THE SECOND PUNIC WAR AT SEA

Author(s): BORIS RANKOV

Source: Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies. Supplement, No. 67, THE SECOND
PUNIC WAR A REAPPRAISAL (1996), pp. 49-57
Published by: Wiley
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THE SECOND PUNIC WAR AT SEA

BORIS RANKOV
INTRODUCTION

By contrast with the First Punic -War, fought largely as a naval war for the control of S

Second Punic War was essentially a land war for the control of Spain and the Italian pen
The war at sea has to a certain extent been seen as a sideshow, albeit an important on
ensured the isolation of Hannibal from potential reinforcements coming from Spain an

Carthage itself. Thus the recent account of the war by John Briscoe, in the second editio

eighth volume of The Cambridge Ancient History, devotes only two pages out of thirty

specifically to naval affairs.1 Briscoe ultimately relies on the fullest study of the war at

magisterial chapter by the Dutch scholar J. H. Thiel published in 1946.2 Thiel him

somewhat apologetic about his topic. He understands that control of the seas between Sp

Italy and Africa and Italy could have changed the outcome of the war, and theref
repeatedly to excuse the lack of energy with which the naval war was pursued. This he

reference to what he believes to be the essential nature of the Romans as 'land lu

supposed shortage of manpower which afflicted the Carthaginians, and an eventu

weariness on both sides. Thiel' s somewhat nebulous assertions are insufficient to exp
the Second Punic War never developed into a serious conflict at sea, but his focus

particular problem is entirely justified. This paper seeks to offer a more practical exp
based on the nature of ancient naval warfare in the Mediterranean and on the region's p
geography in the aftermath of the First Punic war.

THE LIMITATIONS OF OARED WARSHIPS

It is a truism that naval power must be projected from the land. In the end, all fleets mus

bases and safe havens from which to operate and whence they can obtain supplies and the

of the logistical back-up required to keep them at sea. But the extent of this reliance has

greatly through history according to the varying nature of war fleets. At one extreme, the

of the western maritime powers of the eighteenth century which sought to dominate trad

the great oceans consisted of ships which used only the wind for motive power, were

enough to carry all the supplies their crews required, and stable enough to weather almos

gale; because of this, they could, if necessary, keep at sea for perhaps several months at a s

The switch to fossil fuels in the latter part of the nineteenth century reduced this perio

matter of a few weeks at most; this could be extended by refuelling at sea from supply v

1 J. Briscoe in The Cambridge Ancient History , eds A. E. Astin, F. W. Walbank, M. W. Frederik

R. M. Ogilvie, 2nd edn, 12 vols (Cambridge 1989) VIII, 65-67.

2 J. H. Thiel, Studies on the History of Roman Sea Power in Republican Times (Amsterdam 1946)

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50 THE SECOND PUNIC WAR - A REAPPRAISAL

but the latter, of course, needed to operate from their own land

Mediterranean, however, had a far shorter operational span.

The nature of the winds and currents in that sea meant that

acceptable for merchant shipping where duration of voyage was

had any military role had to supplement this with oar power.3 By t

before, the development of a highly specialised warship type, in th

was part and parcel of the development of genuinely state-ow

eastern Mediterranean.4 These ships crammed large numbers o

hull little more than 35 metres long and 5 metres across in order

manoeuvrability.5 In the fifth and fourth centuries BC, the trirem

It was at its most effective as used by the Athenian democracy,

its poorer citizens to acquire skills at the oar which consistently

their opponents in the use of ramming tactics. Nevertheless, con

said on at least one occasion to have attempted to convert her fas

ships which could carry on deck numerous hoplite marines.6 T

became a mere precursor to boarding and that victory at sea wou

citizens who could afford hoplite armour rather than the com
Thucydides, discussing the battle of Sybota fought between the

in 433 BC, describes the latter approach as an old-fashioned form

regards it as inferior and less effective than simple ramming.7

Nevertheless, in the course of the fourth century a growing s

the development of catapult artillery which could be mounted

boarding tactics, coupled with the development of heavier ships

both artillery and larger bodies of troops. Fours ( tetrereis )

Carthage,8 by the end of the fifth century and the first five
Dionysius I, tyrant of Syracuse, in 398 BC.9 The former were sh
along each side, probably arranged in two banks with two men a
files on each side, probably arranged in three banks with two

banks and one man at each oar in the lowest bank (another altern

ships with respectively three and two men at each oar).10 The n

unknown, but fives (or quinqueremes) at the battle of Ecnom

Polybius as being powered by 300 oarsmen and carrying 120 m

Even within a trireme there was little room for storage or crew

his own seat which was laterally immediately alongside thos

3 On conditions of navigation in the Mediterranean, see J. H. Pryor Th

navigation in the Mediterranean' in The Age of the Galley , eds Robe

(London 1995)206-16.

4 This is one of the principal theses of the recent study by H. T. Wallin

Great Persian War . The Ancestry of the Ancient Trireme (Leiden 19

5 J. F. Coates and J. S. Morrison, The Athenian Trireme (Cambridge

6 Plutarch Cim . 12.2.

7 Thucydides 1.45-54.
8 Pliny HN 7.207.

9 Diodorus Siculus 14.41.3; 42.2; 44.7.

10 See J. S. Morrison in The Age of the Galley , eds Robert Gardi

J. F. Coates, ibid., 127-41.
11 Polybius 1.26.7.

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BORIS RANKOV: THE SECOND PUNIC WAR AT SEA 51

separated from the next seat down the ship on the same level by o

metre.12 The oarsman would, for the most part, be confined to th

rowing. This has been made clear by experimental trials of the mo

Olympias. The oarsmen are, in effect, the ballast of this ship, repr

of a total displacement of 42 tonnes. It is vital for the stability of the

not move about en masse}1 Space, even for as vital a commodity as w

only a minimal amount of rations and equipment can be carried.

even more cramped aboard the larger ships. Continued use of tri

fours came into use in the fourth century suggests that their beam

the same as those of the triremes, whilst the physical limitations o

hull construction mean that fives are unlikely to have been very m

only a little more space available in total for crews which were mu

the number of men in the case of the quinquereme - together with

the marines.

It will be evident that ships constructed and manned in this way

for an extended period. Not only did these conditions make it dif

around within the ship, but sanitation, food and above all the supply

under a Mediterranean sun all posed major logistical problems. In

following wind which would allow easy sailing, the crew would hav

would become a factor. Because of this, in normal voyaging crew

go ashore at lunchtime and every evening.15 Overnight voyag

necessity or in an extreme emergency. Casson has listed a number o

Mediterranean of varying lengths, although it is not alwa

uninterruptedly without landfall. Amongst those which can safely b

crossings, the longest appear to have taken about three and a half d

crossing of 475 miles by a Carthaginian fleet from the Greater

Minoa on the southern coast of Sicily took a day longer than this but

was made by transports without warship escort and evidently

unintentionally, of an unexpected southerly wind.17 Another crossin

by the tyrant Agathocles from Syracuse to Kale Akte (Cape Bon)

Diodorus tells us that 'on sighting Africa, the crews broke into che

this was at the limits of endurance for oared warships and troop t
would be in a fit state for battle immediately after such a voyage.
ran for shore and beached rather than risk an engagement.18

Such observations have been clarified by the operational experienc

but the point is not new. In an unfairly neglected paper in the Jou

12 J. F. Coates and J. S. Morrison, Athenian Trireme 132-51, 212-17.

13 J. F. Coates in J. F. Coates, S. K. Pltis, J. T. Shaw, The Trireme Tri

Hellenic Sea Trials of Olympias, Oxbow Monograph 2 (Oxford 1990) 6

14 See J. F. Coates in T. Shaw, The Trireme Project. Operational Experi

Oxbow Monograph 31 (Oxford 1993) 78-81; J. F. Coates in The Age of th

and John S. Morrison, 138-41.

15 J. F. Coates and J. S. Morrison, Athenian Trireme 94-106; J. E. Dotson

Robert Gardiner and John S. Morrison, 217-23.

16 L. Casson, Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World (Princeton 19

17 Plutarch Dion 25.4-5.
18 Diodorus Siculus 20.6.

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52 THE SECOND PUNIC WAR - A REAPPRAISAL

1933, A.W. Gomme made much the same argument based on

Thucydides, Xenophon and Demosthenes. He pointed out that th

ships tended to voyage in straight lines across the open sea, but t
'had an extremely narrow range of action; it must be within easy
a suitable friendly shore - a shore that is, that has not only an

especially the latter, but on which a regular encampment can b

cook, sleep, and embark again at any time.' 19 Gomme was thinking

in the fifth and fourth centuries BC, but his words are even more

manned and slower ships of the Hellenistic and Roman navies.

THE NAVAL STRATEGY OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR

The limitations noted by Gomme must have had the most profound implications fo
strategy in the Second Punic War, but have, for the most part, been ignored. Thiel on
does demonstrate some awareness of the problems facing oared warships, but never

throughout his work treats naval movements as if they were those of modern ships dr

mechanical means. In particular, he hardly ever considers the need for ships' crews
ashore for rest, food and water after covering even a moderate distance, and so he

underplay the importance of the control of harbours and landing places. The suppr

piracy required the seizure of pirate bases from the land as much as the destruction
fleets on the sea; hence the grant to Pompey by the Lex Gabinia of 67 BC of military c

throughout the Mediterranean equal to that of local provincial governors ( imperium

infinitum) and extending as far as 50 miles from the coast.20 The fact of the similar im

of land bases for the operation of war fleets has often been acknowleged, but as with Th

rarely been exploited.

The naval strategy of the Second Punic War was, in essence, determined by the contr
number of key bases and coastlines. Possibly the most spectacular example of this is the

Hannibal chose to attempt what was regarded as impossible and invade Italy through t

rather than attempt either the coastal route or a passage by sea. De Sanctis argued that th

was dictated by the Carthaginians' inability to transport horses (and presumably elepha

sea,21 but this was rightly rejected by Thiel on the grounds that they were able to do preci

on other occasions.22 For instance, in 205 BC the Carthaginians sent 25 warships, 6,000 in

800 cavalry and seven elephants to reinforce Mago in Northern Italy.23 Thiel, however,
as if what was preventing this in 218 was merely Roman naval superiority, based on

quinqueremes Rome then had available;24 these presumably included the aged survivo
final bout of Roman naval construction of the First Punic War, which had taken place i
Certainly, one of the Senate's first actions upon the declaration of war in 218 was to
consul P. Cornelius Scipio to Spain with 60 quinqueremes 26, a force sufficient to match

19 A. W. Gomme, 'A Forgotten Factor of Greek Naval Strategy', JHS, 53 (1933) 16-24 (quotatio
20 Velleius Paterculus 2.31.2-4.

21 G. de Sanctis, Storia dei Romani (Turin: Fratelli Bocca, 1917) III.2, 12.
22 J. H. Thiel, Studies 36.

23 Livy 29.4.6.

24 Polybius 3.41.2; Livy 21.17.3; Appian Hisp. 14.

25 Polybius 1.59.8.
26 Seen. 24.

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BORIS RANKOV: THE SECOND PUNIC WAR AT SEA 53

Carthaginian force of 50 quinqueremes, two quadriremes and fiv

quinqueremes and five triremes were in commission.27 At least as

fact that any invasion force put together by Hannibal could not hav

500 nautical miles directly across from Spain to Italy, for which th

voyage of four days28 but which would normally have taken a f

favourable conditions. Only the coastal route along the northern sho

a pos-sibility, but this was mostly along Roman-held territory whe

be risky, would take the Carthaginian fleet past Rome's staunch all

had her own war fleet, and would sooner or later produce an en

predictably coming the other way by the same route.29 The sam
establishment of this Roman fleet at Tarraco effectively blocked t

reinforcements from Spain for the duration of the war. Only in 206

largely fallen to the younger Scipio and the Carthaginian admiral

his former base at Gades (Cadiz), did the latter succeed in desperatio

island of Pityusa (Ibiza) and then establishing himself on Minorca in

in the following year, he sailed across the open sea, seized Genoa by
raise a rebellion amongst the Ligurians but to little effect.31

Italy was similarly protected against seaborne invasion from Carth

open sea between the mainlands of Africa and Italy. This meant tha

to raid or invade Italy would first have to gain a foothold in Sardin

islands which had beeri wrested by the Romans from Carthaginian c

Punic War. In Sardinia, the key landfall was the harbour of Carales

of the island. In 46 BC, it took Caesar three days to sail the 160 mile

of course, arrived on a friendly shore. The Carthaginians were more

reception. Early in 217, immediately following on from the defeat

sent to Sardinia, Sicily and Tarentum and sixty new ships were bui

that early in the war, Carthaginian fleets were able to gain some hel

of the island who had until recently been their own subjects, since

able to raid the Italian coast near Pisa, return to Sardinia and ijien e

senate assigned a squadron of 25 ships 'to protect the shores ar

litora tutanda)?5 and this proved to be a necessary precaution since

attempted a crossing from Carthage to Sardinia but was blown

Another Roman army was sent under T. Manlius Torquatos and def

once he had finally landed. Meanwhile, T. Otacilius Crassus had

decided to sail to the island after raiding the African coast from Sicily

because war fleets tended to move along the same sea-lanes betw

Hasdrubal's fleet and defeated it in battle.36 Thereafter, Carthage m

27 Polybius 3.33.14; Livy 21.22.4.
28 Pliny HN 19.3-4.

29 Polybius 3.41.4.
30 Livy 28.37.

31 Livy 28.46.7-11.
32 B.Afr. 98.

33 Polybius 3.75.4.
34 Polybius 3.96.8- 1 1 ; Livy 22. 1 1 .6-7.

35 Livy 23.32.18.

36 Livy 23.32;34;40-l.

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54 THE SECOND PUNIC WAR - A REAPPRAISAL

Sardinia until 210 when 40 ships were sent to raid the coasts, att

of the island until a Roman army appeared and then sailing roun

Finally, in 208, a permanent squadron of 50 Roman ships was

where there had been hardly any naval activity, and assigned to

Even more important to the protection of Italy was Sicily, not l

to the area of Apulia in the south from which Hannibal derived m

he was effectively confined after 21 1. Here, once Malta had been

the Carthaginians by the consul T. Sempronius Longus in 218,39

the western end of the island at Lilybaeum. This port lay only 65

African coast40 and provided by far the easiest stepping stone f

Rome's original war strategy was to use Lilybaeum for an invasi

as the elder Scipio had been sent to Spain with 60 ships, his

despatched to Sicily with a fleet of 160 quinqueremes, only to be

through of Hannibal's arrival south of the Alps. But even before

ships from Carthage had attempted to raid Italy, only to be scatt

Islands, and another of 35 ships had been beaten off in a naval e

before raiding Vibo on the Italian coast. Longus left 50 ships a

and another 25 were detailed to protect the coast of Italy.41

With Lilybaeum firmly held by the Romans, the Carthaginians th

strategy to open up the sea-link to Africa. After the disaster at C

to Naples and gradually took over the ports of southern Italy

Croton. By 212, he also held Thurii, Heraclea, Metapontum and w

prize, Tarentum. But at the latter, the stubborn Roman garrison

the citadel which dominated the entrance to the harbour and so made it useless to Hannibal.

Furthermore, in themselves, these ports were of relatively little use because whilst the Romans
held lilybaeum and the Carthaginians were deprived of an intermediate landing place in Sicily,
they were effectively out of range of a fleet coming from Africa. The other plank of the strategy

was therefore to gain the vital foothold in Sicily, and this was provided in 215 by the revolt of
Syracuse against the Romans on the death of the aged tyrant Hiero II which resulted in a large

section of the island declaring in favour of Carthage. This put Rome in real danger, because it
opened up the possibility of a bridge between Carthage and Hannibal. Already in 215, Bomilcar

had slipped a fleet of transports through to Locri whilst Otacilius' Lilybaeum squadron was
distracted by events in Sardinia.42 Rome responded by building 100 new ships in the following
year, to be manned for the first time by slaves, and attaching 30 of them to the 100 ships already

blockading Syracuse.43 In 213, Himilco invaded Sicily via Heraclea Minoa in order to try to lift
the siege being prosecuted by the proconsul M. Claudius Marcellus,44 whilst Bomilcar repeatedly
crossed to Syracuse with large fleets carrying supplies, in 213, 212 and 21 1.45 In this last year,

37 Livy 27.6.13-14.
38 Livy 27.22.7-8.
39 Livy 21.51.1-2.
40 Cf. Livy 29.27.6-8.

41 Polybius 3.41; Livy 21.17; 49-51; Appian Hisp. 14.

42 Livy 23.41.10.
43 Livy 24.11; 36.4-7.
44 Livy 24.35.

45 Livy 24.36.3; 25.25.11-13; 25.27.

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BORIS RANKOV: THE SECOND PUNIC WAR AT SEA 55

Bomlcar' s 130 ships were confronted by Marcellus off the Pach

forced to flee to Tarentum. Soon afterwards Syracuse fell.46

The fall of Syracuse to the Romans was a major turning point

Hannibal's last real chance of a line of reinforcement from Africa.

in help coming from Spain, a hope effectively dashed at the Metaur

to being a base for Roman raiding of Africa carried out by Ot

Messalla in 210, and M. Valerius Laevinus in 208 and 207. On bo

Punic fleet, now confined to African waters, felt obliged to cha

returned from their raids, but suffered severe losses in ships sunk

setback came in 210 when a Tarentine fleet destroyed an allied squa

(Reggio di Calabria).48
The only other area of concern on the naval front was on the s
came about as a result of the involvement of Philip V of Macedn

warships ( lemboi ) into Illyrian waters. This trespassed on the Rom

the Adriatic, and his subsequent pact with Hannibal in 215 BC mad

this pact had been concluded, the senate had stationed M. Valeriu
between Brundisium (Brindisi) and Tarentum with 25 ships and so
from Corcyra (Corfu) which was the shortest route to Greece.49 It

captured Philip's envoy to Hannibal in 215, together with a documen

had been made. The squadron was consequently doubled in size to 50

he operated as propraetor across the Adriatic, recapturing Oricu

Philip in 214, and seizing Zacynthus in 212.51 The squadron con
successor, the consul P. Sulpicius Galba, from 21 1 until 206, peace
year.

CONCLUSIONS

This brief survey allows us to draw some general conclusions about the conduct and str

the Second Punic War at sea. First of all, for reasons already indicated concerned with th

of oared warships, the control of naval bases by land was as important, perhaps eve

important, than the actual possession of a fleet. The ability to defeat and destroy the e

ships was worthless if one could not land. A fleet of transports had to be escorted by w

warships needed to be able to beach or enter harbour at relatively short intervals; th

control of beaches and harbours along an intended route could allow the movement o

Hannibal's problem was that one consequence of the First Punic War and Rome's sub

conquest of the ligurian and Gallic seabord in the 220s had been that the beaches and ha

between Spain and Italy and Africa and Italy were now all subject to Roman dominat

determined that he had to invade Italy by land, and that aid from both Spain and Carth

going to be difficult to obtain. Secondly, this situation meant that, by contrast with the Fir

War, which consisted largely of naval operations around Sicily where both sides then co
parts of the shoreline, engagements at sea were always going to be limited in this war.

46 Livy 25.27-31.

47 Livy 25.31.12-15; 27.5.8-9; 29.7-8; 28.4.5-7.

48 Livy 26.39.

49 Livy 23.32.17.
50 Livy 23.34.1-9; 38.

51 Polybius 9.39.2; Livy 24.40; 26.24.15.

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56 THE SECOND PUNIC WAR - A REAPPRAISAL

not because the Romans were 'landlubbers' (they had demonstr

because the Carthaginians were short of manpower or war- weary

for the most part, have the control of territory which would make

the hostility towards Rome of the native populations of Sardin

manifested did the Carthaginians have the ability to make landfa

to attempt naval thrusts towards Italy. Sardinia was soon taken

patch of a military garrison, only later supplemented by a perm

the southern Italian ports was a prerequisite for his being able to

it was valueless without a foothold in Sicily. Hence the vital impo

of Syracuse, reflected in the despatch of the consul Marcellus to

ive ending of Carthaginian naval operations beyond African w

Rome used her sea power in the Second Punic War essentially
from Africa through Sardinia and Sicily, and, at least initially,
this both because she had the ships and men, but even more bec

places which, it has been argued, were essential to the prosecut

Only towards the end of the war did she begin to project her

Greece, then by raiding in Africa, aimed at least in part at we

significant length of coastline which was immediately and direct

Lilybaeum. When Scipio finally did invade in 204, he had the adv

and disembark without warning at any one of a number of differen

coast which could not all be protected simultaneously. Once ag

work in Rome's favour. At the end, the same factors which had

war also laid Carthage open to destruction.

Royal Holloway , University of London

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BORIS RANKOV: THE SECOND PUNIC WAR AT SEA 57

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