Muslim Sects in Indonesia and the Emergence of Intolerance

Introduction
Formerly known to Westerners as the East Indies, modern Indonesia comprises some
250 million inhabitants, thousands of separate islands, and hundreds of ethnic and
linguistic groups. After independence following more than four hundred years of rule
by Dutch colonialists, a nascent, shared identity was fortified by the official adoption
of the motto Bhinneka Tunggal Ika ("many, yet one"). The overwhelming majority of
the population is ardently Muslim, but even they are divided into a multitude of sects,
each with its own customs and interpretations of the Muslim religion. The result is a
state of dynamic interaction between diverse religious sects that creates constant
social and political tension. The state officially adheres to the five principles of
Pancasila: Belief in the One and only God; Justice for all Indonesians, regardless of
their ethnic or social status; The Unity of Indonesia; Decision-making through
deliberations, musyawarah, to reach a consensus, mufakat; Social justice for the
whole people of Indonesia
There are six internationally recognized religions in Indonesia, namely: Islam,
Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Kong Hu Chu (Confucianism).
Based on the National Statistic Bureau (BPS, 2010) survey, Islamic believers are far
the most numerous, comprising 87.18% of the total population, followed by Protestant
Christians 6.96%, Catholics 2.91%, Hindus 1.69%, Buddhists 0.72%, and Kong Hu
Chu 0.05%. The followers of these religions have for generations lived together side
by side in Indonesia, acknowledging each other's beliefs as something that should not
be questioned by others.
Under the principle of Pancasila, the Indonesian constitution guarantees its people the
right to embrace and practice their belief in God, but the state and state actors1, have
an obligation to maintain harmony between different religious denominations and
sects. Indonesia is a strongly religious state, and the population is keen to follow their
own religious practices in their day-to-day life. The number of what are known as
'piety places', and the number of religious preceptors, including those that preach on
TV channels, is increasing. Today the wearing of headgear by female Moslems, which
is mandatory in Islamic theology, is an example of the significant rise in adherence to
Islamic doctrine.
In the past few years, however, there have been a number of religious attacks on
Christian churches and Syi'ah (Shiite) Muslim followers. These attacks have been
upon both individuals and groups. The attackers are sometimes described in official
records as members of 'radical religious groups' and sometimes as 'terrorists'. This
latter is ironic, because the authorized state apparatus is not always used to restrain
these attacks.
Our purpose in this paper is to explain why radical Islamist terrorism has surfaced in
the post-Sukarno, and post-Suharto, reform era in Indonesia. The main hypothesis is
that the emergence of radical religious groups is a negative consequence of the

political situation in the post-authoritarian Reform era. Thus, it is a paradox of

democracy.
A Glance at Muslim Communities in Indonesia
The inhabitants of Indonesia, as already mentioned, are an amalgam of various ethnic
groups2, and these cling to their own customs and usages, which include diverse
beliefs. Muslim beliefs spread widely throughout the archipelago with the coming of
Arab traders more than one thousand years ago. The members of the different ethnic
groups have lived on the same major islands and on thousands of smaller islands
spread across the archipelago for thousands of years. Even where different religious
groups lived in the same neighborhood, they generally maintained harmonious
relations, and showed mutual respect for each other's beliefs, religious rites and holy
celebrations.
These communities played an important role in the Indonesian struggle for
independence. They differed in their doctrines, backgrounds and interests, but were
politically united in terms of the struggle to seek a sovereign state. Under Dutch
colonial rule, the established Muslim groups mostly shared similar characteristics,
namely: (1) most Muslims did not wish to live under colonial rule and preferred their
own ways, (2) they used their religion as a way to retain their unity and their own
culture, while seeking to retain their individual membership, and (3) they did not
allow different interpretations of Islamic teaching to be an obstacle to friendly
relations: each practiced its own Islamic rituals, and had respect for each other. Some
of the organizations listed above no longer exist, since they merged with each other
due to feelings of brotherhood and because of political pressure to fuse. Masyumi, for
example, became fused with the PPP (the Development United Party) while President
Suharto was in power. A few, such as Syarikat Islam, Persatuan Islam, and Al Irsyad,
that focused on local social issues such as Islamic-based education programs, still
exist, but they are disappearing as Indonesian public and political life becomes more
dynamic.
Both NU and Muhammadiyah have been very active in social, cultural and economic
affairs, or in political action to reform and improve Muslim political life. Some
prominent figures have even established political parties as a 'political window'
through which their people can enter state political arenas to maintain and realize their
own organization's interests. For example, Abdurrahman Wahid, one of NU's more
prominent figures, and his colleagues established PKB (the Nation Awakening Party)
soon after Suharto stepped down, while Professor Amien Rais, a leader of the
Muhammadiyah, established PAN (the National Mandate Party). Nahdlatul Watan is a
prominent and influential regional Muslim organization based in West Nusa Tenggara
(Nusa Tenggara Barat), and has the same basic teaching as NU.
Muslim Group Dynamics in Different Eras
It is important to understand the political system in different periods, because people
react to the prevailing government. The dynamic of religious groups, especially of the
more intolerant Moslem groups, is strongly influenced by the political system and the
sort of leadership in power. Since Independence there have been three main political
eras. The first was under the leadership ot President Sukarno, which was heavily

socialist, and even friendly to communism; the second was under President Suharto
which was authoritarian, concentrating on economic development; and the third postSuharto era, known as the reform period, which was more democratic and free, and
has been marked by a rise in freedom and by the participation of Muslim religious
groups in the political life of the nation.
Following Indonesian Independence from the Dutch, August 17, 1945, President
Sukarno sought to unite the diverse peoples of Indonesia into a unitary socialist
society. In this period, the major Muslim organization Masyumi was recognized as a
legal political party, and collaborated with NU and various other Muslim groups. But
in 1952 at its Congress in Palembang (South Sumatera province), NU established a
political party, namely the Partai Nahdlatul Ulama/PNU, separate from Masyumi.
Since then, NU as an official organization has had two different wings, one a social
organization and the other a political party3. Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah maintained
its activities as a social organization, allowing its members to affiliate with different
political parties. NU and Muhammadiyah are today the two largest Muslim
organizations in Indonesia. They are a little different in their membership and
activities. NU is well known as traditional Muslim and is a large social organization
that maintains boarding schools (Pesantren) in rural areas, mostly in the Java and
Madura regions and some in the Sulawesi and Sumatera islands. Muhammadiyah, on
the other hand, attracts mainly modern urban-based Moslems and has adopted a more
modern educational system.
Under President Sukarno, the first President of the Republic of Indonesia (19451967), the government of Indonesia was highly centralized and was known as 'guided
democracy.' One hundred and seventy-two political parties contested the first election
in 1955. As a new sovereign state, Indonesia was an unstable political unit. Sukarno
and the first leaders attempted to create a democratic state. Lacking experience in
managing so many diverse interests and ideologies, which included different religious
and ethnic-based demands, Sukarno worked hard to promote national unity while
moving the country firmly to the left.
There were at least three Muslim youth organizations established in that era: the
Indonesian University Students Association (HMI, founded in Yogyakarta by a group
of Muslim students from different universities (February 5, 1947); the Indonesian
Muslim Students (PII), founded in Yogyakarta (May 4, 1947); and the Indonesian
Muslim University Students Movement (PMII), founded in Surabaya, East Java (April
17, 1960) by NU background based student activists. Although the dates of their
establishment and their members' backgrounds were different, these student
organizations had similar motivations, notably, making young Muslims aware of the
inconsistency in Indonesian politics because of government officials who held largely
non-Islamic values. Moreover President Sukarno had tended to open the political field
to the Communist Party (PKI), so that for a while Indonesia was dominated by a
political triangle popularly dubbed Nasionalis-Agama-Komunis (NASAKOM, the
Nationalist-Islamic-Communist Party). However, Masyumi, a major Islamic
charitable organization, refused to become political, and the majority Sunni
population were represented by the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).
Under Sukarno's leadership, political Muslim organizations were divided into two
groups: one in opposition to the government and the other collaborating with the

government. A number of student Muslim groups organized themselves into the

Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesian Student Alliance (KAMMI, the
Moslem University Students Alliance) that also tended to oppose the Sukarno socialist
government and the Communist PKI. President Sukarno allowed the Communist
party to play an important role in the Indonesian political arena and allowed it to
disseminate its ideological teaching. Many Muslims saw teaching Communism as
similar to teaching atheism, and this contributed to the eventual overthrow of
President Sukarno.
With the overthrow of Sukarno, Indonesia entered its second period, known as the
New Order (Orde Baru) under the rule of President Suharto (1967-1998). Suharto's
leadership has been described as an authoritarian effort to improve the economy, using
the military and police to impose his agenda toward that goal. Political parties were
reduced to three, based on common political and economic interests. These were the
PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party), a nationalist group; the PPP (Development Unity
Party), an Islamic-based group; and Golkar (Golongan Karya), comprising mainly
technocrats, bureaucrats, and members of the military and police. The demands of the
religious group, centered on preserving religious principles, were not well received,
some religious customs being actually prohibited at that time. Indeed, females were
then banned from wearing Islamic headgear in public schools.
In short, Suharto's leadership effectively pressed people's democratic demands and
implemented the special premise of "economic development first, democracy later".
This premise to some extent had also been encouraged by international development
agencies (such as the World Bank, ADB, and others) that provided loans to support
Indonesia's development programs. The international funding agencies seemed to
prefer the authoritarian rule of Suharto because they only had to consult with the
government when funding development. In the meantime, the rights of the people
were ignored, although people continued to be affected by the concept of the trickledown prosperity resulting from cooperative developmental programs involving
government agencies and donors. Suharto's administration at that time had strong
support from developed countries, and he felt strong politically because inside the
country he was supported by the main political forces through Golkar, and by the
army and police force as coercive state instruments.
Suharto tried to avoid any political discourse that might have created opposition to
whatever he did. In society, indeed, there were groups of people who were critical,
although this was limited in scope. Included among them were those in the Islamic
values-based movement. All were successfully suppressed by persuasion or if
necessary by violence. The Tanjung Priok incident4 in September 1984, for example,
occurred because the Suharto government felt challenged by religious activists.
Twenty-three people were killed by military force, and activist individuals
imprisoned. After this, very few people dared to openly criticize Suharto, and most
kept silent.
President Suharto declared a 'uniform policy' through an Act on Mass Organizations
1985. This law forced all mass organization (including youth and student-based
organizations) to conform to the five principles of the Republic of Indonesia
(Pancasila). Whoever disobeyed would be suspect as a possible state enemy.

But between the 1980s and 1990s, socio-religious political movements demanding
greater freedom spread across the nation, and Suharto was forced to step down after
ruling the country for 32 years. Those instrumental for replacing Suharto included
NGO activists, university students, academia groups, religious people, groups such as
NU (Nadhlatul Ulama - Awakening Ulema), activists led by Abdurrahman Wahid,
Muhammadiyah activists, and some critical political figures from PDI under the
leadership of Megawati Soekarnoputri and PPP.
Suharto had a different image of Islamic doctrine than most activist Islamic political
groups and he regarded the views of the latter as blocking his economic reforms. In
actuality, a couple of years before he was overthrown5, he agreed to the establishment
of ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia - the Indonesian Muslim
Intellectual Union). ICMI was created by Prof. Dr. BJ. Habibie, who was to become
Suharto's successor. Thereafter, the opposition of Muslim groups to Suharto gradually
diminished.
The third era in the history of post-Independence Indonesia is the so-called Reform
Era. This is significantly different from Suharto's regime. The reform movement that
brought about the fall of Suharto and the end of his New Order regime re-energized
Indonesian society: people became much freer to pursue their own social and political
aspirations. It has been marked by constitutional amendments that changed the
political system and state management, requiring much greater respect for human
rights and creating democracy for all the people of Indonesia. The President and Vice
President are now elected directly by the people (one man, one vote). The same is true
for the legislators in the DPR (the House of the People Representatives), the DPD
(National Council for Regional Representatives), and the DPRD (Local Councils), as
well as for the election of governors, mayors, and regents. There is no longer a
representative of the military police faction in the parliament, and the police also are
not allowed to be involved in any way in the political arena: they are expected to be
more professional.
At the same time, people and groups have now enjoyed far greater political,
economic, and cultural freedom and less legal restrictions. People have been freer to
establish new civil organizations and/or political organizations. Freedom of the press
has been practiced, whereas in the past the press was controlled by the state. In short,
in the reform era people have been enjoying a democratic atmosphere and there is a
spirit of "reform euphoria". Indeed, some political observers have stated that
Indonesia has become the third most democratic country in the world.
The new situation made it possible for all Indonesians, including Muslim
organizations, to express themselves more openly, and Muslim organizations may
now be classified into two groups: (1) those who seek to play a national role in the
political arena, and (2) those whose activities remain centered on religious and ethnic
instruction.
The major Muslim groups in the post-Suharto are are listed above. The Muslim-based
political party, PPP, has existed since before the reform era, but many of the current
Muslim-based political parties are new because with the end of authoritarian rule
smaller groups have broken away from the political parties they had belonged to in

the Suharto era and have struck out on their own. These are now free to represent
divergent communities, and to promote their own interpretation of Islam.
But the presence of four new Muslim-based political parties has not eliminated PPP,
even though PBB failed to achieve a place in the national parliament in the last two
national elections (2009 and 2014), and the appearance of new parties has multiplied
the total number of Muslim political parties at the state level without materially
changing the overall political orientation of Indonesian politics.
There is no clear correlation between Muslim political party activity and the
emergence of the new Muslim-based organizations mentioned above. But by
observing the movements of the so-called "radical" groups such as FPI, MMI, and
Laskar Jihad (FKIA), the following assumptions can be made: (1) some Muslims do
not fully trust Muslim-based political parties to ensure that Islamic values are
implemented in governmental policies, and (2) some Muslim leaders believe that the
older Muslim mass-based organizations, such as NU and Muhammadiyah have been
unable to play an optimal role in enforcing Islamic values in Indonesian public life;
and that (3) some Muslim leaders enter public life for hidden purposes. In short, the
rise of new Muslim groups is in part due to disappointment in the achievements of
existing Muslim-based organizations.
New Muslim Groups and Radicalism
The authoritarian rule by Suharto was followed by a period of reform in which people
were allowed to express their ways of thinking, including religious practices. The rise
of radical Muslim groups that were previously not allowed by the state authorities is
one of the results of the reformist era. It is unfortunate, however, that these new
Muslim groups have adopted radical policies and by doing so have created a bad
image of Indonesian Muslims.
MMI, for example, has a standing ideological position that "whoever disagrees with
Islamic law enforcement will be challenged and opposed even through violent ways."
FPI opposes any practices and behaviors by people or state actors that are categorized
as a deviation from Islamic values. FKIA has mobilized its members to take part in
'holy missions' or 'Laskar Jihad', to defend Moslems threatened by non-Moslems, and
sometimes to physically fight against non-Moslem groups that it regards as enemies
of Islam. Such doctrines have led to disputes not only between radical groups and
non-Moslems but also between various Moslem communities, especially the more
moderate and liberal groups. NU, Muhammadiyah, scholars, and other Moslem
figures have criticized these doctrines. But the activities of these new groups could
not be prohibited by government because of the emphasis placed on freedom in the
post-Suharto era.
In short, there has been increasing tension within the Moslem community of
Indonesia. To a certain extent this phenomenon explains the different ways of thinking
or characteristics between the older Moslem mass-based organizations and the newly
established ones. The former are moderate in their expression of their criticisms of the
state. The latter, on the other hand, are engaging in very controversial actions because
of their radicalism. These have been disturbing not only to non-Moslem people, but
also to Moslem communities themselves.

We list below three types of destructive actions that have created a bad image not only
for these new organizations but also for Indonesian Moslems in general:
1. Bomb blasts and MMI. Bomb blasts during the reform era have destroyed many
important buildings and even caused casualties. From 2000 to 2013, at least 32 cases
of bomb blasts occurred in several different places in the country,6 always shaking
social stability and traumatizing those living within the surrounding areas. Authorized
government agencies (mainly the police and state intelligence) have always
investigated to find out who was responsible, and mostly found that the bombers were
allied to certain Muslim radical groups such as the Jamaah Islamiyah (JI)7 mission
which to some extent collaborated with Majelis Mujahidin (MMI) under Abu Bakar
Baasyir's8 leadership.
These cases tend to show that most of the bombing targets were non-Muslims and/or
secular foreigners. This may create an inappropriate image that Indonesian Muslims
let terrorist groups exist because of antagonism toward non-Muslim communities.
MMI has been labeled as the terrorist wing of the new Muslim groups in Indonesia for
bombing any group it suspects as an enemy of Islam. The label isn't altogether true,
but it sticks because it is already set in the public mind, especially among nonMuslims.
The situation as it is has led to a misconception about relations between Muslims and
non-Muslims. This misconception exists especially among people who are easily
influenced by the mass media. The media think that hatred continues to build against
non-Muslims and that government actors tend to keep silent. For this reason, several
non-Muslim countries, such as the USA, Australia and Europe, have issued travel
warnings about visiting or being in Indonesia. The impact is harmful to Indonesia,
leading to a decline in the tourist industry.
Social conflict and Laskar Jihad (LJ)9. In the early years of the reform era, especially
during the social conflicts that happened in Ambon (Maluku islands province) and
Poso (central Sulawesi province), Laskar Jihad (LJ) joined local Muslims in fighting
Christian groups. During that time, the name of LJ also became involved in internal
Indonesian conflicts. After the social conflicts calmed down, the name of LJ
disappeared from media publications. Nevertheless, the main figure, Umar Ja'far
Thalib, as a founder and highest commander of LJ, continued his activities in other
ways. In a special public appearance (tabligh akbar) in a Mosque in Yogyakarta,
Thalib declared his intention to continue the fight against pluralism. This was in
keeping with the claim by some community groups that Yogyakarta was ceasing to be
purely Muslim and was changing Indonesia into a pluralist society.
Some regarded the protest as an insignificant event that nobody should worry about,
because it involved only a few people organized by a radical figure who did not
represent Indonesia's mainstream Muslim population. But others considered it a bad
development that could grow. There is always this concern, especially amongst those
who live close to the centers controlled by radical activist groups. Non-Muslims
especially would have been constantly disturbed by the activities of these intolerant
Moslem groups. This situation, indeed, is not conducive to inter-religious harmony
that is threatened by the current lax policy of government toward intolerant groups.

2. The FPI10 and Violence: "Moral Police". The FPI is the Front Pembela Islam
(Islamic Defense Front). It is notorious in Indonesia because of its willingness to
resort to violence. The FPI was established because its founders saw too many
immoral practices in society, with authorized state actors not making appropriate
policy or taking proper actions in dealing with them. Thus, the existence of FPI is
'holy', if it is seen from the radical religious side, in that it enforces what they see as
Islamic values and encourages government actors to pay special attention to that
purpose. Unfortunately, however, FPI has shown itself to be a hardline Muslim group
given to violence in the implementation of its agenda. Members of FPI undoubtedly
have destroyed buildings used for prostitution, entered hotels where immoral
activities are believed to be taking place, and attacked non-violent demonstrations
conducted by people who protest FPI. All these actions were done at the organization
leader's command, which means that violence has become an organizational doctrine.
In short, FPI has made itself into an Islamic "moral police force" that uses violence to
achieve its goals.
Organizationally FPI is strong being controlled by a command structure. FPI's leader
has claimed that the organization has thousands of followers, so that it is politically
considered to have influence as a pressure group. Its followers may easily be
mobilized for political purposes. FPI has become a political movement that opposes
every political policy its leader believes is against Islamic values. An example of such
influence is the rejection of Basuki Tjahja Purnama (nicknamed 'Ahok')11 at the time
he could have become Governor of DKI Jakarta following Joko Widodo's election as
President of the Republic of Indonesia. FPI's influence was even used by politicians
who opposed Ahok. Ahok is a non-Muslim Chinese man who was elected ViceGovernor and under the law later had the right to become Governor. The rejection of
Ahok for this post ran counter to the ideal of pluralism that is a basic element to the
Indonesian constitution.
Theoretical Discussion
1 State actors' role
The emergence of Muslim groups in contemporary Indonesia is characterized by the
leadership of individuals who interpret Islamic values in different ways and seek to
advance these at the state level. People who embrace Islam as their religion can make
it a base for struggle in the political world. Muslim leaders often seek to form a band
of followers who will help to realize their goals; the more such leaders, the more
groups there are that claim to speak on behalf of Islam. These Islamic groups then
tend to be used to advance the interests of the leaders, including those who seek to
gain not just idealist benefits but also material benefits. In this context, the struggle of
the Islamic groups can be either idealistic or pragmatic, or a mixture of both.
The problem is that Indonesian Muslims are diverse in their religious interpretations,
and if the state rules contrary to their religious views intolerant Muslims can resort to
violence. Indeed, this is what is happening in Indonesia. A strong state is needed to
preserve stability in any pluralistic society. Indonesia had a strong government during
Suharto's leadership, but unfortunately it was implemented in overly authoritarian
ways. The change of political system from authoritarian to "reformist" led to problems
for the management of the state. Many groups of people who in the past had no

opportunity to advance their religious and community preferences have now had more
freedom to do whatever they want, while the state actors have been busy advancing
their own interests, or collaborating with specific interest groups, such as FPI.12 To
promote their own ideologies, religious interest groups have taken advantage of the
delay in consolidating democracy in Indonesia and there has been much abuse of
people's rights by the more intolerant religious groups.
2 Why followers commit evil deeds
Some interpreters of Islamic doctrine see it as tolerant of other religious groups. It is
clearly stated in the Koran (Al Kafirun), "my religion is for me, and your religion is
for you". This sentence directs Moslems not to disturb followers of other religions.
The Koran acknowledges the existence of other monotheistic religions, as taught by
different prophets. Aggression against other believers in the one true God is a
deviation from Islamic doctrine.
But in many cases, intolerant Islamic groups have expressed themselves on behalf of
Islamic doctrine violently. Charles Kimball (2002), referring to 9/11, tries to explain
why religious followers become hardline and intolerant. According to Kimball, the
concepts of absolute truth and blind obedience, both central to Islam, are the two main
factors that make Islamic actors commit 'evil' deeds. People who have been trapped
by that situation can be easily persuaded to engage in acts of violence when instructed
by a leader they trust. Chandra Muzaffar (2006) describes such people as being
trapped in an exclusivist religious group. This is the situation in which the many
members of contemporary radical Muslim groups in Indonesia find themselves.
The question is, why do people become blind followers of radical groups? This
question, indeed, needs separate research in each case, before we can come to a
comprehensive answer. To a certain extent, the answer seems to combine poor
socioeconomic conditions with a poor understanding of religion and exposure to a
malignant and distorted interpretation of religious ideology. Such people usually find
themselves in a client-patron relationship that they cannot break away from.
Indonesia's case is in line with this situation. According to the Central Statistics
Agency (BPS), in March 2014, the number of poor people in Indonesia reached 28.28
million people, or approximately 11.25% of the population. But the educational
quality of the Indonesian people is ranked 124 out of 187 countries in the world. This
is due in part to the fact that about 50% of its population is only educated to the
primary level. Low education and economic problems are factors that make
individuals highly vulnerable to prominent religious leaders. Such persons can
become role models. It is our opinion that the relation between social-culturaleconomic conditions in Indonesia and the prestige of Muslim religious leaders
explains the rise of radical Muslim groups in the reform era, groups that have a low
tolerance for pluralism. This is a problem that can only be solved by socioeconomic
measures and national dialogue, not by physical violence against citizens of the nation
itself, which is the solution pursued by certain state security agencies.
3 New generations and Western values
The establishment of new activist groups in Indonesia in the reform or post-Suharto
era reflects a changing political system; it is also in part a result of changes within the

older Muslim organizations themselves. Since Indonesia won its independence from
colonial rule (1965), new generations have been growing to maturity, drawn from
different backgrounds and absorbing different values, sometimes accepting Western
influence but at other times turning to radical Islamic solutions. Also, the older people
are still conservative in their way of thinking and are responding to cultural changes
that many see as socially immoral. Sadly, their response has often been a resort to
violence.
The new Muslim radicalism has met with resistance from four sides. The first is from
non-Muslim communities, mainly those that have become victims of Muslim
violence. The second is from older-established Muslim figures, including Islamic
scholars who do not agree with the use of violence. The third is from the state actors
who see violence as a threat to the government. The fourth is from international
communities that sometimes make matters worse by assuming that all Muslims are
willing to resort to violence to achieve their goals.
The new radical Muslim groups openly reject all kinds of Western values. Thus, it is
not surprising if some of them react violently to the changes that have occurred under
the reformist post-Suharto leadership. They believe that democracy in Indonesia has
been introduced by the international community, and see it as a non-Islamic
institution. They see it as an imported system that is not in line with Islamic teaching,
regardless of the historical reality that the Islamic religion was brought to Indonesia
by Arab traders hundreds of year ago.13 They reject democracy because it has
disrupted the implementation of the teachings and values of Islam as they understand
it. Their rejection of democracy is reinforced by corruption in the government and the
state apparatus, and in the political system. It is not surprising that there is an
assumption that democracy has destroyed the morality of Indonesian society. Seeing
democracy as an alien political system imported from Western countries, some radical
leaders portray it as part of an anti-Muslim agenda aimed at destroying the morality of
the Indonesian people.
The opposition of even moderate Indonesians to Western values has increased since
the 9/11 attack in America. This does not mean that they approve of those depraved
actions. Like many others Muslims, Indonesian Muslims regret this tragic event and
have sympathy for the victims and their families. They believe that terrorist actions
are contrary to Islamic teaching. But conflict between the US and Muslims in the
Middle East has raised strong emotions amongst many Indonesian Muslims not only
against the US government but also against all Western elements. In this context, the
Christian religion has come to be regarded as a part of the Western mission and
values. The new radical Muslim groups have played an important part in promoting
negative sentiment towards non-Muslim communities in Indonesia.
Western countries, mainly the United States and Europe, do not seem to realize the
impact of their interventionist policies on Muslim countries, which includes bringing
about a negative impact on the relationship between Islam and non-Muslims in
Indonesia. Despite efforts by Western media to make Muslims see Western
intervention in the Muslim world the same way that the West sees it, as resisting
Islamic terrorist groups, the majority Muslim population of Indonesia remains
obdurate, seeing the Middle Eastern Muslim populations as the victims of Western
invasions. What is seen as the arrogant attitude of the non-Muslim developed Western

countries is a major factor affecting the relations between Moslem and non-Muslim
communities in Indonesia.
The Dutch colonial rulers allowed the many different ethnic, cultural and religious
groups and sects to continue their own practices so long as they did not openly cause
trouble. The brief Japanese occupation of the East Indies had little impact, but the
eventual overthrow of Dutch colonial rule freed the numerous ethnic groups to
struggle each for their own interests.
Even the various Muslim religious sects are far from united, except in that as Muslims
they express concern at the fate of Muslims worldwide, and regard the non-Muslim
Western nations as enemies of Islam when these send troops into Muslim countries.
The recent Reform era attempts to introduce stable democratic rule to Indonesia have
exacerbated the problem of maintaining order over such a large population. In these
circumstances violence is always a possibility and such countries need a strong
government. But repression is not the long-term answer. Indonesia needs to free its
poor from both poverty and ignorance. With a rapidly increasing population, the first
will be difficult to achieve; but any improvement in the educational system on a
nationwide basis could hopefully liberate young minds from submission to dangerous
political and religious passions.
Footnote
1 A "state actor" in this paper is defined as any person or organization that acts on
behalf of government.
2 There are roughly 500 tribal groups in Indonesia spread from Sabang Island (north
of Sumatra in the west) to Merauke (a Papuan island in the eastern part of Indonesia).
3 Although there were two different wings of NU management, they remained under a
single leadership chaired by KH. Idham Khalid. Mr. Khalid served NU for 32 years
(1952 to 1984). After that, through its 1984 congress in Situbondo, East Java
Province, NU declared itself an independent social Muslim organization, not allied to
any political party. It allowed its members to freely decide whichever political party
they wanted to vote for and/or to be personally allied with. In other words, in the postKhalid leadership, NU declared itself as 'Kembali ke Khittah 1926" (back to the
original intent as in the 1926 NU establishment). The Khalid's successor was
Abdurrahman Wahid, a grandson of NU's founder KH. Hasyim Asy'ari. He was
famous as a young NU intellectual and social activist, and later became the fourth
President of the Republic of Indonesia (1999 - 2001).
4 The Tanjung Priok incident was a riot that occurred on September 12, 1984 in one
of the mosques in the area of Tanjung Priok, North Jakarta, Indonesia, which resulted
in 23 deaths and 36 injuries. Several Muslim leaders opposed the New Order
government's plan to force all organizations to accept Pancasila upon the occasion of
a mass gathering being addressed by activist Muslim leaders who were distributing
flyers critical of the government.
5 Suharto stepped down from his position on May 21, 1998.

6 In 2000, for instance, there were bomb blasts at the Residence of the Philippines
Ambassador (8/1), at the Malaysian embassy in Jakarta (8/27), at the Jakarta Stock
Exchange (9/13), at several Christian Churches at nighttime during Christmas (24/12).
In 2001: at Santa Anna and HKBP Church in Jakarta (7/22), at Plaza Atrium Senen,
Jakarta (9/23), at the KFC Restaurant, Makassar (10/12), at the Australian Intl School,
Jakarta (11/6). In 2002: in Bulungan, Jakarta (1/1), in Bali, so-called "Bomb Bali I"
(10/12), at McDonald Restaurant, Makassar (12/5). In 2003: at Police Headquarters,
Jakarta (2/3), at Sukarno-Hatta Itl Airport (4/27), at JW Marriott (8/5). In 2004: in
Papolo (South Sulawesi) (1/10), at the Australian Embassy (11/9), at Immanuel
Church Palu Central Sulawesi (12/12). In 2005: in Ambon, Maluku Province (3/21),
in Tentena, Central Sulawesi Province (5/28), at Pamulang, Banteng Province (6/8), in
Bali, so-called "Bali II" (10/1), at the Market area in Palu, Central Sulawesi (12/31).
In 2009: at JW Marriott and Ritz- Carlton Htl (7/17). In 2011: inside Mosque Cirebon,
West Java (4/15), at Christ Cathedral Gading Serpong Banten (4/22), at GBIS
Kepunton Church Solo Central Java (9/25). In 2012: in Solo (Central Java) at Pospam
Gladak (8/19). In 2013: at the Bank Mandiri Building in Makassar (1/14), at Mamasa
Church Jemaat Jordan, West Sulawesi (2/10), at Toaraja Church Jamaat Tiatira, South
Sulawesi (2/10), at GKI Church Makassar (2/14), Toraja Church (2/14).
Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) is well known as the most militant Muslim group in Southeast
Asia. Its members were later accused also of being members of MMI.
8 Abu Bakar Baasyir (75) is an Indonesian Arab who graduated from the "modern"
Gontor Boarding School in East Java. He is active in various Islamic organizations,
and the Chairman of MMI. The Indonesian Intelligence Agency has accused him of
being an Al Qaida operative in Indonesia who is likely to mobilize Muslim-based
terrorists, although Baasyir has always denied it. He is now in prison after being
accused of several cases of terrorism in Indonesia.
9 Laskar Jihad is known for its linkage to Forum Komunikasi Islam Ahlusunnah
Waljamaah (FKIA) which is also coordinated by Umar Ja'far Thalib, who has declared
himself a Wahabist .
10 One of the founders of FPI is Habib Riziq, who is of mixed Indonesian-Arabic
origin.
11 The rejection of Ahok actually happened after his nomination as the vice-governor
to assist Joko Widodo, but such rejections are more often done on the eve of the
inauguration. One such rejection of a candidate occurred in early October 2014 and
resulted in casualties among the protesters, who were confronted by security forces
(see: LIPUTAN6.COM).
12 FPI support for one of the Presidential candidates in the 2014 Presidential election
is a sign that that hardline Muslim groups had assumed a place in Indonesia's politics.
13 Historians have different opinions as to when Islam arrived in Indonesia. Some
claim it was as early as the 7th century. Others think it to have been as late as the 13th
century, for which there is definite evidence.
References

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