[G.R. No. 144784.

September 3, 2002]

PEDRO G. SISTOZA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO in his

capacity as Ombudsman, and ELISEO CO, respondents.
DECISION
It is settled that the preliminary investigation proper, i.e., the determination of
whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the
offense charged and should be subjected to the expense, rigors and
embarrassment of trial, is the function of the prosecution. For criminal cases
falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, it is the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, as an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman, which
exercises investigatory and prosecutory powers. It is settled that the preliminary
investigation proper, i.e., the determination of whether there is reasonable ground
to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be
subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial, is the function of the
prosecution.
In the instant case, we see this principle at work when the
Sandiganbayan deferred to the authority of the prosecution to exercise
investigatory powers when it granted petitioner Sistoza's motion for
reinvestigation.
i[14]

ii[14]

It is settled that the preliminary investigation proper, i.e., the determination of

whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the
offense charged and should be subjected to the expense, rigors and
embarrassment of trial, is the function of the prosecution.
which would
authorize the aggrieved person to file a petition for certiorari and prohibition
under Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. There is grave abuse of discretion
where power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, patent and gross as to amount
to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
When the Ombudsman does not take essential facts into consideration in the
determination of probable cause, it has been ruled that he gravely abuses his
discretion.
iii[14]

iv[16]

v[17]

Section 3, par. (e), RA No. 3019 defines "corrupt practices of public officers."
It providesIn addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer
and are hereby declared to be unlawful x x x x (e) Causing any undue injury to
any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.

The elements of the offense are: (a) The accused is a public officer or a
private person charged in conspiracy with the former; (b) The public officer
commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or
in relation to his or her public functions; (c) That he or she causes undue injury to
any party, whether the government or a private party; (d) Such undue injury is
caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties;
and, (e) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith

or gross inexcusable neglect. Evidently, mere bad faith or partiality and

negligence per se are not enough for one to be held liable under the law since
the act of bad faith or partiality must in the first place be evident or manifest,
respectively, while the negligent deed should both be gross and inexcusable. It
is further required that any or all of these modalities ought to result in undue
injury to a specified party.
vi[18]

i
ii
iii

On the other hand, gross inexcusable negligence does not signify mere omission of
duties nor plainly the exercise of less than the standard degree of prudence. Rather, it refers
to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in
a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with
conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. It entails
the omission of care that even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own
property, and in cases involving public officials it takes place only when breach of duty is
flagrant and devious.
iv

[21]

[22]

v
vi

To establish a prima facie case against petitioner for violation of Sec. 3, par. (e), RA 3019, the
prosecution must show not only the defects in the bidding procedure, a circumstance which we need
not presently determine, but also the alleged evident bad faith, gross inexcusable negligence or
manifest partiality of petitioner in affixing his signature on the purchase order and repeatedly endorsing
the award earlier made by his subordinates despite his knowledge that the winning bidder did not offer
the lowest price. Absent a well-grounded and reasonable belief that petitioner perpetrated these acts in
the criminal manner he is accused of, there is no basis for declaring the existence of probable cause.
In Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan this Court similarly rejected the theory of criminal liability where the
head of office in discharging his official duties relied upon an act of his subordinate.
[24]

x x Proof, not mere conjectures or assumptions, should be proffered to indicate that the accused had
taken part in, to use this Court's words in Arias v. Sandiganbayan, the "planning, preparation and
perpetration of the alleged conspiracy to defraud the government" for, otherwise, any "careless use of
the conspiracy theory (can) sweep into jail even innocent persons who may have (only) been made
unwitting tools by the criminal minds" really responsible for that irregularity x x x x
[32]

Having thus concluded, the only remaining issue is whether this Court can direct the
Sandiganbayan to dismiss Crim. Case No. 26072 as against petitioner Sistoza. This will not
be the first time that we order the dismissal of a criminal case being heard by a trial court for
want of probable cause, and there is no reason not to prescribe the same justified outcome in
the instant petition. In Cabahug v. People where this Court ordered the dismissal of a
criminal case pending before the Sandiganbayan for absence of probable cause, we declared
[33]

While it is the function of the Ombudsman to determine whether or not the petitioner
should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial, he cannot do so
arbitrarily. This seemingly exclusive and unilateral authority of the Ombudsman must be
tempered by the Court when powers of prosecution are in danger of being used for
persecution. Dismissing the case against the accused for palpable want of probable cause
not only spares her the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial, but also prevents
needless waste of the courts time and saves the precious resources of the government x x x
x [T]he very purpose of a preliminary investigation is to shield the innocent from precipitate,
spiteful and burdensome prosecution x x x [and] spare the innocent the trouble, expense and
torment of a public trial [as well as] unnecessary expense on the part of the State for useless
and expensive trials. Thus, when at the outset the evidence cannot sustain a prima facie
case or that the existence of probable cause to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the
accused cannot be ascertained, the prosecution must desist from inflicting on any person the
trauma of going through a trial.

In the interest of a fair and just prosecution we cannot degree otherwise.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is GRANTED. The 29
November 1999 Resolution and 29 March 2000 Memorandum and allied issuances of the
Office of the Ombudsman resolving to charge petitioner PEDRO G. SISTOZA with violation of
Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, as he was thereafter indicted, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For want of

well-founded and reasonable ground to believe that petitioner PEDRO G. SISTOZA violated
Sec. 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 as amended, or for absence of probable cause therefor, the
Sandiganbayan is ORDERED to DISMISS forthwith Crim. Case No. 26072, entitled "People
of the Philippines v. Pedro Sistoza y Guimmayen, et al.," only as against accused PEDRO G.
SISTOZA, herein petitioner. The 18 October 2000 temporary restraining order of this Court
enjoining the Sandiganbayan from conducting further proceedings in Crim. Case No. 26072
against petitioner PEDRO G. SISTOZA is made PERMANENT. This Decision is without
prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings in Crim. Case No. 26072, promptly and
without delay, insofar as the other accused therein are concerned. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
[14]

Cabahug v. People, G.R. No. 132816, 5 February 2002.

[15]

Ibid.

[16]

Baylon v. Office of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 142738, 14 December 2001.

[17]

Ibid.

In Gallego v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 57841, 30 July 1982, 115 SCRA 793, we held that the phrases
manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence describe the different modes by
which the offense penalized in Section 3(e) of RA 3019 may be committed; in Llorente v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 122166, 11 March 1998, 287 SCRA 382, undue injury was defined as actual damage capable of proof and
actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty and does not include speculative damages which are too
remote to be included in an accurate estimate of the loss or injury.
[18]

Applying by analogy our ruling in Cabello v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 93885, 14 May 1991, 197 SCRA 94,
where an accused charged with willful malversation was validly convicted of the same felony of malversation
through negligence when the evidence merely sustained the latter mode of perpetrating the offense, it was said
that a conviction for a criminal negligent act can be had under an information exclusively charging the
commission of a willful offense upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense; Kimpo v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 95604, 29 April 1994, 232 SCRA 53.
[19]

[20]

Llorente v. Sandiganbayan, see Note 18.

[21]

Victoria v. Mongaya, A.M. No. P-00-1436, 19 February 2001, 352 SCRA 12.

[22]

Ibid.

[23]

G.R. No. 81031, 20 February 1989, 170 SCRA 400.

[24]

G.R. No. 101545, 3 January 1995, 240 SCRA 13.

[25]

See People v. Rodis, 105 Phil. 1294 (1959).

[26]

See Note 24.

A.C. Esguerra and Sons v. Aytona, No. L-18751, 28 April 1962, 4 SCRA 1245; C&C Commercial Corporation
v. Menor, No. L-28360, 27 January 1983, 120 SCRA 112; Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop v. Ferrer, No.
L-31455, 28 February 1985, 135 SCRA 25.
[27]

[28]

Record, p. 143.

[29]

See Note 21 for an illustration of the distinction between simple negligence and gross inexcusable negligence.

[30]

See Note 24.

[31]

319 Phil. 92 (1995).

[32]

Id., p. 98.

[33]

See Note 14

[G.R. No. 142456. July 27, 2004]

DR. DEMETRIO BEROA, M.D., DR. ROMULO GAERLAN, M.D., AURIE

VIADO-ADRIANO
and
VIDA
LABIOS,
petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Information charged petitioners under Section 3(e) of RA 3019 for causing undue
injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
Section 13 of the same law reads:
SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any incumbent public officer against whom
any criminal prosecution under a valid Information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds
or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution
and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be
convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but
if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement, and to the salaries and benefits which
he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings
have been filed against him.

The purpose of a pre-suspension hearing is to determine the validity of the information.

The court can then have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the trial on
the merits of the case, or withhold the suspension and dismiss the case, or correct any part of
the proceedings that impairs its validity. That hearing is similar to a challenge to the validity of
the information by way of a motion to quash.
In this case, the Sandiganbayan had
determined the validity of the information in a pre-suspension hearing conducted for that
purpose. Hence, petitioners suspension is unquestionably mandatory.
[7]

Suspension pendente lite applies to any office the officer might be currently
holding
The term office in Section 13 of the law applies to any office which the officer
might currently be holding and not necessarily the particular office in relation to which
he is charged. (Emphasis supplied)

Suspension pendente lite prevents the accused from committing further acts of
malfeasance while in office
Oooooooooo
G.R. No. 156577, December 03, 2014
ALEJANDRO C. RIVERA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 156587
ALFREDO Y. PEREZ, JR., Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. NO. 156749
LUIS D. MONTERO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION

It is settled that the appellate jurisdiction of the Court over decisions and final
orders of the Sandiganbayan is limited only to questions of laws; as its the factual
findings, as a rule, are conclusive upon the Court. 30
A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or
falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence
considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, the existence and relevancy of
specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to
the whole, and the probability of the situation. 31
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The essential elements of such crime are as
follows:
The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official
functions;
1.
The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial
or official functions;
2.
The accused must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence; and
3.
The action of the accused caused undue injury to any party, including the
government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage
or preference in the discharge of the functions of the accused. 33
It is not enough that undue injury was caused or unwarranted benefits were
given as these acts must be performed through manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. Proof of any of these three in
connection with the prohibited acts mentioned in Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 is enough to convict.35
The terms partiality, bad faith, and gross inexcusable negligence have been
explained as follows:
"Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to see and
report matters as they are wished for rather than as they are." "Bad faith
does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach
of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the
nature of fraud." "Gross negligence has been so defined as negligence
characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and
intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other
persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even
inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property." 36
The accused gave unwarranted
benefits to PAL Boat through
manifest partiality
The word "unwarranted" means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified;
unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason. "Advantage" means a
more favorable or improved position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of any
kind; benefit from some course of action. "Preference" signifies priority or higher
evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above another.38
The accused caused undue
injury to the Government through

their manifest partiality

The Sandiganbayan was correct in ruling that the petitioners also caused undue
injury to the government through their continuing and manifest partiality towards
PAL Boat.
Undue injury in the context of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 should be equated
with that civil law concept of actual damage. Unlike in actions for torts, undue
injury in Sec. 3(e) cannot be presumed even after a wrong or a violation of a
right has been established. Its existence must be proven as one of the elements
of the crime. In fact, the causing of undue injury, or the giving of any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence constitutes the very act
punished under this section. Thus, it is required that the undue injury be
specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty.50
ooooooooooooooooo

G.R. No. 188066, October 22, 2014

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. CYNTHIA E.
CABEROY, Respondent.
DECISION
Tuares charged Caberoy in OMB-V-A-03-0239-E with both Oppression and
Violation of Section 3(e)(f) of R.A. No. 3019. The Ombudsman, however, found
Caberoy guilty only of Oppression.
Oppression is an administrative offense21 penalized under the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,22 which
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section
52. Classification
of
Offenses.Administrative
offenses
with
corresponding penalties are classified into grave, less grave or light, depending on
their gravity or depravity and effects on the government service.
A. The following are grave offenses with their corresponding penalties:
x
x
x

14. Oppression.
1st Offense - Suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year;
2nd Offense - Dismissal.
xxxx
Oppression is also known as grave abuse of authority, which is a
misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who under color of his office,
wrongfully inflict upon any person any bodily harm, imprisonment or
other injury. It is an act of cruelty, severity, or excessive use of
authority.23 To be held administratively liable for Oppression or Grave
Abuse of Authority, there must be substantial evidence presented
proving the complainant's allegations.24 Substantial evidence is that
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.25 In this case, the CA correctly overturned

the Ombudsman's findings and conclusions, and explained the reasons for
exculpating Caberoy, as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Evidently, from the foregoing disquisitions, respondent Ombudsman
contradicted itself when it found and held that petitioner was guilty of
"oppression" for not paying the private respondent her June 2002 salary, because
as a matter of fact she has been paid albeit delayed. Such payment is clearly and
indubitably established from the table where it was shown that private
respondent received on July 17 and 25, 2002, her June 2002 salary in the
amounts of P4,613.80 and P4,612.00, respectively.
xxxx
The above narration of facts do not show that petitioner committed acts
constitutive of "oppression." Assuming petitioner's action is erroneous or overly
zealous, this certainly does not merit the most severe penalty of dismissal from
government service. Apparently, the petitioner is only protecting herself from any
future, adverse consequences if she allows the disbursement of public funds
without the appropriate supporting documents. "It is a well-known fact that in the
government service an employee must submit his daily time record duly
accomplished and approved before one can collect his salary."
xxxx
Finally, on the contention that the findings and conclusions of the
respondent Ombudsman is considered conclusive and deserve respect
and finality is true only when the same is based on substantial evidence.
xxx [I]n this case before us, the records is bereft of substantial evidence
to support respondent Ombudsman's findings and conclusion that
petitioner committed oppressive acts against private respondent and
violated Sections 3(e) and (f) of RA 3019. On the contrary and as earlier
discussed, respondent Ombudsman found and concluded that private respondent
was paid her June salary albeit late. Hence, it cannot be gainsaid that the act
of respondent Ombudsman in concluding that petitioner is guilty as
charged despite absence of substantial evidence to support the same is
totally unfounded and is therefore, tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion amounting to a lack or excess of discretion, x x x.26 (Citations
omitted)
It must be stressed that like other grave offenses classified under the Civil
Service laws, bad faith must attend the act complained of. Bad faith
connotes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent
or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. 35
The Court has consistently upheld the principle that in administrative
cases, to be disciplined for grave misconduct or any grave offense, the
evidence against the respondent should be competent and must be
derived from direct knowledge.36 "Reliance on mere allegations,
conjectures and suppositions will leave an administrative complaint with
no leg to stand on."37
Oooooooooooooooo

[G.R. NO. 171144 : November 24, 2006]

SANTOS L. NACAYTUNA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION

THAT THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR

RECONSIDERATION

Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 states:

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices by public officers. - In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant
of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 requires proof of the following
facts:
1.) The accused is a public officer discharging administrative or official
functions or private persons charged in conspiracy with them;
2.) The public officer committed the prohibited act during the
performance of his official duty or in relation to his public position;
3.) The public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross, inexcusable negligence; and
cralawlibrary

4.) His action caused undue injury to the Government or any private
party, or gave any party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference to such parties.10
Ooooooooooooooo
G.R. No. 197567, November 19, 2014

GOVERNOR ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, JR., Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN, LEONARDO B. ROMAN, ROMEO L. MENDIOLA, PASTOR P.
VICHUACO, AURORA J. TIAMBENG, AND NUMERIANO G.
MEDINA, Respondents.
DECISION
The present Constitution and RA 6770, 54 otherwise known as the Ombudsman
Act of 1989, have endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with wide latitude, in
the exercise of its investigatory and prosecutorial powers, to pass upon criminal
complaints involving public officials and employees. 55Hence, as a general rule, the
Court does not interfere with the Ombudsmans findings and respects the
initiative and independence inherent in its office, which beholden to no one, acts
as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public
service.56chanrobleslaw
The foregoing principle does not, however, apply when the Ombudsmans ruling is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion, subjecting the same
to certiorari correction. Among other instances, the Ombudsman may be
deemed to have gravely abused its discretion when it unjustifiably fails
to take essential facts and evidence into consideration in the
determination of probable cause.57 It may also be committed when the
Ombudsman patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.
Indeed, any decision, order or resolution of a tribunal tantamount to overruling a
judicial pronouncement of the highest Court is unmistakably grave abuse of
discretion.58chanrobleslaw
Legally classified, such misdeeds fall squarely within the concept of grave abuse
of discretion which is defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment on the part of the public officer concerned, which is equivalent to an
excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.59chanrobleslaw
Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, exists
when the facts are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof. To engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed, and to determine if the suspect is probably guilty of the
same, the elements of the crime charged should, in all reasonable
likelihood, be present. This is based on the principle that every crime is
defined by its elements, without which there should be, at the most, no
criminal offense.61chanrobleslaw
Alberto v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 182130 and 182132, June 19, 2013, 699
SCRA 104, 131.
61

The elements of the crime of Violation of Section 3 (e), 62 RA 3019 are as follows:
(a) the offender must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial,
or official functions; (b) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and (c) his action caused any
undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private
party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his

functions.63chanrobleslaw
Simply put, when a matter is irregular on the documents face, so much so that a
detailed examination becomes warranted, the Arias doctrine is unavailing.
Ooooooooooooo

NOTE! Amount of injury

G.R. No. 160619, September 09, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH
DIVISION), JESSIE CASTILLO, MELENCIO ARCIAGA AND EMERENCIANO
ARCIAGA, Respondents.
DECISION
The Issue

The case before us raises the question of what ultimate facts are required to be
stated in an Information charging an accused with violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019. Specifically, we are called to resolve whether an Information
alleging the grant of unwarranted benefits and existence of undue injury must
state the precise amount of the alleged benefit unduly granted as well as identify,
specify, and prove the alleged injury to the point of moral certainty.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
The main purpose of an Information is to ensure that an accused is
formally informed of the facts and the acts constituting the offense
charged.16 Where insufficient, an accused in a criminal case can file a
motion to have the Information against him quashed and/or dismissed
before he enters his plea.17 A motion to quash challenges the efficacy of an
Information18and compels the court to determine whether the Information suffices
to require an accused to endure the rigors of a trial. Where the Information is
insufficient and thus cannot be the basis of any valid conviction, the court must
drop the case immediately and save an accused from the anxiety and
convenience of a useless trial.19
A motion to quash an Information on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense should be resolved on the basis of the allegations in the
Information whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted. 20 The question
that must be answered is whether such allegations are sufficient to establish the
elements of the crime charged without considering matters aliunde.21 In
proceeding to resolve this issue, courts must look into three matters: (1)
what must be alleged in a valid Information; (2) what the elements of
the crime charged are; and (3) whether these elements are sufficiently
stated in the Information.
Sufficiency of Complaint or Information
Sections 6 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court are relevant. They state -

Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or information is

sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense
given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be
included in the complaint or information.
xxx
Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must
be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language
used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment.
This Court, in Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan22 explained the two important purposes
underlying the rule. First, it enables the accused to suitably prepare his
defense.23 Second, it allows the accused, if found guilty, to plead his conviction in
a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.24 Thus, this Court held that the
true test in ascertaining the validity and sufficiency of an Information is "whether
the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the
accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged."25cralawred
Castillo is charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the elements of
which are as follows:
1.

The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or

official functions

2.

He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence; and
That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions.26

3.

The subject Information filed against Castillo, on the other hand, reads to wit:
That in or about 1998, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the
Municipality of Bacoor, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court,accused Jessie B. Castillo, a public officer, being the
incumbent Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite, while in the performance of his official
and administrative function, acting in evident bad faith and manifest
partiality, conspiring and confederating with accused Melencio A. Arciaga and
Emerenciano A. Arciaga, caretakers of Villa Esperanza, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefits to his
co-accused Melencio A. Arciaga and Emerenciano A. Arciaga, by allowing
the operation of the dump site located at Villa Esperanza, Molino, Bacoor,
Cavite, notwithstanding the fact that no Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) or any permit has been issued by the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB), Department of Environment and Natural
Resources to any person or entity for such purpose, and despite cease and

desist orders issued by the DENR, thereby causing undue injury to the residents
and students in the area who had to endure the stench, Hies, rats and
mosquitoes emanating from the dumpsite.27 (Emphasis supplied.)
Information filed against Castillo and his co-accused is sufficient
The Sandiganbayan, however, allowed the quashal of the Information due to the
prosecution's failure to (1) allege, with precision, the exact amount of benefits
granted by Castillo to the Arciagas and (2) specify, quantify and prove "to the
point of moral certainty" the undue injury caused to the people of Molino.
According to the Sandiganbayan:
xxx the court deems it to be an exercise in futility to proceed to trial when the
information that was filed failed to inform the accused of the quantity of injury
caused by Castillo to the residents of Villa Esperanza and the amount of
unwarranted benefits given to the Arciagas as a result of the operation of the
dumpsite. Such failure is fatal to the prosecution's cause considering that
the public prosecutor is barred from presenting evidence on a matter not
alleged in the information. Otherwise, if the prosecution would be allowed to
present evidence to quantify the element of undue injury or unwarranted
benefits, the same would violate the right of the accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.28
We disagree.
For as long as the ultimate facts constituting the offense have been alleged, an
Information charging a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 need
not state, to the point of specificity, the exact amount of unwarranted
benefit granted nor specify, quantify or prove, to the point of moral
certainty, the undue injury caused. We have consistently and repeatedly held
in a number of cases that an Information need only state the ultimate facts
constituting the offense and not the finer details of why and how the crime was
committed.29
As alleged in the Information, the unwarranted benefit was the privilege granted
by Castillo to the Arciagas to operate the dumpsite without the need to comply
with the applicable laws, rules, and regulations; the undue injury being residents
and students were made to endure the ill-effects of the illegal operation. The
details required by the Sandiganbayan (such as the specific peso amount
actually received by the Arciagas as a consequence of the illegal operation of
the subject dumpsite or the specific extent of damage caused to the residents
and students) are matters of evidence best raised during the trial; they
need not be stated in the Information. For purposes of informing the accused
of the crime charged, the allegation on the existence of unwarranted benefits and
undue injury under the Information suffices.
Moreover, the rationale for the ultimate facts requirement becomes clearer when
one considers the period when a motion to quash is filed, that is, before the
accused's arraignment and the parties' presentation of their evidence. It
would be illogical, if not procedurally infirm, to require specific peso amount
allegations of the unwarranted benefit and proof of undue injury - to the point of
moral certainty, no less at this stage of the criminal proceedings.
Application of Llorente ruling is misplaced
The Sandiganbayan's application of the Llorente ruling in this case is misplaced.

Indeed, this Court held in Llorente that the "undue injury must be specified,
quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty." 30 The validity and
sufficiency of the Information, however, was not an issue in Llorente. The import
of the ruling therein is that proof of undue injury must be established by the
prosecution during the trial and not when the Information is filed. Nowhere
in Llorente did we require that undue injury be specified, quantified and proved to
the point of moral certainty at the time of the filing of the Information. Such an
interpretation would effectively require the prosecution to include all the relevant
evidence in the Information and to present such evidence of undue injury even
prior to arraignment. Moreover, under the Sandiganbayan's interpretation
of Llorente, the accused would be required to face (and even rebut) the evidence
as soon as the Information is filed and even before he pleads. This runs counter
to the function of a motion to quash as a remedy afforded an accused before he
proceeds to trial.
Further, such an interpretation would undermine the value of the Information as a
tool for an accused to understand the crime for which he is being charged as it
requires that the Information already contain a long and detailed list of other
matters not necessary in informing the accused of the charge. It will also be
prejudicial to the prosecution who will then be forced to present evidence even
before the trial proper. This interpretation cannot be countenanced.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the Information was defective
on the ground that the facts charged therein do not constitute an
offense, outright quashal of the Information is not the proper course of
action.
Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court gives clear guidance on this matter. It
provides Sec. 4. Amendment of complaint or information. - If the motion to quash is
based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by
amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made.
If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to
correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the
prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information still
suffers from the same defect despite the amendment. (Emphasis supplied.)
When a motion to quash is filed challenging the validity and sufficiency of an
Information, and the defect may be cured by amendment, courts must deny the
motion to quash and order the prosecution to file an amended
Information.31 Generally, a defect pertaining to the failure of an Information to
charge facts constituting an offense is one that may be corrected by an
amendment.32 In such instances, courts are mandated not to automatically quash
the Information; rather, it should grant the prosecution the opportunity to cure
the defect through an amendment.33 This rule allows a case to proceed without
undue delay. By allowing the defect to be cured by simple amendment,
unnecessary appeals based on technical grounds, which only result to prolonging
the proceedings, are avoided.
Oooooooooooooo
[G.R. No. 144823. December 8, 2003.]

GRACIANO P. DELA CHICA, Municipal Mayor, and EVAN C. ACEVEDA,

Municipal Engineer, Baco, Oriental Mindoro, Petitioners, v. HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN, 4TH Division, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
A. RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING
THAT THE INFORMATION ANNEX C HEREOF, IS VALID.chanrob1es virtua1
1aw library
B. RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW AND
[ACTED] WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE
SUSPENSION OF PETITIONERS FOR NINETY (90) DAYS.
C. RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT QUASHING [THE INFORMATION]
ON [THE] GROUND OF [ITS] INVALIDITY AND LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION.
9
These assigned errors boil down to one pivotal issue: the validity of the
information under which petitioners stand charged.
Petitioners contend that respondent court wrongly ordered their suspension
despite the patent defect of the information. They posit that the failure to allege
the essential element of "manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence" as defined by R.A. 3019 renders the information invalid,
as it fails to comply with the requirements of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. At
the same juncture, they seek a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction to restrain the respondent court from implementing its order of
suspension.
What facts and circumstances are necessary to be stated in the information must
be determined by reference to the definitions and the essentials of the specific
crime. 17 Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, under which petitioners are charged,
provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of
public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving
any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
library
In a number of cases, 18 the elements of this offense have been broken down as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) That the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy
with them;
(2) That said public officers committed the prohibited acts during the performance
of their official duties or in relation to their public positions;
(3) That they caused undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a
private party;
(4) That such injury was caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to such parties; and
(5) That the public officers acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence.
A scrutiny of the information in this case discloses that petitioners are accused of
the following acts, as stated in the pertinent portion of the
information:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . wilfully, unlawfully and criminally caus[ing] undue injury to the government
by making revisions in the completion of the municipal building without prior
approval by the proper authorities resulting to cost deficiency of P375,682.32, to
the damage and injury of the government, in the amount aforestated.
Evidently, the information failed to allege that petitioners, in causing
undue injury to the government by revising the completion of the
municipal building without prior approval of the proper authorities, did
the same through "manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence," an essential element of the crime charged.
Neither did the information embody words which would have
characterized the elements, such as "partiality," or bias which excites a
disposition to see and report matters as they are wished for rather than
as they are; "bad faith," which connotes not only bad judgment or
negligence but also a dishonest purpose or conscious wrongdoing; or
"gross negligence," which is negligence characterized by the want of
even slight care, or acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is
a duty to act willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to
consequences as far as other persons are concerned. 19
Respondents would, however, argue that Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
of Court, 20 does not require that the information be worded in the terms of the
statute defining the offense, as long as it enables a person of common
understanding to know the offense being charged and the court to pronounce
judgment.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw library
Respondents contention is untenable. It is not enough to allege that the acts
were willfully, unlawfully or criminally caused without stating that the same was
done in a manner by which the accused could be held liable for the specific
offense charged. This Court has ruled that in order that one may be held
criminally liable under Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the act of the accused
which caused undue injury must have been done with evident bad faith
or with gross inexcusable negligence. 21 This draws more significance
considering that good faith and regularity are always presumed in the
performance of official duties by public officers. 22 Therefore, manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence must be
alleged with particularity in the information sufficiently to inform the

accused of the charge against him and to enable the court properly to
render a decision.
Respondents, however, question petitioners right to raise the issue of the validity
of the information at this stage, arguing that by entering a plea of not guilty
during the arraignment, petitioners had waived all possible objections to the
sufficiency of the information.
The argument is without legal basis. It is true that pursuant to Section 9,
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court, the failure of the accused to
assert any ground for a motion to quash before he pleads to the
information shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds for a motion to
quash. Respondents, however, may have overlooked that the same
section admits of certain exceptions, as when: (1) no offense was
charged, (2) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged, (3) the offense or penalty has been extinguished, and (4) the
accused would be twice put to jeopardy. 23 In the present case, given
that the information failed sufficiently to charge the offense, petitioners
are not precluded from attacking its validity even after their arraignment.
Considering the foregoing, this Court finds the information in the present case to
be fatally defective. Where it is clear that the information does not really charge
an offense, the case against the accused must be dropped immediately. There is
no point in proceeding under a defective information that can never be the basis
of a valid conviction. 24
Oooooooooooooooooo
G.R. No. 160718 : May 12, 2010
ANUNCIO C. BUSTILLO, EMILIO SUMILHIG, JR., and AGUSTIN BILLEDO,
JR., Petitioners, v.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
We find no evidence on record which would show that petitioners were motivated
by bad faith
In sum, the petitioners have in their favor the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties which the records failed to rebut.
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The
presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption in
rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be
made in support of the presumption and in case of doubt as to an officers
act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its
lawfulness.26cr
Oooooooooooo
G.R. No. 166967 : January 28, 2013
EDNA J. JACA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the
SANDIGANBAYAN,Respondents.

G.R. No. 166974

ALAN C. GAVIOLA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 167167
EUSTAQUIO B. CESA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION

ANTECEDENT FACTS
The petitioners occupied appointive positions in the different divisions of the Cebu
City government at the time material to the controversy: Gaviola was the City
Administrator;5 Cesa was the City Treasurer;6 Bacasmas was the Chief Cashier of
the Cash Division, which is under the Office of the City Treasurer, and Jaca was
the City Accountant.7?r?l1
The steps followed in the grant of cash advances to a paymaster in the Cebu City
government are as follows:cralawlibrary
1. Processing of payment:cralawlibrary
a. Paymasters request for cash advance and prepare cash advance disbursement
vouchers (voucher) to be submitted to the Chief Cashier, as head of Cash
Division;
b. Chief Cashier
1. affixes her initials on Box A of the voucher; and
2. forwards the voucher to the City Treasurer if he sees that the vouchers and its
supporting documents are in order. ???r?bl? ??r??l l?? l?br?r
c. City Treasurer affixes his signature on box A. Description of Box A is as
follows:cralawlibrary
1. "BOX A" Certified Expense, cash advances necessary, lawful and incurred under
my direct supervision. ???r?bl? ??r??l l?? l?br?r
d. The voucher is then forwarded to the City Accountant for processing
(recording) and pre-audit procedure. The City Accountant signs BOX B described
as follows:cralawlibrary
1. "BOX B" Certified, Adequate available funds/budgetary allotment in the amount
of P_____, expenditures properly certified, supported by documents marked (x)
per checklist on back hereof, account under checklist on back hereof, account
codes proper, previous cash advance liquidated/accounted for. ???r?bl? ??r??
l l?? l?br?r

e. City Accountant prepares and attaches an accountants advice to the voucher.

f. The voucher and the accountants advice are returned to Chief Cashier for
preparation of check.
g. Chief Cashier prepares the check and initials/countersigns the check
h. City Treasurer signs the check ?
i. The voucher is forwarded to City Administrator for approval on Box C.
1. City Administrators Internal Control Office (ICO) reviews the supporting
documents, and if in order, will recommend its approval.
2. City Administrator approves BOX C of the voucher and countersigns the
check. ???r?bl? ??r??l l?? l?br?r
j. The voucher, check and the accountants advice are returned to Cash Division.
k. Paymaster signs the receipt portion of the voucher and the warrant/check
register to acknowledge receipt of the check for encashment later at a bank. ???
r?bl? ??r??l l?? l?br?r
2. Payment
a. The paymaster and the Cash Division prepare a report of disbursement of
payrolls paid and supporting papers and record it in the official cashbook;
b. COA auditors go to Cash Division to examine, check and verify the reports of
disbursements, payrolls, cashbook and other supporting documents;
c. Cashier forwards report and supporting papers to City Accountant for recording
and posting.
On March 4, 1998, City Auditor Rodolfo Ariesga created a team of auditors, with
the task of conducting a surprise audit8 of the cash and other accounts handled
by all accountable officers assigned at the Cash Division, Office of the City
Treasurer. Among these disbursing officers was Rosalina G. Badana, who was the
paymaster in charge of paying the salaries of the employees in eight (8) different
departments or offices in the Cebu City government. 9?r?l1
While Badana reported for work in the early morning of March 5, 1998, she
immediately left upon learning of the planned surprise audit to be conducted that
day; she has not reported for work since.10?r?l1
The audit teams cash examination covered the period from September 20, 1995
to March 5, 1998. Cecilia Chan and Cecilia Tantengco, the audit team leader and
assistant team leader, respectively, conducted an examination of the cash and
other accounts in Badanas custody.11 The audit team reported that Badana
incurred a cash shortage of P18,527,137.19. Based on the procedure in the
processing of cash advances, the audit team found out that the failure of the
petitioners to observe the provisions of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1445, 12 RA
No. 716013 and the rules and regulations governing the grant, utilization and
liquidation of cash advances under Commission on Audit (COA) Circular Nos. 90331, 92-382 and 97-002"facilitated, promoted, if not encouraged, the commission
of malversation of public funds."14?r?l1

On March 13, 1998, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas (Ombudsman)15 a complaint against Badana for
malversation of public funds and for violation of RA Nos. 3019 and 6713. 16 The
complaint resulted in administrative and criminal investigations. 17?r?l1
On April 3, 1998, the Ombudsman motu proprio required the petitioners and
Bacasmas to submit their respective counter-affidavits and countervailing
evidence.18 On July 1, 1998, the Ombudsman charged the petitioners and
Bacasmas with violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 19 before the
Sandiganbayan under the following Information:20?r?l1
That on or about the 5th day of March 1998, and for sometime prior thereto, at
Cebu City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, abovenamed accused, public officers, having been duly appointed to such public
positions above-mentioned, in such capacity and committing the offense in
relation to Office, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping xxx
each other, with deliberate intent, with manifest partiality, evident bad faith and
with gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there allow Rosalina G. Badana,
Cashier I of the Cebu City Government to obtain cash advances despite the fact
that she has previous unliquidated cash advances, thus allowing Rosalina G.
Badana to accumulate Cash Advances amounting to P18,522,361.96, Philippine
Currency, which remains unliquidated, thus accused in the performance of their
official functions, had given unwarranted benefits to Rosalina G. Badana and
themselves, to the damage and prejudice of the government, particularly the
Cebu City Government.
On July 2, 1998, the COA Regional Office No. VII (COA Regional Office) submitted
a Narrative Report on the Results of the Examination of the Cash Accounts (COA
Report) of Badana.21 Pertinent portions of the COA Report read:cralawlibrary
"A.1. During the period between September 20, 1995 to March 5, 1998, records
show that additional cash advances were granted, even if the previous cash
advances were not yet liquidated. For example in the Trust Fund, a cash advance
of Php800,000 was granted on December 8, 1997 even if Ms. Badana has an
unliquidated cash advance balance of Php4,940,065.50 as of November 20, 1997
(Annex 19). The situation was true in granting all other cash advances from
September 20, 1995 to March 5, 1998.
Another example in the General fund, cash advance of Php1,000,000.00 was
granted on December 1, 1997 even if the unliquidated balance of Ms. Badana as
of November 28, 1997 was Php8,469,054.19 (Annex 20). The situation is likewise
true in granting all other cash advances during the same period mentioned in the
preceding paragraph. This practice resulted in excessive granting of cash
advances which created the opportunity to misappropriate public funds since idle
funds were placed in the hands of the paymasters under their control and
custody.
The practice is in violation of Section 89, PD 1445; Section 339, RA 7160 and
paragraph 4.1.2 of COA Circular No. 97-002 resulting in the accumulation of
excess cash in the custody of the accountable officer.
A.2 The following practices also facilitated the incurrence of the
shortage:cralawlibrary

a. The amount of cash advance for salary payments was not equal to the net
amount of the payroll for a pay period in violation of par. 4.2.1, COA Cir. No. 90331, Section 48(g), COA Cir. No. 92-382 and par. 4.2.2, COA Cir. No. 97-002.
All disbursement vouchers covering the cash advances were not supported by
payrolls or list of payees to determine the amount of the cash advance to be
granted in violation of par. 4.2.2, COA Cir. No. 90-331. Ms. Rosalina G. Badana,
who was assigned as paymaster to eight different offices/departments with a total
monthly payroll of P5,747,569.96 (Annex 21) was granted an average monthly
cash advance of P7,600,000.00 (Annex 22) or an excess of P1,900,000.00
monthly. As a result, idle funds were again placed in the hands and the total
control of the Paymaster.
b. The face of the disbursement voucher (sample voucher marked as annex 23)
did not indicate the specific legal purpose for which the cash advance was granted
in violation of par. 4.1.5 COA Cir. No. 90-331, Section 48(e) COA Cir. 92-382 and
par. 4.1.7 COA Cir. No. 97-002. It is so because all disbursement vouchers
covering the granting of cash advances to the paymaster did not show the
office/department, the number of payees and the payroll period covered by the
cash advance. The city officials signed, certified and approved these vouchers
despite the aforementioned deficiencies. It makes difficult to identify which
liquidating report pertains to what particular cash advance, thus contributing to
the opportunity to misappropriate the funds.
c. The provisions of par. 5.1.1 COA Cir. 90-331 and 97-002 and Section 48.k of
COA Cir. No. 92-382 on the liquidation of cash advances within 5 days after the
end of the month pay period was not followed due to the existing
practice/procedure in the granting of cash advances Likewise, unliquidated cash
advance balance (audited) at the end of December 31, 1997 amounted to
P15,553,475.61 consisting of P11,690,639.44 and P3,862,836.17 for General and
Trust Fund respectively, in violation of par. 5.8 COA Cir. Nos. 90-331 and 97-002
and Section 48 (o) COA Cir. No. 92-382, resulting in the accumulation of
unliquidated cash advances.
In January 1998, the paymaster was granted cash advances before the foregoing
unliquidated balance (audited) was settled. Detail as follows:cralawlibrary
Date
Check No.
Amount of Cash
Advance Granted
Amount of
Cash Returns
1/05/98
852367
2,000,000.00
1/08/98
25983919
P1,000,000.00
1/09/98

P2,000,000.00
1/09/98
P18,846.00
1/12/98
852430
P1,000,000.00
1/12/98
____________
P2,000,000.00
Total
P4,000,000.00
P4,018,846.00
It appears that the new cash advance of Php4,000,000.00 was used to liquidate
partially the previous years unliquidated balance of P15,553,475.61 in violation of
par. 4.1.5 COA Cir. 90-331, Section 48.e of COA Cir. 92-382 and par. 4.1.7 of COA
Cir. 97-002.
d. As discussed in letter "C" above, accounting records show that these cash
advances were granted and taken up in January, 1998 while the cash returns
made after granting these cash advances were taken up in December, 1997. This
is contrary to the generally accepted principles of Time period which requires that
accounting should be time bounded; meaning cut-off date should be properly and
strictly observed.
e. Submission of financial reports and its supporting schedules and
vouchers/payrolls by the Accounting Division was very much delayed (Annex 25)
in violation of Section 122, PD 1445 despite of several communications from the
Auditor, latest of (which is attached as Annex 26) thus verification and
reconciliation on the paymasters accountability cannot be determined
immediately.
xxx
C. The following practices led to the concealment of the shortage of
P18,527,137.19 from the September 20, 1995 to March 5, 1998:cralawlibrary
1. Accounting practices which resulted in inaccurate and misleading information in
the financial statements in violation of Section 111, PD 1445 are enumerated
below:cralawlibrary
a. Cash returns in January, 1998 were recorded as credits to accountability in
December, 1997 amounting to P4,018,846.00 as follows:cralawlibrary

xxx
In effect, the balance of unliquidated cash advances as of December 31, 1997
was understated.
b. Some liquidations/disbursements in January, 1998 were included as credits to
accountability in December, 1997 amounting to P1,974,386,45 Details are as
follows:cralawlibrary
xxx
x x x As a result, the unliquidated cash advances as of December 31, 1997 is
understated by P1,974,386.45.
c. Verification of accounting records maintained in the Accounting Division
revealed that the index cards as a control device in the processing of cash
advance voucher recorded only cash advances granted to paymasters (Annex 24).
It failed to show the liquidation/disposition of public funds. Hence, unliquidated
balance of cash advances cannot be determined instantly when a cash advance
voucher is being processed by the accounting personnel.Summarizing par. a and
b, the total understatement to Ms. Badanas unliquidated cash advances per
accounting records as of December 31, 1997 amounted to P5,993,232.45 for the
General Fund. This practice is in violation of Section 111 of PD 1445. The financial
statements appeared inaccurate and misleading because of "window dressing."???
r?bl? ??r??l l?? l?br?r
2. Presentation of paid payrolls and vouchers already recorded in the cash
book/subsidiary ledgers as cash items thus misleading the auditors into believing
them as valid cash items. There is untruthful presentation of facts constituting
deceit or fraud.
The scheme is explained below.
Paid payrolls and vouchers already recorded in the cashbook and in the subsidiary
ledgers were presented as cash items during the count on May 13, 1996,
November 27, 1996, June 9, 1997 and November 19, 1997. These cash items
were treated as credits to her accountability, thereby reducing her accountability
and consequently concealing her shortage. This scheme was made possible as the
paymaster can readily have access to paid payrolls and vouchers x x x. The
following facilitated the use of fraudulent scheme:cralawlibrary
1.1 The paid payrolls and vouchers were placed in an unlocked box (carton) under
the table of the bookkeeper.
1.2 The paymaster was allowed to get/retrieve paid payrolls and vouchers from
the said box kept by the bookkeeper.
1.3 Failure of the Disbursing officer to stamp "PAID" all paid payrolls and
vouchers. This is a control measure to avoid re-use or recycling of documents. ???
r?bl? ??r??l l?? l?br?r
The accountable officer resorted to the scheme abovementioned with the
intention of claiming double credit when in truth and in fact, she had been
credited already of said transactions: These are the following:cralawlibrary

Date
Amount
May 13, 1996
P3,016,239.07
Nov. 27, 1996
P5,983,102.94
June 9, 1997
P7,959,677.07
Nov. 19, 1997
P12,438,954.88
In effect, as early as May 13, 1996 and subsequently thereafter, she had already
incurred shortages but was able to conceal them through deceit and fraudulent
means as explained above.22?r?l1
The petitioners moved for reinvestigation; the prosecution interposed no
objection, provided that the petitioners motions would be treated as a motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsmans resolution directing the filing of
information.23 The prosecution manifested that, upon its recommendation, the
Ombudsman resolved to maintain the information. 24?r?l1
On arraignment,25 the accused pleaded not guilty.26 During the pre-trial of
December 7, 1999, the prosecution and the petitioners entered into a stipulation
of facts:cralawlibrary
1. That at all times material to this case, all of the accused are public officials of
the City of Cebu.
xxx
5. That the cash advance voucher has three boxes: Box A, Box B, and Box C.
6. That Box A is to be signed by the head of the office requesting the cash
advance;
7. That Box B is to be signed by the head of the office which would conduct preaudit of the cash advances;
8. That Box C is to be signed by the person of authority who will finally approve
the cash advances.27?r?l1 ???r?bl? ??r??l l?? l?br?r
The prosecution presented Ariesga and Chan as its witnesses. Relying on the
audit teams findings, the prosecution claimed that the shortage was incurred due
to the failure of Badana and of the petitioners to comply with the laws, rules and
regulations governing the granting, utilization and liquidation of cash
advances.28 For one, the vouchers for cash advances lacked an indication of the
specific purpose for which an amount was being requested; the office or
department to be paid, the number of payees, and the payroll period to be paid
were not specified.29 For another, the amounts requested were not equal to the
amount of payroll for the pertinent pay period; the vouchers covering the cash
advances for the payment of government employees were not supported by
payrolls for a proper determination of the amount needed for the purpose. Thus,

although the monthly payroll of the eight departments within Badanas

responsibility required more than P5 million, the cash advance granted for each
month averaged more than P7 million. Also, the petitioners repeatedly affixed
their signatures and allowed the disbursement of public funds through cash
advances, regardless of previous unliquidated cash advances. 30 Cash advances
were not liquidated within the period prescribed by law, enabling the use of
subsequent cash advances to liquidate previous cash advances.
Meanwhile, the Ombudsman rendered a decision31 in the administrative aspect of
the case, finding Jaca and Cesa guilty of simple neglect of duty and imposed on
them the penalty of suspension for six (6) months. The case against petitioner
Gaviola was dismissed for being moot and academic. On Cesas appeal, the Court
of Appeals and, eventually, this Court sustained the Ombudsmans ruling.
SANDIGANBAYANS RULING
On December 16, 2004, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its decision32 finding the
petitioners and Bacasmas guilty as charged. The Sandiganbayan held the
petitioners solidarily liable to the Cebu City government for the amount of
P18,527,137.19.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that all the elements under Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 were established by the prosecution: first, the petitioners are all public
officials; second, the public officials committed the prohibited acts during the
performance of their official duties; third, based on the audit teams examinations,
the undue injury suffered by the government amounted to P18,527,137.19 the
amount of Badanas accumulated shortage; fourth, the petitioners gave
unwarranted benefits to Badana, which resulted in undue injury to the
government, by illegally allowing her to obtain cash advances; and fifth, the
petitioners acted with gross inexcusable negligence in the performance of their
duties. The Sandiganbayan relied largely on the COA Report to support a finding
that the Cebu City government lost the amount of P18,527,137.19 under the
petitioners collective watch.
The Sandiganbayan explained that while the information charged and recited all
the modes of violating Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, the prosecution is only
required to prove any of these modes to warrant conviction. The Sandiganbayan
held:cralawlibrary
ACCORDINGLY, accused ALAN C. GAVIOLA, EUSTAQUIO B. CESA, BENILDA N.
BACASMAS and EDNA J. JACA are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having
violated Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019; and each accused is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years and one day as minimum and fifteen
(15) years as maximum, with the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification
from public office. These Accused are directed to indemnify jointly and severally
the City Government of Cebu the amount of Eighteen Million Five Hundred
Twenty-Seven Thousand One Hundred Thirty-Seven and 19/100 Pesos
(Php18,527,137.19).33?r?l1
The petitioners separately moved for reconsideration,34 but the Sandiganbayan
denied their motions on February 1, 2005.35 Hence, these present petitions.
THE PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS

Due to the (i) commonality of the factual circumstance that led to the petitioners
prosecution and conviction, as well as (ii) the different positions occupied by each
of the petitioners, various and varied arguments were submitted. We narrate
these arguments based on the positions of each of the petitioners.
a. The hierarchical positions occupied
i. Cesa as City Treasurer
Cesa argues that he simply adhered to the procedure long observed and
prevailing at the time of (and even prior to) his assumption of office as City
Treasurer. In the processing of cash advance vouchers coming from the Cash
Division, the divisions chief Bacasmas first determines that the voucher and its
supporting documents are in order before Cesa affixes his signature on Box A.
Under RA No. 7160, City Treasurers cease to be an approving authority in the
grant of cash advances. It is the City Accountant who can approve or disapprove
cash advances or disbursements. The City Treasurers previous function of preaudit and internal audit functions are now vested with the City Accountant. He
claims that he signed Box A as a requesting party and not as approving authority.
ii. Jaca as City Accountant
Jaca argues that strict compliance with prior and complete liquidation of Badanas
previous cash advances is "impractical and unrealistic."36 About half of the Cebu
City governments employees are weekly-paid and the rest are paid at the middle
and at the end of the month (quincena basis) a practice within the power of the
Chief Executive, not the City Accountant, to determine, 37 and which has long been
observed before he became City Accountant. This set up resulted in a situation
where, before she can process the liquidation and posting of a previous cash
advance, another request for a subsequent cash advance already comes in; the
request has to be acted upon if only to avoid delay in the payment of salaries. 38?
r?l1
While she certified that Badana had liquidated her previous cash advances, she
had previously informed Cesa and the City Auditor (at that time) of the
unliquidated cash advances.39?r?l1
iii. Gaviola as City Administrator
Gaviola argues that he affixed his signature on Box C of the vouchers because the
City Accountant had earlier certified that Badanas previous cash advances were
liquidated and accounted for. For him, the approval of vouchers was a ministerial
act done not only after the City Accountant had pre-audited the vouchers (by
affixing her signature in Box B), but after theInternal Control Office 40 and a
member of his staff, Virginia Pea, had determined the regularity of the vouchers
and their attachments.41 Gaviola avers that the prosecution failed to present
evidence to show the absence of supporting documents when he affixed his
signature on the vouchers. Headds that his duties do not impose upon him
accountability for the funds entrusted to Badana or the City Treasurer; neither is
he tasked with pre-audit activities nor with the record keeping of a paymasters
accountabilities.
The following are the defenses common to the petitioners:cralawlibrary

b. Good faith in affixing their signatures to the disbursement vouchers

The petitioners invoked good faith in affixing their signatures to the disbursement
vouchers. They deny any knowledge of Badanas shortages until after the surprise
audit was conducted on March 5, 1998.
They argue that since the COA did not send them any notice of disallowance of
Badanas cash advances,42 despite the COAs semestral cash examination, they had
the right to presume regularity in Badanas performance of her job as paymaster.
c. Fatally defective information
The petitioners argue that the information is fatally defective for violating their
right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them. The
prosecution could not have validly alleged that the petitioners committed the
offense "with deliberate intent, with manifest partiality, evident bad faith and with
gross inexcusable negligence"43 since these several modes of committing the
crime are inconsistent with each other; the violation is more so when one
considers the prosecutions allegation of conspiracy, which presupposes intent and
the absence of negligence.44 Because of this serious flaw in the information, the
information effectively charged no offense for which they can be convicted.
Cesa particularly assails the validity of the information because the preliminary
investigation which preceded its filing was allegedly fatally defective. Cesa argued
that the Ombudsman cannot motu proprio require him to submit his counteraffidavit in the preliminary investigation without any prior complaint against
him.45?r?l1
d. Evidence
The petitioners argue that the prosecution witnesses were incompetent to testify.
On the one hand, Ariesga did not actually prepare the COA Report, but merely
received it from the persons who did the actual audit and thereafter submitted it
to the COA Regional Office. On the other hand, while Chan is the head of the
audit team, she did not actually conduct the cash examination and audit of
Badanas accountabilities. In view of the incompetence of the prosecution
witnesses, the Sandiganbayan should not have admitted, much less relied on, the
COA Report as its contents are all hearsay.
e. Proof beyond reasonable doubt and the elements of Section 3(e) of RA No.
3019 were not established.
Since the petitioners received no prior notice of disallowance from the auditors of
the COA at the time material to the controversy, then the petitioners could not
have been charged with knowledge of Badanas previous unliquidated cash
advances. This lack of knowledge negates the element of "giving unwarranted
benefits or causing undue injury."46?r?l1
Particularly, Cesa argues that the existence of unliquidated cash advances was not
established because there has been no complete cash examination, audit and
post audit of Badanas accountability, citing Madarang v. Sandiganbayan. 47 Neither
was "undue injury" established since, as previously argued, the COA Report is
hearsay. Also, the fact that no government employee complained of not being
paid his salary/receivables only shows that no party was ever unduly injured.

OSPs COMMENT
The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) prays for the denial of the petitions on
the ground that the issues raised in the petitions are factual in nature and, hence,
not covered by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The OSP defends the validity of the
information, arguing that there is nothing inconsistent in the allegations because
gross inexcusable negligence also connotes conscious indifference to duty, and
not mere inadvertence. While conspiracy necessitates intent, conspiracy does not
negate gross inexcusable negligence, as recognized in Sistoza v. Desierto. 48?r?l1
On the merits, the OSP asserts that no amount of good faith can be appreciated
for adhering to a practice if this practice is illegal. As a certified public accountant
and a former state auditor himself, Cesas familiarity with the pertinent laws and
regulations should have cautioned him against making a certification in Box A.
Delay in the payment of salaries cannot be used as an excuse to violate the law
and pertinent COA regulations. Jacas repeated certification in Box B of the
vouchers despite the lack of liquidation of prior cash advances establishes her
gross inexcusable negligence in the performance of her duties.
Unlike in Sistoza, the vouchers Gaviola signed: (i) were on their face palpably
irregular for lack of entries required by law - i.e., the net amount of payroll to be
paid, the intended payees and the period covered by the payroll; and, (ii) lacked
supporting documents. Gaviola failed to substantiate his claim that he signed the
vouchers with supporting documents. None of the documents alleged to have
supported the vouchers were presented. In contrast, Chans finding and unbiased
testimony (that the vouchers were signed without supporting documents) enjoy
the presumption of regularity.
The petitioners claim of good faith has no basis, considering that the procedure
they adopted in approving the disbursement vouchers was made in violation of
existing laws and COA circulars. Also, Ariesga and Chan are competent to testify
on the COA Report as they were part of, and directly participated in, the audit
process.
OUR RULING
We deny the petitions.
At the outset, we emphasize that, as a rule, the Court does not review factual
questions under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. In appeals from the
Sandiganbayan, only questions of law and not issues of fact may be raised. Issues
raised before the Court on whether the prosecutions evidence proved the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt, whether the presumption of innocence was
properly accorded the accused, whether there was sufficient evidence to support
a charge of conspiracy, or whether the defense of good faith was correctly
appreciated are all, in varying degrees, questions of fact. As a rule, the factual
findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive on this Court, subject to limited
exceptions.49We find none of these exceptions in the present case.
The information is valid
Pursuant to the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him,50 the Revised Rules of Court51 require,
inter alia, that the information state the designation of the offense given by the

statute and the acts or omissions imputed which constitute the offense
charged.52 Additionally, it requires that these acts or omissions and their
attendant circumstances "be stated in ordinary and concise language" and "in
such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is intended to be charged and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment."53 As long as the crime is described in intelligible terms and with such
particularity and reasonable certainty that the accused is duly informed of the
offense charged, then the information is considered sufficient. In particular,
whether an information validly charges an offense depends on whether the
material facts alleged in the complaint or information shall establish the essential
elements of the offense charged as defined in the law. The raison detre of the
requirement in the Rules is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his
defense.54?r?l1
Admittedly, the prosecution could have alleged in the information the mode of
committing a violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 with technical precision by
using the disjunctive term "or" instead of the conjunctive term "and."
Nonetheless, in the early case of Gallego, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, 55 the Court
already clarified that the phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith" and
"gross inexcusable negligence" are merely descriptive of the different modes by
which the offense penalized in Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 may be committed,
and that the use of all these phrases in the same information does not mean that
the indictment charges three distinct offenses.
Notably, a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed either by
dolo, as when the accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or
by culpa as when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence. 56 Unlike in
the commission of ordinary felonies however, the law requires that the intent or
negligence, which must attend the commission of the prohibited acts under
Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, should meet the gravity required by law. Thus, in
construing these phrases, the Court observed that bad faith or partiality, on the
one hand, and negligence, on the other hand, per se are not enough for one to be
held criminally liable under the law; that the bad faith or partiality is evident or
manifest, or, that the negligent act or omission is gross and inexcusable must be
shown.57?r?l1
Gross inexcusable negligence is negligence characterized by the want of even
slight care; acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act,
not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to
consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of
that care which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their
own property;58 in cases involving public officials, it takes place only when breach
of duty is flagrant and devious.59?r?l1
Considering the countless scenarios that may fall under the provisions of Section
3 of RA No. 3019, particularly paragraph e, and the avowed purpose of the law to
repress certain acts of public officers constituting graft or corrupt practices or
leading thereto,60 the law considers the gravity of the bad faith (or partiality) or
negligent act or omission as a mode to commit the violation of Section 3(e) of RA
No. 3019. In requiring the negligence to be both gross and inexcusable, the law
demands the neglect or disregard of duty to be willful and intentional in order for
a violation to exist, although it may fall short of the required degree of bad faith,
which must be evident, or of partiality, which must be manifest.

Contrary to the petitioners claims, gross inexcusable negligence, on one hand,

and evident bad faith or manifest partiality, on the other hand, are not two highly
opposite concepts that can result in a fatally defective information should the
terms be conjoined in the information. The fact that the prosecution can properly
allege these different modes alternatively in the information only means that the
conviction may lie based simply on the evidence that is supportive of a particular
mode.61 Significantly, aside from the petitioners polemics, they have not shown
how their right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them
has actually been violated; in fact, they advanced no claim that the wordings in
the information prevented them from preparing their defense.
We likewise cannot support Cesas argument challenging the validity of the
information for being a product of an invalid preliminary investigation. Suffice it to
state that he had already advanced this argument in opposing the prosecutions
motion for the suspension of the petitioners pendente lite. The Sandiganbayan
granted the prosecutions motion and ordered the preventive suspension of the
petitioners who questioned the Sandiganbayans action on certiorari.
In a February 28, 2001 Resolution, the Court dismissed the petition for certiorari
for the petitioners failure to establish grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Sandiganbayan. Effectively, therefore, the Court passed upon and upheld the
validity of the proceedings that led to the filing of the information below.62 Under
the doctrine of the law of the case, our earlier ruling continues to be the rule
governing the same proceeding where the petitioners have been accused before
and convicted by the Sandiganbayan.63?r?l1OOOOOOOOOOOOOO
G.R. NO. 187317 : April 11, 2013
CARLITO C. ENCINAS, Petitioner, v. PO1 ALFREDO P. AGUSTIN, JR., and
PO1 JOEL S. CAUBANG,** Respondents.
DECISION
. Preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of
discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to
enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of the
case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a
crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that
the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he
cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that
pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal. (Emphases supplied)
This principle is further highlighted in MERALCO v. Atilano,92 in which this Court
clearly reiterated that a public prosecutor, in conducting a preliminary
investigation, is not exercising a quasi-judicial function. In a preliminary
investigation, the public prosecutor inspects the records and premises,
investigates the activities of persons or entities coming under the
formers' jurisdiction, or secures or requires the disclosure of information
by means of accounts, records, reports, statements, testimony of
witnesses, and production of documents. In contrast, judicial adjudication
signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and
obligations of concerned parties, viz.:
92

G.R. NO. 166758, 27 June 2012, 675 SCRA 112

This is reiterated in our ruling in Spouses Balangauan v. Court of Appeals, Special

Nineteenth Division, Cebu City, where we pointed out that a preliminary
investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, and the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial
agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public
prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause. A quasi-judicial agency
performs adjudicatory functions when its awards determine the rights of parties,
and its decisions have the same effect as a judgment of a court." This is not the
case when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to determine
probable cause to file an information against a person charged with a criminal
offense, or when the Secretary of Justice reviews the former's orders or
resolutions" on determination of probable cause.
In Odchigue-Bondoc, we ruled that when the public prosecutor conducts
preliminary investigation, he thereby exercises investigative or inquisitorial
powers. Investigative or inquisitorial powers include the powers of an
administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and investigate the
activities of persons or entities coming under his jurisdiction, or to secure, or to
require the disclosure of information by means of accounts, records, reports,
statements, testimony of witnesses, and production of documents. This power is
distinguished from judicial adjudication which signifies the exercise of power and
authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of concerned parties.
Indeed, it is the exercise of investigatory powers which sets a public prosecutor
apart from the court.
Indeed, the public prosecutor exercises investigative powers in the conduct of a
preliminary investigation to determine whether, based on the evidence presented,
further action should be taken through the filing of a criminal complaint in court.
Similarly, in the instant case, the BFP exercised its investigative or fact-finding
function to determine whether, based on the facts and the evidence presented,
further administrative action in the form of a formal charge should be taken
against petitioner. In neither instance is there in adjudication upon the rights,
obligations, or liabilities of the parties before them.
The CA was correct in ruling that there was substantial evidence to hold petitioner
administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service.
On the substantive issue, petitioner claims that the findings are based on a
misapprehension of facts. The dismissal of respondents from service allegedly
placed their credibility in question.93
At the outset, we stress the settled rule that the findings of fact of administrative
bodies will not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the former, or unless the aforementioned findings are not
supported by substantial evidence.94 These factual findings carry even more
weight when affirmed by the CA, in which case they are accorded not only great
respect, but even finality. These findings are binding upon this Court, unless
it is shown that the administrative body has arbitrarily disregarded or
misapprehended evidence before the latter to such an extent as to
compel a contrary conclusion, had the evidence been properly
appreciated.95 This rule is rooted in the doctrine that this Court is not a trier of
facts.96 By reason of the special knowledge and expertise of administrative
agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position
to pass judgment on those matters.97
We rule that the alleged dismissal of respondents from the service would not
suffice to discredit them as witnesses. In People v. Dominguez, 98 this Court had

occasion to rule that even a prior criminal conviction does not by itself
suffice to discredit a witness; the testimony of that witness must be
assayed and scrutinized in exactly the same way the testimonies of other
witnesses must be examined for their relevance and credibility. 99 In
Gomez v. Gomez-Samson,100 this Court echoed its previous
pronouncement that even convicted criminals are not excluded from
testifying as long as, having organs of sense, they "can perceive and
perceiving can make known their perceptions to others." 101
This pronouncement is even more significant in this case, as what petitioner is
alleging is not any past criminal conviction of respondents, but merely their
dismissal from the service.102 Scrutinizing the testimonies of respondents, we find,
as did both the CSC and the CA, that these testimonies carry more weight than
petitioner's self-serving statements and blanket denials.
Administrative proceedings "should not be made to depend on the whims and
caprices of complainants who are, in a real sense, only witnesses therein." 106
We have defined grave misconduct as follows:
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,
more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer; and
the misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption,
such as willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which
must be established by substantial evidence.107 (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, petitioner's acts likewise constitute conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. In Philippine Retirement Authority v. Rupa 108 this Court
elaborated on the specific acts that constitute the grave offense of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, considering that no concrete
description is provided under the Civil Service Law and rules. The Court outlined
therein following acts: misappropriation of public funds, abandonment of
office, failure to report back to work without prior notice, failure to keep
in safety public records and property, making false entries in public
documents, and falsification of court orders.109
Applying this principle to the present case, we hold that petitioner's offense is of
the same gravity or odiousness as that of the aforementioned acts and would
likewise amount to conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The penalty of dismissal includes forfeiture of retirement benefits, except
accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment
in government service and bar from taking civil service
examinations.111 On the other hand, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service is likewise a grave offense, but with a less severe penalty of
suspension of six ( 6) months and one ( 1) day to one ( 1) year for the first
offense and dismissal for the second offense.112
92

G.R. NO. 166758, 27 June 2012, 675 SCRA 112

Catmon Sales International Corporation v. Yngson, Jr., G.R. NO. 179761, 15

January 2010, 610 SCRA 236
94

9
96

Raniel v. Jochico, G.R. NO. 153413, 02 March 2007, 517 SCRA 221

97

Sps. Ricardo, Jr. v. Cinco, G.R. NO. 174143, 28 November 2011, 661 SCRA 311

98

G.R. NO. 100199, 18 January 1993, 217 SCRA 170

100

G.R. NO. 156284, 06 February 2007, 514 SCRA 475

See Gomez v. Gomez-Samson, G.R. NO. 156284, 06 February 2007, 514 SCRA
475
102

Flores v. Garcia, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1499 & A.M. No. P-03-1752, 06 October
2008, 567 SCRA 342
103

See Flores v. Garcia, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1499 & A.M. No. P-03-1752, 06 October
2008, 567 SCRA 342
104

Guro v. Doronio, 444 Phil. 827 (2003) citing Esmeralda-Baroy v. Peralta, 350
Phil. 431 (1998).
105

Guro v. Doronio, 444 Phil. 827 (2003) citing Reyes-Domingo v. Morales, 396
Phil. 150 (2000).
106

Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and Amelia
Serafico, A.M. No. 2008-20-SC, 15 March 2010, 615 SCRA 186, 203-204
107

108

415 Phil. 713 (2001)

Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Sec. 52(A) 3 [Sec.
4 (A)(3) of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil Service dated 18
November 2011 (Revised Rules)]
110

Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Sec. 58 (Sec. 52 of

the Revised Rules).
111

Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Sec. 52 (A) 20

[Sec. 46(8)(8) of the Revised Rules].
112

OOOOOOOO

GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW

In sum, we rule that there is no merit in complainants charge of gross ignorance
of the law leveled against respondent. To constitute gross ignorance of the
law, the acts complained of must not only be contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence, but were also motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty,
and corruption. [32] Gross ignorance of the law is a serious accusation, and a
person who accuses a judge of this very serious offense must be sure of the
grounds for the accusation. [33]
[32] Merontos Vda. de Sayson v. Judge Zerna, 414 Phil. 705, 712 (2001); Frani
v. Judge Pagayatan, 416 Phil. 205, 212 (2001).
[33] Visbal v. Ramos, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1306, 20 March 2001, 354 SCRA 631,
640.