Afghan Migration from an Historical Perspective

1978-2015

Assunta Nicolini
PhD City University, London

Research Paper
Work in progress, please do not cite without the author permission

Understanding the complexities of Afghan migration post-2001 entails an understanding of

the nature of migration and displacement during the previous decades; in first place it must be
noted that the Afghan population has adopted mobility as a strategy to cope with conflict and
environmental calamities; despite conflict being one of the principal reasons for Afghan
displacement during the last decades (Harpviken 2009:8), Afghans have used migration both
internally within the country as well as regionally as a livelihood strategy for centuries
(Monsutti 2009).
The Soviet invasion of the country triggered large-scale displacement. Although armed
conflict and lack of security were primary factors in the decision to flee (Connor 1987),
religious and cultural motivations too (escaping the rule of the infidel Communists)
represented an important factor (Monsutti 2005:33). In the countryside the Soviets were
feared due to their plans to 'modernise' the country; plans to establish universal compulsory
education for both genders were seen with particular suspicion by the most conservative
segments of a largely rural society, as were rumoured plans to illegalise veiling of women and
even rumours, probably of propagandistic origin, of Communist plans to not only re-distribute
land but even to 'collectivise' women (Grau and Gress 2002). As noted by Dupree (1988),
several heads of family interviewed in Peshawar during that time stated that they had fled in
order to protect their wives and daughters from the Soviets' ambitiously modernising
educational projects. Armed conflict per se was therefore not the only determining factor in
the decision to flee, with the modalities under which the conflict unfolded and the
characteristics of the actors involved, in this case the Soviets and the communist Kabul
regime, against the mainly highly conservative rural population among whom armed
resistance first arose, played as much of a relevant determining role.
Although with the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and later after the fall of Najibullahs
government in 1992, Afghan refugees begun to repatriate in large numbers (Harpviken 2009),
the subsequent civil war between the various Mujahedeen factions and the ensuing
lawlessness and instability resulted in renewed mass displacement. In the civil war years,
displacement took on a strong ethnic dimension, while at the same time, communist
sympathisers, and the educated elites, mainly residing in Kabul, were also at risk of
persecution and were forced to flee. This time there was no foreign occupation, although the
various Mujahedeen factions had all, to varying extents, been supported by the USA,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and other foreign powers in their anti-Soviet jihad (Yousaf and Adkin
1992); Afghans were now fleeing conflict and persecution carried out by their fellow
countrymen.
The ascent of the Taliban to power in 1996 established a considerable degree of security in
the areas under their control (Barfield 2010). However, the relative stability under the Taliban
was enforced, outside of the movement's 'heartland' areas in the South, on fear and an extreme
form of control. The ultra-conservative mores the Taliban imposed on Afghans with women
paying the highest price triggered a further outflow of refugees, although in smaller
numbers compared to previous years. Even after the Taliban rose to dominance, violence
continued to affect certain areas, with, for example, the Shamali Plain north of Kabul
devastated in fighting against Ahmed Shah Massoud's forces, and Shia Hazara communities
in particular experiencing sectarian and ethnically-motivated violence, including several
notorious massacres (Rashid 2000). The highly restrictive rules the Taliban regime imposed
on Afghans, and the economic ruin of the country, became important motivations for
migration, particularly among the more educated and relatively cosmopolitan urban
populations. Many families left the country in search of educational and employment
opportunities, which were scant, or, for women, non-existent.
From 1978 to 2001 Afghan migration was mainly a regional issue. The welcoming attitudes
of Pakistan, and to a lesser extent of Iran, functioned as pull factors for Afghan refugees.
Afghan refugees in Pakistan became recipients of an unprecedented amount of humanitarian

aid which whether it reached its intended recipients or not coupled with the tradition of
hospitality provided by the Pushtun tribal code and a shared language and culture of the
Pushton population on both sides of the Durand line, made it an almost natural choice of
destination (Monsutti 2006). Family, kinship and tribal ties across the border which both preexisted the forced migration period or were developed during the various previous phases of
displacement played a central role in deciding the choice of destination. Iran, on the other
hand, although hosting over two million Afghans, had a less welcoming attitude, not least
because it received little or no humanitarian assistance from the West. Iran principally
attracted Afghans fleeing from western Afghanistan due to geographical proximity, while
religious proximity with Iran was also a factor for the Afghan Shia population, largely
consisting of the Hazara ethnic group1.

Migration post-2001
After 2001 as direct result of armed conflict involving international and government forces and
the resurgent Taliban, large numbers of people have fled rural areas, relocating mainly in
refugee camps in and around Kabul as internally displaced persons (IDPs). In 2013 according
the Ministry of Refugees, there were over 500,000 IDPs in Afghanistan. Relocating to the
capital, which had already absorbed huge numbers of returnees from Pakistan and Iran as well
as internal migrants, meant that the already overstretched infrastructure was put under further
strain (Majidi 2011). The only solution became to establish refugee camps; the conditions in
which most IDPs live are desperate, and often fatal for the most vulnerable2.
This form of displacement affects the poorest segments of the Afghan society, those who
could not afford to migrate to further destinations, or who initially hoped for a quick cessation
of hostilities and return to their homes. Internal displacement represents one of the major
challenges for Afghanistan, and although the Ministry of Refugees has made some efforts to
respond to the crisis, long-term solutions still remain confused and in planning phase.

Exposure to internationals and the military in particular, has been widely acknowledged to be
a contributing factor shaping the migration decision making process. In Afghanistan, such
close contact/vicinity, which is particularly strong for Afghan interpreters and for those who
have/had business relationships with the military in various forms3, contributed to
familiarisation with Western countries, gaining knowledge about Western lifestyles and
culture, and to acquire foreign language skills. A more tangible impact of such vicinity is that
of improved economic conditions for those Afghans employed and doing business with the
military. This too impacts on migration decision-making: on the one hand better economic
conditions means that it becomes easier to afford travelling to far-away destinations, with the
price of reaching northern Europe more than $10,000. On the other hand, economic
betterment can have a retaining effect, especially for those enriched Afghans who have
managed to build fortunes in the last decade and who have invested in their future in
Afghanistan4. The withdrawal of international forces in 2014 is having an enormous impact
on the Afghan population, both on economic and security levels. Increased unemployment
and decreased foreign funds are pushing more people to migrate abroad while those
Afghans who invested in the country in the last decade and the emergent middle class5,

1However large numbers of Afghan Hazaras headed also towards Pakistan, to the city of Quetta in particular. Monsutti points out
that Hazaras avoided the UNHCR set up refugee villages in Peshawar populated mainly by Pushtons. Belonging to a different
ethnic group meant also that they couldnt, like Pushtons, appeal to Pushtonwali and religious proximity (2006:32) as form of
support.
2Afghanistan: 17 winter deaths in camps highlight government protection failure
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/50ffdb382.html
3 a wide range of subcontracted works
4
Interview with successful business owner in Kabul, August 2012
5 G. Bowley, Fears of the Future Haunt a Budding Generation of Afghan Strivers, New York Times, 11/2/2013
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/12/world/asia/middle-class-afghans-face-a-murky-future.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

fearing a return to insecurity and civil war, are increasingly concerned and considering
migration6.
With the arrival of the international presence in 2001, Afghanistan became the field for
renewed migration policy approaches, both institutional and not. The UNHCR had already
turned to repatriation as a durable solution in previous years. After 2001, a tripartite
agreement including Pakistan and Iran was put into place, aiming to return millions of
Afghans during the following years. Such an ambitious voluntary return programme was
informed by the perception that with the ousting of the Taliban and state building,
Afghanistan would become a peaceful country, but also by Pakistan's and Iran's growing
anxiety with hosting such large refugee populations. Repatriating and reintegrating millions
of Afghan returnees has proved to be a daunting challenge. From issues of land rights!(UNHCR'
2003) to returnees settlement in urban centres lacking housing and employment, reintegration
of Afghan refugees cannot be deemed to have been a success. At the time when return en
masse was proposed as a durable solution, several scholars!(see$Turton$and$Marsden$2002$for$
example)(expressed severe concerns about the nature, feasibility and sustainability of such a
programme. Although the programme was based on the idea that refugees would return
voluntarily and with support incentives, in practice many were left with little choice in the
matter, putting into question the very basis of the programme (Sales, Blitz, Marzano 2005).
Ongoing repatriation has also a major political dimension. Pakistan has increasingly adopted
extremely restrictive policies towards Afghans, closing major refugee villages in the northwestern areas7 and regularly threatening to expel those without registration cards8 (it is
estimated that over a million unregistered Afghans live in Pakistan). Given the tense
relationship between the two countries involving cross-border shelling and Pakistani
support for the Taliban insurgency it is not surprising that refugees and undocumented
Afghans living in Pakistan are used as bargain chips in the geopolitical scenario.
Ironically enough considering Pakistani support for the insurgency, Pakistanis often perceive
Afghan refugees as troublemakers or extremists. Besides, for Afghans belonging to the
Hazara ethnic group and Shia religious sect, a further deterrent in recent times is the danger of
being caught in the sectarian war raging in Pakistan, especially in and around Quetta,
Balochistan, where hundreds of Shia Hazaras have been killed9. Migrants are also seen as
competitors in a place where resources and employment are already scarce. Jobs for Afghans
in Pakistan have become scarcer, and traditional sectors like that of carpet weaving, mainly in
Karachi, has encountered a significant decline!in recent years. The situation for Afghans in
Iran is also extremely problematic. Aside from large number of Afghans who have returned
voluntarily in the past years, hundreds have been regularly deported10.
With opportunities in neighbouring countries becoming less viable, the number of Afghans
travelling to the Gulf for work purposes has grown considerably. In the Gulf Afghans,
working principally in the construction sector, often make a good income by Afghan
standards but very often enduring harsh treatment by their employers!(HRW%2006). During the
last years it appears that some Afghans are also settling in the Gulf, bringing their families
6 The fear of return to civil war is present among many segments of the Afghan population. Many Hazaras who have
experienced persecution during those years and many of whom after 2001 have enriched/empowerd in the last decade feel
particularly at risk.
7 Jalozai camp closed, returnees face difficulties at home, IRIN News http://www.irinnews.org/Report/78506/AFGHANISTANJalozai-camp-closed-returnees-face-difficulties-at-home
8 Pakistan to expel illegal Afghans until end of 2012, Pajhwok Afghan News http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2012/02/05/pakistanexpel-illegal-afghans-until-end-2012
9 Formidable power of Pakistan's anti-Shia militants By M Ilyas Khan BBC News, Islamabad 12/1/2013
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-20983153
10 Sharp rise in deportation from Iran IRIN NEWS http://www.irinnews.org/Report/85355/AFGHANISTAN-IRAN-Sharp-risein-deportations-from-Iran

once having obtained a secure job.

Dubai is also a destination for wealthy Afghans who in the last decade have been able to
accumulate considerable financial resources, allowing them to invest in properties there11.
If Dubai remains a preferred destination for many Afghans who migrate for economic
purposes, thousands in the last decade have opted to travel to far-away destinations such as
Australia, New Zeland and Indonesia. Others have moved to the US, while Canada and also
appear favoured destinations. Europe has had the largest intake of Afghan asylum seekers,
with Germany and Norway hosting most of them. But if in Dubai Afghans are economic
migrants, although often illegal, in all other Western countries they automatically become
asylum seekers, an immigration status giving little protection and trapping them in years of
uncertainty, ultimately leading many to be deported back to Afghanistan.
A look at Afghan migration from a historical perspective is useful in order to understand how
forced displacement and migration happened in a continuous, fluid manner, how flight and
return alternated and at times coincided throughout the last three decades. Large numbers of
people fled Afghanistan at different times and for different reasons, often retuning to the
country for short periods of time before fleeing again. As Monsutti points out, Afghans,
driven by poverty as much as by war, have been constantly on the move, weaving a
complex web of transnational relations (2006:34). Importantly, these transnational networks
were developed and kept alive not only in times of war, but also through times of relative
peace.
The Afghan context offers a clear example of what has become a defining feature of global
migration in the last two decades, that of mixed migration. Van Hear (2009) notes that it has
been increasingly recognised that many migration flows are composed of people fleeing their
countries pushed by a mixture of motivations, where fear for their lives and the search for
better life opportunities often coexist. Any rigid categorization between refugees and migrants
is problematic in the understanding of contemporary migration; what we have witnessed
during the past years is that migration is a dynamic, fluid process, where often people begin
their experience of exile as refugees but become economic migrants at a later stage (Crisp
2003, Bakewell 2007, Van Hear 2003, 2009), shifting repeatedly between different
immigration statuses (Schuster 2005).

11 Afghan elite enjoys high life in Dubai, Financial Times 8/9/2010 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4843bd14-bb74-11df-a13600144feab49a.html#axzz2PR93AyWm