Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
PHOENIX
CONSTRUCTION,
INC.
and
ARMANDO U. CARBONEL, petitioners,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
LEONARDO DIONISIO, respondents.
FELICIANO, J:
In the early morning of 15 November 1975 at
about 1:30 a.m. private respondent Leonardo
Dionisio was on his way home he lived in
1214-B Zamora Street, Bangkal, Makati from a
cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss, the
general manager of a marketing corporation.
During the cocktails phase of the evening,
Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor.
Dionisio was driving his Volkswagen car and had
just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna
and General Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati,
not far from his home, and was proceeding down
General Lacuna Street, when his car headlights
(in his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched
his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw
a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters
away from his car. The dump truck, owned by
and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix
Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was parked on the
right hand side of General Lacuna Street (i.e., on
the right hand side of a person facing in the
same direction toward which Dionisio's car was
proceeding), facing the oncoming traffic. The
dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to
the street curb) in such a manner as to stick out
onto the street, partly blocking the way of
oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any
so-called "early warning" reflector devices set
anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The
dump truck had earlier that evening been driven
home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its
regular driver, with the permission of his
employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to
be carried out early the following morning,
Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision
by swerving his car to the left but it was too late
and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a
result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some
physical injuries including some permanent
facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of
two gold bridge dentures.
Foreseeable
Intervening
Causes.
If
the
intervening cause is one which in ordinary
human experience is reasonably to be
anticipated or one which the defendant has
reason to anticipate under the particular
circumstances,
the
defendant
may
be
negligence among other reasons, because of
failure to guard against it; or the defendant may
be negligent only for that reason. Thus one who
sets a fire may be required to foresee that an
ordinary, usual and customary wind arising later
wig spread it beyond the defendant's own
property, and therefore to take precautions to
prevent that event. The person who leaves the
combustible or explosive material exposed in a
public place may foresee the risk of fire from
some independent source. ... In all of these
cases there is an intervening cause combining
with the defendant's conduct to produce the
result and in each case the defendant's
negligence consists in failure to protect the
plaintiff against that very risk.
1.
ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY
(P157,430.00), as actual damages
SEVEN
PESOS
2.
FIFTY
THOUSAND
(P50,000.00) as death indemnity;
PESOS
3.
ONE
MILLION
(P1,000,000.00), as moral damages;
PESOS
4.
THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P300,000.00), as exemplary damages;
5.
THIRTY
THOUSAND
(P30,000.00), as attorneys fees; and
6.
PESOS
costs of suit.
In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily
liable, the CA held that the applicable provisions
are not Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of
the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but the
provisions on civil liability arising from felonies
under the Revised Penal Code; that since
Pajarillo had been found guilty of Homicide in a
final and executory judgment and is said to be
serving sentence in Muntinlupa, he must be
adjudged civilly liable under the provisions of
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code since the
civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is
one solely dependent upon conviction, because
said liability arises from the offense charged and
no other; that this is also the civil liability that is
deemed extinguished with the extinction of the
penal liability with a pronouncement that the
fact from which the civil action might proceed
does not exist; that unlike in civil liability arising
from quasi-delict, the defense of diligence of a
good father of a family in the employment and
supervision of employees is inapplicable and
irrelevant in civil liabilities based on crimes or
ex-delicto; that Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that the liability of an employer
for the civil liability of their employees is only
subsidiary, not joint or solidary.
SO ORDERED. [8]
We do not agree.
An act or omission causing damage to another
may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on
the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex
delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such
as those (a) not arising from an act or omission
complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa
contractual or obligations arising from law under
Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts
under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b)
where the injured party is granted a right to file
an action independent and distinct from the
criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code.
Either of these liabilities may be enforced
against the offender subject to the caveat under
Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended
party cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission or under both causes.[13]
xxxx
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xxxx
12
Moreover,
considering
his
reactions
to
Evangelines act of just depositing her firearm for
safekeeping, i.e., of immediately shooting her,
confirms that there was no training or seminar
given on how to handle bank clients and on
human psychology.
13
of
this
case
are
not
14
15
18
February
1991,
respondent
Court
decision 10
16
17
18
surrendered
her
virginity,
the
cherished
possession of every single Filipina, not because
of lust but because of moral seduction the
kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its
example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could
not be held liable for criminal seduction
punished under either Article 337 or Article 338
of the Revised Penal Code because the private
respondent was above eighteen (18) years of
age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that
Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise
to marry where the woman is a victim of moral
seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of
Appeals, 25 this Court denied recovery of
19
20
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965
in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs.
Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to
dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs
for recovery of damages from defendant
Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the
occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin
Hill, with whom he was living and getting
subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the
son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of
which, when criminally prosecuted, the said
accused was acquitted on the ground that his
act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent
to kill, coupled with mistake."
21
emancipation by marriage.
SO ORDERED.
I
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT
ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107,
NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF
COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111,
RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT
WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES
2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE
INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF
ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL
BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF
THE
OTHER
DEFENDANT
THROUGH
EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito,
of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee
Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in
Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was
acquitted on the ground that his act was not
criminal because of "lack of intent to kill,
coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of
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23
24
BIDIN, J.:
This petition assails the decision of respondent
Court
of
Appeals
in
CA-GR CV No. 14948 entitled "Eugenio S. Baltao,
plaintiff-appellee
vs.
Albenson
Enterprises
Corporation, et al, defendants-appellants", which
modified the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch XCVIII in Civil Case
No. Q-40920 and ordered petitioner to pay
private respondent, among others, the sum of
P500,000.00 as moral damages and attorney's
fees in the amount of P50,000.00.
25
26
compensatory
damages
5. Awarding respondents
of
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28
29
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# Footnotes
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
31
IV.
I.
32
dedicated
service
has contributed to
well being not only of
members but also to
needs to be recognized
and
the
the
the
and
33
34
SO ORDERED.
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