SIDENOTES

HABEAS CORPUS
"The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of
personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is
restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire
into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of
action is sufficient.[14]
Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of
liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.
This is the basic requisite under the first part of Section 1, Rule 102, of the Revised Rules of
Court, which provides that "except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of
habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty."
In the second part of the same provision, however, Habeas Corpus may be resorted to in
cases where "the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto." Thus, although the Writ of Habeas Corpus ought not to be issued if the restraint is
voluntary, we have held time and again that the said writ is the proper legal remedy to
enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a
third person of her own free will.[15]
It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and
involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as
a remedy; rather, the writ of habeas corpus is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the
right of custody over a child.
PRETERITION
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them
either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 450 [1966];
Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA [1982]. Insofar as the widow is concerned, Article
854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend or descend from the testator,
although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is
not in the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil Code). However, the same thing cannot be said of the
other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption by the testator has not been
questioned by petitioner (Memorandum for the Petitioner, pp. 8-9). Under Article 39 of P.D.
No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person
the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the
adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that she was totally omitted
and preterited in the will of the testator and that both adopted child and the widow were
deprived of at least their legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly
disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
Preterition annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to intestate
succession the entire inheritance including "la porcin libre (que)no hubiese dispuesto en
virtual de legado, mejora o donacin" (Manresa, as cited in Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra;
Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA [1982]). The only provisions which do not result in
intestacy are the legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and
respected, except in so far as the legitimes are concerned.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire
inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of
such institution of universal heirs - without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear

terms, Article 854 of the Civil Code offers no leeway for inferential interpretation (Nuguid v.
Nuguid), supra. No legacies nor devises having been provided in the will the whole property
of the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters.
The effect of annulling the institution of heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of a total
intestacy (Neri v. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that proper legacies and devises must,
as already stated above, be respected.
LEGITIMACY
Even without it, however, the birth certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi v. Court of
Appeals,[11] where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public documents must be
sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity."
Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present
proceedings for that purpose. A persons legitimacy cannot be questioned in a
complaint for partition and accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by
the proper party.
The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code x x x does not have this purely evidential
character. It serves a more fundamental purpose. It actually fixes a civil status for the child
born in wedlock, and that civil status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the
child can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the
proper parties, and within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in
another action for a different purpose. x x x.[12] (Emphasis supplied.)
Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other
ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come
from different marriages.
The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his children
and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among his
collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is to
leave them eventually to his children as a token of his love for them and as a provision for
their continued care even after he is gone from this earth.
REPRESENTATION
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and acquires
the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but the one
whom the person represented would have succeeded.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are dead,
survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of representation.
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter
of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution
of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981, quoted above, she is entitled

to the share her father would have directly inherited had he survived, which shall be equal
to the shares of her grandparents other children.[13]
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom in
the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be
deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same rights as the latter, these rights do not
include the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only
the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of
either party.[14]
LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION
Q: Whether respondents petition for the issuance of letters of administration sufficiently
states a cause of action considering that respondent merely alleged therein that she is an
illegitimate child of the decedent, without stating that she had been acknowledged or
recognized as such by the latter?
A: Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person. In Saguinsin v. Lindayag,[14] the Court
defined an interested party as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or
one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. This interest, furthermore, must
be
material
and
direct,
not
merely
indirect
or
contingent.
Hence, where the right of the person filing a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration is dependent on a fact which has not been established or worse, can no
longer be established, such contingent interest does not make her an interested party. Here
lies the complication in the case which the appellate court had not discussed, although its
disposition of the case is correct.
Essentially, the petition for the issuance of letters of administration is a suit for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Ismael Tayag. The right of respondent to maintain such
a suit is dependent on whether she is entitled to successional rights as an illegitimate child
of the decedent which, in turn, may be established through voluntary or compulsory
recognition.
We find, therefore, that the allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child of the
decedent suffices even without further stating that she has been so recognized or
acknowledged. A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action in the complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged
therein.[

EVIDENCE | (Tison v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121027, [July 31, 1997], 342 PHIL 550-567)

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BURDEN OF PROOF. The burden of proof rests not on herein
petitioners who have the benefit of the presumption in their favor, but on private respondent
who is disputing the same. The presumption of legitimacy is so strong that it is clear that its
effect is to shift the burden of persuasion to the party claiming illegitimacy. And in order to

destroy the presumption, the party against whom it operates must adduce substantial and
credible evidence to the contrary. Where there is an entire lack of competent evidence to the
contrary, and unless or until it is rebutted, it has been held that a presumption may stand in
lieu of evidence and support a finding or decision. Perforce, a presumption must be followed
if it is uncontroverted. This is based on the theory that a presumption is prima facie proof of
the fact presumed, and unless the fact thus established prima facieby the legal presumption
of its truth is disproved, it must stand as proved. Indubitably, when private respondent opted
not to present countervailing evidence to overcome the presumption, by merely filing a
demurrer to evidence instead, she in effect impliedly admitted the truth of such fact.
3. REMEDIAL

LAW;

EVIDENCE;

TESTIMONIES;

EXCEPTION

TO

THE

HEARSAY

RULE;

DECLARATION ABOUT PEDIGREE; CONDITIONS. The primary proof to be considered in

ascertaining the relationship between the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon
Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime categorically
declared that the former is Teodora's niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration
about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is
dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is
the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the
declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not before the
commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any
controversy has arisen thereon.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUFFICIENCY DISCUSSED. American jurisprudence has it that a
distinction must be made as to when the relationship of the declarant may be proved by the
very declaration itself, or by other declarations of said declarant, and when men It must be
supported by evidence aliunde. The general rule is that where the party claiming seeks
recovery against a relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not from the
declarant himself or the declarant's estate, the relationship of the declarant's estate, the
relationship of the proved by the declaration itself. There must be some independent proof
of this fact. As an exception, the requirement that there be other proof than the declarations
of the declarant as to the relationship, does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate

of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his declarations to the
property of some other member of the family.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIRES NO FURTHER EVIDENCE IN CASE AT BAR. The present
case is one instance where the general requirement on evidence aliunde may be relaxed.
Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of the declarant herself. Conformably,
the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is
admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that
there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason being that such declarant is
rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure
of justice. More importantly, there is in the present case an absolute failure by all and sundry
to refute that declaration made by the decedent. Where the subject of the declaration is the
declarant's own relationship to another person. it seems absurd to require, as a foundation
for the admission of the declaration, proof of the very fact which the declaration is offered to
establish. The preliminary proof would render the main evidence unnecessary.
6. ID.; ID.; RULES OF ADMISSIBILITY; DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE; INSUFFICIENCY ADMITTED
WHEN NOT TIMELY OBJECTED. While the documentary evidence submitted by petitioners
do not strictly conform to the rules on their admissibility, we are however of the considered
opinion that the same may be admitted by reason of private respondent's failure to
interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were being offered in evidence. It is
elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible
document is offered in evidence, otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived, since
the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waived. The proper time is
when from the question addressed to the witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the
presentation of the proof, the inadmissibility of the evidence is, or may be inferred. Thus, a
failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform with the statute is a waiver of
the provisions of the law. That objection to a question put to a witness must be made at the
time the question is asked. An objection to the admission of evidence on the ground of
incompetency, taken after the testimony has been given, is too late. Thus, for instance,
failure to object to parol evidence given on the stand, where the party is in a position to
object, is a waiver of any objections thereto.
EVIDENCE

3. REMEDIAL

||

LAW;

EVIDENCE;

OFFICIAL

DOCUMENT

ENJOYS

PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY; CASE AT BAR; EXCEPTION. While it is

true that an official document such as petitioner's Birth Certificate enjoys the
presumption of regularity, the specific facts attendant in the case at bar, as well
as the totality of the evidence presented during trial, sufficiently negate such
presumption.First, there were already irregularities regarding the Birth Certificate
itself. It was not signed by the local civil registrar. More important, the Court of
Appeals observed that the mother's signature therein was different from her
signatures in other documents presented during the trial. Second, the
circumstances surrounding the birth of petitioner show that Hermogena is not the
former's real mother. For one, there is no evidence of Hermogena's pregnancy,
such as medical records and doctor's prescriptions, other than the Birth
Certificate itself. In fact, no witness was presented to attest to the pregnancy of
Hermogena during that time. Moreover, at the time of her supposed birth,
Hermogena was already 54 years old. Even if it were possible for her to have
given birth at such a late age, it was highly suspicious that she did so in her own
home, when her advanced age necessitated proper medical care normally
available only in a hospital.

ISHaC|||

(Babiera v. Catotal, G.R. No. 138493, [June 15,

2000], 389 PHIL 34-44)

CIVIL PROCEDURE;
JUDGMENT ON DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE. Private respondent may no longer be allowed to
present evidence by reason of the mandate under Section I of revised Rule 38 of the Rules of
Court which provides that "if the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is
reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence."
||| (Tison v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121027, [July 31, 1997], 342 PHIL 550-567)

REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; EFFECT OF FINAL JUDGMENT; RES

JUDICATA; APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. In the light of the ruling of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47832, as affirmed with finality by this Court in
G.R. No. 163124, there can be no serious objection to applying in this case the
rule on conclusiveness of judgment, one of two (2) concepts embraced in the res

judicata principle. Following the rule on conclusiveness of judgment, herein

respondent is precluded from claiming that she is the legitimate daughter of
Francisco and Genoveva Mercado. In fine, the issue of herein respondent's
legitimate filiation to Francisco and the latter's marriage to Genoveva, having
been judicially determined in a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction,
has thereby become res judicata and may not again be resurrected or litigated
between herein petitioner and respondent or their privies in a subsequent action,
regardless of the form of the latter.
8. ID.; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED
PERSONS; SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR; THE SURVIVING SPOUSE IS
PREFERRED OVER THE NEXT OF KIN OF THE DECEDENT. [I]t should be
noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the
deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent.
When the law speaks of the "next of kin", the difference is to those who are
entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the decedent's property; one whose
relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate as distributed, or in
short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters
of administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court
perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate action
will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration, the trial court
acted within bounds when it looked into and pass upon the claimed relationship
of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.
(Angeles v. Maglaya, G.R. No. 153798, [September 2, 2005], 506 PHIL 347365)
|||

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; A BIRTH CERTIFICATE TO BE CONSIDERED AS VALIDATING

PROOF OF PATERNITY AND AS AN INSTRUMENT OF RECOGNITION MUST
BE SIGNED BY THE FATHER AND MOTHER JOINTLY, OR BY THE MOTHER
ALONE IF THE FATHER REFUSES. The reason is as simple as it is
elementary: the Birth Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco against
whom legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It was signed by the
attending physician, one Rebecca de Guzman, who certified to having attended

the birth of a child. Such certificate, albeit considered a public record of a private
document is, under Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, evidence only of
the fact which gave rise to its execution: the fact of birth of a child. Jurisprudence
teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered as validating proof of paternity
and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the father and mother
jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses. Dr. Arturo Tolentino,
commenting on the probative value of the entries in a certificate of birth, wrote: . .
. if the alleged father did not intervene in the making of the birth certificate, the
putting of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is void; the signature of
the alleged father is necessary. (Angeles v. Maglaya, G.R. No. 153798,
[September 2, 2005], 506 PHIL 347-365)
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