Bonsato vs CA

95 PHIL 481
FACTS: The case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, by respondents Josefa
Utea and other heirs of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario, both deceased. Their
complaint (for annulment and damages) charged that on the first day of December, 1949, Domingo
Bonsato, then already a widower, had been induced and deceived into signing two notarial deeds of
donations in favor of his brother Juan Bonsato and of his nephew Felipe Bonsato, respectively,
transferring to them several parcels of land situated in the municipalities of Mabini and Burgos,
Province of Pangasinan, both donations having been duly accepted in the same act and documents.
Plaintiffs likewise charged that the donations were mortis causa and void for lack of the requisite
formalities. The defendants, Juan Bonsato and Felipe Bonsato, answered averring that the donations
made in their favor were voluntarily executed in consideration of past services rendered by them to
the late Domingo Bonsato; that the same were executed freely without the use of force and violence,
misrepresentation or intimidation; and prayed for the dismissal of the case. After trial,
the CFI rendered its decision finding that the deeds of donation were executed by the donor while the
latter was of sound mind, without pressure or intimidation; that the deeds were of donation inter
vivos without any condition making their validity or efficacy dependent upon the death of the donor;
but as the properties donated were presumptively conjugal, having been acquired during the
coverture of Domingo Bonsato and his wife Andrea Nacario, the donations were only valid as to an
undivided one-half share in the three parcels of land described therein.
ISSUE: W/N the donation was a donation mortis causa or a donation inter vivos?
HELD: Donation inter vivos. If it was a donation mortis causa, then the documents should reveal
any or all of the following characteristics:
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts
to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the
property while alive (Vidal vs. Posadas, 58 Phil., 108; Guzman vs. Ibea, 67 Phil., 633);
(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of
the properties conveyed (Bautista vs. Sabiniano, G. R.L-4326, November 18, 1952);
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
None of these characteristics is discernible in the deeds of donation executed by the late Domingo
Bonsato. The donor only reserved for himself, during his lifetime, the owners share of the fruits or
produce (de los productos mientras viva el donante tomara la parte que corresponde como dueo),
a reservation that would be unnecessary if the ownership of the donated property remained with the
donor. Most significant is the absence of stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations; on the
contrary, the deeds expressly declare them to be irrevocable, a quality absolutely incompatible with
the idea of conveyances mortis causa where revocability is of the essence of the act, to the extent
that a testator cannot lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation (Old Civil Code, Art. 737; New
Civil Code, Art. 828). It is true that the last paragraph in each donation contains the phrase that after
the death of the donor the aforesaid donation shall become effective (que despues de la muerte del
donante entrara en vigor dicha donacion). However, said expression must be construed together
with the rest of the paragraph, and thus taken, its meaning clearly appears to be that after the donors
death, the donation will take effect so as to make the donees the absolute owners of the donated
property, free from all liens and encumbrances; for it must be remembered that the donor reserved for
himself a share of the fruits of the land donated. Such reservation constituted a charge or

encumbrance that would disappear upon the donors death, when full title would become vested in
the donees.
PUIG v. PENAFLORIDA
The reservation by the donor of the right to dispose of the property during her lifetime in the deed
does not indicate that title had passed to the donee in her lifetime but that the donor merely reserves
power to destroy the donation at any time.
FACTS:
Carmen Ubalde Vda. de Parcon died in the City of Iloilo, without forced heirs, leaving certain
properties in the City and province of Iloilo. She left a will and was survived by nephews and nieces,
children of her predeceased brother, Catalino Ubalde, and sister, Luisa Ubalde, married to Ariston
Magbanua. Besides her will, the deceased had executed two notarial deeds of donation. One, entitled
DONACION MORTIS CAUSA, was executed on November 24, 1948, in favor of her niece, Estela
Magbanua. The deceased executed another deed of donation, also entitled "ESCRITURA DE
DONACION MORTIS CAUSA" in favor of the same donee, Estela Magbanua Peaflorida, conveying
to her three parcels of land
Defendants-appellants Estela Magbanua Peaflorida, et al., insist that the reservation by the donor of
the right to dispose of the property during her lifetime in the deed of December 28, 1949 indicates that
title had passed to the donee in her lifetime, otherwise, it is argued, the reservation would be
superfluous.
ISSUE: Is the donation mortis causa or inter vivos?
HELD: The Court in its decision took to account not only the foregoing circumstance but also the fact
that the deceased expressly and consistently declared her conveyance to be one of donation mortis
causa, and further forbade the registration of the deed until after her death.
The power, as reserved in the deed, was a power to destroy the donation at any time, and that it
meant that the transfer is not binding on the grantor until her death made it impossible to channel the
property elsewhere.
HOWARD v. PADILLA
Donations must conform with the formalities set by law.
FACTS:
Marie Howard is the widow of the donor. The donated propert was conjugal in nature. The CA ruled
that the donation was inter vivos, not mortis causa. As such it is valid and irrevocable. It is valid,
however, only up to the extent of the share of the donor in the property.
ISSUE: Is the donation mortis causa or inter vivos?
HELD: The donation is mortis causa which takes effect upon the death of the donor. Therefore, the
donation not having conformed with the formalities of the law, the same is void.

DE LUNA VS. JUDGE ABRIGO

Onerous Donation
FACTS:
De Luna donated a portion of a 75 sq. m. lot to the Luzonian University Foundation. The donation
was embodied in a Deed of Donation Intervivos and was subject to certain terms and conditions. In
case of violation or non-compliance, the property would automatically revert to the donor. When the
Foundation failed to comply with the conditions, de Luna revived the said donation by executing a
Revival of Donation Intervivos with the following terms and conditions:

1) The Donee shall construct on the land and at its expense a Chapel, Nursery, and Kindergarten
School to be named after St. Veronica
2) Construction shall start immediately and must be at least 70% completed three years from the date
of the Deed unless the Donor grants extensions
3) Automatic reversion in case of violation

The Foundation accepted and the donation was registered and annotated in the TCT. By a Deed of
Segregation, the foundation was issued a TCT for area the lot donated while the remaining area was
retained by the De Luna.

The children and only heirs of the late De Luna (died after the donation) filed a complaint with the
RTC for the cancellation of the donation on the ground that the terms were violated. The Foundation
defended itself by saying that it had partially and substantially complied with the conditions and that
the donor granted it an indefinite extension of time to complete construction. The RTC dismissed the
petition on the ground of prescription (for being filed after 4 years). The heirs did not file an MR and
went straight to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether the action prescribes in 4 years (based on art. 764 NCC-judicial decree of revocation of the
donation) or in 10 years (based on art. 1144 enforcement of a written contract)
RULING: 10 years
The donation subject of this case is one with an onerous cause. Under the old Civil Code, it is a
settled rule that donations with an onerous cause are governed not by the law on donations but by
the rules on contract. On the matter of prescription of actions for the revocation of onerous donation,
it was held that the general rules on prescription apply. The same rules apply under the New Civil
Code as provided in Article 733 thereof which provides:

Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and remuneratory

donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the value of the
burden imposed.

It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions for the revocation of a donation must be
brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation. However,
said article does not apply to onerous donations in view of the specific provision of Article 733
providing that onerous donations are governed by the rules on contracts. The rules on prescription
and not the rules on donation applies in the case at bar.
QUILALA vs. ALCANTARA
TOPIC: MAKING ANG ACCEPTANCE OF DONATIONG.R No.: 132681 December 3, 2001
FACTS: On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala (donor) executed a "Donation of Real Property Inter
Vivos" in favor of Violeta Quilala (donee) over a parcel of land located in Sta. Cruz, Manila and
registered in her name. The "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" consists of two pages. The first
page contains the deed of donation itself, and is signed on the bottom portion by Catalina Quilala and
Violeta Quilala, and two instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the Acknowledgment,
which states merely that Catalina Quilala personally appeared before the notary public and
acknowledged that the donation was her free and voluntary act and deed. There appear on the lefthand margin of the second page the signatures of Catalina Quilala and one of the witnesses, and on
the right-hand margin the signatures of Violeta Quilala and the other witness On November 7, 1983,
Catalina Quilala died. Violeta Quilala likewise died on May 22, 1984. Petitioner Ricky Quilalaalleges
that he is the surviving son of Violeta Quilala. Meanwhile, respondents Gliceria Alcantara, Leonora
Alcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan Reyes, claiming to be Catalina's only surviving relatives within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity instituted an action for the declaration of nullity of the donation
inter vivos , and for the cancellation of the TCT in the name of Violeta Quilala.The trial court rendered
a decision declaring null and void the deed of donation of real property inter vivos executed by
Catalina Quilala in favor of Violeta Quilala. The trial court found that since it was acknowledged
before a notary public only by the donor, Catalina, there was no acceptance by Violeta of the donation
in a public instrument. The decision was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the donation executed by Catalina in favor of Violeta is valid
HELD: Valid even if the acknowledgment was only signed by the donor
Below the terms and stipulations of the donation, the donor, donee and their witnesses affixed their
signature. However, the Acknowledgment appearing on the second page mentioned only the donor,
Catalina Quilala. Thus, the trial court ruled that for Violeta's failure to acknowledge her acceptance
before the notary public, the same was set forth merely on a private instrument, i.e., the first page of
the instrument. We disagree. As provided for in Section 112, paragraph 2 of PD No. 1529, the second
page of the deed of donation, on which the Acknowledgment appears, was signed by the donor and
one witness on the left-hand margin. The donee and the other witness signed on the right hand
margin. Surely, the requirement that the contracting parties and their witnesses should sign on the
left-hand margin of the instrument is not absolute. The intendment of the law merely is to ensure that
each and every page of the instrument is authenticated by the parties. The requirement is designed to
avoid the falsification of the contract after the same has already been duly executed by the parties.
Hence, a contracting party affixes his signature on each page of the instrument to certify that he is
agreeing to everything that is written thereon at the time of signing. Simply put, the specification of the
location of the signature is merely directory. The fact that one of the parties signs on the wrong side of

the page does not invalidate the document. In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the
donee before the notary public does not also render the donation null and void. The instrument
should be treated in its entirety. It cannot be considered a private document in part and a public
document in another part. The fact that it was acknowledged before a notary public converts the deed
of donation in its entirety a public instrument. The fact that the donee was not mentioned by the
notary public in the acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure, it is the conveyance that should be
acknowledged as a free and voluntary act. In any event, the donee signed on the second page, which
contains the Acknowledgment only. Her acceptance, which is explicitly set forth on the first page
of the notarized deed of donation, was made in a public instrument. Petition is granted. The appealed
decision of the CA is reversed.
REYES V. MOSQUEDA
The nature of the disposition made is the determinative factor which makes the donation inter vivos
or mortis causa and not the title given to a deed of donation.
FACTS
Dr. Emilio Pascual died intestate and was survived by his sister Ursula Pascual and the children of his
late sisters, herein petitioners Ruperto Reyes et. al. The heirs of Dr. Pascual filed Special
Proceedings No. 73-30-M in the CFI for the administration of Pascuals estate. Ursula then filed a
motion to exclude some properties included alleging that these were donated to her in a donation
mortis causa in 1966. This was granted by the CFI without prejudice to its final determination in a
separate action. An appeal was made to the SC. The SC then issued a TRO enjoining the CFI from
enforcing the order.
Among the properties donated to Ursula is lot 24 which was also donated in 1969 in a deed of
donation inter vivos in favor of Ofelia Parungao who was then a minor at the time of the donation.
When she reached the age of majority, she had the donation registered but found out that the
certificate of title was missing so she filed a petition for reconstitution of title which was granted and
she registered the donation and was issued a new TCT in her name.
Ursula then sold the lot in favor of the Reyes. Benjamin Reyes filed a complaint for declaration of
nullity of Ofelias TCT which prompted Ofelia to file a petition for recovery of possession against
Benjamin Reyes. The CFI issued a joint decision for the 2 cases ruling that Ofelias TCT was null and
void. The IAC affirmed thus an appeal to the SC.
ISSUES
(1) W/N the probate has jurisdiction to exclude properties donated to Ursula
(2) W/N the donation executed in favor of Ursula was a donation inter vivos
RULING
(1) YES
It was stressed in the order of the probate court that it was without prejudice to the final
determination in a separate action. It is well-settled that although a probate court cannot
adjudicate or determine title to properties, it can determine whether or not the properties
should be included in the inventory to be administered. Such determination is not conclusive
and is subject to the final decision in a separate action.
(2) YES
Although the donation was entitled donations mortis causa it has been held that dispositions in a
deed of donation do not depend on the title or term used in the deed of donation. It is the body of
the document which should be considered in ascertaining the intention of the donor.

For a donation to be a donation mortis causa, the following characteristics should be present:
1. It conveys no title before the death of the transferor or the transferor retains ownership over the
property
2. Before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will
3. The transfer is void should the transferor survive the transferee
The following are not present in the case. The transfer of ownership was immediate and independent
of the death of the donor. The provision stating that the donor has reserved sufficient properties for
himself to maintain him for life confirms the intention of the donor to give naked ownership
immediately after execution of the deed of donation.