On doing philosophy and different approaches

1
I hope to write ABOUT philosophizing, doing philosophy and possible different approaches to and of doing it,
decisions that are made during this process and underlying (explicit and implicit) assumptions that are made
along the way and the (often mistakenly) selected (side tracks of the) path (method) chosen at different stages.
2
By expressing the above I have already made many implicit decisions and assumptions, some of which I am sort
of aware but others I have not yet realized. The consequences of having those assumptions and of having made
those decisions will determine many things that I will do, taking me to places where I am compelled to make
decisions - that I am fairly and some totally, unaware of at this stage of writing down these (the fairly vague at
this point) ideas.
I mention a number of different approaches to and ways of doing philosophy, this is to illustrate different
philosophical methods and methodologies. I discuss certain aspects of them in between quoting them at length. I
also give the entire contents of a certain approach, book or article so that the reader can see if s/he is interested
in that approach to the socio-cultural practice of philosophy or not as different people are only interested in
certain schools or types of doing philosophy.
See for instance Formal Methods in Philosophy Lecture Notes 2013 Dr. Anders J. Schoubye.
At the end I again work through an approach that treats different methods and methodology of philosophy as if
it is a process with different steps in it. The previously mentioned approaches, lectures, articles and Contents
pages of books/articles etc can be seen to fit in somewhere in this final overview. This illustrates the restrictions
of all these approaches.
Broad concentrates on or reduces philosophizing to three things or activities namely : analysis, synopsis and
synthesis. I give some background details concerning Broad so to assist in the understanding of these notions of
his, for example that he really was trained in science, mathematics and logic. He considered himself not to be
outstanding in those difficult disciplines so he moved to philosophy (becoming a professor at several
universities in the UK). But his former training is shown in his reductionist view and treatment of philosophy
and philosophizing. He shows that certain philosophers reduce all philosophy, philosophizing and reality by
means of these approaches (skills or tricks) to execute their speculative system of philosophy, like Hegel, or
analytic, like Hume. His science background is obvious from his examples and dealing in depth with issues
from science.
Broad, on his own admission, did not have a philosophyif by that phrase is meant highly original
philosophical theories, and a highly original way of approaching philosophical problems. He writes: I have
nothing worth calling a system of philosophy of my own, and there is no philosopher of whom I should be
willing to reckon myself a faithful follower.
Another, very different view on and interpretation of philosophy is that by Buddy Seed, et al in their lengthy (15
pages) presentation of what the life of the philosopher and the need for doing and living philosophy by everyone
are. That article seems to be inspired by religion, more specifically Christianity (and Roman Catholicism?). I
does mention a number of important notions concerning the true philosopher, real philosophy and authentic
philosophizing. But eventually it appears, to me at least, as if it goes off into a flight or flights of fantasy or
phantasy.
It will be noted that I try to write in United Kingdom English, but that other spelling than UK English appears in
for instance US sources I am aware of that by decided to leave it like that.
3**
I can mention a few things that should serve as a warning to what I think, what I exclude from considering at
this stage and what I imagine to be meaningful and relevant enough to write down now.
Three of these things are, being aware of the fact that it is said that a)
Philosophy, especially at this stage, involves doubt and the sense of wonder - (This astonishment and wonder
could mislead one, being over-enthusiastic, into following misleading notions and practices.
Plato said that "philosophy begins in wonder",[Plato, Theaetetus 155 d (tr. Benjamin Jowett)] a view which is
echoed by Aristotle: "It was their wonder, astonishment, that first led men to philosophize and still leads them."
[Aristotle, Metaphysics 982b12] Philosophizing may begin with some simple doubts about accepted beliefs. The
initial impulse to philosophize may arise from suspicion, for example that we do not fully understand, and have
not fully justified, even our most basic beliefs about the world.
Note that in what I expressed above these things are revealed, namely that I wonder about and am filled with
wonder as well as being astonished about certain things. But, at the same time I am, wise enough by now after
years of becoming involved in such philosophically relevant things and being trapped by them, suspicious of

what I started to do here, again. I feel suspicious of what I do because I now know that I do not really know, that
I do not fully understand what I am involved with by writing this. Why am I writing this, what are my reasons,
what are my motives, what motivates me and what are the rationale for executing this.
First of all philosophizing to me always was a very personal and passionate affair - really one of the basic
reasons to be alive, giving meaning to me life.
This is why I emphasize the wonder of this activity, the euphoria of having insights - and that arrives non-stop as
I am a highly creative- and original thinking individual, apart from having an exceptional IQ, EQ etc.
Both the acts or experience of having or undergoing insights as well as the objects the insights are about fill me
with endless wonder, delight and astonishment. Much of this concerns not yet conceptualized or pre-conceptual
notions. As this occurs to me endlessly my life and experiences are very subtle, profound and vast. Because my
life consisted out of such insights, sets of them lead to me insights and so on.
b)
I reflect on these things, the process of insights, the things they are about etc, thus I grasped what is
According to Aristotle three levels of abstraction:
- First Degree of Abstraction: we consider things as dogs, cats, car, wood, etc.
(Natural Sciences)
- Second Degree of Abstraction: we consider things in terms of number
(Mathematics)
- Third Degree of Abstraction: we consider things as Being (Metaphysics).
Having different types of insights and from or in different discourse by means of different socio-cultural
practices required me to reflect on them and distinguish them - meta-reflection, if not always metaphilosophically relevant reflections.
So what did I do with those insights, apart from the fact that they created in my mind, or as if my mind and
ways of thinking, having experience, perception and being conscious in general occurs in a very insightful,
greatly differentiated and subtle frame/s of reference.
So what did I do with such insights.
After having an insight, we can do something about it, i.e. we can articulate, clarify and deepen our
understanding of our insight.
- Fr. Ferriols mentions 3 techniques in doing something with the insight: metaphor, analysis, and other
techniques.
He says about this Metaphor
- use of something familiar, ordinary to articulate, clarify, and deepen what is not
familiar and ordinary.
Metaphor is very important because:
1. it fixes the insight in the mind
2. it sharpens the insight in the sense that:
- it clarifies the insight
- it makes us understand the insight more deeply
3. it enables us to understand the ordinary and familiar more deeply.
Analysis
- We use analysis also to articulate, clarify and deepen our understanding of the
insight
- analysis:
- breaking down into parts
- breaking down the insight into the different elements or dimensions which
constitute it.
Other Techniques
- according to Paul Ricoeur:
- Symbol
- Myth
- Speculation
We are given certain cautions for dealing with insights - Analysis could desiccate an insight
- analysis could dry up, fossilize the insight
- in other words, insight could cease to be alive, to be meaningful and relevant as
one subjects it to analysis.
ii. It is important to return to the concrete fullness of the original insight and insight should
permeate the whole process of doing with an insight. Why?
- to vitalize the insight
- to keep it alive, meaningful and relevant
- to prevent it from being fossilized, from being dried up.
- To check whether the analysis, metaphor or other technique of doing with
insight really leads to a clarification, articulation and deeper understanding of the insight
iii. Insight is inexhaustible
- one can explore and do something with the insight in variety of ways in order to
clarify, articulate and understand it
- but the insight itself is rich, superabundant such that it could never be exhausted

by any techniques; none of the them could fully and completely clarify, articulate, and
understand the insight.
- In every doing with an insight, there is a tension between: sense of
knowledge/light and sense of ignorance/darkness
iv. The richness of insight is the richness of reality itself
- insight brings us to the very heart of reality, to the deeper aspect of reality
- reality itself is superabundantly rich, inexhaustible
- thus, the richness of insight points to, indicated the richness of reality itself
- reality as mystery
- there is a tension between light and darkness in our knowledge, understanding,
appropriation of reality.

https://www.scribd.com/doc/56238200/Lecture-1-The-Act-of-Philosophizing page 4
In the Throe of Wonder: Intimations of the Sacred in a Post-Modern World by Jerome A. Miller
Insight by Bernard Lonergan
This is the appropriate context to introduce false and misleading notions about philosophy, doing philosophy
and philosophers.
"The Philosophical Enterprise" by John Kavanaugh
a. Introduction: False Notions of a Philosopher and Doing Philosophy
i. False Images/Caricature of a Philosopher
1. Isolated Thinker
- one who is confined, isolated within the walls of his rooms or sitting on a ivory
tower
- one who tries to make sense of the world which he is isolated from and which
he alone understands.
2. Great System Builder
- one who has built a great system of thought but now is relegated to obscure
footnotes and erudite commentaries
- one has to cite him in one's footnote in order to be considered learned, scholarly
but in fact he is difficult to understand.
3. Academician
4
- one who teaches courses in philosophy which seem to be not in touch with
present pressing realities and to be irrelevant to the demands of the day to day life.
ii. False notions in how a person conducts the discipline of philosophy
1. memorizing answers to questions which he himself never has asked or has ceased to ask
or which should have never been asked or never cares to ask
- trying to remember what the philosopher said rather than trying to understand
what drove the philosopher to say those things in the first place
- consequently, philosophy courses will turn out being a big mistake on all levels:
experientially, pedagogically, and humanistically
2. isolated from other disciplines and sometimes reduced to the same level as other
disciplines
- study of philosophy in general, and of philosophy of man in particular is
conducted in isolation from social/behavioral and natural sciences, and other
disciplines
- thus, there is little connection between philosophy and history, myth, literature
or arts
- Why? some want philosophy to be "science", a respectable discipline with
subject and credential of its own. But as a consequence, it reduces philosophy on the
same level as other disciplines.
3. Being concerned with the problems of "the one and many", the development of logical
atomism, and linguistic or metaphysical analyses than with the fundamental questions of
meaning and the horizon of his possibilities as a man.
- to correct these false notions of a philosopher and of how philosophizing is to be
conducted, let us try to see philosophy as a Discipline of Questioning, Discipline of
Liberation, and Discipline of Personhood.
ibid. pages 4-5
More details, analysis and points of the wonder and astonishment mentioned by Plato and Aristotle, especially
in so far as the formulation of questions goes. How and why someone will ask questions and the wonder
associated with this activity and developing the ability of this attitude towards all experiences, people, the
world, situations, one self and others.
Philosophizing as the Discipline of Questioning
- to understand the act of philosophizing, we must find out and understand first
what drives, moves, leads one to philosophize as sheer human exigency, i.e. very
necessary to human existence.
- What drives a person to philosophize is the inescapable dynamism and capacity
of the human person himself to question and to seek answers to questions he himself
raises.
- In short, at the root of all philosophizing is the pre-eminent personal affair of
question-asking.
i. Queston-Asking
1. Question-asking is very common, at the heart of our day to day experience

- we could not escape, pass the day without asking question, without being
confronted by a question
- we could not start nor finish the day without some questions
- Why? Because of our desire, our dynamism to:
- To be confronted by things outside of us (Experience)
- Know, understand the things we experience (Understanding): What is
it?
- Find out the truth of what we come to understand (Judgment): Is it?
- Make decisions for what we do/act (Decision/Action): What should I
do?
2. Different Levels 2.1 Horizontal/Superficial Questions
- questions of survival
- Where will I find money to pay my rent?
- What will I do to save myself from trouble?
- practical questions
- What will I do tomorrow?
- How do I use the computer?
- What shirt, shoes, pant will I wear?
- What are the advantages and disadvantages of VFA?
- scientific questions: Questions of facts and making sense of certain,
particular empirical reality
- How does the sun produce its heat and light?
- How does a computer work?
- Are there intelligent life-forms outside of our planet?
- Why is there a rainbow?
2.2 Vertical/Depth Questions
- questions of ultimate purpose and meaning
- questions of significance and meaning that enables us to perceive order
and harmony in the world as a whole, our place in the universe.
- E.g.:
5
- Where does the world as a whole come from?
- Why is there existence rather than non-existence?
- Why am I here? What is my place in the universe?
- Where am I going?
- question of truth/reality
- Is what I perceive, understand true? What makes it true?
- question of value
- Is it good? What makes it good? What makes us truly happy?
- These are ultimate, fundamental questions in life:
- deeper questions, questions we ask even if our superficial questions are
answered; questions to which the superficial questions bring us ultimately if
we pursue the inner dynamics of questioning
- questions whose answers have bearing on our superficial questions,
questions which are the bases/foundations of our horizontal questions.
ii. Personal Affair of Asking Depth-Question
1. I myself have come to these depth-questions
- I myself see them as questions, as problems
- They are really questions/issues for me.
2. The depth-questions are really of personal value to me
- the answer to these questions are of great value to me: significant, important,
would make a difference in my life
- such that these questions:
- consume my entire person: my intellect, my will, my effort, my time,
my body
- no let up till I find the answers
3. Starting point of all the depth-questions is my own person.
- behind, at the center and the beginning of all depth questions: questions about
MYSELF, AS A HUMAN PERSON
- Question of Meaning and Purpose: Why am I here? What can I hope for?
- Question of Truth: Who am I really? What are my potentialities? My
uniqueness?
- Question of Value: What is my good, my happiness? What should I do? What is
the criterion in deciding what is good or not, my happiness or not?
iii. Conclusion: Greatness of philosophy lies in perpetual questioning
- philosophy does not begin with an answer/insight but a question
- it continues because we still continue to ask questions, particularly depth questions
- and the answers to our questions do not stop the question-asking but spur one to
further search for a better answer, to ask for further, deeper or different questions.
- Thus, philosophy is music of the fugue: incessant counterpoint of questioning and answering them.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The notions in this last paragraph (I refer to point 3 from the beginning here **) should be
conceptualized more clearly and then analysed in much greater detail and depth. So on
to certain warnings contained in
c)
Jonathan Ichikawa, Arch Philosophical Research Centre, University of St Andrews reviewed Chris Dalys
An Introduction to Philosophical Methods, Broadview Press, 2010, 257pp., $29.95 (pbk), ISBN 9781551119342 here
http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/24675-an-introduction-to-philosophical-methods.
By the way see sentences 2 and 3 in the first paragraph that stun me with their beauty: Even setting aside their

notorious epistemological challenges, attempts to understand philosophical investigation and " And more
inclusive discussions of the methodology of philosophy run the risk of generating lists of tautologies - ...etc. rather than informative treatments of how philosophy ought to proceed. This OUGHT surely is another
problem and a very large one?
Daly does not attempt a :unifying statement of the nature or methodology of philosophy. ..... instead electing
for what he calls (p. 11) a 'twin track' approach, considering particular methods and kinds of data that
philosophers sometimes appear to use, and pairing descriptions of such methods with various case studies
intended to illustrate them.
I quote these reviewing statements as they express what I wrote above concerning my present writings cause,
my astonishment and wonder, and that Daly wisely steered clear from that. What he does attempt, according to
Ichikawa is employ a restricted strategy does seem advisable; the nature of philosophy is best understood
through methodologically reflective first-order philosophical practice. Here follows Ichikawas warning and
criticism of the shortcomings of Dalys approach/book: However, its proponent does run the risk of having
little of interest, and little distinctive of philosophy, to say, thus succumbing to the latter horn of the dilemma set
out above. Daly's book does, to some extent, so succumb. Ichikawa refers to his 3 rd sentence in the first
paragraph: And more inclusive discussions of the methodology of philosophy run the risk of generating lists of
tautologies -- believe according to the evidence, make good inferences, do not beg questions against dialectical
opponents, etc.
Ichikawa then criticizes Daly for NOT having done the following: "Daly does little in the book to characterize
how he thinks philosophy might differ from other kinds of engagement. The extended discussion of science in
Chapter Six considers how science may bear on philosophy but does not engage with how it is and is not
similar. He does point out (p. 1) that philosophers are unlike scientists in that they do not use laboratory tools to
run experiments, but this does little to distinguish philosophy in particular. He then states what Daly said he IS
going to do: " Since the central puzzle motivating the book, as given in the introductory pages, involves the
juxtaposition of, first, the propensity of philosophers to, to use Daly's term, 'make various claims' with, second,
their neglect of laboratory experiments. He suggests that: "a more forceful introduction to the present book
might include a discussion of to what extent, if any, the questions raised are particularly pressing for
philosophy. Well Daly did NOT do that.
On page 11 Daly mentioned his approach: " he calls (p. 11) a 'twin track' approach, considering particular
methods and kinds of data that philosophers sometimes appear to use, and pairing descriptions of such
methods with various case studies intended to illustrate them. This restricted strategy does seem advisable;
the nature of philosophy is best understood through methodologically reflective first-order philosophical
practice.
The book comprises six chapters, plus a brief introduction and conclusion. Each chapter involves an initial set
of methodological questions and consideration of one or more case studies designed to illustrate how the
questions bear on philosophical methodology. For example, the first chapter, 'Common Sense', opens with
questions about the nature and significance of common sense claims, then focuses primarily on G. E.
Moore's application of common sense arguments to philosophical questions, with particular emphasis on his
infamously straightforward attempted proof of the external world.
"it was not clear to me why Daly chose the topics he did one question
and what unifies the work as a whole. another separate question.
The longest chapter of the book, the 62-page Chapter Two, 'Analysis', considers several attempts to analyze
the notion of philosophical analysis and finds them inadequate in various respects before finally concluding
very briefly (on p. 100) that the notion of analysis is not after all an interesting one for the purpose of
understanding the methodology of philosophy. Although I agree with Daly's conclusion here, students
engaging with the book will wonder, as I did, why we spent so much time on a question that was ultimately to
be dismissed? another (type) question
"The third chapter is devoted to 'Thought Experiment'. It begins with general questions about the nature and
value of thought experiments before giving brief introductions to seventeen well-known examples of thought

experiments, plus a more extended case study of thought experiments involving personal identity. Daly
concludes: "chapter (pp. 127-8) with what he calls the 'tentative and speculative sceptical proposal' that use of
intuition and consideration of hypothetical cases are ir""relevant to philosophical questions. At least we can
now exclude them as relevant and necessary to philosophizing and philosophical methodology!
" Daly suggests that we dispense with thought experiments and intuitions and observe only that knowledge and
reliably produced true belief are in fact coextensive. Then we may infer to the best explanation that they are
identical. This very radical suggestion raises many serious questions which go unaddressed.....
Ichikawa questions Daly on the following: " can one correlate actual cases of knowledge to reliably produced
true belief without making use of the sorts of intuitions Daly wants to set aside? Ichikawa gives a suggestion
by means of a question that, he thinks, refutes what Daly states. This is not very important to me. The following
is his judgement on Dalys hypothesis of/for setting intuitions aside. The two paragraphs Daly devotes to his
'sceptical proposal' --.... -- are not adequate to the extreme view articulated,
"Next is Chapter Four, 'Simplicity', which examines how considerations of simplicity and complexity bear on
appropriate selection of hypotheses; the main focus is on various interpretations of Occam's Razor. Daly's
conclusion here (p. 152) is that given the various notions of simplicity available, and given the availability of
reasons to tolerate complex hypotheses, considerations of simplicity are 'quite restricted' in their
applicability to philosophical methodology. I personally cannot see the point and relevance of this?
"In Chapter Five ('Explanation'), Daly considers the extent to which philosophical theories do and should
explain. In particular, he considers the suggestion that, when choosing between hypotheses, we should select
that which offers the best explanation of the relevant phenomena. Of course, there are difficult and interesting
questions about just what explanation consists in, how to distinguish cases of explanation from nonexplanation, and how to determine which of various competing explanations is in the relevant sense 'better'.
Daly says little about these questions, noting (p. 180) that 'the strategy of inference to the best explanation
needs to be supplemented not only by detailed accounts of each of the theoretical virtues, but also by a
detailed account of how to make a rational theory choice in [various cases].' This is surely right; but absent
any such detailed account -- or even a vague, impressionistic account -- the suggestion threatens to be all but
empty. Again I fail to see any significant point in this for philosophical methodology.
"Chapter Six, 'Science', is not about science per se, but instead considers the bearing of science on
philosophy. The bulk of the chapter consists in putting forward and criticizing arguments for naturalism,
which Daly officially characterizes as 'The view that scientific methods and results are valuable, or even
indispensable, to philosophy.' I would like to know more about the reasons for this claim and in which ways
such things are indispensable, functional, useful to philosophy? Do they keep philosophers informed in general
and/or about the approaches of sciences, or about particular results, facts from, science?
However, he also cautions the reader that 'no single view can be identified with naturalism.' (p. 188)
Unfortunately, in much of the ensuing discussion, Daly does not keep various naturalist theses distinct, in
several dimensions. For instance, Daly argues against naturalizing epistemology in part by claiming (p. 199) that
the psychological claims that might be of relevance to epistemology -- our susceptibility to various errors in
perception, reasoning, etc. -- consist largely in 'something we already knew, at least in broad outline'. While this
may provide some insulation against the methodological suggestion that one must formally study
psychology in order to do epistemology responsibly, it does not show, as Daly suggests it does, that
scientific information is not relevant to epistemology. This point is particularly clear if one considers how, by
parity of reasoning, one could argue from the fact cited above -- common sense already told us that we perform
less well epistemically in certain kinds of environments -- that the data provided by science is not relevant to
cognitive psychology. In both cases, philosophy and cognitive psychology, that common sense already delivered
the broad outlines of the relevant information is a non sequitur with respect to the general bearing of scientific
evidence. Daly also seems at times to conflate the suggestion that scientific work bears on philosophical
questions ('it is perfectly appropriate to draw on the resources (e.g.) of science', p. 200, quoting Hilary
Kornblith) with the suggestion that scientific evidence and methodology are sufficient for resolving the
relevant philosophical questions (a 'discipline or theory can generate a problem but it does not follow that its
resources are sufficient to solve that problem', p. 202). This seems a bit confusing to me. To me the more
serious question is - which aspects of science, sciences methods, methodologies are relevant to
philosophy/izing and why is it the case, how does it work?
"After these six chapters, Daly gives a three-and-a-half page conclusion that puts forward two more general
ideas about philosophy. The first is that although there is philosophical debate about what data and methods
are appropriate to the practice of philosophy, it is permissible when engaging in first-order philosophy to
proceed from contentious or debatable assumptions I cannot accept the latter as one would have to look at
particular cases of such debatable assumptions.

."This claim does sit in some obvious prima facie tension with various accusations throughout the book -- for
instance, on pp. 27, 33, 115, and 177 -- that certain arguments beg questions in pernicious ways, and with the
statement on p. 115 that 'begging the question is a defect in any piece of reasoning'. This tension is not
explored.[1] The second idea of the conclusion is that often a method of cost-benefit analysis is appropriate to
choosing between philosophical theories. This idea, while plausible and useful, is not obviously connected to or
developed from the discussion of the main text. Ichikawa questions Dalys suggestion or statement on other
grounds, namely that Daly itself contradicted it earlier in his book. I cannot see the point of Dalys second idea,
while Ichikawa is concerned about the fact that it is/was not developed in the main text. The latter to me is
irrelevant as the whole second idea is irrelevant to philosophizing.
In general, Daly's writing style is reasonably clear, although he does tend to transition rather suddenly from
general conversational tones to more technical ones that might confuse or intimidate students. This happens
most often when he draws on work from other academics that speaks to the issues he has introduced. This
point I have often seen in philosophical writing - employing the work of other academics, so as not to have to
argue for a certain idea. But is IS a (useful? meaningful?) philosophical (writing) tool (I suppose?).
this often includes the incorporation of direct quotation, which is not always clearly extracted or explained
Ichikawa then writes more on this criticism and contin ues with it below:
Although Daly notes that this cannot constitute a criterion for common sense, since some Moorean certainties
are not directly observational (the earth has existed for centuries, etc.), he suggests -- citing, but not
explaining, Campbell -- that the empirical questions might nevertheless help. Few students at an
introductory level could, I suspect, engage this passage with anything like full clarity without quite a lot of
guidance. This is a representative pattern that occurs many times in the book. (E.g., a detour from common
sense into a discussion of Michael Dummett and a distinction between belief and acceptance on p. 19; a
presentation of Steven Rieber's application of a technical notion of semantic structure to bear on questions of
analysis on p. 66; the consideration of a dialectic between Kathleen Wilkes and James Robert Brown on
personal identity on p. 118.)
More advanced students or researchers will have an easier time following these parts of the book, but they, I
think, will be frustrated by the superficial treatments of the interesting issues raised in the case studies. And in
some instances, these latter seem also to involve philosophical errors and confusions (for example, in the
discussions of the Euthyphros famous argument about piety and god-lovedness and of David Lewiss modal
realism).
The book would also have benefitted from more careful editing; there are a surprising number of typos -including one on the first page of the introduction -- and grammatical/structural errors. These are not serious
philosophical matters, of course, and would easily be fixed; I mention them because an introductory text read by
philosophy students will provide a model for their own writing, and it is best to expose them to writing of the
highest technical quality.
An Introduction to Philosophical Methods does touch upon many issues worthy of engagement, and Daly does
seem to have done well in selecting the relevant literature to consider with respect to each of his chosen topics.
As a result, the references and bibliography in this book will be useful for philosophers looking for guidance in
their early research efforts. But with respect to its central aim as an introduction to philosophical
methodology, the book falls short.
[1] Daly suggests (p. 158) that 'tension' in contexts like this is 'a weasel word' that should be avoided because it
is unclear what exactly it is meant to convey. I do not agree that this sort of language is in general
inappropriately vague. At any rate, in this instance, when I say that these elements of Daly's view are 'in tension,'
I mean that there is sufficient prima facie conflict such that someone averring both views ought to recognize that
they constitute a surprising conjunction and remark on how, contrary to appearance, they may be consistent and
mutually well-motivated. I suspect this is approximately what most philosophers mean when they say that
various claims are 'in tension' with one another. So clarify what they DO mean.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------d
I quote, with my highlights, what I consider to be distracting in philosophizing. This person refers to these
things that I object to as philosophical methods. I object to them when you see the contexts he employs them in

and the topics he applies them to. Philosophical methods? Strategies? Technique for/of Reasoning and
explanation?
http://simsphilosophy.blogspot.co.za/2007/05/reflection-essay-on-philosophical.html
Reflection on Philosophical Methodologies
I think I have applied most of these philosophical methodologies in philosophy classes. First off, the logical
analysis is a method we employed in various exercises for my reasoning class. The conceptual analysis is
something I am doing quite a bit of right now in my European Contemporary Though class through
examining such terms as democracy, freedom and sovereignty. I also experience this methodology
through some of the Save Our Constitution panel discussions. I took a whole course basically just about the
method of deconstruction in the Sociology of Knowledge class I took last semester. Phenomenology and one
that is not on here but seems quite similar to phenomenology, introspection, is something I have been doing
on my own since I was seventeen. It is, in many respects, my self-therapy as I struggle to reflect on my life
experiences and the meanings or lack thereof that they so entail. Also, in a class I am taking now, Feminist
Philosophies, we were just reading an essay by Iris Marion Young titled Menstrual Meditations, where young
talks a lot about where young talks a lot about Heideggers methodology of exploring oneself by going into
and through and reflecting upon ones moods. The Philosopher as Public Intellectual is a method that I
would like to utilize more often, especially once I am out of school. The example I have given through my
article about democracy matters I actually got published a few weeks ago in the hill news. In all, I think I have
applied most, if not all, of these methods whether in courses or just in my everyday life.
A couple methods that I would like to explore in more depth in my own philosophical activities are the
philosophy as conversation method and the two respective comparative methods. I believe these two
methods could be synthesized in a way as to facilitate a true dialectic between a diversity of philosophical
positions. All too often philosophy is only talking to itself. While the comparative methods might still be subject
to this problematic I believe the philosophy as conversation method could really serve as useful tool to bridge
the gap between the formally philosophical and everyday experiences. The comparative method is one that I in
fact employed in my first philosophy class called Humanities which I had in my senior year in high school. I
believe this method is most necessary in terms of its political implications. I say this because the current
methods of Identity Politics have fragmentized and specialized the Left in comparison to the what I would
consider the over-specialization of academia. While particular groups on the left such as womens liberation,
civil rights, socialists, gay rights and environmental organizations fight for there own particular ends, they all
too often fail to form coalitions as they instead fight (both internally within organization and externally between
different movements) for the same resources and media attention. I firmly believe that the Left needs to bridge
this gap if it ever hopes to achieve any of its particular goals in a sustainable way. Thus, if I choose to return to
academia my work will most surely focus on making these connections and explicit comparisons between
different social movements and between different philosophies.
I think if there is one method here that most reflects my own philosophical work it would be either
phenomenology or deconstruction. As I already mentioned I think Ive been doing phenomenology for some
time now, and I believe in the necessity of looking critically and reflectively first and foremost at ones own
experiences. I believe that the deconstruction and phenomenological method are implicit within one another. If
there was anything I learned in Sociology of knowledge it is the reciprocity by which our epistemology is
created and legitimized by particular subjectivities with particular intentions (usually power). Only by
understanding how ones own sincere intentions figure into this power struggle can one begin to determine how
to change the system. One cannot do this by simple abstraction for there is no view from nowhere. The key is to
be honest with oneself and ones intentionality, for it is my contention that only from within the system may the
system ever be altered.
------------------------------------------e
http://mcps.umn.edu/philosophy/14_15Boyd.pdf

I do not find this article of much interest to philosophical methodology and consider it to be distracting from the
real issues and nature of this methodology.
f
The writer makes statements and do not present any grounds or arguments for them
http://www.westminster.edu/staff/brennie/WDGroupsubpages/stories/four_approaches_to_philosophy.htm
This article presents us with what the author claims are Four Approaches to Philosophy.
His summary:
Summary:

Few people care to study or understand logic due to everyone believing that they are skilled enough in the art of
reasoning. Logicality is one of our most useful qualities. There are four main approaches to philosophy.
1. If you can not prove something is real, then it does not lead to a contrary conclusion, but it is still seen as
being harmonious in the aspects of method and conception.
2. There is one thing in which a proposition should and will in most cases confirm. This means that no one can
doubt realities because it would not be a source of dissatisfaction. The hypothesis is then something that
everyone must agree on and admit.
3. Everyone uses the scientific method for many things and only not use it when one does not know how to
apply it to the situation.
4. Using or gaining experience of the method does not make us want to use it but helps us settle our opinions.
Because of its many splendid triumphs, it has become a permanent part of our lives.
The fourth method is the only one that displays the distinction of right and wrong. By adopting the method of
tenacity, you are taking away any doubt in which you might come upon. We adopt whatever belief that we are
most accustomed to until we are awakened by the harsh realities which cause us to down spiral into the so called
'real world'. Authority is the method in which mankind will always be ruled. The other methods do have their
importance and truths, but this method is the one that will never change.
He then continues to provide us with an analysis Tenacity
The first method Pierce names is tenacity, which is characterized by clinging to a particular belief with
complete disregard to all evidence or reason that may imply that it is incorrect. While this is an effective
method in that it allows for action and decision without hesitation, it is limited by the fact that other people will
inevitably tenaciously cling to different beliefs, casting doubt and disunity. After all, it is hard to believe
absolutely in one thing and deny all other reason when you are surrounded by people who hold different beliefs
to be just as true.
To resolve this problem, the second method of authority is formed. it ensures that everyone tenaciously holds
to the same belief..
people will inevitably see that other authorities practice different doctrines, and will therefore question their own
authority. A third method, a priori, accounts for this. It is the method of choosing whatever opinion or truth is
most pleasing at the time. This allows for quick and easy satisfaction to the problem of "who is right?"
All of these methods are flawed, however, for several reasons. They do not distinguish between a right and
wrong method. The a priori method, which derives from the first two, will eventually leave doubt in regard to
the validity of the opinion ("sure, it feels good, but is it truly correct?"). For these reasons it becomes necessary
to develop a method that removes the "human" factor from the equation and leaves only the raw facts. This
is the scientific method, which operates off of the belief that regular laws affect the world and are
completely independent of our opinions about them. By observing these laws and their interactions with the
world, it is possible to come to a valid conclusion.
These methods are interlinked. We always allow our opinions to be determined by something; be it a particular
belief, an authority, what strikes us at the moment, or science. Peirce argues that humans need a scientific
authority because we are self centered and view the world in a biased way.
...Science itself is influenced by our flawed nature....Thus, Peirce's argument deserves a qualification: with the
scientific method, we move constantly towards a greater knowledge and more "valid" opinions based on our
ever more accurate (and yet never perfect) perspective of the world.
-----------------------------g
http://schoubye.org/teaching/Formal-Methods/FormalMethodsNotes2013.pdf
Formal Methods in Philosophy
Lecture Notes 2013
Dr. Anders J. Schoubye

School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences

University of Edinburgh
anders.schoubye@ed.ac.uk


See the Contents of this lecture and judge for yourself the assumption underlying this piece.
Contents
Preface
i
1 Summary: First Order Logic
1
1.1
First Order Logic (FOL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
1.1.1
Primitive Vocabulary of
L
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
1.1.2
Syntax of
L
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1
1.1.3
Variable Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2
1.1.4
Semantics and Models for
L
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2
1.1.5
Variables in
L
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3
1.1.6
Valuations and Truth-in-a-Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3
1.1.7
Validity and Logical Consequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4
2 Set Theory
5
2.1
Na
ve Set Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5
2.1.1
Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5
2.1.2
Basic Axioms of Na
ve Set Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5
2.1.3
Empty Set, Singleton Sets, and Pairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8
2.1.4
Subsets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8

2.1.5
Intersection and Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9
2.1.6
Ordered Pairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
2.1.7
Cartesian Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
2.1.8
Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11
2.2
Russells Paradox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
15
3 ZermeloFraenkel Set Theory
17
3.1
Cumulative Set Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
17
3.1.1
The Intuitive Picture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
17
3.1.2
The Axioms of ZFC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
18
3.1.3
Sizes of Infinite Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
23
3.1.4
Cardinality and One-to-One Correspondence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
23
4 Modal Logic
25
4.1
Modal Logic: Necessity and Possibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
25
4.1.1
Modals in Natural Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
26
4.2
Grammar of Modal Propositional Logic (MPL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
26
4.2.1
Primitive Vocabulary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
27
4.2.2
Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
27
4.2.3
Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
27
4.2.4
The Problem with a Truth Functional Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
28
4.3
Modal Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
30
4.3.1
Validity and Consequence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31
4.4
Establishing Validities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
32
4.5
Invalidity and Countermodels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
34
4.5.1
Graphical Procedure for Demonstrating Invalidity . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
35
4.6
Axiomatic Proof Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
39
4.6.1
System K . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
39
4.6.2
System D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
44
4.6.3
System T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
44
4.6.4
System B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
45
4.6.5
System S4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
45
4.6.6
System S5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
46
4.7
Soundness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
46
5 Counterfactuals
49
5.1
Counterfactuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
49
5.2
The Behavior of Natural Language Counterfactuals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
49
5.3
The Lewis-Stalnaker Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
52
5.4
Stalnakers System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
53
5.4.1
Primitive Vocabulary of SC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
53
5.4.2
Syntax of SC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
53
5.4.3
Semantics and Models for SC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
53
5.4.4
Semantic Validity Proofs in
SC

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
56
5.4.5
Semantic Invalidity in
SC
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
57
5.4.6
Logical Features of
SC
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
57
5.5
Lewis Criticism of Stalnakers System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
60
5.5.1
Lewis System (LC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
62
5.6
Disjunctive Antecedents: Problems for Stalnaker and Lewis . . . . . . . . . . . . .
63
6 Decision Theory
65
6.1
Decision and Game Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
65
6.1.1
Some (famous) Decision Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
66
6.2
Dominance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
68
6.3
States, Choices, and Independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
68
6.4
Maximax and Maximin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
69
6.5
Ordinal vs. Cardinal Utilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
70
6.6
Do What Is Likely To Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
72
7 Probability Theory
75
7.1
Probability and Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
75
7.2
Propositions and Probabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
78
7.3
Axioms of Probability Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
79
7.4
Conditional Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
80
7.5
Conditionalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

83
7.6
Probabilities: Independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
84
7.7
Correlation vs. Causation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
85
8 Utility and Probability
91
8.1
Utilities and Expected Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
91
8.2
Maximise Expected Utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
92
8.3
Properties of the Maximise Expected Utility Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
93
8.4
A More General Version of Dominance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
94
8.5
The Sure Thing Principle and the Allais Paradox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
95
8.6
Interpretations of Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
97
8.6.1
Probabilities as Frequencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
97
8.6.2
Degrees of Beliefs Bayesianism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
98
8.6.3
Evidential Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
8.6.4
Objective Chance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
9 More on Utility
103
9.1
Declining Marginal Utility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
9.1.1
Insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
9.2
Utility and Welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
9.2.1
Experience Based Theories of Welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
9.2.2
Objective List Theories of Welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
9.2.3
Preference Theories of Welfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
10 Newcombs Problem
109
10.1 Solutions to Newcombs Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
10.2 Two (potentially) Conflicting Decision Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
10.2.1 Arguments for 2-Boxing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
10.3 Causal vs. Evidential Decision Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
10.3.1 Arguments for Evidential Decision Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
11 Framing Effects
119

11.1 Risk Aversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

11.1.1 Gains vs. Losses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
11.2 Outcome Framing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
11.2.1 The Psychophysics of Chances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
11.2.2 Normative vs. Descriptive Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
----------------------------h
https://onemorebrown.com/2008/08/15/the-philosophical-method/
It seems to me that philosophy is distinguished from other endeavors by the method that it adopts. This is not
unusual, as science is usually identified by the scientific method. But what is the philosophical method? This
question is obviously controversial but I think a good case can be made that the philosophical method involves a
commitment to reason and argument as a source of knowledge.
Well there you have it!
--------------------------i
https://explicitblog.wordpress.com/2013/11/07/the-method-of-philosophy-is-the-method-of-inquiry/
The Method of Philosophy Is the Method of Inquiry
Posted on 7 November, 2013
In my earlier post on the method of philosophy I made several negative claims: the method of philosophy is not
based on intuitions or reflective equilibrium, its not random speculating, and its also not just about arguments.
Today Im going to motivate a little maxim that Ive been mumbling to myself for a few years: that the method
of philosophy is the method of inquiry.
What do I mean by inquiry? By inquiry, I mean something like the deliberate project of understanding the
world (including ourselves) better. Sometimes this is done in order to accomplish a specific goal, like curing
polio or building bridges, and sometimes its not. I take it that building the Large Hadron Collider and looking
for the Higgs boson is an example of the latter kind, although there have been highly practical discoveries along
the way and this was always a part of the plan. At its best moments, the academy (I dont mean the Academy,
but academia, the worldwide system of universities and other institutions of higher learning) is an institution
dedicated to furthering inquiry and disseminating the resulting understanding to students and others. I am
tempted to think of inquiry as a distinctively human project (as far as we know).
Nothing needs to be said about this?
-------------------------------j
The Method of Philosophy: Making Distinctions. - School of Philosophy
philosophy.cua.edu/.../Th eMethod of Philosophy_Making Distinction...
lies in its method The method of philosophical thinking is not obvious; we think we have ... I wish to help
clarify what philosophy is by discussing its method.

----------------------------------------k http://johnpollock.us/ftp/PAPERS/Pollock_Technical_Methods_In_Philosophy.pdf
CONTENTS
PREFACE
IX
CHAPTER ONE:
SET
THEORY
1.
The
Logical
Framework
1
2.
The
Basic
Concepts
of
Set

Theory
2
2.1
Class
Membership
2
2.2
Definition
by
Abstraction
3
2.3
Some
Simple
Sets
5
2.4
Subsets
6
2.5
Unions and Intersections
8
2.6
Relative Complements
11
2.7
Power
Sets
12
2.8
Generalized
Union
and Intersection
13
3.
Relations
15
3.1
Ordered
Pairs
15
3.2
Ordered
n-tuples
18
3.3
The
Extensions
of
Properties and Relations
19
3.4
Operations
on
Relations
21
3.5
Properties
of
Relations

23
3.6
Equivalence Relations
25
3.7
Ordering Relations
27
4.
Functions
30
4.1
Mappings Into and
Onto
32
4.2
Operations on
Functions
33
4.3
The
Restriction
of
a Function
34
4.4
One-One
Functions
34
4.5
Ordered
n-tuples
35
4.6
Relational Structures and
Isomorphisms
35
5.
Recursive
Definitions
37
6.
Arithmetic
44
6.1
Peano's
Axioms
44
6.2
Inductive Definitions
5
1
6.3
The
Categoricity
of
Peano's
Axioms
54
TENTS
6.4

Set-Theoretic
Surrogates
56
6.5
Arithmetic
59
CHAPTER
TWO:
LOGIC
1.
The
Predicate
Calculus
62
1.1
Syntax
62
1.2
Formal
Semantics
66
1.3
Derivations
72
1.4
Definite Descriptions
84
1.5
First-Order Logic
with
Functions
87
2.
First-Order
Theories
87
2.1
Axiomatic
Theories
87
2.2
Semantic
Closure
89
2.3
Godel's
Theorem
96
3.
Higher-Order
Logic
106
SOLUTIONS
TO
EXERCISES
Chapter
One
Ill
Chapter
Two

117
LIST
OF SYMBOLS
121
-------------------------l
http://www.csudh.edu/phenom_studies/methods_phil/lect_2.htm
2. Methods in Philosophy
As long as we understand philosophy is "questioning search," and thus "pursuit of knowledge," this search is not
the end product of such a search as a bulk of knowledge or information. On the contrary, any pursuit of
knowledge, as long as we are finite, mortal human-beings and it searches for knowledge, this pursuit is a rather
"endless" process. It is the process starting from "here," from this starting point of the self awareness of one's
own ignorance.
2-1-1. Method in General
In general, therefore, the decision to choose a certain way or road or approach is extremely crucial, also
needless to say, to the pursuit of knowledge. It may be so due to the lack of knowledge of the so-called
"controlled procedure," or it may be the lack of knowledge about the preparations (e.g. including the strong
enough approach) or the confusion of the knowledge of the end of such a search. It may very well be that we
have a totally wrong "direction" and "anticipation" of such an investigation.
2-1-2. Method and Tool
On the other hand, method may find its way in other activities than in the pursuit of knowledge (of course, of
which we are most interested in). Take for example, to work on making something by dealing with what
Aristotle called productive knowledge. I would like to cut this pine tree in the garden. In order to do this, I have
to have an axe, a hand saw or an electric chain saw. Not only the knowledge of the tools in relation to the object
to which the tool is going to be applied here is necessary, but also the knowledge of which direction the tree
should fall down in as well as the knowledge of how to axe or saw the tree in order to have it happen. The order
of the steps necessary for cutting the tree should be considered ahead before we start cutting it. The similar will
be applied to any kind of "productive" activity (including making a clay pot, curving a stone into something,
etc.). Thus controlled procedure means those different kinds of knowledge in order to act or achieve some
particular goal as well as the order of the knowledge and steps. A biological or a pharmacological experiment
perhaps requires more elaborate conditions in which an experiment is going to be conducted. Needless to say, so
are doubtlessly with the engineering.
Within the complexity which can be specified those order of steps and knowledge of the tool by means of the
linear, mechanical causality, how complicated the procedure might be can be solved by the causal connections
step by step.
However, when the procedure to be controlled becomes so complex that the linear, mechanical causation
(logical inference on the basis of that causality) can no longer handle it. Take for example, to send a moon we
are no longer able to linearly follow the procedure step by step, but rather mutual influences and simultaneous
processes are to be "controlled" in order to achieve such a goal with the complex means. In this case, we are
now developing a controlling procedure called "simulation." This is certainly one of the first steps to overcome
the limits of the linear, mechanical causality. Such a thinking is sometimes called a "system" or a "complex
system." (to continue)
2-1-3. The Etymological Search for "Method"
On the one hand, however, the word "meodos" or "methodus" in Latin, "method" in English translation, existed
in the Classical Greek, which was made as a composite word from two words, the one is "meta" (meta)"in
pursuit of (something) along side with", the other, "odos" (hodos)"the way." What do these words, "meta"
and "hodos," mean in the Ancient Greek?
Thus, "methodos" as a composite word from "meta" and "hodos" signified and understood as "in pursuit of (a
certain end) along side with the (specified and controlled) way." This concept of "method" in the philosophical
significance may be traced back to Hesiod and some Pre-Socratic philosophers via Plato. According to this
understanding of the method in philosophy as the Way, the method meant "the Way" ('odos, keleuqos, patos,

each one of which means the way, the road, the path, etc.) in the doubled significance 1) as the Way of one's
devotion of life to the true and the right and 2) as the Way of the questioning search with such a devotion.
Hesiod distinguished the narrow, sterile way of the virtue (in the sense of "success") from the wider path of
wickedness.
Heraclitus was supposed to warn the person who should be mindful when one forgets where the way would
lead.
In case of Parmenides, the Way to Truth and Just is shown as the way of the person with the rational
understanding that Being is, and is distinguished from the way, which the people of habitual mundaneity and in
mortal conceptions follow and are never in touch with Truth. Thus, in the pursuit of Truth lead by Reason shows
the Way of Truth with confidence.
In Plato, it appears, this Way ended with the explicit notion of "Method." First of all, in Plato's philosophy, the
method signified the inquiry or search, that is, to "scientifically" ask a question or the questioning as such. As
we shall see it later in more details, his famous doctrine of method as the dialectic to search the ultimate reality.
Then, of course, in distinction from the art of persuasion or sophistic art and skill (h sofistikh tenhh
sophistik techn) of persuading the other regardless of its truth, the correct way and manner of investigation or
of the questioning search for reality.
Among the earlier and later sophists, naturally the method signified the way of winning the discussion or the art
of persuasion itself ('h sofistikh tenhh sophistik techn) or rhetoric.
According to Hippocrates, the method may find its master example of the art and manner of inquiry in the
correct medical diagnosis.
As we shall also discuss later more in detail, Aristotle stipulated the method as the procedure directed to the
good with deliberation ('h proairesish proairesis) which is controlled on the basis of insight and can be
obtained by study. It is also considered belonging in general to techn ('h tchnh).
The above mentioned characteristics of "method" are to be more precisely articulated and defined in terms of a
specific end. Thus, we may generally state the nature of method as follows:
The activity to pursue a certain plan or goal in accordance with the controlled procedure.
This etymological explication of the meaning of "method" may apply to philosophy as questioning search as
well as any search for knowledge as a scientific pursuit including mathematics.
Before we shall get into the explication of the historical development of the philosophical method or the
methods in philosophy, we would like to discuss Aristotle and his method as logic first. For logic was
considered for a long time as the philosophical method even until Immanuel Kant. It is necessary to pay a
special attention to logic as the philosophical methods.
2-1-4. Methods in Philosophy and the Objective of Philosophical Inquiry
an Overview of the Problem Domains Anticipating our Inquiry
2-1-4. Methods in Philosophy and the Objective of Philosophical Inquiry
an Overview of the Problem Domains Anticipating our Inquiry
According to the preceding etymological investigation of the nature of method, the method is "the activity to
pursue a certain plan or goal in accordance with the controlled procedure.
We also understand that philosophy is questioning search, the pursuit of knowledge, for its own sake
Philosophical inquiry is not useful, nor practical, even not meaningful to our living at all. In this sense, the
philosopher in the genuine sense is non professional, because of the following two senses: 1) it is because the
philosopher and the philosophical knowledge are absolutely no use for our practical, pragmatic life: 2) the

philosopher and the philosophical knowledge cannot have any professional training (in order to earn one's living
by doing so).
However, this does not mean that the philosophical inquiry has no end or goal, nor even a plan. To be sure that
the research and its consequence are neither useful anything else or practical at all.
Neither the knowledge which is to be pursued should be "objective!" It is beyond such a distinction between the
objective and the subjective, as Kierkegaard correctly pointed out about the question of our own existence as the
reality.
And yet, as long as the method in philosophy is a "activities" to attain a certain knowledge as its objective via
certain "procedure," we must be rather explicitly aware not only of the "controlled procedure," but also of the
"plan," "objective," or "end." This "objective" or "goal" is, as pointed out before, should be known to us even if
it is obscure in terms of our cognition of the thing experience.
As we saw earlier, thus, often lead by the value which such an end or a plan possesses, we are only aware of the
general direction.
Due to this beginning of philosophical inquiry, the phenomenological epoch (the bracketing the preconceived
ideas, bias, assumptions, presuppositions) neutralizes our dogmatic beliefs, as Husserl said. This may be
characterized as a return to Pythagoras' "audience" as the philosophical attitude during the Olympic Games. In
this sense, the philosopher is not in the stream, not in the flow of consciousness, but an observer standing
outside of such a stream. This unconcerned, uninterested observer's attitude seems to work as long as our
endeavouring to see, experience and know reality as it discloses itself as it actually is static in two senses: In the
sense a) reality itself is unchanging, static. In the other sense, not reality, but our attitude itself is static in tune
with the way in which reality reveals itself as it actually is.
Besides, reality in which we live is no longer static, but in dynamic change and metamorphosis. We are no
longer stand outside of reality and remain as the unconcerned, uninterested observer.
In approaching to reality as it reveals itself as it actually is, the philosopher today is no longer an uninterested
audience to the static reality, but h/she is expected and does commit himself/herself to the search for reality itself
as it reveals itself. Kierkegaard was right, when he said, the objective truth loses its total significance, but the
problem is our urgent, subjective truth of our own existence.
2-2. The Methods in the Classic Philosophy in the Far East
----------------------------------m
http://www.swami-krishnananda.org/phil/phil_03.html
The methods employed in philosophical reasonings and enquiries include the basic presuppositions of scientific
approach in general; but over and above these methods, philosophical processes endeavour to discover ways of
considering and knowing the facts implied in the phenomena of experience.
The true philosophic method should not be lopsided, should not be biased to any particular or special dogma,
but comprehend within itself the processes of reflection and speculation and at the same time be able to
reconcile the deductive and the inductive methods of reasoning. The philosophy of the Absolute rises above
particulars to greater and greater universals, basing itself on facts of observation and experience by the method
of induction and gradual generalisation of truths, without missing even a single link in the chain of logic and
argumentation, reflection and contemplation, until it reaches the highest generalisation of the Absolute Truth;
and then by the deductive method comes down to interpret and explain the facts of experience in the light of the
nature of this Truth. This is a great example of the most satisfactory method of philosophical enquiry.
Philosophy being the way of the knowledge of Truth, its method must be in agreement with the nature of Truth.
In philosophy and religion the end always determines the nature of the means.
------------------------n
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scholarly_method
The scholarly method or scholarship is the body of principles and practices used by scholars to make their
claims about the world as valid and trustworthy as possible, and to make them known to the scholarly public. It
is the methods that systemically advance the teaching, research, and practice of a given scholarly or academic
field of study through rigorous inquiry. Scholarship is noted by its significance to its particular profession, and is
creative, can be documented, can be replicated or elaborated, and can be and is peer-reviewed through various
methods

Originally started to reconcile the philosophy of the ancient classical philosophers with medieval Christian
theology, scholasticism is not a philosophy or theology in itself but a tool and method for learning which places
emphasis on dialectical reasoning. The primary purpose of scholasticism is to find the answer to a question or to
resolve a contradiction. It was once well known for its application in medieval theology, but was eventually
applied to classical philosophy and many other fields of study.
The historical method comprises the techniques and guidelines by which historians use primary sources and
other evidence to research and then to write history. The question of the nature, and indeed the possibility, of
sound historical method is raised in the philosophy of history, as a question of epistemology. History guidelines
commonly used by historians in their work require external criticism, internal criticism, and synthesis.
The empirical method is generally taken to mean the collection of data on which to base a hypothesis or derive a
conclusion in science. It is part of the scientific method, but is often mistakenly assumed to be synonymous with
other methods. The empirical method is not sharply defined and is often contrasted with the precision of
experiments, where data is derived from the systematic manipulation of variables. The experimental method
investigates causal relationships among variables. An experiment is a cornerstone of the empirical approach to
acquiring data about the world and is used in both natural sciences and social sciences. An experiment can be
used to help solve practical problems and to support or negate theoretical assumptions.
The scientific method refers to a body of techniques for investigating phenomena, acquiring new knowledge, or
correcting and integrating previous knowledge. To be termed scientific, a method of inquiry must be based on
gathering observable, empirical and measurable evidence subject to specific principles of reasoning. A scientific
method consists of the collection of data through observation and experimentation, and the formulation and
testing of hypotheses
-----------------------o
SOME METHODS OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY
By Professor C. D. Broad.
Published in Aristotelian Society Supplement 21 (1947): 1-32.
Examples of Synopsis
Problem of sense-perception
Mind-body problem
Free-will problem
Paranormal phenomena
Synopsis and Analysis
Synopsis and Synthesis
Some further Remarks on Synopsis and Synthesis
How are Principles of Synthesis Discovered?
How are Proposed Principles of Synthesis Recommended?
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------p
https://www.scribd.com/user/76974855/Buddy-Seed
https://www.scribd.com/doc/56238200/Lecture-1-The-Act-of-Philosophizing
On page 6 we are informed about
Philosophizing as the Discipline of Liberation especially by ,means of questioning ourselves, our species, our history/ies, our society, community, culture,
socio-cultural practices such as philosophy/izing, etc.
Below we are shown how this questioning operates and how it assists in liberation one from historical,
sociological, psychological encapsulation, determination or conditioning.
- philosophizing as a discipline of questioning is a discipline of liberation, i.e. in
asking questions, philosophy leads to liberation:
- liberation from encapsulation, conditioning, determination
- liberation to the horizon of possibilities

- liberation to affirm one's possibilities and one's determination

i. Questioning liberates one from historical, sociological, psychological encapsulation,
determination or conditioning
1. Historical, Sociological and Psychological encapsulation, determination, conditioning
Historical
- what am I know, what can I do, what I am doing, how I value things,
4. Philosophizing as the Discipline of Personhood
- philosophizing becomes an authentic discipline of questioning and of liberation
when it is discipline of personhood, i.e.:
- personal task
- at the root of one's being a person
- important in my growth as a person
i. Philosophizing as a Personal Task
1. Personal Affair of Asking-Question
- I must myself personally ask the depth-question
- The personal questions and their answers are of great value to me
- The questions have to do with my person, my identity
2. Personal Search for the answer, for the truth to these depth-questions
- I myself will look/find for the answers to these depth-questions
- I could not delegate this to other, nor just be a spectator to the searching-activity
- In my personal search, I must not be content:
- with sheer conjecture,
- with sentimentalism: feeling good and nice
- with philosophical warm blanket
- just with pursuing relevance
- utmost aim: pursuing truth:
- be it palatable or not
- be it a comfort or threat/discomfort
- my personal search for the answer involves:
a. exacting, careful, disciplined reflection of my own experience and thoughts
b. philosophical dialogue:
- I will be open to other philosophers' experiences and insights
- Study works of others
c. study also of other disciplines
- open to other things which might be vehicle for finding answers to my
depth-questions about myself: myth, history, literature, natural sciences,
behavioral sciences.
3. Seeing the answers to these questions or the truth myself
- in finding some answers to my depth-questions, I myself see, realize
- the truth of these answers
- that they are really true to me
- they really answer my personal depth-questions
ii. Philosophizing is at the root of one's being a person
- the human person is driven by his personhood to philosophize:
7
- to ask depth-questions
- to seek/find answers for them
- to see himself the truth of the answers he has found
- Why? because of the nature of his person as homo viator (man on the way)
- His present situation - the situation he finds himself at the moment:
- not yet complete, not yet finished-product
- not yet sufficient with himself
- contingent
- finite truth, happiness, justice (Pascal)
- yet not content, satisfied with what he is: restless, insatiable
- he is not happy, at rest, content with he is and has at the moment
- he desires, longs from something more than what he is and has at the
moment
- Quixotic man: dreaming the impossible
- Alexandrian man: crying because there is no more to conquer
- Augustinian man: ever restless until my heart rests in Thee.
- Pascalian man: great abyss within that cannot be filled by anything
finite.
- Dostoyevski's moral hero
- Thus, he asks more questions, he searches, demands for more answers about
himself, about his world.
iii. In philosophizing, one's personhood, one's growth as a person is at stake
- when I stop philosophizing (to ask depth-questions, to seek/find answers for
them and to see himself the truth of the answers he has found),
- I become determined, conditioned, encapsulized by my history, society, and
psychological make-up

- I refuse to be open to my own possibilities, and take responsibility of them and

myself as creative self-project
- Remain satisfied with the present and stagnate, arresting my growth as a person.
Conclusion/Summary:
- questioning, then, is the starting point and the continuing force of all philosophy
- questioning leads one to find answers, and finding the answers he himself must see the
truth of those answers
- but in finding answers to the depth-questions primarily about himself: his identity and
action, he will not reach a point of no return; rather leads him back to new questions, leading
to a new search, new answers, so on and so forth.
- In so doing, he is liberated from those which enslave, he becomes open
how I see things could be determined or conditioned in large extent by the past
events, by what happened in the past
- past events: personal, family, society.
- Sociological encapsulation, determination, conditioning
- the kind of society that I live in, the culture, the social structures I find
myself in affect in significant degree to the point even of conditioning,
determining and encapsulizing my seeing, doing and valuing.
- Psychological encapsulation, determination, conditioning
- refers to how my genes, experiences of pain and pleasure, neurons,
among others affect my seeing, doing and valuing.
2. By questioning, I am liberated from these conditioning, encapsulation and determination
- Why? By questioning, I am able to place myself at a distance from these types
of conditioning, determination or encapsulation, such that they no longer determine
at least in the same degree as before I have begun to question By questioning, I could say, "wait a minute", to the present situation: the present
conditioning, determination
- In this way, I could resist the conditioning, the currents, the pull; in effect, I
revolt against the historical, sociological and psychological conditioning.
ii. Questioning opens me to the horizon of possibilities
1. What was seen before as a pure necessity (that which could not be otherwise, in which I
have no choice) is now seen upon questioning as a possibility which I could choose to
reject or accept.
2. Other possibilities, possible patterns, options which I never have thought before open
before me.
iii. Questioning leads one to Affirmation
1. Affirmation of the Future as Creative Self-Project
- the possibilities that are opened before him/her in questioning, he must affirm,
he must choose, must take responsibility of as his/her project, through which he
shapes, determines himself/herself.
- Only in this way, he takes responsibility to determine/shape himself/herself,
what kind of self/person he will be in the future (future self-project), rather than
being determined by one's history, society and psychological make-up.
2. Affirmation of the Past, of my determinations
- Questioning leads one to confront the past and embrace/accept/own/possess the
past as his/her past
- Why is this very important?
- The past is part of one's identity though I do not have to be determined
by it
- The possibilities of the present that are opened to me and among which
I must choose to determine my self-project are the results of the past.
- Thus, to embrace the past is also to embrace my present identity and
my future self-project.
This exploration of questioning is then from page 7 onwards related to philosophy, or placed in the context of
the discourse of philosophy. First as philosophy for all people or in everyday context and then gradually as a
disciplined practice.
4. Philosophizing as the Discipline of Personhood
- philosophizing becomes an authentic discipline of questioning and of liberation
when it is discipline of personhood, i.e.:
- personal task
- at the root of one's being a person
- important in my growth as a person
i. Philosophizing as a Personal Task
1. Personal Affair of Asking-Question
- I must myself personally ask the depth-question
- The personal questions and their answers are of great value to me
- The questions have to do with my person, my identity
2. Personal Search for the answer, for the truth to these depth-questions
- I myself will look/find for the answers to these depth-questions

- I could not delegate this to other, nor just be a spectator to the searching-activity
- In my personal search, I must not be content:
- with sheer conjecture,
- with sentimentalism: feeling good and nice
- with philosophical warm blanket
- just with pursuing relevance
- utmost aim: pursuing truth:
- be it palatable or not
- be it a comfort or threat/discomfort
- my personal search for the answer involves:
a. exacting, careful, disciplined reflection of my own experience and thoughts
b. philosophical dialogue:
- I will be open to other philosophers' experiences and insights
- Study works of others
c. study also of other disciplines
- open to other things which might be vehicle for finding answers to my
depth-questions about myself: myth, history, literature, natural sciences,
behavioral sciences.
3. Seeing the answers to these questions or the truth myself
- in finding some answers to my depth-questions, I myself see, realize
- the truth of these answers
- that they are really true to me
- they really answer my personal depth-questions
ii. Philosophizing is at the root of one's being a person
- the human person is driven by his personhood to philosophize:
7
- to ask depth-questions
- to seek/find answers for them
- to see himself the truth of the answers he has found
- Why? because of the nature of his person as homo viator (man on the way)
- His present situation - the situation he finds himself at the moment:
- not yet complete, not yet finished-product
- not yet sufficient with himself
- contingent
- finite truth, happiness, justice (Pascal)
- yet not content, satisfied with what he is: restless, insatiable
- he is not happy, at rest, content with he is and has at the moment
- he desires, longs from something more than what he is and has at the
moment
- Quixotic man: dreaming the impossible
- Alexandrian man: crying because there is no more to conquer
- Augustinian man: ever restless until my heart rests in Thee.
- Pascalian man: great abyss within that cannot be filled by anything
finite.
- Dostoyevski's moral hero
- Thus, he asks more questions, he searches, demands for more answers about
himself, about his world.
iii. In philosophizing, one's personhood, one's growth as a person is at stake
- when I stop philosophizing (to ask depth-questions, to seek/find answers for
them and to see himself the truth of the answers he has found),
- I become determined, conditioned, encapsulized by my history, society, and
psychological make-up
- I refuse to be open to my own possibilities, and take responsibility of them and
myself as creative self-project
- Remain satisfied with the present and stagnate, arresting my growth as a person.
Conclusion/Summary:
- questioning, then, is the starting point and the continuing force of all philosophy
- questioning leads one to find answers, and finding the answers he himself must see the
truth of those answers
- but in finding answers to the depth-questions primarily about himself: his identity and
action, he will not reach a point of no return; rather leads him back to new questions, leading
to a new search, new answers, so on and so forth.
- In so doing, he is liberated from those which enslave, he becomes open he becomes open to his own
possibilities, and takes responsibility of himself as a creative self-project.
-------------------------------------We are then presented with William Luijpens Authenticity of philosophy.
As we can see this section deals with the following:
The authenticity of philosophy and the contradiction of or rather in(side) philosophy. Misleading or mistaken
reactions lead to , what Luijpens consider to be, inauthentic philosophy. Symptoms of inauthentic philosophy
are:

scient-ism, (as absolute, final, all-encompassing, revealing and dealing with the one and only true reality,
perfect methods, etc)
scepticism (rejection of all knowledge, truths, philosophies, etc) is also a philosophy (philosophical approach or
attitude);
and dogmatism (of the one, absolute philosophy or the final philosophical system and method, eg Marxism,
Critical Theory, Phenomenology, Kantiasm, Analytic philosophy, Deconstructionism, etc).
Luijpen then sets out the characteristics of authentic philosophy from page 9 onwards.
It isa personal affair
of asking questions
looking for answers
seeing the truth (and meaningfulness?) of some of the answers
and philosophy/izing is authentic when Philosophizing is authentic when it is one's own life that raises the philosophical questions
- man has to live his own life, determine his own action
- he is responsible for his own life and his actions
- he is only human, a person only when he himself lives his own life and
determines his own actions
- others could not live my life for me nor I could simply live the life of others
- I could not let others determine my life and actions, nor determine others' lives
and actions
- To live my own life, to determine my own action is to live according to my own
basic convictions about:
- Life/Realtiy
- Myself
- Values
- To come to my own basic convictions, I myself have to discover them:
- I myself ask the questions about them
- I myself seek the answers
- I myself have to see the truth of the answers
- Thus, I myself can discover my own basic convictions from within.
----------------------------------------------------------------------He then deals with existing philosophies and the relation of my own personal philosophy or authentic
philosophical living to them. Page 10
What is the role of constituted philosophies in the philosophizing as a personal
task/affair? This we will answer:
- First, by clarifying the nature of these constituted philosophies. This we will do
in this section.
- Then, by clarifying the proper relationship between my philosophizing as a
personal affair with these constituted philosophies. This we will do in the next
section.
i. Philosophy as Personal
Philosophy as Personal Expression of Particular Experience of Reality
Here he introduces a new notion , almost a standard of authentic philosophy/izing as
a SPEAKING WORD. Not merely a talking word, but a speaking word.
AND not all speaking word is philosophy/ical.
Then describes to us what a philosopher is *
(someone:
- who sees particular aspects of reality, in a particular depth
- who experiences reality in a particular way
- who is present to reality in a particular way
- to whom reality is present in a distinct way
- philosophy (philosophers ideas, theories, etc.) is an articulation, expression of
this particular way of experiencing the world/reality.)
He describes the correct philosophical training and his conclusion informs us the purpose and necessity of
studying already constituted (or already existing) philosophy/ies.
Conclusion:
- If constituted philosophy is a speaking word (i.e., an articulation/expression of a
particular experience of reality), then the study of the works of the different philosophers
leads us to:
- Experience the philosophers' particular experiences of reality
(APPROPRIATION)
- Experience new and deeper aspect of reality other than what they have

experienced (EXPANSION)
- And one does not simply accumulate knowledge but listens to reality no matter
where it speaks to him.

-----------------------------------------1. Philosophy as Speaking Word, not Talking Words

- talking:
- ideas are just set of ideas
- which we must relate with one another
- which we understand in themselves as ideas/ statements/words
- speaking:
- ideas are expressions of the philosopher's personal experience of reality
- experience:
- subject presence to reality: personal presence of who I am to reality, my
opening up to reality
- reality presence to the subject: presence of reality to the person;
unfolding, manifestation, unveiling of reality to the person.
- Ideas try to express, articulate what the person sees himself deeply in
reality, what he himself experiences, his particular insight of the wealth of
reality
2. Not All Speaking Word is Philosophy
- there are different ways of experiencing reality, i.e.
- of being present to reality
- of reality being present to me
- not all of these are philosophy, or philosophical experience. E.g.:
- Rose, a beautiful beach:
- Economist
- Lover
- Theologian
- Scientist
- Philosopher
- School
10
- Student
- Teacher
- Administrator
- Janitor
- *A philosopher is someone:
- who sees particular aspects of reality, in a particular depth
- who experiences reality in a particular way
- who is present to reality in a particular way
- to whom reality is present in a distinct way
- philosophy (philosophers ideas, theories, etc.) is an articulation, expression of
this particular way of experiencing the world/reality.
- E.g.: Plato's Philosophy: Theory of Forms
- As solidified thought it may sound abstract
- But it is really an expression of Plato's particular experience, insight of

3. The Authenticity of Philosophy (William Luijpen)

a. Introduction
i. The Innumerable Contradictions of Philosophy
- for 2,500 years, man has been philosophizing and the result is innumerable and
contradictory claims and systems of philosophy.
- much older than Modern Science, yet unable to formulate even a few theses
(statements) which are unanimously accepted by all philosophers as observed by the
philosophers themselves like the Sceptics, Rene Descartes, Hume, Kant
- not a single thesis is not denied by another philosopher in the past, present,
or/and future.
ii. Reactions Leading to Inauthentic Philosophy
1. Scientism: Rejecting Philosophy and Absolutizing Physical/Empirical Sciences
- Unlike philosophy, Physical/Empirical Sciences:
- Very successful discipline
- Better knowledge of the physical world
- Fruitful knowledge: leads to mastery/control of the physical world

- Greatly contributed in making life better

- Highly Verifiable/Intersubjective Knowledge
- Because of these characteristics of Physical Sciences, some are led to reject
philosophy and to absolutize Science (Scientism). How? By claiming/believing that:
1. Science alone is the only genuine and reliable source of knowledge, not
philosophy or any other means.
- what can be known and is known by Science constitutes alone as the
true knowledge
- knowledge, pure and simple, is the knowledge offered by Science
8
- here, Science, already claims and decrees, not about the physical world
but claims and decrees on Theory of Knowledge: the possibility, extent and
validity of knowledge
2. Science alone discloses reality such that whatever cannot be disclosed or are not
disclosed by Science is not real.
- here, reality is equated or reduced with the reality accessible to Science
- from its epistemological claim, Science is led to an ontological claim:
A Theory of Reality: The Structure and Constitution of Reality.
- Scientism (absolutizing Science) is not a science, not scientific
- It already claims about things beyond the competence/realm of physical
sciences
- It deals with or addresses some things beyond its tasks, namely: Theory
of Knowledge, Theory of Reality
- This is already the work of philosophy.
- Thus, in rejecting philosophy, it philosophizes although in a
contradictory way, an inauthentic philosophy
- Scientific yet unscientific
- Verifiable yet unverifiable
- Rejects philosophy but already takes a philosophical position on the
issues of Knowledge and Reality
2. Scepticism
- rejection of all claims of knowledge of reality, all claims as doubtful, not only
philosophical claims, but all claims
- this is itself is a philosophy, a philosophical position/view about knowledge and
reality
- yet a self-contradictory philosophy; thus, an inauthentic philosophy
- claim: all knowledge is doubtful
- yet this claim is also a form of knowledge
- therefore, this claim (that all knowledge is doubtful) is also doubtful
- this shows that the conclusion falsifies the first premise; thus the
argument contradicts itself.
- Any rejection of philosophy (Scientism, Scepticism and others) is itself a
philosophy though a bad one
- To ridicule philosophy, to laugh at philosophy is itself a philosophy
3. Dogmatism
- claims that of the different philosophical systems, one can be the philosophy, is
the philosophy
- thus, one looks for THE philosophy:
- in the past: turns to different philosophies or philosophers in the past
- in the present: turns to every new philosophy or system to whether at
last it present THE philosophy
- in the future: expects that THE philosophy will be formulated in the
future.
- This expectation, of course, meets with disappointments, frustrations, and
disillusions. Why?
- Because there was, is and will be never such thing as THE philosophy
2. Authentic Philosophy as a Personal Task
i. Philosophizing: not an attempt to learn a philosophical system
- few geniuses in history laid down their thoughts in grandiose masterpieces and
systems like Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Descartes, Kant, Whitehead
- to philosophize authentically is not simply to learn one of these philosophical
systems
- not just to talk about, study/learn with or without proof:
- the questions they asked
- the answers the found and proposed
- and these questions and answers are in the first place not my own personal
questions nor could their answers mean anything to me nor make a difference in my
life, nor make me more human, more of a person I am meant to be.
- In short, learning their truth, but not my truth.
ii. Philosophizing is authentic only when it is a personal affair
1. Personal Affair of Question-Asking
- I myself personally raise the depth questions

- I myself see the importance of these questions and their answers to me

- It is myself that I question
2. Personal Affair of Searching the Answer to these questions
9
- I myself look diligently for the answers, overcoming any obstacles, subjecting
myself to certain disciplines
3. Personal Affair of Seeing the Truth of the answers
- I myself see the truth of the answers I found.
- Only in this way can philosophizing be authentic philosophizing, i.e.:
- Philosophize in an original and personal way
- My own philosophy, not just any other philosophy
iii. Philosophizing is authentic when it one's own life that raises the philosophical questions
- man has to live his own life, determine his own action
- he is responsible for his own life and his actions
- he is only human, a person only when he himself lives his own life and
determines his own actions
- others could not live my life for me nor I could simply live the life of others
- I could not let others determine my life and actions, nor determine others' lives
and actions
- To live my own life, to determine my own action is to live according to my own
basic convictions about:
- Life/Reality
- Myself
- Values
- To come to my own basic convictions, I myself have to discover them:
- I myself ask the questions about them
- I myself seek the answers
- I myself have to see the truth of the answers
- Thus, I myself can discover my own basic convictions from within.
3. Authentic Philosophy as a Speaking Word
- though authentic philosophy is a deeply personal affair, there are already
concluded philosophies, i.e. thoughts laid down in a system by great genius of the past,
like Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas among others.
- What is the role of constituted philosophies in the philosophizing as a personal
task/affair? This we will answer:
- First, by clarifying the nature of these constituted philosophies. This we will do
in this section.
- Then, by clarifying the proper relationship between my philosophizing as a
personal affair with these constituted philosophies. This we will do in the next
section.
i. Philosophy as Personal Expression of Particular Experience of Reality
1. Philosophy as Speaking Word, not Talking Words
- talking:
- ideas are just set of ideas
- which we must relate with one another
- which we understand in themselves as ideas/ statements/words
- speaking:
- ideas are expressions of the philosopher's personal experience of reality
- experience:
- subject presence to reality: personal presence of who I am to reality, my
opening up to reality
- reality presence to the subject: presence of reality to the person;
unfolding, manifestation, unveiling of reality to the person.
- Ideas try to express, articulate what the person sees himself deeply in
reality, what he himself experiences, his particular insight of the wealth of
reality
2. Not All Speaking Word is Philosophy
- there are different ways of experiencing reality, i.e.
- of being present to reality
- of reality being present to me
- not all of these are philosophy, or philosophical experience. E.g.:
- Rose, a beautiful beach:
- Economist
- Lover
- Theologian
- Scientist
- Philosopher
- School
10
- Student
- Teacher

- Administrator
- Janitor
- A philosopher is someone:
- who sees particular aspects of reality, in a particular depth
- who experiences reality in a particular way
- who is present to reality in a particular way
- to whom reality is present in a distinct way
- philosophy (philosophers ideas, theories, etc.) is an articulation, expression of
this particular way of experiencing the world/reality.
- E.g.: Plato's Philosophy: Theory of Forms
- As solidified thought it may sound abstract
- But it is really an expression of Plato's particular experience, insight of
reality.
ii. End of Philosophical Formation and Training
- not just:
- drilling the aspirant into different philosophical theses or ideas
- memorizing the different philosophical theses and understanding them in
themselves
- but the ideas/theses/solidified thoughts are just means:
- to make us personally see/experience what the philosopher has seen, has
experienced of reality
- to make us enter into a whole new world we have never seen or even suspected
before
- analogy of index finger as a sign
4. Authentic Philosophy as a Common Task
i. Authentic Philosophy as both a personal task and a common task
- Philosophizing to be authentic should both:
- A personal task/affair
- A personal affair of asking questions, seeking answers, and seeing the
truth of the answers I have found.
- Philosophizing about my person, philosophizing arising from my own
personal situation
- A common task
- Demands the study of the works, thoughts of the philosophers
- Why?
- I am inserted in a history of thought, which is not purely personal,
which I have not made myself.
- I do not start from zero, from scratch in my own philosophizing for
other have thought before me.
- I am carried by their thought; I am in the stream of thought established
by tradition
- at least because of the language I speak
- and because of the ideas in this language which permeate me
- Thus, impossible for me to think without tradition
- Problem:
- How do I philosophize in such a way that we do not compromise either:
- The act of philosophizing as a personal task
- The act of philosophizing as a common task
ii. Constituted Philosophy makes us sensitive and gives us access to the wealth of reality
which they great philosophers have perceived and which otherwise we could not have
perceived.
- philosophers have long been dead and their own particular experiences of reality
have long passed.
- Yet these experiences found expression, are embodied, contained in their
philosophy which is a speaking word.
- Through their works, we have access to their unique experience of reality and
through them, their own experiences of reality could also be ours.
- Without their experiences, it would be difficult for us to come to those
experiences. E.g.:
- without Plato,
- our experience and conception of reality would be trivial and
materialistic
- the totality of being could not be experienced and understood in its
great variety and levels, at least when we reflect philosophically upon reality
11
- without Augustine, we would not have been sensitive and understood the
meaning of our restlessness of being-in-the-world.
- Without Marx, Darwin, Freud, we could not have been corrected of our
exaggerated spiritualism.
- Therefore, they make it possible for us to have personal experience of reality, to
make us sensitive to the superabundance/wealth contained in the totality of all that is.

iii. What the great philosophers saw/experienced remains fruitful and source of inspiration
- works of great philosophers are considered classical not only because they make
us see/experience what they saw/experience which otherwise we could have been blind
of.
- But at the same time they inspire us to see/experience over and beyond what
they saw
- They further inspire us to ask questions, further beyond, deeper than they have
asked
- To find/seek answers beyond what they found
- To see ourselves the truth of the answers beyond what they themselves saw.
- Yet as every philosopher was struck/awed by a particular aspect of reality, and
every system constructed by a great philosopher is an expression/articulation of some
aspect of reality, there is a danger:
- that a particular aspect of reality might be elevated by him to the rank of reality,
pure and simple, or THE REALITY
- that a particular experience of reality may be proclaimed as the only REALITY
and its articulation and systematization as the SYSTEM, THE PHILOSOPHY.
- When this happens, it becomes antiquated.
Conclusion:
- If constituted philosophy is a speaking word (i.e., an articulation/expression of a
particular experience of reality), then the study of the works of the different philosophers
leads us to:
- Experience the philosophers' particular experiences of reality
(APPROPRIATION)
- Experience new and deeper aspect of reality other than what they have
experienced (EXPANSION)
- And one does not simply accumulate knowledge but listens to reality no matter
where it speaks to him.

-------------------------------------------------------------From page 12 onwards we are informed that philosophy is intersubjective. in other it is note merely subjective,
invented and practised by a single, isolated individual but in terms of inter-subjective (socio-cultural) standards,
norms or rules of the philosophical discourse and socio-cultural practice.
According to him philosophical truths (insights? knowledge) are intersubjective because Philosophical Truth is intersubjective simply because any truth is intersubjective.
- In principle,
- Truth is not true to me alone but to true to all; otherwise is not true at all.
- Though in fact (de facto)
- A particular philosophical truth is not yet recognized by all
- Yet, it can be recognized by all as true, as valid.
--------------------Philosophical truths differ from scientific (also intersubjective) truth difference is not that scientific truth is intersubjective while philosophical truth
is not
- but that the intersubjectivity of scientific truth is easier to achieve than the
intersubjective examination of philosophical question and discovery.
- In principle, both are intersubjective.
He then concludes that philosophy is not useful in the world/reality of work, but it is useful and meaningful(?) in
the context of the reality/world of philosophy.
------------------------5. The Intersubjectivity of Philosophical Truth
i. Denial of Intersubjectivity of Philosophical Truth
- Subjective View of Philosophical Truth: Philosophical Truth has to be
subjective in order to be authentic. Why?
- Philosophy is a personal task/affair:
- Asking one's own depth-questions
- Seeking find by himself answers for them
- Seeing himself the truth of the answers
- As a personal task, it involves study of other philosophers in order to see the
truth they discovered as true to me, to be inspired to see myself more than what they
have seen.
- Subjectivistic View of Philosophical Truth
- Philosophical truth (that which I see, discover, know in my philosophical
enterprise, that which is unfolded before me in philosophical pursuit) is true/valid to
me alone but not true/valid for all.
- Philosophical Truth is per se not truth for all (not intersubjective)
- Intersubjective View of Scientific Truth
- Scientific truth is the only intersubjective truth, i.e. the only truth which could be
accepted/validated by all as true.

- Intersubjectivity as the exclusive characteristic of Science

ii. Subjectivistic View of Philosophy is Self-Contradictory View
- those who claim that philosophical truth is true to me alone but not true to all
contradict themselves; in other words, their claim contradicts/falsifies their claim
- How?
- For them to claim this subjectivistic view of philosophical truth, they presuppose
that this view as true is valid to all and not just to a particular person.
- To claim otherwise, they would not make sense at all as they would not make
any statement or any claim on this view. Why?
- For to make a claim of anything before anyone, I presuppose that no
one can rightly deny this truth. Thus, this implies that he can also see the truth of
what I claim.
12
- But they claim that no philosophical truth is true to all
- Thus, they contradict themselves.
iii. Difference between Philosophical Truth and Scientific Truth
- difference is not that scientific truth is intersubjective while philosophical truth
is not
- but that the intersubjectivity of scientific truth is easier to achieve than the
intersubjective examination of philosophical question and discovery.
- In principle, both are intersubjective.
iv. Philosophical Truth is intersubjective simply because any truth is intersubjective.
- In principle,
- Truth is not true to me alone but to true to all; otherwise is not true at all.
- Though in fact (de facto)
- A particular philosophical truth is not yet recognized by all
- Yet, it can be recognized by all as true, as valid.
6. The Usefulness of Philosophy
1. Philosophy is not useful in the "World of Work"
- "World of Work":
- technocratic world, functional world
- control/manipulation of nature to serve/meet one's particular needs
- dealing with practical living
- life on the horizontal dimension
- Science is very useful in this kind world
- E.g. Physics, Biology, Chemistry, Economic, Psychology
- But philosophy is not useful, and even wholly useless in this kind world, the
world of work
- Thus, when a person concerns himself with the practical living and as society
tends to become a technocratic organization of work, philosophy is seen as useless
- Ironically, it is to this person, and to this society that philosophy becomes not
only useful but even necessary.
2. Philosophy is useful in the "World of Philosophy"
- unless one enters into a particular presence to reality (world) achieved by
philosophers, unless one enters into the level, dimension, realm, aspect of reality which
the philosophers have entered, one cannot be convinced of the usefulness of philosophy.
- Thus, the usefulness of philosophy can only be appreciated by those who have
left behind or go beyond or deeper than the world of work, and have experienced,
perceived or entered into this realm, dimension of reality - world of philosophy
- For those who have already entered, they do not need to be convinced of the
usefulness of philosophy for the value of philosophy clearly reveals itself.
- For those who have not yet entered into the world of philosophy, they can at
least accept the usefulness of philosophy in good faith, and start philosophizing.
--------------------------I find many of his ideas very attractive because I have since my youth identified written about then when I
found their relevance for philosophy and their meaningfulness, for example intersubjectivity, authentic
philosophy/izing and philosophers and those who live for philosophy (and not merely living off it as academic
philosophers). Original, creative thinking philosophers versus academic, derivative philosophers, comparable
to academic art and the art by original-, creative-thinking artists.
However, much of what he suggests are not hard philosophy(ical facts), but the idealization of and hope for
what philosophy might be like - almost in the vein of Plato. These are often mere speculations when he makes
statements or speculates and do not provide us with arguments and reasons for these statements he makes.
---------------------------Q
I include this article by C D Broad from 1947 among methods of philosophy as I find it interesting for several
reasons.
He was professor of philosophy at a number of universities, mostly in the UK .

(Broad was openly homosexual at

a time when homosexual acts were illegal. In March 1958, Broad along with fellow philosophers A.J. Ayer and
Bertrand Russell, writer J.B. Priestley, and 27 others, sent a letter to The Times which urged the acceptance of
the Wolfenden Report's recommendation that homosexual acts should 'no longer be a criminal offence'.). He was
also President of the Society for Psychical Research in 1935 and 1958. Broad argued that if research showed
that psychic events occur, this would challenge philosophical theories of "basic limiting principles" in at least
five ways:
1.

Backward causation, the future affecting the past, is rejected by many philosophers, but would be
shown to occur if, for example, people could predict the future.

2.

One common argument against dualism, that is the belief that minds are non-physical, and bodies
physical, is that physical and non-physical things cannot interact. However, this would be shown to be
possible if people can move physical objects by thought (telekinesis).

3.

Similarly, philosophers tend to be skeptical about claims that non-physical 'stuff' could interact with
anything. This would also be challenged if minds are shown to be able to communicate with each other,
as would be the case if mind-reading is possible.

4.

Philosophers generally accept that we can only learn about the world through reason and perception.
This belief would be challenged if people were able to psychically perceive events in other places.

5.

Physicalist philosophers believe that there cannot be persons without bodies. If ghosts were shown to
exist, this view would be challenged.

6.

Broad argued for "non-occurrent causation" as "literally determined by the agent or self." The agent
could be considered as a substance or continuant, and not by a total cause which contains as factors
events in and dispositions of the agent. Thus our efforts would be completely determined, but their
causes would not be prior events.

7.

New series of events would then originate which he called "continuants." These are essentially causa
sui.

8.

Peter van Inwagen says that Broad formulated an excellent version of what van Inwagen has called the
"Consequence Argument" in defense of incompatibilism.

Broad's early interests were in science and mathematics. Despite being successful in these he came to believe
that he would never be a first-rate scientist, and turned to philosophy. Broad's interests were exceptionally wideranging. He devoted his philosophical acuity to the mind-body problem, the nature of perception, memory,
introspection, and the unconscious, to the nature of space, time and causation. He also wrote extensively on the
philosophy of probability and induction, ethics, the history of philosophy and the philosophy of religion. The
ample scope and scale of Broad's work is impressive In addition he nourished an interest in parapsychologya
subject he approached with the disinterested curiosity and scrupulous care that is characteristic of his
philosophical work.
Broad did not have a philosophyif by that phrase is meant highly original philosophical theories, and a
highly original way of approaching philosophical problems. He writes: I have nothing worth calling a system
of philosophy of my own, and there is no philosopher of whom I should be willing to reckon myself a faithful
follower (1924, p. 77 Critical and Speculative Philosophy, in Contemporary British Philosophy (First Series),
ed. by J.H. Muirhead, London: Allen and Unwin).
It is one thing to delineate the contours of the notion of emergence, another to argue that emergent phenomena
actually exist. A wide variety of phenomena have been held to be emergent. Apart from consciousness, various
chemical and biological phenomena have been held to be emergent. Broad is not willing to rule out a
physicalistic reduction of chemistry and biology to physics: chemical and biological phenomena might, he
believes, very well be reducible to complex microphysical processes. In his opinion, however, consciousness is
a different matter. We will turn to consciousness in a moment. When it comes to biology and chemistry he
declares that he does not see any a priori impossibility in a mechanistic biology or chemistry (1925, p. 72).
He stresses that it is in practice enormously difficult to know whether, say, a certain biological feature such as
nutrition is emergent or not. It is evident from what Broad says that he recognises that the Emergentist stance
has its dangers in that it tends to encourage acceptance of laws and properties as ultimate and irreducible. There

is a danger in this because, as he notes, reductive explanations have proved remarkably successful in the past,
and there is the possibility that what we take to be an emergent phenomenon is in fact reducible.
In the last chapter of his book Broad presents a taxonomy of no less than seventeen different theories which are
possible theoretically on the relation between Mind and Matter (1925, p. 607). By a process of elimination
Broad arrives at a more wieldy number of theories. Two of the remaining rivalling theories are Physicalismin
Broad's terminology, Mechanismand Emergentism. Let us now take a closer look at his case for
Emergentism.
Broad adduces a version of what has come to be known as The Knowledge Argument in favour of an
Emergentist position with respect to the place of consciousness in nature. He asks us to assume that there is a
mathematical archangel.

Metaphilosophy
Broad distinguishes two chief aspects of philosophical thinking. He labels these critical philosophy and
speculative philosophy. Critical philosophy has two chief tasks, one of which is to analyse certain very
general concepts such as number, thing, quality, change, cause, etc. (1924, p. 82). We make use of these and a
whole host of other concepts in science and ordinary life. Although we are typically able to apply them fairly
consistently, we are not able to analyse them. Nor are we able to state their precise relations to each other. One
task of critical philosophy is to provide analyses of such concepts. It becomes evident that this is an
important task as soon as it is realized that when we seek to apply these concepts to odd or exceptional cases we
are often uncertain whether they are applicable. For example, it might be unclear whether a certain individual
with a multiple personality disorder is a person or not.Such difficulties arise because we are not clear as to
what we mean by being a person (1924, p. 83). There is, therefore, a need for an intellectual discipline that
seeks to analyse and define this and many other concepts.
In science and in daily life we do not merely use unanalysed concepts. We also assume uncritically a number of
very fundamental propositions. In all our arguments we assume the truth of certain principles of reasoning.
Again, we always assume that every change has a cause. And in induction we certainly assume somethingit is
hard to say whatabout the fundamental make-up of the existent world (1924, p. 84).
The second task of critical philosophy is to examine these and other fundamental assumptions; it is to
take these propositions which we uncritically assume in science and daily life and to subject them to criticism
(ibid.).
In order to analyse a proposition we must seek to attain a clearer grasp of the concepts featured in the
proposition. Thus the analysis and criticism of a proposition depends on the analysis of concepts. And vice
versa: by reflecting on the propositions in which a certain concept occurs we clear up the meaning of it.
Now, critical philosophy is one part or aspect of philosophical thinking. But critical philosophy does not
include all that is understood by philosophy. It is certainly held to be the function of a philosopher to discuss
the nature of Reality as a whole, and to consider the position and prospects of men in it (1924, p. 96).
This aspect of philosophical thinking is speculative philosophy.
Speculative philosophy seeks to work out a view of reality as a whole by taking into account the whole range of
human experiencescientific, social, ethical, sthetic, and religious: Its business is to take over all aspects of
human experience, to reflect upon them, and to try to think out a view of Reality as a whole which shall do
justice to all of them (1924, p. 96).
Broad's idea is that the various aspects of human experience and (putative) facts linked to these provide a point
of departure for philosophical reflectionan exceedingly important sort of reflection aiming at a reasoned view
of Reality as a whole.

As can be gathered from the above, philosophical thinking features, according to Broad, a
distinctive type of birds-eye view. He calls it synopsis. Let us take a somewhat closer look at
this. The plain man as well as the professional scientist or scholar

I understand by synopsis the necessary preliminary towards trying to satisfy this desire, viz.
the deliberate viewing together of aspects of human experience which are generally viewed
apart, and the endeavour to see how they are inter-related. (1947a, p. 4)
On reflection it is clear that the synoptic stance is necessary for the discovery of various
inadequacies in our picture of reality, inadequacies resulting from a far too insular perspective
on reality. The synoptic stance will, in effect, lead to the discovery of latent philosophical
problems: It is synopsis, revealing prima facie incoherence, which is the main motive to
philosophical activity (1958, p. 121; cf. 1947a, p. 16). And it is clearly only after we have
discovered and successfully addressed these problems that we may lay claim to a satisfactory
picture of reality as a whole.
Broad gives several examples of how synopsis is featured in philosophical thinking. One of
these is taken from the free will problem. he main facts germane to the problem are these: (i)
When we consider a situation in which we did a certain action, we are quite convinced that
we could have done otherwise: we could have performed an alternative action. On reflection
it seems clear that could is used in some sense that is not analysable in terms of would
have, if. (ii) Our moral judgments seem to presuppose that a person who in fact willed to do
a certain action could have willed otherwise. (iii) Given the past, the actual situation and the
laws of nature it seems impossible that anything other should have happened than what in
fact did happen. If so, how can our volitions be other than completely determined? (iv) It is
difficult, then, to reconcile the notions of moral responsibility with the view that our volitions
are completely determined.
The problem of free will is discovered when we look at (i) and (ii) in the light of (iii) In other
words, the very problem is discerned only because we have envisaged these facts together,
i.e. because we have taken a synoptic view of the facts.
Above are a few of the reasons why I find Broad, his work, ideas and suggestions of interest.
It is against the above background as context that the article below should be res.
I find Broads notions and depictions of method of (analytic and) speculative philosophy both
very general, but also in another sense very limited. Those are obviously not the only reasons
for philosophy or the only methods employed by philosophers. In spite of this I find his view
of methods of philosophy of interest.
SOME METHODS OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY
By Professor C. D. Broad.
Published in Aristotelian Society Supplement 21 (1947): 1-32.
Examples of Synopsis
-it might be said, there is no single non-disjunctive characteristic, and no conjunction of such characteristics, common and peculiar to what
Hume was doing and what Hegel was doing. To philosophize, on this view, is to perform one or another or a mixture of at least two
fundamentally different kinds of activity, one of which is exemplified by Hume's attempt to analyze causal propositions and the other by
Hegel's attempt to establish the formal structure of the universe by dialectical reasoning.
I think it is quite clear that the word "philosophy" has always been used to cover the kind of thing that Hegel did and that McTaggart did in
addition to the kind of thing which Hume did and which Moore does, whether or not these be two radically disparate kinds of activity.
Anyone who proposes that the name "philosophy" shall be confined to the latter kind of activity is proposing that it shall henceforth be used
in a new and much narrower sense, and he should be expected to give reasons for this linguistic innovation. He might, e.g., give as his
reason that philosophizing, in the sense of doing the kind of thing that Hume did, is a practicable and useful activity; whilst philosophizing,
in the sense of doing the kind of thing which Hegel did, is not only impracticable and therefore useless, but is also a deceptive activity, based
on certain fundamental illusions which have now been detected and explained but are still dangerously insidious.
This brings me to my main point. I am inclined to think that there are two features which are together characteristic of all work that would
generally be regarded as philosophical, and a third which is often present in a high degree but may be evanescent. The two which I think are
always present may be called "analysis" and "synopsis"; the one which may be present in a vanishingly small degree can be called
"synthesis." Analysis and synopsis themselves may he present in very different degrees and proportions. Hume's work, e.g., is so
predominantly analytic that it might be denied to be synoptic, and Hegel's is so predominantly synoptic that it might be denied to be

analytic. But I believe that both are always present, and that each involves some degree of the other. Lastly, there is a very high positive
correlation between synopsis and synthesis. Synthesis presupposes synopsis, and extensive synopsis is generally made by persons whose
main interest is in synthesis.
. Let it suffice to say crudely that it (analysis) consists in clearing up the meanings of all the fundamental kinds of sentence which we
habitually use, e.g., causal sentences, material-thing sentences, sentences with the word "I" as grammatical subject, sentences with temporal
copulas, ethical sentences, religious sentences, and so on.
Synopsis and synthesis are specially characteristic of what may be called "speculative philosophy," and that is why the latter phrase
occurs in the title of my paper. I will begin with the notion of synopsis.
Examples of Synopsis.
(1) As our first example we will take the problem of sense-perception. Why is there a problem?
(i) In the first place, because, if we attend carefully, we note such facts as these.
Two observers, who are said to be seeing the same part of the same thing at the same time, are often not being presented with precisely
similar visual appearances of that object.
One and the same observer, who is said to be seeing the same unchanged part of the same thing at different times and from different
positions, is often not presented with precisely similar visual appearances of that object on both occasions.
(ii) Secondly, because there are visual experiences which are abnormal in various ways and degrees, but are similar to and continuous with
those which are normal. They range, e.g., from mirror-images and straight sticks that look bent when half immersed in water,
(iii) Thirdly, because of facts which are still quite unknown except to a minority of grown-up educated persons, and which must have been
completely hidden from everyone at the time when the language in which we express our sense-experiences was first formed and for
thousands of years afterwards. One of these is the physical fact that light takes time to travel; and that the visual appearance which a remote
object presents at any time to an observer depends, not on the shape, size, position, etc., of the object at that moment, but on what they were
at the moment when the light now striking the observer's eye left the object. Another of them is the physiological fact that visual
appearances vary with certain changes in the observers eye, optic nerve, and brain
There is a problem of sense-perception, in the philosophical sense, for those and only those who try to envisage all these fact together and
to interpret sense-perception and its implications in relation to all of them. Since it is plain that they are all relevant to it, it is desirable that
someone should take this synoptic view. Since the language in which we express our visual sense-perceptions was formed unwittingly in
prehistoric times to deal in a practical way with a kind of normalized extract from our visual experiences, and in complete ignorance of a
whole department of relevant physical, physiological, and psychological facts, it would be a miracle if it were theoretically adequate and if it
were not positively misleading in some of its implications.
(i) It is plain to common sense that many of a person's sensations and feelings follow immediately upon and vary concomitantly with
certain events in his eyes, ears, joints, etc. On the other hand, many experiences, e.g., processes of day-dreaming, deliberating, reasoning,
etc., do not seem prima facie to be covariant with events in the body.
(ii) The sciences of physiology and anatomy make it almost certain that the immediate bodily antecedents and correlates of sensations and
feelings are not events in one's eyes, ears, joints, etc., but are slightly later imperceptible chemical or electrical changes in certain parts of
one's brain.
(iii) It is further alleged, on the authority of these sciences, that there are immediate bodily antecedents and correlates of the same general
nature, viz., chemical or electrical events in certain parts of the brain, even to those mental processes, such as deliberating, comparing,
abstracting, reasoning, etc., which do not seem prima facie to be covariant with bodily events.
(iv) The physical sciences have developed a concept of causation in terms of regular sequence and concomitant variation, in which the
notions of agent and instrument, activity and passivity, etc., play little if any explicit part.
Now these various mutually relevant facts are hardly ever viewed synoptically except by philosophers. Common sense is quite ignorant of
many of them and common language had grown up and crystallized ages before they were known or suspected. On the other hand, scientists
who are familiar with all of them tend to concentrate on one at a time and temporarily to ignore the rest. When they confine their attention to
the physical and physiological and anatomical facts they are inclined to take the view that men are "conscious automata," i.e., that all our
mental states, including processes of reasoning, willing, etc., are mere by-products of states of brain which are determined by purely
physical and physiological antecedents. But their daily lives and all their professional activities presuppose a view which is shared by plain
men and which seems prima facie to be incompatible with the conscious automaton theory.
Scientists all assume in practice that when they design and carry out an experiment, they are initiating certain changes in the material world
which would never have taken place unless they had been thought out beforehand, desired, and deliberately led up to. They assume that their
assent to or dissent from the various alternative interpretations which might be put on the results of an experiment is determined by
processes of reasoning, demonstrative or probable, in which belief is given or withheld in accordance with evidence, which may be
favourable or unfavourable, weak or strong or coercive. Now all this involves concepts, and seems prima facie to involve modes of
causation, completely different from those in terms of which the conscious automaton theory is formulated.
To sum this up briefly. The scientist who investigates and theorizes about man and his powers and activities is himself a man exercizing
certain characteristically human powers and activities. But the account which he is apt to give of man, when he treats him as an object of
scientific investigation, seems prima facie difficult to reconcile with the occurrence and the validity of his own most characteristic activities
as investigator, experimenter, theorist, and reasoner. The need for synopsis by someone who is aware of all the main facts and can hold them
steadily together in one view is here particularly obvious.
(3) As a third example of synopsis I will take what may roughly be called the "free-will" problem. The main facts are these.
Here again the need for synopsis is evident. It seems prima facie that each of us conducts one part of his life on the assumption of
complete determinism and another part on the assumption of incomplete determinism plus something else more positive which it is very
hard to formulate clearly. And these two parts are not sharply separated; they overlap and interpenetrate each other. Most of us generally
manage to ignore one aspect at a time and concentrate on the other; but, however convenient this may be in practice,

Problem of sense-perception
Mind-body problem
Free-will problem
Paranormal phenomena

Synopsis and Analysis

I think that there is a very close connexion between synopsis and the process of analysis which everyone admits to be a characteristically
philosophical activity. It is generally synopsis which gives the stimulus to analysis. As I have shown in my examples, it often happens that
each of several regions of fact, which we generally contemplate or react to separately, gives rise to its own set of concepts and principles;
that each such set seems satisfactory and internally coherent; but that, when we contemplate these various departments together, we find that
the corresponding sets of concepts and principles seem to conflict with each other. The intellectual discomfort thus produced in a person of
philosophical disposition is perhaps the most usual motive for trying to analyze those concepts and to formulate those principles clearly.
Such a process is an indispensable step towards deciding whether the inconsistency is real or only apparent and towards formulating it
precisely if it is real ; and this is a precondition of any efficient attempt to resolve it.
Synopsis and Synthesis
Synopsis is not an end in itself. It not only provides the stimulus for analysis, but it also furnishes the basis for something else, which may
be called "Synthesis." The purpose of synthesis is to supply a set of concepts and principles which shall cover satisfactorily all the various
regions of fact which are being viewed synoptically.
The apparent conflict between the concepts and principles characteristic of different regions of fact must be shown to arise from the valid
application of these common concepts and principles in different contexts and under different special limitations.
Some further Remarks on Synopsis and Synthesis
Intellectual activities which are genuinely philosophical, in that they involve deep analysis, wide synopsis, and illuminating synthesis, occur
from time to time within some special science. This is particularly obvious when the science is concerned, as physics is, with very
fundamental and pervasive features of reality. I could certainly count as philosophical the work done by Galileo on the analysis of kinematic
and dynamical phenomena, and the correlated work of synthesis in which the formulation of the three laws of motion and the law of
gravitation by Newton is an outstanding phase and the unification of these laws by Lagrange, Hamilton, and finally Einstein is a further
development.
Again, the situations which led respectively to the formulation of the Principle of Relativity and the Uncertainty Principle are typical of what
I have exemplified under the head of synopsis, and the principles themselves are typical of what I have described as synthesis. In the case of
relativity there were many different kinds of possible experiments which, in accordance with well-tried and generally accepted principles,
might have been expected to provide perceptible evidence for the motion of a body relative to the surrounding ether. The results of all these
experiments were completely negative
The Principle of Relativity and the Uncertainty Principle are clear instances of synthesis, based on synopsis, and preceded and made
possible by a more profound analysis of generally accepted concepts and principles.
The results of such synthesis in physics have the advantage that either they themselves can be stated mathematically or that they impose
certain conditions on the form of equations which express possible physical laws. Hence their consequences can be rigidly deduced. This is
seldom, if ever, true of syntheses which cover several widely different fields of fact, e.g., man considered as reasoner, experimenter, and
morally responsible agent, and man considered as an object of physiological and psychological experiment
In the Second Book of his Ethics Spinoza tries to formulate a theory of bodies consistent with his general principle that there are no finite
continuants, that the only genuine continuant is God, and that God is a substance which is at once material and mental
Synopsis and synthesis both take place at various levels. I have just given examples of them within a single region of fact, viz., that of
physics. At a higher level one would try to get a synoptic view, e.g., of the phenomena of organic and inorganic material things and
processes, and try to synthesize them into a single coherent scheme. At a still higher level one would take into one's view the facts of mental
life at the animal level, and then at the level of rational cognition, deliberate action, specifically moral emotion and motivation, and so on.
Finally, if no account had so far been taken of paranormal phenomena, these would have to be brought into the picture, and an attempt made
to synthesize them with the normal facts. As each new department was considered it would be necessary to review the syntheses which had
seemed fairly satisfactory at the previous level. Some of them might not need to be rejected or even seriously modified, but others might
have to be completely abandoned or considerably altered when a new department of fa or analyticcts was brought into the picture.
How are Principles of Synthesis Discovered?
I am sure that it is impossible to give rules for the discovery of principles of synthesis in philosophy
just as it is impossible to give rules for suggesting fruitful hypotheses and colligating a mass of observations in science
Now the speculative philosopher naturally wants to unify and synthesize such a hierarchy, and he is often tempted to do it in one or other of
two opposite ways. These might be called respectively Reduction and Sublimation. The reductive type of unification tries to show that the
features which are characteristic of the higher levels are analyzable without remainder into those which belong to the lower levels. Just the
same laws hold throughout, but we have different and more special collocations of the same elements at the higher levels; and the
occurrence of those special collocations is itself explicable from the laws and collocations characteristic of the lowest level. The sublimative
type of unification tries to show that the features which seem to be peculiar to the higher levels are really present in a latent or a specially
simplified or a degenerate form at the lower levels. It may even try to show that features which seem to be typical of the lowest levels are
partially misleading appearances of features which are typical of the highest levels. Materialism, in its non-emergent forms, and Leibniz's
form of mentalism, are extreme cases respectively of the reductive and the sublimative types of unification.
How are Proposed Principles of Synthesis Recommended?
How does a philosopher persuade himself and try to persuade others to accept the kind of synthesis which he proposes?
In former times the method was often, ostensibly at any rate, deductive. Certain very general premises were accepted by a philosopher as
self-evident synthetic propositions. He either assumed that other persons would find them self-evident at once, or, if not, he tried to remove
confusions and misunderstandings and to place his readers in a position in which they could contemplate these premises for themselves. He
hoped and expected that they too would find them self-evident.
In recent times speculative philosophers have more and more tended to abandon this method.
Certain very general premises were accepted by a philosopher as self-evident synthetic propositions. He either assumed that other persons
would find them self-evident at once, or, if not, he tried to remove confusions and misunderstandings and to place his readers in a position in
which they could contemplate these premises for themselves. He hoped and expected that they too would find them self-evident.
In recent times speculative philosophers have more and more tended to abandon this method.
-----------------------------------

I offer as a conclusion to the different notions expressed concerning the method/s and the methodology of
philosophy the following suggestions.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_methodology
I make comments in this statement of philosophy and its methods/methodologies.
Philosophical method (or philosophical methodology) is the (intersubjective, socio-cultural practice ,
discipline or discourse employing and based on agreements or norms accepted by and institutionalized in the
particular schools of or moments in philosophy of the philosophical discourse, if not accepted by the entire
discourse, that is all the schools and movements that constitute it) study of how to do philosophy. A common
view among philosophers is that philosophy is distinguished by the ways that philosophers follow in addressing
philosophical questions. There is not just one method that philosophers use to answer philosophical questions.
Systematic philosophy is a generic term that applies to philosophical methods and approaches that attempt to
provide a framework in reason that can explain all questions and problems related to human life.(is it not ALL
life or rather existence? Ontology and metaphysics) Examples of systematic philosophers include Plato,
Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, and Hegel. In many ways, any attempts to formulate a philosophical method that
provides the ultimate constituents of reality, a metaphysics, can be considered systematic philosophy. In modern
philosophy the reaction to systematic philosophy began with Kierkegaard and continued in various forms
through analytic philosophy, existentialism, hermeneutics, and deconstructionism.
Some common features of the methods that philosophers follow (and discuss when discussing philosophical
method) include:

Methodic doubt - a systematic process of being skeptical about (or doubting) the truth of one's beliefs.
(and all underlying assumptions and implicit pre-suppositions or transcendentals as in the case of
Kant).

Argument - provide an argument or several arguments supporting the solution.(by means of coherent,
logical reasoning and sound arguments0

Dialectic - present the solution and arguments for criticism by other philosophers, and help them judge
their own.

Doubt and the sense of wonder

Plato said that "philosophy begins in wonder", a view which is echoed by Aristotle: "It was their wonder,
astonishment, that first led men to philosophize and still leads them." Philosophizing may begin with some
simple doubts about accepted beliefs. The initial impulse to philosophize may arise from suspicion, for
example that we do not fully understand, and have not fully justified, even our most basic beliefs about the
world. (doubt as a way, a method to question and problematize things)

Formulate questions and problems

Another element of philosophical method is to formulate questions to be answered or problems to be solved.
The working assumption is that the more clearly the question or problem (the process of problematization) is
stated, the easier it is to identify critical issues.
A relatively small number of major philosophers prefer not to be quick, but to spend more time trying to get
extremely clear on what the problem is all about.

Enunciate a solution
Another approach is to(1) enunciate a theory , or (2) to offer a definition or analysis, which constitutes an
attempt to solve a philosophical problem. Sometimes a philosophical theory by itself can be stated quite briefly.
All the supporting philosophical text is offered by way of hedging, (Broad illustrates how this works in detail,
attempts to provide solutions from particular cases, generalize mistakenly to all cases, false hypotheses and
proposals) explanation, and argument. (see Broad who from his scientific background, has a number of things to
say about developing and using theories in science and reductionism, sublimation and deductionism in
philosophy. How are Principles of Synthesis Discovered? gives details of how philosophers do

this. remarks on the general procedure of speculative philosophers.What often happens is

this. A philosopher is strongly impressed by some feature which is highly characteristic of a
certain important region of fact, and which within that region is felt to be completely
intelligible and a source of satisfactory explanations..Finally, he tries to show that this
principle is, in fact, operative in those regions in which it seemed at first sight not to be so. In
this way, he feels that he has discovered order and unity pervading the collection of various
regions of fact which he is surveying synoptically. Now the speculative philosopher
naturally wants to unify and synthesize such a hierarchy, and he is often tempted to do it in
one or other of two opposite ways. These might be called respectively Reduction and
Sublimation. The reductive type of unification tries to show that the features which are
characteristic of the higher levels are analyzable without remainder into those which belong
to the lower levels. Just the same laws hold throughout, but we have different and more
special collocations of the same elements at the higher levels; and the occurrence of those
special collocations is itself explicable from the laws and collocations characteristic of the
lowest level. The sublimative type of unification tries to show that the features which seem to
be peculiar to the higher levels are really present in a latent or a specially simplified or a
degenerate form at the lower levels. It may even try to show that features which seem to be
typical of the lowest levels are partially misleading appearances of features which are typical
of the highest levels.)
Not all proposed solutions to philosophical problems consist of definitions or generalizations. Sometimes what
is called for is a certain sort of explanation not a causal explanation, but an explanation for example of how
two different views, which seem to be contrary to one another, can be held at the same time, consistently. One
can call this a philosophical explanation. (See the above comments and philosophical explanation of how
this is done by Broad. Broad himself uses this technique in the whole of his article).

Justify the solution

A argument is a set of statements, one of which (the conclusion), it is said or implied, follows from the others
(the premises). One might think of arguments as bundles of reasons often not just a list, but logically
interconnected statements followed by the claim they are reasons for. The reasons are the premises, the claim
they support is the conclusion; together they make an argument. (See Formal methods in Philosophy by
Schoubye for details on the formal aspects of arguments and reasoning, very detailed and complex). (also see
Thouless: Straight and Crooked thinking for correct arguments and different fallacies. Available as free PDF
download here: http://neglectedbooks.com/Straight_and_Crooked_Thinking.pdf Straight and Crooked

Thinking, first published in 1930 and revised in 1953, is a book by Robert H. Thouless which
describes, assesses and critically analyses flaws in reasoning and argument.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Straight_and_Crooked_Thinking Synopsis of Thirty-eight fallacies
discussed in the book. (Brtoad selects a few of these that according to him are frequently ,
illegally not validly, employed by philosophers. He uses his own terms to refer to them).
Among them are:

No. 3. proof by example, biased sample, cherry picking

No. 6. ignoratio elenchi: "red herring"

No. 9. false compromise/middle ground

No. 12. argument in a circle

No. 13. begging the question

No. 17. equivocation

No. 18. false dilemma: black and white thinking

No. 19. continuum fallacy (fallacy of the beard)

No. 21. ad nauseam: "argumentum ad nauseam" or "argument from repetition" or

"argumentum ad infinitum"

No. 25. style over substance fallacy

No. 28. appeal to authority

No. 31. thought-terminating clich

No. 36. special pleading

No. 37. appeal to consequences

No. 38. appeal to motive

See also

Thinking portal

List of cognitive biases

List of common misconceptions

List of fallacies

List of memory biases

List of topics related to public relations and propaganda )

Philosophical arguments and justifications are another important part of philosophical method. It is rare
to find a philosopher, particularly in the Western philosophical tradition, who lacks many arguments.
Philosophers are, or at least are expected to be, very good at giving arguments. They constantly demand and
offer arguments for different claims they make. ( To make and argument is to provide a bundle of reasons
that are logicalyl interconnected or coherent so as to be able to arrive at and make a or draw a certain
conclusion. Thestatements are followed by a claim for something to be the case or not. The argument/s support
the claim, the conclusion that is arrived at or made). (As we shall see in the quotes below a good argument is
clear, well organized and a sound statement of a number of interconnected or coherent reasons for why one is
able and it is legitimate to say something or to make a certain claim or draw a certain conclusion.)
This therefore indicates that philosophy is a quest for arguments. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument n

philosophy and logic, an argument is a series of statements typically used to persuade

someone of something or to present reasons for accepting a conclusion.[1][2] The general form
of an argument in a natural language is that of premises (typically in the form of propositions,
statements or sentences) in support of a claim: the conclusion.[3][4][5] The structure of some
arguments can also be set out in a formal language, and formally defined "arguments" can be
made independently of natural language arguments, as in math, logic, and computer science.
In a typical deductive argument, the premises guarantee the truth of the conclusion, while in
an inductive argument, they are thought to provide reasons supporting the conclusion's

probable truth.[6] The standards for evaluating non-deductive arguments may rest on different
or additional criteria than truth, for example, the persuasiveness of so-called "indispensability
claims" in transcendental arguments,[7] the quality of hypotheses in retroduction, or even the
disclosure of new possibilities for thinking and acting.[8]
The standards and criteria used in evaluating arguments and their forms of reasoning are
studied in logic.[9] Ways of formulating arguments effectively are studied in rhetoric (see also:
argumentation theory). An argument in a formal language shows the logical form of the
symbolically represented or natural language arguments obtained by its interpretations.)
Argument at PhilPapers
Argument at the Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project
"Argument". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.http://www.iep.utm.edu/argument/ The
focus of this article is on understanding an argument as a collection of truth-bearers (that is,
the things that bear truth and falsity, or are true and false) some of which are offered as
reasons for one of them, the conclusion. This article takes propositions rather than sentences
or statements or utterances to be the primary truth bearers. The reasons offered within the
argument are called premises, and the proposition that the premises are offered for is called
the conclusion.
1. The Structural Approach to Characterizing Arguments
2. The Pragmatic Approach to Characterizing Arguments
3. Deductive, Inductive, and Conductive Arguments
4. Conclusion
5. References and Further Reading )

A good argument a clear, organized, and sound statement of reasons may ultimately cure the original
doubts that motivated us to take up philosophy. If one is willing to be satisfied without any good supporting
reasons, then a Western philosophical approach may not be what one actually requires.(
https://www3.nd.edu/~jspeaks/courses/2008-9/10100-spring/_LECTURES/2%20-%20arguments.pdf
http://philosophy.hku.hk/think/arg/goodarg.php Argument analysis

A01. What is an argument?

A02. The standard format

A03. Validity

A04. Soundness

A05. Valid patterns

A06. Validity and relevance

A07. Hidden Assumptions

A08. Inductive Reasoning

A09. Good Arguments

A10. Argument mapping

A11. Analogical Arguments

A12. More valid patterns

A13. Arguing with other people

https://www.futurelearn.com/courses/logical-and-critical-thinking/0/steps/9153

https://www.futurelearn.com/courses/logical-and-critical-thinking/0/steps/9152

So far we have talked about the kind of support that can be given for conclusions: deductive
and non-deductive. But we havent said anything yet about whether the premises are true or
not. This is what we do when we evaluate whether arguments are sound or cogent.
Validity and strength of arguments do not on their own tell us whether arguments are good or
bad. Weve actually seen rubbish arguments that were valid. Thats why we need to introduce
two further concepts for arguments: being sound and being cogent.

Sound Arguments

Definition: A sound argument is a valid argument that has true premises.

Firstly, a sound argument is a deductive argument. Its trying to establish conclusive support
for its conclusion. Secondly, the argument is valid: the premises, if true, would guarantee that
the conclusion is also true. And on top of all that, the premises are actually true. Therefore, a
sound argument guarantees that its conclusion is true.
We say that a sound argument is a good argument. It is a good argument because it guarantees
that the conclusion is true. It would be irrational for you not to believe the conclusion of a
sound argument.
Of course, sound arguments are very rare, because theyre very hard to establish. But, some

arguments are sound.

For example:
The province of Qubec is part of Canada. Patrick was born in Qubec. Therefore, Patrick
was born in Canada.
This is a valid argument. Can you see why?
Furthermore, the premises are true: Qubec is indeed part of Canada, and Patrick was indeed
born in Qubec. Hence, you can be absolutely certain that Patrick was born in Canada, and
you ought to believe that Patrick was born in Canada. Theres no way around it.
Here are some more examples of sound arguments:
I drank coffee this morning; therefore, I drank something this morning.
Patrick got married on January 4, 2014. Patrick has not been divorced, and Patrick is not a
widower. Therefore, Patrick is not a bachelor.
It is true that Patrick got married on January 4, 2014, that he has not divorced and that he is
not a widower. So Patrick is not a bachelor because a bachelor is an unmarried male, by
definition.

Cogent Arguments
Now, what about non-deductive arguments? For non-deductive arguments, we introduce the
notion of a cogent argument.

Definition: A cogent argument is a strong non-deductive argument that has true

premises.

And again, we say that cogent arguments are good. A cogent argument is by definition nondeductive, which means that the premises are intended to establish probable (but not
conclusive) support for the conclusion.
Furthermore, a cogent argument is strong, so the premises, if they were true, would succeed
in providing probable support for the conclusion. And finally, the premises are actually true.
So the conclusion indeed receives probable support.
Heres an example:
Patrick was born in North America and Patrick wasnt born in Mexico. Its thus quite
probable that Patrick was born in the USA.
That is a cogent argument. If all you know about Patrick is whats contained in the premises,
and those premises are true (they are!), then thats a fairly strong argument, because the
population of the USA is over 300 000 000, whereas that of Canada is under 40 000 000. This
means that the odds that Patrick was born in the USA are roughly 88%, which makes the
support for the conclusion quite strong. Furthermore, the premises are true. Therefore, the
argument is cogent, and so it is a good argument.
This means that we can have good arguments that have false conclusions!
Heres another example:
I had coffee this morning. Therefore, its quite likely that I drank something this morning.
This is a strong argument with true premises, so it is cogent and therefore, good. But the
conclusion is not guaranteed. It may be that I had coffee this morning by eating it, or by some
other means. But of course, this is very unlikely, so the argument is strong, though its still

possible that the conclusion is false. Still, this is cogent and therefore, a good argument.
Patrick Girard, University of Auckland

Philosophical criticism (by and among colleagues and other philosophers that form part of the
intersubjective discourse of philosophy or a particular school of or movement in it, usually from a
specialized field).
In philosophy, which concerns the most fundamental aspects of the universe, the experts all disagree.( (First of
all they dis/agree about what philosophy is and is not, what it must be and what it may be; then they disagree
with those from other schools and movements of philosophy and finally with those from the same school or
movement as their own. All this occurs on agreed intersubjective, institutionalized and internalized sociocultural norms, practices, rules and standards that constitute the current or contemporary philosophical discourse
in general and their own school or moment in particular. ) It follows that another element of philosophical
method, common (socio-culturally institutionalize in their particular school or movement of philosophy and
internalized and adhered to be individuals constituting that school, movement or approach) in the work of nearly
all philosophers, is philosophical criticism. It is this that makes much philosophizing a(n institutionalized) social
(a socio-cultural practice and intersubjective discourse) endeavour.
Philosophers offer definitions and explanations in (to try and obtain a) solution to problems (or to attempt
and dissolve those problems) ; they argue for those solutions; and then other philosophers provide counter
arguments, expecting to eventually come up with better solutions. This exchange and resulting revision of
views is called dialectic. Dialectic (in one sense of this history-laden word) is simply philosophical
conversation amongst people who do not always agree with each other about everything.
One can do this sort of harsh criticism on one's own, but others can help greatly, if important assumptions are
shared with the person offering the criticisms. Others are able to think of criticisms from another perspective.
Some philosophers and ordinary people dive right in and start trying to solve the problem. They immediately
start giving arguments, pro and con, on different sides of the issue. Doing philosophy is different from this. It is
about questioning assumptions, digging for deeper understanding. Doing philosophy is about the journey,
the process, as much as it is about the destination, the conclusion. Its method differs from other disciplines, in
which the experts can agree about most of the fundamentals.

Motivation
Method in philosophy is in some sense rooted in motivation (it is a passion for a need of certain individuals, the
wonder and astonishment of Plato and Aristtotle), only by understanding why people take up philosophy can
one properly understand what philosophy is. (The article of Buddy Seed deals at length with details of the
why do philosophy, the reasons, the passion for it, the authentic philosopher, the authentic and inauthentic
philosophical life and philosophy and ways of doing philosophy and reasons for doing philosophy).
People often find themselves believing things that they do not understand. For example, about God, themselves,
the natural world, human society, morality and human productions. Often, people fail to understand what it is
they believe (and how this what of their believes are determined by implicit underlying transcendentals such
assumptions and pre-suppositions. These assumptions concern many things, for example the philosophers
acceptance of the principles of a certain school or movement, certain methods and norms concerning other
aspects of philosophical practice that frequently remains implicit and that people are unaware of) and fail to
understand the reasons they believe in what they do. Some people have questions about the meaning of their
beliefs and questions about the justification (or rationality) of their beliefs. A lack of these things shows a lack
of understanding, and some dislike not having this understanding.
These questions about are only the tip of the philosophical iceberg. There are many other things about this
universe about which people are also fundamentally ignorant. Philosophers are in the business of investigating
all sorts of those areas of ignorance.
A bewilderingly huge number of basic concepts are poorly understood. For example:

What does it mean to say that one thing causes another?

What is rationality? What are space and time?

What is beauty, and if it is in the eye of the beholder, then what is it that is being said to be in the eye of
the beholder?

One might also consider some of the many questions about justification. Human lives are deeply informed with
many basic assumptions. Different assumptions, would lead to different ways of living.
--------------------------------------------------------------Theories to consider if you wish to be involved in metaphysics, ontology and
epistemology

The notion of inflation.

Definition: A sound argument is a valid argument that has true

premises.
David Marsh, of the Centre for Theoretical Cosmology at Cambridge University, is not giving
up on inflation yet. The predictions of inflation developed by Stephen Hawking and others
more than 30 years ago have been tested by cosmological observations and faced those tests
remarkably well. Many scientists regard inflation as a simple and elegant explanation of the
origin of galaxies in the universe, he said.
Or,
Scientists could soon find out whether light really did outpace gravity in the early universe.
The theory predicts a clear pattern in the density variations of the early universe, a feature
measured by what is called the spectral index. Writing in the journal Physical Review, the
scientists predict a very precise spectral index of 0.96478, which is close to the latest, though
somewhat rough, measurement of 0.968.
Science can never prove the theory right. But Afshordi said that if measurements over the
next five years shifted the spectral index away from their prediction, it would rule out their
own theory. If we are right then inflation is wrong. But the problem with inflation is that you
can always fine tune it to fit anything you want, he said.
And

Magueijo and Afshordis theory does away with inflation and replaces it with a variable speed
of light. According to their calculations, the heat of universe in its first moments was so
intense that light and other particles moved at infinite speed. Under these conditions, light
reached the most distant pockets of the universe and made it look as uniform as we see it
today. In our theory, if you go back to the early universe, theres a temperature when
everything becomes faster. The speed of light goes to infinity and propagates much faster
than gravity, Afshordi said. Its a phase transition in the same way that water turns into
steam.
Magueijo and Afshordi came up with their theory to explain why the cosmos looks much the
same over vast distances. To be so uniform, light rays must have reached every corner of the
cosmos, otherwise some regions would be cooler and more dense than others. But even
moving at 1bn km/h (The speed of light in a vacuum is considered to be one of the
fundamental constants of nature. Thanks to Einsteins theory of general relativity, it was
stamped in the annals of physics more than a century ago at about 1bn km/h. But while
general relativity is one of the cornerstones of modern physics, scientists know that the rules
of today did not hold at the birth of the universe.), light was not travelling fast enough to
spread so far and even out the universes temperature differences.
The multiverse (other universes or alternative universes) The multiverse (or meta-universe) is the hypothetical set of possible universes, including

the universe in which we live. Together, these universes comprise everything that exists: the
entirety of space, time, matter, energy, and the physical laws and constants that describe
them.
The various universes within the multiverse are called "parallel universes", "other universes"
or "alternative universes."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portal:Astronomy
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portal:Cosmology