Department, either by writ of certiorari or injunction, to conduct
our foreign relations with Japan in a certain manner.

Sereno,CJ., Concurring Opinion:

Constitutional Law International Law Reparations View
that the statement in the 2010 ponencia that the wisdom of
such decision [to waive all claims for reparations] is not for the

courts to question must be qualified.I am of the opinion,

however, that the statement in the 2010 ponencia that the
wisdom of such decision [to waive all claims for
reparations] is not for the courts to question must be
qualified. As party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the
Philippines has limited discretion to waive another states
reparations obligation arising from the commission of grave
breaches of the convention. The 1949 Geneva
598

598

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vinuya vs. Romulo

Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time

of War (Geneva Convention IV) expressly states the following:
ARTICLE 147 Grave breaches to which the preceding Article
relates shall be those involving any of the following acts, if
committed against persons or property protected by the
present Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman
treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing
great suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful
deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a
protected person, compelling a protected person to serve in the
forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person
of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the present
Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and
appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and
carried out unlawfully and wantonly. ARTICLE 148 No High
Contracting Party shall be allowed to absolve itself or any
other High Contracting Party of any liability incurred by
itself or by another High Contracting Party in respect of
breaches referred to in the preceding Article.
Same Same Same View that a state is precluded from
absolving other states from liability on the ground that the
individual persons who actually perpetrated the grave breach of
the convention have already been punished Pursuant to the 1949
Geneva Conventions, a state remains responsible and continues
to be liable to pay compensation for the grave breaches
committed against protected persons.It is said that the non
absolution clause under Article 148 is a logical consequence of the
grave breaches under Article 147 of Geneva Convention IV. A
state is precluded from absolving other states from liability on the

ground that the individual persons who actually perpetrated the

grave breach of the convention have already been punished.
Indeed, it would seem unjust for individuals to be punished while
the state in whose name or on whose instructions they acted is
released from all liability. Article 148 was meant to prevent the
defeated state from being forced into entering into an armistice or
peace treaty in which it would renounce all reparations for grave
breaches committed by persons in the service of the victorious
state. Thus, pursuant to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, a state
remains responsible and continues to be liable to pay
compensation for the grave breaches committed against
protected persons.
599

VOL. 732, AUGUST 12, 2014

599

Vinuya vs. Romulo

Same Same Same View that I vote to dismiss the petition for
failure to establish that respondents committed grave abuse of
discretion in declining to espouse the claims of petitioners.In the
light of the foregoing context, I vote to dismiss the petition for
failure to establish that respondents committed grave abuse of
discretion in declining to espouse the claims of petitioners. The
dismissal thereof should not, however, be taken as a definitive
ruling on the merits of the claims of petitioners, in the event that
they bring the same to an appropriate forum or through a proper
recourse. Neither should it be taken to mean that we should
forget the suffering that our people, especially petitioners, bore in
the Second World War, or the unfortunate story of our attempts to
get the reparation that was due us, and learn. From such
understanding, we must forge the elements that will make the
Philippine state strong, able to protect its people and safeguard
their wellbeing under the aegis of the Constitution. Justice
demands no less.

MOTION
FOR
RECONSIDERATION
and
SUPPLEMENTAL
MOTION
FOR
RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme
Court.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Roque & Butuyan Law Offices for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.