TodayisFriday,October28,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
FIRSTDIVISION

G.R.No.120972July19,1999
SPOUSES JOSE and EVANGELINE AGUILAR, SPS. DOMINGO and SIXTA AGUILAR, AMBROSIO DELOS
REYES, and SPS. FRANCISCO DELOS REYES, EMILIA MERCADO REYES, SPS. JOSE and ROSA Y
VILLARAMA,RUBYIBANEZ,MAGNOMANALOandVALENTINOMAGSARILI,petitioners,
vs.
HON,COURTOFAPPEALS,SANMIGUELCORPORATION,PAZG.PALANCAandROMEOREYES,Clerkof
Court and ExOfficio Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff InCharge, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Caloocan City, Metro Manila ESPERANZA T. ECHIVERRI and
FERNANDOG.CRUZ,ClerkofCourtandExOfficioSheriffandDeputySheriffInCharge,respectively,of
theRegionalTrialCourt,NationalCapitaljudicialRegion,Valenzuela,MetroManilaJOSER.ORTIZ,JR.
and HECTOR L. GALURA, Clerk of Court, and ExOfficio Sheriff and Deputy Sheriff InCharge,
respectively,oftheRegionalTrialCourt,NationalCapitalJudicialRegion,PasayCity,MetroManilaPIO
Z.MARTINEZandNICANORD.BLANCO,ExOfficioSheriffandDeputySheriffInCharge,respectively,of
theRegionalTrialCourt,FourthJudicialRegional,Antipolo,Rizal,respondents.
RESOLUTION

KAPUNAN,J.:
OnJuly25,1995,petitionersSpousesJoseandEvangelineAguilar,etal.,throughpetitionerJoseAguilar,fileda
MotionforExtensionofTimeseekingthirty(30)daysfromJuly26,1995tofileapetitionforreviewoncertiorari
assailing the Court of Appeals' Decision dated September 30, 1994 in CAG.R. CV No. 40901 and Resolution
datedFebruary2,1995denyingtheirmotionforreconsideration.Petitionersallegedthattheyreceivedacopyof
theFebruary2,1995ResolutiononJuly11,1995"uponfollowups."1
Private respondent San Miguel Corporation opposed the motion alleging that the decision petitioners sought to
elevateforreviewtothisCourtattainedfinalityonMarch29,1995,withentryofjudgmentmadebytheCourtof
AppealsonMay5,1995.2
ThepetitionwasfiledwiththisCourtonAugust25,1995.Initscomment,privaterespondentreiteratedthatthe
disputeddecisionoftheHonorableCourtofAppealscannolongerbereviewedasthesamehadbecomefinal
andexecutory.3
InourResolutiondatedOctober5,1998,werequiredpetitionerstosubmittothisCourtthenameandaddressof
theircounselwithinten(10)daysfromnotice.InaMotiondatedNovember6,1998,petitionersaskedfor"atleast
thirty(30)dayswithinwhichtofindaLawyertoassist[them]." 4Wegrantedpetitioner'smotioninaResolutiondated
February10,1999andgavethem"anextensionofthirty(30)daysfromtheexpirationoftheoriginalperiodwithinwhichto
submitthenameandaddressofcounsel." 5Untilthetimeofthepromulgationofthisresolution,however,petitionerhasnot
compliedwiththeFebruary10,1999Resolution.

TheCourtofAppealsrollorevealsthatacopyoftheFebruary2,1995ResolutionwassentonFebruary7,1995
to petitioners' counsel of record, Atty. Almario T. Amador, through registered mail, at his address appearing on
record. The envelope containing the resolution was, however, returned to sender Court of Appeals stamped
"unclaimed." On the envelope also appears stamped boxes with notations "second notice/213" and "third
notice/214."6
A copy of the resolution was then sent on March 2, 1995 to Jose Aguilar, one of the parties, at his address
appearingonrecord.Themailwas,however,returnedtotheCourtofAppealswiththeannotation"moved."7
Subsequently,onMay5,1995,theDecisiondatedSeptember30,1994wasenteredintheBookofJudgmentsof
thecourtofAppeals"perSec.8,Rule13,RevisedRulesofCourt."8
The issue to be resolved is whether service upon Atty. Amador, petitioners' counsel of record at the appellate
court,anduponpetitionerJoseAguilarmaybedeemedcomplete,sothatentryofjudgmentwasdulymade.
PetitionersallegereceiptoftheassaileddecisiononJuly11,1995.Theirmotionforextensionoftimewasfiledon
July25,1995.
8,Rule13oftheRevisedRulesofCourt9providesthus:
Completenessofservice. Personal service is complete upon actual delivery. Service by ordinary
mail is complete upon the expiration of five (5) days after mailing, unless the court otherwise
provides.Servicebyregisteredmailiscompleteuponactualreceiptbytheaddresseebutifhefails
to claim his mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date of first notice of the post
master,serviceshalltakeeffectattheexpirationofsuchtime.

Thegeneralruleisthatservicebyregisteredmailiscompleteuponactualreceiptthereofbytheaddressee.The
exceptioniswheretheaddresseedoesnotclaimhismailwithinfive(5)daysfromthedateofthefirstnoticeof
thepostmaster,inwhichcasetheservicetakeseffectupontheexpirationofsuchperiod.
Inasmuch as the exception only refers to constructive and not actual service, such exception must be applied
uponconclusiveproofthatafirstnoticewasdulysentbythepostmastertotheaddressee.10Notonlyisitrequired
thatnoticeoftheregisteredmailbesentbutthatitshouldalsobedeliveredtoandreceivedbytheaddressee. 11Notably,
thepresumptionthatofficialdutyhasbeenregularlyperformedisnotapplicableinthesituation.Itisincumbentuponaparty
whoreliesonconstructiveserviceorwhocontendsthathisadversarywasservedwithacopyofafinalorderorjudgment
upontheexpirationoffivedaysfromthefirstnoticeofregisteredmailsentbythepostmastertoprovethatthefirstnotice
wassentanddeliveredtotheaddressee.12

Thebestevidencetoprovethatnoticewassentwouldbeacertificationfromthepostmaster,whoshouldcertify
notonlythatthenoticewasissuedorsentbutalsoastohow,whenandtowhomthedeliverythereofwasmade.
13Themailmanmayalsotestifythatthenoticewasactuallydelivered. 14

In Barrameda v. Castillo, 15 we again faulted the trial court for applying the presumption as to constructive service
"literally and rigidly," and for failing to require the adverse party to present the postmaster's certification that a first notice
was sent to opposing party's counsel and that notice was received. The envelope containing the unclaimed mail was
presentedincourt.Onitsface,theenvelopeborethenotation"Returnedtosender.Reason:Unclaimed."Onthebackside
oftheenvelopeborethelegend"CityofSanPablo,Philippines,Jan.29,1966"withthedates"2366and2966,"and"Rto
S,notified3/3/66."Westatedthatthemereexhibitionincourtoftheenvelopecontainingtheunclaimedmailisnotsufficient
proofthatafirstnoticewassent.

InDe la Cruz v. De la Cruz, 16 we held as error the trial court's mere reliance on the notations on the envelope of the
returned order consisting of " R & S", "unclaimed" and the stamped box with the wordings "2nd notice" and "last notice"
indicating that the registered mail was returned to sender because it was unclaimed in spite of the notices sent by the
postmastertotheaddressee.Nootherproofofactualreceiptofthefirstnoticewaspresentedincourt.

Inanothercase,Johnson&Johnson(Phils.),Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,17 petitioners assailed the following resolution

oftheappellatecourt:

Considering that the copy of the resolution dated November 29, 1990 served upon counsel for
respondentwasreturnedunclaimedonJanuary3,1991,andafterwardsthesamecopysenttothe
privaterespondentitselfatgivenaddresswaslikewisereturnedunclaimedonFebruary28,1991,the
CourtRESOLVEDtoDECLAREserviceofthesaidresolutionupontheprivaterespondentcomplete
asofFebruary28,1991,pursuanttoSec.8,Rule13,RulesofCourt.
WeheldthattheCourtofAppealserredinrulingthatthereinpetitionerhadbeendulyservedwithacopyofthe
assailed resolution, as there was utter lack of sufficient evidence to support the appellate court's conclusion.
Nothingintherecordsshowedhow,when,andtowhomthedeliveryoftheregistrynoticesoftheregisteredmail
addressed to petitioner was made and whether said notices were received by the petitioner. The envelope
containingtheunclaimedmailmerelyborethenotation"returntosender:unclaimed"onitsfaceand"Returnto:
Court of Appeals" at the back. We concluded that the respondent court should not have relied solely on these
notations to support the presumption of constructive service, and accordingly, we set aside the questioned
resolutionandorderedtheappellatecourttoproperlyservethesameonthereinpetitioner.
1 w p h i1 .n t

In the instant case, in the Court of Appeals rollo there is no postmaster's certification to the effect that the
registeredmailwasunclaimedbytheaddresseeAtty.Amadorandthusreturnedtosender,afterfirstnoticewas
senttoandreceivedbyaddresseeonaspecifieddate.Thus,thereisnoconclusiveproofthatnoticewassentto
Atty. Amador and actually received by him. Absent such proof, the disputable presumption of completeness of
servicedoesnotariseastotheregisteredmailaddressedtoAtty.Amador.
However, even absent proof of completeness of service upon Atty. Amador, we must rule that service upon
petitionerJoseAguilarhimselfwascomplete.
Jurisprudenceprovidesthatwhenapartyisrepresentedbycounsel,noticeshouldbemadeuponthecounselof
recordathisgivenaddresstowhichnoticesofallkindsemanatingfromthecourtshouldbesentintheabsence
ofaproperandadequatenoticetothecourtofachangeofaddress, 18unlessservice upon the party himself is by
courtorder.19Thisdoctrineisfoundedon2,Rule13oftheRevisedRulesofCourt20whichprovidesthus:

Papers to be filed and served. Every order required by its terms to be served, every pleading
subsequenttothecomplaint,everywrittenmotionotherthanonewhichmaybeheardexparte,and
everywrittennotice,appearance,demand,offerofjudgmentorsimilarpapersshallbefiledwiththe
court, and served upon the parties affected thereby. If any of such parties has appeared by an
attorney or attorneys, service upon him shall be made upon his attorneys or one of them unless
service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Where one attorney appears for several
parties, he shall only be entitled to one copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite side.
(Emphasissupplied.)
ThemailingofacopyoftheFebruary2,1994ResolutiontoJoseAguilarwaseffectedbytheCourtofAppeals,21
after the resolution could not be served upon Atty. Almario. It is not disputed that the mail was sent to the address of Mr.
Aguilaronrecord,butthatthemailwasreturnedtotheappellatecourtwiththeannotation"moved."22

Notably, petitioners admit that after the preparation and filing of their rejoinder before the appellate court, Atty.
Almariotookillandcouldnolongerdischargehisfunctionsastheircounsel. 23Yet,Atty.Almario,athisaddresson
record,receivedacopyoftheappellatecourt'sdecision. 24Subsequently,itwasMr.Aguilarhimselfwhosignedthemotion
for reconsideration. 25 Knowing fully well that Atty. Almario may not be physically up to acting on any pleading, and
petitionershavingtakenoverthe"followingup"ofthecase,itwaspetitionersandtheircounsel'sresponsibilitytodevisea
systemforthereceiptofmailintendedforthem.26

Toruleotherwiseconsideringthecircumstancesintheinstantcasewouldbetonegatethepurposeoftheruleon
completenessofservice,whichistoplacethedateofreceiptofpleadings,judgmentsandprocessesbeyondthe
power of the party being served to determine at his pleasure. The finality of a decision is a jurisdictional event
whichcannotbemadetodependontheconvenienceofaparty.27

ACCORDINGLY,theCourtResolvedtoDENYthepetition,thedecisionoftheCourtofAppealsinCAG.R.CVNo.
40901havingalreadybeenenteredintheBookofJudgmentsoftheCourtofAppealsonMay5,1995.
1 w p h i1 .n t

SOORDERED.
Davide,Jr.,C.J.,Melo,PardoandYnaresSantiago,JJ.,concur.
Footnotes
1Rollop4.
2Id.,at9.SeeCourtofAppealsrollo,p.296.
3Id.,at124.
4Id.,at178.
5Id.,at181.
6CourtofAppealsrollo,pp.288290.
7Id.,at294.
8Id.,at296.
9Now10,Rule13ofthe1997RulesofCivilProcedure.
10Johnson&Johnson(Phils.)Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,201SCRA768(1991).
11DelaCruzv.DelaCruz,160SCRA361(1988),citedinVillTransportServices,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,
193SCRA25(1991).InVillTransport,theCourtruledthatwheretheelementofnegligenceispresent
wherecounselfailedtoinformthecourtofachangeinaddresstheruleinDelaCruzisinapplicable.
12Barramedav.Castillo,78SCRA1(1977),citedinJesusG.Santosv.CourtofAppeals,etal.,G.R.No.
128061,September3,1998.
13Barramedav.Castillo,supra,citingHernandezv.Navarro,48SCRA44(1972).
14Barramedav.Castillo,supra,citedinJohnson&Johnsonv.CourtofAppeals,supra.
15Seenote12.
16Seenote11.
17Seenote10.
18Magnov.CourtofAppeals,152SCRA555(1987),citingCubarv.Mendoza,120SCRA768(1983).Also
Leev.Romillo,Jr.,161SCRA589(1988).
19Riegov.Riego,18SCRA91(1966)Ongisakov.Natividad,79Phil.3(1947)Notorv.Daza,76Phil.850
(1952).SeeTanpincov.Lozada,4SCRA338(1962).
20NOW2,Rule13ofthe1997RulesofProcedure.
21CARollo,p.291.
22Id.,at294.
23Rollo,p.161.
24CARollo,p.245.
25Id.,at266.
26NIAConsult,Inc.v.NationalLaborRelationsCommission,266SCRA17(1997),citingcases.
27Ibid.
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation