Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

law." 4 Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed in the absence of prior
consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the Charter's nonimpairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI
members face should the Order be further enforced.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and
TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, respondents.
Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.

SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a
firm "engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for
overseas placement," 1 challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order
No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character
of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF
DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this
petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for
"discrimination against males or females;" 2 that it "does not apply to all Filipino
workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills;" 3 and that it is
violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the
lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.
In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the
Constitution, providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by

On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of
Labor and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed
a Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor
Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada,
Hongkong, United States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. * In submitting the
validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor General invokes the police power
of the Philippine State.
It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power
measure. The only question is whether or not it is valid under the Constitution.
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been
defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal
liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." 5 As defined, it consists
of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the
common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled
in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.
"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate
the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible
response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits." 6
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its
origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in
the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of
government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance.
Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, 7 refers to it succinctly as the
plenary power of the State "to govern its citizens." 8

"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection, and
it is not inaptly termed the "law of overwhelming necessity." It may be said to be that
inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things
hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society." 9
It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is
"rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to
enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the
enactment of such salutary measures calculated to ensure communal peace, safety,
good order, and welfare." 10 Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not purport to
be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the
greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's will." 11 It is
subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater
number.
Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations.
For all its awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or
unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is
exercised, that is, to advance the public good. Thus, when the power is used to
further private interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of the
power. 12
In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed.
As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed vahdity. 13 In the absence of clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should
be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to
"female contract workers," 14 but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination
between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the
Constitution 15 does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women.
It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial

distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not
confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the
same class. 16
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers
rests on substantial distinctions.
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has
befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid
exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal
abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even
rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are
compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely the caretaker of
Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation.
In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's efforts.
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is
no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been
afflicted with an Identical predicament. The petitioner has proffered no argument that
the Government should act similarly with respect to male workers. The Court, of
course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic notion that men are superior to
women. What the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of evidence (that
women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and not
upon some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this case. It is
evidence capable indeed of unquestionable demonstration and evidence this Court
accepts. The Court cannot, however, say the same thing as far as men are
concerned. There is simply no evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice it to
state, then, that insofar as classifications are concerned, this Court is content that
distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is justified.
As we have furthermore indicated, executive determinations are generally final on
the Court. Under a republican regime, it is the executive branch that enforces
policy. For their part, the courts decide, in the proper cases, whether that policy, or
the manner by which it is implemented, agrees with the Constitution or the laws, but

it is not for them to question its wisdom. As a co-equal body, the judiciary has
great respect for determinations of the Chief Executive or his subalterns,
especially when the legislature itself has specifically given them enough room
on how the law should be effectively enforced. In the case at bar, there is no
gainsaying the fact, and the Court will deal with this at greater length shortly, that
Department Order No. 1 implements the rule-making powers granted by the Labor
Code. But what should be noted is the fact that in spite of such a fiction of finality,
the Court is on its own persuaded that prevailing conditions indeed call for a
deployment ban.
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose
behind the measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order
No. 1 to "enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers" 17 this Court
has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have
suffered abroad, a ban on deployment will be for their own good and welfare.
The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to
apply indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself
("Pending review of the administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in
the host countries . . ." 18), meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a
means impressed with a greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As a
stop-gap measure, it is possessed of a necessary malleability, depending on the
circumstances of each case. Accordingly, it provides:
9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION. The Secretary of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) may, upon recommendation of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), lift the suspension in
countries where there are:
1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or,
2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure
the welfare and protection of Filipino workers. 19

The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female
domestic overseas workers. That it does not apply to "all Filipina workers" 20 is not
an argument for unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given universal applicability,
then it would have been unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of
them are similarly circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out
of a select person or group of persons within an existing class, to the prejudice of
such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or
group of persons. To apply the ban, say exclusively to workers deployed by A, but
not to those recruited by B, would obviously clash with the equal protection clause of
the Charter. It would be a classic case of what Chase refers to as a law that "takes
property from A and gives it to B." 21 It would be an unlawful invasion of property
rights and freedom of contract and needless to state, an invalid act. 22 (Fernando
says: "Where the classification is based on such distinctions that make a real
difference as infancy, sex, and stage of civilization of minority groups, the better rule,
it would seem, is to recognize its validity only if the young, the women, and the
cultural minorities are singled out for favorable treatment. There would be an
element of unreasonableness if on the contrary their status that calls for the law
ministering to their needs is made the basis of discriminatory legislation against
them. If such be the case, it would be difficult to refute the assertion of denial of
equal protection." 23 In the case at bar, the assailed Order clearly accords
protection to certain women workers, and not the contrary.)
It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a total ban on overseas
deployment. From scattered provisions of the Order, it is evident that such a total
ban has hot been contemplated. We quote:
5. AUTHORIZED DEPLOYMENT-The deployment of domestic helpers
and workers of similar skills defined herein to the following [sic] are
authorized under these guidelines and are exempted from the
suspension.
5.1 Hirings by immediate members of the family of Heads
of State and Government;

5.2 Hirings by Minister, Deputy Minister and the other

senior government officials; and
5.3 Hirings by senior officials of the diplomatic corps and
duly accredited international organizations.
5.4 Hirings by employers in countries with whom the
Philippines have [sic] bilateral labor agreements or
understanding.
xxx xxx xxx
7. VACATIONING DOMESTIC HELPERS AND WORKERS OF
SIMILAR SKILLS--Vacationing domestic helpers and/or workers of
similar skills shall be allowed to process with the POEA and leave for
worksite only if they are returning to the same employer to finish an
existing or partially served employment contract. Those workers
returning to worksite to serve a new employer shall be covered by the
suspension and the provision of these guidelines.
xxx xxx xxx
9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION-The Secretary of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) may, upon recommendation of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), lift the suspension in
countries where there are:
1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the
Philippines, and/or,
2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient
safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of
Filipino workers. 24
xxx xxx xxx

The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair
the right. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of
"public safety," "as may be provided by law." 25 Department Order No. 1 is a valid
implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection
to labor," 26pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-making authority
vested in it by the Labor Code. 27 The petitioner assumes that it is unreasonable
simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we have stated, the right
itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.
Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1
constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is
the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be
lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the
Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking powers in the enforcement
whereof. 28
The petitioners's reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker participation "in
policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits" 29 is not
well-taken. The right granted by this provision, again, must submit to the
demands and necessities of the State's power of regulation.
The Constitution declares that:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.

30

"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What
concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above
all, decent, just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons
and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at
home. Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our
toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally and economically, while
away from home. In this case, the Government has evidence, an evidence the

petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such protection, and
as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.
The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not indiscriminately made use
of its authority. It is not contested that it has in fact removed the prohibition with
respect to certain countries as manifested by the Solicitor General.
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must
yield to the loftier purposes targetted by the Government. 31 Freedom of contract and
enterprise, like all other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this
jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling
economic way of life.
This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the
business of recruitment. The concern of the Government, however, is not
necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events,
it is profits that suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of the State
is to provide a decent living to its citizens. The Government has convinced the Court
in this case that this is its intent. We do not find the impugned Order to be tainted
with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Cortes and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr. and Medialdea, JJ., are on leave.

PASEI vs DRILON
Edit 0 1

PASEI vs DRILON
163 SCRA 380
Facts:Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is
engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male
and female of overseas employment. It challenges the
constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE
entitled Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of
Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers. It
claims that such order is a discrimination against males and
females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only
to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is
in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise
of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of
the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as
may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on
behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged
guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed
the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in
some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the

Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient

safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino
workers.
Issue:Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the
challenged Department Order No. 1.
Decision:SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been
valid classification, the Filipino female domestics working abroad
were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to
which their class was exposed. There is no question that Order
No.1 applies only to female contract workers but it does not
thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. It is well
settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does
not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women.
It admits of classification, provided that:
1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions
2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law
3. They are not confined to existing conditions
4. They apply equally to al members of the same class
In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial
distinctions.
Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The
consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to travel
does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among
other things, to the requirements of public safety as may be
provided by law. Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a

valid exercise of police power. Police power as been defined as

the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare.
Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order
No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the
labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.

G.R. No. 77875 February 4, 1993

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO SANTOS, JR., HOUDIEL MAGADIA, GILBERT ANTONIO, REGINO
DURAN, PHILIPPINE AIRLINES EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, and THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, respondents.
Fortunato Gupit, Jr., Solon R. Garcia, Rene B. Gorospe, Bienvinodo T. Jamoralin, jr.
and Paulino D. Ungos, Jr. for petitioner.
Adolpho M. Guerzon for private respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
The instant petition for certiorari seeks to set aside the decision of The National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. 4-1206-85, promulgated on
December 11, 1986, 1 containing the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the Decision
appealed from is set aside and another one entered, declaring the

suspension of complainants to be illegal and consequently, respondent

PAL is directed to pay complainants their salaries corresponding to the
respective period(s) of their suspension, and to delete the disciplinary
action from complainants' service records.2
These material facts recited in the basic petition are virtually undisputed and we
reproduce the same hereunder:
1. Individual respondents are all Port Stewards of Catering SubDepartment, Passenger Services Department of petitioner. Their duties
and responsibilities, among others, are:
Prepares meal orders and checklists, setting up standard
equipment in accordance with the requirements of the
type of service for each flight; skiing, binning, and
inventorying of Commissary supplies and equipment.
2. On various occasions, several deductions were made from their
salary. The deductions represented losses of inventoried items
charged to them for mishandling of company properties . . . which
respondents resented. Such that on August 21, 1984, individual
respondents, represented by the union, made a formal notice
regarding the deductions to petitioner thru Mr. Reynaldo Abad,
Manager for Catering. . . .
3. As there was no action taken on said representation, private
respondents filed a formal grievance on November 4, 1984 pursuant
to the grievance machinery Step 1 of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement between petitioner and the union. . . . The topics which the
union wanted to be discussed in the said grievance were the
illegal/questionable salary deductions and inventory of bonded goods
and merchandise being done by catering service personnel which they
believed should not be their duty.

4. The said grievance was submitted on November 21, 1984 to the

office of Mr. Reynaldo Abad, Manager for Catering, who at the time
was on vacation leave. . . .
5. Subsequently, the grievants (individual respondents) thru the shop
steward wrote a letter on December 5, 1984 addressed to the office of
Mr. Abad, who was still on leave at the time, that inasmuch as no reply
was made to their grievance which "was duly received by your
secretary" and considering that petitioner had only five days to resolve
the grievance as provided for in the CBA, said grievance as believed
by them (private respondents) was deemed resolved in their favor. . . .
6. Upon Mr. Abad's return on December 7, 1984, he immediately
informed the grievants and scheduled a meeting on December 12,
1984. . . .
7. Thereafter, the individual respondents refused to conduct inventory
works. Alberto Santos, Jr. did not conduct ramp inventory on
December 7, 10 and 12. Gilbert Antonio did not conduct ramp
inventory on December 10. In like manner, Regino Duran and Houdiel
Magadia did not conduct the same on December 10 and 12.
8. At the grievance meeting which was attended by some union
representatives, Mr. Abad resolved the grievance by denying the
petition of individual respondents and adopted the position that
inventory of bonded goods is part of their duty as catering service
personnel, and as for the salary deductions for losses, he rationalized:
1. It was only proper that employees are charged for the
amount due to mishandling of company property which
resulted to losses. However, loss may be cost price 1/10
selling price.

9. As there was no ramp inventory conducted on the mentioned dates,

Mr. Abad, on January 3, 1985 wrote by an inter-office memorandum
addressed to the grievants, individual respondents herein, for them to
explain on (sic) why no disciplinary action should be taken against
them for not conducting ramp inventory. . . .
10. The directive was complied with . . . . The reason for not
conducting ramp inventory was put forth as:
4. Since the grievance step 1 was not decided and no
action was done by your office within 5 days from
November 21, 1984, per provision of the PAL-PALEA
CBA, Art. IV, Sec. 2, the grievance is deemed resolved in
PALEA's favor.
11. Going over the explanation, Mr. Abad found the same
unsatisfactory. Thus, a penalty of suspension ranging from 7 days to
30 days were (sic) imposed depending on the number of infractions
committed. *
12. After the penalty of suspension was meted down, PALEA filed
another grievance asking for lifting of, or at least, holding in abeyance
the execution of said penalty. The said grievance was forthwith denied
but the penalty of suspension with respect to respondent Ramos was
modified, such that his suspension which was originally from January
15, 1985 to April 5, 1985 was shortened by one month and was lifted
on March 5, 1985. The union, however, made a demand for the
reimbursement of the salaries of individual respondents during the
period of their suspension.

13. Petitioner stood pat (o)n the validity of the suspensions. Hence, a
complaint for illegal suspension was filed before the
Arbitration Branch of the Commission, . . . Labor Arbiter Ceferina
J. Diosana, on March 17, 1986, ruled in favor of petitioner by
dismissing the complaint. . . . 3
Private respondents appealed the decision of the labor arbiter to respondent
commission which rendered the aforequoted decision setting aside the labor arbiter's
order of dismissal. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied, it
interposed the present petition.
The Court is accordingly called upon to resolve the issue of whether or not public
respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in rendering the aforementioned decision.
Evidently basic and firmly settled is the rule that judicial review by this Court in labor
cases does not go so far as to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence upon which
the labor officer or office based his or its determination, but is limited to issues of
jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. 4 It has not been shown that respondent NLRC has
unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins it to perform as a
duty or has otherwise unlawfully excluded petitioner from the exercise of a right to which it is entitled.

The instant case hinges on the interpretation of Section 2, Article IV of the PALPALEA Collective Bargaining Agreement, (hereinafter, CBA), to wit:
Sec. 2 Processing of Grievances
xxx xxx xxx
STEP 1 Any employee who believes that he has a justifiable
grievance shall take the matter up with his shop steward. If the shop
steward feels there is justification for taking the matter up with the
Company, he shall record the grievance on the grievance form
heretofore agreed upon by the parties. Two (2) copies of the grievance
form properly filled, accepted, and signed shall then be presented to

and discussed by the shop steward with the division head. The division
head shall answer the grievance within five (5) days from the date of
presentation by inserting his decision on the grievance form, signing
and dating same, and returning one copy to the shop steward. If the
division head fails to act within the five (5)-day regl(e)mentary period,
the grievance must be resolved in favor of the aggrieved party. If the
division head's decision is not appealed to Step II, the grievance shall
be considered settled on the basis of the decision made, and shall not
be eligible for further appeal. 5 (Emphasis ours.)
Petitioner submits that since the grievance machinery was established for both labor
and management as a vehicle to thresh out whatever problems may arise in the
course of their relationship, every employee is duty bound to present the matter
before management and give the latter an opportunity to impose whatever corrective
measure is possible. Under normal circumstances, an employee should not preempt
the resolution of his grievance; rather, he has the duty to observe the status quo. 6
Citing Section 1, Article IV of the CBA, petitioner further argues that respondent
employees have the obligation, just as management has, to settle all labor disputes
through friendly negotiations. Thus, Section 2 of the CBA should not be narrowly
interpreted. 7 Before the prescriptive period of five days begins to run, two concurrent requirements
must be met, i.e., presentment of the grievance and its discussion between the shop steward and the
division head who in this case is Mr. Abad. Section 2 is not self-executing; the mere filing of the
grievance does not trigger the tolling of the prescriptive period. 8

Petitioner has sorely missed the point.

It is a fact that the sympathy of the Court is on the side of the laboring classes, not
only because the Constitution imposes such sympathy, but because of the one-sided
relation between labor and capital. 9 The constitutional mandate for the promotion of labor is as
explicit as it is demanding. The purpose is to place the workingman on an equal plane with
management with all its power and influence in negotiating for the advancement of his interests
and the defense of his rights. 10 Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to
accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with less
privileges in life should have more privileges in law. 11

It is clear that the grievance was filed with Mr. Abad's secretary during his
absence. 12 Under Section 2 of the CBA aforequoted, the division head shall act on the grievance
within five (5) days from the date of presentation thereof, otherwise "the grievance must be resolved
in favor of the aggrieved party." It is not disputed that the grievants knew that division head Reynaldo
Abad was then "on leave" when they filed their grievance which was received by Abad's
secretary. 13 This knowledge, however, should not prevent the application of the CBA.

On this score, respondent NLRC aptly ruled:

. . . Based on the facts heretofore narrated, division head Reynaldo
Abad had to act on the grievance of complainants within five days from
21 November 1984. Therefore, when Reynaldo Abad, failed to act
within the reglementary period, complainants, believing in good faith
that the effect of the CBA had already set in, cannot be blamed if they
did not conduct ramp inventory for the days thereafter. In this regard,
respondent PAL argued that Reynaldo Abad was on leave at the time
the grievance was presented. This, however, is of no moment, for it is
hard to believe that everything under Abad's authority would have to
stand still during his absence from office. To be sure, it is to be
expected that someone has to be left to attend to Abad's duties. Of
course, this may be a product of inadvertence on the part of PAL
management, but certainly, complainants should not be made to suffer
the consequences. 14
Contrary to petitioner's submission, 15 the grievance of employees is not a matter which
requires the personal act of Mr. Abad and thus could not be delegated. Petitioner could at least have
assigned an officer-in-charge to look into the grievance and possibly make his recommendation to Mr.
Abad. It is of no moment that Mr. Abad immediately looked into the grievance upon returning to work,
for it must be remembered that the grievants are workingmen who suffered salary deductions and
who rely so much on their meager income for their daily subsistence and survival. Besides, it is
noteworthy that when these employees first presented their complaint on August 21, 1984, petitioner
failed to act on it. It was only after a formal grievance was filed and after Mr. Abad returned to work on
December 7, 1984 that petitioner decided to turn an ear to their plaints.

As respondent NLRC has pointed out, Abad's failure to act on the matter may have
been due to petitioner's inadvertence, 16 but it is clearly too much of an injustice if the

employees be made to bear the dire effects thereof. Much as the latter were willing to discuss their
grievance with their employer, the latter closed the door to this possibility by not assigning someone
else to look into the matter during Abad's absence. Thus, private respondents should not be faulted
for believing that the effects of the CBA in their favor had already stepped into the controversy.

If the Court were to follow petitioner's line of reasoning, it would be easy for
management to delay the resolution of labor problems, the complaints of the workers
in particular, and hide under the cloak of its officers being "on leave" to avoid being
caught by the 5-day deadline under the CBA. If this should be allowed, the
workingmen will suffer great injustice for they will necessarily be at the mercy of their
employer. That could not have been the intendment of the pertinent provision of the
CBA, much less the benevolent policy underlying our labor laws.
ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby DENIED
and the assailed decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is
AFFIRMED. This judgment is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Nocon and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.