1

Evidence Rule 128

RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA, Petitioner,

- versus BOARD OF MEDICINE
Respondents.

and

EDITHA

G.R. No. 177407

SIOSON,

.
February 9, 2011

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision [1] dated September 22, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 87755. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza (Atienza), which, in turn, assailed the Orders [2] issued by public respondent
Board of Medicine (BOM) in Administrative Case No. 1882.
The facts, fairly summarized by the appellate court, follow.
Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical Center (RMC) for check-up on February 4, 1995. Sometime in 1999, due to the same
problem, she was referred to Dr. Pedro Lantin III of RMC who, accordingly, ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests. The tests revealed that her right kidney is
normal. It was ascertained, however, that her left kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing. Thus, she underwent kidney operation in September, 1999.
On February 18, 2000, private respondents husband, Romeo Sioson (as complainant), filed a complaint for gross negligence and/or incompetence before the [BOM]
against the doctors who allegedly participated in the fateful kidney operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio Florendo and
petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza.
It was alleged in the complaint that the gross negligence and/or incompetence committed by the said doctors, including petitioner, consists of the removal of private
respondents fully functional right kidney, instead of the left non-functioning and non-visualizing kidney.
The complaint was heard by the [BOM]. After complainant Romeo Sioson presented his evidence, private respondent Editha Sioson, also named as complainant there,
filed her formal offer of documentary evidence. Attached to the formal offer of documentary evidence are her Exhibits A to D, which she offered for the purpose of
proving that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated. She described her exhibits, as follows:
EXHIBIT A the certified photocopy of the X-ray Request form dated December 12, 1996, which is also marked as Annex 2 as it was actually originally the Annex to x
x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, IIIs counter affidavit filed with the City Prosecutor of Pasig City in connection with the criminal complaint filed by [Romeo Sioson] with the said
office, on which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the results of the ultrasound examination. Incidentally, this exhibit happens to be the same
as or identical to the certified photocopy of the document marked as Annex 2 to the Counter-Affidavit dated March 15, 2000, filed by x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, on
May 4, 2000, with this Honorable Board in answer to this complaint;
EXHIBIT B the certified photo copy of the X-ray request form dated January 30, 1997, which is also marked as Annex 3 as it was actually likewise originally an
Annex to x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, IIIs counter-affidavit filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City in connection with the criminal complaint filed by
the herein complainant with the said office, on which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the results of the examination. Incidentally, this
exhibit happens to be also the same as or identical to the certified photo copy of the document marked as Annex 3 which is likewise dated January 30, 1997,
which is appended as such Annex 3 to the counter-affidavit dated March 15, 2000, filed by x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III on May 4, 2000, with this Honorable Board
in answer to this complaint.
EXHIBIT C the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated March 16, 1996, which is also marked as Annex 4, on which are handwritten entries which
are the interpretation of the results of the examination.
EXHIBIT D the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated May 20, 1999, which is also marked as Annex 16, on which are handwritten entries which are
the interpretation of the results of the examination. Incidentally, this exhibit appears to be the draft of the typewritten final report of the same examination
which is the document appended as Annexes 4 and 1 respectively to the counter-affidavits filed by x x x Dr. Judd dela Vega and Dr. Pedro Lantin, III in answer to

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Evidence Rule 128

the complaint. In the case of Dr. dela Vega however, the document which is marked as Annex 4 is not a certified photocopy, while in the case of Dr. Lantin, the
document marked as Annex 1 is a certified photocopy. Both documents are of the same date and typewritten contents are the same as that which are written
on Exhibit D.
Petitioner filed his comments/objections to private respondents [Editha Siosons] formal offer of exhibits. He alleged that said exhibits are inadmissible because the
same are mere photocopies, not properly identified and authenticated, and intended to establish matters which are hearsay. He added that the exhibits are
incompetent to prove the purpose for which they are offered.
Dispositions of the Board of Medicine
The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private respondent [Editha Sioson] was admitted by the [BOM] per its Order dated May 26, 2004. It reads:
The Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence of [Romeo Sioson], the Comments/Objections of [herein petitioner] Atienza, [therein respondents] De la Vega and
Lantin, and the Manifestation of [therein] respondent Florendo are hereby ADMITTED by the [BOM] for whatever purpose they may serve in the resolution of
this case.
Let the hearing be set on July 19, 2004 all at 1:30 p.m. for the reception of the evidence of the respondents. SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the abovementioned Order basically on the same reasons stated in his comment/objections to the formal offer of
exhibits.
The [BOM] denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner in its Order dated October 8, 2004. It concluded that it should first admit the evidence being
offered so that it can determine its probative value when it decides the case. According to the Board, it can determine whether the evidence is relevant or not if
it will take a look at it through the process of admission. x x x. [3]
Disagreeing with the BOM, and as previously adverted to, Atienza filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, assailing the BOMs Orders which admitted Editha Siosons
(Edithas) Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
Hence, this recourse positing the following issues:
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE:
WHETHER PETITIONER ATIENZA AVAILED OF THE PROPER REMEDY WHEN HE FILED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DATED 06 DECEMBER 2004 WITH THE COURT OF
APPEALS UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT TO ASSAIL THE ORDERS DATED 26 MAY 2004 AND 08 OCTOBER 2004 OF RESPONDENT BOARD.
II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND
THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE ADMISSION OF INCOMPETENT AND INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE BY RESPONDENT BOARD,
WHICH CAN RESULT IN THE DEPRIVATION OF PROFESSIONAL LICENSE A PROPERTY RIGHT OR ONES LIVELIHOOD. [4]
We find no reason to depart from the ruling of the CA.
Petitioner is correct when he asserts that a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to assail the Orders of the BOM, admitting in evidence the exhibits of Editha. As the
assailed Orders were interlocutory, these cannot be the subject of an appeal separate from the judgment that completely or finally disposes of the case. [5] At that stage, where
there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the only and remaining remedy left to petitioner is a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

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Evidence Rule 128

However, the writ of certiorari will not issue absent a showing that the BOM has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Embedded
in the CAs finding that the BOM did not exceed its jurisdiction or act in grave abuse of discretion is the issue of whether the exhibits of Editha contained in her Formal Offer of
Documentary Evidence are inadmissible.
Petitioner argues that the exhibits formally offered in evidence by Editha: (1) violate the best evidence rule; (2) have not been properly identified and authenticated;
(3) are completely hearsay; and (4) are incompetent to prove their purpose. Thus, petitioner contends that the exhibits are inadmissible evidence.
We disagree.
To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings before administrative bodies such as the BOM. [6] Although trial courts
are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of evidence, [7] in connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or
admissibility, we have held that:
[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for
the reason that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other hand, their admission, if they
turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring them. [8]
From the foregoing, we emphasize the distinction between the admissibility of evidence and the probative weight to be accorded the same pieces of
evidence. PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals [9] teaches:
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to be considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of
evidence refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue.
Second, petitioners insistence that the admission of Edithas exhibits violated his substantive rights leading to the loss of his medical license is misplaced. Petitioner
mistakenly relies on Section 20, Article I of the Professional Regulation Commission Rules of Procedure, which reads:
Section 20. Administrative investigation shall be conducted in accordance with these Rules. The Rules of Court shall only apply in these proceedings by analogy or on a
suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. Technical errors in the admission of evidence which do not prejudice the substantive rights of either
party shall not vitiate the proceedings.[10]
As pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the exhibits did not prejudice the substantive rights of petitioner because, at any rate, the fact sought to be proved
thereby, that the two kidneys of Editha were in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated on, is presumed under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.
The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms dated December 12, 1996, January 30, 1997, March 16, 1996, and May 20, 1999, filed in connection with
Edithas medical case. The documents contain handwritten entries interpreting the results of the examination. These exhibits were actually attached as annexes to Dr. Pedro
Lantin IIIs counter affidavit filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City, which was investigating the criminal complaint for negligence filed by Editha against the
doctors of Rizal Medical Center (RMC) who handled her surgical procedure. To lay the predicate for her case, Editha offered the exhibits in evidence to prove that her kidneys
were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time of her operation.
The fact sought to be established by the admission of Edithas exhibits, that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time of her operation,
need not be proved as it is covered by mandatory judicial notice. [11]
Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely the means for ascertaining the truth respecting a matter of fact. [12] Thus, they likewise provide for some facts which
are established and need not be proved, such as those covered by judicial notice, both mandatory and discretionary. [13] Laws of nature involving the physical sciences,
specifically biology,[14] include the structural make-up and composition of living things such as human beings. In this case, we may take judicial notice that Edithas kidneys
before, and at the time of, her operation, as with most human beings, were in their proper anatomical locations.
Third, contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is inapplicable. Section 3 of Rule 130 provides:

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Evidence Rule 128
1. Best Evidence Rule
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors before the BOM are liable for gross negligence in removing the right functioning kidney of Editha instead of
the left non-functioning kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys. As previously discussed, the proper anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys at the time
of her operation at the RMC may be established not only through the exhibits offered in evidence.
Finally, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of the anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys. To further drive home the point, the anatomical positions,
whether left or right, of Edithas kidneys, and the removal of one or both, may still be established through a belated ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area.
In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies of the exhibits, is allowed. [15] Witness Dr. Nancy Aquino testified that the Records Office of RMC no longer
had the originals of the exhibits because [it] transferred from the previous building, x x x to the new building. [16] Ultimately, since the originals cannot be produced, the BOM
properly admitted Edithas formal offer of evidence and, thereafter, the BOM shall determine the probative value thereof when it decides the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87755 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

CIRTEK EMPLOYEES LABOR UNIONFEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 190515

Present:

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Evidence Rule 128
- versus -

Promulgated:
CIRTEK ELECTRONICS, INC.,
Respondent.

November 15, 2010

Cirtek Electronics, Inc. (respondent), an electronics and semi-conductor firm situated inside the Laguna Technopark, had an existing Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) with Cirtek Employees Labor Union-Federation of Free Workers (petitioner) for the period January 1, 2001 up to December 31, 2005. Prior to the 3rd year of the CBA, the
parties renegotiated its economic provisions but failed to reach a settlement, particularly on the issue of wage increases. Petitioner thereupon declared a bargaining deadlock
and filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board-Regional Office No. IV (NCMB-RO IV) on April 26, 2004. Respondent, upon the other hand, filed a
Notice of Lockout on June 16, 2004.
While the conciliation proceedings were ongoing, respondent placed seven union officers including the President, a Vice President, the Secretary and the Chairman of
the Board of Directors under preventive suspension for allegedly spearheading a boycott of overtime work. The officers were eventually dismissed from employment,
prompting petitioner to file another Notice of Strike which was, after conciliation meetings, converted to a voluntary arbitration case. The dismissal of the officers was later
found to be legal, hence, petitioner appealed.
In the meantime, as amicable settlement of the CBA was deadlocked, petitioner went on strike on June 20, 2005. By Order[1] dated June 23, 2005, the Secretary of
Labor assumed jurisdiction over the controversy and issued a Return to Work Order which was complied with.
Before the Secretary of Labor could rule on the controversy, respondent created a Labor Management Council (LMC) through which it concluded with the remaining
officers of petitioner a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) [2] providing for daily wage increases of P6.00 per day effective January 1, 2004 and P9.00 per day effective January 1,
2005. Petitioner submitted the MOA via Motion and Manifestation [3] to the Secretary of Labor, alleging that the remaining officers signed the MOA under respondents assurance
that should the Secretary order a higher award of wage increase, respondent would comply.
By Order[4] dated March 16, 2006, the Secretary of Labor resolved the CBA deadlock by awarding a wage increase of from P6.00 to P10.00 per day effective January 1,
2004 and from P9.00 to P15.00 per day effective January 1, 2005, and adopting all other benefits as embodied in the MOA.
Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the Decision as petitioners vice-president submitted a Muling Pagpapatibay ng Pagsang-ayon sa Kasunduan na may
Petsang ika-4 ng Agosto 2005,[5] stating that the union members were waiving their rights and benefits under the Secretarys Decision. Reconsideration of the Decision was
denied by Resolution[6] of August 12, 2008, hence, respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
By Decision[7] of September 24, 2009, the appellate court ruled in favor of respondent and accordingly set aside the Decision of the Secretary of Labor. It held that the
Secretary of Labor gravely abused his discretion in not respecting the MOA. It did not give credence to the minutes of the meeting [8] that attended the forging of the MOA as it
was not verified, nor to the Paliwanag[9] submitted by respondent union members explaining why they signed the MOA as it was not notarized.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution [10] of December 2, 2009, the present petition was filed, maintaining that the Secretary of
Labors award is in order, being in accord with the parties CBA history respondent having already granted P15.00 per day for 2001, P10.00 per day for 2002, and P10.00 per
day for 2003, and that the Secretary has the power to grant awards higher than what are stated in the CBA.
Respecting the MOA, petitioner posits that it was surreptitiously entered into [in] bad faith, it having been forged without the assistance of the Federation of Free
Workers or counsel, adding that respondent could have waited for the Secretarys resolution of the pending CBA deadlock or that the MOA could have been concluded before
representatives of the Secretary of Labor.
The relevant issues for resolution are 1) whether the Secretary of Labor is authorized to give an award higher than that agreed upon in the MOA, and 2) whether the MOA was
entered into and ratified by the remaining officers of petitioner under the condition, which was not incorporated in the MOA, that respondent would honor the Secretary of
Labors award in the event that it is higher.
The Court resolves both issues in the affirmative.
It is well-settled that the Secretary of Labor, in the exercise of his power to assume jurisdiction under Art. 263 (g) [11] of the Labor Code, may resolve all issues involved in the
controversy including the award of wage increases and benefits. [12] While an arbitral award cannot per se be categorized as an agreement voluntarily entered into by the

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parties because it requires the intervention and imposing power of the State thru the Secretary of Labor when he assumes jurisdiction, the arbitral award can be considered
an approximation of a collective bargaining agreement which would otherwise have been entered into by the parties, hence, it has the force and effect of a valid
contract obligation.[13]
That the arbitral award was higher than that which was purportedly agreed upon in the MOA is of no moment. For the Secretary, in resolving the CBA deadlock, is not
limited to considering the MOA as basis in computing the wage increases. He could, as he did, consider the financial documents [14] submitted by respondent as well as the
parties bargaining history and respondents financial outlook and improvements as stated in its website. [15]
It bears noting that since the filing and submission of the MOA did not have the effect of divesting the Secretary of his jurisdiction , or of automatically
disposing the controversy, then neither should the provisions of the MOA restrict the Secretarys leeway in deciding the matters before him.
The appellate courts brushing aside of the Paliwanag and the minutes of the meeting that resulted in the conclusion of the MOA because they were not verified and notarized,
thus violating, so the appellate court reasoned, the rules on parol evidence, does not lie. Like any other rule on evidence, parol evidence should not be strictly applied in labor
cases.
The reliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. In labor cases pending before the Commission or the Labor Arbiter, the rules of
evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling. Rules of procedure and evidence are not applied in a very rigid and technical sense in
labor cases. Hence, the Labor Arbiter is not precluded from accepting and evaluating evidence other than, and even contrary to, what is stated in the CBA.
[16]
(emphasis supplied)
While a contract constitutes the law between the parties, this is so in the present case with respect to the CBA, not to the MOA in which even the unions signatories
had expressed reservations thereto.But even assuming arguendo that the MOA is treated as a new CBA, since it is imbued with public interest, it must be construed liberally
and yield to the common good.
While the terms and conditions of a CBA constitute the law between the parties, it is not, however, an ordinary contract to which is
applied the principles of law governing ordinary contracts. A CBA, as a labor contract within the contemplation of Article 1700 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines which governs the relations between labor and capital, is not merely contractual in nature but impressed with public interest, thus, it
must yield to the common good. As such, it must be construed liberally rather than narrowly and technically, and the courts must place a practical and
realistic construction upon it, giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and purpose which it is intended to serve. [17] (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 24, 2009 and the Resolution dated December 2, 2009 of the Court of Appeals
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Order dated March 16, 2006 and Resolution dated August 12, 2008 of the Secretary of Labor are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
ABOSTA SHIPMANAGEMENT CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
- versus NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
(FIRST DIVISION) and ARNULFO R. FLORES,

G.R. No. 163252

Promulgated:
July 27, 2011

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Evidence Rule 128

Respondents.

The petition for review on certiorari[1] before us seeks the reversal of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated October 20, 2003[2] and April 6, 2004,[3] rendered in CAG.R. SP No. 66806.
The Facts
Respondent Arnulfo R. Flores entered into a 12-month contract of employment, as radio officer, with the petitioner Abosta Shipmanagement Corporation ( agency) for and in
behalf of Panstar Shipping Co. Ltd. (Panstar) of Busan, South Korea. Under the contract, Flores was to receive a salary of US$728.00/month for a 48-hour work week, a
guaranteed overtime pay of US$439.00 a month, a monthly vacation pay of US$146.00, and a supplemental allowance of US$33.00 a month.
Flores joined the vessel M/V Morning Charm sometime in June 1997. The Master of the vessel, Captain B.H. Mun, and Chief Engineer Gowang Gun Lee are from South Korea.
Aside from Flores, there were other Filipino workers on the vessel. On November 29, 1997, Flores was repatriated due to alleged infractions committed while on board the
vessel. In reaction, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal on January 13, 1998 against the agency and Panstar.
The Compulsory Arbitration Proceedings
Before the labor arbiter, Flores alleged that in the course of his employment, he was asked by the Master to coordinate with several crew members who were requesting that
they be allowed to resign or pre-terminate their employment contracts due to the alleged mismanagement of the vessel. He acted as coordinator as bidden, but was surprised
to learn later that he was one of those whose resignations were accepted. He sought clarification from the Master, only to be told that he was among the crew members who
were considered to have resigned; hence, his discharge on November 29, 1997.
Upon his return to Manila, he immediately informed the agency that he had been erroneously included among those who were considered resigned. He was surprised
to learn that he was blamed for having instigated the mass resignation of the Filipino crew. When he tried to explain his side, the agency told him that the action taken by the
Master was final and that it was not interested in his story.
For their part, the agency and Panstar argued that Flores, while in their employ, insistently and rudely questioned the crews working schedule, including the propriety of
requiring them to render overtime services. They claimed that Flores instigated the crew to rebel against the authority of the Master, under the guise of questioning social
security and income tax deductions. As a result, the crew members became unruly, arrogant, and impolite, and were even violent in expressing their views. They even refused
to obey the lawful orders of the Master and the senior officers, thus causing dissension on board the vessel.
The agency alleged that sometime in September 1997, Flores prepared a petition for five Filipino crew members from the engine department, demanding the ouster of
1st Assistant Engineer Rodolfo Escarola, reportedly for incompetence and inefficiency; they threatened mass resignation. To create further unrest and
dissatisfaction, Flores induced Sofronio Tibay, Herman Sebuando, Primitive Ferrer and Raymundo Angel, of the same department, to write a letter to the ship management that
they would be taking their emergency leaves, one after the other, in November 1997. They charged the vessel officers of mismanaging the crew. When confronted about the
letter, however, they denied most of the letters contents, pointing to Flores as the author of the letter. At Flores instigation, the crew members threatened to disembark without
waiting for their replacements. The Master asked them to work for a less drastic solution, but they maintained their threat.
In light of the growing unrest on board the ship and Flores negative work attitude, the Master, Capt. B.H. Mun, asked Flores to explain why he should not be administratively
sanctioned for (1) disrespecting his superior officers through his unruly, discourteous, impolite and violent behavior; (2) inciting the crew to commit insubordination and
engaging in an activity which tends to create discontent among the crew or to destroy harmonious relations with the principal; and (3) inefficiency and other infractions,

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Evidence Rule 128

specifically: (a) staying at his quarters most of the time while on duty, leaving unattended the messages from the charterer or from the Panstar office; (b) revealing confidential
messages to the crew without the Masters permission; and (c) insubordination.
According to the agency and Panstar, Flores became enraged after he was informed of the charges, but could only vehemently deny the accusations. The Master then decided
to separate Flores from the service as the former was convinced that the charges were well-founded. The agency and Panstar claimed that Flores was paid his overtime pay,
salary for November 1997, and accrued vacation leave pay.
In a decision dated August 20, 1999,[4] Labor Arbiter Adolfo C. Babiano dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. He found that the evidence the agency and Panstar presented
were convincing enough to prove that Flores was a serious threat to the safety of the vessel and its crew. He noted that Flores failed to refute the agencys and Panstars
allegations that he incited the crew to rebel against the authority of the Master and the vessels senior officers. He also found Flores to have been paid all his monetary
entitlements.
On appeal by Flores, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), in its decision of December 29, 2000,[5] reversed the labor arbiters ruling. The NLRC found that the
agency and Panstar failed to prove (1) that Flores termination of employment was for a just or authorized cause and (2) that he was accorded due process. It opined that the
main basis for the dismissal action against Flores was the accusation that he agitated the crew to rebel against the authorities of M/V Morning Charm, as reported by the Chief
Officer (Chief Mate) and the 1st Assistant Engineer. The reports, the NLRC believe, did not constitute proof of the validity of the dismissal.
Moreover, the NLRC noted that Flores was dismissed immediately after the Master conducted his inquiry on November 17, 1997. It stressed that the Masters so called
administrative inquiry did not satisfy the due process requirements, as Flores was not given an adequate time for his defense.
Accordingly, the NLRC declared Flores to have been illegally dismissed. It directed the agency and Panstar to pay Flores, jointly and severally, US$2,184.00 as salary for the
unexpired portion of his contract, P50,000.00 in moral damages, and P25,000.00 in exemplary damages, plus 10% attorneys fees. The agency moved for reconsideration, but
the NLRC denied the motion in its order of July 18, 2001.[6] The agency then sought relief from the CA, through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The CA Ruling
In its first assailed resolution (dated October 20, 2003), [7] the CA dismissed the petition due to insufficiency in substance, [8] as the petitioner failed to show that the
NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the labor arbiters decision finding Flores dismissal legal. It sustained the NLRCs conclusion that the dismissal was
without a valid cause and that Flores was denied due process.

The second assailed CA resolution[9] denied the agencys motion for reconsideration, prompting the agencys present appeal [10] to this Court.
The Petitioners Case
Through its submissions the petition itself, [11] the reply to Flores comment[12] and the memorandum[13] the agency contends that in affirming the NLRC ruling, the CA
deviated from the substantial evidence rule in quasi-judicial proceedings. It argues that Flores employer, Panstar, met this standard of evidence through the affirmative
declarations (reports) of Capt. B.H. Mun, Chief Officer Alfredo R. de Luna and 1 st Assistant Engineer Rodolfo Escarola that Flores committed the infractions which led to his
dismissal. In the face of these positive statements, the agency points out that Flores could only offer bare and self-serving denials. It stresses too that, contrary to the

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Evidence Rule 128

impression of the NLRC and the CA, Flores dismissal was not only for inciting members of the crew to rebel against the ship officers, but also for other causes such as
inefficiency and insubordination or disobedience to the lawful orders of a superior officer, all prejudicial to the interests of the employer.
The agency insists that Flores contumacious acts, while on board the vessel, constituted a serious and grave offense which posed a threat to the safety of the crew and
the vessel. It adds that they also reflected Flores arrogance and disobedience to lawful orders/directives of his superiors, punishable by dismissal pursuant to Section 31 of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract.
The agency posits that the CA erred in brushing aside the findings of the labor arbiter. It calls attention to the labor arbiters observation that Flores failed to refute the
agencys allegation that he incited the crew to rebel against the authority of the Master and the senior officers of the vessel. Flores did not also refute the charge that to
pressure the principal, he induced some members of the crew to take their emergency leaves one by one and to threaten the principal to an early sign-off.
The Case for Flores
In his comment[14] and memorandum,[15] Flores asks that the petition be dismissed for raising purely questions of fact and not of law. He contends that the appellate courts
findings are not to be disturbed as they are binding upon this Court and, although there are certain exceptions to the rule, the petition does not fall within any of the
exceptions.[16]
Flores further submits that aside from raising only questions of fact, the agency failed to state any special and important reasons to justify the exercise by the Court of its
discretionary appellate jurisdiction in the case.[17]
The Courts Ruling
The procedural question
We first resolve the procedural issue of whether we should rule on the petition which, as Flores contends, raises only questions of fact and not of law. While it is true that the
Court is not a trier of facts, we deem it proper to re-examine the evidence in view of the variance in the factual findings of the labor arbiter, on the one hand, and of the NLRC
and the CA, on the other hand.
The substantive issue
After a careful and objective study of the parties submissions, we find that there is substantial evidence on record supporting Flores dismissal. Substantial evidence[, it must
be stressed,] is more than a mere scintilla[. It means such] relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds,
equally reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise. [18]
The agency, to our mind, succeeded in showing, by substantial evidence, that its principal (Panstar) had a valid reason for terminating Flores employment. The Master, Capt.
B.H. Mun, decided to dismiss him not only for agitating the crew to rebel against the authorities of the vessel M/V Morning Charm (which the NLRC considered as the main
reason for the dismissal),[19] but for several other infractions. As the records show, and as Capt. B.H. Mun stressed in his letter of November 17, 1997 to the agency
management,[20] Flores was also charged with inefficiency or neglect of duty, insubordination, insolent and disrespectful behavior, and other actuations which made him unfit
for his position and rank.
Capt. B.H. Muns letter chronicled the bases of the charges lodged against Flores, and its salient points may be summarized as follows:

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1.

2.

Since Flores came on board, he had been complaining about the deduction of US$40.00 from the crews monthly allotment for the Associated Marine Officers and
Seamens Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP) Fund. To Capt. B.H. Muns knowledge, the crew members were aware of the deduction. Despite this, Flores prepared a
letter to the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF) and asked the crew members to sign it. Capt. B.H. Mun asked Flores to explain the contents of the ITF
letter to the crew to avoid any misunderstanding. Instead of pacifying the crew, he stirred them up and made them even more agitated. Also, despite Capt. B.H.
Muns instructions to the contrary, he prepared letters for the crew containing his own complaints and sentiments against the company rather than those of the
crew.
He revealed to the crew all outgoing and incoming messages, without informing Capt. B.H. Mun.

3.

Contrary to Capt. B.H. Muns instructions, Flores issued shore-passes to the deck crew without the permission of the chief mate when the vessel made a port call
at Maputo during its last voyage. The deck crew members were not supposed to go on shore as cargo was being unloaded at the time. It was a rush operation
which had to be supervised and monitored to avoid damage to the cargo and to be on alert for stowaways. Flores went on shore nevertheless, with some of the
crew to whom he had issued shore-passes.

4.

Flores entered in his overtime sheet 40-50 hours in excess of the monthly 85 hours, despite the captains instructions to the crew not to go over 85
hours; Flores did this to give the impression that he was doing a lot of work.

5.

Flores stayed most of the time at the crew restroom while on duty instead of the radio room, resulting in the failure, at times, of the charterer and
the Panstar Busan Office to communicate with the vessel by INMARSAT phone. This gave rise to several complaints, especially from the charterer who was
compelled to use two communication devices the facsimile machine and the telex to send the same instruction or message to the vessel.

Capt. B.H. Mun considered the foregoing infractions and a few more mentioned in his letter as indications of Flores efforts to bypass his authority and to act at cross
purposes with him.
It is clear that the letters of Chief Officer De Luna [21] and 1st Assistant Engineer Escarola[22] to Panstars Capt. Chung, detailing how Flores agitated the crew (with charges
of mismanagement of the vessel), and Capt. B.H. Muns letter to the agency all depict a radio officer who undermined the authority of the shipmaster and the other officers in
the guise of raising labor-management issues on board the vessel. Additionally and as an indication of his disrespect for the vessels management, as well as his low regard for
his work, he neglected his duties as radio officer and disobeyed Capt. B.H. Muns instructions on several occasions. It is no surprise that his record of service [23] yielded a very
poor assessment or a no further employment assessment.
The NLRC grossly erred in rejecting the letters as proof of the validity of Flores dismissal. It misappreciated the contents of the letters, especially that of Capt. B.H. Mun. They
did not contain a mere accusation of wrongdoing. [24] The letters made direct affirmative statements on Flores transgressions, all of which only elicited angry denials from him.
More significantly, he failed to refute the charges in the compulsory arbitration proceedings, as the labor arbiter emphasized in his decision. This aspect of the case should
have been given due consideration by the NLRC.
In a different vein, Flores questioned the probative value of Capt. B.H. Muns statements, contending that they are self-serving. He regarded them as pure hearsay which cannot
be considered as evidence. It bears stressing in this regard that under the law, technical rules of evidence are not binding in administrative proceedings, and the NLRC and the

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labor arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all
in the interest of due process.[25]
Hearsay or not, and by way of reiteration, Capt. B.H. Muns statements cannot just be ignored, for Flores himself admitted in his position paper, as noted by the labor arbiter,
that the shipmaster asked him to be the coordinator or go-between for several crew members who wanted to pre-terminate their contract. [26] It is not disputed that Flores acted
as such coordinator between the crew and Capt. B.H. Mun. Thus, Capt. B.H. Mun specifically asked him to explain to the crew the deduction of US$40.00 from their monthly
allotment for the AMOSUP Fund so that they would understand and would not to be agitated; instead of doing this, he stirred up the crew further. In fractured English, Capt.
B.H. Mun stated:
Notwithstand he should if necessary take all his way be persuaded and kindly explained to the crew about misunderstanding ITF contents, but he did has to say
nothing of crew persuasion, more excite with big voices and stir up to the crew to mischief. Two anhalf months ago, I asked him that dont be helping to crew to
be sent company their letters specially, because his prepared it for crew had writ down his own complaining with unless and reactive stories thru their letter. He
didnt still follow to master instruction thats why help to nice preparing crew letter according to his say. [27]
The fact that Flores acted as coordinator or liaison between the crew and the vessels officers signifies that Flores did interact with the crew, and had the opportunity to
sow discontent among them towards the shipmanagement. Flores infractions, as mentioned in the letters, could not have been just pigments of the imagination of
Capt. B.H. Mun and the other officers as Flores insinuated; they were reporting on Flores actual transgressions while on board the vessel.
Still on the probative value of the letters, Flores wondered why the agency did not present in evidence the vessels logbook [28] the official records of a ships voyage that the
master is required by law to keep and where he records the decision/s he made during the voyage, including all happenings on board. [29] The existence of a logbook, however,
does not at all preclude the admission and consideration of other accounts of what was happening on board the vessel, such as, in this instance, the shipmasters report.
In Abacast Shipping and Management Agency, Inc. v. NLRC, [30] the Court explained The [logbook] is a respectable record that can be relied upon to authenticate the charges filed and the procedure taken against the employees prior to their dismissal.
Curiously, however, no entry from such [logbook] was presented at all in this case. What was offered instead was the shipmasters report, which was later claimed to be a
collation of excerpts from such book.
xxxx
At that, even if the shipmasters report were to be admitted and considered, a close reading thereof will show that the private respondents have not
committed any act that would justify the termination of their services before the expiration of the contracts.
While the shipmasters report was not considered in Abacast Shipping, the reason behind the rejection was the Courts conclusion that the separated employees had not
committed any act that would justify their dismissal, as their dismissal was based on mere apprehension. This situation does not obtain in Flores case. As mentioned earlier,
Capt. B.H. Muns report made affirmative statements regarding Floresinfractions that led to his dismissal. These infractions involved not only instigating several crew members
to rebel against the vessels authorities and to disrespect their superiors, but also other transgressions that made him unfit to continue in employment.
Even as he assailed the reports of Capt. B.H. Mun and the other officers as hearsay and self-serving, Flores failed to controvert the affirmative statements made in the
reports. The reports were submitted on compulsory arbitration. He did not refute the charges, thus leaving them unrebutted. Capt. B.H. Muns statements, corroborated by the
reports of Chief Officer De Luna and 1st Assistant Engineer Escarola, should have therefore been admitted as sufficient support for the charges.
On the whole, we are convinced that Flores dismissal was justified on the following grounds:
1.
Sowing intrigue and dissension on board the vessel M/V Morning Charm;[31]
2.
Inefficiency and neglect of duty;[32] and
3.
Insubordination or disobedience of the lawful orders of the shipmaster.[33]

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The NLRCs rulings, disregarding these grounds, do not only constitute errors in the appreciation of evidence; they were gross errors as they practically disregarded the
petitioners evidence. Hence, the CA erred in not recognizing these errors for what they were grossly abusive acts that affected the NLRCs exercise of its jurisdiction.
The procedural due process issue
The records bear out that Flores was not given a reasonable opportunity to present his side vis--vis the charges at the time he was dismissed. As the NLRC noted, Flores was
immediately dismissed after Capt. B.H. Mun conducted his inquiry on November 17, 1997. Although Flores merely issued a vehement denial, Capt. B.H. Mun should have given
him a reasonable time to explain, if necessary, in writing. While this lapse in procedure cannot negate the existence of a valid cause for Flores dismissal, as discussed above,
the violation of his right to procedural due process warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages, as we held in Agabon v. National Labor Relations
Commission.[34] Given the circumstances in the present case, we deem an award of nominal damages to Flores in the amount of P30,000.00 to be appropriate.
In sum, we find the petition meritorious.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the resolutions dated October 20, 2003 and April 6, 2004 of the Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE. We DECLARE the dismissal of
respondent Arnulfo R. Flores LEGAL, but AWARD him nominal damages in the amount of P30,000.00 for the violation of his procedural due process rights.
No cost. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 207988, March 11, 2015
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRIAN MERCADO Y SARMIENTO, Accused-Appellant.
Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 04942 affirming the Decision 2 in Criminal Case Nos. C-77992 and C-77993
rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 120 of Caloocan City. The RTC Decision found accused-appellant Brian Mercado y Sarmiento (accused-appellant) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.
The Facts
The accused-appellant was charged of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, in two (2) Informations, both dated 31 July 2007, which respectively read as
follows:
Crim. Case No. 77992 (For violation of Section 5, R.A. No. 9165)
That on or about the 27th day of July, 2007 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of
law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to PO3 RAMON GALVEZ, who posed, as buyer, a plastic sachet containing METHYLAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu) weighing 0.02 gram, a dangerous drug, without corresponding license or prescription therefore, knowing the same to be such. 3
Crim. Case No. 77993 (For violation of Section 11, R.A. No. 9165)
That on or about the 27th day of July, 2007 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being
authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control Two (2) sachets containing METHYLAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE (Shabu) weighing 0.02 gram & 0.02 gram, respectively, when subjected for laboratory examination gave positive result to the tests of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.4
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to said charges. 5 Trial thereafter proceeded. Based on the evidence presented and on the stipulations and
admitted facts entered into by the parties, the summary of factual findings is stated as follows:
The Version of the Prosecution

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[A]t around 10:00 a.m. on July 27, 2007, acting on a tip from a confidential informant that accused-appellant was selling shabu, the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operation
Unit (SAID-SOU) of the Philippine National Police (PNP) organized a buy-bust operation [with] SPO2 Wilfredo Quillan as team leader, PO3 [Ramon] Galvez as poseur-buyer, and
SPO1 [Fernando] Moran, PO2 Eugene Amaro, PO2 Celso Santos and PO3 Jose Martirez as members. After SPO2 Quillan briefed the buy-bust team, a pre-operation report was
prepared. PO3 Galvez was provided with two (2) one hundred-peso bills which he marked on the right portion with his initials RG. Then, the team and the informant boarded
a passenger jeepney and proceeded to Phase 3-D, Camarin, Caloocan City. When the informant pointed to accused-appellant, PO3 Galvez approached him and said, [p]re,
pa-iskor naman, offering to buy P200.00 worth of shabu. He then handed the buy-bust money and accused-appellant brought out from his pocket three (3) pieces of plastic
sachets, chose one (1) sachet and gave it to PO3 Galvez. As the sale was already consummated, PO3 Galvez introduced himself as a police officer, arrested accused-appellant,
and gave the pre-arranged signal to his companions by scratching his nape. When SPO1 Moran rushed in, PO3 Galvez marked the plastic sachet with BMS/RG and told SPO1
Moran about the remaining two (2) plastic sachets in accused-appellants pocket. SPO1 Moran then frisked him and confiscated the items which he marked as BMS/FM-1 and
BMS/FM-2. Thereafter, they brought accused-appellant and the confiscated items to the SAID-SOU office in Samson Road, Caloocan City, and turned them over to the
investigator, PO2 [Randulfo] Hipolito, who prepared the corresponding evidence acknowledgment receipt and request for laboratory examination.
Qualitative examination conducted on the confiscated three (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance, each weighing 0.02 gram,
yielded positive for methylampethamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.6
The Version of the Defense
On July 26, 2007, at around 9:30 to 10:00 in the evening, accused-appellant returned the jeepney he was driving to the garage of Phase 3-B, Camarin, Caloocan City. He was
walking home when a jeepney with police officers on board suddenly stopped in front of him. PO3 Galvez asked accused-appellant where he came from. He answered that he
just came from driving his jeepney showing the police officers his drivers license. Accused-appellant was then forced to ride in the jeepney where he saw eight (8) persons in
handcuffs. He was brought to the police station and was told to produce ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) in exchange for his liberty, otherwise, a case would be filed against
him. Unable to produce the money, accused-appellant faced the present charges. 7
The Ruling of the RTC
After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision8 finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. No.
9165. The dispositive portion of which is hereunder quoted, to wit:
Premises considered, this court finds and so holds that:
(1) The accused Brian Mercado y Sarmiento GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and imposes upon him the following:
(a) In Crim. Case No. C-77992, the penalty of Life Imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00); and
(b) In Crim. Case No. C-77993, the penalty of Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to Fourteen (14) years and a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P300,000.00).
The drugs subject matter of these cases are hereby confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government to be dealt with in accordance with law. 9
The trial court concluded that the evidence presented by the prosecution sufficiently satisfied the quantum required for accused-appellants conviction. It declared that the
fact of sale was sufficiently established upon showing the complete detailed manner of negotiation of said sale, exchange of consideration, and handing of the subject of the
sale. The court a quo ruled that, as long as the police officer went through the operation as a buyer and his offer was accepted by the accused-appellant, and the dangerous
drugs delivered to the former, the crime is considered consummated by the delivery of goods. 10 Likewise, the testimonies of the police officers who participated in the buybust operation appear credible and reliable since absence of any showing of ill-motive on their part to concoct trumped charges, they enjoy the presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duties.11 On the other hand, the denial of the accused-appellant and his mere allegation of extortion were found to be unsubstantiated by any convincing

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and credible evidence. Hence, being considered as negative, weak, and self-serving evidence, accused-appellants bare denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of
the prosecutions witnesses and the physical evidence which supported said judgment of conviction. 12
The Ruling of the CA
On intermediate appellate review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision in convicting the accused-appellant. It ruled that failure to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 will
not render the arrest of the accused illegal, nor will it result to the inadmissibility in evidence against the accused of the illegal drugs seized in the course of the entrapment
operation. What is of utmost relevance is the preservation of the integrity and maintenance of the evidentiary value of the confiscated illegal drugs, for in the end, the same
shall necessarily be the thrust that shall determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. The prosecution therefore must simply show that the seized item recovered from
appellant was the same item presented in court and found to be an illegal/prohibited drug. These were all established and proven beyond reasonable doubt in the instant
case.13 Accordingly, the prosecution was able to sufficiently bear out the statutory elements of the crime of illegal sale and illegal possession of such drugs committed by
accused-appellant. The disposal on appeal reads:
It is well-settled that objection to the admissibility of evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desire the court to reject the evidence offered, he
must so state in the form of objection. Thus, as the trial was already concluded, [w]e can no longer turn back to find out the justifiable grounds for the omission of the legal
requisites.
In any case, the procedural lapse did not render accused-appellants arrest illegal or the evidence adduced inadmissible. If there is non-compliance with Section 21, the issue is
not of admissibility, but of weight evidentiary merit or probative value to be given the evidence. After a scrutiny of the records, [w]e find the evidence adduced more than
sufficient to prove the charges against accused-appellant. Therefore, considering that no circumstance exists to put the trial courts findings in error, [w]e apply the timehonored precept that findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of
facts and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings.
FOR THESE REASONS, [w]e DENY the appeal and AFFIRM the assailed February 23, 2011 Decision of the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court, Branch 120. 14
Moreover, the appellate court emphasized that, during trial, accused-appellant neither suggested that there were lapses in the safekeeping of the suspected drugs that could
affect their integrity and evidentiary value nor objected to their admissibility. Accused-appellant was then precluded from raising such issue which must be timely raised
during trial.15
Upon elevation of this case before this Court, the Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it will no longer file its supplemental brief and, instead, will adopt all the
arguments in its brief filed before the CA.16 On the other hand, accused-appellant raised the issue that the court a quo gravely erred in convicting him notwithstanding the
police operatives patent non-compliance with the strict and mandatory requirements of R.A. No. 9165.
The Issue Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in finding that the evidence of the prosecution was sufficient to convict the accused of the alleged sale and possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, in violation of Sections 5 and 11, respectively, of R.A. No. 9165.
Our Ruling
We sustain the judgment of conviction. The Court finds no valid reason to depart from the time-honored doctrine that where the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, and in
this case their testimonies as well, the findings of the trial court are not to be disturbed unless the consideration of certain facts of substance and value, which have been
plainly overlooked, might affect the result of the case. 17
Upon perusal of the records of the case, we see no reason to reverse or modify the findings of the RTC on the credibility of the testimony of prosecutions witnesses, more so in
the present case, in which its findings were affirmed by the CA. It is worthy to mention that, in addition to the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of their
official duty, the court a quo was in the best position to weigh the evidence presented during trial and ascertain the credibility of the police officers who testified as to the
conduct of the buy-bust operation and in preserving the integrity of the seized illegal drug.
This Court has consistently ruled that for the successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the following
elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. 18 In other
words, there is a need to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused actually sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and that the former indeed knew that
what he had sold and delivered to the latter was a prohibited drug. 19 To reiterate, what is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the

15
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transaction or sale actually took place, plus the presentation in court of corpus delicti as evidence.20 On the other hand, we have adhered to the time-honored principle that for
illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs under Section 11 of the same law, the prosecution must establish the following elements: (1) the accused is in possession of
an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed
the drug.21
Undoubtedly, the prosecution had indeed established that there was a buy-bust operation 22 showing that accused-appellant sold and delivered the shabu for value to PO3
Ramon Galvez (PO3 Galvez), the poseur-buyer. PO3 Galvez himself testified that there was an actual exchange of the marked-money and the prohibited drug. Likewise,
accused-appellant was fully aware that what he was selling was illegal and prohibited considering that when PO3 Galvez told him, pre, pa-iskor naman, the former
immediately answered, magkano?, then when the poseur-buyer replied, dos lang, it resulted to the production of three (3) pieces of plastic sachets from accusedappellants pocket. Thereafter, the corpus delicti or the subject drug was seized, marked, and subsequently identified as a prohibited drug. Note that there was nothing in the
records showing that he had authority to possess them. Jurisprudence had pronounced repeatedly that mere possession of a prohibited drug constitutes prima facie evidence
of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of any satisfactory explanation. 23 Above all, accused-appellant likewise failed to present
contrary evidence to rebut his possession of the shabu. Taken collectively, the illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs by accused-appellant were indeed
established beyond reasonable doubt.
By way of emphasis, in cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially
when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. 24 In this regard, the defense
failed to show any ill motive or odious intent on the part of the police operatives to impute such a serious crime that would put in jeopardy the life and liberty of an innocent
person, such as in the case of accused-appellant. As a matter of fact, aside from accused-appellants mere denial and alleged extortion against him, no evidence was ever
presented to prove the truthfulness of the same. Incidentally, if these were simply trumped-up charges against him, it remains a question why no administrative charges were
brought against the police officers. Moreover, in weighing the testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses vis--vis that of the defense, it is a well-settled rule that in the
absence of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge, the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal. 25
To reiterate, in the absence of any showing that substantial or relevant facts bearing on the elements of the crime have been misapplied or overlooked, this Court can only
accord full credence to such factual assessment of the trial court which had the distinct advantage of observing the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses during the trial.
Absent any proof of motive to falsely charge an accused of such a grave offense, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings of the trial
court with respect to the credibility of witnesses shall prevail over his/her bare allegation. 26
Furthermore, this Court has time and again adopted the chain of custody rule, 27 a method of authenticating evidence which requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. This would include testimony about every link in the
chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from
whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered
to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. 28
It is essential for the prosecution to prove that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit. Its identity
must be established with unwavering exactitude for it to lead to a finding of guilt. 29
Alongside these rulings are our pronouncements, just as consistent, that failure to strictly comply with the prescribed procedures in the inventory of seized drugs does not
render an arrest of the accused illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is essential is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 30 Thus: From the point of view of jurisprudence, we are not
beating any new path by holding that the failure to undertake the required photography and immediate marking of seized items may be excused by the unique circumstances
of a case. In People v. Resurreccion, we already stated that marking upon immediate confiscation does not exclude the possibility that marking can be at the police station
or office of the apprehending team. In the cases of People v. Rusiana, People v. Hernandez, and People v. Gum-Oyen, the apprehending team marked the confiscated items at
the police station and not at the place of seizure. Nevertheless, we sustained the conviction because the evidence showed that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items
seized had been preserved. To reiterate what we have held in past cases, we are not always looking for the strict step-by-step adherence to the procedural requirements; what

16
Evidence Rule 128

is important is to ensure the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. We
succinctly explained this in People v. Del Monte when we held:
We would like to add that non-compliance with Section 21 of said law, particularly the making of the inventory and the photographing of the drugs
confiscated and/or seized, will not render the drugs inadmissible in evidence. Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, evidence is admissible when it is
relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids its reception. If there is no such
law or rule, the evidence must be admitted subject only to the evidentiary weight that will [be] accorded it by the courts. x x x
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring about the non-admissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to
non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance with said section, is not of admissibility, but of
weight evidentiary merit or probative value to be given the evidence.The weight to be given by the courts on said evidence depends on the circumstances
obtaining in each case.31 (Emphases supplied and citations omitted)
From the testimonies of the police officers in the case at bench, the prosecution established that they had custody of the drug seized from the accused from the moment he
was arrested, during the time he was transported to the police station, and up to the time the drug was submitted to the crime laboratory for examination. The same
witnesses also identified the seized drug with certainty when this was presented in court. With regard to the handling of the seized drugs, there are no conflicting testimonies
or glaring inconsistencies that would cast doubt on the integrity thereof as evidence presented and scrutinized in court. It is therefore safe to conclude that, to the
unprejudiced mind, the testimonies show without a doubt that the evidence seized from the accused-appellant at the time of the buy-bust operation was the same one tested,
introduced, and testified to in court. This fact was further bolstered by the stipulations entered into between the parties as to the testimony of Forensic Chemical Officer of the
Northern Police District Crime Laboratory Office, Caloocan City, Police Chief Inspector Albert S. Arturo. 32 In other words, there is no question as to the integrity of the evidence
against accused-appellant.
Accordingly, we hereby affirm the position taken by the CA when it expounded on the matter:
It is well-settled that objection to the admissibility of evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he
must so state in the form of objection. Thus, as the trial was already concluded, [w]e can no longer turn back to find out the justifiable grounds for the omission of the legal
requisites.
In any case, the procedural lapse did not render accused-appellants arrest illegal or the evidence adduced inadmissible. If there is non-compliance with Section 21, the issue
is not of admissibility, but of weight evidentiary merit or probative value to be given the evidence. After scrutiny of the records, [w]e find the evidence adduced more than
sufficient to prove the charges against accused-appellant. Therefore, considering that no circumstance exists to put the trial courts findings in error, [w]e apply the timehonored precept that findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross misapprehensions
of facts and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. 33
Again, although this Court finds that the police officers did not strictly comply with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, such noncompliance did not affect
the evidentiary weight of the drug seized from the accused-appellant, because the chain of custody of the evidence was shown to be unbroken under the circumstances of the
case. As correctly found by the appellate court:
The following links must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the
forensic chemist to the court. A circumspect study of the evidence movements reveal the integrity and the evidentiary value of the suspected drugs were safeguarded. PO3
Galvez and SPO1 Moran testified that they marked the suspected drugs with BMS/RG, BMS/FM-1 and BMS/FM-2 in the presence of accused-appellant immediately upon
confiscation. Then, they brought accused-appellant and the confiscated items to their office, entrusting custody to investigator PO2 Hipolito. Contrary to accused-appellants
claim, there is no hiatus in the third and fourth link in the chain of custody. The defense admitted that, upon receipt of the items, PO2 Hipolito prepared the corresponding
evidence acknowledgment receipt and request for laboratory examination. The request for laboratory examination, which the prosecution offered as part of its documentary
evidence, bears a stamp stating PO2 Hipolito was the one who delivered the marked confiscated items to PNP Crime Laboratory, with forensic chemist PSI Arturo as the

17
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receiving officer. PSI Arturo then conducted the examination which yielded positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.When the prosecution presented the
marked plastic sachets in court, PO3 Galvez and SPO1 Moran positively identified them as those recovered from accused-appellant in the buy-bust operation. Considering that
every link was adequately established by the prosecution, the chain of custody was unbroken. 34
In fine, considering the pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution, the denial and allegation of extortion of the accused-appellant fails. Courts generally view the
defense of denial with disfavor due to the facility with which an accused can concoct it to suit his or her defense. As evidence that is both negative and self-serving, this
defense cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who testify clearly, providing thereby positive evidence on the various aspects of the
crime committed.35 Consequently, we find no cogent reason to disturb the decisions of the RTC and the CA. Accused-appellant Bryan Mercado y Sarmiento is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 04942 dated 26 September 2012, is AFFIRMED in all respects. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-19550
June 19, 1967
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL
PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court
of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE
DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin 1 hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors several judges 2 hereinafter referred to as
Respondents-Judges issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein 4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the
any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following
personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is
described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with
particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence
against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers
and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the
Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the
deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void,
and commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents,
papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question.

18
Evidence Rule 128

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said
warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the
alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or
dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as
regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein. 7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and
seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance
thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the
amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. 8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality
of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and
cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized
from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has
been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers
were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other
defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if
unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could
they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United
States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure
does not extend to the personal defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3
F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary
injunction previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and
seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may
be used in evidence against petitioners herein.1wph1.t
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are
null and void. In this connection, the Constitution 13 provides:

19
Evidence Rule 128

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in
the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person
therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense
had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who
issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not
allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate provision of said
laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the
sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought
to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen
political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the
former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be
searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions
were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening
the explicit command of our Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination
of general warrants.

20
Evidence Rule 128

Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the
documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that
the position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free
merely "because the constable has blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other
than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance
of the search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such
other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of
enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing
the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the
prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his
rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The
efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by
years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same Federal Court.
in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):

After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held,

20

. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books,
are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a
specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against
them by the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable
federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that
rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing
evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held in Wolf that the amendment was
applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment
included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded operatively enforceable
against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the

21
Evidence Rule 128

Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches state or federal it
was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine an essential part of the right to privacy be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the
right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege,
namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to
withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once
recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by
state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like
effect as other basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law
enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees
him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of
justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be
sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is
intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent
evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation
(not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to
establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the
constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those
belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the minority usually but, understandably finds itself
in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is watered
down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments,
House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises considered in said
Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and
other effects seized in the offices of the corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive possession and
control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal"
nature thereof, has Been Advanced, notin their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962.
In other words, said theory would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and

22
Evidence Rule 128

amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either
inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other
papers submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant
application of the views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter
open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein
petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs
prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers
and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so
ordered.
G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986
EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act (RA) No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act, on the issue of whether or not an extension
telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of
communications between the two parties using a telephone line.
The facts presented by the People and narrated in the respondent court's decision are not disputed by the petitioner.
In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant's residence discussing the terms for
the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed
conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 3-5).
That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular
lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip. According to the request, appellant went to the office of Laconico where he was briefed about the problem. (Exhibit 'D',
tsn, April 22, 1982, pp. 4-5).
When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the
proposed conditions for the settlement. Appellant heard complainant enumerate the following conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault.

23
Evidence Rule 128

(a) the P5,000.00 was no longer acceptable, and that the figure had been increased to P8,000.00. A breakdown of the P8,000.00 had been made together with other demands,
to wit: (a) P5,000.00 no longer for the teacher Manuel Montebon, but for Atty. Pintor himself in persuading his client to withdraw the case for Direct Assault against Atty.
Laconico before the Cebu City Fiscal's Office;
(b) Public apology to be made by Atty. Laconico before the students of Don Bosco Technical High School;
(c) Pl,000.00 to be given to the Don Bosco Faculty club;
(d) transfer of son of Atty. Laconico to another school or another section of Don Bosco Technical High School;
(e) Affidavit of desistance by Atty. Laconico on the Maltreatment case earlier filed against Manuel Montebon at the Cebu City Fiscal's Office, whereas Montebon's affidavit of
desistance on the Direct Assault Case against Atty. Laconico to be filed later;
(f) Allow Manuel Montebon to continue teaching at the Don Bosco Technical School;
(g) Not to divulge the truth about the settlement of the Direct Assault Case to the mass media;
(h) P2,000.00 attorney s fees for Atty. Pintor. (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 47-48).
Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered 'Yes'. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for
instructions on where to deliver the money. (tsn, March 10, 1983, pp. 2-12).
Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his
friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the money. (tsn, March 10, 1982,
pp. 26-33). When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.
Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached
the affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation without
complainant's consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a decision dated November 22, 1982, found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The
two were each sentenced to one (1) year imprisonment with costs. Not satisfied with the decision, the petitioner appealed to the appellate court.
On August 16, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the communication between the complainant and accused Laconico
was private in nature and, therefore, covered by Rep. Act No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard such communication without the knowledge and consent of the complainant;
and that the extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear the telephone conversation between complainant and Laconico is covered in the term "device'
as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200.

24
Evidence Rule 128

In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner assails the decision of the appellate court and raises the following issues; (a) whether or not the telephone conversation between
the complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature; (b) whether or not an extension telephone is covered by the term "device or arrangement" under Rep. Act No.
4200; (c) whether or not the petitioner had authority to listen or overhear said telephone conversation and (d) whether or not Rep. Act No. 4200 is ambiguous and, therefore,
should be construed in favor of the petitioner.
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 provides:
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph
or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described:
It shall be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceeding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record,
disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner
prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions
thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, that the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of
offenses mentioned in Section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
We rule for the petitioner.
We are confronted in this case with the interpretation of a penal statute and not a rule of evidence. The issue is not the admissibility of evidence secured over an extension line
of a telephone by a third party. The issue is whether or not the person called over the telephone and his lawyer listening to the conversation on an extension line should both
face prison sentences simply because the extension was used to enable them to both listen to an alleged attempt at extortion.
There is no question that the telephone conversation between complainant Atty. Pintor and accused Atty. Laconico was "private" in the sense that the words uttered were made
between one person and another as distinguished from words between a speaker and a public. It is also undisputed that only one of the parties gave the petitioner the
authority to listen to and overhear the caller's message with the use of an extension telephone line. Obviously, complainant Pintor, a member of the Philippine bar, would not
have discussed the alleged demand for an P8,000.00 consideration in order to have his client withdraw a direct assault charge against Atty. Laconico filed with the Cebu City
Fiscal's Office if he knew that another lawyer was also listening. We have to consider, however, that affirmance of the criminal conviction would, in effect, mean that a caller by
merely using a telephone line can force the listener to secrecy no matter how obscene, criminal, or annoying the call may be. It would be the word of the caller against the
listener's.
Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of electronic equipment and the extra heavy loads which telephone cables are made to carry in certain areas,
telephone users often encounter what are called "crossed lines". An unwary citizzen who happens to pick up his telephone and who overhears the details of a crime might
hesitate to inform police authorities if he knows that he could be accused under Rep. Act 4200 of using his own telephone to secretly overhear the private communications of
the would be criminals. Surely the law was never intended for such mischievous results.
The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around the meaning of the phrase "any other device or arrangement." Is an extension of a telephone unit
such a device or arrangement as would subject the user to imprisonment ranging from six months to six years with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification

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Evidence Rule 128

for a public officer or deportation for an alien? Private secretaries with extension lines to their bosses' telephones are sometimes asked to use answering or recording devices
to record business conversations between a boss and another businessman. Would transcribing a recorded message for the use of the boss be a proscribed offense? or for that
matter, would a "party line" be a device or arrangement under the law?
The petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not included in the enumeration of "commonly known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong
to the same class of enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law. He maintains that in 1964, when Senate Bill No. 9 (later Rep. Act No. 4200) was being considered in
the Senate, telephones and extension telephones were already widely used instruments, probably the most popularly known communication device.
Whether or not listening over a telephone party line would be punishable was discussed on the floor of the Senate. Yet, when the bill was finalized into a statute, no mention
was made of telephones in the enumeration of devices "commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph, detectaphone or walkie talkie or tape recorder or however otherwise
described." The omission was not a mere oversight. Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act.
The respondent People argue that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the term "device" within the context of the aforementioned law because it is not a part
or portion of a complete set of a telephone apparatus. It is a separate device and distinct set of a movable apparatus consisting of a wire and a set of telephone receiver not
forming part of a main telephone set which can be detached or removed and can be transferred away from one place to another and to be plugged or attached to a main
telephone line to get the desired communication corning from the other party or end.
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There
must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof
cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for
ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not
be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. (see Commissioner of
Customs v. Esso Estandard Eastern, Inc., 66 SCRA 113,120).
In the case of Empire Insurance Com any v. Rufino (90 SCRA 437, 443-444), we ruled:
Likewise, Article 1372 of the Civil Code stipulates that 'however general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct
and cases that are different from those upon which the parties intended to agree.' Similarly, Article 1374 of the same Code provides that 'the various stipulations of a contract
shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly.
Consequently, the phrase 'all liabilities or obligations of the decedent' used in paragraph 5(c) and 7(d) should be then restricted only to those listed in the Inventory and should
not be construed as to comprehend all other obligations of the decedent. The rule that 'particularization followed by a general expression will ordinarily be restricted to the
former' is based on the fact in human experience that usually the minds of parties are addressed specially to the particularization, and that the generalities, though broad
enough to comprehend other fields if they stood alone, are used in contemplation of that upon which the minds of the parties are centered. (Hoffman v. Eastern Wisconsin R.,
etc., Co., 134 Wis. 603, 607, 115 NW 383, cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court (Evidence), 1973 ed, pp. 180-181).

26
Evidence Rule 128

Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments
of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or
presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping,
intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.
An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can
be moved from place ' to place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely presume that the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an
extension telephone and he runs the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party line or a telephone unit which shares its line with another. As was held in the case
of Rathbun v. United States (355, U.S. 107, 2 L Ed 2d 137-138):
Common experience tells us that a call to a particular telephone number may cause the bell to ring in more than one ordinarily used instrument. Each party to a telephone
conversation takes the risk that the other party may have an extension telephone and may allow another to overhear the conversation. When such takes place there has been
no violation of any privacy of which the parties may complain. Consequently, one element of 605, interception, has not occurred.
In the same case, the Court further ruled that the conduct of the party would differ in no way if instead of repeating the message he held out his hand-set so that another could
hear out of it and that there is no distinction between that sort of action and permitting an outsider to use an extension telephone for the same purpose.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an
extension telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone. In the case of People v.
Purisima, 86 SCRA 542, 562, we explained the rationale behind the rule:
American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be the tenderness of the law of the rights of individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to
which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. (United States v. Harris, 177 US 305, 44 L Ed 780, 20 S Ct 609; Braffith v. Virgin Islands (CA3) 26 F2d 646;
Caudill v. State, 224 Ind 531, 69 NE2d; Jennings v. Commonwealth, 109 VA 821,63 SE 1080, all cited in 73 Am Jur 2d 452). The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to
escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts." (State v. Zazzaro, 20 A 2d 737, quoted in Martin's Handbook on Statutory
Construction, Rev. Ed. pp. 183-184).
In the same case of Purisima, we also ruled that on the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and
spirit of the law. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records will show that not only did our lawmakers not contemplate the inclusion of an extension telephone as a
prohibited device or arrangement" but of greater importance, they were more concerned with penalizing the act of recording than the act of merely listening to a telephone
conversation.
Senator Taada. Another possible objection to that is entrapment which is certainly objectionable. It is made possible by special amendment which Your Honor may introduce.
Senator Diokno.Your Honor, I would feel that entrapment would be less possible with the amendment than without it, because with the amendment the evidence of entrapment
would only consist of government testimony as against the testimony of the defendant. With this amendment, they would have the right, and the government officials and the
person in fact would have the right to tape record their conversation.

27
Evidence Rule 128

Senator Taada. In case of entrapment, it would be the government.

Senator Diokno. In the same way, under this provision, neither party could record and, therefore, the court would be limited to saying: "Okay, who is more credible, the police
officers or the defendant?" In these cases, as experienced lawyers, we know that the Court go with the peace offices.
Senator Diokno. The point I have in mind is that under these conditions, with an agent outside listening in, he could falsify the testimony and there is no way of checking it. But
if you allow him to record or make a recording in any form of what is happening, then the chances of falsifying the evidence is not very much.
Senator Taada. Your Honor, this bill is not intended to prevent the presentation of false testimony. If we could devise a way by which we could prevent the presentation of false
testimony, it would be wonderful. But what this bill intends to prohibit is the use of tape record and other electronic devices to intercept private conversations which later on
will be used in court.
It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from
installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the
mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature. We are of the view that an
extension telephone is not among such devices or arrangements. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court dated August
16, 1984 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act. SO
ORDERED.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR,
Complainant,
- versus -

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2076

JUDGE ALBERTO L. LERMA,

Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------x
ATTY. LOURDES A. ONA,
Complainant,
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2077
- versus JUDGE ALBERTO L. LERMA,
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------x
JOSE MARI L. DUARTE,
Complainant,
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2078
- versus JUDGE ALBERTO L. LERMA,
Respondent.

28
Evidence Rule 128

x-----------------------------------------x
RET. GENERAL MELITON D. GOYENA,
Complainant,
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2079
- versus JUDGE ALBERTO L. LERMA,
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------x
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR,
Complainant,
- versus JUDGE ALBERTO L. LERMA,
Respondent.

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2080

October 12, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Five (5) administrative cases were filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) against Judge Alberto L. Lerma (respondent judge) of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 256, Muntinlupa City, for violating Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars, for making untruthful statements in his certificates of service, for gross
ignorance of the law and/or gross negligence, for delay in rendering an order, for abusing judicial authority and discretion, and for serious irregularity.
In a memorandum[1] dated September 24, 2007, embodying the report and recommendation of the OCA, then Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock (Court
Administrator Lock) referred to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno (Chief Justice Puno) the five administrative cases filed against respondent judge, to wit: a) Administrative
Matter No. 98-6-179-RTC (Re: Request for transfer of arraignment/trial of Criminal Case No. 3639-R); b) OCA IPI No. 07-2644-RTJ ([Ret.] General Meliton D. Goyena v. Judge
Alberto L. Lerma); c) OCA IPI No. 07-2643-RTJ (Jose Mari L. Duarte v. Judge Alberto L. Lerma); d) OCA IPI No. 07-2639-RTJ (Atty. Lourdes A. Ona v. Judge Alberto L. Lerma); and
e) OCA IPI No. 07-2654-RTJ (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Alberto L. Lerma).
Per resolution[2] of the Supreme Court En Banc dated September 25, 2007, the foregoing cases were respectively redocketed as regular administrative cases, as follows:
A.M. Nos. RTJ-07-2076, RTJ-07-2079, RTJ-07-2078, RTJ-07-2077, and RTJ-07-2080.
Thereafter, the cases were referred to an Investigating Justice[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation and recommendation.
We shall discuss the cases individually, taking into account their peculiar factual surroundings and the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Justice.
a.)

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2076

On November 27, 1995, Ruperto Pizarro y Bruno (accused) was charged with Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 in an information filed with the RTC, Branch 53,
Rosales, Pangasinan and docketed as Criminal Case No. 3639-R. [4] Since accused was already detained at the Quezon City Jail due to the pendency of another criminal case
(Criminal Case No. Q-95-64130-31) filed against him. The court ordered that all notices of hearings and proceedings in Criminal Case No. 3639-R be forwarded to the Jail
Warden of the Quezon City Jail. [5] Subsequently, in a letter dated March 25, 1998, [6] Officer-in-Charge/City Warden Arnold Buenacosa of the Quezon City Jail informed Judge
Teodorico Alfonzo B. Bauzon (Judge Bauzon), RTC of Rosales, Pangasinan, that accused was transferred to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City on March 21, 1998 in
compliance with the commitment order and decision in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64130-31 of the RTC, Branch 82, Quezon City.

29
Evidence Rule 128

The Supreme Court, in a resolution [7] dated June 30, 1998, directed (1) the Clerk of Court of the RTC, Branch 53, Rosales, Pangasinan, to forward the records of Criminal
Case No. 3639-R to the Executive Judge, RTC, Muntinlupa City, for appropriate action; (2) the Executive Judge, RTC, Muntinlupa City, to raffle the case among the judges to
arraign the accused and consequently take his testimony; and (3) the Clerk of Court, RTC, Muntinlupa City, to return the records to the RTC, Branch 53, Rosales, Pangasinan, for
the continuation of the proceedings.
Pursuant to the Supreme Court resolution, Criminal Case No. 3639-R [8] was raffled to RTC, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City, presided by respondent judge. Accused was
arraigned on September 29, 1998. Thereafter, respondent judge proceeded to receive the evidence for the prosecution. On February 7, 2003, the prosecution formally offered
its exhibits, but the firearm subject of the information was not included in the formal offer. On June 27, 2005, the accused, through Atty. Abelardo D. Tomas of the Public
Attorneys Office (PAO), filed a motion for leave of court to file demurrer to prosecutions evidence.[9] Respondent judge granted the said motion on July 26, 2005. [10] On
November 8, 2005, Atty. Rodney Magbanua of the PAO filed a demurrer to prosecutions evidence,[11] contending that, without the subject firearm, the prosecution failed to
prove an essential element of the offense. On February 28, 2007, respondent judge issued an order, granting the demurrer to prosecutions evidence and dismissing the case
for insufficiency of evidence.[12]
In a memorandum[13] dated September 24, 2007, the OCA charged respondent judge with exceeding his authority under the Supreme Court resolution dated June 30,
1998 in A.M. No. 98-6-179-RTC.According to the OCA, the authority given to respondent judge under the resolution was clearly limited to the arraignment of the accused and
the taking of his testimony; it did not authorize respondent judge to decide the merits of the case. The OCA contended that the act of respondent judge constituted violation of
a Supreme Court directive, a less serious offense, under Section 9(4), Rule 140, Revised Rules of Court.
In his comment dated November 16, 2007, respondent judge asserted that there was neither a conscious nor a deliberate intent on his part to disobey any directive of
the Supreme Court when he granted the demurrer to evidence filed by the accused in Criminal Case No. 3639-R. He claimed that, through inadvertence, he was not able to
recall the limits of the referral made to him, and stressed that he ruled on the merits of the case in a way not tainted with fraud, dishonesty, or corruption. He emphasized that
he acted on the demurrer to evidence because of the inadequacy of the evidence for the prosecution and because of the failure of the latter to object to the demurrer. He
maintained that it would have been wrong for him to add to the penalty already being served by the accused when there was no evidence to warrant the detention of the latter
for the unproved offense.[14]
Under Section 9(4), Rule 140, Revised Rules of Court, failure to obey the Courts resolution is a less serious offense that carries a penalty of suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) month or more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
The Investigating Justice recommends that a fine of P15,000.00 be imposed upon respondent, based on the following findings:
In criminal actions, it is a fundamental rule that venue is jurisdictional. The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an
essential element of jurisdiction.Thus, a court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense committed outside the limited territory. Furthermore, the
jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. [15]
The demurrer to evidence filed by the accused cited the accusatory portion of the information which charged him with unlawful possession of a caliber .30 U.S. carbine
with two magazines and twenty-five (25) rounds of ammunition. The information clearly stated that the accused possessed the carbine, magazines, and ammunitions in
Barangay Cabalaongan Sur, Municipality of Rosales, Province of Pangasinan. Had respondent judge exercised a moderate degree of caution before resolving the demurrer to
evidence, a mere perusal of the records would have reminded him that his court was only authorized to arraign the accused, to receive the evidence in the said case, and to
return the records of the case to the RTC, Branch 53, Rosales, Pangasinan for continuation of the proceedings. In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the
facts.[16]

30
Evidence Rule 128
Respondent judge was found wanting in the diligence required of him. We agree with the Investigating Justice in finding respondent judge guilty of violating a Supreme
Court directive, and impose upon him a fine of P15,000.00.
b.) A.M. No. RTJ-07-2080
In a letter[17] dated August 28, 2007, Godofredo R. Galindez, Jr., (Godofredo), president of the Alabang Country Club, Inc. (Alabang Country Club), in response to the letter dated
August 21, 2007 of Court Administrator Lock, stated that respondent judge played golf at the Alabang Country Club on the following dates and tee-off time:
Date
April 8, 2000
July 21, 2000
August 4, 2000
November 28, 2000
May 17, 2001
September 29, 2001
March 5, 2002
June 19, 2002
February 12, 2004
February 28, 2005

Tee off-time
12:00 P.M.
1:08 P.M.
1:20 P.M.
10:00 A.M.
3:05 P.M.
12:56 P.M.
1:00 P.M.
7:12 A.M.
1:35 P.M.
10:41 A.M.

With the exception of May 17, 2001, during which respondent judge allegedly played nine (9) holes of golf, Godofredo stated in his letter that the former played eighteen (18)
holes of golf on all the aforestated dates.
In another letter[18] dated September 3, 2007, Hirofumi Hotta (Hirofumi), operations manager of TAT Filipinas Golf Club (Tat Filipinas), in answer to an inquiry made by Court
Administrator Lock, stated that respondent judge visited the said golf club and appeared to have played golf there on the following dates all Thursdays and time:
Date
April 14, 2005
April 28, 2005
August 18, 2005
August 25, 2005
November 17, 2005
November 24, 2005
December 15, 2005
January 26, 2006
February 9, 2006
March 2, 2006
March 23, 2006
April 6, 2006
April 27, 2006
June 15, 2006

Time
1:30 P.M.
1:30 P.M.
1:30 P.M.
1:30 P.M.
1:30 P.M.
1:30 P.M.
1:30 P.M.
1:30 P.M.
1:30 P.M.
1:30 P.M.
1:30 P.M.
1:30 P.M.
1:30 P.M.
1:30 P.M.

31
Evidence Rule 128
December 14, 2006

1:30 P.M.

According to the OCA, its records in the Office of the Administrative Services show that respondent judge did not declare his absences on July 21, 2000, August 4, 2000,
March 5, 2002, February 12, 2004, and February 28, 2005, during which he reportedly played golf at the Alabang Country Club. Further, in a certification[19] dated September 5,
2007, Hermogena F. Bayani (Hermogena), Supreme Court Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Leave Division, OCA, stated that respondent judge did not file any application for a leave
of absence on all the dates mentioned by Hirofumi in his letter dated September 3, 2007.These constituted violations of Supreme Court Memorandum Order dated November
19, 1973, Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999, and Administrative Circular No. 5 dated October 4, 1988. [20]
The OCA asserted that on the days that respondent judge played golf, he was lost to the judiciary for half the working/session hours on those days, positing that this is
not merely truancy but also dishonesty and falsification of certificates of service.
Respondent judge, in his comment, countered that contrary to the allegations of the OCA, he only played golf thrice in 2000, once in 2001, twice in 2002, six (6) times
in 2005, and five (5) times in 2006 a total of eighteen (18) times in six years, or at the average of three (3) times a year. He argued that his playing golf 18 times in six years,
or thrice a year, could not be reasonably characterized as habitual to the extent that it jeopardized the discharge of his functions as a judge. He alleged that since he shared
his courtroom with the other judges in Muntinlupa, he only played golf on days when no other place was available for him to carry out his official functions. Likewise, he
explained that, in 1996, his physician advised him to exercise more vigorously after he was diagnosed with diabetes and hypertension.Respondent judge also stressed that he
had never missed a day in hearing cases pending in his sala. [21]
In the hearing conducted by the Investigating Justice on December 4, 2007, the OCA presented Godofredo, Hirofumi, and Sheila Aquino as witnesses.
Godofredo testified that the dates and time when respondent judge played golf at the Alabang Country Club, as mentioned in his letter, are based on the logbook
entries made by the starter in the country club. A starter, explained Godofredo, is a person who records in the logbook the names of the individuals who play in the golf
course. The starter may be the player himself or a member who brings in guests to play golf.
On cross-examination, Godofredo admitted that he is not the custodian of the logbook; that he is neither the starter nor the person who wrote the entries in the
logbook; and that he does not recognize in whose handwriting the entries were made.
Hirofumi, the operations manager of TAT Filipinas, testified that Aquino, the front desk receptionist in the golf club, made the listing of the respective dates and time
when respondent judge played at TAT Filipinas based on the data stored in their office computer.
Aquino, who had been employed by the company for fifteen (15) years, and had been working as its front desk receptionist for six (6) years, testified that she saw
respondent judge sign the registered member forms at the golf club prior to playing golf.
The Investigating Justice found as insufficient the evidence that the OCA presented to show that respondent judge played golf at the Alabang Country Club on the dates
alleged, but found substantial evidence that respondent judge played golf at TAT Filipinas on the dates and time indicated in Hirofumis letter dated September 3, 2007.
The testimony of Aquino, along with the certification issued by Hermogena, that respondent judge did not file any leave of absence on the dates indicated in Hirofumis letter,
indubitably established that respondent judge violated Supreme Court Memorandum Order dated November 19, 1973, Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15,
1999, and Administrative Circular No. 5 dated October 4, 1988.

32
Evidence Rule 128

Supreme Court Memorandum Order dated November 19, 1973 provides for the observance by judges, among other officials and employees in the judiciary, of a five-day fortyhour week schedule which shall be from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. and from 12:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. from Mondays to Fridays.
Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars, and making untruthful statements in the certificate of service are considered less serious charges under
Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 11(B) of Rule 140, these acts may be punished by suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less
than one (1) month or more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
On the basis of the foregoing findings, we adopt the recommendation of the Investigating Justice that, in this administrative case, a fine of P15,000.00 be imposed
upon respondent judge.
c.) A.M. No. RTJ-07-2077
On January 24, 1995, the RTC, Branch 142, Makati City, rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 90-659, entitled Alexander Van Twest v. Gloria A. Anacleto and/or
International Corporate Bank, ordering defendant bank (Interbank) or its successors-in-interest to release in favor of plaintiff Alexander Van Twest (Van Twest) the entire
proceeds of Interbank Foreign Currency Trust Deposit (FCTD) No. 39156 in the amount of Deutsch Mark (DM) 260,000.00, including accrued interest and other earnings. The
decision also directed defendant Gloria Anacleto to return to plaintiff the sum of DM 9,777.37 with interest thereon. The court ordered the defendants, jointly and severally, to
pay plaintiff P500,000.00 as moral damages, P250,000.00 as exemplary damages, P200,000.00 as attorneys fees, and the costs of suit. [22]However, even before the decision
was rendered, Van Twest had disappeared and was believed to have been kidnapped and killed. [23]
Subsequently, Atty. Ernesto V. Perez (Atty. Perez), representing Van Twest, filed a Motion for Execution of Decision. In the motion, Atty. Perez informed the RTC of Makati
City that, on October 30, 2006, the RTC, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City, with respondent judge presiding, granted the petition to appoint the former as administrator of the
properties or estate of absentee Van Twest in Special Proceeding No. 97-045, entitled In the Matter of the Petition to Appoint an Administrator for the Estate of Absentee
Alexander Van Twest a.k.a. Eugene Alexander Van West. [24] On January 27, 2007, the RTC Branch 142, Makati City, granted the motion for execution.[25]
Union Bank of the Philippines (Union Bank) filed a Manifestation and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion dated May 23, 2007 in Special Proceeding No. 97-045, praying that the exercise by
Atty. Perez of powers as administrator of absentee Van Twest be held in abeyance until the said manifestation and motion is heard. Because respondent judge was on official
leave at the time of the filing of the Manifestation and Urgent Ex-Parte Motion, Judge Philip A. Aguinaldo, pairing judge of RTC Branch 256, Muntinlupa City, acted on the same,
and, in an order dated May 28, 2007, granted Union Banks urgent ex-parte motion.
Union Bank thereafter filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Recall Writ of Execution/Garnishment in Civil Case No. 90-659, citing, in support thereof, the order
dated May 28, 2007 issued by Judge Aguinaldo in Special Proceeding No. 97-045.
On June 1, 2007, Atty. Perez filed with the Muntinlupa RTC an Omnibus Motion: 1) To Lift or Set Aside Pairing Judges Order of May 28, 2007 for having been issued
without jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion and/or violation of due process of law; 2) To Cite Union Bank of the Philippines counsel for Indirect Contempt.
At the hearing of the omnibus motion on June 6, 2007, respondent judge ordered Atty. Lourdes A. Ona (Atty. Ona), counsel for Union Bank, to file her Opposition and/or
Comment to the said Motion within 10 days. Atty. Perez was given the same period from receipt of the Opposition and/or Comment to file his Reply thereto, if necessary, and
thereafter, the matter would be deemed submitted for resolution.
On the same day, however, respondent judge issued another order bearing the same date, ruling that the bank had not shown any legal basis to set aside the courts decision
of October 30, 2006, or to suspend the Letters of Administration issued to Atty. Perez pursuant thereto. The order then concluded that Atty. Perez may exercise all the powers
granted to him as Administrator of the absentee Van Twest until further orders of the court.

33
Evidence Rule 128
In a letter dated July 23, 2007, addressed to the OCA, complainant alleged that respondent judges issuance of the second order dated June 6, 2007 was irregular, in light of the
following: 1) At the hearing held on June 6, 2007, the omnibus motion filed by Atty. Perez was deemed submitted for resolution only after the complainant shall have filed her
comment/opposition thereto or until the 10-day period shall have expired; 2) The issuance of the second order dated June 6, 2007 was secretly railroaded to give Atty. Perez a
ground to oppose Union Banks Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Recall Writ of Execution/Garnishment filed with the RTC, Branch 142, Makati City, in time for its hearing
originally set on June 8, 2007; 3) Even the staff of respondent judge did not become aware of the second June 6, 2007 order until much later, since respondent judge never
furnished complainant with a copy thereof until the latter made inquiries regarding the same; and 4) The contents of the second order dated June 6,2007 contradicted the first
order and rendered the pending incident moot and academic.
Respondent judge, in his comment, denied the charge and argued that the same should be dismissed. The complainant, according to respondent judge, should instead be
meted disciplinary penalties as a member of the bar.
Notwithstanding the recommendation of the Investigating Justice, the Court finds that the actions of respondent judge constitute gross negligence and/or gross ignorance of
the law.
We have repeatedly held that to warrant a finding of gross ignorance of the law, it must be shown that the error is so gross and patent as to produce an inference of bad faith.
[26]
Gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but
willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and
thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property. In cases involving public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable. [27]
In the instant case, the issuance by respondent of divergent orders raises serious questions of impropriety that taint respondent judges credibility, probity, and
integrity. Coupled with the clandestine issuance of the second order where the Union Bank counsel and even the judges own staff were left completely in the dark the action of
respondent judge gives rise to an inference of bad faith. Indeed, we have ample reason to believe as Atty. Ona posits that the secretly-issued second order was really intended
to give Atty. Perez the ammunition to oppose Union Banks Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Recall Writ of Execution/Garnishment which was to be heard by the RTC of Makati
City. Under the circumstances, the breach committed by respondent can be characterized as flagrant and palpable.
This action of respondent judge violates Section 8 of Rule 140, and carries the penalty of dismissal from the service or suspension from office for more than three (3) months
but not exceeding six (6) months, or a fine of P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
For this violation, we impose upon respondent judge the penalty of dismissal from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits, except earned leave credits, and perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in the government service, including government-owned and controlled corporations.
d)

A.M. No. RTJ-07-2078

Jose Mari L. Duarte (complainant) is one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 2003-433, entitled Eugene T. Mateo v. The Board of Governors of Ayala Alabang Village
Association: Paolo V. Castano, Constantino A. Marcaida, Ruben P. Baes, Eric Yutuc, Roberto Santiago, Beatriz Bettina H. Pou, Edilberto Uichanco, Salvador S. Arceo, Jr., Benjamin
Narciso, Guy L. Romualdez, and Jose Mari L. Duarte, for Declaration of the General Membership Meeting and Election of the Ayala Alabang Village Association (AAVA) as void ab
initio, with prayer for the Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction and/or a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Status Quo Order. Eugene T. Mateo filed the case on July 29,
2003 with the RTC, Muntinlupa City, and it was eventually raffled to the RTC, Branch 256, Muntinlupa City, presided over by respondent judge.[28]

34
Evidence Rule 128

On August 15, 2003, defendants Salvador S. Arceo, Jr. (Arceo) and Benjamin Narciso (Narciso) filed their answer with affirmative defenses and counterclaims, while all the other
defendants filed a motion to dismiss. In moving for the dismissal of the case, all defendants invoked the trial courts lack of jurisdiction over the case and plaintiffs lack of cause
of action. On September 2, 2003, plaintiff filed his opposition to motion to dismiss with motion to declare defendants in default. In an order dated September 12, 2003,
respondent judge denied defendants motion to dismiss and plaintiffs motion to declare defendants in default, and set for hearing plaintiffs application for the issuance of a
TRO. Respondent judge eventually denied the prayer of plaintiff for the issuance of a TRO on September 26, 2003.
On November 25, 2003, respondent judge rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff, declaring the AAVAs general membership meeting held on June 15, 2003 void ab
initio, and ordering that the status quo of the boards composition prior to the proceedings of June 15, 2003 be maintained. The respondent judge also enjoined defendants
Arceo, Narciso, Guy L. Romualdez (Romualdez) and Jose Mari L. Duarte from further exercising the functions of the office they respectively hold. He directed the holding of
another election of the AAVA board, and ordered the defendants to pay jointly and severally the amount of P100,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees. The respondent judge
dismissed the defendants counterclaim.
The aggrieved complainant, together with all the other defendants, appealed to the CA from the above-cited decision. On December 10, 2003, plaintiff filed with the RTC
a petition to direct defendants to show cause why they should not be cited and thereafter punished for indirect contempt of court (petition for indirect contempt) for their
alleged defiance of respondent judges decision dated November 25, 2003, as shown by their continued performance of duties as governors of Ayala Alabang Village, despite
receipt of a copy of the said decision.
On July 1, 2004, respondent judge issued an order declaring complainant, Arceo and Romualdez, guilty of indirect contempt, and ordering each of them to pay a fine in the
amount of P30,000.00.
Unperturbed, complainant and his co-defendants Arceo and Romualdez moved for reconsideration of the July 1, 2004 order. On September 24, 2004, respondent judge granted
their motion for reconsideration, and reversed and set aside his order dated July 1, 2004.
On June 29, 2007, the Special Sixteenth Division of the CA issued a resolution, ruling that the lower court should have dismissed the plaintiff-appellees Complaint for
Declaration of the General Membership Meeting and Election of the AAVA as void ab initio with prayer for the Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction and/or TRO and Status Quo
Order because it is the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board that has jurisdiction over the dispute.
On August 23, 2007, Mateo filed a complaint with the Supreme Court, contending that respondent judge did not have the judicial authority to hear and decide the
issues involved in Civil Case No. 2003-433 for want of jurisdiction. According to complainant, this was brought to the attention of respondent judge, but the latter, being grossly
ignorant of existing laws and rules, if not completely insolent of the same, and with grave abuse of discretion, took cognizance of the case.
In his comment, respondent judge argued that the error he allegedly committed could be corrected by an available judicial remedy. He maintained that if he erroneously
assumed jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 2003-433, the proper recourse available to complainant was not an administrative complaint, but a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court.
The Investigating Justice recommended that the instant administrative case against respondent judge be dismissed. This Court takes the opposite view.
It is true that to constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the subject decision, order, or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties
is contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but, most importantly, he must be moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty, or corruption. [29]
However, when the law is so elementary and the matter of jurisdiction is an elementary principle that judges should be knowledgeable of not to be aware of it
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. They are expected to keep

35
Evidence Rule 128

abreast of our laws and the changes therein as well as with the latest decisions of the Supreme Court. They owe it to the public to be legally knowledgeable, for ignorance of
the law is the mainspring of injustice. Judicial competence requires no less. It is a truism that the life chosen by a judge as a dispenser of justice is demanding. By virtue of the
delicate position which he occupies in society, he is duty bound to be the embodiment of competence and integrity. [30]
On the matter of the order finding complainant guilty of indirect contempt, we also find the action of respondent judge sadly wanting. Section 4, Rule 71 of the same
Rules provides:
Sec. 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an
order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of
documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court concerned. If
the contempt
charges
arose
out
of
or
are
related
to
a
principal
action
pending
in
the
court,
the
petition
for contempt
shall allege that fact but saidpetition shall be docketed, heard and
decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. [31]
The Rules are unequivocal. Indirect contempt proceedings may be initiated only in two ways: (1) motu proprio by the court; or (2) through a verified petition and
upon compliance with the requirements for initiatory pleadings. The procedural requirements are mandatory considering that contempt proceedings against a person
are treated as criminal in nature.[32] Conviction cannot be had merely on the basis of written pleadings. [33]
The records do not indicate that complainant was afforded an opportunity to rebut the charges against him. Respondent judge should have conducted a hearing in order
to provide complainant the opportunity to adduce before the court documentary or testimonial evidence in his behalf. The hearing also allows the court a more thorough
evaluation of the circumstances surrounding the case, including the chance to observe the accused present his side in open court and subject his defense to interrogation from
the complainants or from the court itself.[34]
It must be remembered that the power to punish for contempt should be used sparingly with caution, restraint, judiciousness, deliberation, and due regard to the
provisions of the law and the constitutional rights of the individual. [35] In this respect, respondent judge failed to measure up to the standards demanded of member of the
judiciary.
As already mentioned above, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge under Section 8(9), Rule 140, Revised Rules of Court, and a
respondent found guilty of serious charge may be punished by: a) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations, provided, however, that the forfeiture of
benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; b) suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) months but not exceeding six (6)
months; or c) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
In this case, we find respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law, and impose upon him a fine of P40,000.00.
e.) A.M. No. RTJ-07-2079
On January 19, 2006, Bennie Cuason (Cuason) was charged before the RTC, Muntinlupa City, with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, for
defrauding Brigadier General Meliton D. Goyena (Gen. Goyena) (Ret.) by convincing the latter to invest, entrust, and/or deliver the amount of Twenty Million Pesos

36
Evidence Rule 128

(P20,000,000.00) on the promise that the former would return the investment with interest, plus two (2) Condominium Certificates of Title over residential units on the
20th floor at Tower B of Diamond Bay Towers Condominium, with a total value of Nine Million Five Hundred Ninety-Two Thousand Pesos ( P9,592,000.00). Gen. Goyena gave the
amount of Twenty Million Pesos (P20,000,000.00) to the accused and received two (2) condominium certificates of title with numbers 6893 and 6894. After verification,
complainant found that the condominium units were non-existent, or had not yet been constructed.

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-179 and was raffled to RTC, Branch 204, Muntinlupa City, presided over by Judge Juanita T. Guerrero (Judge Guerrero).
On February 14, 2006, accused Cuason, through counsel, filed with the RTC an entry of appearance with a plea to determine whether or not probable cause exists for the
purpose of issuance of a warrant of arrest. Complainant, also through counsel, subsequently filed a Motion to deny the application for judicial determination of probable cause
and to cite accused in contempt of this Honorable Court on the ground of forum shopping. On April 4, 2006, accused Cuason filed his comment and/or opposition thereto, and
on April 10, 2006, accused Cuason filed a supplemental comment and/or opposition to the motion.
With the designation of RTC, Branch 204, Muntinlupa City, as a special court for drug cases on May 2, 2006, the case was re-raffled to the sala of respondent judge. After
hearing the respective arguments of the parties, respondent judge issued an omnibus order dated September 4, 2006, dismissing Criminal Case No. 06-179. The pertinent
portions of the omnibus order read as follows:
On this first issue, this Court, after a careful scrutiny of the arguments and evidence of both parties, believes that there was payment already made as to the principal
obligation as admitted by the complainant in his affidavit dated September 20, 2005 (page 3, par. 17) and what is being left is the payment of interest which,
under the premises, is in [the] form of condominium certificates. So also, while the complainant questions the authenticity of those certificates as well as the
existence of [the] condominium units subject thereof, accused, indubitably, was able to satisfy this Court as to the authenticity of the questioned certificates
and the existence of the units by showing proofs to that effect.
On September 6, 2006, Gen. Goyena filed with the RTC a very urgent manifestation with motion for the court to conduct ocular inspection, and on September 22, 2006,
he filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration, ocular inspection and inhibition, anchored on the following grounds: 1) as correctly found by the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Muntinlupa City, the two (2) condominium units used in partly settling the liabilities of the accused to the private complainant do not exist a fact that should have been
established by now, if only the court allowed the ocular inspection prayed for; 2) the court overlooked the pronouncement in the very case it has relied on, that Allado and
Salonga constitute exceptions to the general rule and may be invoked only if similar circumstances are clearly shown to exist; and 3) the order dismissing the case was
improperly or irregularly issued.
On September 18, 2006, complainant filed a letter-complaint addressed to then Supreme Court Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban, charging respondent judge with abuse of
judicial authority and discretion, serious irregularity, and gross ignorance of the law, allegedly shown by the latters act of willfully and knowingly reversing the well-grounded
finding of probable cause made by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City.
Thereafter, respondent judge issued an order dated October 4, 2006, inhibiting himself from sitting in Criminal Case No. 06-179, and directing that the records of the case be
forwarded to the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC, Muntinlupa City, for appropriate re-raffling. The case was eventually re-raffled to the RTC, Branch 206, Muntinlupa City,
presided over by Judge Patricia Manalastasde Leon (Judge Manalastas-De Leon).
In his memorandum dated September 24, 2007, Court Administrator Lock found ample basis to charge respondent judge with delay in rendering an order and for abuse
of judicial discretion and authority

37
Evidence Rule 128

The OCA stated that Criminal Case No. 06-179 was assigned to respondent judge on May 2, 2006, a fact which the latter did not dispute. More than a month later, or on June
19, 2006, respondent judge set accused Cuasons motion to determine whether or not a probable cause exists for the purpose of the issuance of a warrant of arrest and
complainants motion to deny application for judicial determination of probable cause and to cite accused in contempt of this Honorable Court on the ground of forum
shopping for hearing on July 17, 2006. It must be stressed that accused Cuason and complainant filed their respective motions on February 14, 2006 and on March 22, 2006, or
while the case was still pending in the sala of Judge Guerrero. After hearing the said motions on July 17, 2006, it took another forty-eight (48) days for respondent judge to
issue the omnibus order dated September 4, 2006, dismissing the case for lack of probable cause.
In his comment dated November 23, 2007, respondent judge insists that the charge filed against him should be dismissed.
This Court finds that respondent judges delay in the determination of probable cause clearly runs counter to the provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. (a) By the Regional Trial Court. - Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall
personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested
pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to Section 7 of
this Rules. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from
notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.
While respondent judge could not have ascertained the existence of probable cause for the issuance of an arrest warrant against Cuason within ten (10) days from the filing of
the complaint or information Criminal Case No. 06-179 having been re-raffled to his sala only on May 2, 2006 prudence demanded that respondent judge should have
determined the existence of probable cause within ten (10) days from July 17, 2006, the date he heard the respective arguments of the parties. This interpretation is in keeping
with the provisions of Section 6, Rule 112.
By allowing forty-eight (48) days to lapse before issuing the two-page omnibus order dated September 4, 2006, respondent judge should be held liable for undue delay in
rendering an order, which is classified as a less serious charge under Section 9(1), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, punishable by suspension from office without salary and
other benefits for not less than one (1) month or more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
Furthermore, the Court agrees with the OCA that the respondent judge is guilty of abuse of judicial discretion and authority.
The information in Criminal Case No. 06-179 clearly accuses Cuason of falsely pretending that he can return the investment of complainant by paying cash and two (2)
condominium units when in fact these units do not exist or have not yet been constructed. The issue therefore boils down to whether or not the condominium units exist, and
the incontrovertible proof of this are the condominium units themselves. The logical thing to do would have been to order the conduct of an ocular inspection. Instead of an
ocular inspection, respondent relied on the certificate of registration, the development permit, the license to sell, the building permit, and the Condominium Certificate of Title
on the basis of which the judge ordered the dismissal of the case. It may be that an ocular inspection was premature at the time the respondent dismissed the case because
at that time the case was not yet set for the presentation of evidence of the parties. Nevertheless, it now appears that the pieces of evidence relied upon by the respondent do
not fully support his conclusion.

38
Evidence Rule 128

Section 4, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court provides that evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or nonexistence. Relevancy is, therefore, determinable by the rules of logic and human experienceRelevant evidence is any class of evidence which has rational probative value to
the issue in controversy.[36] Logic and human experience teach us that the documents relied upon by respondent do not constitute the best evidence to prove the existence or
non-existence of the condominium units. To repeat, the best evidence would have been adduced by an ocular inspection of the units themselves.
Judge Lerma should also have exercised caution in determining the existence of probable cause. At the very least, he should have asked the prosecutor to present additional
evidence, in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or, in the alternative, to show cause why the case should not be dismissed instead
of precipitately ordering the dismissal of the case. The circumstances required the exercise of caution considering that the case involved estafa in the considerable amount
of P20 Million for which the complainant paid P129,970.00 in docket fees before the Office of the City Prosecutor and later P167,114.60 as docket fee for the filing of the
Information before the RTC.
For this particular violation, we find respondent judge guilty and impose upon him a fine of P21,000.00.
As an unflattering footnote to these administrative offenses, the OCA, upon the authority of the Chief Justice, conducted a judicial audit from August 21-30, 2007 of the
RTC, Branch 256, Muntinlupa.The initial result of the audit revealed that Judge Lerma failed to decide 30 civil cases and 11 criminal cases within the 90-day reglementary
period. It also appears that 101 civil cases and 137 criminal cases remained unacted despite the lapse of a considerable period.
Judge Lerma had previously been sanctioned by this Court. In a resolution dated September 13, 2003 in A.M. No. RTJ-03-1799, entitled Ma. Cristina Olondriz Pertierra v.
Judge Alberto L. Lerma, this Court found him liable for conduct unbecoming a judge and imposed upon him the penalty of reprimand. In that case, Judge Lerma was found
having lunch with a lawyer who has a pending case in his sala.
The totality of all these findings underscore the fact that respondent judges actions served to erode the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary. He has been
remiss in the fulfillment of the duty imposed on all members of the bench in order to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the image and integrity of the judiciary.
To reiterate, officers of the court have the duty to see to it that justice is dispensed evenly and fairly. Not only must they be honest and impartial, but they must
also appear to be honest and impartial in the dispensation of justice. Judges should make sure that their acts are circumspect and do not arouse suspicion in the minds of the
public. When they fail to do so, such acts cast doubt upon their integrity and ultimately on the judiciary in general.[37] Courts will only succeed in their task and mission if the
judges presiding over them are truly honorable men, competent and independent, honest and dedicated. [38]
Respondent judge failed to live up to the judiciarys exacting standards, and this Court will not withhold penalty when called for to uphold the peoples faith in the
Judiciary.[39]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court RULES, as follows:
1)

In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2076, Judge Alberto Lerma is found GUILTY of violating a Supreme Court directive, and we impose upon him a FINE in the total amount
of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00);

2)

In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2080, Judge Alberto Lerma is FINED in the total amount of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00) for violation of Supreme Court
rules, directives, and circulars, and for making untruthful statements in his certificate of service;

39
Evidence Rule 128
3)

In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2077, Judge Alberto Lerma is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and punished with the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service, with
forfeiture of all benefits, except earned leave credits, with prejudice to reemployment in any government agency or instrumentality.

4)

In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2078, we find Judge Alberto Lerma GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law, and impose upon him a FINE of FORTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P40,000.00); and

5) In A.M. No. RTJ-07-2079, we find Judge Alberto Lerma GUILTY of grave abuse of authority and undue delay in rendering an order, and impose upon him
a FINE of TWENTYONE THOUSANDPESOS (P21,000.00).
This Decision is final and immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 206220, August 19, 2015

LUIS UY, SUBSTITUTED BY LYDIA UY VELASQUEZ AND SHIRLEY UY MACARAIG, Petitioner, v.SPOUSES JOSE LACSAMANA AND ROSAURA* MENDOZA,
SUBSTITUTED BY CORAZON BUENA, Respondents.
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision dated 14 September 2011 2 and Resolution dated 1 March 20133 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
93786.
The subject of the litigation involves a parcel of land known as Lot 5506 of the Cadastral Survey of Batangas plan (LRC) SWO-2817, L.R. Case No. N-445, L.R.C. Record No. N22499. The land, situated in Barrio Alangilan, Batangas City, contains an area of 484 square meters under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-24660. 4 The land was
previously owned by spouses Anastacio Manuel and Mariquita de Villa (Spouses Manuel) under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-2840.
On 4 May 1979, petitioner Luis Uy (Uy) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pallocan West, Batangas City, Branch 4, a Complaint 5 for Declaration of Nullity of Documents
with Damages against respondents Petra Rosca (Rosca), and spouses Jose Lacsamana and Rosaura Mendoza (Spouses Lacsamana).
In the Complaint, Uy alleged that he was the lawful husband of Rosca. He stated that they lived together as husband and wife from the time they were married in 1944 until

40
Evidence Rule 128

1973 when they separated and lived apart. Uy and Rosca had eight children.
Uy alleged that on 29 January 1964,6 he and his wife acquired a 484 square meter residential land for a consideration of P1,936 evidenced by a Deed of Sale 7 from the Spouses
Manuel. The sellers' OCT No. 0-2840 was cancelled and TCT No. T-24660 was issued in the name of "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy."
On 15 June 1964, Uy and Rosca allegedly purchased, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale, 8another residential land adjacent to the 484 square meter land from the
spouses Felix Contreras and Maxima de Guzman (Spouses Contreras). The second purchase consisted of 215 square meters, as declared under Tax Declaration No. 61724, for a
consideration of P700. Thereafter, a split level house with a floor area of 208.50 square meters was constructed on the 484 square meter land.
Uy further alleged that Rosca, in gross and evident bad faith, executed and signed a false and simulated Deed of Sale 9 dated 18 April 1979 on the 484 square meter land,
together with the house erected thereon, for a consideration of P80,000 in favor of Spouses Lacsamana.
Uy prayed that (1) the Deed of Sale dated 18 April 1979 executed by Rosca in favor of Spouses Lacsamana be declared null and void with respect to his rights, interest, and
ownership; (2) that defendants be directed to pay, jointly and severally, to Uy the amounts of P100,000 as moral damages, P10,000 as attorney's fees, P2,000 as expenses
incident to litigation, plus costs of suit; (3) upon declaration of the nullity of the Deed of Sale, the Register of Deeds of Batangas City and the City Assessor be directed to
register Uy as the sole owner of the real properties; (4) if defendant Spouses Lacsamana are found by the court to be buyers in good faith, Rosca be ordered to turn over to Uy
the entire proceeds of sale of the properties and be adjudged to pay the damages; and (5) that the sum of P600,000 taken by Rosca from Uy be collated into the mass of the
conjugal partnership properties.
In her Answer with Counterclaim dated 22 May 1979, Rosca denied the allegations of Uy and claimed that she lawfully acquired the subject real properties using her
paraphernal funds. Rosca added that she was never married to Uy and prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. In her Counterclaim, Rosca prayed that the
court award her (1) P200,000 as moral damages; (2) P100,000 as exemplary damages; (3) P12,000 as attorney's fees; (4) P3,000 as incidental litigation expenses; and (5)
costs of suit. Spouses Lacsamana also filed their Answer with Counterclaim dated 21 May 1979 claiming that they were buyers in good faith and for value and that they relied
on the Torrens title which stated that Rosca was the owner of the subject property.
In the meantime, Uy questioned the registrability of the Deed of Sale before the Office of the Register of Deeds of Batangas City. The Register of Deeds elevated the matter,
on consulta,10 with the Land Registration Commission (LRC) because of an affidavit subsequently filed by Uy contesting the sale and alleging, among others, that the property
was conjugal in nature and sold without his marital consent.
In a Resolution11 dated 7 November 1979, the LRC decided in favor of registration stating that since the property in question was registered in Rosca's name, such
circumstance indicated that the property belonged to Rosca, as her paraphernal property. The LRC added that litigious matters, such as a protest from the other party based on
justifiable and legal grounds, were to be decided not by the Register of Deeds but by a court of competent jurisdiction. The dispositive portion of the Resolution
states:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
WHEREFORE, this Commission is of the opinion that the subject document should be admitted for registration.
SO ORDERED.12
On 18 February 1981, Uy died.13 His two daughters, Lydia Uy Velasquez (Lydia) and Shirley Uy Macaraig (Shirley) substituted him in the case. Fifteen years later or on 10 May
1996, Rosca also died.14 Earlier, respondent Jose Lacsamana died on 20 March 1991. 15redarclaw
Meanwhile, on 24 December 1982, Spouses Lacsamana sold the property to Corazon Buena (Buena) through a Deed of Absolute Sale. 16 Thus, both Rosca and the Spouses
Lacsamana were substituted by Buena as respondent in this case.

41
Evidence Rule 128

During the trial, Uy presented the testimonies of his two daughters, Lydia and Shirley, as his own witnesses, as well as Rosca, as an adverse witness.
Lydia testified that the Uy family lived in the house built on the land acquired by Uy and Rosca. She alleged that the house existed until it was demolished by Buena's agent
sometime in 2006. Lydia also stated that the funds used to construct the family dwelling came from Uy's business. Shirley corroborated the testimony of Lydia on all material
points.
Rosca, on the other hand, testified that sometime before or during World War II, she and Uy cohabited and settled in Batangas. The couple attempted to formalize their marital
union with a marriage ceremony. However, the celebration was not consummated because of the bombings which occurred on the day of the ceremony. Likewise, they were
unable to secure a marriage contract.
Rosca stated that on 29 January 1964, she alone purchased, as sole vendee, with money coming from her own personal and paraphernal funds, the land covered by OCT No. 02840 and owned by Spouses Manuel. Thereafter, on 15 June 1964, she again purchased, using her own personal and paraphernal funds, the land adjacent to the first
purchased property owned by Spouses Contreras and covered by Tax Declaration No. 61724. Immediately after, she caused the construction of a split level house on the land
using her own paraphernal funds which became their family dwelling.
Rosca alleged that Uy had an affair with another woman and sired children with her which led to their physical separation before the year 1973. On 17 September 1976, Rosca
obtained a real estate loan in the amount of P50,000 from Philippine Banking Corporation (PBC) using the house and lot as collateral. In support of this loan, Rosca executed an
Affidavit of Ownership17 dated 27 September 1976, stating that (1) she was the lawful and sole owner of the 484 square meter land, together with the building erected thereon,
and (2) the land was registered under her name and that the phrase "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy" in TCT No. T-24660 was merely a description of her status.
Defendants offered the testimony of Rosca, Atty. Teodulfo Dequito, Jr., Rosaura Mendoza, and Buena.
Atty. Teodulfo Dequito, Jr. testified that Uy questioned the registrability of the Deed of Sale before the Office of the Register of Deeds of Batangas City. The Register of Deeds
elevated the matter on consulta with the LRC, which issued a Resolution dated 7 November 1979 recognizing Rosca as the sole registered owner of the property.
Rosaura Mendoza testified that she and her husband purchased, in the amount of P80,000, the 484 square meter property of Rosca on 18 April 1979 through a Deed of
Absolute Sale of House and Lot.18 The Registry of Deeds of Batangas City cancelled TCT No. T-24660 and issued TCT No. T-35 19in favor of the spouses. Then, Spouses
Lacsamana mortgaged the property to PBC for P48,000. Upon full payment of the mortgage debt on 15 April 1982, PBC issued a Release of Real Estate Mortgage.
Buena testified that she purchased the same property under TCT No. T-35 from Spouses Lacsamana on 24 December 1982 for a consideration of P80,000. Consequently, the
Registry of Deeds of Batangas City cancelled TCT No. T-35 and issued TCT No. T-3244 20 in her name. Likewise, the Assessor's Office of Batangas City issued Tax Declaration No.
90210.21redarclaw
Before the resolution of the case, Shirley and Lydia filed a Motion for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order. They claimed that Buena entered
the property and caused the construction of structures without any court order. Consequently, the RTC issued an Order dated 21 September 2007 granting the preliminary
injunction. Thereafter, the case was submitted for resolution.
In a Decision22 dated 21 April 2009, the RTC decided the case in favor of respondents. The lower court found that (1) there was no valid marriage between Uy and Rosca; (2)
the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca over the house and lot in favor of Spouses Lacsamana was valid; and (3) both parties were not entitled to their respective claims for
damages. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, the instant Complaint filed by plaintiff Uy is hereby DISMISSED. The preliminary injunction and bond are cancelled and are rendered of
no force and effect. The claims for damages of both parties are hereby DENIED. Cost against both parties.
SO ORDERED.23

42
Evidence Rule 128
Uy filed an appeal24 with the CA. In a Decision25 dated 14 September 2011, the CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The appellate court found that respondents were able to
overthrow the presumption of marriage and that the subject property was Rosca's paraphernal property. The appellate court also upheld the validity of the sale. The dispositive
portion of the Decision states:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated April 21, 2009 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.26
Uy then filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the appellate court in a Resolution 27dated 1 March 2013.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue
The main issue for our resolution is whether the Deed of Sale dated 18 April 1979, executed by Rosca alone, without Uy's consent, in favor of Spouses Lacsamana, is valid.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Uy contends that the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca is not valid for being simulated or fictitious for lack of consideration and consent. Uy states that no proof was presented
by Spouses Lacsamana to show that they actually paid P80,000 to Rosca for the purchase of the property. Uy also insists that he did not give his consent to the sale which
prejudiced his rights and interest. Uy argues that Rosca did not give physical possession of the house and lot to the alleged buyers. Further, Uy adds, without admitting that the
sale is valid, that the consideration paid was unreasonably low and unconscionable such that it constitutes an equitable mortgage. Uy insists that Spouses Lacsamana and
Buena cannot be considered buyers in good faith.
Respondents, on the other hand, assert that the contentions of Uy rely on the re-examination and re-evaluation of the evidence of the parties which had previously been
passed upon exhaustively by both the trial and appellate courts. Respondents added that only questions of law may be raised under Rule 45. Since the findings of fact of the
trial and appellate courts were supported by substantial evidence and none of the recognized exceptions allowing this Court to exercise its power to review is present, then the
petition should be dismissed.
We agree with respondents.
The issues raised by Uy had been thoroughly passed upon by the trial and appellate courts. We find no reason to disturb their factual findings. In petitions for review on
certiorari as a mode of appeal under Rule 45, like in the present case, a petitioner can raise only questions of law. Here, Uy would like us to review again the factual
circumstances surrounding the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca with the Spouses Lacsamana and to declare the Deed of Sale invalid for being simulated due to lack of
consideration and consent. Clearly, these are questions of fact which are within the purview of the trial and appellate courts to determine. Also, the issues raised do not come
within the purview of the recognized exceptions28 for this Court to take cognizance of the case. We have reiterated time and again that this Court is not the proper venue to
consider factual issues as it is not a trier of facts.
Here, the main issue in determining the validity of the sale of the property by Rosca alone is anchored on whether Uy and Rosca had a valid marriage. There is a presumption
established in our Rules "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." 29Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio Always presume marriage.30However, this presumption may be contradicted by a party and overcome by other evidence.
Marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. In Pugeda v. Trias,31 we held that testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses
to the marriage, as well as the person who officiated at the solemnization of the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage.

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Documentary evidence may also be shown. In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals,32 we held that the best documentary evidence of a marriage is the marriage contract itself. Under
Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law of 1929,33 as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 114,34 which is applicable to the present case being the marriage law in effect at the time
Uy and Rosca cohabited, the marriage certificate, where the contracting parties state that they take each other as husband and wife, must be furnished by the person
solemnizing the marriage to (1) either of the contracting parties, and (2) the clerk of the Municipal Court of Manila or the municipal secretary of the municipality where the
marriage was solemnized. The third copy of the marriage contract, the marriage license and the affidavit of the interested party regarding the solemnization of the marriage
other than those mentioned in Section 5 of the same Act shall be kept by the official, priest, or minister who solemnized the marriage.
Here, Uy was not able to present any copy of the marriage certificate which he could have sourced from his own personal records, the solemnizing officer, or the municipal
office where the marriage allegedly took place. Even the findings of the RTC revealed that Uy did not show a single relevant evidence that he was actually married to Rosca. On
the contrary, the documents Uy submitted showed that he and Rosca were not legally married to each other. The pertinent portions of the RTC Decision
state:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
x x x In the case under consideration, the presumption of marriage, on which plaintiff Uy anchored his allegations, has been sufficiently offset. Records reveal that there is
plethora of evidence showing that plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca were never actually married to each other, to wit:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
First. In his Petition for Naturalization as a Filipino citizen filed before the then Court of First Instance of Batangas on 12 November 1953, plaintiff Uy himself stated in the fifth
paragraph of his Petition, to quote: "I am married (not legally)."
Second. The Sworn Statement of no less than the Governor of the Province of Batangas executed in support of the plaintiff Uy's Petition for Naturalization categorically states,
in Nos. 2 and 4 thereof, that plaintiff Uy was married (not legally).
Third. The Immigrant Certificate of Residence shows that as late as 9 October 1951, plaintiff Uy also known by his Chinese name of Uy Suan Tee, regarded himself as "single"
when filling up his civil status therein.
Fourth. The Alien Certificate of Registration No. 83758 establishes that plaintiff Uy was an alien duly registered with the Bureau of Immigration of the Philippines and that his
civil status was single.
Fifth. The Affidavit of Vicente J. Caedo, a prominent citizen of Batangas, establishes in Nos. 2 and 4 thereof that plaintiff Uy was not legally married to defendant Rosca.
Sixth. The testimony of defendant Rosca as an adverse witness reveals that plaintiff Uy was not legally married to her because their marriage was not consummated.
For his part, plaintiff Uy tried to justify the non-presentation of their marriage certificate by presenting public documents, namely:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
First. Decision in the case entitled: "In the matter of the Petition of Uy Suan Tee alias Luis G. Uy, to be admitted a citizen of the Philippines";
Second. Certificate of Live Birth of Violeta Uy, daughter of plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca and the descriptive word "legitimate" showing that Violeta Uy was legitimate;
Third. Death Claim under SSS Employee Compensation executed and signed by defendant Rosca, stating that she is the wife of plaintiff Uy;
Fourth. Various pictures of the plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca with their children;
Fifth. Special Power of Attorney executed by defendant Rosca dated 19 July 1985 wherein she admitted being the wife of plaintiff Uy;
Sixth. Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 3 August 1982 executed by defendant Rosca admitting she is the widow of plaintiff Uy which was not testified to nor identified by Rosca;

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Seventh. Affidavit of Ownership dated 27 September 1976 signed by defendant Rosca admitting her status as married;
to establish the fact of his marriage with defendant Rosca. Likewise, plaintiff Uy presented defendant Rosca as an adverse witness purportedly to elicit from her the fact of his
marriage with the latter. However, this presumption had been debunked by plaintiff Uy's own evidence and most importantly, by the more superior evidence presented by the
defendants.
While it is true that plaintiff Uy and defendant Rosca cohabited as husband and wife, defendant Rosca's testimony revealed that plaintiff Uy was not legally married to her
because their marriage was not consummated. In People vs. Borromeo, this Court held that persons living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, absent any counter
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. Consequently, with the presumption of marriage sufficiently overcome, the onus probandi of defendant
Rosca shifted to plaintiff Uy. It then became the burden of plaintiff Uy to prove that he and defendant Rosca, were legally married. It became necessary for plaintiff Uy therefore
to submit additional proof to show that they were legally married. He, however, dismally failed to do so. 35
Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he was legally married to Rosca, their property relations would be governed by Article 147 of the Family Code which applies when
a couple living together were not incapacitated from getting married. Article 147 provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall
be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the
other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In
case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence
of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
The provision states that properties acquired during cohabitation are presumed co-owned unless there is proof to the contrary. We agree with both the trial and appellate
courts that Rosca was able to prove that the subject property is not co-owned but is paraphernal.
First, in the Resolution dated 7 November 1979 of the LRC in LRC Consulta No. 1194, Rosca was recognized as the sole registered owner of the property. 36redarclaw
Second, in the Deed of Sale dated 29 January 1964 between Spouses Manuel and Rosca covering the 484 square meter land, Uy served as a mere witness to Rosca's purchase
of the land as evidenced by his signature under "signed in the presence of." 37 This could only mean that Uy admitted the paraphernal nature of Rosca's ownership over the
property.
Third, in the Affidavit of Ownership dated 27 September 1976 executed by Rosca in support of her real estate loan application with PBC in the amount of P5 0,000, Rosca
stated that she was the sole and lawful owner of the subject property and that the land was registered under her name and that the phrase "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy"
in TCT No. T-24660 was merely a description of her status. 38redarclaw
Last, the title to the property in the name of "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy" was notice to the world, including her heirs and successors-in-interest, that such belonged to

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Rosca as her paraphernal property.39 The words "married to" were merely descriptive of Rosca's status at the time the property was registered in her name. 40 Otherwise, if the
property was conjugal, the title to the property should have been in the names of Luis Uy and Petra Rosca. 41redarclaw
In Ruiz v. Court of Appeals,42 the property subject of the mortgage was registered in the name of "Corazon G. Ruiz, of legal age, married to Rogelio Ruiz, Filipinos." This Court
ruled that the title is registered in the name of Corazon alone because the phrase "married to Rogelio Ruiz" is merely descriptive of the civil status of Corazon and should not
be construed to mean that her husband is also a registered owner.
Based on the evidence she presented, Rosca was able to sufficiently overcome the presumption that any property acquired while living together shall be owned by the couple
in equal shares. The house and lot were clearly Rosca's paraphernal properties and she had every right to sell the same even without Uy's consent.
Uy further contends that the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca is not valid for being simulated or fictitious for lack of consideration. Uy states that no proof was presented by
Spouses Lacsamana to show that they actually paid P80,000 to Rosca for the purchase of the property or even if there was consideration, such was unreasonably low and
unconscionable. Thus, Spouses Lacsamana and Buena cannot be considered as buyers in good faith.
We disagree.
Uy did not present any proof to show that Rosca did not receive any consideration for the sale. Neither did he submit any evidence, whether documentary or testimonial,
showing the fair market value of the property at the time of the sale to prove that the purchase price was unreasonably low or unconscionable. It was even mentioned by the
appellate court that "appellants failed to prove that on April 18, 1979, the property might have been worth millions of pesos." Thus, Uy's allegations lack sufficient
substantiation.
Moreover, the factual findings of the appellate court carry great weight and are binding on this Court when they coincide with the factual findings of the trial court. This Court
will not weigh the evidence all over again since payment of the purchase price and the consideration for the sale are factual issues which cannot be raised in this petition.
In sum, we find that the Deed of Sale, executed by Rosca on her paraphernal property in favor of Spouses Lacsamana, is valid.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 14 September 2011 and Resolution dated 1 March 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93786.
SO ORDERED.