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Power Tactics What power tactics do people use to translate power bases into
specific action? That is, what options do individuals have for influencing their
bosses, coworkers, or employees? And are some of these options, more effective
than others? In this article, we outline popular tactical options and the conditions
under which one may be more effective than another. Some tactics are usually
more effective than others. Specific evidence indicates that rational persuasion,
inspirational appeals, and consultation tend to be the most effective. On the other
hand pressure tends to frequently backfire and is typically the least effective of few
tactics. You can also increase your chance of success by using more than one type
of tactic at the same time or sequentially, as long as your choices are compatible.
For instance, using both ingratiation and legitimacy can lessen the negative
reactions that might come from the appearance of being dictated to by the boss.
But some influence tactics work better depending on the direction of influence.
Studies have found that rational persuasion is the only tactic that is effective across
organizational levels. Inspirational appeals works best as a downward influencing
tactic with subordinates. When pressure works, it is almost always to achieve
downward influence. And the use of personal appeals and coalition are most
effective with lateral influence attempts.
Upward influence:
1. Rational Persuasion
Downward influence:
1. Rational Persuasion
2. Inspirational Appeals
3. Pressure
4. Consultation
5. Ingratiation
6. Exchange
7. Legitimacy
Lateral influence:
1. Rational persuasion
2. Consultation
3. Ingratiation
4. Exchange
5. Legitimacy
6. Personal appeals
7. Coalitions
You are more likely to be effective if you begin with softer tactics that rely on
personal power such as personal and inspirational appeal, rational persuasion, and
consultation. If these fail, you can move to harder tactics which emphasize formal
power and involve greater costs and risks such as exchange, coalitions, and
pressure. Interestingly, it has been found that using a single soft tactic is more
effective than a single hard tactic; and that combining two soft tactics, or a soft
tactic and rational persuasion, is more effective than any single tactic or a
combination of hard tactics. Studies confirm a tactic is more likely to be successful
if the target perceives it to be a socially acceptable form of influence behavior, if the
target has sufficient attitudes about desirability if the request is used in a skillful
way, if it is used for a request that is legitimate and if it is consistent with the target
persons values and needs. Cultures within organization differ markedly for
example, some are warm relaxed and supportive; others are formal and
conservative. The organizational culture, in which a person works, therefore will
have a bearing on defining which tactics are considered appropriate. Some cultures
encourage the use of participation and consultation, some encourage reasons and
still others rely on pressure. So, the organization itself will influence which subset of
power tactics is viewed as acceptable for use. Finally, evidence indicates that
people in different countries tend to prefer different power tactics. For instance, a
study comparing managers in the United States and China found that the Americans
perceived reasons to be most effective, whereas Chinese managers preferred tend
to be consistent with the values in these two countries. Reason is consistent with
the preference of Americans for direct confrontation and the use of rational
persuasion to influence others and resolve differences. Similarly, coalition tactics
are consistent with the Chinese preference for using indirect approaches for difficult
or controversial requests.
I've just finished reading "Rules for Radicals" by Saul Alinsky. These tactics seem to
be as applicable today as they were in 1971, when he published the work.
# Power is not only what you have, but what the enemy thinks you have
# Never go outside the experience of your people
# Wherever possible, go outside the experience of the enemy
# Make the enemy live up to their own book of rules
# Ridicule is man's most potent weapon
# A good tactic is one that your people enjoy
# A tactic that drags on too long becomes a drag
# Keep the pressure on
# The threat is usually more terrifying than the thing itself
# The major premise for tactics is the development of operations that will maintain
a constant pressure upon the opposition
# If you push a negative hard and deep enough it will break through into its
counterside
# The price of a successful attack is a constructive alternative
# Pick the target, freeze it, personalize it, and polarize it
* How do one ensures high level of enthusiasm and commitment during bad
times?????????................
* Motivating people is not as easy as it sounds
22. General Methods of Motivation
* Truth as the highest virtue
* Desire to be great
* Communicate, communicate & communicate
* Sharing the burden of risk
* Motivating by caring
* Motivating people at different levels
* Motivating by setting difficult goals
* Motivating in times of crisis
23. Motivating frontline staff
* Emotionally energies frontline people
* How????
Take an example of US Marine Corps Who invested time and energy to cultivate
strong values, Encouraging to take up leadership positions Clarity between team
and leader
24. Motivating Problem People
* Motivational lectures, cash incentives, or memos etc will it motivate all of
them????
* What about problem employees or difficult people!!!!!!!!!!!
Learn more about them, about yourself and about situation
* Have a range of alternatives
* Have a formal one to one sessions
25. Conflict resolution skills
* What to do??????
* Skills required are:
* Listening
* Questioning
* Communicating
* Non verbal signs
* Mediation skills
26. Leadership Tactics
* A model of Power & Influence
* Relationships beyond chain of command
o Step 1: identify the people who have to be led
* How do leaders identify these relationships?
o Step 2: identify people who may resist cooperation
* How do leaders assess power?
o Step 3: develop relationship with resisting parties
* How do leaders develop such relationships?
o Step 4: good relations & good communication
27.
* A model of Power & Influence continue.
* Relations with Subordinates
* Relations with superiors
* How do effective leaders deal with their superiors ?????
Evaluate your boss strength and weakness Evaluate your strength and
weakness Build a relationship & maintain it Communicate, utilize his time prudently
28. Model of effectiveness and influence Setting Agenda Building Network
Implementing agenda
29. summary
* Persuasion skills
* Motivational skills
Gaining resources and support from bosses whose personal agendas might
include organizationally harmful political games.
Avoiding the numerous traps that generate power misuses and ultimately power
loss.
This chapter will not by itself change your view or way of acquiring power and effectively
exercising influence. It does provide an opportunity to think differently about power,
politics and influence, and it can refocus your attention on organizational issues and
problems. For strategic leaders in most organizations the key to successfully
implementing organizational change and improving long term performance rests with
the leader's skill in knowing how to make power dynamics work for the organization,
instead of against it.
POWER IN ORGANIZATIONS
THE CONCEPTS OF POWER AND ORGANIZATIONAL POLITICS John Gardner,
writing about leadership and power in organizations, notes, "Of course leaders are
preoccupied with power! The significant questions are: What means do they use to gain
it? How much do they exercise it?" To what ends do they exercise it? He further states,
"Power is the basic energy needed to initiate and sustain action or, to put it another way,
the capacity to translate intention into reality and sustain it." In a similar vein, Richard
Nixon wrote, "The great leader needs . . . the capacity to achieve. . . . Power is the
opportunity to build, to create, to nudge history in a different direction." Dahl writing
about the pervasiveness of the concept of power states, "The concept of power is as
ancient and ubiquitous as any that social theory can boast." He defined power "as a
relation among social actors in which one actor A, can get another social actor B, to do
something that B would not otherwise have done." Hence, power is recognized as "the
ability of those who possess power to bring about the outcomes they desire" (Salancik
and Pfeffer 1977).
make the job of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs more challenging. In the
government as a whole, agencies compete for significance in the
national/international picture, because significance means public approval and
that means resources. (The two dominant political parties also attempt to present
the American public with different views of what is significant.)
The five propositions of the political frame do not attribute organizational politics to
negative, dysfunctional or aggrandizing behavior. They assert that organization diversity,
interdependence, resource scarcity, and power dynamics will inevitably generate
political forces, regardless of the players. Organizational politics cannot be eliminated or
fantasized away. Leaders, however, with a healthy power motive can learn to
understand and manage political processes.
POWER AS A MOTIVE . Power is attractive because it confers the ability to influence
decisions, about who gets what resources, what goals are pursued, what philosophy the
organization adopts, what actions are taken, who succeeds and who fails. Power also
gives a sense of control over outcomes, and may in fact convey such enhanced control.
Particularly as decision issues become more complex and outcomes become more
uncertain, power becomes more attractive as a tool for reducing uncertainty.
Power and the ability to use it are essential to effective leadership. Strategic leaders
who are uncomfortable with either the presence of great power in others or its use by
themselves are probably going to fail their organizations at some point. The critical
issue is why the leader seeks power and how it is used. Some see power as a tool to
enhance their ability to facilitate the work of their organizations and groups. Others
value power for its own sake, and exercise power for the personal satisfaction it brings.
There can be good and bad in both cases. However, the leader who uses power in the
service of his/her organization is using power in the most constructive sense. The
leader who seeks power for its own sake and for personal satisfaction is at a level of
personal maturity that will compromise his/her ethical position, risk his/her organization's
effectiveness, and perhaps even jeopardize the long-term viability of the
organization(Jacobs 1996).
Power competition exists at two levels. Individuals compete for power within agencies
and organizations; agencies and organizations compete for power within the broader
governmental context. The mechanics of power competition are much the same. In both
cases, power accrues when an individual or an organization achieves control of a
scarce commodity that others need. And in both cases, the operations are essentially
political. Even when compelling physical force is the means, the mechanism is political.
The scarce commodity is the means of inflicting harm on others. So dictators, by hook
or by crook, gain a monopoly on the means for inflicting harm on others. During the
course of the Cold War, the massive build-up of armaments was aimed at maintaining a
"balance of forces" so as to prevent intimidation by either side. Even after Glasnost, the
level of armaments on both sides was carefully negotiated so as to preclude imbalance
that might tempt one side or the other toward risky moves.
Power competition within an organization or agency is generally for resourcespersonnel spaces or funding, or both, in governmental agencies. And the basis for the
competition can be constructive as well as destructive. If the top-level leadership is wise
and capable, the basis for competition can be defined as meritorious performance of
either individual or group. In that case, performance becomes the basis for determining
who accumulates power. The process is still political, but it is also constructive because
the organization as a whole benefits.
So, the political process can be either destructive or constructive, depending on the
resource to be accumulated, the means by which the competitors seek to accumulate it,
and the value that accrues to all competitors by virtue of the competition. (Of
course, competition based on performance, if conducted at such an extreme that human
values or key norms governing competition are violated, may substantially hurt the
organization in the long term).
However, internal politics can also be detrimental in ways not readily apparent. Subunits within agencies may develop objectives and goals at odds with those of the
agency. For example, a given "desk" owes its stature in its own agency to the
constituency needs it serves. An extremely important constituency is the nation it
represents within its own agency and with which it deals. The "desk" therefore may find
it valuable to promote the needs of that constituency over the needs of the agency by
"selling" important positions or programs that benefit the constituency-thereby
unwittingly becoming co-opted and increasingly vulnerable to manipulation by that
constituency.
Organizations also play a political game. Organizations seek influence. Influence
increases autonomy (freedom to control own assets); organizational morale (the
ability to maintain cohesion and effectiveness); essence (sanctity of essential tasks and
functions); roles and missions (exclusion of options that would challenge these); and
budgets (increased roles and missions will always favor larger budgets) (Jefferies).
To increase their own influence, agencies in government and other organizations will
provide information, recommend options, and execute directives in ways that enhance
their own self interest. Jefferies illustrates with the decision to send a U-2
reconnaissance aircraft to overfly the Cuban missile sites. The decision to send the U-2
was actually made 10 days before the flight occurred, but the implementation was
delayed by the CIA-USAF struggle for the mission. The CIA defined the mission as
intelligence gathering and advanced the argument that it had a better U-2 than did the
USAF. The USAF was concerned that the pilot be in uniform to avoid repetition of the
Gary Powers crisis if the aircraft was shot down. (The total mission delay came from five
days to make the decision and five days to train an Air Force pilot to fly CIA U-2s.)
Because key leaders who form the centralized circle at the top of the policy making
apparatus have different viewpoints, particularly with something as uncertain as
strategic policy, they are obligated to fight for what they consider right. Thus, decision
making is not a unitary process, but also "a process of individuals in politics reacting to
their own perceptions of national, organizational, and personal goals" (Jefferies 1992).
Because the scope and scale are too great for one person to master, the president must
persuade in order to develop the consensus required for broad support of decision
outcomes. (Those who wind up executing must be product champions for these
decisions, or they are not likely to implement them.) The president is also open to
persuasion, because the various branches or agencies may also build power bases
outside government or outside the executive branch.
While our focus has been on establishing a legitimate context for understanding
organizational politics, a countervailing view to the political frame is the rational frame of
organizational decision making
THE RATIONAL FRAME. By definition, rational processes are different from political
processes. Rational decisions rest heavily on analytic process. An analytic process can
be defined as one in which there are agreed-upon methods for generating alternative
solutions to problems, and for assigning values to the benefits and costs expected from
each of the alternatives. And sophisticated computational methods are readily available
for calculating benefits/costs ratios once these values are assigned. The essence of
rational process is the belief that, "All good persons, given the same information, will
come to the same conclusion." Those seeking to employ the rational process to the
exclusion of political process thus seek open communication, perhaps through more
than just formal (vertical) organizational channels.
The rapid expansion of electronic mail systems that permits anyone in an organization
to address anyone else probably rests on a rationality premise-that transcending
organizational channels by allowing all members to address directly even the highest
official will give that official more complete information and thus enable higher quality
decisions. This is very difficult for some people to understand especially those with
narcissistic power needs and maturity issues. There is also a trust assumption: that
members can be trusted not to abuse the privilege and that high officials will not misuse
the information. A political process would view valuable information as a commodity to
be traded for influence (Jacobs).
There is another important difference between rational and political views of appropriate
operations both within and between organizations. The political frame does not depend
on trust between persons. In the preceding example, both trust assumptions would be
discounted as unrealistic. Trust in the probable future actions of coalition members is
based on perception of gain to be expected from not violating agreements on which a
coalition is based, for example. The intrinsic morality of being trustworthy is not
particularly useful as a concept.
Trust probably is not particularly a part of the rational frame, either, except that a strong
rationalist believes in and trusts the logic of the process by which information is
converted into decision outcomes. So a strong rationalist will trust others to be similarly
logical. This leads to important postulates about rational communication within a
system. For a rationalist, systems are information-consuming engines. Particularly at
the strategic level, the unimpeded flow of information is crucial to the health of the
system as a whole. However, politics and power dynamics strongly influence
communication processes. To the extent organizations and the people in them are
motivated by political gain and power dynamics, rational processes are inevitably
shortchanged.
POWER DYNAMICS AND THE RATIONAL
FRAME.
The National Security Strategy apparatus exists to
support the formulation of policy and implementing
strategy and thus presidential decision making. George writes insightfully about both the
demands of these processes, and obstacles to their effective operation-particularly
those attributable to bureaucratic politics. He comments that political scientists of an
earlier generation "were intrigued by the possibility that an overburdened executive
might be able to divide his overall responsibilities into a set of more manageable
subtasks to be assigned to specialized units of the organization. It was hoped and
expected that division of labor and specialization within the organization, coupled with
central direction and coordination, would enable the modern executive to achieve the
ideal of 'rationality' in policy making." He goes on to say that this hope has not been
realized because: Some problems of large scale are not amenable to
fragmentation.
As an example, the task of central coordination and direction of foreign policy making
has gotten steadily worse as the range, complexity, and scope of foreign policy
problems has increased. The distinction between foreign and domestic policy has also
eroded. George illustrates by noting that the deployment of US troops in Europe has
implications for defense posture (DOD), balance of payments (Treasury), and U.S.
relations with foreign nations (State). Such problems must be approached from a
broader, holistic viewpoint, and there must be interaction among representatives of
agencies with diverse viewpoints. This is prevented, however, by power competition
within organizations, and between organizations and agencies within the government.
As Jefferies puts it, individuals play politics within organizations, and organizations play
the political game within the broader context.
Rationalist guidelines for good policy making would include something like the following
(George): get all the information needed for incisive and valid diagnosis of the
proble/situation; identify all dimensions of value complexity so there can be balanced
consideration of value priorities; identify a broad range of alternatives, considering
uncertainties; take into account the policy implementation factor; and arrange for
feedback information. In a politicized structure, the dynamics of organizational politics
impacts all of these by giving a "win-lose" flavor to information-giving and position
advancement. Thus, mixing organizational politics with a rational decision making
process will likely lead to the following consequences:
Each actor acquires information on its own policy issues and not those of others,
thereby denying full, balanced information flow to the decision maker.
Its own parochial interests and goals shape each actor's participation in
identification and evaluation of policy options.
Actors use their own bargaining advantage to manipulate the flow of advice to
influence the executive's choice of policy.
Actors may seek to avoid an area, in order to avoid responsibility for it.
Actors rely on policy routines and SOP that were previously developed, but which
may not be appropriate for novel problems.
Actors may be prevented from dealing incisively with foreign-policy issues by the
time, energy, and attention expended on internal politics.
As George points out, while the rational frame to organizational decision making may be
highly desirable to most decision makers, it is not immune to political influences. The
fact is there are politics involved in innovation and change and suc- cessful strategic
leaders must be effective politicians. The higher one goes in organizations, the more
use of organizational politics becomes an important social process; politics are often
required to get important decisions implemented in
complex systems (Pfeffer).
NATURE OF STRATEGIC LEADER POWER
A number of authors writing in Strivastva's Executive
Power (1992) argue that power at the strategic
organization level is manifested and executed through three fundamental elements:
consensus, cooperation, and culture.
"An organization is high in consensus potential when it has the capacity to synthesize
the commitment of multiple constituencies and stakeholders in response to specific
challenges and aspirations." In this area, strategic leader power is derived from the
management of ideas, the management of agreement, and the management of group
and team decision making processes.
"Cooperative potential refers to an organization's capacity to catalyze cooperative
interaction among individuals and groups." Power is employed by a strategic leader in
the management of organization structures, task designs, resource allocation, and
reward systems that support and encourage this behavior.
"Cultural/spiritual potential refers to a sense of timeless destiny about the organization,
its role in its own area of endeavor as well as its larger role in its service to society."
Strategic leaders use power in this area to manage and institutionalize organizational
symbols, beliefs, myths, ideals and values. Their strategic aim is to create a strong
culture that connects the destiny of the organization to the personal goals and
aspirations of its members.
Jacobs' seminal work of general officer job requirements can be linked to the above
conceptual requirements for successfully acquiring and managing strategic leader
power potential. His study of the work environment of general officers provides a
context for looking at strategic performance requirements. He found three job demands
High energy and physical endurance is the ability and motivation to work long
and often times grueling hours. Absent this attribute other skills and
characteristics may not be of much value.
Directing energy is the ability and skill to focus on a clear objective and to
subordinate other interests to that objective. Attention to small details embedded
in the objective is critical for getting things done.
Successfully reading the behavior of others is the ability and skill to understand
who are the key players, their positions and what strategy to follow in
communicating with and influencing them. Equally essential in using this skill is
correctly assessing their willingness or resistance to following the Strategic
Leader's direction.
Adaptability and flexibility is the ability and skill to modify one's behavior. This skill
requires the capacity to re-direct energy, abandon a course of action that is not
working, and manage emotional or ego concerns in the situation.
Motivation to engage and confront conflict is the ability and skill to deal with
conflict in order to get done what you want accomplished. The willingness to take
on the tough issues and challenges and execute a successful strategic decision
is a source of power in any organization.
Subordinating one's ego is the ability and skill to submerge one's ego for the
collective good of the team or organization. Possessing this attribute is related to
the characteristics of adaptability and flexibility. Depending on the situation and
players, by exercising discipline and restraint an opportunity may be present to
generate greater power and resources in a future scenario.
The skills and attributes identified in the ICAF Strategic Leader Development Inventory
are relevant not only to the work of strategic leaders but may contribute to the their
overall capacity to acquire and use power effectively. These skills and attributes are
grouped as conceptual skills and attributes and positive attributes.
POSITIVE ATTRIBUTES.
Objectivity is the ability to "keep one's cool" and maintain composure under
conditions that might otherwise be personally threatening.
Understanding the character of strategic leader power and the requisite personal
attributes and skills sets the stage for employing power effectively. We need to know
more than the conceptual elements that constitute power in organizations at the
strategic level. But, we need to know the strategies of how to use power effectively
and to get things done.
LEADING WITH POWER
The acquisition and use of strategic leader power involves managing a sequential
process that is described below:
1. The first task is to decide what it is the leader is trying to achieve that
necessitates the use of power.
2. With the goal in mind, the leader must assess the patterns of dependence and
interdependence among the key players and determine to what extent he or she
will be successful in influencing their behavior. It is critical that the leader develop
power and influence when the key players have expressed a differing point of view. It is
important to remember there is more interdependence at the strategic level of the
organization where task accomplishment is more complex.
3. Getting things done means the leader should "draw" a political map of the terrain
that shows the relative power of the various players to fully understand the
patterns of dependence and interdependence. This involves mapping the critical
organization units and sub-units and assessing their power bases. This step is very
important because a leader needs to
determine how much power these units have to leverage influence either in support or
opposition to their effort. For example, if a leader is proposing to introduce a consensus
team decision making process in a joint interdependent environment, this
implementation decision could change power relationships among the players. In this
case, the leader needs to know the opposing players and the depth of their power
bases. This move will likely require the mobilization of allies and the neutralization of
resisters.
4. Developing multiple power bases is a process
connected to those personal attributes and skills
previously discussed and to structural sources
of power. Structural sources of power comes from
the leader's creation and control over resources,
location in communication and information networks, interpersonal connections with
influential others, reputation for being powerful, allies or supporters, and the importance
of leading the "right" organization.
6. Recognizing the need for multiple power bases and developing them is not enough.
The strategic leader must have an arsenal of influence strategies and tactics that
convert power and influence into concrete and visible results. Research on
strategies and tactics for employing power effectively suggests the following range of
influence tactics: (Allen, 1979, Bennis and Nanus, 1985, Blau, 1964, Kotter, 1985, 1978,
Pfeffer, 1992, 1981, Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977)
Interpersonal influence tactics recognizes that power and influence tactics are
fundamental to living and operating in a world where organizations are
characterized as interdependent social systems that require getting things done
with the help of other people. A leader employing interpersonal influence tactics
typically demonstrate behaviors that include: understanding the needs and
concerns of the other person, managing constructive relationships with
superiors, peers and subordinates, using active listening skills, asking
probing questions to understand a countervailing power position,
anticipating how individuals may respond to ideas or information, thinking
about the most effective means to influence the individual and crafting
appropriate tactics to the needs and concerns of the other person, and
maintaining a broad network of individual contacts.
Timing tactics involve determining not only what to do but when to move out.
These types of action include: initiating action first to catch your adversary
unprepared, thereby establishing possible advantage in framing a context
for action, using delay tactics to erode the confidence of proponents or
opponents as it relates to setting priorities, allocating resources and
establishing deadlines, controlling the agenda and order of agenda items
to affect how decisions are made. The sequencing of agenda items is very
critical where decisions are interdependent.
Logical persuasion tactics requires using logical reasons, facts, and data to
influence others. Employment of a leader's expert power base can be used to
support logical persuasion. Effective use of these tactics include the following
behaviors: persuading others by emphasizing the strengths and advantages
of their ideas, developing more than one reason to support one's position,
using systems thinking to demonstrate the advantages of their approach,
and preparing arguments to support their case.
Organizational mapping tactics focus the leader's sight on possible powerdependent and interdependent relationships. The critical task is to identify and
secure the support of important people who can influence others in the
organization. Leaders using these tactics will employ behaviors that include:
determining which actors are likely to influence a decision, getting things
done by identifying existing coalitions and working through them,
garnering support by bringing together individuals from different areas of
the organization, isolating key individuals to build support for a decision,
linking the reputations of important players to the decision context and
working outside formal organization channels to get the support of key
decision makers.
Impact leadership tactics include thinking carefully about the most profound,
interesting or dramatic means to structure a decision situation to gain the support
of others. Behaviors include: presenting ideas that create an emotional bond
with others, using innovative and creative ways to present information or
ideas, finding and presenting examples that are embedded in the political
and cultural frames such as language, ceremonies and propitious events,
and lastly, consistently demonstrating high energy and physical stamina in
getting the job done.
Visioning tactics demonstrate how a leader's ideas and values support the
organization's strategic goals, beliefs and values. Leader behaviors in executing
these tactics include: articulating ideas that connect the organization's
membership to an inspiring vision of what the organization can become,
appealing to organization core values or principles, linking the work of the
organization to the leader's vision and broader goals, creating and using
cultural symbols to develop both individual pride and team identity.
Information and analysis tactics suggest that leaders in control of the facts and
analysis can exercise substantial influence. Leaders will use unobtrusive
behaviors to disguise their true intention, which is to effectively employ influence
tactics that seemingly appear rational and analytical. Facts and data are
manipulated and presented to appear rational and help to make the use of
power and influence less obvious. Another ploy used by leaders is to mobilize
power by bringing in credible outside experts who can be relied on to
support a given strategy and provide the answers they are expected to
give. Lastly, under conditions of VUCA which characterizes strategic decision
making, leaders will selectively advocate decision criteria that support their
own interests and organizations. In these cases, leaders typically do what works
best and make decisions based on criteria that are most familiar to them.
Coercive tactics are the least effective in influencing strategic decisions. These
tactics involve employing threats, punishment, or pressure to get others to do
what a leader wants done. Typical leader behaviors include: using position
power to demand obedient compliance or blind loyalty, making perfectly
clear the costs and consequences of not "playing the game", publicly
abusing and reprimanding people for not performing, and punishing
individuals who do not implement the leader's requests, orders or
instructions.
This chapter has addressed what strategies and tactics are required for leading with
power at the highest organizational level. In a micro context, it is about managing
power, which translates as being personally effective in knowing how to get things done
and having the political will to do so. At a macro level, it means coping effectively with
the strategic environment and dealing with innovation and organizational change.
HOW POWER IS LOST
In a general sense power is lost because organizations change and leaders don't.
Organizational dynamics create complex conditions and different decision situations
that require innovative and creative approaches, new skill sets and new dependent and
interdependent relationships. Leaders who have learned to do things a specific way
become committed to predictable choices and decision actions. They remain bonded
and loyal to highly developed social networks and friendships, failing to recognize the
need for change, let alone allocating the political will to accomplish it. Ultimately, power
may be lost because of negative personal attributes that diminish a leader's capacity to
lead with power effectively. The SLDI identifies a number of negative attributes that
when linked to certain organizational dynamics will generate potential loss of power:
Self-Serving/Unethical leaders abuse power and use it for their own self
aggrandizement, take special privileges, and exploit peers and subordinates by
taking credit for contributions done by others. Self-serving leaders contaminate
the ethical climate by modeling power-oriented behavior that influence others to
replicate their behavior. Over the long run, these leaders engender divisiveness
and are not trusted.
Arrogant leaders are impressed with their own self-importance, and talk down to
both peers and subordinates thereby alienating them. If empowering others is
about releasing purposeful and creative energy, arrogance produces a negative
leadership climate that supresses the power needs of others. Arrogant leaders
makes it almost impossible for subordinates to acquire power as a means to
improve their own performance as well as to seek new ways to learn and grow.
Explosive and Abusive leaders are likely to be "hot reactors" who use profanity
excessively, have inadequate control of temper, and abuse subordinates. They
may also lack the self-control required to probe for in-depth understanding of
complex problems and so may consistently solve them at a superficial level.
Explosive and abusive leaders may self-destruct repeatedly in coalition building
and negotiating situations.
Inaccessible leaders are out of touch with their subordinates particularly when
they need access for assistance. Peers typically "write the individual off." Leaders
are generally inaccessible because they don't place great value on building
interpersonal relationships, they may have weak interpersonal skills or they may
be self-centered.
CONCLUSIONS
What are the key learning points in this chapter and what are the practical implications
for strategic leaders and decision makers. Pfeffer has described learning about power
most succinctly: "it is one thing to understand power--how to diagnose it, what are its
sources, what are the strategies and tactics for its use, and how it is lost. It is quite
another thing to use that knowledge in the world at large...In corporations, public
agencies, universities, and government, the problem is how to get things done, how to
move forward, how to solve the many problems facing organizations of all sizes and
types. Developing and exercising power require having both will and skill. It is the will
that often seems to be missing."
Leveraging Power and Politics in Strategic Decision Making:
Practical Implications
1. POWER IS NOT AMERICA'S LAST DIRTY WORD. THE EXISTENCE OF ORGANIZATIONAL POLITICS IS A REALITY TO MOST
ORGANIZATIONS AND SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIC LEADERS MUST BE GOOD POLITICIANS.
2. IN LARGE, COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS WITH MORE CENTRALIZED CONTROL AND INSTITUTIONALIZED POWER, THE SKILLS
OF USING POWER AND INFLUENCE ARE CRITICAL TO GETTING CHANGE ACCOMPLISHED.
3. IT IS CRITICAL TO RECOGNIZE THAT IN ALMOST EVERY ORGANIZATION, THERE ARE CLUSTERS OF INTERESTS, AND
LEADERS NEED TO UNDERSTAND WHERE THEY ARE LOCATED AND WHAT ISSUES ARE OF CONCERN TO THEM.
4. LEADING AND MANAGING WITH POWER TAKES TIME, ENERGY AND EFFORT.
5. INNOVATION AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE ALMOST INEVITABLY THREATENS THE STATUS QUO. CONSEQUENTLY,
IMPLEMENTING NEW IDEAS REQUIRES DEVELOPING POLITICAL WILL AND THE SKILLFUL USE OF POWER AND INFLUENCE.
6. ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE FREQUENTLY CREATES ORGANIZATIONAL ALIGNMENTS THAT CAUSE THOSE IN POWER TO LOSE
THAT POWER.
7. EMPLOYING POWER AND INFLUENCE TACTICS AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL IS MORE ABOUT METHOD AND PROCESS THAN
EXERCISING FORMAL AUTHORITY.
8. THE USE OF POWER GOES BEYOND EXERCISING FORMAL AUTHORITY. IT REQUIRES BUILDING AND MAINTAINING A
REPUTATION FOR BEING EFFECTIVE AND IT NECESSITATES THE SKILL IN GETTING THINGS DONE.
9. IT IS IMPORTANT TO BE ABLE TO RECOGNIZE AND ASSESS THE ORGANIZATION CONTEXT OF POWER IF IDEAS AND PLANS
ARE TO BE IMPLEMENTED EFFECTIVELY.
10. TO BE EFFECTIVE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS, IT IS CRITICAL TO KNOW HOW TO DEVELOP SOURCES OF POWER
AND HOW TO EMPLOY THAT POWER STRATEGICALLY AND TACTICALLY.
11. IT'S IMPORTANT TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE MOST CRITICAL SOURCES OF POWER ARE PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES OR
LOCATION IN THE ORGANIZATION.
12. IN EVALUATING PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES AS EFFECTIVE SOURCES OF POWER, THE KEY QUESTION IS NOT WHETHER THEY
ARE ATTRACTIVE OR UNATTRACTIVE, BUT WHETHER THEY ARE USEFUL.
13. IT IS IMPORTANT TO HAVE MULTIPLE BASES OF POWER TO TRANSLATE INFLUENCE TACTICS INTO CONCRETE RESULTS.