Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
BOOK I
I. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
1. Magno v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96132, June 26, 1992
Considering further that the victim sustained wounds that were not
fatal and absent a showing that such wounds would have certainly
caused his death were it not for timely medical assistance, we declare
the petitioners guilt to be limited to the crime of attempted homicide.
11. People v. Pareja, G.R. No. 188979, September 5, 2012
In the case at bar, the conclusion that Milan and Chua conspired with
Carandang was established by their acts (1) before Carandang shot the
victims (Milans closing the door when the police officers introduced
themselves, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush), and (2) after the
shooting (Chuas directive to Milan to attack SPO1 Montecalvo and
Milans following such instruction). Contrary to the suppositions of
appellants, these facts are not meant to prove that Chua is a principal by
inducement, or that Milans act of attacking SPO1 Montecalvo was what
made him a principal by direct participation. Instead, these facts are
convincing circumstantial evidence of the unity of purpose in the minds
of the three. As co-conspirators, all three are considered principals by
direct participation.
As held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, Milans act of closing
the door facilitated the commission of the crime, allowing Carandang to
wait in ambush. The sudden gunshots when the police officers pushed
the door open illustrate the intention of appellants and Carandang to
It is clear that without the tally sheets and delivery receipts, the general
voucher cannot be prepared and completed. Without the general
voucher, the check for the payment of the supply cannot be made and
issued to the supplier. Without the check payment, the defraudation
The American courts following the "single larceny" rule, look at the
commission of the different criminal acts as but one continuous act
involving the same "transaction" or as done on the same "occasion"
(State v. Sampson, 157 Iowa 257, 138 NW 473; People v. Johnson, 81
Mich. 573, 45 NW 1119; State v. Larson, 85 Iowa 659, 52 NW 539).
20. Ilagan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110617 December 29, 1994
In relation to the charge that rape was complexed with the crime of
serious physical injuries, we stress the settled principle that a person
who creates in anothers mind an immediate sense of danger that causes
the latter to try to escape is responsible for whatever the other person
may consequently suffer. In this case, Josephine jumped from a window
of her house to escape from Appellant Castromero; as a result, she
suffered serious physical injuries, specifically a broken vertebra which
required medical attention and surgery for more than ninety days. This
There are distinctions between a composite crime, on the one hand, and
a complex or compound crime under Article 48, on the other hand. In a
composite crime, the composition of the offenses is fixed by law; in a
complex or compound crime, the combination of the offenses is not
specified but generalized, that is, grave and/or less grave, or one offense
being the necessary means to commit the other. For a composite crime,
the penalty for the specified combination of crimes is specific; for a
complex or compound crime, the penalty is that corresponding to the
most serious offense, to be imposed in the maximum period. A light
felony that accompanies a composite crime is absorbed; a light felony
that accompanies the commission of a complex or compound crime may
be the subject of a separate information.
II. CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Justifying Circumstances
- Self-Defense
26. Nacnac v. People, G.R. No. 191913, March 21, 2012
Ordinarily, as pointed out by the lower court, there is a difference
between the act of drawing ones gun and the act of pointing ones gun at
a target. The former cannot be said to be unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim. In People v. Borreros, We ruled that for unlawful
aggression to be attendant, there must be a real danger to life or
personal safety. Unlawful aggression requires an actual, sudden and
unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude x x x. Here, the act of the [deceased]
of allegedly drawing a gun from his waist cannot be categorized as
unlawful aggression. Such act did not put in real peril the life or
personal safety of appellant. The facts surrounding the instant case
must, however, be differentiated from current jurisprudence on
unlawful aggression. The victim here was a trained police officer. He
was inebriated and had disobeyed a lawful order in order to settle a
score with someone using a police vehicle. A warning shot fired by a
fellow police officer, his superior, was left unheeded as he reached for
his own firearm and pointed it at petitioner. Petitioner was, therefore,
justified in defending himself from an inebriated and disobedient
colleague.
27. People v. Campos, G.R. No. 176061, July 4, 2011
Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21)
years can no longer avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA
9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because such is already moot and
academic. It is highly noted that this would not have happened if the CA,
when this case was under its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the
appellant. The records show that the appellant filed his notice of appeal
at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344 became effective in 2006,
appellant was 20 years old, and the case having been elevated to the CA,
the latter should have suspended the sentence of the appellant because
he was already entitled to the provisions of Section 38 of the same law,
which now allows the suspension of sentence of minors regardless of
the penalty imposed as opposed to the provisions of Article 192 of P.D.
603.
- Accident
42. Toledo v. People, G.R. No. 158057, September 24, 2004
It is an aberration for the petitioner to invoke the two defenses at the
same time because the said defenses are intrinsically antithetical. There
is no such defense as accidental self-defense in the realm of criminal
law.
Petitioner, being very much smaller in height and heft, had the good
sense of trying to avoid a fight. But as events turned out, a fisticuff still
ensued, suddenly ending when petitioners lucky punch found its mark.
In People v. Macaso, a case where the accused police officer shot and
killed a motorist for repeatedly taunting him with defiant words, the
Court appreciated the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation
or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceding the
shooting. The Court had the same attitude in Navarro v. Court of
Appeals, a case also involving a policeman who killed a man after the
latter challenged him to a fight. Hence, there is no rhyme or reason why
the same mitigating circumstance should not be considered in favor of
petitioner.
- Passion/Obfuscation
47. People v. Ignas, G.R. No. 140514 , September 30, 2003
The rule is that the mitigating circumstances of vindication of a grave
offense and passion and obfuscation cannot be claimed at the same
time, if they arise from the same facts or motive. In other words, if
appellant attacked his victim in proximate vindication of a grave
offense, he could no longer claim in the same breath that passion and
obfuscation also blinded him. Moreover, for passion and obfuscation to
be well founded, the following requisites must concur: (1) there should
be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of
mind; and (2) the act which produced the obfuscation was not far
removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of
time, during which the perpetrator might recover his moral
equanimity. To repeat, the period of two (2) weeks which spanned the
discovery of his wifes extramarital dalliance and the killing of her lover
was sufficient time for appellant to reflect and cool off.
48. People of the Philippines v. Oloverio, G.R. No. 211159. March 18,
2015
To be able to successfully plead the mitigating circumstance of passion
and obfuscation, the accused must be able to prove the following
elements: 1. that there be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce
such condition of mind; and 2. that said act which produced the
obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a
But, we must stress that provocation and passion or obfuscation are not
two separate mitigating circumstances. Well-settled is the rule that if
these two circumstances are based on the same facts, they should be
treated together as one mitigating circumstance. From the facts
established in this case, it is clear that both circumstances arose from
the same set of facts aforementioned. Hence, they should not be treated
as two separate mitigating circumstances.
-Voluntary Surrender
50. People v. Viernes, G.R. No. 136733, December 13, 2001
The act of surrender must be spontaneous, accompanied by an
acknowledgment of guilt, or an intention to save the authorities the
trouble and the expense that search and capture would require. Going to
the police station to clear his name does not show any intent of
appellant to surrender unconditionally to the authorities
51. People v. Abolidor, G.R. No. 147231, February 18, 2004
Treachery attended the killing of the 6-year old Jerry Tejamo for when
an adult person illegally attacks a child of tender years and causes his
death, treachery exists.
57. People v. Latag, G.R. No. 153213. January 22, 2004
In the present case, we find nothing in the records that shows the exact
manner of the killing. Though Atienza turned around immediately after
hearing a gunshot, he could not, and in fact did not, testify as to how the
attack had been initiated. The fact that appellant was standing behind
some shrubs when he shot the victim does not by itself sufficiently
establish that the method of execution gave the latter no opportunity for
self-defense. Nor was the attack deliberately and consciously adopted
by the former without danger to himself.
58. People v. Dinglasan, G.R. No. 101312. January 28, 1997
The Revised Penal Code provides that "(t)here is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from
the defense which the offended party might make." In the case at bench,
the presence of treachery or alevosia which qualified the killing to
murder was correctly appreciated by the trial court because the manner
by which the perpetrators commenced and consummated the stabbing
of the victim Efren Lasona showed conclusively that the latter was
totally surprised by the attack and not afforded an opportunity to raise
any defense against his attackers. Efren Lasona could not have expected,
while riding in that tricycle, that he would be savagely and fatally
assaulted by knife-wielding attackers. The victim was defenseless
during the attack as his hands were restrained by the accused-appellant
to facilitate the stabbing of the victim by the other perpetrators. It is
well-settled that "(a)n unexpected and sudden attack under
circumstances which render the victim unable and unprepared to
defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack,
constitutes alevosia." Parenthetically, the fact that the attack on
deceased Efren Lasona was frontal does not preclude the presence of
treachery in this case as the same made the attack no less unexpected
and sudden.
- Ignominy
59. People v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-62116 March 22, 1990
The trial court is correct in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of
ignominy because of the greater perversity displayed by the offenders.
The testimony of the examining physician that he did not find mud on
the victim's private organ, does not necessarily belie the latter's
asseveration that the accused "plastered" (in the words of the lower
court) mud on her private part. It is worthwhile mentioning that the
victim was examined and treated by Dr. Claudio at 3:55 p.m. or about
almost two (2) hours after the rape was committed. 17 Given this
circumstance, the absence of mud in the victim's private part when she
was examined by the physician, may be attributed to the possibility that
the mud washed or fell off even before the victim left the house for her
physical examination. Moreover, Rebecca's testimony was corroborated
by that of Amelita Malong who swore that she saw mud smeared on
Rebecca's private part when she (Amelita) saw Rebecca right after the
incident. It is also difficult to conceive why the offended party, young as
she was, and with a chaste reputation, would go to the extent of
fabricating this portion of her testimony notwithstanding the
consequent humiliation on her person and disgrace on her womanhood.
We cannot but agree with the trial court's finding that the offense was
aggravated by ignominy. We are of the opinion, however that the word
"cruelty" used in the dispositive portion of the judgment, to describe an
alternative aggravating circumstance, is unnecessary. The act of
"plastering" mud on the victim's vagina right after she was raped, is
adequately and properly described as "ignominy" rather than "cruelty
or ignominy."
Alternative Circumstances
60. People v. Fontillas, G.R. No. 184177, December 15, 2010
Accused appellant did not present any evidence that his intoxication
was not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the rape. The
person pleading intoxication must likewise prove that he took such
Accessories
64. Dizon-Pamintuan v. People, G.R. No. 111426, July 11, 1994
Before P.D. No. 1612, a fence could only be prosecuted for and held
liable as an accessory, as the term is defined in Article 19 of the Revised
Penal Code. The penalty applicable to an accessory is obviously light
under the rules prescribed in Articles 53, 55, and 57 of the Revised
Penal Code, subject to the qualification set forth in Article 60 thereof.
Nothing, however, the reports from law enforcement agencies that
"there is rampant robbery and thievery of government and private
properties" and that "such robbery and thievery have become profitable
on the part of the lawless elements because of the existence of ready
buyers, commonly known as fence, of stolen properties," P.D.
No. 1612 was enacted to "impose heavy penalties on persons who profit
by the effects of the crimes of robbery and theft." Evidently, the
accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft could be prosecuted as
such under the Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612. However, in
the latter case, he ceases to be a mere accessory but becomes
aprincipal in the crime of fencing. Elsewise stated, the crimes of robbery
and theft, on the one hand, and fencing, on the other, are separate and
distinct offenses.
Anti Fencing Law
65. Dimat v. People, G.R. No. 181184, January 25, 2012
The elements of fencing are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed;
2) the accused, who took no part in the robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells,
or in any manner deals in any article or object taken during that robbery
or theft; (3) the accused knows or should have known that the thing
derived from that crime; and (4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain
for himself or for another. evidently, Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari
he bought was not properly documented. He said that Tolentino showed
him its old certificate of registration and official receipt. But this
certainly could not be true because, the vehicle having been carnapped,
Tolentino had no documents to show. That Tolentino was unable to
make good on his promise to produce new documents undoubtedly
confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an illicit
source. Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado who apparently
made no effort to check the papers covering her purchase.
IV. PENALTIES
66. People v. Rocha, G.R. No. 173797, August 31, 2007
It should be kept in mind that accused-appellants could not avail
themselves of parole if their appeal is dismissed, unless they also apply
for executive clemency and ask for the commutation of their reclusion
perpetua sentences. Republic Act No. 4108, as amended, otherwise
known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, does not apply to persons
convicted of offenses punishable with death penalty or life
imprisonment. In several cases, we have considered the penalty of
reclusion perpetua as synonymous to life imprisonment for purposes of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and ruled that said law does not apply
to persons convicted of offenses punishable with the said penalty.
67. People v. Bon, G.R. No. 166401, October 30, 2006
rulings that the penalty two degrees lower than "reclusion perpetua to
death" isprision mayor.
68. Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan,G.R. Nos. L-51065-72, June 30, 1987
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder is
reclusion perpetua to death. There being no other aggravating
circumstance other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the
CA correctly held that the proper imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua, the lower of the two indivisible penalties. "It must be
emphasized, however, that [appellant is] not eligible for parole pursuant
to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 which states that persons
convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose
sentence will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act,
shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."
- Probation Law
76. Padua v. People, G.R. No. 168546, July 23, 2008
The law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation. Any person
convicted for drug trafficking or pushing, regardless of the penalty
imposed, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or
P.D. No. 968. The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when
the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their
meaning must be determined from the language employed and the
statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. If a statute is clear,
plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
One of those who dissent from this decision points out that allowing
Arnel to apply for probation after he appealed from the trial courts
judgment of conviction would not be consistent with the provision of
Section 2 that the probation law should be interpreted to provide an
opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender. An accused like
Arnel who appeals from a judgment convicting him, it is claimed, shows
no penitence.
This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct judgment
of conviction. Here, however, it convicted Arnel of the wrong crime,
frustrated homicide, that carried a penalty in excess of 6 years. How can
the Court expect him to feel penitent over a crime, which as the Court
now finds, he did not commit? He only committed attempted homicide
with its maximum penalty of 2 years and 4 months.
Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to
under the reduced penalty, it would be sending
bars. It would be robbing him of the chance
reformation as a penitent offender, defeating the
probation law.
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the prescription shall begin to
run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment. The running of the prescriptive period shall be interrupted
when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall
begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not provide
that the absence of the accused from the Philippines prevents the
running of the prescriptive period. Thus, the only inference that can be
gathered from the foregoing is that the legislature, in enacting Act No.
3326, did not consider the absence of the accused from the Philippines
as a hindrance to the running of the prescriptive period.Expressio unius
est exclusio alterius.
83. People v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012
October 7, 2013
Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the
Office of the Prosecutor who then files the Information in court, this
already has the effect of tolling the prescription period. The recent
People v. Pangilinan categorically stated that Zaldivia v. Reyes is not
controlling as far as special laws are concerned. Pangilinan referred to
other cases that upheld this principle as well. However, the doctrine of
Pangilinan pertains to violations of special laws but not to ordinances.
It stands that the doctrine of Zaldivia that the running of the
prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is filed in Court
and not on any date before that, is applicable to ordinances and their
prescription period.
85. People v. Lim, February 13, 1992 G.R. No. 95753
While the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during
the pendency of the appeal or before conviction by final judgment and,
therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of Section 19, Article VII of
the Constitution, the grant of the amnesty, for which accused-appellants
William Casido and Franklin Alcorin voluntarily applied under
Proclamation No. 347, 3 was valid. This Proclamation was concurred in
by both Houses of Congress in Concurrent Resolution No.12 adopted on
2 June 1994.
87. People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 185843, March 3, 2010
BOOK II
Crimes Against National Security (Arts. 114-123)
- Treason
88. Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil 856
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus claiming that a Filipino
citizen who adhered to the enemy, giving the latter aid and comfort
during the Japanese occupation, cannot be prosecuted for the crime of
treason for the reasons that: (1) the sovereignty of the legitimate
government in the Philippines and, consequently, the correlative
allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that
there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the
proclamation of the Philippine Republic. The Supreme Court dismissed
the petition and ruled that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the
inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of their legitimate
government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy
occupation because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de
jure is not transferred thereby to the occupier, and if it is not
transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the
legitimate government.
89. People v. Perez, 83 Phil 314
different set of facts. Jerry Manlangit did not see any of accusedappellant apprehend or detain Samson Sayam. He did not even see if
accused-appellant Flores really inspected the residence certificate and
barangay clearance of Samson Sayam. The rest of his testimony
comprised of hearsay evidence, which has no probative value. In
summary, Jerry Manlangits testimony failed to establish that accusedappellants were guilty of arbitrary detention.
92. People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1
When the accused is arrested on the sole basis of a verbal report, the
arrest without a warrant under Section 6(a) of Rule 113 is not lawful
and legal since the offense must also be committed in his presence or
within his view. It is not enough that there is reasonable ground to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime for an
essential precondition under the rule is that the crime must in fact or
actually have been committed first.
93. Albor v. Aguis, A.M. No. P-01-1472, June 26, 2003
- Sedition
98. People v. Hadji October 24, 1963 G.R. L-12686
The rule in this jurisdiction allows the treatment of the common
offenses of murder etc. as distinct and independent acts separable from
sedition. Where the acts of violence were deemed absorbed in the crime
of rebellion, the same does not apply in the crime of sedition.
-Inciting to Sedition
99. Mendoza v. People, G.R. L-2990, December 17 1951
A published writing which calls our government one of crooks and
dishonest persons ("dirty") infested with Nazis and Fascists i.e.
dictators, and which reveals a tendency to produce dissatisfaction or a
feeling incompatible with the disposition to remain loyal to the
government, is a scurrilous libel against the Government. Any citizen
may criticize his government and government officials and submit his
criticism to the "free trade of ideas" but such criticism should be specific
and constructive, specifying particular objectionable actuations of the
government. It must be reasoned or tempered and not a contemptuous
condemnation of the entire government set-up.
Illegal Possession of Firearms
100. Celino v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170562, June 29, 2007
When the other offense is one of those enumerated under RA 8294, any
information for illegal possession of firearms should be quashed
because the illegal possession of firearm would have to be tried together
with such other offense, either considered as an aggravating
circumstance in murder or homicide, or absorbed as an element of
rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d etat and
conversely, when the other offense involved is not one of those
enumerated under RA 8294, then the separate case for illegal
possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted. The
constitutional bar against double jeopardy will not apply since these
offenses are quite different from one another, with the first punished
under the Revised Penal Code and the second under a special law.
R.A 10591, SEC. 29. Use of Loose Firearm in the Commission of a
Crime. The use of a loose firearm, when inherent in the
commission of a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code or
other special laws, shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance: Provided, That if the crime committed with the use
of a loose firearm is penalized by the law with a maximum penalty
which is lower than that prescribed in the preceding section for
illegal possession of firearm, the penalty for illegal possession of
firearm shall be imposed in lieu of the penalty for the crime
charged: Provided, further, That if the crime committed with the
use of a loose firearm is penalized by the law with a maximum
penalty which is equal to that imposed under the preceding section
for illegal possession of firearms, the penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period shall be imposed in addition to the penalty for the
crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code or other special
laws of which he/she is found guilty.
If the violation of this Act is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in
connection with the crime of rebellion of insurrection, or
attempted coup d etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an
element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, or attempted
coup d etat.
If the crime is committed by the person without using the loose
firearm, the violation of this Act shall be considered as a distinct
and separate offense.
- Direct Assault
101. Justo v. Court of Appeals, 99 Phil 453
The character of person in authority is not assumed or laid off at will,
but attaches to a public official until he ceases to be in office. Assuming
that the complainant is not actually performing the duties of his office
when assaulted, this fact does not bar the existence of the crime of
assault upon a person in authority, so long as the impelling motive of
the attack is the performance of official duty. Also, where there is a
mutual agreement to fight, an aggression ahead of the stipulated time
and place would be unlawful since to hold otherwise would be to
sanction unexpected assaults contrary to all sense of loyalty and fair
play.
102. People v. Dollantes, June 30, 1987 G.R. 70639
If the accused acted in good faith when she signed her spouse's name to
the checks and encashed them to pay for the expenses of the spouses
last illness and burial upon the belief that the accused is entitled to them
and considering that the government sustained no damage due to such
encashment, criminal intent may not be ascribed, and the accused
should be acquitted to such crime.
107. People v. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120
pretenses that said permits could be used in lieu of, or at the least as an
excuse not to obtain, the Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR.
Crimes Relative to Opium and Other Prohibited Drugs
110. People v. Edgardo Fermin, G.R. No. 179344, August, 3, 2011
While Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. 9165 excuses non-compliance with the afore-quoted
procedure, the same holds true only for as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officers. Here, the failure of the buy-bust team to comply
with the procedural requirements cannot be excused since there was a
break in the chain of custody of the substance taken from appellant. It
should be pointed out that the identity of the seized substance is
established by showing its chain of custody.
The following are the links that must be established in the chain of
custody in a buy-bust situation: first, the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by
the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover
by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the
marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.
111. People v. Chua 396 SCRA 657
The crime under consideration is malum prohibitum, hence, lack of
criminal intent or good faith does not exempt appellants from criminal
liability. Mere possession of a regulated drug without legal authority is
punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act.
112. Del Castillo v. People, G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012
dominion and control over the place where it is found. The records are
void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in
question nor was it established that he used the said structure as a shop.
The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the
said structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner
being an electrician by profession.
113. David v. People, G.R. No. 181861, October 17, 2011
The failure of the police officers to use ultraviolet powder on the buybust money is not an indication that the buy-bust operation was a
sham. The use of initials to mark the money used in [a] buy-bust
operation has been accepted by this Court.
116. People v. Dequina, G.R. No. 177570, January 19, 2011
It has already been settled that the failure of police officers to mark the
items seized from an accused in illegal drugs cases immediately upon its
confiscation at the place of arrest does not automatically impair the
integrity of the chain of custody and render the confiscated items
inadmissible in evidence. In People v. Resurreccion, the Court explained
that "marking" of the seized items "immediately after seizure and
confiscation" may be undertaken at the police station rather than at the
place of arrest for as long as it is done in the presence of an accused in
illegal drugs cases. It was further emphasized that what is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of
the guilt or innocence of the accused.
118. People v. Laylo, G.R. No. 192235, July 6, 2011
PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor testified that they were the poseur-buyers in
The testimony of Aringoys niece, Rachel, that Lolita had been travelling
to Malaysia to work in bars cannot be given credence. Lolita did not
even have a passport to go to Malaysia and had to use her sisters
passport when Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos first recruited her. It is
questionable how she could have been travelling to Malaysia previously
without a passport, as Rachel claims. Moreover, even if it is true that
Lolita had been travelling to Malaysia to work in bars, the crime of
Trafficking in Persons can exist even with the victims consent or
knowledge under Section 3(a) of RA 9208.
This Court has held that to justify conviction for malversation of public
funds or property, the prosecution has only to prove that the accused
received public funds or property and that he could not account for
them, or did not have them in his possession and could not give a
reasonable excuse for their disappearance. An accountable public officer
131. Caunan v. People, G.R. Nos. 181999 & 182001-04, September 2, 2009
In finding that the walis tingting purchase contracts were grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government, the Sandiganbayan
relied on the COAs finding of overpricing which was, in turn, based on
the special audit teams report. The audit teams conclusion on the
standard price of a walis tingting was pegged on the basis of the
following documentary and object evidence: (1) samples of walis
tingting without handle actually used by the street sweepers; (2) survey
forms on the walis tingting accomplished by the street sweepers; (3)
invoices from six merchandising stores where the audit team purchased
walis tingting; (4) price listing of the DBM Procurement Service; and (5)
documents relative to the walis tingting purchases of Las Pias City.
These documents were then compared with the documents furnished
by petitioners and the other accused relative to Paraaque Citys walis
tingting transactions.
Notably, however, and this the petitioners have consistently pointed
out, the evidence of the prosecution did not include a signed price
quotation from the walis tingting suppliers of Paraaque City. In fact,
even the walis tingting furnished the audit team by petitioners and the
other accused was different from the walis tingting actually utilized by
the Paraaque City street sweepers at the time of ocular inspection by the
audit team. At the barest minimum, the evidence presented by the
prosecution, in order to substantiate the allegation of overpricing,
should have been identical to the walis tingting purchased in 1996-
1998. Only then could it be concluded that the walis tingting purchases
were disadvantageous to the government because only then could a
determination have been made to show that the disadvantage was so
manifest and gross as to make a public official liable under Section 3(g)
of R.A. No. 3019.
132. Trieste v. Sandiganbayan, 146 SCRA 508
134.
136.
Murder
People v. Peteluna, G.R. No. 187048, January 23, 2013
To be convicted of murder, the following must be established: (1) a
person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was with
the attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing neither constitutes
parricide nor infanticide.
138.
139.
140.
Homicide
Abella v. People, G.R. No. 198400, October 7, 2013
In cases of frustrated homicide, the main element is the accuseds intent
to take his victims life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and
141.
142.
Anti-Hazing Law
143.
Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258, February 1, 2012
In Vedaa v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate Justice (now
retired Chief Justice) Hilario Davide that in our nations very recent
history, the people have spoken, through Congress, to deem conduct
constitutive of hazing, [an] act[] previously considered harmless by
custom, as criminal. Although it may be regarded as a simple obiter
dictum, the statement nonetheless shows recognition that hazing or the
conduct of initiation rites through physical and/or psychological
suffering has not been traditionally criminalized. Prior to the 1995 AntiHazing Law, there was to some extent a lacuna in the law; hazing was
not clearly considered an intentional felony. And when there is doubt on
the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the
accused. In dubio pro reo.
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is
constrained to rule against the trial courts finding of malicious intent to
inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there being no proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent to inflict physical
injuries or animus iniuriandi as required in mala in se cases, considering
the contextual background of his death, the unique nature of hazing, and
absent a law prohibiting hazing.
The accused fraternity members guilty of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however,
145.
petitioner, the inference that intent to kill existed should not be drawn
in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact beyond
reasonable doubt. When such intent is lacking but wounds are inflicted
upon the victim, the crime is not attempted murder but physical injuries
only. Since the Medico-Legal Certificate issued by the doctor who
attended Rudy stated that the wound would only require ten (10) days
of medical attendance, and he was, in fact, discharged the following day,
the crime committed is less serious physical injuries only. The less
serious physical injury suffered by Rudy is defined under Article 265 of
the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "(A)ny person who inflicts
upon another physical injuries not described as serious physical injuries
but which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor for ten (10)
days or more, or shall require medical attendance for the same period,
shall be guilty of less serious physical injuries and shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor."
Rape
People v. Orita, G.R. No. 170723, March 3, 2008
For the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential.
Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ without rupture of the
hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction.
Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female
organ because although the offender has commenced the commission of
a felony directly by overt acts, not all acts of execution was performed.
147.
148.
149.
150.
of reclusion perpetua
People v. Dahilig G.R. No. 187083, June 13, 2011
As elucidated by the RTC and the CA in their respective decisions, all the
elements of both crimes are present in this case. The case of People v.
Abay, however, is enlightening and instructional on this issue. It was
stated in that case that if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender
should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A.
No. 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the
Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be accused of both
crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy will
be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability
for a single criminal act.
153.
154.
155.
156.
breasts and inserted his finger into her private part for his sexual
gratification. Garingarao used his influence as a nurse by pretending
that his actions were part of the physical examination he was doing.
Garingarao persisted on what he was doing despite AAAs objections.
AAA twice asked Garingarao what he was doing and he answered that
he was just examining her.
The Court has ruled that a child is deemed subject to other sexual abuse
when the child is the victim of lascivious conduct under the coercion or
influence of any adult.16 In lascivious conduct under the coercion or
influence of any adult, there must be some form of compulsion
equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the
offended partys free will.17 In this case, Garingarao coerced AAA into
submitting to his lascivious acts by pretending that he was examining
her.
Roallos v. People, 198389, December 11, 2013
Roallos assertion that he is not liable for sexual abuse under Section
5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 since AAA is not a child engaged in
prostitution is plainly without merit. "[T]he law covers not only a
situation in which a child is abused for profit but also one in which a
child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in any lascivious
conduct. The very title of Section 5, Article III (Child Prostitution and
Other Sexual Abuse) of R.A. No. 7610 shows that it applies not only to a
child subjected to prostitution but also to a child subjected to other
sexual abuse. A child is deemed subjected to "other sexual abuse" when
he or she indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence
of any adult.
157.
159.
160.
161.
In this case, appellant dragged Jomarie, a minor, to his house after the
latter refused to go with him. Upon reaching the house, he tied her
hands. When Jomarie pleaded that she be allowed to go home, he
refused. Although Jomarie only stayed outside the house, it was inside
the gate of a fenced property which is high enough such that people
outside could not see what happens inside. Moreover, when appellant
tied the hands of Jomarie, the formers intention to deprive Jomarie of
her liberty has been clearly shown. For there to be kidnapping, it is
enough that the victim is restrained from going home. Because of her
tender age, and because she did not know her way back home, she was
then and there deprived of her liberty. This is irrespective of the length
of time that she stayed in such a situation. It has been repeatedly held
that if the victim is a minor, the duration of his detention is
immaterial. This notwithstanding the fact also that appellant, after more
or less one hour, released Jomarie and instructed her on how she could
go home.
People v. Mirandilla, Jr., G.R. No. 186417 July 27, 2011
Notably, however, no matter how many rapes had been committed in
the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime
is only one kidnapping with rape. This is because these composite acts
are regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No. 7659
punishes these acts with only one single penalty. In a way, R.A. 7659
depreciated the seriousness of rape because no matter how many times
the victim was raped, like in the present case, there is only one crime
committed the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape.
162.
However, for the crime of kidnapping with rape, as in this case, the
offender should not have taken the victim with lewd designs, otherwise,
it would be complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. In People v.
Garcia, we explained that if the taking was by forcible abduction and the
woman was raped several times, the crimes committed is one complex
crime of forcible abduction with rape, in as much as the forcible
abduction was only necessary for the first rape; and each of the other
counts of rape constitutes distinct and separate count of rape.
Kidnapping and Failure to Return a Minor
163.
People v. Marquez, G.R. No. 181440, April 13, 2011
It is clear from the records of the case that Marquez was entrusted with
the custody of Justine. Whether this is due to Meranos version of
Marquez borrowing Justine for the day, or due to Marquezs version that
Merano left Justine at her house, it is undeniable that in both versions,
Marquez agreed to the arrangement, i.e., to temporarily take custody of
Justine. It does not matter, for the first element to be present, how long
said custody lasted as it cannot be denied that Marquez was the one
entrusted with the custody of the minor Justine. Thus, the first element
of the crime is satisfied.
As to the second element, neither party disputes that on September 6,
1998, the custody of Justine was transferred or entrusted to Marquez.
Whether this lasted for months or only for a couple of days, the fact
remains that Marquez had, at one point in time, physical and actual
custody of Justine. Marquezs deliberate failure to return Justine, a minor
at that time, when demanded to do so by the latters mother, shows that
the second element is likewise undoubtedly present in this case.
Grave Threats
164.
Caluag v. People, 171511, March 4, 2009
In grave threats, the wrong threatened amounts to a crime which may
or may not be accompanied by a condition. Considering the mauling
incident which transpired earlier between petitioner and Julias
husband, petitioners act of pointing a gun at Julias forehead clearly
enounces a threat to kill or to inflict serious physical injury on her
person which constituted grave threat.
Grave Coercion
165.
Alejandro v. Bernas, G.R. No. 179243, September 7, 2011
We find that the mere presence of the security guards is insufficient to
cause intimidation to the petitioners.
There is intimidation when one of the parties is compelled by a
reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon
his person or property, or upon the person or property of his spouse,
descendants or ascendants, to give his consent. Material violence is not
167.
The distinction between the two lines of decisions, the one holding to
robbery and the other to coercion, is deemed to be the intention of the
accused. Was the purpose with intent to gain to take the property of
another by use of force or intimidation? Then, conviction for robbery.
Was the purpose, without authority of law but still believing himself the
owner or the creditor, to compel another to do something against his
will and to seize property? Then, conviction for coercion under Article
497 of the Penal Code. The motives of the accused are the prime
criterion. And there was no common robber in the present case, but a
man who had fought bitterly for title to his ancestral estate, taking the
law into his own hands and attempting to collect what he thought was
due him. Animus furandi was lacking.
Unjust Vexation
168.
Maderazo v. People, G.R. No. 165065, September 26, 2006
Although Verutiao was not at her stall when it was unlocked, and the
contents thereof taken from the stall and brought to the police station,
the crime of unjust vexation was nevertheless committed. For the crime
to exist, it is not necessary that the offended party be present when the
crime was committed by said petitioners. It is enough that the private
Ramirez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93833, Sept. 28, 1995
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
Theft
Pidelli v. People, G.R. No. 163437, February 13, 2008
There is, here, a confluence of the elements of theft. Petitioner received
the final payment due the partners Placido and Wilson under the
pretext of paying off their obligation with the MTFSH. Under the terms
of their agreement, petitioner was to account for the remaining balance
of the said funds and give each of the partners their respective shares.
He, however, failed to give private complainant Placido what was due
him under the construction contract.
178.
Qualified theft
179.
Zapanta v. People, G.R. No. 170863, March 20, 2013
The elements of qualified theft, punishable under Article 310 in relation
to Articles 308 and 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), are: (a) the
taking of personal property; (b) the said property belongs to another;
(c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be done without the
owner's consent; (e) it be accomplished without the use of violence or
intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; and (f) it be done
under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC,
i.e., with grave abuse of confidence.18
All these elements are present in this case. The prosecutions evidence
proved, through the prosecutions eyewitnesses, that upon the
petitioners instruction, several pieces of wide flange steel beams had
been delivered, twice in October 2001 and once in November 2001,
along Marcos Highway and Mabini Street, Baguio City; the petitioner
betrayed the trust and confidence reposed on him when he, as project
manager, repeatedly took construction materials from the project site,
without the authority and consent of Engr. Marigondon, the owner of
the construction materials.
Ringor v. People, G.R. No. 198904, December 11, 2013
Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of the felony of qualified theft,
must be the result of the relation by reason of dependence,
guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and the offended
party that might create a high degree of confidence between them which
the appellant abused. The element of grave abuse of confidence is
present in this case. Verily, the petitioner, as sales clerk/agent of PCS, is
duty-bound to remit to Ingan the payments which she collected from
the customers of PCS. She would not have been able to take the money
paid by LACS if it were not for her position in PCS. In failing to remit to
Ingan the money paid by LACS, the petitioner indubitably gravely
abused the confidence reposed on her by PCS.
180.
Anti-Carnapping Law
181.
People v. Bustinera, G.R. No. 148233, June 8, 2004
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the
unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the
184.
Estafa
185.
186.
187.
188.
2013
Despite the charge against the respondent of qualified theft, the mere
filing of a formal charge, to our mind, does not automatically make the
dismissal valid. Evidence submitted to support the charge should be
evaluated to see if the degree of proof is met to justify respondents
termination. The affidavit executed by Montegrico simply contained the
accusations of Abis that respondents committed pilferage, which
allegations remain uncorroborated. "Unsubstantiated suspicions,
accusations, and conclusions of employers do not provide for legal
justification for dismissing employees. The other bits of evidence were
also inadequate to support the charge of pilferage.
People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 157943, September 4, 2013
In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the offender, like
the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
In that regard, the Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable
doubt that it was Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the
check. Hence, he cannot be convicted of estafa.
189.
190.
BP 22
People v. Ojeda, G.R. Nos. 104238-58. June 3, 2004
It is clear from the foregoing that complainant merely presumed that
appellant received the demand letter prepared and sent by her lawyer.
She was not certain if appellant indeed received the notice of dishonor
of the checks. All she knew was that a demand letter was sent by her
lawyer to the appellant. In fact, right after complainant made that
presumption, her lawyer filed the criminal cases against appellant at the
Fiscals office without any confirmation that the demand letter
191.
192.
193.
The requirement of notice, its sending to, and its actual receipt by, the
drawer or maker of the check gives the latter the option to prevent
criminal prosecution if he pays the holder of the check the amount due
thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of
such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that the
check has not been paid.
Resterio v. People, G.R. No. 177438, September 24, 2012
What Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 punished was the mere act of issuing a
worthless check. The law did not look either at the actual ownership of
the check or of the account against which it was made, drawn, or issued,
or at the intention of the drawee, maker or issuer. Also, that the check
194.
196.
197.
- Other Deceits
198.
Guinhawa v. People, G.R. No. 162822, August 25, 2005
For one to be liable for other deceits under the law, it is required that the
prosecution must prove the following essential elements: (a) false
pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other than those in the preceding
articles; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be made
or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud;
and (c) as a result, the offended party suffered damage or prejudice.[40] It
is essential that such false statement or fraudulent representation
constitutes the very cause or the only motive for the private complainant to
part with her property.
The provision includes any kind of conceivable deceit other than those
enumerated in Articles 315 to 317 of the Revised Penal Code. It is intended
as the catchall provision for that purpose with its broad scope and
intendment.
-Arson
People v. Malngan, G.R. No. 170470, September 26, 2006
In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine
what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated whether arson, murder or
199.
200.
201.
- Malicious Mischief
202.
Taguinod v. People, G.R. No. 185833, October 12, 2011
Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the evidence for the prosecution
had proven beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the foregoing elements.
First, the hitting of the back portion of the CRV by the petitioner was clearly
deliberate as indicated by the evidence on record. The version of the private
complainant that the petitioner chased him and that the Vitara pushed the
CRV until it reached the stairway railing was more believable than the
petitioner's version that it was private complainant's CRV which moved
backward and deliberately hit the Vitara considering the steepness or angle of
the elevation of the P2 exit ramp. It would be too risky and dangerous for the
private complainant and his family to move the CRV backward when it would
be hard for him to see his direction as well as to control his speed in view of
the gravitational pull. Second, the act of damaging the rear bumper of the CRV
does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction. Lastly, when
the Vitara bumped the CRV, the petitioner was just giving vent to his anger
and hate as a result of a heated encounter between him and the private
complainant.
In sum, this Court finds that the evidence on record shows that the
prosecution had proven the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of malicious mischief.
Crimes Against Chastity
-Qualified Seduction
203.
People v. Fontanilla, G.R. No. L-25354, June 28, 1968
While deceit is an essential element of ordinary or simple seduction, it
does not have to be proved or established in a charge of qualified
seduction. It is replaced by abuse of confidence. Under Art. 337 of the
Revised Penal Code, the seduction of a virgin over twelve and under
eighteen years of age, committed by any person in public authority,
priest, house servant, domestic guardian, teacher, or any person who, in
any capacity, shall be entrusted with the education or custody of the
woman seduced is "constitutive" of the crime of qualified seduction
even though no deceit intervenes or even when such carnal knowledge
was voluntary on the part of the virgin.
204.
1988
There are similar elements between Consented Abduction and Qualified
Seduction, namely: (1) that the offended party is a virgin, and, (2) that
she must be over twelve (12) and under eighteen (18) years of age.
However, Consented Abduction, in addition to the two common
elements, requires that: (1) the taking away of the offended party must
be with her consent, after solicitation or cajolery from the offender, and,
(2) the taking away of the offended party must be with lewd designs
while Qualified Seduction requires that: (1) the crime be committed by
abuse of authority, confidence or relationship, and, (2) the offender has
sexual intercourse with the woman.
- Acts of Lasciviousness
205.
Sombilon v. People, G.R. No. 175528, September 30, 2009
In cases of acts of lasciviousness, it is not necessary that intimidation
be irresistible. It being sufficient that some compulsion equivalent
to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the
offended party. Here, the victim was locked inside a windowless room
together with her aggressor who poked a gun at her forehead. Even a
grown man would be paralyzed with fear if threatened at gunpoint,
what more the hapless victim who was only 15 years old when she was
subjected to such atrocity.
206.
slightest contact with the outer lip or the labia majora of the vagina
already consummates the crime, in like manner, if the tongue, in an act
of cunnilingus, touches the outer lip of the vagina, the act should also be
considered as already consummating the crime of rape through sexual
assault, not the crime of acts of lasciviousness. Notwithstanding, in the
present case, such logical interpretation could not be applied. It must be
pointed out that the victim testified that Ireno only touched her private
part and licked it, but did not insert his finger in her vagina. This
testimony of the victim, however, is open to various interpretation,
since it cannot be identified what specific part of the vagina was defiled
by Ireno. Thus, in conformity with the principle that the guilt of an
accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, the statement cannot
be the basis for convicting Ireno with the crime of rape through sexual
assault.
-Forcible Abduction
208.
People v. Ablaneda, G.R. No. 131914, April 30, 2001
The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, as defined in Article
342 of the Revised Penal Code, are: (1) that the person abducted is any
woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or reputation; (2) that she is
taken against her will; and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs.
On the other hand, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman by force or intimidation, or when the woman is deprived of
reason or is unconscious, or when she is under twelve years of age.
All these elements were proven in this case. The victim, who is a
woman, was taken against her will, as shown by the fact that she was
intentionally directed by accused-appellant to a vacant hut. At her
tender age, Magdalena could not be expected to physically resist
considering that the lewd designs of accused-appellant could not have
been apparent to her at that time. Physical resistance need not be
demonstrated to show that the taking was against her will. The
employment of deception suffices to constitute the forcible taking,
especially since the victim is an unsuspecting young girl. Considering
that it was raining, going to the hut was not unusual to Magdalena, as
probably the purpose was to seek shelter. Barrio girls are particularly
prone to deception. It is the taking advantage of their innocence that
makes them easy culprits of deceiving minds. Finally, the evidence
shows that the taking of the young victim against her will was effected
in furtherance of lewd and unchaste designs. Such lewd designs in
forcible abduction is established by the actual rape of the victim.
209.
210.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must
have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the
petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first
marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage
being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the
beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect.
Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes,
petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the
marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first
marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but
logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where
there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be
acquitted of the instant charge.
No marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a
marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a
marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus,
needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more,
cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which
petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a
judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent
marriage.
215.
2004
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the
spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not
without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or
born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be
considered legitimate.28 There is therefore a recognition written into the
law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce
217.
218.
The libelous article, while referring to "Miss S," does not give a sufficient
description or other indications which identify "Miss S." In short, the
article fails to show that "Miss S" and Florinda Bagay are one and the
same person.
219.
Proof adduced during the trial showed that accused was the manager of
the publication without the corresponding evidence that, as such, he
was directly responsible for the writing, editing, or publishing of the
matter contained in the said libelous article. Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code, however, includes not only the author but also the person
who prints or published it. Thus, proof of knowledge or participation in
the publication of the offending article is not required.
220.
Neither the publisher nor the editors can disclaim liability for libelous
articles that appear on their paper by simply saying they had no
participation in the preparation of the same. They cannot say that Tulfo
was all alone in the publication of Remate, on which the subject articles
appeared, when they themselves clearly hold positions of authority in
the newspaper, or in the case of Pichay, as the president in the
publishing company.
As Tulfo cannot simply say that he is not liable because he did not fulfill
his responsibility as a journalist, the other petitioners cannot simply say
that they are not liable because they did not fulfill their responsibilities
as editors and publishers. An editor or manager of a newspaper, who
has active charge and control of its management, conduct, and policy,
generally is held to be equally liable with the owner for the publication
therein of a libelous article. On the theory that it is the duty of the editor
or manager to know and control the contents of the paper, it is held that
said person cannot evade responsibility by abandoning the duties to
employees, so that it is immaterial whether or not the editor or manager
knew the contents of the publication.
Bonifacio v. RTC Makati, G.R. No. 184800, May 5, 2010
If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first
published are used by the offended party as basis for the venue in the
criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where
the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or
221.
222.
223.