G.R. No.

95851 March 1, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,
vs.
MANOLO VILLANUEVA alias "BOY" VILLANUEVA, accused.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
It was the town fiesta of San Pablo, Laguna. But what could have augured an otherwise festive atmosphere was preempted by
the discovery of the lifeless body of a barrio lass sprawled on the cold cement floor of their conjugal home. Blood was oozing out
of her mouth. She was six months pregnant. The suspected assailant was her husband who allegedly beat her to death after she
slapped him earlier in front of his friends.
Charged with and convicted of parricide with unintentional abortion MANOLO VILLANUEVA also known as "Boy" Villanueva is
now before us still professing innocence. He claims that he was watching a live concert when his wife, Nora Magpantay, 19,
committed suicide by taking sodium cyanide. She was supposedly burdened with family problems and wanted to follow the
footsteps of her sister who had earlier taken her life.
But the evidence shows otherwise. Isidro Magpantay, father of Nora, testified that on 14 January 1989, at around five or six
o'clock in the afternoon, he went to the house of his daughter where she and Manolo were engaged in a heated argument.
Manolo was drunk. After seeing his son-in-law slap his daughter, Isidro felt bad and left. 1
The following morning, at around five o'clock, Isidro was informed by Manolo's parents that Nora had poisoned
herself. 2 Forthwith, Isidro went to the hospital to look into the-medical records of his daughter. But failing to find any, he proceeded to
the funeral parlor where he saw his lifeless daughter with contusions on the right cheek, breast, abdomen and at the back of her left
ear. Her mouth was swollen. Her forearms were raised; he straightened them. 3

To augment the testimony of Isidro and to refute altogether the alibi of the accused, 15-year old Abigail Bandoy narrated that on
14 January 1989, at around seven-thirty in the evening, while in the house of Manolo and Nora, she witnessed the accused
mauling Nora for about fifteen (15) minutes, striking Nora several times in the stomach below her left breast and in different parts
of her body over Nora's incessant pleas "[t]ama na Boy." But Manolo would not stop until Nora fell unconscious on the cement
floor. Then Manolo left. After making sure he had already gone Abigail went home leaving Nora behind. 4
Dr. Nida Glorioso, City Medical Officer, recounted that on 15 January 1989, at around nine-fifteen in the morning, she examined
the cadaver of Nora and found a "contusion on the left cheek including the lateral aspect of the eye" 5 which could have been

caused by a clenched fist, a kick, a piece of wood, a broken bottle or any hard object. 6 She also noticed a "bloody mucoid discharge
com(ing) out from her mouth." 7 She then proceeded to open her abdomen to determine the presence of poison as it was alleged by the
victim's husband that his wife had poisoned herself. The abdomen of the victim however failed to emit the characteristic odor of a
chemical poison, negating the allegation that the victim had poisoned herself.

Nevertheless, to completely rule out poisoning as the cause of death the victim's stomach and intestines were sent to the PC
Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame, Quezon City, for a "chemical analysis." 8 Capt. Luena E. Layador of he PC Crime Laboratory
disclosed that "[t]oxicological examination conducted on the above-mentioned specimen gave NEGATIVE result to the tests for
common metallic, non-metallic, volatile and non-volatile poisons, cyanides, organic phosphates, organic chlorides." 9 Thus, Dr. Glorioso
concluded that "[i]n view of the negative result of the toxicological examination from the P.C. Crime Lab., Camp Crame, Q.C., . . . and
considering the contusio-ecchymosis, cheek, lateral aspect of eye, left, the CAUSE OF DEATH is SHOCK DUE TO CEREBRAL
CONCUSSION secondary to a severe blow on the head. 10

Manolo Villanueva however has a different tale. He averred that on 14 January 1989, at around six-thirty in the evening, he went
home to change his clothes since he was going to watch the concert of singer Randy Santiago at Canossa College in San Pablo
City later that evening. As he was about to leave their house, his wife tried to stop him. His mother who saw them even
reprimanded him. 11 Nevertheless, at around seven-thirty, he left the house. 12 He returned at around two-thirty the following morning.
After knocking at theDOOR , calling out to his wife but failing to get a response for about thirty minutes, he forcibly opened the door
only to find his wife lying prostrate on the floor of their living room. He then noticed the bottle of sodium cyanide, which he was using for
poisoning rats, already empty. 13

On cross-examination, Manolo admitted that on 14 January 1989 he was slapped by his wife in front of his friends which resulted
in a little misunderstanding ("tampuhan"). Although embarrassed, according to him, he nonetheless did not get angry. He merely
ushered his wife back to their house and then left again. 14

Sherwin Isleta, 17, took the witness stand for the defense. His house is adjacent to the conjugal home of Manolo and Nora with
only a party wall separating the two houses. He said that on 14 January 1989 at around eight o'clock in the evening, he saw
Nora sitting near the gate in front of their house, apparently waiting for someone. 15 That was the last time he saw her. At around
three o'clock the following morning he was awakened by the loud knock on the neighbor's door and repeated calls for Nora. A little later
he heard Manolo screaming, "Nora, Nora, why did you do this?16

In its Decision of 27 April 1990 the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City, Br. 31, 17 ruled
A close scrutiny of the evidence discloses that: on January 14, 1989, between 5:00 P.M. and 6:00 P.M. at their
house, accused and his wife, Nora, quarreled with the former slapping the latter in the presence of Isidro
Magpantay who, after half an hour stay thereat, left them; accused also left and went to his hangout; at 6:30
P.M.; accused returned and in the presence of his friends, was slapped by his wife; between 7:30 P.M. and 8:00
P.M., accused mauled his wife by giving her several fist blows, thereby causing her to fall and hit her head on the
cemented floor; also between the same period of time, accused left their house and attended a concert with his
friend, Nick Dalisay, from 9:00 P.M. up to 2:00 A.M. of the following day; at 3:00 A.M. of January 15, 1989,
accused found the lifeless body of his wife on the cemented floor in the bedroom of their house; at 9:15 A.M., Dr.
Glorioso conducted an autopsy on the cadaver and found contusions on the different parts of the body notably,
on the left cheek and eye; and, deceased could have died between 9:00 P.M. of January 14, 1989 and 12:00
A.M. of January 15, 1989 (citations omitted). 18
and held that the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt that accused is guilty of parricide with unintentional
abortion. The accused was initially sentenced to suffer the death penalty which is the penalty for parricide, the more serious
crime, applied in its maximum period. But since the death penalty could not at that time be imposed under the 1987 Constitution,
the penalty for parricide under Art. 246, The Revised Penal Code, was reclusion perpetua, the penalty next lower to death.
However, instead of imposing reclusion perpetua the trial court sentenced the accused to suffer life imprisonment. 19
A careful review of the transcript of stenographic notes shows that save for minor inconsistencies in the statements of
prosecution witnesses which even enhance their truthfulness as they erase any suspicion of being rehearsed, their testimonies
were consistent, in accord with one another, and were given in simple, straightforward manner, mentioning details of the incident
that could not have been merely concocted. Thus, their averments among others included the fact that accused was slapped by
the victim in front of his friends which caused him extreme embarrassment, leading to a heated argument and escalating into the
mauling of the victim. Matter-of-factly, the manner in which the witnesses for the state testified and their narration of events bear
the hallmarks of candidness and sincerity.
And neither do we find material discrepancies or substantial inconsistencies in their testimonies which may engender serious
doubt on their reliability and veracity. Except for witness Isidro Magpantay to whom bias is imputed by reason of his being the
father of the victim who allegedly despised accused as his son-in-law, there appears to be no motive on the part of Abigail and
Dr. Glorioso to testify falsely. The absence of evidence as to improper motives actuating the principal witnesses for the
prosecution strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that no such improper motives existed, and that their testimonies are worthy
of full faith and credit. 20 There was no reason at all for Abigail and Dr. Glorioso to lie and incriminate the accused. More so with
Abigail who was then only fifteen (15) years old when she took the witness stand. It has been held that the testimony of a minor of
sound mind is likely to be more correct and truthful than that of an older person, so that once established that the former has fully
understood the character and nature of an oath, his testimony should be accorded full credence. 21 What is more, the eyewitness
account of Abigail conforms with the autopsy findings, making her testimony even more reliable and faithworthy.

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses to which the lower court has given full faith lead to a fair and reasonable inference
that the accused was indeed responsible for the death of the victim. Isidro Magpantay narrated that he witnessed the
misunderstanding between his daughter and her husband who was then reeking with liquor, which the latter even admitted on
cross-examination. Abigail Bandoy was an eyewitness to the altercation between the spouses which led to the fatal mauling of
the victim. And Dr. Nida Glorioso, after examining the deceased and taking into consideration the result of the tests, concluded
that the cause of death was "shock due to cerebral concussion secondary to a severe blow on the head," contrary to the
submission of the accused that his wife had poisoned herself. Certainly, the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain
leading to a logical conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, perpetrated the crime.
In brief, as this Court has repeatedly ruled, the alibi and denial of the accused cannot prevail over the positive testimony of
prosecution witnesses and their clear identification of him as the perpetrator of the crime. 22 Thus, against the strength of the
evidence of the prosecution, the arguments of the defense have proved to be unavailing.

The submission of the accused that the trial court erred in lending credence to the testimony of the father of the deceased who
has shown his dislike and bias against the former even before the death of Nora is unsustainable. Isidro Magpantay merely
narrated that, the last time he saw his daughter alive was in the afternoon before she died when she and her husband were
quarreling. While he may have previously manifested his enmity towards the accused, Isidro only testified that he saw his
daughter and the accused in a heated altercation, which per se is not incriminatory, and which the accused himself even

admitted, downplaying it as a mere "tampuhan." It has long been settled that relationship of the prosecution witness to the victim
does not necessarily categorize him as biased and interested and thus tarnish his testimony. 23 In fact, it is highly doubtful that
Isidro would aid in the prosecution of the accused simply because he disliked the latter. For sure, he would like to send the real killer of
his daughter to jail, and not just anyone whom he despised. Hence, there is no reason why Isidro's testimony should not be believed.

The contention of the accused that the deceased should have suffered more contusions, and not merely on the "left cheek
including the lateral aspect of the eye," considering the numerous blows she supposedly received from him as narrated by
witness Abigail, is ungrounded. We have repeatedly said that absence of external injuries does not rule out the possibility that a
blow had in fact been administered by the offender. 24
The proposition of counsel of the accused that the toxicological examination performed by Dr. Glorioso was very limited," 25 and

that her conclusions were merely based on her opinion and not on medical findings is likewise untenable. 26In fact, we find this amusing
coming as it does from counsel who has neither presented his qualifications nor cited any medical authority in forming such self-serving
conclusions. We thus sustain the opinion of Dr. Glorioso who certainly appears to be more competent in the field of medicine than
counsel who simply proffered speculations that have remained unsubstantiated.

Thus, even the assertion of the accused that his wife took sodium cyanide is very doubtful, not only because her toxicological
examination yielded negative result for the presence of poison, but also because the pieces of broken bottle which supposedly
contained the poison were also found negative for "volatile, non-volatile and metallic poisons." 27
The defense, contending that "the prosecution should not have been allowed to spring a surprise," then seeks to nullify the
account of rebuttal witness Abigail Bandoy that the accused mauled the victim, and binds the prosecution to its earlier
statements that the rebuttal witness will testify only for the purpose of rebutting the alibi of the accused that he attended the
concert of Randy Santiago.
We are not persuaded. The Court finds it difficult to believe that the defense was surprised by the testimony of witness Abigail
considering that it was able to subject her to a grueling and rigorous cross-examination, ceaselessly trying to elicit contradictory
statements from her. If indeed the defense was caught flat-footed, as it now makes it appear, then it could not have extensively
cross-examined the 15-year old witness. Suffice it to state that what Abigail said she saw and where she was at the time of the
incident are the natural and logical allegations to show that "the accused was not in the Randy Santiago show," 28 which is the
essence of the testimony of the rebuttal witness, as stated by the prosecutor, to refute the denial of the accused.

The accused also takes to task the testimony of Abigail because of her delay in reporting the incident. She witnessed the
mauling of the victim on 14 January 1989. Yet, she executed an affidavit only on 23 January 1990, or after more than one year.
Abigail however explains that she was not aware that the victim had died as a result of the mauling and that a case was filed
against the accused since after the mauling she left for Manila to continue her schooling. Hence, it was only sometime in
November 1989 when she learned that Nora was dead, and only on 23 January 1990 that a case was filed against the accused.
We thus accept the elucidation of Abigail. She has satisfactorily shown that she was indeed in Manila to continue her studies,
and was not well-posted on developments in the province. It was only some ten (10) months later when she returned to San
Pablo that she learned of Nora's death.
It has been repeatedly held that delay in divulging the name of the perpetrator of a crime, if sufficiently explained, does not
impair the credibility of the witness and his testimony nor destroy its probative value. 29 And, the failure of a witness to report at
once to the police authorities the crime he had witnessed cannot be taken against him for it is not uncommon for a witness to a crime to
show some reluctance about getting involved in a criminal case. 30 It has become judicial knowledge that prosecution witnesses are,
more often than not, afraid to testify. This was manifested by the prosecutor in the instant case. Hence, in one case, 31 we said that fear
of reprisal is a valid excuse for the momentary silence of prosecution witnesses.

Thus the testimony of defense witness Sherwin Isleta that he saw Nora at around eight o'clock in the evening before she was
found dead has lost its relevance as it has not shown that the accused was precluded from having mauled the victim and
causing her eventual death. In fine, we uphold the pronouncement of the trial court that "[t]he defense of alibi raised by the
accused showing that he was at the Canossa College in San Pablo City (watching the concert of singer Randy Santiago) with a
friend, Nick Dalisay, who was not even presented in Court, at the time when his wife could have allegedly died even if true is still
of no moment as his act (mauling) committed prior thereto is the one in issue." 32
Consequently, we affirm the conclusion of the trial court that accused Manolo Villanueva is guilty of parricide with unintentional
abortion, for a husband who with violence kills his pregnant wife, occasioning the death of the fetus, is guilty of parricide with
unintentional abortion. 33
Applying Art. 48 of The Revised Penal Code which in part provides that "[w]hen a single act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies . . . the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period,"
accused should be sentenced to death, the maximum period of the penalty for parricide which is the more serious
crime. 34 However, in view of Sec. 19, par. (1), Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution, which proscribes the imposition of the death penalty,

and the inapplicability of R.A. 7659 which restores the death penalty, considering that the act charged was committed prior to the
effectivity of said statute, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, which is the proper penalty as prescribed by The Revised Penal
Code, and not life imprisonment as erroneously imposed by the trial court. Time and again this Court has said that reclusion
perpetua is not the same as life imprisonment. The former entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict
becomes eligible for parole, and carries with it accessory penalties. 35

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from finding accused MANOLO VILLANUEVA also known as "BOY" VILLANUEVA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that the penalty of life imprisonment should instead be reclusion perpetua, and consistent with existing jurisprudence, the civil
indemnity for the death of the victim and the award for moral damages should be as they are increased to P50,000.00 and
P30,000.00, respectively, while the actual damages and costs of P3,000.00 remain.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 93932-33

June 5, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VIVENCIO SABELLANO and WESLY SABELLANO, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Cruz B. Carbon for defendants-appellants.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal purportedly interposed by two of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 65155 (for frustrated homicide) and
67688 (for murder) which were jointly tried and then decided by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 156 on
June 6, 1990. The dispositive portion of the assailed judgment of conviction reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows, to wit:
The court finds accused VIVENCIO SABELLANO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged in Criminal
Case No. 65155 and hereby sentences said accused VIVENCIO SABELLANO to suffer an indeterminate prison term of
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor and to pay the costs.
Let alias warrant be issued for the arrest of VIVENCIO and MAYOLING SABELLANO the same to be served by the NBI
and other national police agencies.
Accused WESLY and JAIME SABELLANO on the other hand are hereby acquitted of the offense charged in said
Criminal Case No. 65155 with costs de oficio.
In Criminal Case No. 67688, the Court finds accused WESLY SABELLANO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of MURDER qualified by treachery, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
sentences said accused WESLY SABELLANO to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all its accessory penalties,

to indemnify the heirs of victim Benito Abrogar, in the amount of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
In the service of his sentence, accused WESLY SABELLANO shall be credited in full with the period of his preventive
imprisonment.
Let alias warrant be issued for the arrest of accused VIVENCIO and JIMMY SABELLANO the same to be served by the
NBI and other national police agencies. (RTC Decision, pp. 13-14; Rollo, pp. 34-35)
The accused-appellants whose surnames had occasionally been misspelled in the records were both charged with the crimes of
frustrated homicide and murder in two separate informations. In Criminal Case No. 65155, the accused-appellants together with
Jaime and Mayoling, also surnamed Sabellano were indicted of the crime of frustrated homicide committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of February, 1985, in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually
helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and stab one Benito Abrogar, hitting the latter on the different parts of his body, thereby causing him stab wounds which
would ordinarily cause his death, thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of
homicide, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of their will, that is due to the timely and
able medical attendance rendered to said Benito Abrogar, which prevented his death. (RTC Decision, p. 1; Rollo, p. 22)
In Criminal Case No. 67688, the accused-appellants with one Jimmy Sabellano were charged with the crime of murder
committed as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of March, 1986, in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together with one John
Doe whose true identity and present whereabout are still unknown and mutually helping and aiding one another, with
intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and stab one Benito Abrogar with a bladed weapon on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter
stab wounds which directly caused his death. (RTC Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p.236)
On April 18, 1986, all the accused in Criminal Case No. 65155 except Mayoling Sabellano who had remained at large up to the
present time, entered a plea of "not guilty" with the assistance of counsel. Subsequently, accused Vivencio and Jaime jumped
bail, hence, they were tried in absentia.
On December 8, 1987, the accused-appellant Wesly Sabellano, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged in Criminal Case No. 67688.
Initially, the case for frustrated homicide was dismissed for the repeated failure of prosecution witnesses to appear in court.
However, the case was revived and consolidated with the murder case after a motion for reconsideration and/or to revise case
filed by the private respondent, Walderita Abrogar, wife of the deceased Benito Abrogar, was granted by the trial court in an
Order dated January 12, 1988.
The antecedent facts in Criminal Case No. 65155 as summarized by the trial court from the lone testimony of the prosecution
witness Walderita Abrogar are as follows:
. . . [O]n February 6, 1985, she was in her house at 536 Calbayog Street, Mandaluyong watching a wake across the
street. A game had then been in progress for about two (2) hours between one Julio Catayong and Wesly. A few people
were watching said game among them, the son of the deceased, Almar Abrogar. Due to both players' zealousness, a
misunderstanding ensued. Julio cursed "putang ina mo" and delivered a fist blow to the rightside jaw of Wesly. Seeing
the trouble erupt, Salvador, brother of Julio, pulled out a knife and advanced towards Wesly. Vivencio Sabellano, at the
same time, had also approached and held up Salvador preventing the latter from attacking Wesly. As this occurred,
Wesly went home and after getting hold of a knife, rushed back and stabbed Salvador twice. In the process, Wesly had
held Salvador's right arm and stabbed him with the knife on his right hand. Salvador was released and ran to his Aunt's
house. Almar, who was then a mere three (3) arm-lengths (sic) away watching, followed to see if Salvador's wounds
were serious. Salvador asked Almar to fetch a taxi to which the latter obliged. When the taxi arrived however, its path
was blocked by Wesly, Vivencio and Paulino Sabellano. Wesly confronted Almar and said "putang ina mo huwag kang
makialam bayaan mo siyang mamatay" while pulling out the knife. Almar ran to the house and hid. The deceased, Benito
Abrogar, was at that time fixing the toilet. Hearing the commotion, he went out holding a bolo. He was met by Vivencio,
Mayoling, Wesly and Jaime who struck him with a bareta. Mayoling and Wesly mauled Benito while Vivencio delivered a
stab to the back with a 29" knife. Benito fell to the ground wounded. He was then picked-up by his wife who, along with

other relatives, took him to Nayan where a doctor advised that he be taken to the Rizal Provincial Hospital and confined
for ten (10) days. (RTC Decision, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 24-25)
In Criminal Case No. 67688, the pertinent facts that led to the conviction of the accused-appellant Wesly Sabellano are stated by
the trial court, to wit:
On March 9, 1986, Benito and Walderita with Gertrudes Basilides were walking along Cordillera Street near Sierra
Madre Street on their way to Divisoria to buy merchandise to be resold later in the day. It was 3:45 a.m. as they chanced
upon the group of Vivencio, Wesly, Jimmy and John Doe at a grocery store. The Abrogars ignored them. Further down
the street however, Gertrudes noticed that two (2) joggers, were coming up behind them. One of the joggers, Wesly,
grabbed Walderita with his left arm around her neck and warned her "huwag kang sisigaw, papatayin kita kapag
sumigaw ka". The other jogger, Vivencio, embraced Benito and stabbed the latter on the right breast. Two (2) persons,
Jaime and John Doe came from Cordillera and Sierra Madre Streets and stabbed Benito in the abdomen. Wesly
released Walderita and stabbed Benito in the back. As Benito dropped to the ground, his assailants ran in different
directions to escape and Walderita tried to help Benito for home but he died shortly thereafter. Gertrudes was only an
arm-length away when the attack occurred. With light coming from a nearby house, she was able to recognize the
assailants. She also remembered the clothes that the attackers had worn. Wesly was wearing a white sando and
maongPANTS ; Jaime had an orange T-shirt and maong and Vivencio was in a black jacket and maong pants. Seeing
Benito fall to the ground, Gertrudes looked at him before going back to Calbayog Street to get help from their relatives.
Walderita stayed with Benito until help arrived. She then called for the police to bring the deceased to the Municipal Hall
and later to Camp Crame for autopsy. A request for autopsy (Exhibit "H") was made and a Certificate of Death (Exhibit
"I") was issued. Medico Legal Report M-0-418-86 (Exhibit D) was issued on the findings as testified to by Dr. Moraleda.
Walderita executed a statement (Exhibit "E") and so did Gertrudes. (Exhibit "G") (RTC Decision, pp. 4-5; Rollo, pp. 2526)
After a joint trial on the merits, the trial court promulgated the questioned decision from which the present appeal was filed
assigning as errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT (SIC) ACCUSED-APPELLANT VIVENCIO SABELLANO GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 65155.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING MUCH CREDENCE TO THE CLEARLY BIASED, HIGHLY IMPROBABLE,
CONTRADICTORY AND CONFLICTING TESTIMONIES OF WALDERITA ABROGAR (WIFE OF THE DECEASED
BENITO ABROGAR) AND GERTRUDES BASELIDES (NIECE OF THE SAID DECEASED).
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SABELLANOS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT WESLY SABELLANO
BEING ONE THEM, (SIC) WERE THE PERSONS WHO HELD UP AND KILLED THE DECEASED BENITO ABROGAR
IN THE MORNING OF MARCH 9, 1986 IN THE CORNER OF CORDILLERA AND SIERRA MADRE STREETS,
MANDALUYONG, METRO MANILA.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAD ESTABLISHED OR PROVED THE
GUILT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT WESLY SABELLANO BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT IN CRIMINAL CASE NO.
67688 FOR MURDER. (Rollo, p. 52)
At the outset, we are constrained to review the trial court's decision only insofar as the accused-appellant Wesly Sabellano's
conviction for the murder of Benito Abrogar is concerned considering that with respect to the other accused-appellant Vivencio
Sabellano, an order dated June 8, 1990 was issued by the trial court which states:
He who wants to avail of the processes of the Court must be within the reach of the Court. Having escaped from
detention, accused Vivencio Sabellano's Notice of Appeal through counsel must perforce be DENIED DUE COURSE
and it is hereby SO ORDERED. (Records, p. 487)
Either by deliberate omission or on account of ignorance of the rules of procedure specifically Section 18, Rule 114 and Section
8, Rule 124, the counsel for the accused Vivencio Sabellano failed to seasonably question the above order which by this time

has become final and executory. Well-settled is the rule that the right to appeal is a statutory right, not a natural or inherent one,
so that the party who seeks to avail of the said right must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Otherwise, the right to
appeal is lost. (Ozaete v. Court of Appeals, 179 SCRA 800 [1989]). Hence, as regards Criminal Case No. 65155 accused
Vivencio Sabellano, who was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide, lost his right to appeal
from the trial court's judgment of conviction.
Anent Criminal Case No. 67688, the issue is whether or not the evidence for the prosecution establishes the guilt of the
accused-appellant Wesly Sabellano beyond reasonable doubt
In support of his prayer for a reversal of the trial court's verdict, the accused-appellant Wesly Sabellano makes the following
contentions in his brief, namely: (a) that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses contained material inconsistencies and
contradictions, so that the trial court erred in giving much credence thereto; (b) that the complaining witness, Walderita Abrogar,
failed to immediately report to the police officer who conducted the "on-the-spot investigation" on the day of the incident in
question that the Sabellanos were the persons responsible for the death of her husband, Benito Abrogar; and (c) that the trial
court unjustly failed to appreciate the defense of alibi despite the fact that the credibility of the prosecution witnesses who
allegedly identified Benito's assailants is highly questionable.
The alleged contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses alluded to by the accused-appellant Wesly Sabellano
are that while Walderita Abrogar stated in her testimony in court that it was only on March 9, 1986, the day of the fatal incident
that the other prosecution witnesses, Gertrudes Baselides, accompanied the former and her husband, Benito Abrogar to
Divisoria to buy some merchandise, Gertrudes testified that she went with her uncle and aunt, Benito and Walderita, to Divisoria
everyday (Appellant's Brief, pp. 22-23); that Walderita testified that when she and her deceased husband were held up by the
accused-appellants Wesly and Vivencio Sabellano, respectively, Gertrudes ran back to her house immediately, while Gertrudes
claimed that she remained at the scene of the fatal incident while her uncle and aunt were embraced by the accused-appellants
until she saw her uncle being stabbed after which she ran home (Appellants' Brief, pp. 23-24); that while Walderita said in open
court that after the stabbing of her husband, she saw four (4) persons run to different directions, some towards Libertad Street
and the others towards Sierra Madre Street, Gertrudes asserted that all the assailants ran towards only one direction, towards
the Producers Market (Appellants' Brief, pp. 24-26); and that while Walderita claimed that there were police officers at the scene
of the fatal incident since she was the one who summoned them on March 9, 1986, Gertrudes categorically stated that no
policeman arrived at the scene of the crime. (Appellants 'Brief, pp. 26-28)
The discrepancies pointed out by the accused-appellant Wesly Sabellano are not only on minor details but they do not alter the
fact that the deceased Benito Abrogar was fatally stabbed on March 9, 1986 and that one of the assailants was the accusedappellant Wesly Sabellano. The autopsy report (Exh. "D"; Records, p. 356) indicated that Benito suffered from cardiorespiratory
arrest due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of stab wounds of the trunk and upper extremity.
1w phi1

Prosecution witness Desiderio Moraleda, the medico-legal examiner who conducted the autopsy on the deceased Benito
Abrogar described in court the nature of the six (6) stab wounds inflicted on the victim's body and made a conclusion that the
mortal wound caused by a single-bladed knife was that located on the right side of the chest and indicated as Stab Wound No. 1
in the report. (TSN, June 6, 1989, pp. 6-7)
The straight-forward and detailed testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, Walderita Abrogar and Gertrudes Baselides
relating to the fatal stabbing of Benito Abrogar clearly pinpointed the authors of the crime under consideration. (TSN, April 12,
1988, pp. 10-14; TSN, August 25, 1988, pp. 3-5). The inconsistencies and contradictions specified by the accused-appellant
Wesly Sabellano merely pertain to minor details which cannot affect the credibility of Walderita's and Gertrudes' testimonies. Our
ruling in the case of People v. Tomas Gadiana(G.R. No. 92509, March 13, 1991) bears reiterating. We stated:
As this Court had remarked in People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 76742, August 7, 1990:
The truth need not be narrated with perfect symmetry. Several persons remembering the same incident may vary
in their recollections of some of the details but these differences do not necessarily make liars of them all. What
isIMPORTANT is that they agree on essential facts and that their respective versions, corroborate and
substantially coincide with each other to make a consistent and coherent whole. (at pp. 4-5)
The accused-appellant Wesly Sabellano further presents the argument that since the complaining witness, Walderita Abrogar,
reported to the police authorities the matter of her husband's death and identified the Sabellanos as the culprits only after the
lapse of two (2) days and not immediately when she had the very first opportunity to do so, i.e., at the time the police conducted
an "on-the-spot" investigation on March 9, 1986, then, there is ground to believe that the credibility of Walderita's entire
testimony is greatly weakened.
In the light of the circumstances in the case at bar, the delay in relating to the police authorities the attendant facts of the crime
for which the Sabellanos had been charged is consistent with normal behavior considering that after a tragic incident, the last

thing that the bereaved would want to happen is to provoke further reprisals from the perpetrators of the felonious act. Although
there is a natural tendency to seek the ends of justice for the treacherous killing of a dearly departed, mourning and rites for the
dead take priority as dictated by our culture. As we have held in the case of People v. John Gabriel Gamboa (G.R. No. 91374,
February 25, 1991):
It is quite understandable when the witnesses do not immediately report the identity of the offender after a startling
occurrence more especially when they are related to the victim as they just had a traumatic experience . . . Nevertheless,
a delay of about a few hours before the identification of the offender by the prosecution witnesses does not thereby affect
their credibility. (at p. 9)
Moreover, in the case of People v. Ponciano Mandapat, (G.R. No. 76953, April 22, 1991), we distinctly stated that:
As a general rule, the failure of a witness to report at once to the police authorities the crime he had witnessed cannot be
taken against him (People v. Demate, 113 SCRA 353 [1982]) for "it is not uncommon for a witness to a crime to show
some reluctance about getting involved in a criminal case. The natural reticence of most people to get involved in a
criminal case is of judicial notice" (People v. Pacabes, 137 SCRA 158 [1985]; People v. Coronado, 145 SCRA 250
[1986]) and the fear of eyewitness when townmates are involved in the commission of the crime is understandable for
they may provoke reprisals from the accused (People v. Rosario, 134 SCRA 496 [1985]). The delay, when adequately
explained, does not impair the credibility of the witness, as in the case at bar (People v. Cabanit, 139 SCRA 94 [1985];
People v. Millora, 119 SCRA 417 [1984]); neither will it render his testimony biased (People v. Itura, 129 SCRA 127
[1984]); nor will it destroy its probative value (People v. Millora, supra) . . . (at pp. 5-6)
Lastly, the accused-appellant Wesly Sabellano tries to buttress his claim that he is innocent of the crime imputed to him by
adducing evidence in support of the defense of alibi. Hence, he testified that at the time of the incident in question, he was
asleep in his house and was awakened only by Walderita shouting about her being held-up together with her husband (TSN,
March 13, 1990, pp. 9-12). Corroborative evidence on the defense of alibi was also given by Erlinda Sabellano, accusedappellant Wesly's mother, who stated in her testimony that on March 6, 1986, between 3:00 o'clock and 4:00 o'clock in the
morning, she was preparing food for her children which included accused-appellant Wesly who were all asleep at that time.
(TSN, January 24, 1990, pp. 6-8)
We affirm the trial court's rejection of the defense of alibi in line with the doctrinal rule that the defense of alibi being inherently
weak cannot prevail against the prosecution's positive identification of the accused and in the absence of any convincing
evidence showing physical impossibility of the accused's being at the time and place of the crime. (See People v. Roberto
Soriano y Bruan alias "Ruben", et al., G.R. No. 74783, April 22, 1991, citingPeople v. Garcellano, 23 SCRA 595 [1968]; People
v. Naba-unag, 79 SCRA 32 [1977]; see also People v. Magno Gupo y Gayeta, et al., G.R. No. 75814, September 24,
1990 citing People v. Reunir, 157 SCRA 686 [1988]) As the trial court stated:
Also, as clearly shown in Exhibit "3" for the defense, the house of accused Wesly is not far enough from the scene of the
crime for him to have been physically impossible to have participated in the crime and be at his house shortly thereafter.
Established is the rule that the accused must be able to show that he was at another place at the time the crime was
committed and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the particular moment it was
perpetrated.
Lastly, Mrs. Abrogar and Gertrudes Baselides gave such a vivid account of the attack, clearly identifying the attackers
and the clothes worn that the defense of alibi must necessarily fail. Alibi is not credible where the prosecution witnesses
directly testify as to how the assault was committed and positively identified the accused as the offenders. (Rollo, pp. 3334)
Moreover, the trial court correctly ruled that alibi becomes less plausible as a defense when it is mainly established by the
accused himself and his immediate relatives who would naturally be expected to make statements in his favor, as in this case it
was the mother of accused-appellant Wesly Sabellano who supported the accused's alibi. (People v. Dennis de Guzman y de
Leon, G.R. No. 95685, March 4, 1991, citing People v. Somera, 173 SCRA 684 [1989]).
We find no cogent reason to overturn the trial court's finding that conspiracy exists among the assailants of the deceased Benito
Abrogar. In the case at bar, although the records do not show any direct proof showing that the accused-appellant Wesly
Sabellano together with his three other companions agreed to inflict fatal wounds on the person of the deceased, there is
overwhelming evidence from the elaborate testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that Benito's attackers were at the time and
place of the stabbing incident that led to the death of the said victim, Benito Abrogar, and that all of them acted in consonance
with a common design so that the guilt of one becomes the guilt of all. (People v. Martin Cagadas, Jr., et al., G. R. No. 88044,
January 23, 1991 citingPeople v. Maralit, 165 SCRA 427; People v. Newman, 163 SCRA 496; People v. Salvador, 163 SCRA
574) Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence but can be inferred from the acts of the accused tending to show
community of criminal purpose. (People v. Valeriano Pacris, et al., G.R. No. 69986, March 5, 1991 citingPeople v. Balane, 123

SCRA 614; People v. Baltazar Alan Alitao, et al., G.R. No. 74736, February 19, 1991 citingPeople v. Pineda, 157 SCRA 71;
People v. Palino, 183 SCRA 680)
After a careful review of the instant case, we find that the accused-appellant Wesly Sabellano is guilty of the crime of murder
qualified by treachery considering that he and his other companions adopted a mode of attack that insured the killing of the
deceased Benito Abrogar without risk to themselves inasmuch as their attack was swiftly and methodically done as observed by
the trial court and their victim and his party were unarmed and taken by surprise. (see People v. Luis Mision y Salipot, G.R. No.
63480, February 26, 1991 citing Bernabe v. Bolinas, Jr., 18 SCRA 812; see also People v. Mabubay, 185 SCRA 675
[1990] citing People v. Lopez, 80 SCRA 18; People v. Alegria 84 SCRA 614).
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the trial court's decision dated June 6, 1990 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the amount of indemnity be increased to FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) in accordance with the
Court's recent pronouncements.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 182356

December 4, 2013

DRA, LEILA A DELA LLANO, Petitioner,

vs.
REBECCA BIONG, doing business under the name and style of Pongkay Trading, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Very case essentially turns on two basic questions: questions of fact and questions of law. Questions of fact are the parties and
their counsel to respond to, based on what supporting facts the legal questions require; the court can only draw conclusion from
the facts or evidence adduced. When the facts are lacking because of the deficiency of presented evidence, then the court can
only draw one conclusion: that the cause must fail for lack of evidentiary support.
The present case is one such case as Dra. Leila A dela Llanas(petitioner) petition for review on certorari1challenging the
February 11, 2008 Decision2 and the March 31, 2008 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89163.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 30, 2000, at around 11:00 p.m., Juan dela Llana was driving a 1997 Toyota Corolla car along North Avenue, Quezon
City.4
His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front passenger seat while a certain Calimlim was at the backseat.5
Juan stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital when the signal light turned red. A few seconds after the car
halted, a dump truck containing gravel and sand suddenly rammed the cars rear end, violently pushing the car forward. Due to
the impact, the cars rear end collapsed and its rear windshield was shattered.GLASS splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana.
Apart from these minor wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have suffered from any other visible physical injuries.6

The traffic investigation report dated March 30, 2000 identified the truck driver as Joel Primero. It stated that Joel was recklessly
imprudent in driving the truck.7
Joel later revealed that his employer was respondent Rebecca Biong, doing business under the name and style of "Pongkay
Trading" and was engaged in a gravel and sand business.8
In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side of her neck and shoulder. The
pain became more intense as days passed by. Her injury became more severe. Her health deteriorated to the extent that she
could no longer move her left arm. On June 9, 2000, she consulted with Dr. Rosalinda Milla, a rehabilitation medicine specialist,
to examine her condition. Dr. Milla told her that she suffered from a whiplash injury, an injury caused by the compression of the
nerve running to her left arm and hand. Dr. Milla required her to undergo physical therapy to alleviate her condition. Dra. dela
Llanas condition did not improve despite three months of extensive physical therapy.9
She then consulted other doctors, namely, Drs. Willie Lopez, Leonor Cabral-Lim and Eric Flores, in search for a cure. Dr. Flores,
a neuro-surgeon, finally suggested that she undergo a cervical spine surgery to release the compression of her nerve. On
October 19, 2000, Dr. Flores operated on her spine and neck, between the C5 and the C6 vertebrae.10
The operation released the impingement of the nerve, but incapacitated Dra. dela Llana from the practice of her profession since
June 2000 despite the surgery.11
Dra. dela Llana, on October 16, 2000, demanded from Rebecca compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca refused to pay.12
Thus, on May 8, 2001, Dra. dela Llana sued Rebecca for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC). She
alleged that she lost the mobility of her arm as a result of the vehicular accident and claimed P150,000.00 for her medical
expenses (as of the filing of the complaint) and an average monthly income of P30,000.00 since June 2000. She further prayed
for actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees.13
In defense, Rebecca maintained that Dra. dela Llana had no cause of action against her as no reasonable relation existed
between the vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llanas injury. She pointed out that Dra. dela Llanas illness became manifest one
month and one week from the date of the vehicular accident. As a counterclaim, she demanded the payment of attorneys fees
and costs of the suit.14
At the trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary witness15 and Joel as a hostile witness.16
Dra. dela Llana reiterated that she lost the mobility of her arm because of the vehicular accident. To prove her claim, she
identified and authenticated a medical certificate dated November 20, 2000 issued by Dr. Milla. The medical certificate stated
that Dra. dela Llana suffered from a whiplash injury. It also chronicled her clinical history and physical examinations.17
Meanwhile, Joel testified that his truck hit the car because the trucks brakes got stuck.18
In defense, Rebecca testified that Dra. dela Llana was physically fit and strong when they met several days after the vehicular
accident. She also asserted that she observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Joel.
She pointed out that she required Joel to submit a certification of good moral character as well as barangay, police, and NBI
clearances prior to his employment. She also stressed that she only hired Primero after he successfully passed the driving skills
test conducted by Alberto Marcelo, a licensed driver-mechanic.19
Alberto also took the witness stand. He testified that he checked the truck in the morning of March 30, 2000. He affirmed that the
truck was in good condition prior to the vehicular accident. He opined that the cause of the vehicular accident was a damaged
compressor. According to him, the absence of air inside the tank damaged the compressor.20
RTC Ruling
The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held that the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llanas whiplash injury to be Joels
reckless driving.21
It found that a whiplash injury is an injury caused by the sudden jerking of the spine in the neck area. It pointed out that the
massive damage the car suffered only meant that the truck was over-speeding. It maintained that Joel should have driven at a
slower pace because road visibility diminishes at night. He should have blown his horn and warned the car that his brake was
stuck and could have prevented the collision by swerving the truck off the road. It also concluded that Joel was probably
sleeping when the collision occurred as Joel had been driving for fifteen hours on that fateful day. The RTC further declared that
Joels negligence gave rise to the presumption that Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in Joel's
selection and supervision of Joel. Rebecca was vicariously liable because she was the employer and she personally chose him

to drive the truck. On the day of the collision, she ordered him to deliver gravel and sand to Muoz Market, Quezon City. The
Court concluded that the three elements necessary to establish Rebeccas liability were present: (1) that the employee was
chosen by the employer, personally or through another; (2) that the services were to be rendered in accordance with orders
which the employer had the authority to give at all times; and (3) that the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by
reason of the functions entrusted to him. The RTC thus awarded Dra. dela Llana the amounts of P570,000.00 as actual
damages, P250,000.00 as moral damages, and the cost of the suit.22
CA Ruling
In a decision dated February 11, 2008, the CA reversed the RTC ruling. It held that Dra. dela Llana failed to establish a
reasonable connection between the vehicular accident and her whiplash injury by preponderance of evidence. Citing Nutrimix
Feeds Corp. v. Court of Appeals,23 it declared that courts will not hesitate to rule in favor of the other party if there is no evidence
or the evidence is too slight to warrant an inference establishing the fact in issue. It noted that the interval between the date of
the collision and the date when Dra. dela Llana began to suffer the symptoms of her illness was lengthy. It concluded that this
interval raised doubts on whether Joels reckless driving and the resulting collision in fact caused Dra. dela Llanas injury. It also
declared that courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash injuries. It observed that Dra. dela Llana
did not immediately visit a hospital to check if she sustained internal injuries after the accident. Moreover, her failure to present
expert witnesses was fatal to her claim. It also gave no weight to the medical certificate. The medical certificate did not explain
how and why the vehicular accident caused the injury.24
The Petition
Dra. dela Llana points out in her petition before this Court that Nutrimix is inapplicable in the present case. She stresses that
Nutrimix involved the application of Article 1561 and 1566 of the Civil Code, provisions governing hidden defects. Furthermore,
there was absolutely no evidence in Nutrimix that showed that poisonous animal feeds were sold to the respondents in that
case. As opposed to the respondents in Nutrimix, Dra. dela Llana asserts that she has established by preponderance of
evidence that Joels egligent act was the proximate cause of her whiplash injury. First, pictures of her damaged car show that
the collision was strong. She posits that it can be reasonably inferred from these pictures that the massive impact resulted in her
whiplash injury. Second, Dr. Milla categorically stated in the medical certificate that Dra. dela Llana suffered from whiplash
injury. Third, her testimony that the vehicular accident caused the injury is credible because she was a surgeon.
Dra. dela Llana further asserts that the medical certificate has probative value. Citing several cases, she posits that an
uncorroborated medical certificate is credible if uncontroverted.25
She points out that expert opinion is unnecessary if the opinion merely relates to matters of common knowledge. She maintains
that a judge is qualified as an expert to determine the causation between Joels reckless driving and her whiplash injury. Trial
judges are aware of the fact that whiplash injuries are common in vehicular collisions.
The Respondents Position
In her Comment,26 Rebecca points out that Dra. dela Llana raises a factual issue which is beyond the scope of a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. She maintains that the CAs findings of fact are final and conclusive.
Moreover, she stresses that Dra. dela Llanas arguments are not substantial to merit this Courts consideration.
The Issue
The sole issue for our consideration in this case is whether Joels reckless driving is the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llanas
whiplash injury.
Our Ruling We find the petition unmeritorious.
The Supreme Court may review questions of fact in a petition for review on certiorari when the findings of fact by the lower
courts are conflicting
The issue before us involves a question of fact and this Court is not a trier of facts. As a general rule, the CAs findings of fact
are final and conclusive and this Court will not review them on appeal. It is not the function of this Court to examine, review or
evaluate the evidence in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We can only review the
presented evidence, by way of exception, when the conflict exists in findings of the RTC and the CA.27
We see this exceptional situation here and thus accordingly examine the relevant evidence presented before the trial court.
Dra. dela Llana failed to establish her case by preponderance of evidence

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that "[w]hoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is a quasi-delict." Under this provision, the elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are:
(1) damages to the plaintiff;
(2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose acts the defendant must respond, was guilty;
and
(3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages.28
These elements show that the source of obligation in a quasi-delict case is the breach or omission of mutual duties that civilized
society imposes upon its members, or which arise from non-contractual relations of certain members of society to others.29
Based on these requisites, Dra. dela Llana must first establish by preponderance of evidence the three elements of quasi-delict
before we determine Rebeccas liability as Joels employer.
She should show the chain of causation between Joels reckless driving and her whiplash injury.
Only after she has laid this foundation can the presumption - that Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of Joel - arise.30
Once negligence, the damages and the proximate causation are established, this Court can then proceed with the application
and the interpretation of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.31
Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in relation with the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, "an action predicated on an employees
act or omission may be instituted against the employer who is held liable for the negligent act or omission committed by his
employee."32
The rationale for these graduated levels of analyses is that it is essentially the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which
creates the vinculum juris in extra-contractual obligations.33
In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.
He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by preponderance of evidence or greater weight of credible evidence.34
The reason for this rule is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof.
In short, mere allegations are not evidence.35
In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joels negligence and Dra. dela Llanas whiplash
injury rests on Dra. dela Llana. She must establish by preponderance of evidence that Joels negligence, in its natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced her whiplash injury, and without which her
whiplash injury would not have occurred.36
Notably, Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on three pieces of evidence:
(1) the pictures of her damaged car,
(2) the medical certificate dated November 20, 2000, and
(3) her testimonial evidence. However, none of these pieces of evidence show the causal relation between the vehicular
accident and the whiplash injury. In other words,
Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not adduce the factum probans or the evidentiary facts by which the factum probandum or the
ultimate fact can be established, as fully discussed below.37
A.

The pictures of the damaged

car only demonstrate the
impact of the collision
Dra. dela Llana contends that the pictures of the damaged car show that the massive impact of the collision caused her whiplash
injury. We are not persuaded by this bare claim. Her insistence that these pictures show the causation grossly belies common
logic. These pictures indeed demonstrate the impact of the collision. However, it is a far-fetched assumption that the whiplash
injury can also be inferred from these pictures.
B.
The medical certificate cannot be
considered because it was
not admitted in evidence
Furthermore, the medical certificate, marked as Exhibit "H" during trial, should not be considered in resolving this case for the
reason that it was not admitted in evidence by the RTC in an order dated September 23, 2004.38
Thus, the CA erred in even considering this documentary evidence in its resolution of the case. It is a basic rule that evidence
which has not been admitted cannot be validly considered by the courts in arriving at their judgments.
However, even if we consider the medical certificate in the disposition of this case, the medical certificate has no probative value
for being hearsay. It is a basic rule that evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on
the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand.39
Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence40 except in very unusual circumstance that is not found
in the present case. Furthermore, admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of
evidence depends on its relevance and competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its
tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends
on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the Rules of Court.41
During trial, Dra. dela Llana testified:
"Q: Did your physician tell you, more or less, what was the reason why you were feeling that pain in your left arm?
A: Well, I got a certificate from her and in that certificate, she stated that my condition was due to a compression of the nerve,
which supplied my left arm and my left hand.
Court: By the way, what is the name of this physician, Dra.?
Witness: Her name is Dra. Rosalinda Milla. She is a Rehabilitation Medicine Specialist. Atty. Yusingco: You mentioned that this
Dra. Rosalinda Milla made or issued a medical certificate. What relation does this medical certificate, marked as Exhibit H have
to do with that certificate, you said was made by Dra. Milla?
Witness: This is the medical certificate that Dra. Milla made out for me.
Atty. Yusingco: Your Honor, this has been marked as Exhibit H.
Atty. Yusingco: What other medical services were done on you, Dra. dela Llana, as a result of that feeling, that pain that you felt
in your left arm?
Witness: Well, aside from the medications and physical therapy, a re-evaluation of my condition after three months indicated that
I needed surgery.
Atty. Yusingco: Did you undergo this surgery?
Witness: So, on October 19, I underwent surgery on my neck, on my spine.
Atty. Yusingco: And, what was the result of that surgical operation?

Witness: Well, the operation was to relieve the compression on my nerve, which did not resolve by the extensive and prolonged
physical therapy that I underwent for more than three months."42(emphasis ours)
Evidently, it was Dr. Milla who had personal knowledge of the contents of the medical certificate. However, she was not
presented to testify in court and was not even able to identify and affirm the contents of the medical certificate. Furthermore,
Rebecca was deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Milla on the accuracy and veracity of her findings. We also point
out in this respect that the medical certificate nonetheless did not explain the chain of causation in fact between Joels reckless
driving and Dra. dela Llanas whiplash injury. It did not categorically state that the whiplash injury was a result of the vehicular
accident. A perusal of the medical certificate shows that it only attested to her medical condition, i.e., that she was suffering from
whiplash injury. However, the medical certificate failed to substantially relate the vehicular accident to Dra. dela Llanas whiplash
injury. Rather, the medical certificate only chronicled
her medical history and physical examinations.
C.
Dra. dela Llanas opinion that
Joels negligence caused her
whiplash injury has no probative value
Interestingly, the present case is peculiar in the sense that Dra. dela Llana, as the plaintiff in this quasi-delict case, was the lone
physician-witness during trial. Significantly, she merely testified as an ordinary witness before the trial court. Dra. dela Llana
essentially claimed in her testimony that Joels reckless driving caused her whiplash injury. Despite the fact that Dra. dela Llana
is a physician and even assuming that she is an expert in neurology, we cannot give weight to her opinion that Joels reckless
driving caused her whiplash injury without violating the rules on evidence. Under the Rules of Court, there is a substantial
difference between an ordinary witness and an expert witness. The opinion of an ordinary witness may be received in evidence
regarding:
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. Furthermore, the witness may also testify on his
impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person.43
On the other hand, the opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill,
experience or training which he shown to possess.44
However, courts do not immediately accord probative value to an admitted expert testimony, much less to an unobjected
ordinary testimony respecting special knowledge. The reason is that the probative value of an expert testimony does not lie in a
simple exposition of the expert's opinion. Rather, its weight lies in the assistance that the expert witness may afford the courts by
demonstrating the facts which serve as a basis for his opinion and the reasons on which the logic of his conclusions is founded.45
In the present case, Dra. dela Llanas medical opinion cannot be given probative value for the reason that she was not
presented as an expert witness. As an ordinary witness, she was not competent to testify on the nature, and the cause and
effects of whiplash injury. Furthermore, we emphasize that Dra. dela Llana, during trial, nonetheless did not provide a medical
explanation on the nature as well as the cause and effects of whiplash injury in her testimony.
The Supreme Court cannot take
judicial notice that vehicular
accidents cause whiplash injuries.
Indeed, a perusal of the pieces of evidence presented by the parties before the trial court shows that Dra. Dela Llana did not
present any testimonial or documentary evidence that directly shows the causal relation between the vehicular
accident and Dra. Dela Llanas injury. Her claim that Joels negligence causes her whiplash injury was not established
because of the deficiency of the presented evidence during trial. We point out in this respect that courts cannot take judicial
notice that vehicular ccidents cause whiplash injuries. This proportion is not public knowledge, or is capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.46 We have no expertise in the field of medicine.
Justices and judges are only tasked to apply and interpret the law on the basis of the parties pieces of evidence and their
corresponding legal arguments.

In sum, Dra. dela Llana miserably failed to establish her cause by preponderance of evidence. While we commiserate with her,
our solemn duty to independently and impartially assess the merits of the case binds us to rule against Dra. dela Llanas favor.
Her claim, unsupported by prepondernace of evidence, is merely a bare assertion and has no leg to stand on.
WHEREFORE, presmises considered, the assailed Decision dated February 11, 2008 and Resolution dated March 31, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

G.R. No. 132558 May 9, 2000

BEBERISA RIO, petitioner,
vs.
EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION and SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Death benefits under the Labor Code, as amended, are awarded only when the cause of death is listed as an occupational
disease by the Employees' Compensation Commission, or when the claimant presents proof that the working conditions
increased the risk of contracting the fatal disease.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the June 30, 1997
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)2 in CA-GR SP No. 41257. The dispositive portion of the challenged CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission is AFFIRMED, and the petition
DISMISSED.3
The Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) affirmed by the CA disposed as follows:
Based on the foregoing medical findings, it would appear that the etiology of deceased's ailment which caused
his death is not attributable to his employment. Since the ailment is not deemed work-connected, the instant
claim for death benefits cannot be given due course.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Social Security System appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, and
the instant case is dismissed for want of merit. 4
Petitioner also assails the January 29, 1998 Resolution5 of the appellate court denying reconsideration.
The Facts
Virgilio T. Rio Sr., husband of herein petitioner, was employed by Allied Port Services Inc. as stevedore since July, 1982. His
duties included: (1) handling of steel cargoes; (2) loading and unloading of silica sand; (3) handling, loading and unloading of
lumber products; (4) supervising other stevedores; and (5) performing other related work.6
On July 19, 1992, Virgilio Rio collapsed while working at the South Harbor, Manila. He was rushed to the Philippine General
Hospital (PGH) because of "melena, fever, chills and abdominal pains 8 days [prior to confinement] . . . ." He died three days
later. According to the Medical Certificate issued by Fe B. Bais, chief of the PGH Medical Records Division, the cause of death
was "uremia [secondary] to chronic renal failure. Chronic glomerulonephritis. . . ."7
Petitioner Beberisa Rio, his spouse, filed a claim for death benefits before the Social Security System (SSS). However, the
SSS denied the claim in this wise:8
The cause of death of your husband cannot be considered work-connected because based on the clinical
abstract you submitted, your husband had already on and off attack of edema and hypertension which are signs
of kidney disease even before his employment with the company.9
On appeal, the ECC affirmed the findings of the SSS. 10 Ruling that petitioner failed to present relevant evidence to establish the
causal connection between the deceased's ailment and his work as stevedore, the ECC held:
Moreover, medical evaluation suggests that Uremia is the sine qua non of chronic renal failure. It results from the
retention in the blood of urea and other end products of metabolism normally excreted into the urine. Chronic
Renal Failure on the other hand, is a toxic clinical condition associated with renal insufficiency and retention in
the blood of nitrogenous waste products. It may be due to the following:
a) nephritis

b) congestive heart failure

c) couch syndrome
d) poison
(Reference: Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, 11th Edition p. 1155).
Based on the foregoing medical findings, it would appear that the etiology of deceased's ailment which caused
his death is not attributable to his employment. Since the ailment is not deemed work-connected, the instant
claim for death benefits cannot be given due course. 11
After the ECC denied the Motion for Reconsideration, 12 petitioner appealed to the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In affirming the ECC, the Court of Appeals ruled:
Since petitioner failed to establish any causal connection of the disease which led to the death of her husband
with the nature of his working conditions, and, in particular, that said working condition had increased the risk of
contracting the disease, then the claim for death benefits must fail.
The former law on compensation, the Workmen's Compensation Act, was replaced by a novel scheme in the
New Labor Code under the title "Employees" Compensation and State Insurance Fund.' The new law discarded,
among others, the concept of "presumption of compensability and aggravation" and substituted one based on
social security principles. The purpose was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to
pay workmen's compensation and employee's right to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability. .
..
While as a rule, labor and social welfare legislation should be liberally construed in favor of the applicant, such
liberal construction of labor laws may not be applied where the pertinent provisions of law are clear and leave no
room for interpretation. 1
Hence, this Petition for Review. 14
Issue
The lone issue submitted for this Court's resolution is:
Whether . . . petitioner's claim for death benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended, shall prosper under the
increased risk theory. 15
This Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Compensability of Rio's Death
Under the Labor Code, as amended, 16 the beneficiaries of an employee are entitled to death benefits if the cause of death is a
sickness listed as occupational disease by the ECC; or any other illness caused by employment, subject to proof that the risk of
contracting the same is increased by the working conditions. 17
The primary and antecedent causes of Virgilio Rio's death are not listed as occupational diseases. Hence, petitioner should
have presented substantial evidence, or such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion, showing that the nature of her husband's employment or working conditions increased the risk of uremia, chronic
renal failure or chronic glomerulonephritis. 18 This the petitioner failed to do.
Petitioner did not adduce any proof of a reasonable connection between the work of the deceased and the cause of his death.
There was no showing that the progression of the disease was brought about largely by the conditions in Virgilio's job. Indeed,

petitioner presented no medical history, records or physician's report in order to substantiate her claim that the working
conditions at the Port Area increased the risk of uremia, renal failure or
glomerulonephritis. 19
As we ruled in Sante v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 20 ". . . a claimant must submit such proof as would constitute a
reasonable basis for concluding either that the conditions of employment of the claimant caused the ailment or that such working
conditions had aggravated the risk of contracting that ailment. What kind and quantum of evidence would constitute an adequate
basis for a reasonable man (not necessarily a medical scientist) to reach one or the other conclusion, can obviously be
determined only on a case-to-case basis. That evidence must, however, be real and substantial, and not merely apparent; for
the duty to prove work-causation or work-aggravation imposed by existing law is real . . . not merely apparent." At most,
petitioner merely claims that:
. . . The nature of his work required physical strength in handling cargoes and at the same time giving full
attention in supervising his men as the group's leadman assigned at Del Pan Area. It is worth mentioning that in
the place where the deceased was assigned, there were no available comfort rooms to enable him to answer the
"call of nature". In effect, delayed urination was a reality, coupled with the fact that being the leadman of his
group, his continuing physical presence at the work's premises was indispensable. . . . 21
Such bare allegation does not ipso facto make Virgilio's death compensable. Awards of compensation cannot rest on
speculations or presumptions. 22 The beneficiaries must present evidence to prove a positive proposition. 2
While this Court has ruled that the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries, 24 it is likewiseIMPORTANT
to note that such sympathy must be balanced by the equally vital interest of denying undeserving claims for compensation.
"Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to
which the tens of millions of workers and their families to look to for compensation whenever covered accidents, diseases and
deaths occur." 25 In this case, this Court has no other course but to apply the clear provisions of the law. 26
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 188551

February 27, 2013

EDMUNDO ESCAMILLA y JUGO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 dated 20 August 2009. It seeks a review of the 10 June 2009 Resolution2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 30456, which denied the Motion for Reconsideration3 of the 10 November 2008 CA
Decision4 affirming the conviction of Edmundo Escamilla (petitioner) for frustrated homicide.
BACKGROUND
The facts of this case, culled from the records, are as follows:
Petitioner has a house with a sari-sari store along Arellano Street, Manila.5 The victim, Virgilio Mendol (Mendol), is a tricycle
driver whose route traverses the road where petitioner's store is located.6
Around 2:00 a.m. of 01 August 1999, a brawl ensued at the comer of Estrada and Arellano Streets, Manila.7Mendol was about to
ride his tricycle at this intersection while facing Arellano Street.8 Petitioner, who was standing in front of his store, 30 meters
away from Mendol,9 shot the latter four times, hitting him once in the upper right portion of his chest.10 The victim was brought
to Ospital ng Makati for treatment11 and survived because of timely medical attention.12
The Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila filed an Information13 dated 01 December 1999 charging petitioner with frustrated
homicide. The Information reads:
That on or about August 1, 1999, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one Virgilio Mendol, by then and there
shooting the latter with a .9mm Tekarev pistol with Serial No. 40283 hitting him on the upper right portion of his chest, thereby
inflicting upon him gunshot wound which is necessarily fatal and mortal, thus performing all the acts of execution which should
have produced the crime of Homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes, independent
of his will, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Virgilio Mendol which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.14 During trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Mendol, Joseph
Velasco (Velasco) and Iluminado Garcelazo (Garcelazo), who all positively identified him as the shooter of Mendol.15 The doctor
who attended to the victim also testified.16 The documentary evidence presented included a sketch of the crime scene, the
Medical Certificate issued by the physician, and receipts of the medical expenses of Mendol when the latter was treated for the
gunshot wound.17 In the course of the presentation of the prosecution witnesses, the defense requested an ocular inspection of
the crime scene, a request that was granted by the court.18 On the other hand, the defense witnesses are petitioner himself, his
wife, Velasco and Barangay Tanod George Asumbrado (Asumbrado).19 The defense offered the results of the paraffin test of
petitioner and the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the courts ocular inspection of the crime scene.20
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) held that the positive testimonies of eyewitnesses deserve far more weight and credence than
the defense of alibi.21 Thus, it found petitioner guilty of frustrated homicide.22 The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Edmund Escamilla Y Jugo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Frustrated Homicide under Articles 249 and 50 [sic] of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences the accused to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as maximum. Accused is hereby ordered to indemnify complainant Virgilio Mendol the sum of 34,305.16 for
actual damages, 30,000.00 for moral damages.
SO ORDERED.23
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal dated 14 July 2006.24 In the brief that the CA required him to file,25 he questioned the credibility
of the prosecution witnesses over that of the defense.26 On the other hand, the Appellees Brief27 posited that the prosecution

witnesses were credible, because there were no serious discrepancies in their testimonies.28 Petitioner, in his Reply brief,29 said
that the prosecution witnesses did not actually see him fire the gun.30 Furthermore, his paraffin test yielded a negative result.31
The CA, ruling against petitioner, held that the issue of the credibility of witnesses is within the domain of the trial court, which is
in a better position to observe their demeanor.32 Thus, the CA upheld the RTCs appreciation of the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses in the present case.33 Also, the CA ruled that the victims positive and unequivocal identification of petitioner totally
destroyed his defense of alibi. Hence, it found no reason to disbelieve Mendols testimony.34 In addition, it said that a paraffin test
is not a conclusive proof that a person has not fired a gun and is inconsequential when there is a positive identification of
petitioner.35
A Motion for Reconsideration36 dated 08 December 2008 was filed by petitioner, who asserted that the defense was able to
discredit the testimony of the victim.37
In its 10 June 2009 Resolution,38 the CA denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration for being without merit, because the
matters discussed therein had already been resolved in its 10 November 2008 Decision.39
Hence, this Petition40 assailing the application to this case of the rule that the positive identification of the accused has more
weight than the defense of alibi.41 This Court resolved to require the prosecution to comment on the Petition.42 In his
Comment43 dated 15 December 2009, the victim said that his positive identification of petitioner was a direct evidence that the
latter was the author of the crime.44 Furthermore, what petitioner raised was allegedly a question of fact, which is proscribed by a
Rule 45 petition.45 Thus, the victim alleged, there being no new or substantial matter or question of law raised, the Petition
should be denied.46
We then obliged petitioner to file a reply.47 In his Reply dated 01 March 2010,48 he assigned as an error the application by the CA
of the rule that the positive identification of the accused has more weight than the defense of alibi.49 He posits that the lower
court manifestly overlooked relevant facts not disputed by the parties, but if properly considered would justify a different
conclusion.50 This Court, he said, should then admit an exception to the general rule that the findings of fact of the CA are
binding upon the Supreme Court.51
ISSUES
The questions before us are as follows:
I. Whether the prosecution established petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.52
II. Whether a defense of alibi, when corroborated by a disinterested party, overcomes the positive identification by three
witnesses.53
COURTS RULING
We deny the Petition.
I. The prosecution proved petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
A. Petitioner was positively identified by three witnesses.
Petitioner argues that there was reasonable doubt as to the identity of the shooter.54 He is wrong. As correctly held by the RTC
and affirmed by the CA, the identity of the assailant was proved with moral certainty by the prosecution, which presented three
witnesses the victim Mendol, Velasco, and Garcelazo who all positively identified him as the shooter.55 We have held that a
categorical and consistently positive identification of the accused, without any showing of ill motive on the part of the
eyewitnesses, prevails over denial.56 All the three witnesses were unswerving in their testimonies pointing to him as the shooter.
None of them had any ulterior motive to testify against him.
Mendol said that he was about to ride his tricycle at the corner of Arellano and Estrada Streets, when petitioner, who was in front
of the formers store, shot him.57 The first shot hit its target, but petitioner continued to fire at the victim three more times, and the
latter then started to run away.58
Velasco, who was also at the corner of Estrada and Arellano Streets, heard the first shot, looked around, then saw petitioner
firing at Mendol three more times.59

Lastly, Garcelazo testified that while he was buying bread from a bakery at that same street corner, he heard three shots before
he turned his head and saw petitioner pointing a gun at the direction of the victim, who was bloodied in the right
chest.60 Garcelazo was just an arms length away from him.61
The three witnesses had a front view of the face of petitioner, because they were all facing Arellano Street from its intersection
with Estrada Street, which was the locus criminis.62 Although the crime happened in the wee hours of the morning, there was a
street lamp five meters from where petitioner was standing when he shot the victim, thus allowing a clear view of the assailants
face.63 They all knew petitioner, because they either bought from or passed by his store.64
B. The intent to kill was shown by the continuous firing at the victim even after he was hit.
Petitioner claims that the prosecution was unable to prove his intent to kill.65 He is mistaken. The intent to kill, as an essential
element of homicide at whatever stage, may be before or simultaneous with the infliction of injuries.66 The evidence to prove
intent to kill may consist of, inter alia, the means used; the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim; and
the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing of the victim.67
Petitioners intent to kill was simultaneous with the infliction of injuries. Using a gun,68 he shot the victim in the chest. 69 Despite a
bloodied right upper torso, the latter still managed to run towards his house to ask for help. 70Nonetheless, petitioner continued to
shoot at him three more times,71 albeit unsuccessfully.72 While running, the victim saw his nephew in front of the house and
asked for help.73 The victim was immediately brought to the hospital on board an owner-type jeep.74 The attending physician,
finding that the bullet had no point of exit, did not attempt to extract it; its extraction would just have caused further
damage.75 The doctor further said that the victim would have died if the latter were not brought immediately to the hospital.76 All
these facts belie the absence of petitioners intent to kill the victim.
II. Denial and alibi were not proven.
In order for alibi to prosper, petitioner must establish by clear and convincing evidence that, first, he was in another place at the
time of the offense; and, second, it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. 77 The appreciation of the
defense of alibi is pegged against this standard and nothing else. Petitioner, as found by both the RTC and CA, failed to prove
the presence of these two requisite conditions. Hence, he was wrong in asserting that alibi, when corroborated by other
witnesses, succeeds as a defense over positive identification.78
A. Petitioner was unable to establish that he was at home at the time of the offense.
The alibi of petitioner was that he was at home asleep with his wife when Mendol was shot.79 To support his claim, petitioner
presented the testimonies of his wife and Asumbrado.80
1. The wife of petitioner did not know if he was at home when the shooting happened.
The wife of petitioner testified that both of them went to sleep at 9:00 p.m. and were awakened at 3:00 a.m. by the banging on
their door.81 However, she also said that she did not know if petitioner stayed inside their house, or if he went somewhere else
during the entire time she was asleep.82 Her testimony does not show that he was indeed at home when the crime happened. At
the most, it only establishes that he was at home before and after the shooting. Her lack of knowledge regarding his
whereabouts between 1:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. belies the credibility of his alibi. Even so, the testimonies of relatives deserve
scant consideration, especially when there is positive identification83 by three witnesses.
2. Asumbrano did not see the entire face of the shooter.
Petitioner is questioning why neither the RTC nor the CA took into account the testimony of Asumbrado, the Barangay Tanod on
duty that night.84 Both courts were correct in not giving weight to his testimony.
Asumbrado said that he was there when the victim was shot, not by appellant, but by a big man who was in his twenties.85 This
assertion was based only on a back view of the man who fired the gun 12 meters away from Asumbrado.86 The latter never saw
the shooters entire face.87 Neither did the witness see the victim when the latter was hit.88 Asumbrado also affirmed that he was
hiding when the riot took place. 89 These declarations question his competence to unequivocally state that indeed it was not
petitioner who fired at Mendol.
B. Petitioner's home was just in front of the street where the shooting occurred.
Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the accused was when the crime transpired and the place
where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places. 90 Petitioner failed to prove the physical
impossibility of his being at the scene of the crime at the time in question.

Both the prosecution and the defense witnesses referred to the front of appellant's house or store whenever they testified on the
location of the shooter. Petitioner was in front of his house when he shot the victim, according to Velasco's
testimony.91 Meanwhile the statement of Asumbrado that the gate of the store of the petitioner was closed when the shooting
happened92 can only mean that the latter's house and store were both located in front of the scene of the crime.
1wphi 1

Petitioner proffers the alibi that he was at home, instead of showing the impossibility of his authorship of the crime. His alibi
actually bolsters the prosecution's claim that he was the shooter, because it placed him just a few steps away from the scene of
the crime. The charge is further bolstered by the testimony of his wife, who could not say with certainty that he was at home at
2:00a.m.- the approximate time when the victim was shot.
Based on the foregoing, it cannot be said that the lower courts overlooked any fact that could have justified a different
conclusion. Hence, the CA was correct in affirming the R TC 's Decision that petitioner, beyond reasonable doubt, was the
assailant.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED. The 10 June 2009 Resolution93 and 10 November 2008
Decision94 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 30456 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 188603

January 16, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
RAMIL RARUGAL alias "AMAY BISAYA," Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before this Court is the appeal of the June 30, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02413,2 which
affirmed with modification the May 29, 2006 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 86, Quezon City in Crim. Case
No. -Q-99-82409, entitled People of the Philippines v. Ramil Rarugal that found appellant Ramil Rarugal alias "Amay Bisaya"
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder.
On December 8, 1998, the following information for the crime of murder was filed against appellant:
That on or about the 19th day of October, 1998, in Quezon City, Philippine, the above-named appellant, with intent to kill,
qualified by evident premeditation and treachery, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
employ personal violence upon the person of one Arnel M. Florendo, by then and there stabbing him with a bladed weapon,
hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said Arnel M. Florendo.4

Appellant was only arrested sometime in August 2001. During his arraignment on August 27, 2001, appellant pleaded not
guilty.5 Trial on the merits ensued.
Based on the testimonies of witnesses presented by the prosecution, the RTC found that on the night of October 19, 1998 at
around 9:45 p.m., while victim Arnel Florendo (Florendo) was cycling along Sampaguita Street, Barangay Capari, Novaliches,
Quezon City, appellant, with the use of a long double-bladed weapon, stabbed Florendo; thus, forcibly depriving him of his
bicycle. Immediately thereafter, appellant hurriedly fled the scene. This incident was witnessed by Roberto Sit-Jar, who positively
identified appellant in court.
Florendo arrived home bleeding. He was quickly attended to by his siblings, including his brother Renato. When Renato
recounted the events of that night to the court, he testified that Florendo told him and his other relatives that it was appellant who
had stabbed him. They then took Florendo to Tordesillas Hospital but had to transfer him to Quezon City General Hospital, due
to the unavailability of blood. It was there that Florendo died6 on October 26, 1998 with the family spending about P2,896.007 for
his hospitalization and P25,000.008 for his funeral.
Autopsy Report signed by Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Dominic L. Aguda, showed the following Postmortem Findings9:
Cyanosis, lips and fingernailbeds
Brain- pale
Heart-chambers, contain small amount of dark clotted blood
STAB WOUNDsutured, healing, 3.0 cms, located on left chest, 15.0 cms. from the anterior median line directed backwards and medially
involving the skin and underlying tissues passing between the 6th and 7th left ribs, entering the thoracic cavity and
severed the lower lobe of the left lung with a depth of 7-8 cms.
THORACOSTOMY INCISIONSsutured, 3.5 cms., located on the left chest, 19.0 cms. from the anterior median line; sutured, 3.2 cms. located on the
right chest 20 cms. from the anterior median line
Hemothorax- left, 500 cc
Visceral organs- pale
Stomach- empty
CAUSE OF DEATH:
STAB WOUND, LEFT CHEST
In his defense, appellant denied that he stabbed Florendo since he was at that time working as a farm administrator for the town
mayor in Pangasinan. He said he was living with his cousin in Urbiztondo, Pangasinan on October 19, 1998, where he had been
staying since 1997. He stated that during the period 1997 to 1998, he did not visit Manila at any point. On cross-examination,
appellant stated that he was arrested in front of his house in Novaliches, Quezon City.10
On May 29, 2006, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code. It stated:
After evaluation, the Court finds that the guilt of the appellant was proven beyond reasonable doubt. Witness Sit-Jar positively
identified appellant as the assailant of Florendo. In view of the positive identification made by Sit-Jar, the denial and alibi made
by [appellant] has no leg to stand on. Under prevailing jurisprudence alibis and denials are worthless in light of positive
identification by witnesses who have no motive to falsely testify.
Moreover, Florendo did not immediately die after he was stabbed by the appellant. Florendo, apparently conscious that he could
die of his wound, identified his assailant as the appellant Ramil Rarugal. Under the rules, statements made by a person under
the consciousness of an impending death is admissible as evidence of the circumstances of his death. The positive identification

made by the victim before he died, under the consciousness of an impending death is a strong evidence indicating the liability of
herein appellant.
xxxx
As shown by the evidence, the killing of Arnel Florendo was sudden indicating treachery and the appellant being then armed
with a knife, the killing was done with abuse of superior strength. These circumstances qualify the crime to murder, all of the
elements of the offense being present.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered finding the appellant Ramil Rarugal alias "Amay Bisaya"
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of P28,124.00 for actual damages, P50,000.00 for civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as and for moral damages.11 (Citations omitted.)
Appellant filed his notice of appeal on July 21, 2006.12 He questioned the RTCs finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the
commission of the crime and its appreciation of treachery as a qualifying circumstance. He argued that witness Sit-Jar lacked
credibility for giving inconsistent testimony. Moreover, he averred that there was no basis for the finding that treachery qualified
the crime to murder since its elements were not established.13
On June 30, 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the May 29, 2006 decision of the RTC. It stated that witness
Sit-Jars positive identification of appellant as the one who stabbed Florendo takes precedence over appellants defense of
denial and alibi. Moreover, appellant failed to adduce evidence to show that Sit-Jar had any improper motive to falsely testify
against him. The Court of Appeals thus disposed of the appeal in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the appellant
RAMIL RARUGAL is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P27,896.00 as actual damages and the amount
of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. The said Decision in all other respect STANDS.14
Hence, this appeal.15 Petitioners confinement was confirmed by the Bureau of Corrections on September 30, 2009.16
Both the appellee17 and the appellant18 waived the filing of supplemental briefs and adopted the briefs they filed before the Court
of Appeals.
We affirm the June 30, 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals, with modification respecting the award of damages.
This Court has consistently stated that the trial court is in a better position to adjudge the credibility of witnesses, especially if its
decision is affirmed by the Court of Appeals.19 We have been reminded in People v. Clores20 that:
When it comes to the matter of credibility of a witness, settled are the guiding rules some of which are that (1) the appellate court
will not disturb the factual findings of the lower court, unless there is a showing that it had overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case x x x; (2) the
findings of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of a witness is entitled to great respect since it had the opportunity to
examine his demeanor as he testified on the witness stand, and, therefore, can discern if such witness is telling the truth or not;
and (3) a witness who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remains consistent on
cross-examination is a credible witness. (Citations omitted.)
The rationale for these guidelines is that the trial courts are in a better position to decide the question of credibility, having heard
the witnesses themselves and having observed firsthand their deportment and manner of testifying under grueling examination.21
We see no need to depart from the aforestated rules. After a careful review of the records, we find that appellant failed to negate
the findings of the trial court with concrete evidence that the latter had overlooked, misconstrued, or misapplied some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case. We agree with the Court of Appeals that
the prosecution witness recounted the details of that fateful night in a "clear, straightforward and convincing manner, devoid of
any signs of falsehood or fabrication."22
First, prosecution witness Sit-Jar positively identified appellant as the victims assailant in contrast to the appellants defense of
denial and alibi. We have stated in Malana v. People23 that:

It is elementary that alibi and denial are outweighed by positive identification that is categorical, consistent and untainted by any
ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter. Alibi and denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. The prosecution witnesses positively identified
appellants as two of the perpetrators of the crime. It is incumbent upon appellants to prove that they were at another place when
the felony was committed, and that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it
was committed. x x x. (Citations omitted.)
The records are devoid of any indication that it was physically impossible for appellant to have been in the scene of the crime at
the time it was committed. Appellants bare alibi that he was working as a farm administrator in Urbiztondo, Pangasinan and was
allegedly staying there at the time of the commission of the crime does not suffice to prove the alleged physical impossibility that
he committed the crime charged, moreso in the face of positive identification by the witness, who was not motivated by any
improper motive to falsely testify against him.
Second, the victim was still alive after the stabbing incident. He had time to reach his house and confide in his brother, witness
Renato, that it was appellant who had stabbed him.
Rule 130, Section 37 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 37. Dying declaration. The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an impending death, may
be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of
such death.
The Court has stated in People v. Maglian24:
The Rules of Court states that a dying declaration is admissible as evidence if the following circumstances are present: "(a) it
concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; (b) it is made when death appears to be
imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to
testify had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the
declarants death." x x x. (Citation omitted.)
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the statement of Florendo made to his brother Renato has complied with the requisites
of a dying declaration. It isIMPORTANT to note that Florendo, after being stabbed by appellant twice on the chest, went home
and under labored breathing, told Renato that it was appellant who had stabbed him. Clearly, the statement made was an
expression of the cause and the surrounding circumstances of his death, and under the consciousness of impending death.
There being nothing in the records to show that Florendo was incompetent, he would have been competent to testify had he
survived.25 It is enough to state that the deceased was at the time competent as a witness.26 Lastly, the dying declaration is
offered in an inquiry the subject of which involves his death. We reproduce the statement of the RTC:
Moreover, the victim did not immediately die after he was stabbed by the appellant. The victim, apparently conscious that he
could die of his wound, identified his assailant as the appellant Ramil Rarugal. Under the rules, statement made by a person
under the consciousness of an impending death is admissible as evidence of the circumstances of his death. The positive
identification made by the victim before he died, under the consciousness of an impending death is a strong evidence indicating
the liability of herein appellant.27
It is of no moment that the victim died seven days from the stabbing incident and after receiving adequate care and treatment,
because the apparent proximate cause of his death, the punctures in his lungs, was a consequence of appellants stabbing him
in the chest.
Anent the finding of treachery by the RTC, we agree that appellants act of suddenly stabbing Florendo while he was innocently
cycling along Sampaguita Street, Barangay Capari, Novaliches, Quezon City constituted the qualifying circumstance of
treachery. As we previously ruled, treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.28 Here, appellant surprised Florendo when he suddenly and
swiftly attacked and stabbed him in the chest. The swift turn of events left Florendo defenseless to protect himself, allowing
appellant to commit the crime without risk to his own person. Thus, we sustain the findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the crime.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death for the crime of murder. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code.29

However, to conform to existing jurisprudence, the Court must modify the amount of indemnity for death and exemplary
damages awarded by the courts a quo.
Anent the award of damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto
for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees
and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in proper cases.30
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the heirs of the victim were able to prove before the trial court actual damages in the
amount of P27,896.00 based on the receipts31 they submitted. Moreover, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the award of
exemplary damages is proper in this case. We have stated that:
Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily,
intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the
private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary
or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather
than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether
ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of
Article 2230 of the Civil Code.32 (Emphasis omitted.)
We, however, increase the award of exemplary damages to P30,000.0033 and the award for mandatory civil indemnity to
P75,000.0034 to conform to recent jurisprudence.
We sustain the RTCs award for moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 even in the absence of proof of mental and
emotional suffering of the victims heirs.35 As borne out by human nature and experience, a violent death invariably and
necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victims family.36
In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the monetary awards for damages interest at the legal
rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.37
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The June 30, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02413 is
AFFIRMED. Appellant RAMIL RARUGAL alias "Amay Bisaya" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER, and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of Arnel M. Florendo the
amounts of P27,896.00 as actual damages, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages. All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality
of this Decision until fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 141633

December 14, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
REX T. CANLAS and other JOHN DOES, accused-appellants.
CARPIO, J.:
Where the court relies solely on circumstantial evidence, the combined effect of the pieces of circumstantial evidence must
inexorably lead to the conclusion that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction must rest on nothing less than
moral certainty, whether it proceeds from direct or circumstantial evidence.

The Case
On appeal before us is the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Angeles City, dated January 19, 2000, in Criminal
Case No. 98-755 finding appellant REX T. CANLAS guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The Charge
Appellant was charged together with six other unidentified men who were designated in the Information as Richard Doe, Peter
Doe, Rommel Doe, Winston Doe, and Charlie Doe. The Information alleges:
"That on or about the 14th day of June, 1998, in Brgy. Palat, municipality (sic) of Porac, province (sic) of Pampanga,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, with intent of (sic) gain, and with violence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away with them merchandise consisting of assorted clothes worth P4,000.00 and cash
money in the amount of P1,000.00, belonging to the deceased, Jing Garcia Flores, with a total value of FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) Philippine Currency, and on the occasion of said robbery and for the purpose of
enabling them to take, steal and carry away the said articles, accused in pursuance of their conspiracy, and taking
advantage of their superior strength and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and use personal violence upon the deceased, Jing Garcia Flores with the use of a lead pipe and a hunting knife,
inflicting upon him mortal and fatal injuries which caused his death.
Contrary to law."2
Arraignment and Plea
When arraigned on October 7, 1998, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty.3 Trial then ensued.
The Trial
The evidence of the prosecution consisted of the oral testimonies of SPO2 Henry Ayson (for brevity "SPO2 Ayson"), Jose
Tamayo (for brevity "Jose"), Willie Silva (for brevity "Silva"), Ismael Victoria (for brevity "Victoria"), Dr. Olga Bausa (for brevity
"Dr. Bausa"), and Dr. Lilia Panlilio, as well as documentary and object evidence. The defense for its part presented appellant as
its lone witness.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution through the Office of the Solicitor General narrates its version of the facts, as follows:
"On June 14, 1998, at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Willie Silva, Ismael Victoria, Daniel Flores and Jing Flores, all
ambulant vendors, went to Palat, Porac, Pampanga to sell different kinds of clothes, such as t-shirts, shorts and sandos.
Daniel Flores and Ismael Victoria were the first to be called by customers, while Willie Silva and Jing Flores went on their
way to look for other customers. When Willie Silva was called by a customer to whom Willie showed his wares, Jing
Flores continued walking and entered a small alley. After Willie Silva finished attending to his buyer, Willie followed Jing
Flores at the small alley. Not finding Jing Flores, Willie asked the residents there if they saw where Jing went. After
receiving negative replies, except from a deaf-mute who said that Jing was embraced by someone, Willie Silva went
back to his companions. Willie, this time accompanied by Ismael Victoria and Daniel Flores, went back to the alley and
looked for Jing Flores. They also searched the back of a house and the creek, but to no avail. At the time he
disappeared, Jing Flores was wearing a white Hanes t-shirt, maong shortPANTS , blue sandals, a cap with "Bench"
marking and a red towel.
Thereafter, at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Willie Silva, Ismael Victoria and Daniel Flores went to Towking, Porac
to continue selling their goods. The three of them returned to Palat an hour later. They continued looking for Jing Flores
until 8:00 o'clock in the evening. Thereafter, they all went home to Dolores, Mexico, Pampanga.
Upon learning that Jing Flores had not yet gone home, Willie Silva and his companions sought the help of their barangay
captain and several barriomates. Their group, numbering twenty, went back to Palat, Porac to look for Jing Flores.
Arriving midnight at Palat, the group sought the help of the barangay captain thereat and thereupon searched for Jing
Flores. They searched the whole barangay for hours. At around 6:00 to 7:00 o'clock in the morning the following day,
June 15, 1998, the lifeless body of Jing Flores was found in a creek with his head and upper body covered with animal
feed sack.

Roberto Bautista, the Barangay Captain of Dolores, Mexico, reported to SPO2 Henry Ayson of the Porac Police Station
that the dead body of Jing Flores was found in a creek at Palat, Porac. SPO2 Ayson, together with SPO2 Edilberto David
and other policemen, went to the site where the cadaver of Jing Flores was found. SPO2 Ayson ordered the taking of
pictures before and after retrieving the cadaver, which was positively identified by Roberto Bautista as that of Jing Flores.
Traces of blood were seen not only at the place where the lifeless body of Jing Flores was found, but also on the leaves
of the different plants which lead to the backyard of the house, around 300 meters away from the creek, of Jose Tamayo.
Since there were still traces of blood leading to the kitchen of Jose Tamayo's house, SPO2 Ayson asked the permission
of Jose if the former could enter the latter's house. When said permission was granted, SPO2 Ayson, together with his
policemen-companions and some barangay officials and members of the search party, entered the house and found
traces of blood on the kitchen floor which was covered with sand. Traces of blood that lead to one of the rooms were
also found. Upon entering the said room, SPO2 Ayson found underneath a bamboo bed a bag containing assorted
clothes, some of which were soaked in blood. SPO2 Ayson likewise found inside the room a red sack containing a blue
cap with "Bench" markings, a red towel wet with blood, a bed sheet with blood stains and blue sandals. At the corner of
the bamboo bed was a lead pipe likewise stained with blood. A hunting knife inside one of the drawers in the house was
also recovered.
Lucila, the wife of Jose Tamayo, told SPO2 Ayson that Rex Canlas is their grandson, and that the bag which was
recovered inside the room belongs to Rex who used to occupy the bamboo bed. Upon further questioning by SPO2
Ayson, Lucila narrated that she saw Rex Canlas call Jing Flores to enter the house. Rex asked Lucila to get out of the
house and, when she complied, Rex locked theDOOR . Outside, Lucila heard someone was being beaten inside the
house. After an hour, Lucila found the dead body of Jing Flores inside the house and Rex Canlas cleaning the kitchen
floor.
In the course of his investigation, SPO2 Ayson also found that, at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning of June 14, 1998,
Rex Canlas had a drinking spree with his cousins as it was the birthday of one of their relatives. That appellant attended
said birthday celebration was admitted by appellant himself.
Willie Silva, who was among those who went inside the house of Jose Tamayo, also saw blood on the wall in the kitchen.
Willie likewise found that the clothes inside the bag and the blue sandals which were recovered inside one of the rooms
in the house were those of Jing Flores. He also saw Lucila Tamayo washing a white Hanes t-shirt stained with blood.
Ismael Victoria likewise identified the clothes that were placed inside the bag which was recovered underneath the
bamboo bed as those being sold by Jing Flores, and that the blue sandals, cap and red towel were those worn by Jing
Flores at the time he disappeared the day before. Ismael recalled that the first time he and his companions looked for
Jing Flores in the afternoon of June 14, 1998, Ismael saw Rex Canlas standing under a tree across the house of Jose
Tamayo.
Dr. Olga Bausa, a forensic chemist of the PNP, Camp Crame, conducted an examination to determine the presence of
human blood on the evidence (sic) the police gathered that led them to the house of Jose Tamayo and those that were
recovered therein. According to Dr. Bausa, all except the bladed weapon, gave positive results for the presence of
human blood.
Dr. Lilia Panlilio, the Municipal Health Officer of Porac, Pampanga, conducted an autopsy of the cadaver of Jing Flores.
According to Dr. Panlilio, Jing Flores suffered numerous incised and lacerated wounds. She also found that all of the
lobes of the brain of Jing's cadaver had blood, and that the most fatal wound inflicted upon Jing was the one which
caused epidural hemorrhages in the brain. Dr. Panlilio concluded that Jing died of cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to
intracranial hemorrhages, and that the weapon used in inflicting the aforesaid hemorrhages could have been a blunt
object such as a lead pipe.
Jose Tamayo declared that he is the father of appellant's mother, Remedios. After Remedios died, Jose Tamayo and his
wife took care of appellant. When appellant would come home from work, he would sometimes sleep in (sic) the bamboo
bed in the house of Jose Tamayo.
The heirs of Jing Flores spent sums of money totaling P54,000.00 for Jing's funeral, burial and related expenses. They
also suffered emotional pain, sleepless nights and mental anguish as a result of Jing's death."4
Version of the Defense
In his testimony in court, appellant denied any involvement in the commission of the crime. The trial court summarized
appellant's testimony in this wise

"Accused Rex Canlas testified that he was working at Maybunga, Pasig on the date of the incident as aFACTORY
worker. He went home to his father's house at Palat, Porac in the evening of June 13, 1998. At 7 o'clock of the
following morning, June 14, 1998, and when he was about to return to Pasig for work, he was invited by his cousin
Dexter Canlas to attend the latter's birthday. He went to Dexter's house which is near the house of his grandfather, Jose
Tamayo. He left the house of Dexter at 10:30 a.m. and proceeded to the jeepney terminal at barangay Tokwing. The
jeepney that he boarded left the terminal at 11:30 a.m. and he arrived at Angeles City at noon where he boarded a
Philippine Rabbit bus that brought him to Manila. He arrived in Manila at 2:30 p.m. and boarded a passenger jeepney
going to Pasig. He arrived at his place of work at around 4:30 p.m. of the same day. He denied the charge made against
him as he already left barangay Palat when the incident happened. He likewise denied that he lives with Jose Tamayo
and alleged that he was living in his father's house which was also located at barangay Palat. He admitted, however, that
he sometimes slept at the house of Jose Tamayo. He denied though, that he slept on the wooden bed as he only slept
on the sofa. He further alleged that he had nothing to do with the death of Jing Garcia Flores."5
The Trial Court's Ruling
After trial, the trial court rendered the now assailed judgment convicting appellant, thus:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Rex Canlas is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Accused Rex Canlas is further ordered to pay the heirs of Jing Garcia Flores the sum of P54,000.00 as actual damages,
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim and P50,000.00 for and as moral damages.
SO ORDERED."6
The Issues
In this appeal, appellant continues to profess his innocence and seeks his acquittal based on these errors allegedly committed
by the trial court:
"I. THE LOWER COURT IS (SIC) ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME AS
CHARGED THRU (SIC) CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
II. THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE EVIDENCE OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IN ORDER TO
ACQUIT HIM."7
The Court's Ruling
After a careful and thorough review of the facts and evidence on record, we rule for appellant's acquittal.
There is no direct evidence in this case that could link appellant to the commission of the crime. As stated by the trial court,
"(N)obody actually saw how the victim was killed and how the robbery was committed."8 The trial court was thus compelled to
rely solely on circumstantial evidence. The trial court enumerated the pieces of circumstantial evidence that justified its finding of
guilt:
"1. Jing Garcia Flores was last seen alive at around 2 o'clock in the afternoon of June 14, 1998 entering a small alley
leading to the house of Jose Tamayo.
2. The victim was wearing a blue "Bench" cap and a pair of blue "Beach Walk" sandals, with a red towel and carrying
assorted merchandise when last seen entering a small alley.
3. While conducting the search for Jing Garcia Flores in the afternoon of June 14, 1998, prosecution witness Ismael
Victoria saw accused Rex Canlas standing under a tree across the house of Jose Tamayo contrary to the accused (sic)
allegation that he was already in Metro Manila at that time.
4. In the early morning of June 15, 1998, the lifeless body of Jing Garcia Flores was found in a creek bearing contusions
and incised wounds.
5. The creek is only around three hundred meters away from the house of Jose Tamayo.
6. Drips of blood and blood stains (sic) were found at the creek were the body of the victim was recovered.

7. The drips of blood and blood stains (sic) were also found on the leaves of different plants that lead to the backyard of
Jose Tamayo.
8. Blood stains (sic) were also found leading to the kitchen of Jose Tamayo's house.
9. At the kitchen floor, drips of blood were found which were covered with sand. Blood stains (sic) were also found on the
wall and on the small table of the kitchen.
10. When the police and the searching party entered the house of Jose Tamayo, they saw the grandmother of the
accused washing a white "Hanes" shirt stained with blood in a basin. The grandmother said that the clothing belonged to
the victim and at the same time requesting that she be not involve (sic) in the case as she is already old.
11. Underneath a bamboo bed inside one of the rooms of the house of Jose Tamayo was found a bag containing
assorted clothings (103 pieces of shortPANTS and 34 pieces of sandos) with some soaked in blood and were identified
to belong to the victim.
12. The blue cap with "Bench" marking, the blue sandals, and a red towel stained with blood all belonging to the victim
were also found inside the said room. At the corner of the bamboo bed was a lead pipe with blood stains (sic).
13. A bedsheet (sic) with blood stains (sic) was also found inside the room.
14. Dr. Olga Bausa, a forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame, testified that these items with
blood stains (sic) when subjected for examination gave positive results for the presence of human blood.
15. Jose Tamayo testified that after the accused (sic) mother died, said accused lived with them and they were the ones
who send (sic) Rex to school.
16. Jose Tamayo also admitted that the accused used to stay and sleep at the room where the items belonging to the
deceased were recovered.
17. Accused admitted that in the morning of June 14, 1998, he was at his cousin Dexter Canlas' house and attended the
birthday of the latter. Dexter Canlas' house is very near the house of Jose Tamayo."9
We do not agree with the trial court that the foregoing circumstantial evidence inexorably lead to the conclusion that appellant
robbed and killed the victim, Jing Flores.
True, conviction is not always based on direct evidence for it may also rest purely on circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial
evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference.10 It
is founded on experience, observed facts and coincidences establishing a connection between the known and proven facts and
the facts sought to be proved.11 Conviction may be warranted on the basis of circumstantial evidence provided that: (1) there is
more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.12 With respect to the third requisite, it is essential
that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of others, as the guilty person.13
Based on these requisites, the circumstantial evidence invoked by the trial court raises doubt rather than moral certainty as to
the guilt of appellant. The circumstantial evidence of the prosecution fails to muster the quantum of proof required in criminal
cases guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, the circumstances enumerated by the trial court do not completely discount
the possibility that other than appellant, there could be another person or persons who could have perpetrated the crime.
First, the trial court gave much weight to the testimony of Victoria who claimed he saw appellant standing under a tree across
the house of Jose in the afternoon of June 14, 1998, at the time Victoria and his companions were looking for the victim.14 The
trial court considered the presence of appellant at the crime scene at the time the victim disappeared as sufficient to incriminate
appellant to the commission of the crime. Such presence of appellant at the crime scene does not necessarily mean that
appellant authored the crime. Such presence at the crime scene merely debunks appellant's alibi that he was in Manila.15
While the defense of alibi is by nature a weak one, it assumes commensurate significance and strength where the evidence for
the prosecution is also intrinsically weak.16 There is no evidence that appellant was the person who was last seen with the victim.
There is also no evidence that appellant ever approached the victim. Silva, one of the companions of the victim, testified that
when he was looking for the victim in the afternoon of June 14, 1998, a deaf-mute gestured to him that someone had embraced
the victim.17 However, Silva was not able to check the veracity of the deaf-mute's claim because the deaf-mute's mother
prevented him from further communicating with Silva.18 The deaf-mute was not presented in court. The absence of proof

connecting appellant to the disappearance of the victim that fateful day compels us to consider with caution the other pieces of
circumstantial evidence.
Second, we do not agree that the pieces of circumstantial evidence enumerated by the trial court "clearly make an unbroken
chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
perpetrator of the crime."19 The events that transpired from the time of the disappearance of the victim at about 2:00 o'clock in
the afternoon of June 14, 1998 to 7:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day, the time when the victim's body was
discovered, are unaccounted for. There is no concrete proof showing that appellant was with the victim during that span of time.
The records also do not show when the victim was actually killed.
Third, in view of the inherently weak evidence of the prosecution against appellant, the possibility that another person or persons
could have authored the crime cannot be totally discounted. SPO2 Ayson, the police officer who investigated the crime, testified
that the house of Jose has neither a fence nor a gate. While the back of the house has a "single barbed wire", anybody could
enter said house.20 SPO2 Ayson further testified that the room where the personal properties of the victim were found and where
the pipe with bloodstains was also discovered has noDOOR , making it open.21 The house and the said room are easily
accessible to entry by other persons. Even the police investigators originally theorized that several persons committed the crime.
SPO2 Ayson testified that:
"Q:

Officer Ayson, when you decided to file a case, whom did you charge?

A:

Rey Canlas, Gerald Canlas, Rex Canlas and Angelito Galang.

Q:

That was (sic) included Rex Canlas?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

Will you please explain to the court why you charged those persons in the first instance, what was your basis?

A:

Because all of them participated in the drinking bout.

Q:

Did you find out the relationship of Gerald Canlas, Ramil Canlas to Rex Canlas?

A:

They are all cousins.

Q:

What about Angelito Galang?

A:

May be a relative of them (sic).

ATTY. PUNZALAN:
Q:

In your investigation, where were these persons drinking together?

A:

At the house of the celebrant, Dexter Canlas, a brother of Gerald Canlas.

Q:

Did you find out what time of the day?

A:
They started drinking from 9 o'clock. They added they went home before 1 o'clock already in the (sic) intoxicated
condition.
Q:

On what day?

A:

14 June, 1998, sir.

Q:

Where were they drinking together? In what house?

A:

Gerald Canlas, sir.

Q:

That Gerald Canlas' house, how far was that from the house of Jose Tamayo?

A:

Only adjacent. They are immediate neighbors, sir.

ATTY. PUNZALAN:
That will be all for the witness, Your Honor.
COURT:
Q:

Mr. Witness, why did you include the others in this case as accused?

A:

Based on our theory, sir.

Q:
But per information given you by the grandmother it was only Rex Canlas who was inside the room when the
incident happened?
A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

It was only your theory that others also participated?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

As what?

A:

Because they were together when the victim passed-by, sir."22

Due to the insufficiency of evidence against the other suspects, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor in a Resolution dated
September 4, 1998, ordered the dropping of these suspects from the case and directed the filing of the Information for robbery
with homicide against appellant and other unidentified suspects designated in the Information as Richard Doe, Peter Doe,
Rommel Doe, Winston Doe, etc.23
The test to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record is sufficient to convict the accused is that the series
of circumstances duly proved must be consistent with each other and that each and every circumstance must be consistent with
the accused's guilt and inconsistent with his innocence.24 The circumstantial evidence must exclude the possibility that some
other person has committed the offense.25 In this case, the evidence at hand does not convincingly prove appellant's complicity
in the crime, nor does it foreclose the possibility that another person is liable for it.
Fourth, the following pieces of circumstantial evidence do not conclusively point to appellant as the assailant of the victim: (1) the
traces of blood from the creek where the body was discovered leading to the house of the grandfather of appellant; (2) the
bloodstains on the kitchen floor of the house of said grandfather; (3) a bag containing the items belonging to the victim found
under the bamboo bed inside a room that appellant allegedly slept in occasionally; (4) the cap of the victim and a pipe with
bloodstains also found inside said room; and (5) a hunting knife found inside the kitchen cabinet. No other independent physical
evidence that could connect appellant to the crime, like appellant's fingerprints, was found at the scene of the crime or on the
object evidence gathered by the investigators.
It is lamentable that the integrity of the evidence collected by the police investigators is highly questionable. SPO2 Ayson
admitted in court that on June 15, 1998, around 150 people were in the places where they were conducting their investigation
and that the police investigators were unable to secure or cordon off these places.26 Also, due to the investigators' failure to
submit a sufficient quantity of blood samples for testing, Dr. Bausa, the Forensic Chemist of the Philippine National Police, was
unable to conduct further examinations such as blood typing.27 She was thus prevented from confirming that the traces of blood
in the vicinity of the crime and on the object evidence were those of the victim.28 All that Dr. Bausa could confirm from the
samples was that the blood submitted for examination was human blood.29
The conviction of appellant cannot stand on the basis of sketchy and doubtful circumstantial evidence. It is when evidence is
purely circumstantial that the prosecution is much more obligated to rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the
weakness of the evidence for the defense, and that conviction must rest on nothing less than moral certainty.30
Fifth, the most compelling evidence that could have been used against appellant is the alleged statement of Lucila Tamayo to
SPO2 Ayson during the course of his investigation of the crime on June 15, 1998. Lucila, the grandmother of appellant,
supposedly stated that: (1) appellant called the victim inside the house pretending to buy merchandise; (2) appellant asked her
to leave the house and he then locked theDOOR ; (3) Lucila heard someone being beaten up inside the house; and (4) after an
hour, she saw the victim's cadaver and appellant thereafter cleaned the floor.31 However, Lucila was never presented in court to
testify. Without Lucila's testimony, her statement incriminating appellant to the crime belongs to the realm of hearsay evidence
and therefore has no probative value.

The settled rule is conviction can never be based on hearsay evidence.32 Any oral or documentary evidence is hearsay by nature
if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other person who was
never presented on the witness stand.33 Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that a witness can only testify to
those facts that he knows of his personal knowledge, otherwise, such testimony is inadmissible for being hearsay.34 The
underlying reasons for this rule are: (1) to afford the judge the opportunity of observing the demeanor of the witness, and (2) to
allow the adverse party a chance of cross-examining the witness.35
SPO2 Ayson's testimony recalling Lucila's statement merely proves the fact that such statement was made or the tenor of such
statement, but it does not establish the truth of the fact asserted in the statement.36 Lucila should have been presented in court
to prove the truth of the matter surrounding appellant's alleged involvement in the crime. This would have afforded appellant his
constitutional right of confrontation, or to meet the witness against him face-to-face.37
Finally, every criminal conviction requires the prosecution to prove two things: (1) the fact of the crime, i.e., the presence of all
the elements of the crime for which the accused stands charged, and (2) the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the
crime.38 Here, appellant was charged with the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. To be liable for the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove: (a) the taking of the personal property
with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property thus taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is
characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of
homicide was committed.39What is crucial for a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide is for the prosecution to firmly
establish the offender's intent to take personal property before the killing, regardless of the time when the homicide is actually
carried out.40 There must be a showing that the death of the victim occurred by reason or on occasion of the robbery.
No shred of evidence is on record that could support the conclusion that appellant's primary motive was to rob the victim and
that he was able to accomplish it. While the trial court noted that there were no eyewitnesses to the robbery,41 nonetheless, it
ruled that the robbery aspect of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide was sufficiently proven because:
"(T)he assorted clothings and other items of the victim was them (sic) carrying to be sold to customers were nowhere to
be found near the scene where the victim's body was recovered. They were later found inside the house of Jose
Tamayo. Hence, the robbery angle is also beyond dispute."42
The trial court's conclusion that there was robbery simply because the items belonging to the victim were found in the house of
the grandfather of appellant is speculative. The evidence is not definitive as to whether appellant regularly slept in the house of
his grandfather or specifically, on the bamboo bed under which the personal effects and items peddled by the victim were found.
Mere speculation and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required in establishing the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable
doubt.43
The evidence to establish the homicide aspect of the subject composite crime also falls short of proving that appellant was
indubitably the assailant of the victim. The trial court, citing the cases of People vs. Kagui Malasugui,44 People vs.
Lorenzo,45 United States vs. Divino,46 and People vs. Ramos,47 held that "(I)n the absence of an explanation of how one has
come into possession of stolen effects belonging to a person wounded and treacherously killed, he must necessarily be
considered the author of the aggression and death of the said person and of the robbery committed on him."48 The presumption
in these cases must not be taken in isolation, for the guilt of the accused in these cases was determined not on the basis of
tenuous circumstantial evidence. The totality of the evidence in People vs. Kagui Malasugui, People vs. Lorenzo, and People vs.
Ramos clearly pointed to the accused therein as the assailants of the victims.
In People vs. Kagui Malasugui, the victim's dying declaration named the accused as his killer and the accused was arrested in
possession of the victim's personal effects. The accused could not give a plausible explanation as to how such possession came
about. In People vs. Lorenzo, an eyewitness recounted on the witness stand the stabbing of the victim. The accused were
arrested shortly after the killing and a portion of the proceeds of the robbery was retrieved from one of the accused. In People
vs. Ramos, the accused were nabbed while fleeing from the scene of the crime with the bloodstained weapon. And in the case
of United States vs. Divino, the crime charged was robbery only. The accused, who was convicted of robbery, was caught in
possession of the stolen livestock.
The factual milieu of the present case is different. Appellant was not found in possession of the properties of the victim. The bag
containing the items peddled by the victim was discovered under the bamboo bed in the house of the grandfather of appellant.
The grandfather denied that the bag belonged to appellant.49 The evidence is not certain as to whether appellant regularly slept
on the bamboo bed where the bag in question was found. It was not even proven that appellant slept in the house of his
grandfather the night before the killing of the victim. The fact that the house wherein the personal properties of the victim were
recovered was easily accessible precludes us from concluding with certainty that no other person or persons, aside from
appellant, could have stashed away the properties of the victim in the house of appellant's grandfather.

Robbery with homicide is a special complex crime against property.50 Absent clear and convincing evidence that the crime of
robbery was perpetrated, and that, on occasion or by reason thereof, a homicide was committed, an accused cannot be found
guilty of robbery with homicide, but only of homicide or murder, as the case may be.51There is a paucity of evidence to show that
appellant had a hand in the killing of the victim. We cannot convict appellant for the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide or for the separate crimes of robbery or homicide when the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial court is
plainly inadequate and unconvincing in proving appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated January 19, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Angeles City in Criminal
Case No. 98-755 finding appellant, Rex T. Canlas, guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and appellant is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt. He is ordered IMMEDIATELY
RELEASED from confinement unless held for some other legal cause.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No.179535

June 9, 2014

JOSE ESPINELI a.k.a. DANILO ESPINELI, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Jurisprudence teaches us that "for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all circumstances must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent x x x."1 Thus, conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided that the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.2
Assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari3 is the July 6, 2007 Decision4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 02252 which modified the August 31, 1999 Decision5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite, Branch 90,
by finding petitioner Jose Espineli a.k.a. Danilo "Danny" Espineli (petitioner) guilty of the crime of homicide instead of murder.
Also questioned is the CAs September 14, 2007 Resolution6 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.7
Factual Antecedents
On June 24, 1997, an Information8 charging petitioner with the crime of murder was filed before the RTC,9 the accusatory portion
of which reads as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of December, 1996 in the Municipality of Imus, Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, together with one (1) Sotero Paredes and three (3) other

unidentified persons, whose real names, identities and whereabouts are still unknown, said Sotero Paredes having been earlier
charged with the same offense, and is now undergoing trial before Branch 90, of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, then armed
with firearms, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault
and shoot one Alberto Berbon y Downie with the use of said firearms, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot wounds
on his head and different parts of his body which caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
said Alberto Berbon y Downie. CONTRARY TO LAW.10
Petitioner was arrested on July 1, 1997 and when arraigned on July 7, 1997 with the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of not
guilty.11
The facts show that in the early evening of December 15, 1996, Alberto Berbon y Downie (Alberto), a 49-year old Senior Desk
Coordinator of the radio station DZMM, was shot in the head and different parts of the body in front of his house in Imus, Cavite
by unidentified malefactors who immediately fled the crime scene on board a waiting car.
Meanwhile, the group of Atty. Orly Dizon (Atty. Dizon) of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) arrested and took into
custody one Romeo Reyes (Reyes) for the crime of Illegal Possession of Deadly Weapon. Reyes confided to the group of Atty.
Dizon that he was willing to give vital information regarding the Berbon case. In due course, NBI Agent Dave Segunial(NBI
Agent Segunial) interviewed Reyes on February 10, 1997 and reduced his statement into writing whereby Reyes claimed that on
December 15, 1996, he saw petitioner and Sotero Paredes (Paredes) board a red car while armed with a .45 caliber firearm and
armalite, respectively; and that petitioner told Paredes that "ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon."12 Subsequently,
Reyes posted bail and was released on February 14, 1997. Thenceforth, he jumped bail and was never again heard of. NBI
Agent Segunial testified on these facts during the trial.
The victims widow, Sabina Berbon (Sabina) likewise testified. According to her, sometime in the third week of February 1997
Reyes sought financial help so he could transfer his family to the province and protect them from any untoward consequence
that may result from his giving information to the NBI regarding the death of Sabinas husband. Sabina gave him the total
amount of P1,500.00 and promised to help him in applying for the witness protection program. This was affirmed on the witness
stand by Sabinas brother, Bartolome Pakingan. After that, however, Reyes never came back.
Another prosecution witness, Rodolfo Dayao (Rodolfo), testified that he sold his red Ford Escort car to three persons who came
to his residence in the afternoon of September 1, 1996. He later identified the said car from the photographs presented to him by
the police officers.
Dr. Ludivino J. Lagat (Dr. Lagat), the NBI Medico-Legal Officer who conducted a post-mortem examination on Alberto, declared
in his Autopsy Report that the victim suffered multiple gunshot wounds in the head and body. He also stated that based on the
size of the gunshot wounds or entrance, high-powered guns were used in the killing.
Petitioner, on the other hand, did not adduce evidence for his defense. Instead, he filed a Demurrer to Evidence13without leave of
court. As no action whatsoever was taken thereon by the trial court, petitioner just moved that the case be deemed submitted for
decision.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision14 dated August 31, 1999, the trial court adjudged petitioner guilty of murder, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused JOSE ESPINELI a.k.a. DANILO "Danny" ESPINELI, is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of committing the crime of "Murder" as charged. He is, therefore, sentenced to suffer the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA, and is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Alberto Berbon y Downie, the civil indemnity
of P50,000.00, and actual and compensatory damages in the total amount of P135,000.00 as funeral expenses (Exhibit "H"),
interment fee of P8,360.00 (Exhibit "C"), medical expenses in the total amount of P1,519.45 (Exhibit[s] "D", "D-1" and "D-2") and
for the contract fees of Memorial Park Care the amount of P15,700.00 (Exhibit "E").
Furthermore, considering that he is a high risk prisoner, his transfer to the National Penitentiary at Muntinlupa City, Metro
Manila, is immediately ordered.
SO ORDERED.15
Petitioner seasonably appealed his conviction before this Court. Pursuant, however, to the Courts pronouncement in People v.
Mateo,16 the case was ordered transferred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition through a Resolution17 dated March
22, 2006.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision18 promulgated on July 6, 2007, the CA affirmed with modification the findings of the trial court. It ratiocinated that
since none of the prosecution witnesses saw how the killing of the victim was perpetrated, the qualifying circumstance of abuse
of superior strength cannot be appreciated. Neither can nighttime serve as an aggravating circumstance as the time of the
commission of the crime was not even alleged in the Information. In view thereof, the CA found petitioner guilty only of homicide
instead of murder. The decretal portion of the appellate courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The appealed Decision dated August 31, 1999
of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 90 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant is
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide and is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate prison
term of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
In all other respects, the said decision STANDS.
In the service of his sentence, accused-appellant shall be credited in full with the period of his preventive imprisonment.
With costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.19
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration20 which the CA denied in its Resolution21 dated September 14, 2007.
Hence, this Petition.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner posits that the CA should not have affirmed the Decision of RTC as the latter erred:
1. x x x [in admitting, considering and giving] probative value to Exhibit "A", the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" of [Reyes]
because [he] was not presented in court to confirm, affirm and authenticate the contents of his sworn statement. It
resulted in the denial of petitioners constitutional right to confront and cross-examine his accusers.22
2. x x x [in convicting] the [petitioner] based on unproven, inadmissible circumstantial evidence.23
3. x x x in not acquitting the petitioner for failure of the prosecution to prove [his guilt] beyond reasonable doubt x x x.24
In sum, petitioner anchors his quest for the reversal of his conviction on the alleged erroneous admission in evidence of the
Sinumpaang Salaysay25 of Reyes for being hearsay and inadmissible. He avers that the said sworn statement should not have
been given probative value because its contents were neither confirmed nor authenticated by the affiant. Thus, all circumstances
emanating from or included in the sworn statement must be totally brushed aside as lacking any evidentiary and probative value.
Petitioner emphasizes that as found by the courts below, there was no direct evidence linking him to the crime; therefore, he
wants this Court to review the sufficiency of the circumstantial evidence upon which his conviction was based as he believes that
the same failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing respondent People of the Philippines, concurs with the
petitioner and recommends his acquittal.26 It is also of the view that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving
petitioners guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
Truly, "direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis from which a court may draw its finding of guilt."27 The
rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is
that evidence "which indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which the fact-finder draws from the evidence
established."28 Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence would be sufficient to convict the
offender "if i)there is more than one circumstance; ii) the facts from which the inference is derived are proven; and iii) the
combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt."29 All the circumstances must be
consistent with one another, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the

hypothesis that he is innocent. Thus, conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld provided that the
circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others as the guilty person.30
In this case, the circumstances found by the CA as forming an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion
that petitioner, to the exclusion of all others, is the guilty person are the following:
1. In the morning of December 15,1996, petitioner was heard telling his co-accused Sotero Paredes (Sotero) "ayaw ko
nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon" before boarding a red car. Sotero was holding an armalite rifle while petitioner
was armed with a .45 caliber pistol;
2. The said red car was identified or recognized by prosecution witness Rodolfo to be the same car he had sold to Sotero
for P10,000.00 in September 1996;
3. The victim Alberto was fatally shot later in the day (December 15, 1996) by unidentified gunmen who thereafter
immediately fled riding a red car; and
4. Post-mortem examination of the victims body showed that he sustained multiple gunshot wounds, the nature, severity
and characteristics of which indicate that they were inflicted using high-powered guns, possibly anarmalite rifle and .22
caliber pistol.31
The records reveal that there was no eyewitness to the actual killing of Alberto. Thus the courts below were forced to render
their verdict of conviction on circumstantial evidence as sanctioned under Section 4, Rule 13332of the Rules of Court. The central
issue now confronting this Court is whether the prosecution has amply proved by circumstantial evidence petitioners guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
The circumstantial evidence relied upon by the Court of Appeals sufficiently support petitioners conviction.
The Court has carefully scrutinized the evidence presented in this case in the light of the standards discussed above and finds
the foregoing circumstantial evidence sufficient to support a judgment of conviction. Several reasons deserve our acceptance of
the circumstances upon which petitioners conviction was based, to wit:
First, NBI Agent Segunial testified that he had investigated Reyes and reduced the latters statement into writing declaring,
among others, that in the morning of December 15, 1996, he (Reyes) overheard petitioner telling Sotero "Ayaw ko nang abutin
pa ng bukas yang si Berbon" and saw them armed with .45 caliber pistol and an armalite, respectively, before boarding a red
car. The CA gave weight to Reyes sworn statement in this wise:
The probative value of Romeo Reyess worn statement as to the words spoken by appellant to his co-accused Sotero Paredes
in the morning of December 15, 1996 cannot be disputed. x x x33
Petitioner takes vigorous exception to the said findings, insisting that the said sworn statement belongs to the category of
hearsay evidence and therefore inadmissible. He asserts that its contents were never confirmed or authenticated by Reyes,
thus, it lacks probative value.
The Court is unconvinced.
The hearsay evidence rule as provided under Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. A witness can testify only to those facts
which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in
these rules.
Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends in whole or in part on the competency and credibility of some persons
other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce. However, while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made
by another person given for the purpose of establishing the truth of the fact asserted in the statement is clearly hearsay
evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement on the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement,
or the tenor of such statement, was made. Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, when what is relevant is the fact that
such statement has been made, the hearsay rule does not apply and the statement may be shown. As a matter of fact, evidence
as to the making of the statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or is
circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact.34 This is known as the doctrine of independently relevant statements.35

In the present case, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial that while he was investigating Reyes, the latter confided to him that he
(Reyes) heard petitioner telling Sotero "Ayaw ko nang abutin pa ng bukas yang si Berbon" and that he saw the two (petitioner
and Sotero) armed with a .45 caliber pistol and an armalite, respectively, before boardinga red car, cannot be regarded as
hearsay evidence. This is considering that NBI Agent Segunials testimony was not presented to prove the truth of such
statement but only for the purpose of establishing that on February 10, 1997, Reyes executed a sworn statement containing
such narration of facts. This is clear from the offer of the witness oral testimony.36 Moreover, NBI Agent Segunial himself
candidly admitted that he is incompetent to testify on the truthfulness of Reyes statement.37 Verily then, what the prosecution
sought to be admitted was the fact that Reyes made such narration of facts in his sworn statement and not necessarily to prove
the truth thereof. Thus, the testimony of NBI Agent Segunial is in the nature of an independently relevant statement where what
is relevant is the fact that Reyes made such statement and the truth and falsity thereof is immaterial. In such a case, the
statement of the witness is admissible as evidence and the hearsay rule does not apply.38 Moreover, the written statement of
Reyes is a notarized document having been duly subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Cesar A. Bacani, a supervising agent of
the NBI. As such, it may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being a prima facie
evidence of the due execution of this instrument or document involved pursuant to Section 30 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
As held in Gutierrez v. Mendoza-Plaza,39 a notarized document enjoys a prima facie presumption of authenticity and due
execution which must be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Here, no clear and convincing evidence was presented by
petitioner to overcome such presumption. Clearly, therefore, the CA did not err in its appreciation of Reyes sworn statement as
testified to by NBI Agent Segunial.
Second, the identification and recognition through photograph by Rodolfo of the 1971 Ford Escort red colored car as the same
car he had sold to Sotero in September 1996 clearly and convincingly prove that it was the very same red car used in the killing
of Alberto on December 15, 1996.
Third, Alberto was shot and killed on December 15, 1996 and the gunmen immediately fled the scene riding a red car which was
identified as the same car previously sold by Rodolfo to Sotero.
Fourth, though the testimony of Dr. Lagat was limited to the post-mortem examination of the cadaver of Alberto, his findings that
the victim suffered multiple gunshot wounds and that the same were caused by high-powered guns, served as corroborative
evidence and contributed in a significant way in establishing the level of proof that the law requires in convicting petitioner.
Lastly, petitioners escape from detention on August 26, 1998 while the case was pending can also be considered as another
circumstance since it is a strong indication of his guilt.
All told, this Court finds the concordant combination and cumulative effect of the alleged established circumstances, which
essentially were the same circumstances found by the trial court and the appellate court, to have satisfied the requirement of
Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, the incriminating circumstances, when taken together, constitute an unbroken
chain of events enough to arrive at the conclusion that petitioner was responsible for the killing of the victim.
Besides, it is "[a]n established rule in appellate review x x x that the trial courts factual findings, including its assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, as well as the conclusions drawn from the factual
findings, are accorded respect, if not conclusive effect. These factual findings and conclusions assume greater weight if they are
affirmed by the CA,"40 as in this case.
The Crime Committed and the Proper Penalty.
The Court agrees with the CA that petitioner is guilty only of the crime of homicide in view of the prosecutions failure to prove
any of the alleged attendant circumstances of abuse of superior strength and nighttime. As aptly observed by the appellate
court:
The circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor, and the latter takes
advantage of it in the commission of the crime. However, as none of the prosecution witnesses saw how the killing was
perpetrated, abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated in this case. Neither can nighttime serve as an aggravating
circumstance, the time of the commission of the crime was not even alleged in the Information.41 (Citations omitted)
The penalty prescribed by law for the crime of homicide is reclusion temporal.42 In view of the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the sentence should be within the
range of reclusion temporal in its medium term which has a duration of fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the minimum should be within the range of prision mayor which has a duration
of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Thus, the imposition by the CA of an indeterminate prison term of ten (10)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, is in order.

Petitioners Civil liability

While the CA correctly imposed the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, it failed, however, to award moral damages. These
awards are mandatory without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim, owing to the fact of the
commission of murder or homicide.43 Thus, for moral damages, the award of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the victim is only proper.
Anent the award of actual damages, this Court sees no reason to disturb the amount awarded by the trial court as upheld by the
CA since the itemized medical and burial expenses were duly supported by receipts and other documentary evidence.
The CA did not grant any award of damages for loss of earning capacity and rightly so. Though Sabina testified as to the
monthly salary of the deceased, the same remains unsubstantiated. "Such indemnity cannot be awarded in the absence of
documentary evidence except where the victim was either self-employed or a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum
wage under current labor laws.''44 The exceptions find no application in this case.
In addition and in conformity with current policy, an interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all the monetary
awards for damages from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated July 6, 2007 and Resolution
dated September 14, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02252 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS
that petitioner JOSE ESPINEL! a.k.a. DANILO "DANNY'' ESPINEL! is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim ALBERTO
BERBON y DOWNIE PS0,000.00 as moral damages as well as interest on all the damages assessed at the legal rate of 6% per
annum from date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 142531

October 15, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
DANILO ASIS y FONPERADA and GILBERT FORMENTO y SARICON, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Circumstantial evidence that merely arouses suspicions or gives room for conjecture is not sufficient to convict. It must do more
than just raise the possibility, or even the probability, of guilt. It must engender moral certainty. Otherwise, the constitutional
presumption of innocence prevails, and the accused deserves acquittal.
The Case
For automatic review before this Court is the March 8, 2000 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila (Branch 54) in
Criminal Case No. 98-163090, finding Danilo Asis y Fonperada and Gilbert2 Formento y Saricon guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of robbery with homicide aggravated by abuse of confidence, superior strength and treachery. The decretal portion of the
Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the two (2) accused are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide with the
generic aggravating circumstances of abuse of confidence, superior strength and treachery; and each is sentenced to death
under Article 294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code; they are also ordered to jointly and severally pay P100,000.00 as damages
to the heirs of the victim."3
Appellants were charged in an Information4 dated February 18, 1998, worded as follows:5
"That on or about February 10, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and by means of force
and violence upon person, to wit: by then and there stabbing one YU HING GUAN @ ROY CHING with a bladed instrument on
the different parts of the body thereafter take, rob and carry away the following, to wit:

Cash money in the amount of P20,000.00

one (1) wristwatch
one (1) gold necklace
and undetermined items
or all in the total amount of P20,000.00 more or less, belonging to said YU HING GUAN @ ROY CHING against his will,
to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid amount more or less of P20,000.00, Philippine Currency,
and as a result thereof, he sustained mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death."6
When arraigned on July 9, 1998, both appellants pleaded not guilty.7 Found to be deaf-mutes, they were assisted, not only by a
counsel de oficio,8 but also by an interpreter from the Calvary Baptist Church. After due trial, appellants were found guilty and
sentenced to death.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief,9 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) detailed the facts in the following manner:
"The prosecution presented nine (9) witnesses. Although none of them had actually seen the crime committed, strong and
substantial circumstantial evidence abound linking beyond reasonable doubt both appellants to the crime.
"As culled from the records, hereunder are the pertinent facts of the case:
"George Huang, the nephew of the victim Yu Hing Guan a.k.a. Roy Ching, always passes by the store of the victim at 1042
Benavidez Street, Binondo, Manila to bring food stuff, ice and other things to his uncle and mother, Diana Yu, who work[s] in the
office of said store.
"On February 9, 1998, at around 6:30 oclock in the morning, Huang arrived at the victims store and discovered that the
steelDOOR of the store was locked from the outside. When he opened the steel door, he found everything to be normal except
for the inner door which had always been left open but which was closed at that time with only a chair blocking it.
"When he removed the blocking chair, he discovered the body of his uncle, Yu Hing Guan a.k.a. Roy Ching (victim), lying
prostrate on the ground with a knife embedded on his nape. He closed the door and proceeded to Luneta, where [his] mother
exercises, to inform her of what he saw. After informing [his] mother, Huang first went to the Chinatown Police Station and
reported the incident; thereafter, he went to another station located in Soler corner Reina Regente to report the incident again.
"Diana Yu, the sister of the victim, testified that on February 9, 1998, before 8:30 oclock in the evening, she was in the office of
her brother where she was working at 1042 Benavidez St., Binondo, Manila. She saw the two appellants, namely: Danilo Asis
and Gilbert Formento, and her brother (the victim), who are all deaf-mutes, talking in sign language. She testified that Danilo
Asis frequented the office of the victim, while Gilbert Formento came only on the night of February 9, 1998. At around 8:30
oclock in the evening, she left the office, leaving both appellants and the victim behind. The following morning, at around 7:30
oclock in the morning, her son, George Huang, informed her of her brothers (victims) death. Upon learning of said incident, she
went to the office where she saw her brothers body. She discovered that the sales proceeds of the preceding day were missing
and the necklace of her brother (victim) which he always wore was also missing.
"On re-direct examination, Diana testified that she suspected both appellants, especially Gilbert Formento, to have perpetrated
the crime because of the fact that she saw the pair of shorts of the victim in the bag of appellant Gilbert Formento.
"Jimmy Pagaduan testified that he was a helper in the Yu Hing Guan Auto Supply for five years already. He saw the two
appellants everyday in the store of the victim. Furthermore, he testified that as far as he knows, Danilo Asis owed the victim PhP
3,000.00 and that he saw a list thereof which the victim showed him. On February 9, 1998, he left the store at around 6:00
oclock in the evening and he saw both appellants conversing with the victim.
"SPO2 Pablo Ileto of WPD Homicide Section testified that on February 11, 1998, he was at Barangay Sto. Ni[]o, Hagunoy,
Bulacan together with Sgt. Napoleon Timbol, PO3 Luis Chico, and witness, Diana Yu. The three (3) of them were trying to locate
the whereabouts of appellant Gilbert Formento in connection with the death of Yu Hing Guan a.k.a. Roy Ching. They
coordinated with the Hagunoy Bulacan police and searched the area. Diana Yu saw Gilbert Formento in a delivery truck and she

pointed him to them. Thereafter, they invited Gilbert Formento to their office at the WPD Homicide Section. But before going to
the WPD station, they first brought Gilbert Formento to his house. Upon reaching the house, Diana Yu asked from the wife of the
suspect for the stolen money. However, they could not understand each other, so the wife gave Diana Yu the bag of Gilbert
Formento where Diana Yu noticed the pair of shorts which belonged to the victim. PO2 Ileto noticed what appears to be blood
stains on the pair of shorts.
"SPO1 Benito Cabatbat testified that he, together with SPO1 Alfredo Opriasa, SPO1 Raul Olavario, the photographer SPO2
Tabio, and fingerprint technician Domingo Daclan of the District Crime Laboratory Division went to the crime scene to conduct
the investigation on February 10, 1998. Upon arriving at the scene, they saw the victim lying prostrate on the ground,
barefooted, and clad only in brief.
"After photographing the victim, the team went upstairs where traces of blood were seen on the second and third floors.
"During the course of investigation, SPO1 Cabatbat received a phone call from a relative informing him that one of the suspects,
appellant Danilo Asis, went back to the scene of the crime. Afterwards, they brought Danilo Asis to the police station for
investigation, who expectedly denied having anything to do with the killing of the victim.
"During investigation (February 10, 1998), SPO1 Balatbat noticed that there was a bloodstain in Asis T-shirt.
"During the presentation of prosecution witness Dr. Olga Bausa, they stipulated that the bloodstains found in the white t-shirt
with a lettering of Collorrific and in the shortPANTS were human blood."10 (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
On the other hand, appellants version of the facts is as follows:11
"GILBERT FORMENTO is a deaf-mute who is one of the accused in this case. He testified through sign interpreter, Mrs. Nelda
Bahena. On February 9, 1998 at about 11 am., he was in the house of Roy Ching[.] They talked about things and events. When
he left the house of Ching he proceeded to Bulacan while Asis went to Luneta. He denied having in possession of the clothes of
Ching found with him in Bulacan. A policeman met him in his house in Sto. Nino, Hagunoy, Bulacan. They handcuffed him
immediately. He was whipped for the first time in his life. He was brought to Manila at Funeraria Paz. The relatives of Roy Ching
were pointing to him while he was being whipped by the two policemen.
"NESTOR PAGLINAWAN is a friend of Danilo Asis. He is a vendor who vends at the PICC area. He testified that accusedappellant Danilo Asis occasionally help[s] him in vending by guarding his selling items and preparing coffee. He communicated
with accused-appellant Asis through sign language. He had known Asis for five years. On February 9, 1998, at about 10:00 p.m.,
Danilo Asis was with him at the PICC. Accused-appellant Asis stayed with him until 7:00 am of the following day.
"DANILO ASIS is a deaf-mute and one of the accused in this case. He testified through sign interpreters, Ms. Theta Figuerres
and Mrs. Nelda Bahena. Roy Ching was his friend since 1995. On February 9, 1998, he went to the store of Roy Ching because
he was called by Ching to help him in his store. When he arrived at Chings store, Gilbert Formento was there already. The three
of them drank beer. He left the store at 9:00 p.m., ahead of Gilbert Formento. He proceeded to PICC to help his friend Nestor, a
cigarette vendor.
"He denied killing Ching. When he went back to Roy Chings store at 10 a.m. the following day, he felt depressed upon knowing
that Roy Ching was dead. He was arrested and incarcerated on that same day."12 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The RTC held that the "crime charged and proved is robbery with homicide under Article 294, No. 1 of the Revised Penal
Code."13 It ruled that "although no witnesses to the actual killing and robbery were presented, the circumstantial evidence
including the recovery of bloodstained clothing from both accused definitely proved that the two (2) x x x committed the
crime."14 Finally, the RTC also appreciated the aggravating circumstances of abuse of confidence, superior strength and
treachery and thus sentenced both appellants to the supreme penalty of death.
Hence, this automatic review before us.15
Issues
In their Brief, appellants fault the trial court with the following assignment of errors:

"I
The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with
homicide notwithstanding the insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution.
"II
The trial court gravely erred in concluding that evident premeditation, treachery and conspiracy attended the killing of Roy Ching.
"III
The trial court gravely erred in not considering the physical infirmities of the two accused-appellants who are deaf-mutes."16
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is meritorious. The prosecutions evidence does not prove the guilt of appellants beyond reasonable doubt; hence,
their constitutional right to be presumed innocent remains and must be upheld.
Main Issue:
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
In the present appeal, two things stand out: first, there were no eyewitnesses to the robbery or to the homicide; and second,
none of the items allegedly stolen were recovered or presented in evidence.
Appellants argue that the pieces of circumstantial evidence submitted by the prosecution are insufficient to prove their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution counters that these pieces of evidence, taken together, necessarily lead to their
conviction.
Certainly, it is not only by direct evidence that the accused may be convicted of the crime charged.17Circumstantial evidence is
resorted to when direct testimony would result in setting felons free and deny proper protection to the community.18 The former is
not a "weaker form of evidence vis--vis the latter."19 The accused may be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence,
provided the proven circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.20 "Circumstantial evidence is akin to a tapestry; it should be made up
of strands which create a pattern when interwoven."21 This pattern should be reasonably consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty and at the same time totally inconsistent with the proposition that he or she is innocent.22
The Rules on Evidence23 allow conviction by means of circumstantial evidence as follows:
"SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt."
Bloodstained Trousers
The prosecution argues that the strongest piece of evidence damning appellants is the victims bloodstained pair of shortPANTS
recovered from the bag of Gilbert Formento. It argues that since the trousers were recovered from one of the appellants, then
Rule 131 (j) of the Revised Rules of Court should apply. The said provision is worded, thus:
"Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions.
The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx

xxx

xxx

(j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole
act; otherwise, that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him;"24
We disagree. It escapes this Court how the recovery of a bloodstained pair of shorts allegedly owned by the victim should give
rise to the presumption that one of the appellants was the "taker and doer of the whole act"25 of robbery with homicide. By itself,
the retrieval of the pair of shorts does not prove that appellants, or even just one of them, robbed the trouser owner of cash and
jewelry and also killed him, as charged in the Information. Neither does it show that appellants, or one of them, perpetrated the
aggression leading to the victims death.
Furthermore, the ownership of the pair of shorts was not definitively determined. And even granting for the sake of argument that
it indeed belonged to the victim, still, there is no evidence to prove that it was taken from him on the night of the homicide.
Neither can it be ruled out that he might have lent it or gave it to either one of the two. It was neither extraordinary nor impossible
for him to have allowed Appellant Formento to use it, considering that they were friends, and that they shared a commonality as
deaf-mutes.
The OSG harps on the bloodstains found on the shorts. But as testified to by the pathologist26 who examined them, although the
origin was human blood, the blood grouping could not be determined.27 Thus, its mere presence on the pair of shorts did not in
any way support the prosecutions theory linking appellants to the crime.
Evidence Is Inadmissible
In any event, appellants argument of illegal search and seizure cannot simply be brushed aside, considering the guarantee so
sacredly enshrined in our Constitution.
There is no question that appellants were collared without any arrest warrant. Neither was there any valid search warrant
obtained against them. However, they never questioned the legality of their arrest through a motion to quash the Information.
Instead, they entered a plea of not guilty and participated in the trial. Settled is the rule that any objection involving the arrest or
the trial courts procedure of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before the arraignment;
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.28
Indeed, appellants do not now question the legality of their arrest. What they object to is the introduction of the bloodstained pair
of shorts allegedly recovered from the bag of Appellant Formento. They argue that the search was illegally done, making the
obtainment of the pair of shorts illegal and taints them as inadmissible. The prosecution, on the other hand, contends that it was
the wife of appellant who voluntarily surrendered the bag that contained the bloodstained trousers of the victim.29 Her act, it
claims, constituted a valid consent to the search without a warrant.30
We clarify. Primarily, the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one, cannot be
waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or who is expressly authorized to do so on his or her behalf.31 In
the present case, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses show that at the time the bloodstained pair of shorts was
recovered, Appellant Formento, together with his wife and mother, was present. Being the very subject of the search,
necessarily, he himself should have given consent. Since he was physically present, the waiver could not have come from any
other person.
The OSG cites Lopez v. Commissioner of Customs,32 which validated a waiver of a warrantless search, when a woman thought
to be the wife of the accused -- but who later turned out to be a manicurist -- surrendered to the police the papers belonging to
the appellant. The instant appeal, however, presents a different situation, because here the accused himself was present when
the search was made. Hence, consent should have been obtained from or given by him. In Lopez, the accused was not present
when the search was made; hence, the consent given by the occupant of theHOTEL ROOM was deemed the consent of the
accused who was then renting the space.
The OSGs argument loses even more cogency when evaluated against the well-settled principles on searches and seizures
without warrants.
To constitute a valid waiver, it must be shown that first, the right exists; second, the person involved had knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of such a right; and third, the person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.33 How could
Appellant Formento have consented to a warrantless search when, in the first place, he did not understand what was happening
at that moment? The prosecution witnesses themselves testified that there was no interpreter to assist him -- a deaf-mute -during the arrest, search and seizure. Naturally, it would seem that he indeed consented to the warrantless search, as the
prosecution would want this Court to believe.
As early as 1938, Justice Jose P. Laurel pointed out in Pasion vda. de Garcia v. Locsin:

"As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the
position of either contesting an officers authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a
peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for
the supremacy of the law."34

This point becomes even more pronounced in the present case, in which appellant is a deaf-mute, and there was no interpreter
to explain to him what was happening. His seeming acquiescence to the search without a warrant may be attributed to plain and
simple confusion and ignorance.
Verily, "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and x x x we do not
presume acquiescence [to] the loss of fundamental rights."35
Neither can the OSG claim that appellants wife voluntarily surrendered the bag that contained the bloodstained trousers of the
victim.36 As admitted by Prosecution Witness PO2 Pablo Ileto, the victims sister and appellants wife "cannot understand each
other."37 Eventually, appellants wife gave the belongings of Gilbert Formento where the bloodstained shorts of the victim were
recovered.38 How can the surrender of appellants belongings in this case be voluntary, when the person surrendering them did
not even understand the person she was communicating with?
To be sure, the OSG cannot even use the argument that the search was made by a private individual, the victims sister, and
thereby skirt the issue of constitutional protection against unlawful searches by the State.
The victims sister herself testified against this argument as follows:
"ATTY. FONTANILLA
Q So Gilbert Formento was not wearing the alleged trouser[s]?
A The bag was given by his mother or his wife, sir.
Q To whom?
A To the policemen, sir.
Q And they searched this, is that right?
A Yes sir."39
This testimony clearly forecloses the assertion that it was not the police authorities who conducted the search. This testimony in
fact belies that of PO2 Pablo Ileto40 that it was the prosecution witness who was talking to appellants wife, and who conducted
the search that yielded the bloodstained shortpants.
All told, the bloodstained pair of shorts was a piece of evidence seized on the occasion of an unlawful search and seizure. Thus,
it is tainted and should thus be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree.41 In the language of the fundamental
law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.42
Bloodstained Shirt
The prosecution then contends that when the other appellant, Danilo Asis, was brought to the police station for investigation the
following day, the police found bloodstain on his shirt.
Again, this fact cannot be taken as an indication of guilt on the part of Appellant Asis. It does not point to the conclusion that he
was involved in the crime charged against him. We cannot agree that since there was bloodstain on his clothing, ergo, he
committed the robbery and the attendant killing. At most, this piece of circumstantial evidence, taken with the other one, may
lead to suspicion. But courts do not rely on circumstantial evidence that merely arouses suspicion or conjecture.43 For
circumstantial evidence to lead to conviction, it must do more than just raise the mere possibility or even probability of guilt.44 It
must engender moral certainty.
Motive for the Crime

The prosecution then attempts to ascribe motive to appellants by arguing that one of them, Appellant Asis, allegedly owed the
victim P6,070.45
Indeed, motive becomes material when the evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive, and there is some doubt on whether a
crime has been committed or whether the accused has committed it.46 But the prosecutions contention again fails, as the fact of
indebtedness was never conclusively established. According to the sister of the victim, Asis still owed her brother the amount of
P6,070. Yet, during the testimony of the said appellant, it was shown that it was actually the victim who had been indebted to the
former. The prosecution, in fact, uses this testimony of Asis to bolster its claim that he became "madder and madder" at the
victim. Coming from the prosecution itself, this argument casts doubts on whether it was appellant who owed the victim or the
other way around.
The Public Attorneys Office, the defense counsel, correctly points out that the victim himself had made the entries in his logbook
which served as bases for the prosecutions averment that appellant owed him some amount. The sister, who was explaining the
entries, admitted that she had no personal knowledge thereof. MoreIMPORTANT , their veracity was never established. Neither
were the erasures or scratches thereon sufficiently explained.
To show that there was sufficient motive to commit the crime charged, the prosecution uses the testimony of Asis that he got
"madder and madder" at the victim. This statement is too speculative to deserve serious consideration.
The Last Persons Seen
Talking with the Victim
It is also argued that appellants were the last persons seen with the victim; ergo, the suspicion that they were the authors of the
crime. Admittedly, this circumstance may raise a speculation, but it is insufficient to establish their guilt. As this Court has
consistently stressed, mere suspicions and speculations can never be the bases of conviction in a criminal case.47
Neither is the mere presence of appellants at the locus criminis sufficient to implicate them. Their being at the store of the victim
was not unusual, as testified to by the witnesses. In fact, it was established that he and appellants had known one another well,
and that they had regularly met at his store. Moreover, there was paucity of evidence indicating that, other than appellants, no
other person had or could have had access to the store where he was robbed and killed.
As they themselves correctly observe, their complicity in the crime becomes even more doubtful because, as testified to by his
sister, the neighbors heard shouts; these could not have come from deaf-mutes. Furthermore, appellants question the nonpresentation of the results of the tests conducted on the fingerprints lifted from the crime scene.
Appellants Pointed to Each Other?
Finally, we do not find any evidence that appellants indeed pointed to one another as the author of the crime charged. In fact,
even during their cross-examination, neither of them specifically shifted the blame to the other. When questioned by the public
prosecutor, they even denied having done so.
All told, to sustain a conviction for the complex crime of robbery with homicide, which is primarily an offense against property, it
is essential that the robbery be proved beyond reasonable doubt.48 Proof of the homicide alone is not sufficient to support a
conviction for the aforesaid complex crime.49
Essential to robbery is the taking, with intent to gain, of personal property belonging to another by means of violence or
intimidation against another person by the use of force upon things. There is robbery with homicide when, by reason or on the
occasion of a robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of persons, homicide is also committed.50
Accordingly, in robbery with homicide cases, the prosecution needs to prove these elements: (a) the taking of personal property
is perpetrated by means of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is
characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of
homicide -- here used in its generic sense -- is committed.51
Robbery Completely
Unsubstantiated
The prosecution tried its best to prove the crime of homicide, even if unsuccessfully, but in the process, it left the crime of
robbery totally unsubstantiated.

More glaring is the fact that the Information charged appellants "as conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
each other."52 Yet, the RTC Decision found them both guilty of the crime charged without any pronouncement as to the presence
of conspiracy. To serve effectively as a basis for conviction, conspiracy must be proved as convincingly as the criminal act
itself.53
Had the alleged conspiracy to commit the crime been established, then the precise modality of each individual conspirator
becomes secondary. The applicable rule in conspiracy is that the act of one shall be deemed to be the act of all.54 The degree of
actual participation in the commission of the crime is immaterial.55 However, since there was neither proof nor finding of
conspiracy, then the extent of the individual participation of each appellant should have been clearly delineated.
In criminal cases, the prosecution has the onus probandi of establishing the guilt of the accused.56 Ei incumbit probatio non qui
negat. He who asserts -- not he who denies -- must prove.57 The burden must be discharged by the prosecution on the strength
of its own evidence, not on the weakness of that for the defense.58 Hence, circumstantial evidence that has not been adequately
established, much less corroborated, cannot be the basis of conviction.59 Suspicion alone is insufficient, the required quantum of
evidence being proof beyond reasonable doubt.60 Indeed, "the sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it
is without rudder or compass."61
It must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence
of the accused, but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to their guilt.62 Where there is no moral certainty as to their guilt,
they must be acquitted even though their innocence may be questionable. The constitutional right to be presumed innocent until
proven guilty can be overthrown only by proof beyond reasonable doubt.63
In the final analysis, the circumstances narrated by the prosecution engender doubt rather than moral certainty on the guilt of
appellants.
In view of the above findings, we deem it unnecessary to deal with the other issues raised by appellants.
WHEREFORE, the automatically appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 54) in Criminal Case No. 98163090 is SET ASIDE. Danilo Asis and Gilbert Formento are ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt, and ordered immediately
RELEASED from custody, unless they are being held for some other lawful cause.
The director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to implement this Decision forthwith and to INFORM this Court, within
five (5) days from receipt hereof, of the date appellants were actually released from confinement. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 170834

August 29, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO NOGRA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision1 dated August 31, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. C.R. No.
00244 affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, Naga City in Criminal Case No. 98-7182,
convicting Antonio Nogra (appellant) of large scale illegal recruitment under Section 6(m) in relation to Section 7(b) of
Republic Act No. 8042 (R.A. No. 8042),2otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995."3
The inculpatory portion of the Information charging one Lorna G. Orciga and appellant with large scale illegal recruitment
reads as follows:
That sometime during the period of March 1997 to November, 1997 in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the General Manager and Operations
Manager of LORAN INTERNATIONAL OVERSEAS RECRUITMENT CO., LTD., with office at Concepcion Grande,
Naga City, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each other, representing themselves to have
the capacity to contract, enlist, hire and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement to the herein
complaining witnesses RENATO ALDEN, OLIVER SARMIENTO, FE ZABALLA, TEOFILA LUALHATI, PILIPINA
MENDOZA and KERWIN DONACAO, but failed to actually deploy them without valid reason, as well as to
reimburse their documentation, placement and processing expenses for purposes of deployment despite their
repeated demands for the return of the same, to their damage and prejudice in the amounts as may be proven in
court.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Only appellant was brought to the jurisdiction of the trial court since Lorna G. Orciga was then and still is at large.
Arraigned with the assistance of counsel, appellant entered a plea of "NOT GUILTY" to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial
of the case ensued.
Of the six complainants, the prosecution was able to present five of them, namely: Renato Alden, Fe Zaballa, Teofila
Lualhati, Filipina Mendoza and Kerwin Donacao. Anaielyn Sarmiento, wife of complainant Oliver Sarmiento, also testified
for the prosecution.
The facts, as established by the prosecution, are aptly summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as
follows:
Appellant held office at Loran International Overseas Recruitment Co., (Loran) in Concepcion Grande, Naga City
(p. 4, TSN, October 19, 1998). A nameplate on his table prominently displayed his name and position as operations
manager (p. 11, TSN, November 17, 1998; p. 4, TSN, January 12, 1999; p. 21, TSN, November 19, 1998). The
license of Loran also indicated appellant as the operations manager (p. 5, TSN, February 10, 1999). The POEA
files also reflect his position as operations manager of Loran (Exhibit L to L-4, pp. 5-9, TSN, November 19, 1998).
Sometime in December 1996, Renato Alden went to Loran to apply for a job asHOTEL worker for Saipan. He was
interviewed by appellant, who required Alden to submit an NBI clearance and medical certificate and to pay the
placement fee. Alden paid the amount of P31,000.00. The additional amount of P4,000.00 was to be paid prior to
his departure to Saipan (pp. 5-6, TSN, November 17, 1998). Appellant promised Alden that he would leave within a
period of three to four months. After one year of waiting Alden was not able to leave. Alden filed a complaint with
the NBI when he was not able to recover the amount and could no longer talk with appellant (p. 6, TSN, November
17, 1998).
On April 18, 1997, Teofila Lualhati applied for employment asHOTEL worker for Saipan with Loran (pp. 1-3, 10,
TSN, November 19, 1998). Appellant required her to submit an NBI clearance and medical certificate and to pay
the processing fee in the amount of P35,000.00 so she could leave immediately. She paid the amount

of P35,000.00 to Loran's secretary in the presence of appellant. She was promised that within 120 days or 4
months she would be able to leave (pp. 11-13, TSN, November 19, 1998). Despite repeated follow-ups, Lualhati
was unable to work in Saipan. She demanded the refund of the processing fee. When the amount was not returned
to her, she filed a complaint with the NBI (pp. 14-15, TSN, November 19, 1998).
Sometime in April 1998, Filipina Mendoza went to Loran to apply for employment asHOTEL worker (p. 4, TSN,
July 12, 1999). She paid the amount of P35,000.00 as placement fee. When she was not able to work abroad, she
went to Loran and sought the return of P35,000.00 from appellant (p. 7, TSN, January 21, 1999).
Sometime in October 1997, Kerwin Donacao went to Loran to apply for employment as purchaser in Saipan (p. 4,
TSN, February 10, 1999). He was required to submit NBI clearance, police clearance, previous employment
certificate and his passport. He paid the placement fee of P35,000.00 (pp.4-5, TSN, February 10, 1999). After
paying the amount, he was told to wait for two to three months. When he was not able to leave for Saipan, he
demanded the return of the placement fee, which was not refunded (pp. 6-7, TSN, February 10, 1999).
During the first week of November 1997, Annelyn Sarmiento and her husband, Oliver Sarmiento, applied for
overseas employment. For the application of Oliver Sarmiento, they submitted his medical certificate and
certification of previous employment. They were also made to pay the amount of P27,000.00 as processing fee.
Oliver Sarmiento was promised that within 1 month, he would be able to leave. Initially, Oliver Sarmiento was told
that allegedly his visa was yet to be obtained. When he was not able to leave and what he paid was not refunded,
he filed a complaint with the NBI (pp. 4-6, TSN, April 23, 1999).
Sometime in May 1997, Fe Zaballa applied for overseas employment in Saipan with Loran (p. 4, TSN, May 21,
1999). She was required to submit her medical certificate, original copy of her birth certificate, NBI clearance and
police clearance. She was also required to pay the amount of P35,000.00 as placement fee. When she could not
be deployed, she sought to recover the amount she paid, which was not returned (pp. 7-8, TSN, May 2, 1999).5
On the other hand, appellant presented the following evidence:
The defense presented [appellant] Antonio Nogra and the agency's secretary and cashier, Maritess Mesina.
From their testimonies it was established that LORAN INTERNATIONAL OVERSEAS RECRUITMENT CO., LTD.,
(LORAN, for brevity) was owned by accused Lorna Orciga and Japanese national Kataru Tanaka (TSN, September
30, 2000, p. 7). Sometime in July 1994, [appellant] Antonio Nogra read from outside the agency's main office at
Libertad, Mandaluyong City that it was in need of a liaison officer. He applied for the position. The part-owner and
co-accused, Lorna Orciga, hired him instead as Operations Manager as the agency was then still in the process of
completing the list of personnel to be submitted to the POEA. (TSN, January 31, 2001, p. 5).
[Appellant] Nogra started working with LORAN in October 1994. In 1995, he was transferred to Naga City when the
agency opened a branch office thereat. Although he was designated as the Operations Manager, [appellant] Nogra
was a mere employee of the agency. He was receiving a monthly salary of P5,000.00 and additional P2,000.00
monthly meal allowance. He was in-charge of the advertisement of the company. He also drove for the company.
He fetched from the airport the agency's visitors and guests and drove them toHOTELS and other places. (TSN,
May 3, 2000, pp. 2-9).
Although part-owner Lorna Orciga was stationed in Manila, she, however, actually remained in control of the
branch office in Naga City. She conducted the final interview of the applicants and transacted with the foreign
employers. She also controlled the financial matters and assessment fees of the agency in Naga City (TSN,
September 20, 2000, pp. 8-9). The placement and processing fees collected by the agency in Naga City were all
deposited in the bank account of Lorna Orciga and not a single centavo went to the benefit of [appellant] Nogra
(TSN, January 10, 2000, pp. 14-22).6
On March 26, 2003, the RTC rendered Judgment7 finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ANTONIO NOGRA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Illegal Recruitment Committed in Large Scale defined under Sections 6(m) and 7(b) of RA 8042, otherwise known
as The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 and, accordingly, hereby imposes upon him the
penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).

SO ORDERED.8
On April 10, 2003, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.9 The RTC ordered the transmittal of the entire records of the case to
this Court.
Conformably to the ruling in People v. Mateo,10 the case was referred to the CA for intermediate review.11
On August 31, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision12 affirming the decision of the RTC. The CA held that being an employee
is not a valid defense since employees who have knowledge and active participation in the recruitment activities may be
criminally liable for illegal recruitment activities, based upon this Court's ruling in People v. Chowdury13 and People v.
Corpuz;14 that appellant had knowledge of and active participation in the recruitment activities since all the prosecution
witnesses pinpointed appellant as the one whom they initially approached regarding their plans of working overseas and
he was the one who told them about the fees they had to pay, as well as the papers that they had to submit; that the mere
fact that appellant was not issued special authority to recruit does not exculpate him from any liability but rather strongly
suggests his guilt; that appellant's invocation of non-flight cannot be weighed in his favor since there is no established rule
that non-flight is, in every instance, an indication of innocence.
A Notice of Appeal15 having been timely filed by appellant, the CA forwarded the records of the case to this Court for
further review.
In his Brief, appellant assigns as errors the following:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS A MERE EMPLOYEE
OF THE RECRUITMENT AGENCY DESPITE HIS DESIGNATION AS ITS OPERATIONS MANAGER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE OFFENSE-CHARGED
DESPITE THE FACT THAT UNDER THE LAW, HE WAS NOT CRIMINALY LIABLE FOR HIS AGENCY'S
TRANSACTIONS.16
Appellant argues that the agency was under the management and control of Orciga, and that he was a mere employee;
that he could not be held personally liable for illegal recruitment in the absence of any showing that he was validly issued
special authority to recruit workers, which was approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA);
that his non-flight is indicative of his innocence.
Appellee, through the OSG, counters that appellant is not a mere clerk or secretary of Loran, but its Operations Manager
who directly participated in the recruitment scheme by promising private complainants work abroad, but failed to deploy
them and refused to reimburse the applicants' placement fees when demanded.
The appeal fails. The CA did not commit any error in affirming the decision of the RTC.
R.A. No. 8042 broadened the concept of illegal recruitment under the
Labor Code17 and provided stiffer penalties, especially those that constitute economic sabotage, i.e.,Illegal Recruitment in
Large Scale and Illegal Recruitment Committed by a Syndicate.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 defined when recruitment is illegal:
SEC. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising
or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder
of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the
Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise
include the following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee
or holder of authority:

xxxx
(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the Department of Labor and
Employment; and
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the workers in connection with his documentation and
processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place
without the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered
as offense involving economic sabotage.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3)
or more persons individually or as a group.
The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices, and accessories. In
case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their business shall be
liable. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the present case, evidence for the prosecution showed that Loran
International Overseas Recruitment Co., Ltd. is a duly licensed recruitment agency with authority to establish a branch
office. However, under R.A. No. 8042, even a licensee or holder of authority can be held liable for illegal recruitment,
should he commit or omit to do any of the acts enumerated in Section 6.
Appellant was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale under Section 6 (l) and (m) of R.A. No. 8042. Section 6 (l)
refers to the failure to actually deploy without valid reason, as determined by the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE). Section 6 (m) involves the failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his
documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases in which the deployment does not actually take place
without the workers fault.
A thorough scrutiny of the prosecution's evidence reveals that it failed to prove appellant's liability under Section 6 (l) of
R.A. No. 8042. The law requires not only that the failure to deploy be without valid reason "as determined by the
Department of Labor and Employment." The law envisions that there be independent evidence from the DOLE to establish
the reason for non-deployment, such as the absence of a proper job order. No document from the DOLE was presented in
the present case to establish the reason for the accused's failure to actually deploy private complainants. Thus, appellant
cannot be held liable under Section 6 (l) of R.A. No. 8042.
As to Section 6 (m) of R.A. No. 8042, the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that private complainants
made payments to Loran, and appellant failed to reimburse the amounts paid by private complainants when they were not
deployed. The prosecution presented the receipts issued by Loran to private complainants evidencing payment of
placement fees ranging from P27,000.00 to P35,000.00.
Appellant does not dispute that private complainants were not deployed for overseas work, and that the placement fees
they paid were not returned to them despite demand. However, he seeks to exculpate himself on the ground that he is a
mere employee of Loran.
The Court is unswayed by appellant's contention.
The penultimate paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042 explicitly states that those criminally liable are the "principals,
accomplices, and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their
business shall be liable." Contrary to appellant's claim, the testimonies of the complaining witnesses and the documentary
evidence for the prosecution clearly established that he was not a mere employee of Loran, but its Operations Manager.
The license of Loran, the files of the POEA and the nameplate prominently displayed on his office desk reflected his
position as Operations Manager. As such, he received private complainants' job applications; and interviewed and
informed them of the agencys requirements prior to their deployment, such as NBI clearance, police clearance, medical
certificate, previous employment certificate and the payment of placement fee. He was also responsible for the radio
advertisements and leaflets, which enticed complaining witnesses to apply for employment with the agency. Clearly, as
Operations Manager, he was in the forefront of the recruitment activities.

The defense of being a mere employee is not a shield against his conviction for large scale illegal recruitment. In People v.
Gasacao18 and People v. Sagayaga,19 the Court reiterated the ruling in People v. Cabais,20 People v.
Chowdury21 and People v. Corpuz22 that an employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be
held liable as principal by direct participation, together with its employer, if it is shown that he actively and consciously
participated in the recruitment process.
In the present case, it was clearly established that appellant dealt directly with the private complainants. He interviewed
and informed them of the documentary requirements and placement fee. He promised deployment within a three or four
month-period upon payment of the fee, but failed to deploy them and to reimburse, upon demand, the placement fees paid.
The Court is not persuaded by appellant's argument that his non-flight is indicative of his innocence. Unlike the flight of an
accused, which is competent evidence against him tending to establish his guilt, non-flight is simply inaction, which may be
due to several factors. It may not be construed as an indication of innocence.23
Of marked relevance is the absence of any showing that the private complainants had any ill motive against appellant
other than to bring him to the bar of justice to answer for the crime of illegal recruitment. Besides, for strangers to conspire
and accuse another stranger of a most serious crime just to mollify their hurt feelings would certainly be against human
nature and experience.24 Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper
motive, their positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand under the solemnity of an oath deserve full faith
and credence.25
It is a settled rule that factual findings of the trial courts, including their assessment of the witnesses credibility, are entitled
to great weight and respect by the Supreme Court, particularly when the CA affirmed such findings.26 After all, the trial
court is in the best position to determine the value and weight of the testimonies of witnesses.27 The absence of any
showing that the trial court plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the
result of the case, or that its assessment was arbitrary, impels the Court to defer to the trial courts determination according
credibility to the prosecution evidence.
Under the last paragraph of Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042, illegal recruitment shall be considered an offense involving
economic sabotage if committed in large scale, viz, committed against three or more persons individually or as a group. In
the present case, five complainants testified against appellants acts of illegal recruitment, thereby rendering his acts
tantamount to economic sabotage. Under Section 7 (b) of R.A. No. 8042, the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not
less than P500,000.00 nor more than P1,000.000.00 shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage.
Thus, the RTC and the CA correctly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of large scale illegal recruitment.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated August 31, 2995 of the Court of Appeals affirming the
conviction of appellant Antonio Nogra for large scale illegal recruitment under Sections 6 (m) and 7 (b) of Republic Act No.
8042 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 146296

October 15, 2007

EDUARDO GULMATICO y BRIGATAY, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision2 dated July 31, 2000 which affirmed the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of

Valenzuela City, dated April 16, 1999, convicting petitioner Eduardo Gulmatico (petitioner) of the crime of Robbery, with the
modified conclusion that the felony proven was Theft instead.
The Facts
Petitioner was charged with the crime of Robbery in an Information dated January 2, 1997 which reads:
That on or about the 31st day of December, 1996, in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain and by means of force, that is, by breaking theDOOR , and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away
one (1) AIWA VHS worth P8,000.00, one (1) BL Rayban, worth P3,000.00, one (1) gold necklace worth P1,200.00, one (1)
camera Fuji worth P1,400.00 and one (1) leather wallet with cash money of P100.00 belonging to one REBECCA HUERVALIPAYCO, to the damage and prejudice of the owner in the total amount of P12,800.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Upon arraignment on January 15, 1997, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.5 Thus, trial on the merits ensued. In
the course of the trial, two varying versions arose.
Version of the Prosecution
Spouses Gary Lipayco (Gary) and Rebecca Huerva-Lipayco (Rebecca) -- the Lipaycos -- are employees of CDO-Foodsphere,
Inc. and reside at 2-D Bonifacio St. Canumay, Valenzuela City. On December 31, 1996, the spouses went to work. When
Rebecca returned home between 11:00 in the morning and 12:00 noon of the same day, she found their door broken open, their
place in shambles and some of their things missing. She went to report the incident first to the barangay but finding no official in
the barangay hall, she went to the nearest police outpost and had the incident blottered. An investigation was immediately
conducted and the statements of witnesses were taken. Angelo "Cookie" Alera (Angelo) and Michael Arnaldo (Michael), then
both eight (8) years old, testified that at about noon of December 31, 1996, while they were playing nearby together with other
children,6 they saw petitioner push the door of the house of the Lipaycos, enter the same, ransack the cabinet and take a VHS
player7 and a wallet containing P100.00.8 Conchita Alera (Conchita) corroborated the statements of Angelo and Michael since
she also saw the petitioner inside the house of the Lipaycos.9 The items missing and unrecovered were one (1) AIWA VHS
player worth P8,000.00; one (1) Bausch & Lombe (BL) Rayban worth P3,000.00; one (1) gold necklace worth P1,200.00; one (1)
Fuji camera worth P1,400.00; and one (1) leather wallet containing P100.00, or a total of P12,800.00.10
Version of the Defense
Petitioner is a family friend of the Lipaycos and a godfather of the latter's child. He is also employed at CDO-Foodsphere, Inc. as
a company driver. Due to the nature of his work, petitioner was often away and entertained himself with a car stereo which he
would always bring with him. Petitioner claimed that he would place the said car stereo on top of the delivery vehicle's
dashboard. After work, he would bring the car stereo with him.11 Petitioner denied the accusations made against him. He testified
that on December 30, 1996, he made deliveries in Malolos, Bulacan, where he stayed overnight. The next day, December 31,
1996, he returned to their office and left work at already about 11:30 in the morning. He waited for a while so that he could get
the second half of his 13th month pay. Then, he went to another company compound to get a suitable box for his holiday ham
which he entrusted to Conchita for safekeeping. After securing a box, he went to Conchita's house to get the ham. While
Conchita was getting petitioner's ham, he passed by the house of the Lipaycos to see if Gary was there, by calling out for him at
theDOOR 12 since Rebecca asked petitioner at their office if he saw Gary. Petitioner attested that the door was slightly opened
and he slightly pushed it to look for Gary. However, Gary was out.13 Thereafter, Conchita gave the ham to petitioner and he
placed it inside the box. Carrying the same in a big plastic bag and his car stereo, petitioner on board a tricycle, went to his
sleeping quarters. Ricky Acostosa, also an employee of CDO-Foodsphere, Inc. testified that he and the petitioner boarded the
same tricycle on the said date on the way to their sleeping quarters. He observed that petitioner was carrying a car stereo and a
box of ham at the time and that he did not notice that petitioner was carrying any VHS player.14 Thereafter, petitioner left for
Villamor Airbase in Pasay City where he celebrated the New Years Eve with his relatives. He returned to his quarters on
January 1, 1997 and in the afternoon of the same date, upon knowledge that Rebecca was looking for him, petitioner went to the
Lipaycos' house where he was apprehended by the police and was subsequently detained.15 Upon posting the corresponding
bail bond for his provisional liberty in the amount of P24,000.00, the RTC ordered the petitioner's release.16
The RTC's Ruling
On April 16, 1999, the RTC held that petitioner's defenses of denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of
petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime by Michael and Angelo, who testified with sufficient coherence and clarity. Thus, the
RTC disposed of this case in this wise:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused EDUARDO GULMATICO y BRIGATAY guilty beyond reasonable
doubt and as principal of the crime of robbery and, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences him to a penalty
of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE
(1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum. The accused is further sentenced to pay complaining witness Rebecca Huerva-Lipayco
the amount of P12,800.00 representing the total value of the goods stolen without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Finally, the accused is sentenced to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.17
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.18
The CA's Ruling
On July 31, 2000, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC that the petitioner's defenses of denial and alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the petitioner by the eyewitnesses which were categorical, consistent and without any showing of ill
motive on the latter's part. However, the CA opined that while asportation was proven, the element that petitioner entered the
Lipaycos' house by breaking itsDOOR was not established since Michael and Angelo testified that petitioner merely pushed the
door open in order to gain entry. Moreover, based on the photographs of the said door, the CA found that the same was intact
and unbroken. Thus:
Properly, then, the felony proven against Gulmatico is Theft defined in Art. 308 and penalized under Art. 309 of the Revised
Penal Code, although the end penalties imposable are just the same as those imposed by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, except for the felony which is instead Theft as defined and punished in Arts. 308 and 309 of the Revised Penal
Code, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.19
On August 25, 2000, petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration20 of the assailed Decision which the CA denied in its
Resolution21 dated December 8, 2000.
Hence, this Petition raising the sole issue of whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals decided correctly in finding herein
petitioner still guilty of Theft notwithstanding the fact that the evidence of the prosecution was preponderantly flawed and
unmeritorious, short of the required proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Correlatively, the instant Petition is based on the following grounds:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT STILL
GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF THEFT WHEN IT PREMISED ITS FINDING OF THE AFFIRMATION ON THE
FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS:
a) That there were two eyewitnesses (two 8-year-olds) who were familiar with the accused and had good
opportunity to observe the felony and the felon;
b) That the veracity of the testimonies of these two eyewitnesses should not be doubted because the Trial Court
has shown its appreciation of the testimonies of witnesses 'who were able to relay to the (Trial) court with
sufficient coherence and clarity what they saw;
c) That there was another witness who corroborated the testimonies of the two boys;
d) That the testimonies of these prosecution witnesses were aboveboard as 'none of the witnesses were
discredited by the defense as having ill will towards or motive against the accused,' concluding therefore that
there was nothing which could have tainted the truthfulness of said testimonies;
e) That the defense put up by the accused using DENIAL, was no match to the prosecution where the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were positive, clear and unbiased;
f) That the defense of ALIBI cannot also save the day for the accused.

II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL
COURT, WHICH FOUND ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF A CRIME BASED ON THE WEAKNESS OF DEFENSE
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, JUST LIKE THE TRIAL COURT, IN NOT GIVING
WEIGHT TO THE DEFENSE EVIDENCE.22
Moreover, petitioner argues that the testimonies of Michael and Angelo are deficient as the two boys merely testified that
petitioner took the VHS player and the wallet; that the witnesses' testimonies are incoherent due to their numerous loopholes as
regards the alleged taking; that it was physically impossible for the witnesses to view the commission of the crime, considering
the interior of the Lipaycos' residence; that the prosecution failed to rebut petitioner's testimony that he was in the premises for
the purpose of getting his ham from Conchita; that Michael and Angelo were pre-coached in giving their testimonies by their
respective mothers; that Michael and Angelo mistakenly identified petitioner's car stereo as the VHS player; that petitioner's nonflight speaks of his innocence; that Rebecca's testimony before the police and the photographs of the brokenDOOR are pieces
of evidence which are contrary to the witnesses' testimony that the petitioner merely pushed the door in order to gain entry,
hence, the finding of the crime of Theft; and that since the witnesses merely saw that petitioner take only the VHS player and the
wallet, the value of the items lost amounts only to P8,100.00, hence, the petitioner, without conceding the offense charged, is
entitled to the imposition of a lesser penalty. Lastly, petitioner attests that he is innocent of the offense charged and prays for his
acquittal.23
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posits that the direct,
positive and categorical testimonies of Michael and Angelo pointing to the petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime of Theft are
entitled to full faith and credit; that petitioner failed to prove any improper motive on the part of the mothers of Michael and
Angelo in allegedly coaching the minors to testify against him; that petitioner's defenses of denial and alibi are unavailing; that
factual findings of the RTC particularly in its assessment of credibility of witnesses are entitled to respect; and that non-flight is
not proof of innocence.24
The Petition lacks merit.
While it is true that the RTC and the CA had separate and different findings as to the crime committed, this Court holds that
asportation was indeed established. Thus, we agree with the ruling of the CA that the crime of Theft was committed based on
the evidence presented.
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code defines theft as follows:
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence, against or
intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter's consent.
The elements of theft are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the
taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be
accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.25 Therefore, in theft, corpus
delicti has two elements, namely: (1) that the property was lost by the owner, and (2) that it was lost by felonious taking.26
At this juncture, petitioner offers the defense of denial, postulating that when Michael and Angelo saw the petitioner, he was
carrying at the time his car stereo which they have mistaken to be the VHS player of the Lipaycos. Moreover, petitioner contends
that he is not invoking the defense of alibi because he admittedly passed by the house of the Lipaycos on December 31,
1996.27 However, a perusal of the petitioner's pleadings before this Court shows that the proffered defense is still alibi, since
petitioner alleged that he cannot be at two places at the same time.28
We reject petitioners arguments.
First. It could not be said that Michael and Angelo, young as they were, could have mistakenly identified petitioner's car stereo
for the VHS player. On cross-examination, both Michael and Angelo manifested that they know what a VHS player is and even
described the size and color thereof before the RTC.29 Moreover, Angelo also testified that the petitioner, aside from taking the
VHS player, ransacked the cabinet of the Lipaycos and took the wallet.30 In sum, the car stereo cannot fully and adequately fill in
for the felonious taking of the other lost and unrecovered items of the Lipaycos.
Second. Other than petitioner's own admission that he passed by the house of the Lipaycos on December 31, 1996,31 Michael
and Angelo, as corroborated by Conchita, testified that petitioner was there before Rebecca arrived, who eventually found that

their things were scattered all over the place and that certain items were missing. MoreIMPORTANTLY , Michael and Angelo,
throughout their respective testimonies before the RTC, positively and categorically identified the petitioner as the perpetrator of
the crime.32
Time and time again, this Court has ruled that denial and alibi are the weakest of all defenses, because they are easy to concoct
and difficult to disprove. Furthermore, they cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal identification of the accused by the
principal witnesses. Absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, a categorical,
consistent and positive identification of the accused prevails over denial and alibi. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing
proof, denial and alibi are negative, self-serving and undeserving of any weight in law.33
We cannot discern any improper motive on the part of, and no such motive was ever imputed to, the prosecution's witnesses,
namely, Michael, Angelo, Conchita and even Rebecca that they would falsely implicate the petitioner as the perpetrator of the
crime. The absence of evidence as to improper motive actuating the principal witnesses for the prosecution strongly sustains the
conclusion that none existed, and consequently, their testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit.34
Stripped of the defenses of denial and alibi, the instant Petition now hinges on the assessment of the credibility of the witnesses
presented.
The CA, citing the RTC Decision, aptly and judiciously held, to wit:
The principal eyewitnesses were Michael and Angelo then both 8 years old who were familiar with the accused and had good
opportunity to observe the felony and the felon. The testimonies of these eyewitnesses were appreciated by the trial court as
follows:
Michael and Angelo, both 8 years of age, and who were able to relay to the court with sufficient coherence and clarity what they
saw on the date and at the time in question positively identified the accused as the one who entered the house of Rebecca and
as the one who took away from that house the betamax. (Decision, p. 104, record)
Their testimonies were corroborated in part by Conchita Alera who also saw Gulmatico inside the house. None of these
witnesses were discredited as having ill will towards or motive against Gulmatico.
Petitioner claims that Michael and Angelo were pre-coached when they gave their respective testimonies before the police and
before the RTC as their respective mothers and Rebecca were there at the time.
We disagree.
This Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the assessment made by the RTC, duly affirmed by the CA anent the
credibility of the said prosecution witnesses who testified during the trial of this case. Michael and Angelo clearly pointed out
their exact location and the surrounding circumstances when they observed the petitioner and the felonious taking. Upon the
directive of the trial court judge, Angelo even described his location and the respective distances of the houses in the
neighborhood by walking around the courtroom.35 It bears stressing that full weight and respect to the determination by the trial
court of the credibility of witnesses is usually accorded by the appellate courts, since the trial court judge had the opportunity to
observe the demeanor of the witnesses.36 This Court is not a trier of facts and, as a rule, we do not weigh anew the evidence
already passed upon by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.37 Thus, in the case of Siccuan v. People,38 we
clearly held:
We have consistently adhered to the rule that where the culpability or innocence of an accused would hinge on the issue of
credibility of witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies, findings of the trial court are given the highest degree of respect.
These findings will not be ordinarily disturbed by an appellate court absent any clear showing that the trial court has overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts of circumstances of weight or substance which could very well affect the outcome of
the case. It is the trial court that had the opportunity to observe 'the witnesses' manner of testifying, their furtive glances,
calmness, sighs or their scant or full realization of their oaths. It had the better opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand
and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grueling examination.
Furthermore, Michael and Angelo are child witnesses. A child witness could not be expected to give a precise response to every
question posed to him. His failure to give an answer to the point of being free of any minor inconsistencies is understandable
and does not make him a witness less worthy of belief.39 Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, when referring only to
minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the substance of their declarations or the veracity or the weight of their
testimonies. Although there may be inconsistencies on minor details, the same do not impair the credibility of the witnesses
where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the accused.40 To this Court, Michael
and Angelo's testimonies are sufficiently and consistently credible as to establish that: (1) the crime of Theft was committed
against the Lipaycos and (2) petitioner committed the said crime.

Lastly, we are not persuaded by petitioner's contention that the fact that he came back to the Lipaycos' house on January 1,
1997 shows that he is innocent of the offense charged. It is established in this jurisdiction that while flight indicates guilt, nonflight does not mean innocence.41 Much like the defenses of alibi and denial, non-flight cannot prevail against the weight of
positive identification of the accused.42 Therefore, the Court finds no reason to overturn the judgment of conviction against the
petitioner for the crime of Theft as the prosecution sufficiently proved his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 23230,
finding petitioner Eduardo Brigatay Gulmatico guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Theft, is hereby AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 194255

June 13, 2012

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
NURFRASIR HASHIM y SARABAN a.k.a "FRANZ/FRANS," MAKDUL JAMAD y BUKIN (AL) a.k.a. "MACKY," a certain
"TAS," and a certain "JUN," Accused,
BERNADETTE PANSACALA a.k.a. "Neneng Awid," Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00644-MIN promulgated on 20 July 2010, which
affirmed the conviction of herein accused-appellant Bernadette Pansacala a.k.a Neneng Awid, together with co-accused
Nurfrasir Hashim y Saraban a.k.a "Franz/Frans," Makdul Jamad y Bukin a.k.a. "Macky," a certain "Tas" and a certain "Jun" for
the crime of illegal recruitment as defined under Section 6 in relation to Section 7(b) of Republic Act. No. (R.A.) 8042 or the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.
The Facts
On 10 March 2004, accused-appellant was charged as follows:2
That on or about June 11, 2003 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and
assisting with one another without having previously obtained from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, license
or authority to engage in the recruitment and deployment of overseas workers, did then and there willfully [sic], unlawfully and
feloniously, illegally recruit for a promised employment abroad particularly in Brunei and Malaysia, thus causing and prompting
the persons of BBB and AAA3 to apply which employment however did not materialize because in truth and in fact, the promised
employment is non-existent, in flagrant violation of the above-mentioned law and causing damage and prejudice to said
complainants; further, the commission of the above stated offense tantamount to economic sabotage in that the same was
committed by a syndicate.
Only accused-appellant and Nurfrasir Hashim y Saraban were arrested, and both entered a plea of "not guilty" when arraigned.
Private complainants AAA and BBB, Police Chief Inspector Ronald Aonuevo, and police officers Edmond Ranel Villareal and
Renato Rabuya dela Pea were presented by the prosecution to prove the following:

On 10 June 2003, accused-appellant approached AAA, who was then doing her job as a waitress at a stall in Paseo de
Zamboanga, Buenavista, Zamboanga City, to encourage AAA to work in Malaysia, as accused-appellant knew certain persons
who would soon be leaving for that country.
On the next day, 11 June 2003, private complainant BBB was at her house in Talon-talon Loop, Zamboanga City, when
accused-appellant paid her a visit and invited her to work as a saleslady in Brunei. After being assured that the prospective
employment was above board and that she would be well compensated, BBB accepted the invitation.
The day after, accused-appellant, together with co-accused Makdul Amad y Bukin a.k.a. "Macky" (Macky) and a certain "Jun,"
returned to the house of BBB. Accused-appellant informed BBB that the latter would be escorted to Malaysia by the two men,
and that they would meet the next day at 1:00 p.m. at Plaza Pershing, Zamboanga City.
On 13 June 2003, BBB, Macky and Jun met as planned. They proceeded to Shop-O-Rama, where they met with co-accused
Nurfrasir Hashim, a.k.a. "Franz" (Franz), who assured BBB that she would be easily hired because of her beauty and height.
They then agreed to meet at 3:00 p.m. that same day at Paseo de Zamboanga.
At Paseo de Zamboanga, BBB, accused-appellant, Macky, and Jun met with AAA, a certain CCC (allegedly another recruit) and
Arlene (allegedly AAAs employer). Then at 7:00 p.m. of that same day, they all proceeded to the wharf, where they met accused
Franz and a certain Cristy, who was also allegedly invited by accused-appellant to work in Malaysia.
Thereafter, AAA, BBB, CCC, Cristy, Macky and Jun boarded the M/V Grand Flora and were given pieces of paper containing a
name. Franz, accused-appellant Bernadette and a certain Titing did not board the boat. Accused-appellant informed private
complainants and their companions that she and Franz would follow and bring their passports. We quote the Decision of the CA
to describe the journey of the group after boarding the M/V Flora bound for Bongao, Tawi-Tawi, at 10:00 p.m.:4
On June 14, 2003, they (BBB, AAA, CCC, Cristy, accused Macky) and Jun disembarked at Bongao, Tawi-Tawi, and then they
proceeded to Sitangkai, Tawi-Tawi where they stayed for two days. On June 16, 2003, they went to Pundohan, which is a
terminal going to Lahad Datu, Sabah, Malaysia.
On June 17, 2003, at 6:00 oclock [sic] in the morning[,] they arrived at Lahad Datu and soon thenafter [sic] they boarded a van
going to Samporna, Malaysia where they met accused Mackys cousin named Pat. They waited at Samporna until 5:00 oclock
[sic] in the afternoon when accused Franz and Tash[,] who was allegedly their financier[,] arrived. Accused Franz then
distributed to AAA, BBB, CCC and Cristy their respective passports.
Thereafter, they boarded a bus going to Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia, and they arrived thereat at 7:00 oclock [sic] in the morning of
June 18, 2003. Later, they boarded again a bus going to Minumpo, Malaysia and then a barge going to Labuan, Malaysia where
they stayed at aHOTEL [the Classic Hotel] for three nights or from the night of June 18, 2003 until June 20, 2003.
On June 21, 2003, accused Franz instructed BBB, AAA, CCC and Cristy to wear "sexy clothes" because they were going to
meet their supposed boss named Bunso at Cape Imperial located at Labuan, Malaysia.
When they arrived at Cape Imperial, accused Macky and Jun talked to Bunso but they failed to reach an agreement on the
purported compensation of the four girls. So, accused Macky and Jun brought the girls to Golden Lotus Barber Salon (Salon for
brevity) where the latter were introduced to a certain person named Mommy Cindy, the alleged owner of the salon, and their
purported manager Hako who was called Mommy Susan.
The prosecution also alleged that while the group was staying at the ClassicHOTEL IN Labuan, BBB was forced on numerous
occasions to have sexual intercourse with Franz at his bidding, even in the presence of other people. She followed his orders for
fear that he would inflict physical harm on her.
At first, private complainants were not aware of the circumstances surrounding their employment at the Golden Lotus. It was
only after they agreed to stay there for employment that they were forced to become sex workers toEARN MONEY and pay off
the debts they incurred from their travel from Zamboanga City to Labuan, Malaysia.
Thus, from 21 June 2003 to 13 July 2003, AAA and BBB worked as prostituted women. Each of the girls would be booked to a
customer for the whole night for 300 Ringgit at a certain hotel near the Golden Lotus. Meanwhile, during the day, they would be
hired by customers for a "short time" for 150 Ringgit in one of the rooms of the Golden Lotus. The girls were told that they would
be made to pay a fine of 150 Ringgit if they refused to have sexual intercourse with the customers.
On 12 July 2003, BBB had a customer who was a law enforcer at Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia. She sought his help for her return to
the Philippines, and he agreed.

The following day, on 13 July 2003, the Golden Lotus was raided by the Immigration Officers of Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia, and
the prostituted Filipino women, including AAA and BBB, were detained at the Balay Polis (Police Department) in Labuan until all
the women were deported to the Philippines.
The defense, on the other hand, presented three witnesses: accused-appellant Bernadette, her common-law partner Majujie
Jailya Misuari, and co-accused Franz.
According to accused-appellant, she and BBB were friends and neighbors in Talon-talon, Zamboanga City. Sometime in April
2003, when asked by BBB why accused-appellant returned to the Philippines from Malaysia, the latter said that she had been
made a prostituted woman in Malaysia.
Accused-appellant denied having offered BBB a job in Malaysia, a denial corroborated by Majujie Jailya Misuari. Accusedappellant also denied knowing AAA and Franz. She claimed that she only met AAA when the latter, together with BBB, visited
her in jail and offered to withdraw the case if accused-appellant would give them money.
Co-accused Franz merely denied knowing AAA, BBB or accused-appellant.
On 27 June 2008, after trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City rendered a Decision,5 the
dispositive portion of which states:6
WHEREFORE, the Court finds both accused NURFRASIR HASHIM y SARABAN a.k.a "FRANZ/FRAS" and BERNADETTE
PANSACALA a.k.a "NENENG AWID" GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
defined under Section 6 and penalized under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers
and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995", as principals by direct participation, committed by a syndicate, against BBB and AAA, and
SENTENCES each of said accused to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of P 1,000,000.00 each;7 to
pay each of the above victims P 50,000.00 as moral damages; P 300,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
The trial court considered that, in the course of the trial, the prosecution and the defense had entered into a stipulation that
neither accused-appellant Bernadette nor Franz had a license or an authority to recruit or deploy workers for overseas
employment.
Moreover, the trial court found that the crime was committed in conspiracy by the accused and other persons. It painstakingly
enumerated the overt acts of the accused-appellant showing her direct participation in the commission of the crime. These acts
included inducing AAA and BBB to work in Malaysia; introducing Macky, Jun and Franz to the victims; and escorting them to the
wharf, where the victims boarded the vessel that took them away from their families and their country and brought them to
Malaysia, where heretofore unbeknownst to them they were made to work as prostituted women.
It further held that the credible and positive testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution prevailed over those of the defense
of mere denial, absent any showing that the witnesses for the prosecution had any ill motive to falsely testify and implicate the
accused in the commission of the crime charged.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of fact of the trial court in the formers assailed Decision, but modified the award of
damages, to wit:8
WHEREFORE, the Appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated June 27, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16 of
Zamboanga City in Criminal Case No. 19921 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the amount of exemplary damages in
favor of the private complainants be reduced to P 25,000.00 each.
SO ORDERED.
In the present appeal, instead of filing a supplemental brief, both accused-appellant and the Office of the Solicitor General opted
to adopt their respective Briefs filed with the CA.
The appeal is unmeritorious.
To be convicted of the crime of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate, the following elements must occur:9
1. The accused have no valid license or authority required by law to enable them to lawfully engage in the recruitment
and placement of workers.

2. The accused engaged in this activity of recruitment and placement by actually recruiting, deploying and transporting.
3. Illegal recruitment was committed by three persons conspiring and confederating with one another.
As to the first element, accused-appellant admitted that she did not have a valid license to recruit persons for overseas
employment, consistent with her defense that she did not engage in the recruitment of persons for employment.
Anent the second element, both victims, AAA and BBB, narrated in great detail how they were induced by accused-appellant to
accept an employment opportunity, and how they were successfully transported from Zamboanga City to Malaysia where they
eventually worked as prostituted women.
On the third element, accused-appellant posits that the prosecution failed to prove that there were more than two persons
involved in the alleged crime of illegal recruitment, since the trial court held only two of the accused liable for the crime. The
prosecution, she alleges, failed to establish that the other accused Macky, Jun, and Tas also had no license or authority to
recruit workers for overseas employment.
In the recent case People v. Lalli,10 we affirmed the trial courts findings in which 2 of the 3 accused were convicted of illegal
recruitment committed by a syndicate, even though the third accused was at-large. In so ruling, we took note of the fact that the
victim would not have been able to go to Malaysia were it not for the concerted efforts of the three accused. We held thus:
Flight in criminal law is the evading of the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing oneself in order to avoid arrest or detention
or the institution or continuance of criminal proceedings. The unexplained flight of an accused person may as a general rule be
taken into consideration as evidence having a tendency to establish his guilt. Clearly, in this case, the flight of accused
Relampagos, who is still at-large, shows an indication of guilt in the crimes he has been charged.
It is clear that through the concerted efforts of Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos, Lolita was recruited and deployed to Malaysia to
work as a prostitute. Such conspiracy among Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos could be deduced from the manner in which the
crime was perpetrated each of the accused played a pivotal role in perpetrating the crime of illegal recruitment, and evinced a
joint common purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.
For these reasons, this Court affirms the CA Decision, affirming the RTC Decision, declaring accused Ronnie Aringoy y Masion
and Hadja Jarma Lalli y Purih guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate in
Criminal Case No. 21930, with a penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P 500,000 imposed on each of the accused.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, the prosecution was similarly able to establish that accused-appellant Bernadette and Franz were not the only
ones who had conspired to bring the victims to Malaysia. It was also able to establish at the very least, through the credible
testimonies of the witnesses, that (1) Jun and Macky were the escorts of the women to Malaysia; (2) a certain Tash was their
financier; (3) a certain Bunso negotiated with Macky for the price the former would pay for the expenses incurred in transporting
the victims to Malaysia; and (4) Mommy Cindy owned the prostitution house where the victims worked. The concerted efforts of
all these persons resulted in the oppression of the victims.
Clearly, it was established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant, together with at least two other persons, came to
an agreement to commit the felony and decided to commit it. It is not necessary to show that two or more persons met together
and entered into an explicit agreement laying down the details of how an unlawful scheme or objective is to be carried out.
Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated; or from the acts of the accused
evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.11
Findings of fact of the CA, when they affirm those of the trial court, are binding on this Court, unless the findings of the trial and
the appellate courts are palpably unsupported by the evidence on record, or unless the judgment itself is based on a
misapprehension of facts.12
Likewise, we have time and again ruled that mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a witness. A mere denial,
just like an alibi, is a self-serving negative evidence, which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declarations
of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As between a categorical testimony that has the ring of truth on the one
hand and a bare denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.13
We, however, find it proper to modify the amount of moral and exemplary damages awarded by the CA.
On 12 May 2003, Congress passed R.A. 9208 or the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act. This law was approved on 26 May 2003.
Ironically, only a few days after, private complainants found themselves in a situation that this law had sought to prevent.

In Lalli, we increased the amount of moral and exemplary damages from P 50,000 to P 500,000 and from P50,000 to P 100,000,
respectively, having convicted the accused therein of the crime of trafficking in persons. In so doing, we said:
The Civil Code describes moral damages in Article 2217:
Art. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for omission.
Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are awarded in addition to the payment of moral damages, by way of example or
correction for the public good, as stated in the Civil Code:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed
with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from fines and shall bePAID TO the
offended party.
1w phi 1

The payment of P 500,000 as moral damages and P 100,000 as exemplary damages for the crime of Trafficking in Persons as a
Prostitute finds basis in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which states:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover moral
damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in the
order named.
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or
other lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse. To be trafficked as a prostitute without ones consent and to be sexually violated four to
five times a day by different strangers is horrendous and atrocious. There is no doubt that Lolita experienced physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation when she
was trafficked as a prostitute in Malaysia. Since the crime of Trafficking in Persons was aggravated, being committed by a
syndicate, the award of exemplary damages is likewise justified. (Emphasis supplied.)
We find no legal impediment to increasing the award of moral and exemplary damages in the case at bar. Neither is there any
logical reason why we should differentiate between the victims herein and those in that case, when the circumstances are
frighteningly similar. To do so would be to say that we discriminate one from the other, when all of these women have been the
victims of unscrupulous people who capitalized on the poverty of others. While it is true that accused-appellant was not tried and
1w phi1

convicted of the crime of trafficking in persons, this Court based its award of damages on the Civil Code, and not on the AntiTrafficking in Persons Act, as clearly explained in Lalli.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00644-MIN dated 20 July
2010 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Bernadette Pansacala a.k.a. "Neneng Awid" is
ORDERED to pay AAA and BBB the sum of P 500,000 each as moral damages and P 100,000 each as exemplary damages
and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 135695-96

October 12, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TOMAS TUNDAG, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For automatic review is the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, in Criminal Cases Nos.DU-6186
and DU-6203, finding appellant Tomas Tundag guilty of two counts of incestuous rape and sentencing him to death twice.
On November 18, 1997, private complainant Mary Ann Tundag filed with the Mandaue City Prosecutors Office two separate
complaints for incestuous rape. The first complaint, docketed as Criminal Case No. DU-6186, alleged:
That on or about the 5th day of September, 1997, in the City of Mandaue, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the father of complainant MARY ANN TUNDAG, who is a 13-year-old girl,
with deliberate intent, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the said offended party
against the latters will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
The other, docketed as Criminal Case No. DU-6203, averred:
That on or about the 7th day of November, 1997, in the City of Mandaue, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being the father of complainant MARY ANN TUNDAG, who is a 13-year-old girl, with
deliberate intent, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the said offended party
against the latters will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Upon arraignment appellant, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charges.
The two cases were consolidated and a joint trial ensued.
Appellants defense was bare denial. He claimed that private complainant had fabricated the rape charges against him since he
and his daughter, "had a quarrel when he accordingly reprimanded her for going out whenever he was not at home."3
Appellant did not present any witness to reinforce his testimony.
On August 31, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Joint Judgment is hereby rendered, to wit:
I. In Criminal Case No. DU-6186 a) Finding the herein accused TOMAS TUNDAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape, said
accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of death;
b) To indemnify the offended party Mary Ann Tundag the following amounts:
(1) P50,000.00 by reason of the commission of the offense of rape upon her; and
(2) Another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 2217
and 2230 of the New Civil Code for the pain and moral shock suffered by her and for the commission of
the crime of rape with one qualifying aggravating circumstance; and
c) To pay the costs.

II. In Criminal Case No. DU-6203 a) Finding the herein accused TOMAS TUNDAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape, said
accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of death;
b) To indemnify the offended party Mary Ann Tundag the following amounts:
(1) P50,000.00 by reason of the commission of the offense of rape upon her; and
(2) Another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 2217 and
2230 of the New Civil Code for the pain and moral shock suffered by her and for the commission of the crime of
rape with one qualifying aggravating circumstance; and
(3) To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.4
In its judgment, the court below gave credence to complainants version of what accused did to her.
The evidence for the prosecution as adduced during the trial on the merits clearly shows that private complainant Mary Ann
Tundag is a 13 year old girl who does not know how to read and write and has an IQ of 76% which is a very low general mental
ability and was living with her father, the herein accused, at Galaxy Compound, Mandaue City.
xxx
That on September 5, 1997 at about 10:00 oclock in the evening, she was in the house together with her father. But before she
went to sleep, her father was already lying down on the mat while herself (sic) just lied down at his head side which was not
necessarily beside him. However, when she was already sleeping, she noticed that her father who was already undressed was
beside her and was embracing her. Then, he undressed her which she resisted but her father used a knife and told her that he
would kill her if she shouts and after that, he inserted his penis into her vagina and told her not to shout or tell anyone. In effect,
his penis penetrated her genital, which made her vagina bleed and was very painful.
That when the penis of her father was already inserted in her vagina, her father was all the time asking by saying (sic) : Does it
feel good? And at the same time, he was laughing and further, told her that a woman who does not marry can never enter
heaven and he got angry with her when she contradicted his statement.
That while the penis of her father was inside her vagina and (he) was humping over her, she felt intense pain that she cried and
told him to pull it out but did not accede and in fact, said: Why will I pull it out when it feels so good(?)
That after removing his penis from her vagina and after telling her that she could not go to heaven if she did not get married, her
father just stayed there and continued smoking while she cried.
That in the evening of November 7, 1997, she was at home washing the dishes while her father was just smoking and squatting.
That after she finished washing the dishes, she lied (sic) down to sleep when her father embraced her and since she does not
like what he did to her, she placed a stool between them but he just brushed it aside and laid down with her and was able to take
her womanhood again by using a very sharp knife which he was holding and was pointing it at the right side of her neck which
made her afraid.
That in the early morning of the following day, she left her fathers place and went to her neighbor by the name of Bebie
Cabahug and told her what had happened to her, who, in turn, advised her to report the matter to the police, which she did and
accompanied by the policemen, she went to the Southern Islands Hospital where she was examined and after her medical
examination, she was brought back by the police and was investigated by them."5
Appellants claim that the complainants charges were manufactured did not impress the trial court, which found him twice guilty
of rape. Now before us, appellant assails his double conviction, simply contending that:6
THE TRIAL COURT HAS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN NOT ABSOLVING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES
CHARGED IN THE INFORMATIONS DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF REASONABLE DOUBT TO EXCULPATE HIM OF THE
SAME.

Appellant flatly denies that the incidents complained of ever took place. He contends that on September 5, 1997, he was working
as a watch repairman near Gals Bakery in Mandaue City Market and went home tired and sleepy at around 11:00 oclock that
evening. On November 7, 1997, he claims he was at work. In his brief, he argues that it was impossible for him to have raped his
daughter because when the incidents allegedly transpired, "he went to work and naturally, being exhausted and tired, it is
impossible for him to do such wrongdoings."7
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with appellant and urges the Court to affirm the trial courts decision, with the
recommendation that the award of damages and indemnity ex delicto be modified to conform to prevailing jurisprudence.
Considering the gravity of the offense charged as a heinous crime and the irreversibility of the penalty of death imposed in each
of these cases before us, the Court leaves no stone unturned in its review of the records, including the evidence presented by
both the prosecution and the defense. Conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt.8 But here we find no
room to disturb the trial courts judgment concerning appellants guilt, because his defense is utterly untenable.
Appellants defense of alibi and denial is negative and self-serving. It hardly counts as a worthy and weighty ground for
exculpation in a trial involving his freedom and his life. Against the testimony of private complainant who testified on affirmative
matters,9 such defense is not only trite but pathetic. Denial is an inherently weak defense, which becomes even weaker in the
face of the positive identification by the victim of the appellant as the violator of her honor.10 Indeed, we find that private
complainant was unequivocal in charging appellant with ravishing her. The victims account of the rapes complained of was
straightforward, detailed, and consistent.11Her testimony never wavered even after it had been explained to her that her father
could be meted out the death penalty if found guilty by the court.12
In a prosecution for rape, the complainants credibility is the single mostIMPORTANT issue.13 The determination of the
credibility of witnesses is primarily the function of the trial court. The rationale for this is that the trial court has the advantage of
having observed at first hand the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand and, therefore, is in a better position to form an
accurate impression and conclusion.14 Absent any showing that certain facts of value have clearly been overlooked, which if
considered could affect the result of the case, or that the trial courts finding are clearly arbitrary, the conclusions reached by the
court of origin must be respected and the judgment rendered affirmed.15
Moreover, we note here that private complainants testimony is corroborated by medical findings that lacerations were present in
her hymen. The examination conducted by Dr. Bessie Acebes upon the private complainant yielded the following results:
Genitalia: grossly female
Pubic Hairs: scanty
Labia Majora: coaptated
Labia Minora: -doFourchette: U-shaped
Vestibule: pinkish
Hymen: + old healed laceration at 3 and 9 oclock position(s).
Orifice: admits 2 fingers with ease
Vagina:
Walls: pinkish
Ruganities: prominent
Uterus: small
Cervix: closed
Discharges: Mucoid, minimal
Smears:

Conclusions: sperm identification (-)

Gram staining of vaginal disc.16
Dr. Acebes testified that her findings of healed hymenal lacerations in the complainants private parts meant a history of sexual
congress on her part.17 According to her, the lacerations may have been caused by the entry of an erect male organ into
complainants genitals. The examining physician likewise pointed out that previous coitus may be inferred from complainants Ushaped fourchette since the fourchette of a female who has not yet experienced sexual intercourse is V-shaped.18 While Dr.
Acebes conceded under cross-examination, that the existence of the datum "U-shape(d) fourchette does not conclusively and
absolutely mean that there was sexual intercourse or contact because it can be caused by masturbation of fingers or other
things,"19 nonetheless, the presence of the hymenal lacerations tends to support private complainants claim that she was raped
by appellant.
Appellant next contends that his daughter pressed the rape charges against him because she had quarreled with him after he
had castigated her for misbehavior. He stresses that the prosecution did not rebut his testimony regarding his quarrel or
misunderstanding with private complainant. He urges us to consider the charges filed against him as the result of his frequent
castigation of her delinquent behavior.20
Such allegation of a family feud, however, does not explain the charges away. Filing a case for incestuous rape is of such a
nature that a daughters accusation must be taken seriously. It goes against human experience that a girl would fabricate a story
which would drag herself as well as her family to a lifetime of dishonor, unless that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to
protect her honor.21 More so, where her charges could mean the death of her own father, as in this case.
Appellant likewise points out that it was very unlikely for him to have committed the crimes imputed to him considering that he
and his wife had ten children to attend to and care for. This argument, however, is impertinent and immaterial. Appellant was
estranged from his wife, and private complainant was the only child who lived with him.22 As pointed out by the Solicitor General,
appellant was thus "free to do as he wished to satisfy his bestial lust on his daughter."23
Nor does appellants assertion that private complainant has some psychological problems and a low IQ of 76 in any way favor
his defense. These matters did not affect the credibility of her testimony that appellant raped her twice. We note that the victim
understood the consequences of prosecuting the rape charges against her own father, as shown by the following testimony of
the victim on cross-examination:
Q : Were you informed that if, and when your father will be found guilty, your father will be sentenced to death?
A : Yes.
Q : Until now you wanted that your father will be sentenced by death?
A (Witness nodding.)
xxx
Q : I will inform you, Miss Witness, that you have filed two cases against your father and in case your father would be found
guilty, two death sentences will be imposed against him?
A: Yes.
Q: With that information, do you still want this case would proceed?
A: I want this to proceed.24
Indeed, appellant is guilty. But is the penalty of death imposed on him correct?
Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659,25 penalizes rape of a minor daughter by
her father as qualified rape26 and a heinous crime. In proving such felony, the prosecution must allege and prove the elements of
rape: (1) sexual congress; (2) with woman; (3) by force or without her consent27and in order to warrant the imposition of capital
punishment, the additional elements that: (4) the victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the rape and (5) the offender is a
parent of the victim.28

In this case, it was sufficiently alleged and proven that the offender was the victims father.29 But the victims age was not
properly and sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt. She testified that she was thirteen years old at the time of the rapes.
However, she admitted that she did not know exactly when she was born because her mother did not tell her. She further said
that her birth certificate was likewise with her mother. In her own words, the victim testified - 30
COURT TO WITNESS
Q: When were you born?
A: I do not know.
Q: You do not know your birthday?
A: My mama did not tell me exactly when I asked her.
COURT: Proceed.
FISCAL PEREZ: For our failure to secure the Birth Certificate Your Honor, may we just request for judicial notice that the victim
here is below 18 years old.
ATTY. SURALTA: Admitted.
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without proof because they already
know them.31 Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may either be mandatory or discretionary. Section 1 of Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court provides when court shall take mandatory judicial notice of facts SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice without the introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations,
the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official
acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions.
Section 2 of Rule 129 enumerates the instances when courts may take discretionary judicial notice of facts SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. - A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
Thus, it can be considered of public knowledge and judicially noticed that the scene of the rape is not always nor necessarily
isolated or secluded for lust is no respecter of time or place. The offense of rape can and has been committed in places where
people congregate, e.g. inside a house where there are occupants, a five (5) meter room with five (5) people inside, or even in
the same room which the victim is sharing with the accuseds sister.32
The Court has likewise taken judicial notice of the Filipinas inbred modesty and shyness and her antipathy in publicly airing acts
which blemish her honor and virtue.33
On the other hand, matters which are capable of unquestionable demonstration pertain to fields of professional and scientific
knowledge. For example, in People v. Alicante,34 the trial court took judicial notice of the clinical records of the attending
physicians concerning the birth of twin baby boys as "premature" since one of the alleged rapes had occurred 6 to 7 months
earlier.
As to matters which ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions, an example would be facts which are
ascertainable from the record of court proceedings, e.g. as to when court notices were received by a party.
With respect to other matters not falling within the mandatory or discretionary judicial notice, the court can take judicial notice of
a fact pursuant to the procedure in Section 3 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which requires that SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. - During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may
announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial
notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.

In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper, despite the defense counsels admission, thereof acceding to the
prosecutions motion. As required by Section 3 of Rule 129, as to any other matters such as age, a hearing is required before
courts can take judicial notice of such fact. Generally, the age of the victim may be proven by the birth or baptismal certificate of
the victim, or in the absence thereof, upon showing that said documents were lost or destroyed, by other documentary or oral
evidence sufficient for the purpose.
Thus, in People v. Rebancos, 172 SCRA 426 (1989), the victim was below 12 and we found that the rape committed was
statutory rape. The mother testified that her daughter was born on October 26, 1974, and so was only 9 years old at the time of
the rape on February 12, 1984. Although no birth certificate was presented because the victims birth had allegedly not been
registered, her baptismal certificate was duly presented. Hence, we ruled that the mothers testimony coupled with the
presentation of the baptismal certificate was sufficient to establish that the victim was below 12 at the time of the rape.
However, in People v. Vargas, 257 SCRA 603 (1996), we ruled that appellant can only be convicted of simple rape, and not
statutory rape, because of failure of the prosecution to prove the minority of the victim, who was allegedly 10 years old at the
time of the rape. The prosecution failed to present either the birth or baptismal certificate of the victim. Also there was no
showing that the said documents were lost or destroyed to justify their non-presentation. We held that testimony of the victim
and her aunt were hearsay, and that it was not correct for the trial court to judge the age of the victim by her appearance.
1wphi1

In several recent cases, we have emphasized the need for independent proof of the age of the victim, aside from testimonial
evidence from the victim or her relatives. In People v. Javier,35 we stressed that the prosecution must present independent proof
of the age of the victim, even though it is not contested by the defense. The minority of the victim must be proved with equal
certainty and clearness as the crime itself. In People v. Cula,36 we reiterated that it is the burden of the prosecution to prove with
certainty the fact that the victim was below 18 when the rape was committed in order to justify the imposition of the death
penalty. Since the record of the case was bereft of any independent evidence thereon, such as the victims duly certified
Certificate of Live Birth, accurately showing private complainants age, appellant could not be convicted of rape in its qualified
form. In People v. Veloso,37 the victim was alleged to have been only 9 years of age at the time of the rape. It held that the trial
court was correct when it ruled that the prosecution failed to prove the victims age other than through the testimony of her father
and herself.
Considering the statutory requirement in Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 7659 and R.A. No.
8353, we reiterate here what the Court has held in Javier without any dissent, that the failure to sufficiently establish victims age
by independent proof is a bar to conviction for rape in its qualified form. For, in the words of Melo, J., "independent proof of the
actual age of a rape victim becomes vital and essential so as to remove an iota of doubt that the case falls under the qualifying
circumstances" for the imposition of the death penalty set by the law.
In this case, the first rape was committed on September 5, 1997 and is therefore governed by the death penalty law, R.A. 7659.
The penalty for the crime of simple rape or rape in its unqualified form under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Sec. 11 of R.A. 7659, is reclusion perpetua. The second rape was committed on November 7, 1997, after the effectivity of
R.A. 8353, also known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which took effect on October 22, 1997. The penalty for rape in its
unqualified form remains the same.
As to civil indemnity, the trial court correctly awarded P50,000.00 for each count of rape as civil indemnity. However, the award
of another P50,000.00 as "moral and exemplary damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 2217 and 2230 of the Civil
Code" for each count is imprecise. In rape cases, the prevailing jurisprudence permits the award of moral damages without need
for pleading or proof as to the basis thereof.38 Thus, pursuant to current jurisprudence, we award the amount of P50,000.00 as
moral damages for each count of rape.
The award of exemplary damages separately is also in order, but on a different basis and for a different amount. Appellant being
the father of the victim, a fact duly proved during trial, we find that the alternative circumstance of relationship should be
appreciated here as an aggravating circumstance. Under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code, exemplary damages may be
imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Hence, we find an award of exemplary
damages in the amount of P25,000.00 proper. Note that generally, in rape cases imposing the death penalty, the rule is that
relationship is no longer appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance in view of the amendments introduced by R.A. Nos.
7659 and 8353. The father-daughter relationship has been treated by Congress in the nature of a special circumstance which
makes the imposition of the death penalty mandatory.39 However, in this case, the special qualifying circumstance of relationship
was proved but not the minority of the victim, taking the case out of the ambit of mandatory death sentence. Hence, relationship
can be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance in this instance so that exemplary damages are called for. In rapes
committed by fathers on their own daughters, exemplary damages may be imposed to deter other fathers with perverse
tendency or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters.40
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, in Criminal Case Nos. DU-6186 and DU6203, is hereby MODIFIED as follows: appellant Tomas Tundag is found guilty of two (2) counts of simple rape; and for each

count, sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 177809

October 16, 2009

SPOUSES OMAR and MOSHIERA LATIP, Petitioners,

vs.
ROSALIE PALAA CHUA, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 89300:1 (1) reversing
the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 274, Paraaque City in Civil Case No. 04-0052;2 and (2) reinstating and
affirming in toto the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 78, of the same city in Civil Case No. 2001-315.3
First, we sift through the varying facts found by the different lower courts.
The facts parleyed by the MeTC show that respondent Rosalie Chua (Rosalie) is the owner of Roferxane Building, a commercial
building, located at No. 158 Quirino Avenue corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran, Paraaque City.
On July 6, 2001, Rosalie filed a complaint for unlawful detainer plus damages against petitioners, Spouses Omar and Moshiera
Latip (Spouses Latip). Rosalie attached to the complaint a contract of lease over two cubicles in Roferxane Bldg., signed by
Rosalie, as lessor, and by Spouses Latip, as lessees thereof.
1 a vv p h ! 1

The contract of lease reads:

CONTRACT OF LEASE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This Contract of Lease is entered into by and between:

ROSALIE PALAA CHUA, Filipino, of legal age, married with office at 2/F JOFERXAN Building, F.B. Harrison St., Brgy.
Baclaran, Paraaque City, and hereinafter referred to as the LESSOR,
- and OMAR LATIEF marriage to MOSHIERA LATIEF, also both Filipino, of legal age with address at 24 Anahan St. RGV Homes
Paraaque City, and hereinafter referred to as the LESSEES.
WITNESSETH
1. That the LESSOR is the owner of the commercial building erected at the lot of the Toribio G. Reyes Realty, Inc. situated at
158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran in Paraaque Ctiy;
2. That LESSOR hereby leases two (2) cubicles located at the 1st & 2nd Floor, of said building with an area of 56 square meters
under the following terms and conditions, to wit:
a. That the monthly rental of the two (2) cubicles in PESOS, SIXTY THOUSAND (P60,000.00), Philippine
Currency. However, due to unstable power of the peso LESSEES agrees to a yearly increase of ten (10%)
percent of the monthly rental;
b. That any rental in-arrears shall be paid before the expiration of the contract to the LESSOR;
c. That LESSEES agree to pay their own water and electric consumptions in the said premises;
d. That the LESSEES shall not sub-let or make any alteration in the cubicles without a written permission from
the LESSOR. Provided, however, that at the termination of the Contract, the lessee shall return the two cubicles
in its original conditions at their expenses;
e. That the LESSEES agree to keep the cubicles in a safe and sanitary conditions, and shall not keep any kinds
of flammable or combustible materials.
f. That in case the LESSEES fail to pay the monthly rental every time it falls due or violate any of the above
conditions shall be enough ground to terminate this Contract of Lease. Provided, further, that, if the LESSEES
pre-terminate this Contract they shall pay the rentals for the unused month or period by way of liquidated
damages in favor of the LESSOR.
3. That this Contract of Lease is for six (6) yrs. only starting from December _____, 1999 or up to December ______, 2005.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto affixed their hands this ___th day of December, 1999 at City of Manila,
Philippines.
(sgd.)
ROSALIE PALAA-CHUA
LESSOR

(sgd.)
MOSHIERA LATIEF
LESSEE
(sgd.)
OMAR LATIEF
LESSEE

SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:

(sgd.)
1. Daisy C. Ramos

(sgd.)
2. Ferdinand C. Chua

Republic of the Philippines)

City of Manila)s.s.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the City of Manila personally appeared the following persons:

Rosalie P. Chua with CTC No. 05769706 at Paraaque City on 2/1/99; Moshiera Latief with CTC No. 12885654 at Paraaque
City on 11/11/99; Omar Latief with CTC No. 12885653 Paraaque City on Nov. 11, 1999.
known to me and to me known to be the same persons who executed this instrument consisting of two (2) pages duly signed by
them and the two (2) instrumental witnesses and acknowledged to me that the same is their free and voluntarily acts and deeds.
IN FAITH AND TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my hand and Notarial Seal this ____th day of December, 1999
at the City of Manila, Philippines.
Doc. No. _____
Page No. _____
Book No. LXV
Series of 1999

ATTY. CALIXTRO B. RAMOS

NOTARY PUBLIC
Until December 31, 2000
PTR # 374145-1/11/99/-Mla.
IBP # 00262-Life Member4

A year after the commencement of the lease and with Spouses Latip already occupying the leased cubicles, Rosalie, through
counsel, sent the spouses a letter demanding payment of back rentals and should they fail to do so, to vacate the leased
cubicles. When Spouses Latip did not heed Rosalies demand, she instituted the aforesaid complaint.
In their Answer, Spouses Latip refuted Rosalies claims. They averred that the lease of the two (2) cubicles had already been
paid in full as evidenced by receipts showing payment to Rosalie of the total amount of P2,570,000.00. The three (3) receipts, in
Rosalies handwriting, read:
1. I received the amount of P2,000,000.00 (two million pesos) from [O]mar Latip & Moshi[e]ra Latip for the
payment of 2 cubicles located at 158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Rd.[,] Baclaran P[ara]aque City.
ROFERLAND5 Bldg. with the terms 6 yrs. Contract.
P2,000,000.00
CHECK # 3767924
FAR EAST BANK

(sgd.)
____________________
Rosalie Chua
(sgd.)
____________________
Ferdinand Chua

2. Received cash
P500,000.00
From Moshiera Latip

12/10/99

(sgd.)
Rosalie Chua
____________________
Received by

3. Received cash
P70,000.00 from
Moshiera Latip

12-11-99

(sgd.)
____________________
Received by:6

Spouses Latip asseverated that sometime in October 1999, Rosalie offeredFOR SALE lease rights over two (2) cubicles in
Roferxane Bldg. Having in mind the brisk sale of goods during the Christmas season, they readily accepted Rosalies offer to
purchase lease rights in Roferxane Bldg., which was still under construction at the time. According to Spouses Latip, the
immediate payment of P2,570,000.00 would be used to finish construction of the building giving them first priority in the
occupation of the finished cubicles.

Thereafter, in December 1999, as soon as two (2) cubicles were finished, Spouses Latip occupied them without waiting for the
completion of five (5) other stalls. Spouses Latip averred that the contract of lease they signed had been novated by their
purchase of lease rights of the subject cubicles. Thus, they were surprised to receive a demand letter from Rosalies counsel
and the subsequent filing of a complaint against them.
The MeTC ruled in favor of Rosalie, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [Spouses Latip] and all persons claiming rights under them are hereby ordered to
VACATE the property subject of this case located at the 1st and 2nd floors of a Roferxane Building situated at No. 158 Quirino
Avenue corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran, Paraaque City. The [Spouses Latip] are also ordered to PAY [Rosalie]
the amount of SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P720,000.00) as rent arrearages for the period of December
1999 to December 2000 and thereafter to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of SEVENTY TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P72,000.00) per
month from January 2001 to December 2002, plus ten percent (10%) increase for each and every succeeding years thereafter
as stipulated in paragraph 2(a) of the Contract of Lease x x x, until the [Spouses Latip] have completely vacated the leased
premises subject of this lease. Finally[,] the [Spouses Latip] are hereby ordered to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) as attorneys fees and TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) per [Rosalies] appearance in
Court as appearance fee and to PAY the cost of this suit.
[Spouses Latips] counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.7
In stark contrast, the RTC reversed the MeTC and ruled in favor of Spouses Latip. The RTC did not give credence to the
contract of lease, ruling that it was not notarized and, in all other substantial aspects, incomplete. Further on this point, the RTC
noted that the contract of lease lacked: (1) the signature of Ferdinand Chua, Rosalies husband; (2) the signatures of Spouses
Latip on the first page thereof; (3) the specific dates for the term of the contract which only stated that the lease is for "six (6)
y[ea]rs only starting from December 1999 or up to December 2005"; (4) the exact date of execution of the document, albeit the
month of December and year 1999 are indicated therein; and (5) the provision for payment of deposit or advance rental which is
supposedly uncommon in big commercial lease contracts.
The RTC believed the claim of Spouses Latip that the contract of lease was modified and supplemented; and the entire lease
rentals for the two (2) cubicles for six (6) years had already been paid by Spouses Latip in the amount of P2,570,000.00. As to
Rosalies claim that her receipt of P2,570,000.00 was simply goodwill payment by prospective lessees to their lessor, and not
payment for the purchase of lease rights, the RTC shot this down and pointed out that, apart from her bare allegations, Rosalie
did not adduce evidence to substantiate this claim. On the whole, the RTC declared an existent lease between the parties for a
period of six (6) years, and already fully paid for by Spouses Latip. Thus, Spouses Latip could not be ejected from the leased
premises until expiration of the lease period.
The RTC disposed of the appeal, viz.:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the appealed decision of the [MeTC] dated January 13, 2004 is reversed as
judgment is hereby rendered for the [Spouses Latip] and against [Rosalie], ordering the latter to pay the former
(1) the sum of PhP1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
(2) the sum of PhP500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(3) the sum of PhP250,000.00 plus PhP3,000.00 per court appearance as and for attorneys fees; and
(4) costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.8
In yet another turn of events, the CA, as previously mentioned, reversed the RTC and reinstated the decision of the MeTC. The
CA ruled that the contract of lease, albeit lacking the signature of Ferdinand and not notarized, remained a complete and valid
contract. As the MeTC had, the CA likewise found that the alleged defects in the contract of lease did not render the contract
ineffective. On the issue of whether the amount of P2,570,000.00 merely constituted payment of goodwill money, the CA took
judicial notice of this common practice in the area of Baclaran, especially around the Redemptorist Church. According to the
appellate court, this judicial notice was bolstered by the Joint Sworn Declaration of the stallholders at Roferxane Bldg. that they
all had paid goodwill money to Rosalie prior to occupying the stalls thereat. Thus, ruling on Rosalies appeal, the CA disposed of
the case:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of RTC Paraaque
City Branch 274 dated September 24, 2004 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the January 13, 2004 decision of the
MeTC is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED en toto.
SO ORDERED.9
Not surprisingly, Spouses Latip filed the present appeal.
The singular issue for our resolution is whether Spouses Latip should be ejected from the leased cubicles.
As previously adverted to, the CA, in ruling for Rosalie and upholding the ejectment of Spouses Latip, took judicial notice of the
alleged practice of prospective lessees in the Baclaran area to pay goodwill money to the lessor.
We disagree.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the taking of judicial notice is mandatory or discretionary on the
courts, thus:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations,
the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official
acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions.
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
On this point, State Prosecutors v. Muro10 is instructive:
I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be
exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the
subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general
knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the
limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that
of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be
dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so
notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is
not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or
professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those matters which are "commonly" known.
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally
in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and
are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in
encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so
generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person.11
We reiterated the requisite of notoriety for the taking of judicial notice in the recent case of Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,12 which cited State Prosecutors:
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general
knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the
limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that
of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.
Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within
the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.

Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally
in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and
are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in
encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are such of universal notoriety and so
generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. As the common
knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of
common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or nonexistence of a fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge.
1avvphi1

From the foregoing provisions of law and our holdings thereon, it is apparent that the matter which the appellate court took
judicial notice of does not meet the requisite of notoriety. To begin with, only the CA took judicial notice of this supposed practice
to pay goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran area. Neither the MeTC nor the RTC, with the former even ruling in favor of
Rosalie, found that the practice was of "common knowledge" or notoriously known.
We note that the RTC specifically ruled that Rosalie, apart from her bare allegation, adduced no evidence to prove her claim that
the amount of P2,570,000.00 simply constituted the payment of goodwill money. Subsequently, Rosalie attached an annex to
her petition for review before the CA, containing a joint declaration under oath by other stallholders in Roferxane Bldg. that they
had paid goodwill money to Rosalie as their lessor. On this score, we emphasize that the reason why our rules on evidence
provide for matters that need not be proved under Rule 129, specifically on judicial notice, is to dispense with the taking of the
usual form of evidence on a certain matter so notoriously known, it will not be disputed by the parties.
However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of attaching documentary evidence, i.e., the Joint
Affidavit of the stallholders, to Rosalies appeal before the CA. In short, the alleged practice still had to be proven by Rosalie;
contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court What need not be proved.
Apparently, only that particular division of the CA had knowledge of the practice to pay goodwill money in the Baclaran area. As
was held in State Prosecutors, justices and judges alike ought to be reminded that the power to take judicial notice must be
exercised with caution and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be ample reason for the claim of judicial notice to be
promptly resolved in the negative.
Ultimately, on the issue of whether Spouses Latip ought to be ejected from the leased cubicles, what remains in evidence is the
documentary evidence signed by both parties the contract of lease and the receipts evidencing payment of P2,570,000.00.
We need not be unduly detained by the issue of which documents were executed first or if there was a novation of the contract
of lease. As had been found by the RTC, the lease contract and the receipts for the amount of P2,570,000.00 can be reconciled
or harmonized. The RTC declared:
Definitely, the parties entered into a lease agreement over two (2) cubicles of the 1st and 2nd floors of Roferxane (Roferland)
Building, a commercial building located at 158 Quirino Avenue, corner Redemptorist Road, Baclaran, Paraaque City and
belonging to [Rosalie]. The lease agreement is for a term of six (6) years commencing in December 1999 up to December 2005.
This agreement was embodied in a Contract of Lease x x x. The terms of this lease contract, however, are modified or
supplemented by another agreement between the parties executed and or entered into in or about the time of execution of the
lease contract, which exact date of execution of the latter is unclear.13
We agree with the RTCs holding only up to that point. There exists a lease agreement between the parties as set forth in the
contract of lease which is a complete document. It need not be signed by Ferdinand Chua as he likewise did not sign the other
two receipts for P500,000.00 and P70,000.00, respectively, which contained only the signature of Rosalie. Besides, it is
undisputed that Rosalie owns and leases the stalls in Roferxane Bldg.; thus, doing away with the need for her husbands
consent. The findings of the three lower courts concur on this fact.
The contract of lease has a period of six (6) years commencing in December 1999. This fact is again buttressed by Spouses
Latips admission that they occupied the property forthwith in December 1999, bearing in mind the brisk sales during the holiday
season.
On the conflicting interpretations by the lower courts of the receipts amounting to P2,570,000.00, we hold that the practice of
payment of goodwill money in the Baclaran area is an inadequate subject of judicial notice. Neither was Rosalie able to provide
sufficient evidence that, apart from the belatedly submitted Joint Affidavit of the stallholders of Roferxane Bldg., the said amount
was simply for the payment of goodwill money, and not payment for advance rentals by Spouses Latip.
In interpreting the evidence before us, we are guided by the Civil Code provisions on interpretation of contracts, to wit:

Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be
principally considered.
Art. 1372. However general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct
and cases that are different from those which the parties intended to agree.
Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several meanings, it shall be understood as bearing thatIMPORT
which is most adequate to render it effectual.
The RTC was already on the right track when it declared that the receipts for P2,570,000.00 modified or supplemented the
contract of lease. However, it made a quantum leap when it ruled that the amount was payment for rentals of the two (2)
cubicles for the entire six-year period. We cannot subscribe to this finding. To obviate confusion and for clarity, the contents of
the receipts, already set forth above, are again reproduced:
1. I received the amount of P2,000,000.00 (two million pesos) from [O]mar Latip & Moshi[e]ra Latip for the payment of 2
cubicles located at 158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Rd.[,] Baclaran P[ara]que City. ROFERLAND Bldg. with the
terms 6 yrs. Contract.
P2,000,000.00
CHECK # 3767924
FAR EAST BANK

(sgd.)
____________________
Rosalie Chua
(sgd.)
____________________
Ferdinand Chua

2. Received cash
P500,000.00
From Moshiera Latip

12/10/99

(sgd.)
Rosalie Chua
____________________
Received by

3. Received cash
P70,000.00 from
Moshiera Latip

12-11-99

(sgd.)
____________________
Received by:14

There is nothing on the receipts and on record that the payment and receipt of P2,570,000.00 referred to full payment of rentals
for the whole period of the lease. All three receipts state Rosalies receipt of cash in varying amounts. The first receipt
for P2,000,000.00 did state payment for two (2) cubicles, but this cannot mean full payment of rentals for the entire lease period
when there are no words to that effect. Further, two receipts were subsequently executed pointing to the obvious fact that
the P2,000,000.00 is not for full payment of rentals. Thus, since the contract of lease remained operative, we find that Rosalies
receipt of the monies should be considered as advanced rentals on the leased cubicles. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact
that Rosalie demanded payment of the lease rentals only in 2000, a full year after the commencement of the lease.
Finally, we note that the lease ended in 2005. Consequently, Spouses Latip can be ejected from the leased premises. They are
liable to Rosalie for unpaid rentals on the lease of the two (2) cubicles in accordance with the stipulations on rentals in the
Contract of Lease. However, the amount of P2,570,000.00, covering advance rentals, must be deducted from this liability of
Spouses Latip to Rosalie.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
89300 is REVERSED. The petitioners, spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip, are liable to respondent Rosalie Chua for unpaid
rentals minus the amount of P2,570,000.00 already received by her as advance rentals. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 159507

April 19, 2006

ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and/or IAN T. FISH and DOMINIC MASCRINAS, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 dated May 22, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553. The assailed decision directed the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, Branch 25 thereof, to vacate and set aside its Orders dated September 10,
2001 and January 2, 2002 in Civil Case No. R-3172, and enjoined the presiding judge2 thereof from conducting further
proceedings in said case, except to dismiss the complaint filed therewith on ground of improper venue. The petition also seeks
to reverse and set aside the appellate court's Resolution dated August 14, 2003 denying the motion for reconsideration of the
assailed decision.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American Express International, Inc. (AMEX) and/or its officers
Ian T. Fish, Vice-President and Country Manager, and Dominic Mascrinas, Head of Operations, with the RTC of Maasin City,
Southern Leyte. The case was raffled to Branch 25 of the said court.
The complaint alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff (herein petitioner Saludo) "is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, and a member of the
House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, Philippines." On the other hand, defendant
(herein respondent AMEX, Inc.) "is a corporation doing business in the Philippines and engaged in providing credit and other
credit facilities and allied services with office address at 4th floor, ACE Building, Rada Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City." The
other defendants (herein respondents Fish and Mascrinas) are officers of respondent AMEX, and may be served with summons
and other court processes at their office address.
The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of petitioner Saludo's AMEX credit card and the
supplementary card issued to his daughter. The first dishonor happened when petitioner Saludo's daughter used her
supplementary credit card to pay her purchases in the United States some time in April 2000. The second dishonor occurred
when petitioner Saludo used his principal credit card to pay his account at theHOTEL Okawa in Tokyo, Japan while he was
there with other delegates from the Philippines to attend the Congressional Recognition in honor of Mr. Hiroshi Tanaka.
The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards were allegedly unjustified as they resulted from respondents' unilateral act of
suspending petitioner Saludo's account for his failure to pay its balance covering the period of March 2000. Petitioner Saludo
denied having received the corresponding statement of account. Further, he was allegedly wrongfully charged for late payment
in June 2000. Subsequently, his credit card and its supplementary cards were canceled by respondents on July 20, 2000.
Petitioner Saludo claimed that he suffered great inconvenience, wounded feelings, mental anguish, embarrassment, humiliation
and besmirched political and professional standing as a result of respondents' acts which were committed in gross and evident
bad faith, and in wanton, reckless and oppressive manner. He thus prayed that respondents be adjudged to pay him, jointly and
severally, actual, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

In their answer, respondents specifically denied the allegations in the complaint. Further, they raised the affirmative defenses of
lack of cause of action and improper venue. On the latter, respondents averred that the complaint should be dismissed on the
ground that venue was improperly laid because none of the parties was a resident of Leyte. They alleged that respondents were
not residents of Southern Leyte. Moreover, notwithstanding the claim in his complaint, petitioner Saludo was not allegedly a
resident thereof as evidenced by the fact that his community tax certificate, which was presented when he executed the
complaint's verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay City. To buttress their contention,
respondents pointed out that petitioner Saludo's complaint was prepared in Pasay City and signed by a lawyer of the said city.
Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint a quo.
Thereafter, respondents filed an Opposition to Ex-Parte Motion (to Set Case for Pre-Trial) and Motion for Preliminary Hearing
(on Affirmative Defense of Improper Venue) to which petitioner Saludo filed his Comments and/or Objections to the Affirmative
Defense of Improper Venue. He asserted that any allegation refuting his residency in Southern Leyte was baseless and
unfounded considering that he was the congressman of the lone district thereof at the time of the filing of his complaint. He
urged the court a quo to take judicial notice of this particular fact. As a member of Congress, he possessed all the qualifications
prescribed by the Constitution including that of being a resident of his district. He was also a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Southern Leyte Chapter, and has been such ever since his admission to the Bar. His community tax certificate was
issued at Pasay City only because he has an office thereat and the office messenger obtained the same in the said city. In any
event, the community tax certificate is not determinative of one's residence.
In the Order dated September 10, 2001, the court a quo denied the affirmative defenses interposed by respondents. It found the
allegations of the complaint sufficient to constitute a cause of action against respondents. The court a quo likewise denied
respondents' affirmative defense that venue was improperly laid. It reasoned, thus:
x x x [T]he fact alone that the plaintiff at the time he filed the complaint was and still is, the incumbent Congressman of the Lone
District of Southern Leyte with residence at Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, is enough to dispell any and all doubts about his
actual residence. As a high-ranking government official of the province, his residence there can be taken judicial notice of. As
such his personal, actual and physical habitation or his actual residence or place of abode can never be in some other place but
in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte. It is correctly stated by the plaintiff, citing the case of Core v. Core, 100 Phil. 321 that,
"residence, for purposes of fixing venue of an action, is synonymous with domicile. This is defined as the permanent home, the
place to which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on the facts and circumstances,
in the sense that they disclose intent. A person can have but one domicile at a time. A man can have but one domicile for one
and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. Venue could be at place of his residence.
(Masa v. Mison, 200 SCRA 715 [1991])3
Respondents sought the reconsideration thereof but the court a quo denied the same in the Order dated January 2, 2002. They
then filed with the appellate court a petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
presiding judge of the court a quo in issuing the September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 Orders. Upon respondents' posting of
a bond, the appellate court issued on March 14, 2002 a temporary restraining order which enjoined the presiding judge of the
court a quo from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. R-3172.
On May 22, 2003, the appellate court rendered the assailed decision granting respondents' petition for certiorari as it found that
venue was improperly laid. It directed the court a quo to vacate and set aside its Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January
2, 2002, and enjoined the presiding judge thereof from further proceeding in the case, except to dismiss the complaint.
The appellate court explained that the action filed by petitioner Saludo against respondents is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of
the Rules of Court. The said rule on venue of personal actions basically provides that personal actions may be commenced and
tried where plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, at the
election of plaintiff.
Venue was improperly laid in the court a quo, according to the appellate court, because not one of the parties was a resident of
Southern Leyte. Specifically, it declared that petitioner Saludo was not a resident thereof. The appellate court pronounced that,
for purposes of venue, the residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or his actual residence or place of
abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.4
The appellate court quoted the following discussion in Koh v. Court of Appeals5 where the Court distinguished the terms
"residence" and "domicile" in this wise:
x x x [T]he term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is [an] established
principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a
temporary stay of a person in a given place. In fact, this distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary
Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.

xxxx
"There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or
temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may
have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with
intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he
may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means,
necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile."6 (Italicized for emphasis)
In holding that petitioner Saludo is not a resident of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, the appellate court referred to his community
tax certificate, as indicated in his complaint's verification and certification of non-forum shopping, which was issued at Pasay
City. Similarly, it referred to the same community tax certificate, as indicated in his complaint for deportation filed against
respondents Fish and Mascrinas. Under Republic Act No. 7160,7 the community tax certificate shall be paid in the place of
residence of the individual, or in the place where the principal office of the juridical entity is located.8 It also pointed out that
petitioner Saludo's law office, which was also representing him in the present case, is in Pasay City. The foregoing
circumstances were considered by the appellate court as judicial admissions of petitioner Saludo which are conclusive upon him
and no longer required proof.
The appellate court chided the court a quo for stating that as incumbent congressman of the lone district of Southern Leyte,
judicial notice could be taken of the fact of petitioner Saludo's residence thereat. No evidence had yet been adduced that
petitioner Saludo was then the congressman of Southern Leyte and actual resident of Ichon, Macrohon of the said province.
The appellate court held that, based on his complaint, petitioner Saludo was actually residing in Pasay City. It faulted him for
filing his complaint with the court a quo when the said venue is inconvenient to the parties to the case. It opined that under the
rules, the possible choices of venue are Pasay City or Makati City, or any place in the National Capital Judicial Region, at the
option of petitioner Saludo.
It stressed that while the choice of venue is given to plaintiff, said choice is not left to his caprice and cannot deprive a defendant
of the rights conferred upon him by the Rules of Court.9 Further, fundamental in the law governing venue of actions that the situs
for bringing real and personal civil actions is fixed by the rules to attain the greatest possible convenience to the party litigants by
taking into consideration the maximum accessibility to them - i.e., to both plaintiff and defendant, not only to one or the other - of
the courts of justice.10
The appellate court concluded that the court a quo should have given due course to respondents' affirmative defense of
improper venue in order to avoid any suspicion that petitioner Saludo's motive in filing his complaint with the court a quo was
only to vex and unduly inconvenience respondents or even to wield influence in the outcome of the case, petitioner Saludo being
a powerful and influential figure in the said province. The latter circumstance could be regarded as a "specie of forum shopping"
akin to that in Investors Finance Corp. v. Ebarle11 where the Court mentioned that the filing of the civil action before the court in
Pagadian City "was a specie of forum shopping" considering that plaintiff therein was an influential person in the locality.
The decretal portion of the assailed Decision dated May 22, 2003 of the appellate court reads:
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the challenged orders must be, as they hereby are, VACATED and SET
ASIDE and the respondent judge, or any one acting in his place or stead, is instructed and enjoined to desist from further
proceeding in the case, except to dismiss it. The temporary restraining order earlier issued is hereby converted into a writ of
preliminary injunction, upon the posting this time by petitioners [herein respondents], within five (5) days from receipt of this
decision, of a bond in the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00), to answer for all damages that private respondent
[herein petitioner] may sustain by reason of the issuance of such injunction should the Court finally decide that petitioners are
not entitled thereto. Private respondent, if he so minded, may refile his case for damages before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City or Pasay City, or any of the Regional Trial Courts of the National Capital Judicial Region. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.12
Petitioner Saludo sought the reconsideration of the said decision but the appellate court, in the Resolution dated August 14,
2003, denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence, he filed the instant petition for review with the Court alleging that:
The Court of Appeals, (Special Fourth Division), in promulgating the afore-mentioned Decision and Resolution, has decided a
question of substance in a way probably not in accord with law or with applicable decisions of this Honorable Court.
(a) the Court of Appeals erred in not taking judicial notice of the undisputed fact that herein petitioner is the incumbent
congressman of the lone district of Southern Leyte and as such, he is a residence (sic) of said district;

(b) the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on the basis of improper venue due to the alleged judicial
admission of herein petitioner;
(c) the Court of Appeals in dismissing the complaint ignored applicable decisions of this Honorable Court; and

1avv phil .net

(d) the Court of Appeals erred in deciding that herein petitioner violated the rules on venue, and even speculated that
herein petitioner's motive in filing the complaint in Maasin City was only to vex the respondents.13
In gist, the sole substantive issue for the Court's resolution is whether the appellate court committed reversible error in holding
that venue was improperly laid in the court a quo in Civil Case No. R-3172 because not one of the parties, including petitioner
Saludo, as plaintiff therein, was a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of the complaint.
The petition is meritorious.
Petitioner Saludo's complaint for damages against respondents before the court a quo is a personal action. As such, it is
governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Courts which reads:
SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant
where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.
The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the RTC is given to plaintiff but not to plaintiff's caprice because the
matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.14 The rule on venue, like other procedural rules, is designed to insure a just and
orderly administration of justice, or the impartial and evenhanded determination of every action and proceeding.15 The option of
plaintiff in personal actions cognizable by the RTC is either the place where defendant resides or may be found, or the place
where plaintiff resides. If plaintiff opts for the latter, he is limited to that place.16
Following this rule, petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff, had opted to file his complaint with the court a quo which is in Maasin City,
Southern Leyte. He alleged in his complaint that he was a member of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon,
Macrohon, Southern Leyte to comply with the residency requirement of the rule.
However, the appellate court, adopting respondents' theory, made the finding that petitioner Saludo was not a resident of
Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint. It hinged the said finding mainly on the fact that petitioner Saludo's
community tax certificate, indicated in his complaint's verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was issued at Pasay
City. That his law office is in Pasay City was also taken by the appellate court as negating petitioner Saludo's claim of residence
in Southern Leyte.
The appellate court committed reversible error in finding that petitioner Saludo was not a resident of Southern Leyte at the time
of the filing of his complaint, and consequently holding that venue was improperly laid in the court a quo. In Dangwa
Transportation Co., Inc. v. Sarmiento,17 the Court had the occasion to explain at length the meaning of the term "resides" for
purposes of venue, thus:
In Koh v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the term "resides" as employed in the rule on venue on personal actions filed with
the courts of first instance means the place of abode, whether permanent or temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant, as
distinguished from "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of
returning.
"It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules of Court) that the situs for bringing real and
personal civil actions are fixed by the rules to attain the greatest convenience possible to the parties-litigants by taking into
consideration the maximum accessibility to them of the courts of justice. It is, likewise, undeniable that the term domicile is not
exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence, for it is an established principle in Conflict of Laws that
domicile refers to the relatively more permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a person in a
given place. In fact, this distinction is very well emphasized in those cases where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily
supplant the Nationality Theory in cases involving stateless persons.
"This Court held in the case of Uytengsu v. Republic, 50 O.G. 4781, October, 1954, reversing its previous stand in Larena v.
Ferrer, 61 Phil. 36, and Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, that 'There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or
temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may
have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the
intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he

may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not by any means,
necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.' (Italicized for emphasis)
"We note that the law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of Rule 4, Rules of Court) in referring to the parties utilizes
the words 'resides or may be found,' and not 'is domiciled,' thus:
'Sec. 2(b) Personal actions - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants
resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.' (Italicized for
emphasis)
"Applying the foregoing observation to the present case, We are fully convinced that private respondent Coloma's protestations
of domicile in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, based on his manifested intention to return there after the retirement of his wife from
government service to justify his bringing of an action for damages against petitioner in the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte, is entirely of no
moment since what is of paramountIMPORTANCE is where he actually resided or where he may be found at the time he
brought the action, to comply substantially with the requirements of Sec. 2(b) of Rule 4, Rules of Court, on venue of personal
actions." (Koh v. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 304-305.)
The same construction of the word "resides" as used in Section 1, Rule 73, of the Revised Rules of Court, was enunciated in
Fule v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. L-40502) and Fule v. Hon. Ernani C. Pao, et al. (G.R. No. L-42670), decided on
November 29, 1976. Thus, this Court, in the aforecited cases, stated:
"2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term 'resides' mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of
the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term 'resides' connotes ex vi termini 'actual
residence' as distinguished from 'legal residence or domicile.' This term 'resides,' like the terms 'residing' and 'residence' is
elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purposes of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules - Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature - residence rather
than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word 'domicile' still it is construed as meaning residence
and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms 'residence' and 'domicile' but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term 'inhabitant.' In
other words, 'resides' should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation
of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular
sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary."18
There is no dispute that petitioner Saludo was the congressman or the representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte at the
time of filing of his complaint with the court a quo. Even the appellate court admits this fact as it states that "it may be conceded
that private respondent ever so often travels to Maasin City, Southern Leyte, because he is its representative in the lower
house."19
As a member of the House of Representatives, petitioner Saludo was correctly deemed by the court a quo as possessing the
requirements for the said position,20 including that he was then a resident of the district which he was representing, i.e., Southern
Leyte. Significantly, for purposes of election law, the term "residence" is synonymous with "domicile," thus:
x x x [T]he Court held that "domicile" and "residence" are synonymous. The term "residence," as used in the election
law,IMPORTS not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or
for like reasons, one intends to return. x x x21
It can be readily gleaned that the definition of "residence" for purposes of election law is more stringent in that it is equated with
the term "domicile." Hence, for the said purpose, the term "residence"IMPORTS "not only an intention to reside in a fixed place
but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."22 When parsed, therefore, the term
"residence" requires two elements: (1) intention to reside in the particular place; and (2) personal or physical presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. As the Court elucidated, "the place where a party actually or
constructively has a permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to
return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of
election law."23
On the other hand, for purposes of venue, the less technical definition of "residence" is adopted. Thus, it is understood to mean
as "the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal

residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile."24
Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the district of Southern Leyte, had his residence (or
domicile) therein as the term is construed in relation to election laws, necessarily, he is also deemed to have had his residence
therein for purposes of venue for filing personal actions. Put in another manner, Southern Leyte, as the domicile of petitioner
Saludo, was also his residence, as the term is understood in its popular sense. This is because "residence is not domicile, but
domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time."
Reliance by the appellate court on Koh v. Court of Appeals25 is misplaced. Contrary to its holding,26 the facts of the present case
are not similar to the facts therein. In Koh, the complaint was filed with the Court of First Instance in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte by
plaintiff who admitted that he was a resident of Kamias, Quezon City. Save for the fact that he grew up in San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte and that he manifested the intent to return there after retirement, plaintiff therein had not established that he was actually a
resident therein at the time of the filing of his complaint. Neither did he establish that he had his domicile therein because
although he manifested the intent to go back there after retirement, the element of personal presence in that place was lacking.
To reiterate, domicile or residence, as the terms are taken as synonyms,IMPORTS "not only an intention to reside in a fixed
place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."27
In contrast, petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of his complaint with
the court a quo. Absent any evidence to the contrary, he is deemed to possess the qualifications for the said position, including
that he was a resident therein. And following the definition of the term "residence" for purposes of election law, petitioner Saludo
not only had the intention to reside in Southern Leyte, but he also had personal presence therein, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. The latter element, or his bodily presence as an inhabitant in Southern Leyte, was sufficient for
petitioner Saludo to be considered a resident therein for purposes of venue.
The following ratiocination of the court a quo is apt:
Residence in civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. A person can have two or more
residences, such as a country residence and a city residence. (Quetulio v. Ruiz, S.C. Off. Gaz. 156, Commentaries and
Jurisprudence in Civil Law, Vol. 1, page 211, Tolentino). Residence is acquired by living in a place; on the other hand, domicile
can exist without actually living in the place. TheIMPORTANT thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established in
one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in some other place.
Thus, if a person lives with his family habitually in Quezon City, he would have his domicile in Quezon City. If he also has a
house for vacation purposes in the City of Baguio, and another house in connection with his business in the City of Manila, he
would have residence in all three places (Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on Civil Law, Vol. 1, Page 212, 1990
Edition) so that one[']s legal residence or domicile can also be his actual, personal or physical residence or habitation or place of
abode if he stays there with intention to stay there permanently.
In the instant case, since plaintiff has a house in Makati City for the purpose of exercising his profession or doing business and
also a house in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, for doing business and/or for election or political purposes where he also lives
or stays physically, personally and actually then he can have residences in these two places. Because it would then be
preposterous to acknowledge and recognize plaintiff Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. as congressman of Southern Leyte without also
recognizing him as actually, personally and physically residing thereat, when such residence is required by law.28
The fact then that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City is of no moment because granting
arguendo that he could be considered a resident therein, the same does not preclude his having a residence in Southern Leyte
for purposes of venue. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous
places of residence.29
That petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of the lone district of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his
complaint was admitted as a fact by the court a quo. In this connection, it consequently held that, as such, petitioner Saludo's
residence in Southern Leyte, the district he was the representing, could be taken judicial notice of. The court a quo cannot be
faulted for doing so because courts are allowed "to take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable
of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions." 30 Courts are likewise
bound to take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the law in force in the Philippines, 31 including its
Constitution.
The concept of "facts of common knowledge" in the context of judicial notice has been explained as those facts that are "so
commonly known in the community as to make it unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly known to as to make it
indisputable among reasonable men." 32 Moreover, "though usually facts of 'common knowledge' will be generally known
throughout the country, it is sufficient as a basis for judicial notice that they be known in the local community where the trial court

sits." 33 Certainly, the fact of petitioner Saludo being the duly elected representative of Southern Leyte at the time could be
properly taken judicial notice of by the court a quo, the same being a matter of common knowledge in the community where it
sits.
Further, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte could likewise be properly taken judicial notice of by the court a quo. It
is bound to know that, under the Constitution, one of the qualifications of a congressman or representative to the House of
Representatives is having a residence in the district in which he shall be elected.
In fine, petitioner Saludo's act of filing his complaint with the court a quo cannot be characterized as a "specie of forumshopping" or capricious on his part because, under the rules, as plaintiff, he is precisely given this option.
Finally, respondents' claim that the instant petition for review was not properly verified by petitioner Saludo deserves scant
consideration.
Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or
accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of
his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief," or upon "knowledge,
information and belief," or lacks proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.
Petitioner Saludo's verification and certification of non-forum shopping states that he has "read the contents thereof [referring to
the petition] and the same are true and correct of my own personal knowledge and belief and on the basis of the records at
hand." The same clearly constitutes substantial compliance with the above requirements of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 22, 2003 and Resolution dated August
14, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated September 10,
2001 and January 2, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, Branch 25 thereof, in Civil Case No. R3172 are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 152392

May 26, 2005

EXPERTRAVEL & TOURS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and KOREAN AIRLINES, respondent.
DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 61000 dismissing
the petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by Expertravel and Tours, Inc. (ETI).
The Antecedents
Korean Airlines (KAL) is a corporation established and registered in the Republic of South Korea and licensed to do business in
the Philippines. Its general manager in the Philippines is Suk Kyoo Kim, while its appointed counsel was Atty. Mario Aguinaldo
and his law firm.
On September 6, 1999, KAL, through Atty. Aguinaldo, filed a Complaint2 against ETI with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, for the collection of the principal amount of P260,150.00, plus attorneys fees and exemplary damages. The verification
and certification against forum shopping was signed by Atty. Aguinaldo, who indicated therein that he was the resident agent
and legal counsel of KAL and had caused the preparation of the complaint.
ETI filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Atty. Aguinaldo was not authorized to execute the verification and
certificate of non-forum shopping as required by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. KAL opposed the motion, contending
that Atty. Aguinaldo was its resident agent and was registered as such with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as
required by the Corporation Code of the Philippines. It was further alleged that Atty. Aguinaldo was also the corporate secretary
of KAL. Appended to the said opposition was the identification card of Atty. Aguinaldo, showing that he was the lawyer of KAL.
During the hearing of January 28, 2000, Atty. Aguinaldo claimed that he had been authorized to file the complaint through a
resolution of the KAL Board of Directors approved during a special meeting held on June 25, 1999. Upon his motion, KAL was
given a period of 10 days within which to submit a copy of the said resolution. The trial court granted the motion. Atty. Aguinaldo
subsequently filed other similar motions, which the trial court granted.
Finally, KAL submitted on March 6, 2000 an Affidavit3 of even date, executed by its general manager Suk Kyoo Kim, alleging that
the board of directors conducted a special teleconference on June 25, 1999, which he and Atty. Aguinaldo attended. It was also
averred that in that same teleconference, the board of directors approved a resolution authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to execute the
certificate of non-forum shopping and to file the complaint. Suk Kyoo Kim also alleged, however, that the corporation had no
written copy of the aforesaid resolution.
On April 12, 2000, the trial court issued an Order4 denying the motion to dismiss, giving credence to the claims of Atty. Aguinaldo
and Suk Kyoo Kim that the KAL Board of Directors indeed conducted a teleconference on June 25, 1999, during which it
approved a resolution as quoted in the submitted affidavit.
ETI filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order, contending that it was inappropriate for the court to take judicial notice of
the said teleconference without any prior hearing. The trial court denied the motion in its Order5dated August 8, 2000.
ETI then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus, assailing the orders of the RTC. In its comment on the petition, KAL
appended a certificate signed by Atty. Aguinaldo dated January 10, 2000, worded as follows:
SECRETARYS/RESIDENT AGENTS CERTIFICATE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
I, Mario A. Aguinaldo, of legal age, Filipino, and duly elected and appointed Corporate Secretary and Resident Agent of
KOREAN AIRLINES, a foreign corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of
Korea and also duly registered and authorized to do business in the Philippines, with office address at Ground Floor, LPL
Plaza Building, 124 Alfaro St., Salcedo Village, Makati City, HEREBY CERTIFY that during a special meeting of the
Board of Directors of the Corporation held on June 25, 1999 at which a quorum was present, the said Board
unanimously passed, voted upon and approved the following resolution which is now in full force and effect, to wit:
RESOLVED, that Mario A. Aguinaldo and his law firm M.A. Aguinaldo & Associates or any of its lawyers are
hereby appointed and authorized to take with whatever legal action necessary to effect the collection of the
unpaid account of Expert Travel & Tours. They are hereby specifically authorized to prosecute, litigate, defend,
sign and execute any document or paper necessary to the filing and prosecution of said claim in Court, attend
the Pre-Trial Proceedings and enter into a compromise agreement relative to the above-mentioned claim.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my signature this 10th day of January, 1999, in the City of Manila,
Philippines.

(Sgd.)
MARIO A. AGUINALDO
Resident Agent
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 10th day of January, 1999, Atty. Mario A. Aguinaldo exhibiting to me his
Community Tax Certificate No. 14914545, issued on January 7, 2000 at Manila, Philippines.
Doc. No. 119;
Page No. 25;
Book No. XXIV
Series of 2000.

(Sgd.)
ATTY. HENRY D. ADASA
Notary Public
Until December 31, 2000
PTR #889583/MLA 1/3/20006

On December 18, 2001, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition, ruling that the verification and certificate of nonforum shopping executed by Atty. Aguinaldo was sufficient compliance with the Rules of Court. According to the appellate court,
Atty. Aguinaldo had been duly authorized by the board resolution approved on June 25, 1999, and was the resident agent of
KAL. As such, the RTC could not be faulted for taking judicial notice of the said teleconference of the KAL Board of Directors.
ETI filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, which the CA denied. Thus, ETI, now the petitioner, comes to the
Court by way of petition for review on certiorari and raises the following issue:
DID PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS DEPART FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS WHEN IT RENDERED ITS QUESTIONED DECISION AND WHEN IT ISSUED ITS
QUESTIONED RESOLUTION, ANNEXES A AND B OF THE INSTANT PETITION?7
The petitioner asserts that compliance with Section 5, Rule 7, of the Rules of Court can be determined only from the contents of
the complaint and not by documents or pleadings outside thereof. Hence, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, and the CA erred in considering the affidavit of the respondents general manager, as well as
the Secretarys/Resident Agents Certification and the resolution of the board of directors contained therein, as proof of
compliance with the requirements of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner also maintains that the RTC cannot
take judicial notice of the said teleconferencewithout prior hearing, nor any motion therefor. The petitioner reiterates its
submission that the teleconference and the resolution adverted to by the respondent was a mere fabrication.
The respondent, for its part, avers that the issue of whether modern technology is used in the field of business is a factual issue;
hence, cannot be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. On the merits of the petition, it
insists that Atty. Aguinaldo, as the resident agent and corporate secretary, is authorized to sign and execute the certificate of
non-forum shopping required by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, on top of the board resolution approved during the
teleconference of June 25, 1999. The respondent insists that "technological advances in this time and age are as commonplace
as daybreak." Hence, the courts may take judicial notice that the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc. had
provided a record of corporate conferences and meetings through FiberNet using fiber-optic transmission technology, and that
such technology facilitates voice and image transmission with ease; this makes constant communication between a foreignbased office and its Philippine-based branches faster and easier, allowing for cost-cutting in terms of travel concerns. It points
out that even the E-Commerce Law has recognized this modern technology. The respondent posits that the courts are aware of
this development in technology; hence, may take judicial notice thereof without need of hearings. Even if such hearing is
required, the requirement is nevertheless satisfied if a party is allowed to file pleadings by way of comment or opposition thereto.
In its reply, the petitioner pointed out that there are no rulings on the matter of teleconferencing as a means of conducting
meetings of board of directors for purposes of passing a resolution; until and after teleconferencing is recognized as a legitimate
means of gathering a quorum of board of directors, such cannot be taken judicial notice of by the court. It asserts that
safeguards must first be set up to prevent any mischief on the public or to protect the general public from any possible fraud. It
further proposes possible amendments to the Corporation Code to give recognition to such manner of board meetings to
transact business for the corporation, or other related corporate matters; until then, the petitioner asserts, teleconferencing
cannot be the subject of judicial notice.
The petitioner further avers that the supposed holding of a special meeting on June 25, 1999 through teleconferencing where
Atty. Aguinaldo was supposedly given such an authority is a farce, considering that there was no mention of where it was held,
whether in this country or elsewhere. It insists that the Corporation Code requires board resolutions of corporations to be
submitted to the SEC. Even assuming that there was such a teleconference, it would be against the provisions of the
Corporation Code not to have any record thereof.

The petitioner insists that the teleconference and resolution adverted to by the respondent in its pleadings were mere
fabrications foisted by the respondent and its counsel on the RTC, the CA and this Court.
The petition is meritorious.
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or
other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any
court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein;
(b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five
(5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other
initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon
motion and after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein
shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If
the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for
summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
It is settled that the requirement to file a certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory8 and that the failure to comply with this
requirement cannot be excused. The certification is a peculiar and personal responsibility of the party, an assurance given to the
court or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases involving basically the same parties, issues and causes of action.
Hence, the certification must be accomplished by the party himself because he has actual knowledge of whether or not he has
initiated similar actions or proceedings in different courts or tribunals. Even his counsel may be unaware of such facts.9 Hence,
the requisite certification executed by the plaintiffs counsel will not suffice.10
In a case where the plaintiff is a private corporation, the certification may be signed, for and on behalf of the said corporation, by
a specifically authorized person, including its retained counsel, who has personal knowledge of the facts required to be
established by the documents. The reason was explained by the Court in National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals,11 as
follows:
Unlike natural persons, corporations may perform physical actions only through properly delegated individuals; namely,
its officers and/or agents.

The corporation, such as the petitioner, has no powers except those expressly conferred on it by the Corporation Code
and those that are implied by or are incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation exercises said powers through its
board of directors and/or its duly-authorized officers and agents. Physical acts, like the signing of documents, can be
performed only by natural persons duly-authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by specific act of the board of
directors. "All acts within the powers of a corporation may be performed by agents of its selection; and except so far as
limitations or restrictions which may be imposed by special charter, by-law, or statutory provisions, the same general
principles of law which govern the relation of agency for a natural person govern the officer or agent of a corporation, of
whatever status or rank, in respect to his power to act for the corporation; and agents once appointed, or members
acting in their stead, are subject to the same rules, liabilities and incapacities as are agents of individuals and private
persons."

For who else knows of the circumstances required in the Certificate but its own retained counsel. Its regular officers,
like its board chairman and president, may not even know the details required therein.
Indeed, the certificate of non-forum shopping may be incorporated in the complaint or appended thereto as an integral part of the
complaint. The rule is that compliance with the rule after the filing of the complaint, or the dismissal of a complaint based on its
non-compliance with the rule, is impermissible. However, in exceptional circumstances, the court may allow subsequent
compliance with the rule.12 If the authority of a partys counsel to execute a certificate of non-forum shopping is disputed by the
adverse party, the former is required to show proof of such authority or representation.

In this case, the petitioner, as the defendant in the RTC, assailed the authority of Atty. Aguinaldo to execute the requisite
verification and certificate of non-forum shopping as the resident agent and counsel of the respondent. It was, thus, incumbent
upon the respondent, as the plaintiff, to allege and establish that Atty. Aguinaldo had such authority to execute the requisite
verification and certification for and in its behalf. The respondent, however, failed to do so.
The verification and certificate of non-forum shopping which was incorporated in the complaint and signed by Atty. Aguinaldo
reads:
I, Mario A. Aguinaldo of legal age, Filipino, with office address at Suite 210 Gedisco Centre, 1564 A. Mabini cor. P. Gil
Sts., Ermita, Manila, after having sworn to in accordance with law hereby deposes and say: THAT 1. I am the Resident Agent and Legal Counsel of the plaintiff in the above entitled case and have caused the preparation
of the above complaint;
2. I have read the complaint and that all the allegations contained therein are true and correct based on the records on
files;
3. I hereby further certify that I have not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency. If I subsequently
learned that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,
or different divisions thereof, or any tribunal or agency, I will notify the court, tribunal or agency within five (5) days from
such notice/knowledge.
(Sgd.)
MARIO A. AGUINALDO
Affiant
CITY OF MANILA
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 30th day of August, 1999, affiant exhibiting to me his Community Tax
Certificate No. 00671047 issued on January 7, 1999 at Manila, Philippines.
Doc. No. 1005;
Page No. 198;
Book No. XXI
Series of 1999.

(Sgd.)
ATTY. HENRY D. ADASA
Notary Public
Until December 31, 2000
PTR No. 320501 Mla. 1/4/9913

As gleaned from the aforequoted certification, there was no allegation that Atty. Aguinaldo had been authorized to execute the
certificate of non-forum shopping by the respondents Board of Directors; moreover, no such board resolution was appended
thereto or incorporated therein.
While Atty. Aguinaldo is the resident agent of the respondent in the Philippines, this does not mean that he is authorized to
execute the requisite certification against forum shopping. Under Section 127, in relation to Section 128 of the Corporation Code,
the authority of the resident agent of a foreign corporation with license to do business in the Philippines is to receive, for and in
behalf of the foreign corporation, services and other legal processes in all actions and other legal proceedings against such
corporation, thus:
SEC. 127. Who may be a resident agent. A resident agent may either be an individual residing in the Philippines or a
domestic corporation lawfully transacting business in the Philippines: Provided, That in the case of an individual, he must
be of good moral character and of sound financial standing.
SEC. 128. Resident agent; service of process. The Securities and Exchange Commission shall require as a condition
precedent to the issuance of the license to transact business in the Philippines by any foreign corporation that such
corporation file with the Securities and Exchange Commission a written power of attorney designating some persons
who must be a resident of the Philippines, on whom any summons and other legal processes may be served in all
actions or other legal proceedings against such corporation, and consenting that service upon such resident agent shall
be admitted and held as valid as if served upon the duly-authorized officers of the foreign corporation as its home
office.14

Under the law, Atty. Aguinaldo was not specifically authorized to execute a certificate of non-forum shopping as required by
Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. This is because while a resident agent may be aware of actions filed against his principal
(a foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines), such resident may not be aware of actions initiated by its principal,
whether in the Philippines against a domestic corporation or private individual, or in the country where such corporation was
organized and registered, against a Philippine registered corporation or a Filipino citizen.
The respondent knew that its counsel, Atty. Aguinaldo, as its resident agent, was not specifically authorized to execute the said
certification. It attempted to show its compliance with the rule subsequent to the filing of its complaint by submitting, on March 6,
2000, a resolution purporting to have been approved by its Board of Directors during a teleconference held on June 25, 1999,
allegedly with Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim in attendance. However, such attempt of the respondent casts veritable doubt
not only on its claim that such a teleconference was held, but also on the approval by the Board of Directors of the resolution
authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to execute the certificate of non-forum shopping.
In its April 12, 2000 Order, the RTC took judicial notice that because of the onset of modern technology, persons in one location
may confer with other persons in other places, and, based on the said premise, concluded that Suk Kyoo Kim and Atty.
Aguinaldo had a teleconference with the respondents Board of Directors in South Korea on June 25, 1999. The CA, likewise,
gave credence to the respondents claim that such a teleconference took place, as contained in the affidavit of Suk Kyoo Kim, as
well as Atty. Aguinaldos certification.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general
knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the
limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that
of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety.[15] Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.16
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of
the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of
ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias,
dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are of such universal notoriety and so generally
understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of
man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common
knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a
fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge.17
In this age of modern technology, the courts may take judicial notice that business transactions may be made by individuals
through teleconferencing. Teleconferencing is interactive group communication (three or more people in two or more locations)
through an electronic medium. In general terms, teleconferencing can bring people together under one roof even though they
are separated by hundreds of miles.18 This type of group communication may be used in a number of ways, and have three
basic types: (1) video conferencing - television-like communication augmented with sound; (2) computer conferencing - printed
communication through keyboard terminals, and (3) audio-conferencing-verbal communication via the telephone with optional
capacity for telewriting or telecopying.19
A teleconference represents a unique alternative to face-to-face (FTF) meetings. It was first introduced in the 1960s with
American Telephone and Telegraphs Picturephone. At that time, however, no demand existed for the new technology. Travel
costs were reasonable and consumers were unwilling to pay the monthly service charge for using the picturephone, which was
regarded as more of a novelty than as an actual means for everyday communication.20 In time, people found it advantageous to
hold teleconferencing in the course of business and corporate governance, because of the money saved, among other
advantages include:
1. People (including outside guest speakers) who wouldnt normally attend a distant FTF meeting can participate.
2. Follow-up to earlier meetings can be done with relative ease and little expense.
3. Socializing is minimal compared to an FTF meeting; therefore, meetings are shorter and more oriented to the primary
purpose of the meeting.
4. Some routine meetings are more effective since one can audio-conference from any location equipped with a
telephone.
5. Communication between the home office and field staffs is maximized.

6. Severe climate and/or unreliable transportation may necessitate teleconferencing.

7. Participants are generally better prepared than for FTF meetings.
8. It is particularly satisfactory for simple problem-solving, information exchange, and procedural tasks.
9. Group members participate more equally in well-moderated teleconferences than an FTF meeting.21
On the other hand, other private corporations opt not to hold teleconferences because of the following disadvantages:
1. Technical failures with equipment, including connections that arent made.
2. Unsatisfactory for complex interpersonal communication, such as negotiation or bargaining.
3. Impersonal, less easy to create an atmosphere of group rapport.
4. Lack of participant familiarity with the equipment, the medium itself, and meeting skills.
5. Acoustical problems within the teleconferencing rooms.
6. Difficulty in determining participant speaking order; frequently one person monopolizes the meeting.
7. Greater participant preparation time needed.
8. Informal, one-to-one, social interaction not possible.22
Indeed, teleconferencing can only facilitate the linking of people; it does not alter the complexity of group communication.
Although it may be easier to communicate via teleconferencing, it may also be easier to miscommunicate. Teleconferencing
cannot satisfy the individual needs of every type of meeting.23
In the Philippines, teleconferencing and videoconferencing of members of board of directors of private corporations is a reality, in
light of Republic Act No. 8792. The Securities and Exchange Commission issued SEC Memorandum Circular No. 15, on
November 30, 2001, providing the guidelines to be complied with related to such conferences.24 Thus, the Court agrees with the
RTC that persons in the Philippines may have a teleconference with a group of persons in South Korea relating to business
transactions or corporate governance.
Even given the possibility that Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim participated in a teleconference along with the respondents
Board of Directors, the Court is not convinced that one was conducted; even if there had been one, the Court is not inclined to
believe that a board resolution was duly passed specifically authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to file the complaint and execute the
required certification against forum shopping.
The records show that the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the respondent failed to comply
with Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. The respondent opposed the motion on December 1, 1999, on its contention that
Atty. Aguinaldo, its resident agent, was duly authorized to sue in its behalf. The respondent, however, failed to establish its claim
that Atty. Aguinaldo was its resident agent in the Philippines. Even the identification card25 of Atty. Aguinaldo which the
respondent appended to its pleading merely showed that he is the company lawyer of the respondents Manila Regional Office.
The respondent, through Atty. Aguinaldo, announced the holding of the teleconference only during the hearing of January 28,
2000; Atty. Aguinaldo then prayed for ten days, or until February 8, 2000, within which to submit the board resolution purportedly
authorizing him to file the complaint and execute the required certification against forum shopping. The court granted the
motion.26 The respondent, however, failed to comply, and instead prayed for 15 more days to submit the said resolution,
contending that it was with its main office in Korea. The court granted the motion per its Order27 dated February 11, 2000. The
respondent again prayed for an extension within which to submit the said resolution, until March 6, 2000.28 It was on the said
date that the respondent submitted an affidavit of its general manager Suk Kyoo Kim, stating, inter alia, that he and Atty.
Aguinaldo attended the said teleconference on June 25, 1999, where the Board of Directors supposedly approved the following
resolution:
RESOLVED, that Mario A. Aguinaldo and his law firm M.A. Aguinaldo & Associates or any of its lawyers are hereby
appointed and authorized to take with whatever legal action necessary to effect the collection of the unpaid account of
Expert Travel & Tours. They are hereby specifically authorized to prosecute, litigate, defend, sign and execute any

document or paper necessary to the filing and prosecution of said claim in Court, attend the Pre-trial Proceedings and
enter into a compromise agreement relative to the above-mentioned claim.29
But then, in the same affidavit, Suk Kyoo Kim declared that the respondent "do[es] not keep a written copy of the aforesaid
Resolution" because no records of board resolutions approved during teleconferences were kept. This belied the respondents
earlier allegation in its February 10, 2000 motion for extension of time to submit the questioned resolution that it was in the
custody of its main office in Korea. The respondent gave the trial court the impression that it needed time to secure a copy of the
resolution kept in Korea, only to allege later (via the affidavit of Suk Kyoo Kim) that it had no such written copy. Moreover, Suk
Kyoo Kim stated in his affidavit that the resolution was embodied in the Secretarys/Resident Agents Certificate signed by Atty.
Aguinaldo. However, no such resolution was appended to the said certificate.
The respondents allegation that its board of directors conducted a teleconference on June 25, 1999 and approved the said
resolution (with Atty. Aguinaldo in attendance) is incredible, given the additional fact that no such allegation was made in the
complaint. If the resolution had indeed been approved on June 25, 1999, long before the complaint was filed, the respondent
should have incorporated it in its complaint, or at least appended a copy thereof. The respondent failed to do so. It was only on
January 28, 2000 that the respondent claimed, for the first time, that there was such a meeting of the Board of Directors held on
June 25, 1999; it even represented to the Court that a copy of its resolution was with its main office in Korea, only to allege later
that no written copy existed. It was only on March 6, 2000 that the respondent alleged, for the first time, that the meeting of the
Board of Directors where the resolution was approved was held via teleconference.
Worse still, it appears that as early as January 10, 1999, Atty. Aguinaldo had signed a Secretarys/Resident Agents Certificate
alleging that the board of directors held a teleconference on June 25, 1999. No such certificate was appended to the complaint,
which was filed on September 6, 1999. MoreIMPORTANTLY , the respondent did not explain why the said certificate was
signed by Atty. Aguinaldo as early as January 9, 1999, and yet was notarized one year later (on January 10, 2000); it also did
not explain its failure to append the said certificate to the complaint, as well as to its Compliance dated March 6, 2000. It was
only on January 26, 2001 when the respondent filed its comment in the CA that it submitted the Secretarys/Resident Agents
Certificate30 dated January 10, 2000.
The Court is, thus, more inclined to believe that the alleged teleconference on June 25, 1999 never took place, and that the
resolution allegedly approved by the respondents Board of Directors during the said teleconference was a mere concoction
purposefully foisted on the RTC, the CA and this Court, to avert the dismissal of its complaint against the petitioner.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
61000 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is hereby ORDERED to dismiss, without prejudice,
the complaint of the respondent.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 171406

April 4, 2011

ASIAN TERMINALS, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
MALAYAN INSURANCE, CO., INC., Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Once the insurer pays the insured, equity demands reimbursement as no one should benefit at the expense of another.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the July 14, 2005 Decision2and the February
14, 2006 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CV No. 61798.
Factual Antecedents
On November 14, 1995, Shandong Weifang Soda Ash Plant shipped on board the vessel MV "Jinlian I" 60,000 plastic bags of
soda ash dense (each bag weighing 50 kilograms)FROM CHINA to Manila.4 The shipment, with an invoice value of
US$456,000.00, was insured with respondent Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. under Marine Risk Note No. RN-0001-21430,
and covered by a Bill of Lading issued by Tianjin Navigation Company with Philippine Banking Corporation as the consignee and
Chemphil Albright and Wilson Corporation as the notify party.5
On November 21, 1995, upon arrival of the vessel at Pier 9, South Harbor, Manila,6 the stevedores of petitioner Asian Terminals,
Inc., a duly registered domestic corporation engaged in providing arrastre and stevedoring services,7 unloaded the 60,000 bags
of soda ash dense from the vessel and brought them to the open storage area of petitioner for temporary storage and
safekeeping, pending clearance from the Bureau of Customs and delivery to the consignee.8 When the unloading of the bags
was completed on November 28, 1995, 2,702 bags were found to be in bad order condition.9
On November 29, 1995, the stevedores of petitioner began loading the bags in the trucks of MEC Customs Brokerage for
transport and delivery to the consignee.10 On December 28, 1995, after all the bags were unloaded in the warehouses of the
consignee, a total of 2,881 bags were in bad order condition due to spillage, caking, and hardening of the contents.11
On April 19, 1996, respondent, as insurer, paid the value of the lost/ damaged cargoes to the consignee in the amount
of P643,600.25.12
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On November 20, 1996, respondent, as subrogee of the consignee, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 35, a Complaint13 for damages against petitioner, the shipper Inchcape Shipping Services, and the cargo broker MEC
Customs Brokerage.14
After the filing of the Answers,15 trial ensued.
On June 26, 1998, the RTC rendered a Decision16 finding petitioner liable for the damage/loss sustained by the shipment but
absolving the other defendants. The RTC found that the proximate cause of the damage/loss was the negligence of petitioners
stevedores who handled the unloading of the cargoes from the vessel.17 The RTC emphasized that despite the admonitions of
Marine Cargo Surveyors Edgar Liceralde and Redentor Antonio not to use steel hooks in retrieving and picking-up the bags,
petitioners stevedores continued to use such tools, which pierced the bags and caused the spillage.18 The RTC, thus, ruled that
petitioner, as employer, is liable for the acts and omissions of its stevedores under Articles 217619 and 2180 paragraph (4)20 of
the Civil Code.21Hence, the dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering defendant Asian Terminal, Inc. to pay plaintiff Malayan Insurance Company, Inc.
the sum of P643,600.25 plus interest thereon at legal rate computed from November 20, 1996, the date the Complaint was filed,
until the principal obligation is fully paid, and the costs.
The complaint of the plaintiff against defendants Inchcape Shipping Services and MEC Customs Brokerage, and the
counterclaims of said defendants against the plaintiff are dismissed.
SO ORDERED.22
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed23 to the CA but the appeal was denied. In its July 14, 2005 Decision, the CA agreed with the RTC
that the damage/loss was caused by the negligence of petitioners stevedores in handling and storing the subject
shipment.24 The CA likewise rejected petitioners assertion that it received the subject shipment in bad order condition as this
was belied by Marine Cargo Surveyors Redentor Antonio and Edgar Liceralde, who both testified that the actual counting of bad
order bags was done only after all the bags were unloaded from the vessel and that the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes
(TOSBOC) upon which petitioner anchors its defense was prepared only on November 28, 1995 or after the unloading of the
bags was completed.25 Thus, the CA disposed of the appeal as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 26, 1998 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 35, in Civil Case No. 96-80945 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.

SO ORDERED.26
Petitioner moved for reconsideration27 but the CA denied the same in a Resolution28 dated February 14, 2006 for lack of merit.
Issues
Hence, the present recourse, petitioner contending that:
1. RESPONDENT-INSURER IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF GRANTED AS IT FAILED TO ESTABLISH ITS
CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER SINCE, AS THE ALLEGED SUBROGEE, IT NEVER
PRESENTED ANY VALID, EXISTING, ENFORCEABLE INSURANCE POLICY OR ANY COPY THEREOF IN COURT.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT THE TOSBOC &
RESBOC WERE ADOPTED AS COMMON EXHIBITS BY BOTH PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT.
3. CONTRARY TO TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE ON RECORD, VARIOUS DOCUMENTATIONS WOULD POINT TO THE
VESSELS LIABILITY AS THERE IS, IN THIS INSTANT CASE, AN OVERWHELMING DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
TO PROVE THAT THE DAMAGE IN QUESTION WERE SUSTAINED WHEN THE SHIPMENT WAS IN THE CUSTODY
OF THE VESSEL.
4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT ADJUDGED HEREIN DEFENDANT LIABLE DUE TO
[THE] FACT THAT THE TURN OVER SURVEY OF BAD ORDER CARGOES (TOSBOC) WAS PREPARED ONLY
AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE DISCHARGING OPERATIONS OR ON NOVEMBER 28, 1995. THUS,
CONCLUDING THAT DAMAGE TO THE CARGOES WAS DUE TO THE IMPROPER HANDLING THEREOF BY ATI
STEVEDORES.
5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE CONTRACT FOR
CARGO HANDLING SERVICES BETWEEN PPA AND ATI AND APPLYING THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS
THEREOF AS REGARDS ATIS LIABILITY.29
In sum, the issues are: (1) whether the non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy is fatal to respondents cause
of action; (2) whether the proximate cause of the damage/loss to the shipment was the negligence of petitioners
stevedores; and (3) whether the court can take judicial notice of the Management Contract between petitioner and the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) in determining petitioners liability.
Petitioners Arguments
Petitioner contends that respondent has no cause of action because it failed to present the insurance contract or policy covering
the subject shipment.30 Petitioner argues that the Subrogation Receipt presented by respondent is not sufficient to prove that the
subject shipment was insured and that respondent was validly subrogated to the rights of the consignee.31 Thus, petitioner
submits that without proof of a valid subrogation, respondent is not entitled to any reimbursement.32
Petitioner likewise puts in issue the finding of the RTC, which was affirmed by the CA, that the proximate cause of the
damage/loss to the shipment was the negligence of petitioners stevedores.33 Petitioner avers that such finding is contrary to the
documentary evidence, i.e., the TOSBOC, the Request for Bad Order Survey (RESBOC) and the Report of Survey.34 According
to petitioner, these documents prove that it received the subject shipment in bad order condition and that no additional damage
was sustained by the subject shipment under its custody.35Petitioner asserts that although the TOSBOC was prepared only after
all the bags were unloaded by petitioners stevedores, this does not mean that the damage/loss was caused by its stevedores.36
Petitioner also claims that the amount of damages should not be more than P5,000.00, pursuant to its Management Contract for
cargo handling services with the PPA.37 Petitioner contends that the CA should have taken judicial notice of the said contract
since it is an official act of an executive department subject to judicial cognizance.38
Respondents Arguments
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy was not raised in the trial
court. Thus, it cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.39 Respondent likewise contends that under prevailing jurisprudence,
presentation of the insurance policy is not indispensable.40 Moreover, with or without the insurance contract or policy, respondent
claims that it should be allowed to recover under Article 123641 of the Civil Code.42 Respondent further avers that "the right of
subrogation has its roots in equity - it is designed to promote and to accomplish justice and is the mode which equity adopts to
compel the ultimate payment of a debt by one who in justice, equity and good conscience ought to pay."43

Respondent likewise maintains that the RTC and the CA correctly found that the damage/loss sustained by the subject shipment
was caused by the negligent acts of petitioners stevedores.44 Such factual findings of the RTC, affirmed by the CA, are
conclusive and should no longer be disturbed.45 In fact, under Section 146 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law
may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari.47
As to the Management Contract for cargo handling services, respondent contends that this is outside the operation of judicial
notice.48 And even if it is not, petitioners liability cannot be limited by it since it is a contract of adhesion.49
Our Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
Non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy is not fatal in the instant case
Petitioner claims that respondents non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy between the respondent and the
consignee is fatal to its cause of action.
We do not agree.
First of all, this was never raised as an issue before the RTC. In fact, it is not among the issues agreed upon by the parties to be
resolved during the pre-trial.50 As we have said, "the determination of issues during the pre-trial conference bars the
consideration of other questions, whether during trial or on appeal."51 Thus, "[t]he parties must disclose during pre-trial all issues
they intend to raise during the trial, except those involving privileged or impeaching matters. x x x The basis of the rule is simple.
Petitioners are bound by the delimitation of the issues during the pre-trial because they themselves agreed to the same."52
Neither was this issue raised on appeal.53 Basic is the rule that "issues or grounds not raised below cannot be resolved on
review by the Supreme Court, for to allow the parties to raise new issues is antithetical to the sporting idea of fair play, justice
and due process."54
Besides, non-presentation of the insurance contract or policy is not
necessarily fatal.55 In Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,56 we ruled that:
Anent the second issue, it is our view and so hold that the presentation in evidence of the marine insurance policy is not
indispensable in this case before the insurer may recover from the common carrier the insured value of the lost cargo in the
exercise of its subrogatory right. The subrogation receipt, by itself, is sufficient to establish not only the relationship of herein
private respondent as insurer and Caltex, as the assured shipper of the lost cargo of industrial fuel oil, but also the amountPAID
TO settle the insurance claim. The right of subrogation accrues simply upon payment by the insurance company of the
insurance claim.
The presentation of the insurance policy was necessary in the case of Home Insurance Corporation v. CA (a case cited by
petitioner) because the shipment therein (hydraulic engines) passed through several stages with different parties involved in
each stage. First, from the shipper to the port of departure; second, from the port of departure to the M/S Oriental Statesman;
third, from the M/S Oriental Statesman to the M/S Pacific Conveyor; fourth, from the M/S Pacific Conveyor to the port of arrival;
fifth, from the port of arrival to the arrastre operator; sixth, from the arrastre operator to the hauler, Mabuhay Brokerage Co., Inc.
(private respondent therein); and lastly, from the hauler to the consignee. We emphasized in that case that in the absence of
proof of stipulations to the contrary, the hauler can be liable only for any damage that occurred from the time it received the
cargo until it finally delivered it to the consignee. Ordinarily, it cannot be held responsible for the handling of the cargo before it
actually received it. The insurance contract, which was not presented in evidence in that case would have indicated the scope of
the insurers liability, if any, since no evidence was adduced indicating at what stage in the handling process the damage to the
cargo was sustained.57 (Emphasis supplied.)
In International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. FGU Insurance Corporation,58 we used the same line of reasoning in
upholding the Decision of the CA finding the arrastre contractor liable for the lost shipment despite the failure of the insurance
company to offer in evidence the insurance contract or policy. We explained:
Indeed, jurisprudence has it that the marine insurance policy needs to be presented in evidence before the trial court or even
belatedly before the appellate court. In Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Regis Brokerage Corp., the Court stated that the
presentation of the marine insurance policy was necessary, as the issues raised therein arose from the very existence of an
insurance contract between Malayan Insurance and its consignee, ABB Koppel, even prior to the loss of the shipment. In
Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc. v. Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc., the Court ruled that the insurance contract must

be presented in evidence in order to determine the extent of the coverage. This was also the ruling of the Court in Home
Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals.
However, as in every general rule, there are admitted exceptions. In Delsan Transport Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court
stated that the presentation of the insurance policy was not fatal because the loss of the cargo undoubtedly occurred while on
board the petitioners vessel, unlike in Home Insurance in which the cargo passed through several stages with different parties
and it could not be determined when the damage to the cargo occurred, such that the insurer should be liable for it.
As in Delsan, there is no doubt that the loss of the cargo in the present case occurred while in petitioners custody. Moreover,
there is no issue as regards the provisions of Marine Open Policy No. MOP-12763, such that the presentation of the contract
itself is necessary for perusal, not to mention that its existence was already admitted by petitioner in open court. And even
though it was not offered in evidence, it still can be considered by the court as long as they have been properly identified by
testimony duly recorded and they have themselves been incorporated in the records of the case.59
Similarly, in this case, the presentation of the insurance contract or policy was not necessary. Although petitioner objected to the
admission of the Subrogation Receipt in its Comment to respondents formal offer of evidence on the ground that respondent
failed to present the insurance contract or policy,60 a perusal of petitioners Answer61and Pre-Trial Brief62 shows that petitioner
never questioned respondents right to subrogation, nor did it dispute the coverage of the insurance contract or policy. Since
there was no issue regarding the validity of the insurance contract or policy, or any provision thereof, respondent had no reason
to present the insurance contract or policy as evidence during the trial.
Factual findings of the CA, affirming the RTC, are conclusive and binding
Petitioners attempt to absolve itself from liability must likewise fail.
Only questions of law are allowed in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Thus, it is not our duty
"to review, examine, and evaluate or weigh all over again the probative value of the evidence presented,"63 especially where the
findings of both the trial court and the appellate court coincide on the matter.64 As we have often said, factual findings of the CA
affirming those of the RTC are conclusive and binding, except in the following cases: "(1) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the [CA] is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
[CA], in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (6) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (7) when
the [CA] manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion; and (8) when the findings of fact of the [CA] are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted
by the evidence on record."65 None of these are availing in the present case.
Both the RTC and the CA found the negligence of petitioners stevedores to be the proximate cause of the damage/loss to the
shipment. In disregarding the contention of petitioner that such finding is contrary to the documentary evidence, the CA had this
to say:
ATI, however, contends that the finding of the trial court was contrary to the documentary evidence of record, particularly, the
Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes dated November 28, 1995, which was executed prior to the turn-over of the cargo by
the carrier to the arrastre operator ATI, and which showed that the shipment already contained 2,702 damaged bags.
We are not persuaded.
Contrary to ATIs assertion, witness Redentor Antonio, marine cargo surveyor of Inchcape for the vessel Jinlian I which arrived
on November 21, 1995 and up to completion of discharging on November 28, 1995, testified thatit was only after all the bags
were unloaded from the vessel that the actual counting of bad order bags was made, thus:
xxxx
The above testimony of Redentor Antonio was corroborated by Edgar Liceralde, marine cargo surveyor connected with
SMS Average Surveyors and Adjusters, Inc., the company requested by consignee Chemphil Albright and Wilson Corporation to
provide superintendence, report the condition and determine the final outturn of quantity/weight of the subject shipment. x x x
xxxx
Defendant-appellant ATI, for its part, presented its claim officer as witness who testified that a survey was conducted by the
shipping company and ATI before the shipment was turned over to the possession of ATI and that the Turn Over Survey of Bad
Order Cargoes was prepared by ATIs Bad Order (BO) Inspector.

Considering that the shipment arrived on November 21, 1998 and the unloading operation commenced on said date and
was completed on November 26, 1998, while the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes, reflecting a figure of 2,702
damaged bags, was prepared and signed on November 28, 1998 by ATIs BO Inspector and co-signed by a representative of
the shipping company, the trial courts finding that the damage to the cargoes was due to the improper handling thereof
by ATIs stevedores cannot be said to be without substantial support from the records.
We thus see no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of the trial court that ATI should be made liable for the 2,702 bags of
damaged shipment. Needless to state, it is hornbook doctrine that the assessment of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter
best undertaken by the trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the demeanor, conduct or attitude of the witnesses. The
findings of the trial court on this point are accorded great respect and will not be reversed on appeal, unless it overlooked
substantial facts and circumstances which, if considered, would materially affect the result of the case.
We also find ATI liable for the additional 179 damaged bags discovered upon delivery of the shipment at the consignees
warehouse in Pasig. The final Report of Survey executed by SMS Average Surveyors & Adjusters, Inc., and independent
surveyor hired by the consignee, shows that the subject shipment incurred a total of 2881 damaged bags.
The Report states that the withdrawal and delivery of the shipment took about ninety-five (95) trips from November 29, 1995 to
December 28, 1995 and it was upon completion of the delivery to consignees warehouse where the final count of 2881
damaged bags was made. The damage consisted of torn/bad order condition of the bags due to spillages and caked/hardened
portions.
We agree with the trial court that the damage to the shipment was caused by the negligence of ATIs stevedores and for which
ATI is liable under Articles 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code. The proximate cause of the damage (i.e., torn bags, spillage of
contents and caked/hardened portions of the contents) was the improper handling of the cargoes by ATIs stevedores, x x x
xxxx
ATI has not satisfactorily rebutted plaintiff-appellees evidence on the negligence of ATIs stevedores in the handling and
safekeeping of the cargoes. x x x
xxxx
We find no reason to disagree with the trial courts conclusion. Indeed, from the nature of the [damage] caused to the shipment,
i.e., torn bags, spillage of contents and hardened or caked portions of the contents, it is not difficult to see that the damage
caused was due to the negligence of ATIs stevedores who used steel hooks to retrieve the bags from the higher portions of the
piles thereby piercing the bags and spilling their contents, and who piled the bags in the open storage area of ATI with
insufficient cover thereby exposing them to the elements and [causing] the contents to cake or harden.66
Clearly, the finding of negligence on the part of petitioners stevedores is supported by both testimonial and documentary
evidence. Hence, we see no reason to disturb the same.
Judicial notice does not apply
Finally, petitioner implores us to take judicial notice of Section 7.01,67 Article VII of the Management Contract for cargo handling
services it entered with the PPA, which limits petitioners liability to P5,000.00 per package.
Unfortunately for the petitioner, it cannot avail of judicial notice.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provide that:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations,
the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official
acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions.
1avv phi 1

SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
The Management Contract entered into by petitioner and the PPA is clearly not among the matters which the courts can take
judicial notice of. It cannot be considered an official act of the executive department. The PPA, which was created by virtue of

Presidential Decree No. 857, as amended,68 is a government-owned and controlled corporation in charge of administering the
ports in the country.69 Obviously, the PPA was only performing a proprietary function when it entered into a Management
Contract with petitioner. As such, judicial notice cannot be applied.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed July 14, 2005 Decision and the February 14, 2006 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 61798 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 156052

March 7, 2007

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO, and BONIFACIO S. TUMBOKON,Petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this original petition for mandamus,1 petitioners Social Justice Society (SJS), Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao and Bonifacio S.
Tumbokon seek to compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
The antecedents are as follows.
On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027.2 Respondent mayor approved the
ordinance on November 28, 2001.3 It became effective on December 28, 2001, after its publication.4
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to local government units, a principle described as the
power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals and
general welfare of the society.5 This is evident from Sections 1 and 3 thereof which state:
SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning and ensuring health, public safety, and general welfare of the
residents of Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of [those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig
River in the north, PNR Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in the south, Palumpong St. in the southwest, and Estero de
Pancacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the [n]ortheast, Pasig River in the southeast
and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28
St., and F. Manalo Street, are hereby reclassified from Industrial II to Commercial I.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the operation of which are no longer permitted under Section 1
hereof, are hereby given a period of six (6) months from the date of effectivity of this Ordinance within which to cease and desist
from the operation of businesses which are hereby in consequence, disallowed.
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators
of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of

effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called "Pandacan Terminals" of the oil
companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.
However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of
understanding (MOU)6 with the oil companies in which they agreed that "the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the
most viable and practicable option." Under the MOU, the oil companies agreed to perform the following:
Section 1. - Consistent with the objectives stated above, the OIL COMPANIES shall, upon signing of this MOU, undertake a
program to scale down the Pandacan Terminals which shall include, among others, the immediate removal/decommissioning
process of TWENTY EIGHT (28) tanks starting with the LPG spheres and the commencing of works for the creation of safety
buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. xxx
Section 2. Consistent with the scale-down program mentioned above, the OIL COMPANIES shall establish joint operations
and management, including the operation of common, integrated and/or shared facilities, consistent with international and
domestic technical, safety, environmental and economic considerations and standards. Consequently, the joint operations of the
OIL COMPANIES in the Pandacan Terminals shall be limited to the common and integrated areas/facilities. A separate
agreement covering the commercial and operational terms and conditions of the joint operations, shall be entered into by the OIL
COMPANIES.
Section 3. - The development and maintenance of the safety and green buffer zones mentioned therein, which shall be taken
from the properties of the OIL COMPANIES and not from the surrounding communities, shall be the sole responsibility of the OIL
COMPANIES.
The City of Manila and the DOE, on the other hand, committed to do the following:
Section 1. - The City Mayor shall endorse to the City Council this MOU for its appropriate action with the view of implementing
the spirit and intent thereof.
Section 2. - The City Mayor and the DOE shall, consistent with the spirit and intent of this MOU, enable the OIL COMPANIES to
continuously operate in compliance with legal requirements, within the limited area resulting from the joint operations and the
scale down program.
Section 3. - The DOE and the City Mayor shall monitor the OIL COMPANIES compliance with the provisions of this MOU.
Section 4. - The CITY OF MANILA and the national government shall protect the safety buffer and green zones and shall exert
all efforts at preventing future occupation or encroachment into these areas by illegal settlers and other unauthorized parties.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97.7 In the same resolution, the Sangguniandeclared that the
MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002.8 Thereafter, on January 30, 2003,
the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 139 extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor
Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the
ordinance.10
Meanwhile, petitioners filed this original action for mandamus on December 4, 2002 praying that Mayor Atienza be compelled to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.11
The issues raised by petitioners are as follows:
1. whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the
Pandacan Terminals, and
2. whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.12
Petitioners contend that respondent has the mandatory legal duty, under Section 455 (b) (2) of the Local Government Code (RA
7160),13 to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies. Instead, he has
allowed them to stay.
Respondents defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 has been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions.14However, he also
confusingly argues that the ordinance and MOU are not inconsistent with each other and that the latter has not amended the
former. He insists that the ordinance remains valid and in full force and effect and that the MOU did not in any way prevent him

from enforcing and implementing it. He maintains that the MOU should be considered as a mere guideline for its full
implementation.15
Under Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court, a petition for mandamus may be filed when any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust or station. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty that is already imposed on the respondent and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the act and
it must be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to be done.17
Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable or over which a
substantial doubt exists. The principal function of the writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to inquire and to
adjudicate; thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to secure a legal right but to implement that which is already
established. Unless the right to the relief sought is unclouded, mandamus will not issue.18
To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear legal right to the enforcement of the ordinance, petitioner SJS states that it
is a political party registered with the Commission on Elections and has its offices in Manila. It claims to have many members
who are residents of Manila. The other petitioners, Cabigao and Tumbokon, are allegedly residents of Manila.
We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in previous cases that when a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and
its object is to compel a public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real parties in
interest and they need not show any specific interest.19 Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct interest in the
enforcement of the citys ordinances. Respondent never questioned the right of petitioners to institute this proceeding.
On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and
ordinances relative to the governance of the city.">20 One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he
has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the
courts.21 He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. In Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,22 we stated the reason for this:
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of
public business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially been
declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.23

The question now is whether the MOU entered into by respondent with the oil companies and the subsequent resolutions passed by the Sanggunian have made the respondents duty to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027 doubtful, unclear or uncertain. This is also connected to the second issue raised by petitioners, that is, whether the MOU and Resolution Nos. 97, s. 2002 and 13, s.
2003 of the Sanggunian can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.

We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila
expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. Thus, at present, there is nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.24

Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest of the world, witnessed the horror of the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the WorldTRADE
CENTER

in New York City. The objective of the ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack25 on the

Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a protective measure should be delayed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the City of Manila, is directed to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 136804

February 19, 2003

MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST CO. and/or CHEMICAL BANK, petitioners,

vs.
RAFAEL MA. GUERRERO, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside the Court of Appeals1 Decision of August 24, 1998
and Resolution of December 14, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 423102 affirming the trial courts denial of petitioners motion for partial
summary judgment.
The Antecedents
On May 17, 1994, respondent Rafael Ma. Guerrero ("Guerrero" for brevity) filed a complaint for damages against petitioner
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank ("the Bank" for brevity) with the Regional Trial Court of Manila ("RTC"
for brevity). Guerrero sought payment of damages allegedly for (1) illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his
checking account with the Bank; (2) a returned check worth US$18,000.00 due to signature verification problems; and (3)
unauthorized conversion of his account. Guerrero amended his complaint on April 18, 1995.
On September 1, 1995, the Bank filed its Answer alleging, inter alia, that by stipulation Guerreros account is governed by New
York law and this law does not permit any of Guerreros claims except actual damages. Subsequently, the Bank filed a Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of Guerreros claims for consequential, nominal, temperate, moral and
exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees on the same ground alleged in its Answer. The Bank contended that the trial
should be limited to the issue of actual damages. Guerrero opposed the motion.
The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney, supported the Banks Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Alyssa
Waldens affidavit ("Walden affidavit" for brevity) stated that Guerreros New York bank account stipulated that the governing law
is New York law and that this law bars all of Guerreros claims except actual damages. The Philippine Consular Office in New
York authenticated the Walden affidavit.
The RTC denied the Banks Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and its motion for reconsideration on March 6, 1996 and July
17, 1996, respectively. The Bank filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals assailing the RTC Orders.
In its Decision dated August 24, 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. On December 14, 1998, the Court of Appeals
denied the Banks motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals sustained the RTC orders denying the motion for partial summary judgment. The Court of Appeals ruled
that the Walden affidavit does not serve as proof of the New York law and jurisprudence relied on by the Bank to support its
motion. The Court of Appeals considered the New York law and jurisprudence as public documents defined in Section 19, Rule
132 of the Rules on Evidence, as follows:
"SEC. 19. Classes of Documents. For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
x x x."
The Court of Appeals opined that the following procedure outlined in Section 24, Rule 132 should be followed in proving foreign
law:

"SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible
for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody
of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer
has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office."
The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the Banks argument that Section 2, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court allows the Bank to
move with the supporting Walden affidavit for partial summary judgment in its favor. The Court of Appeals clarified that the
Walden affidavit is not the supporting affidavit referred to in Section 2, Rule 34 that would prove the lack of genuine issue
between the parties. The Court of Appeals concluded that even if the Walden affidavit is used for purposes of summary
judgment, the Bank must still comply with the procedure prescribed by the Rules to prove the foreign law.
The Issues
The Bank contends that the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in "x x x HOLDING THAT [THE BANKS] PROOF OF FACTS TO SUPPORT ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MAY
NOT BE GIVEN BY AFFIDAVIT;
x x x HOLDING THAT [THE BANKS] AFFIDAVIT, WHICH PROVES FOREIGN LAW AS A FACT, IS "HEARSAY" AND
THEREBY CANNOT SERVE AS PROOF OF THE NEW YORK LAW RELIED UPON BY PETITIONERS IN THEIR MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT x x x."3
First, the Bank argues that in moving for partial summary judgment, it was entitled to use the Walden affidavit to prove
that the stipulated foreign law bars the claims for consequential, moral, temperate, nominal and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees. Consequently, outright dismissal by summary judgment of these claims is warranted.
Second, the Bank claims that the Court of Appeals mixed up the requirements of Rule 35 on summary judgments and
those of a trial on the merits in considering the Walden affidavit as "hearsay." The Bank points out that the Walden
affidavit is not hearsay since Rule 35 expressly permits the use of affidavits.
Lastly, the Bank argues that since Guerrero did not submit any opposing affidavit to refute the facts contained in the
Walden affidavit, he failed to show the need for a trial on his claims for damages other than actual.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is devoid of merit.
The Bank filed its motion for partial summary judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 34 of the old Rules of Court which reads:
"Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or
a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or
any part thereof."
A court may grant a summary judgment to settle expeditiously a case if, on motion of either party, there appears from the
pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that noIMPORTANT issues of fact are involved, except the amount of
damages. In such event, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.4
In a motion for summary judgment, the crucial question is: are the issues raised in the pleadings genuine, shamor fictitious, as
shown by affidavits, depositions or admissions accompanying the motion?5
A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which
is fictitious or contrived so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.6
A perusal of the parties respective pleadings would show that there are genuine issues of fact that necessitate formal trial.
Guerreros complaint before the RTC contains a statement of the ultimate facts on which he relies for his claim for damages. He
is seeking damages for what he asserts as "illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking account with the
Bank, a returned check worth US$18,000.00 due to signature verification problems, and unauthorized conversion of his
account." In its Answer, the Bank set up its defense that the agreed foreign law to govern their contractual relation bars the

recovery of damages other than actual. Apparently, facts are asserted in Guerreros complaint while specific denials and
affirmative defenses are set out in the Banks answer.
True, the court can determine whether there are genuine issues in a case based merely on the affidavits or counter-affidavits
submitted by the parties to the court. However, as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the Banks motion for partial summary
judgment as supported by the Walden affidavit does not demonstrate that Guerreros claims are sham, fictitious or contrived. On
the contrary, the Walden affidavit shows that the facts and material allegations as pleaded by the parties are disputed and there
are substantial triable issues necessitating a formal trial.
There can be no summary judgment where questions of fact are in issue or where material allegations of the pleadings are in
dispute.7 The resolution of whether a foreign law allows only the recovery of actual damages is a question of fact as far as the
trial court is concerned since foreign laws do not prove themselves in our courts.8Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial
notice.9 Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proven. Certainly, the conflicting allegations as to whether New York law or
Philippine law applies to Guerreros claims present a clear dispute on material allegations which can be resolved only by a trial
on the merits.
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by (1) an
official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy
must be accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody
thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation must state, in substance, that the
copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be, and must be under the official seal of the
attesting officer.
Certain exceptions to this rule were recognized in Asiavest Limited v. Court of Appeals10 which held that:
"x x x:
Although it is desirable that foreign law be proved in accordance with the above rule, however, the Supreme Court held in the
case of Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, that Section 41, Rule 123 (Section 25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court) does not exclude the presentation of other competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law. In that case, the
Supreme Court considered the testimony under oath of an attorney-at-law of San Francisco, California, who quoted verbatim a
section of California Civil Code and who stated that the same was in force at the time the obligations were contracted, as
sufficient evidence to establish the existence of said law. Accordingly, in line with this view, the Supreme Court in the Collector of
Internal Revenue v. Fisher et al., upheld the Tax Court in considering the pertinent law of California as proved by the
respondents witness. In that case, the counsel for respondent "testified that as an active member of the California Bar since
1951, he is familiar with the revenue and taxation laws of the State of California. When asked by the lower court to state the
pertinent California law as regards exemption of intangible personal properties, the witness cited Article 4, Sec. 13851 (a) & (b)
of the California Internal and Revenue Code as published in Derrings California Code, a publication of Bancroft-Whitney Co.,
Inc. And as part of his testimony, a full quotation of the cited section was offered in evidence by respondents." Likewise, in
several naturalization cases, it was held by the Court that evidence of the law of a foreign country on reciprocity regarding the
acquisition of citizenship, although not meeting the prescribed rule of practice, may be allowed and used as basis for favorable
action, if, in the light of all the circumstances, the Court is "satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof offered." Thus, in a
number of decisions, mere authentication of the Chinese Naturalization Law by the Chinese Consulate General of Manila was
held to be competent proof of that law." (Emphasis supplied)
The Bank, however, cannot rely on Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal or Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher to
support its cause. These cases involved attorneys testifying in open court during the trial in the Philippines and quoting the
particular foreign laws sought to be established. On the other hand, the Walden affidavit was taken abroad ex parte and the
affiant never testified in open court. The Walden affidavit cannot be considered as proof of New York law on damages not only
because it is self-serving but also because it does not state the specific New York law on damages. We reproduce portions of
the Walden affidavit as follows:
1a\^/phi1.net

"3. In New York, "[n]ominal damages are damages in name only, trivial sums such as six cents or $1. Such damages are
awarded both in tort and contract cases when the plaintiff establishes a cause of action against the defendant, but is
unable to prove" actual damages. Dobbs, Law of Remedies, 3.32 at 294 (1993). Since Guerrero is claiming for actual
damages, he cannot ask for nominal damages.
4. There is no concept of temperate damages in New York law. I have reviewed Dobbs, a well-respected treatise, which
does not use the phrase "temperate damages" in its index. I have also done a computerized search for the phrase in all
published New York cases, and have found no cases that use it. I have never heard the phrase used in American law.

5. The Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") governs many aspects of a Banks relationship with its depositors. In this
case, it governs Guerreros claim arising out of the non-payment of the $18,000 check. Guerrero claims that this was a
wrongful dishonor. However, the UCC states that "justifiable refusal to pay or accept" as opposed to dishonor, occurs
when a bank refuses to pay a check for reasons such as a missing indorsement, a missing or illegible signature or a
forgery, 3-510, Official Comment 2. .. to the Complaint, MHT returned the check because it had no signature card on
. and could not verify Guerreros signature. In my opinion, consistent with the UCC, that is a legitimate and justifiable
reason not to pay.
6. Consequential damages are not available in the ordinary case of a justifiable refusal to pay. UCC 1-106 provides that
"neither consequential or special or punitive damages may be had except as specifically provided in the Act or by other
rule of law". UCC 4-103 further provides that consequential damages can be recovered only where there is bad faith.
This is more restrictive than the New York common law, which may allow consequential damages in a breach of contract
case (as does the UCC where there is a wrongful dishonor).
7. Under New York law, requests for lost profits, damage to reputation and mental distress are considered consequential
damages. Kenford Co., Inc. v. Country of Erie, 73 N.Y.2d 312, 319, 540 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4-5 (1989) (lost profits); Motif
Construction Corp. v. Buffalo Savings Bank, 50 A.D.2d 718, 374 N.Y.S..2d 868, 869-70 (4th Dept 1975) damage to
reputation); Dobbs, Law of Remedies 12.4(1) at 63 (emotional distress).
8. As a matter of New York law, a claim for emotional distress cannot be recovered for a breach of contract. Geler v.
National Westminster Bank U.S.A., 770 F. Supp. 210, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Pitcherello v. Moray Homes, Ltd., 150
A.D.2d 860,540 N.Y.S.2d 387, 390 (3d Dept 1989) Martin v. Donald Park Acres, 54 A.D.2d 975, 389 N.Y.S..2d 31, 32
(2nd Dept 1976). Damage to reputation is also not recoverable for a contract. Motif Construction Corp. v. Buffalo
Savings Bank, 374 N.Y.S.2d at 869-70.
1a\^ /phi1.net

9. In cases where the issue is the breach of a contract to purchase stock, New York courts will not take into
consideration the performance of the stock after the breach. Rather, damages will be based on the value of the stock at
the time of the breach, Aroneck v. Atkin, 90 A.D.2d 966, 456 N.Y.S.2d 558, 559 (4th Dept 1982), app. den. 59 N.Y.2d
601, 449 N.E.2d 1276, 463 N.Y.S.2d 1023 (1983).
10. Under New York law, a party can only get consequential damages if they were the type that would naturally arise
from the breach and if they were "brought within the contemplation of parties as the probable result of the breach at the
time of or prior to contracting." Kenford Co., Inc. v. Country of Erie, 73 N.Y.2d 312, 319, 540 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1989),
(quoting Chapman v. Fargo, 223 N.Y. 32, 36 (1918).
11. Under New York law, a plaintiff is not entitled to attorneys fees unless they are provided by contract or
statute. E.g., Geler v. National Westminster Bank, 770 F. Supp. 210, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Camatron Sewing Mach, Inc.
v. F.M. Ring Assocs., Inc., 179 A.D.2d 165, 582 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1st Dept 1992); Stanisic v. Soho Landmark Assocs., 73
A.D.2d 268, 577 N.Y.S.2d 280, 281 (1st Dept 1991). There is no statute that permits attorneys fees in a case of this
type.
12. Exemplary, or punitive damages are not allowed for a breach of contract, even where the plaintiff claims the
defendant acted with malice. Geler v. National Westminster Bank, 770 F.Supp. 210, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Catalogue
Service of chester11_v. Insurance Co. of North America, 74 A.D.2d 837, 838, 425 N.Y.S.2d 635, 637 (2d Dept
1980); Senior v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 110 A.D.2d 833, 488 N.Y.S.2d 241, 242 (2d Dept 1985).
13. Exemplary or punitive damages may be recovered only where it is alleged and proven that the wrong supposedly
committed by defendant amounts to a fraud aimed at the public generally and involves a high moral culpability. Walker v.
Sheldon, 10 N.Y.2d 401, 179 N.E.2d 497, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1961).
14. Furthermore, it has been consistently held under New York law that exemplary damages are not available for a mere
breach of contract for in such a case, as a matter of law, only a private wrong and not a public right is involved. Thaler v.
The North Insurance Company, 63 A.D.2d 921, 406 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1st Dept 1978)."12
The Walden affidavit states conclusions from the affiants personal interpretation and opinion of the facts of the case vis a vis the
alleged laws and jurisprudence without citing any law in particular. The citations in the Walden affidavit of various U.S. court
decisions do not constitute proof of the official records or decisions of the U.S. courts. While the Bank attached copies of some
of the U.S. court decisions cited in the Walden affidavit, these copies do not comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on proof of
official records or decisions of foreign courts.
The Banks intention in presenting the Walden affidavit is to prove New York law and jurisprudence. However, because of the
failure to comply with Section 24 of Rule 132 on how to prove a foreign law and decisions of foreign courts, the Walden affidavit

did not prove the current state of New York law and jurisprudence. Thus, the Bank has only alleged, but has not proved, what
New York law and jurisprudence are on the matters at issue.
Next, the Bank makes much of Guerreros failure to submit an opposing affidavit to the Walden affidavit. However, the pertinent
provision of Section 3, Rule 35 of the old Rules of Court did not make the submission of an opposing affidavit mandatory, thus:
"SEC. 3. Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least ten (10) days before the time specified for the
hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. After the hearing, the judgment sought
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that, except as
to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law." (Emphasis supplied)
It is axiomatic that the term "may" as used in remedial law, is only permissive and not mandatory.13
Guerrero cannot be said to have admitted the averments in the Banks motion for partial summary judgment and the Walden
affidavit just because he failed to file an opposing affidavit. Guerrero opposed the motion for partial summary judgment, although
he did not present an opposing affidavit. Guerrero may not have presented an opposing affidavit, as there was no need for one,
because the Walden affidavit did not establish what the Bank intended to prove. Certainly, Guerrero did not admit, expressly or
impliedly, the veracity of the statements in the Walden affidavit. The Bank still had the burden of proving New York law and
jurisprudence even if Guerrero did not present an opposing affidavit. As the party moving for summary judgment, the Bank has
the burden of clearly demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of fact and that any doubt as to the existence of such
issue is resolved against the movant.14
Moreover, it would have been redundant and pointless for Guerrero to submit an opposing affidavit considering that what the
Bank seeks to be opposed is the very subject matter of the complaint. Guerrero need not file an opposing affidavit to the Walden
affidavit because his complaint itself controverts the matters set forth in the Banks motion and the Walden affidavit. A party
should not be made to deny matters already averred in his complaint.
There being substantial triable issues between the parties, the courts a quo correctly denied the Banks motion for partial
summary judgment. There is a need to determine by presentation of evidence in a regular trial if the Bank is guilty of any
wrongdoing and if it is liable for damages under the applicable laws.
This case has been delayed long enough by the Banks resort to a motion for partial summary judgment. Ironically, the Bank has
successfully defeated the very purpose for which summary judgments were devised in our rules, which is, to aid parties in
avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated August 24, 1998 and the Resolution dated
December 14, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42310 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 178551

October 11, 2010

ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH-KUWAITPetitioners,

vs.
MA. JOSEFA ECHIN, Respondent.
DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas Corporation in behalf of its principal-co-petitioner, the
Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the position of medical technologist under a two-year contract, denominated
as a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), with a monthly salary of US$1,200.00.
Under the MOA,1 all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of one (1) year and are covered by Kuwaits Civil
Service Board Employment Contract No. 2.
Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from employment on February 11, 2001, she not having
allegedly passed the probationary period.
As the Ministry denied respondents request for reconsideration, she returned to the Philippines on March 17, 2001, shouldering
her own air fare.
On July 27, 2001, respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint2 for illegal dismissal
against petitioner ATCI as the local recruitment agency, represented by petitioner, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry, as the
foreign principal.
By Decision3 of November 29, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, finding that petitioners neither showed that there was just cause to
warrant respondents dismissal nor that she failed to qualify as a regular employee, held that respondent was illegally dismissed
and accordingly ordered petitioners to pay her US$3,600.00, representing her salary for the three months unexpired portion of
her contract.
On appeal of petitioners ATCI and Ikdal, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision by Resolution4 of January 26, 2004.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution5 of April 22, 2004, they appealed to the Court of
Appeals, contending that their principal, the Ministry, being a foreign government agency, is immune from suit and, as such, the
immunity extended to them; and that respondent was validly dismissed for her failure to meet the performance rating within the
one-year period as required under Kuwaits Civil Service Laws. Petitioners further contended that Ikdal should not be liable as an
officer of petitioner ATCI.
By Decision6 of March 30, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the NLRC Resolution.
In brushing aside petitioners contention that they only acted as agent of the Ministry and that they cannot be held jointly and
solidarily liable with it, the appellate court noted that under the law, a private employment agency shall assume all
responsibilities for the implementation of the contract of employment of an overseas worker, hence, it can be sued jointly and
severally with the foreign principal for any violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of employment.
As to Ikdals liability, the appellate court held that under Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the "Migrant and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995," corporate officers, directors and partners of a recruitment agency may themselves be jointly and solidarily liable
with the recruitment agency for money claims and damages awarded to overseas workers.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court by Resolution7 of June 27, 2007, the present
petition for review on certiorari was filed.
Petitioners maintain that they should not be held liable because respondents employment contract specifically stipulates that her
employment shall be governed by the Civil Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait. They thus conclude that it was patent error
for the labor tribunals and the appellate court to apply the Labor Code provisions governing probationary employment in deciding
the present case.
Further, petitioners argue that even the Philippine Overseas Employment Act (POEA) Rules relative to master employment
contracts (Part III, Sec. 2 of the POEA Rules and Regulations) accord respect to the "customs, practices, company policies and
labor laws and legislation of the host country."
Finally, petitioners posit that assuming arguendo that Philippine labor laws are applicable, given that the foreign principal is a
government agency which is immune from suit, as in fact it did not sign any document agreeing to be held jointly and solidarily
liable, petitioner ATCI cannot likewise be held liable, more so since the Ministrys liability had not been judicially determined as
jurisdiction was not acquired over it.
The petition fails.

Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade responsibility for the money claims of Overseas Filipino workers
(OFWs) which it deploys abroad by the mere expediency of claiming that its foreign principal is a government agency clothed
with immunity from suit, or that such foreign principals liability must first be established before it, as agent, can be held jointly
and solidarily liable.
In providing for the joint and solidary liability of private recruitment agencies with their foreign principals, Republic Act No. 8042
precisely affords the OFWs with a recourse and assures them of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them.
Skippers United Pacific v. Maguad8 explains:
. . . [T]he obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement entered into by and between the local agent and its
foreign principal are not coterminous with the term of such agreement so that if either or both of the parties decide to end
the agreement, the responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted employees under the agreement do not at all end, but
the same extends up to and until the expiration of the employment contracts of the employees recruited and employed pursuant
to the said recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will render nugatory the very purpose for which the law governing the
employment of workers for foreign jobs abroad was enacted. (emphasis supplied)
The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of the state to protect and alleviate the plight of the working
class.9 Verily, to allow petitioners to simply invoke the immunity from suit of its foreign principal or to wait for the judicial
determination of the foreign principals liability before petitioner can be held liable renders the law on joint and solidary liability
inutile.
As to petitioners contentions that Philippine labor laws on probationary employment are not applicable since it was expressly
provided in respondents employment contract, which she voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her engagement shall be
governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord respect to such rules, customs
and practices of the host country, the same was not substantiated.
Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law between the parties who can establish stipulations, clauses, terms
and conditions as they may deem convenient, including the laws which they wish to govern their respective obligations, as long
as they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the law, under
the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case, petitioners failed to discharge. The Courts ruling in EDI-Staffbuilders
Intl., v. NLRC10 illuminates:
In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters not
provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law intended by the
parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating to the termination of the
employment of Gran.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign
law. The foreign law is treated as a question of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor arbiter cannot take
judicial notice of a foreign law. He is presumed to know only domestic or forum law.
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the International Law doctrine
of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if
pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in
determining the issues presented before us. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. To
prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible
for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody
of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer
has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (emphasis
supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of the
evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the

case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court
having a seal, under the seal of such court.
To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the following: MOA between respondent and the Ministry, as represented by
ATCI, which provides that the employee is subject to a probationary period of one (1) year and that the host countrys Civil
Service Laws and Regulations apply; a translated copy11 (Arabic to English) of the termination letter to respondent stating that
she did not pass the probation terms, without specifying the grounds therefor, and a translated copy of the certificate of
termination,12 both of which documents were certified by Mr. Mustapha Alawi, Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs-Office
of Consular Affairs Inslamic Certification and Translation Unit; and respondents letter13 of reconsideration to the Ministry,
wherein she noted that in her first eight (8) months of employment, she was given a rating of "Excellent" albeit it changed due to
changes in her shift of work schedule.
These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not sufficiently prove that respondent was validly terminated as a
probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws. Instead of submitting a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti labor laws
duly authenticated and translated by Embassy officials thereat, as required under the Rules, what petitioners submitted
were mere certifications attesting only to the correctness of the translations of the MOA and the termination letter
which does not prove at all that Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from Philippine laws and that under such Kuwaiti laws,
respondent was validly terminated. Thus the subject certifications read:
xxxx
This is to certify that the herein attached translation/s from Arabic to English/Tagalog and or vice versa was/were presented to
this Office for review and certification and the same was/were found to be in order. This Office, however, assumes no
responsibility as to the contents of the document/s.
This certification is being issued upon request of the interested party for whatever legal purpose it may serve. (emphasis
supplied)
1avvphi1

Respecting Ikdals joint and solidary liability as a corporate officer, the same is in order too following the express provision of
R.A. 8042 on money claims, viz:
SEC. 10. Money Claims.Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar
days after the filing of the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or
contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual moral, exemplary and other forms of
damages.
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section shall be
joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition
precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be
answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a
juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily
liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 159240

February 4, 2008

GREGORIO SILOT, JR., petitioner,

vs.
ESTRELLA DE LA ROSA, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision1 dated July 9, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68062 entitled
"Estrella de la Rosa v. Gregorio Silot, Jr." The appellate court had affirmed with modification the Joint Decision2 dated May 24,
2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Naga City, in Civil Case Nos. 97-3736 and 97-3750, and decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Joint Decision dated May 24, 2000 of the RTC, Branch 61, Naga City
in Civil Cases Nos. 97-3736 and 97-3750 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION, deleting the award for nominal
damages and reducing the award of attorney's fees to Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos.
Other awards not otherwise modified or deleted stand.
SO ORDERED.3
As culled from the records by the Court of Appeals, the antecedent facts of this case are as follows:
On January 19, 1996, petitioner Gregorio Silot, Jr. and respondent Estrella de la Rosa entered into a contract for the
construction of a dormitory-apartment building on Lot 1-A-9-D, Bagumbayan Sur, Naga City. They expressly agreed that Silot
shall supply the labor and de la Rosa shall pay 33% of the total value of the materials purchased for the project. Upon turnover
in February 1997 of the completed structure, the total cost of materials actually purchased was P2,504,469.65, 33% of which
is P826,474.98. Silot required de la Rosa to pay a total of P1,018,000.00, or P191,525.02 more than the amount due. Through
her son-in-law, de la Rosa confronted Silot about the overpayment but the latter refused to return the overpayment. After her
repeated demands fell on deaf ears, de la Rosa filed a suit against Silot.
Silot, in retaliation, sued de la Rosa for insufficient payment, claiming that he was supposed to receive P1,281,872.404 but was
only paid P1,008,000.00, thus still leaving a balance of P273,872.40.
The two cases were consolidated by the trial court.
During trial, however, Atty. San Jose, counsel for Silot, dispensed with the testimony of Ariel Goingo, a witness for de la Rosa.
Atty. San Jose admitted Goingo's proposed testimony to the effect that in consideration of the 33% as mentioned in the contract,
all the material supplies during the making of the additional works mentioned were already accounted for; that Silot was paid for
all works that were performed as well as all materials supplied; that the total sum was P2,504,469.65, so that 33% of which is
only P826,474.98; that de la Rosa paid the amount of P1,018,000.00; hence, there was an excess payment of P191,525.02; and
that de la Rosa never received any demand from nor was she confronted by Silot regarding an alleged balance.5
Consequently, after trial, the RTC ruled in favor of de la Rosa and ordered Silot to return the overpaid amount, decreeing as
follows:
Wherefore, premises considered, Civil Case No. 3736 is hereby ordered DISMISSED for lack of merit; while in Civil Case
No. 97-3750, defendant Gregorio Silot is hereby ordered to return the amount of P191,525.02 to the plaintiff, Estrella de
la Rosa; to pay P100,000.00 for [a]ttorney's fees and P50,000.00 as nominal damages.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court. Hence, the instant petition wherein Silot assigned the
following errors:
I.
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in construing the admission ma[d]e by Atty. San Jose on the purpose for the
testimony of witness Ariel [Goingo] as admission of evidence.

II.
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in deciding and ordering petitioner-appellant to return the amount of P191,525.02
to respondent appellee and also to pay P20,000.00 attorney[']s fees.7
Simply stated, petitioner is raising the following issues to be resolved: (1) whether the admission by Atty. San Jose, counsel of
petitioner Silot, constituted judicial admission of respondent's evidence; and (2) whether the appellate court erred in ruling that
Silot should return the claimed amount of P191,525.02 to de la Rosa.
Petitioner Silot contends that his counsel Atty. San Jose merely admitted that the subject of Goingo's testimony was that stated
in the offer of testimony, but he did not admit the truth or veracity of the testimony. Silot adds that Atty. San Jose could not and
should not have admitted the testimony because he had no special power of attorney to enter into such stipulations or to
compromise his client's right without the latter's direct intervention.8
Respondent de la Rosa counters that clients are bound by the admissions as well as the negligence of their counsel. She
enumerates several Court decisions to support her contention, among them the following cases:
(1) Ongson v. People,9 where petitioner was held bound by his unqualified admission that he received private complainant's
demand letter with notice of dishonor. The admission binds him considering that he never denied receipt of the notice of
dishonor.
(2) Republic v. Sarabia,10 where the Court held that an admission made in the pleading cannot be controverted by the party
making such admission and are conclusive as to him.
(3) People v. Genosa,11 Arroyo, Jr. v. Taduran,12 Carandang v. Court of Appeals,13 in which cases the Court held that judicial
admissions are conclusive upon the party making it and may not be contradicted in the absence of prior showing that the
admission had been made through palpable mistake, or no admission was in fact made.
(4) People v. Razul14 and Lim v. Jabalde,15 where it was held that stipulations are recognized as declarations constituting judicial
admissions, hence, binding upon the parties.
Moreover, well-entrenched is the rule that the client is bound by the mistakes arising from negligence of his own counsel.16 The
only exception to this rule is, as the Court of Appeals itself cited in its decision, when the negligence is so gross that the client is
deprived of his day in court.17
In our considered view, however, that exception does not find any application in this case. As the records would plainly show,
Silot was not deprived of his day in court. Also, as the appellate court observed, he could have introduced evidence, testimonial
or otherwise, in order to controvert or correct the admission made by his counsel. Said the appellate court:
As gleaned from the records, defendant-appellant Silot was not deprived of his day in court. He was given every
opportunity to be heard through his pleadings and manifestations. He was also presented in open court to testify. As
quoted earlier, Atty. Terbio, counsel for plaintiff-appellee de la Rosa, even repeatedly asked Atty. San Jose, defendantappellant Silot's counsel, if he would admit the purpose for which the witness Ariel Goingo will testify to dispense with his
testimony, and Atty. San Jose repeatedly answered that "We will admit that." And when asked by the judge if he will
admit it, he answered that they will admit P2,504,000.00.18
More importantly, Silot's counsel clearly made admissions of the content of the testimony of witness Goingo, whose presentation
was dispensed with. In People v. Hernandez,19 we held that admissions made for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some
facts are in the nature of judicial admissions, to wit:
A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and defense counsel during trial in open court is automatically
reduced into writing and contained in the official transcript of the proceedings had in court. The conformity of the accused
in the form of his signature affixed thereto is unnecessary in view of the fact that: "[] an attorney who is employed to
manage a party's conduct of a lawsuit [] has prima facie authority to make relevant admissions by pleadings, by oral or
written stipulation, [] which unless allowed to be withdrawn are conclusive." (Italics supplied.) In fact, "judicial
admissions are frequently those of counsel or of the attorney of record, who is, for the purpose of the trial, the
agent of his client. When such admissions are made [] for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some
fact, [] they bind the client, whether made during, or even after, the trial.20 (Emphasis supplied.)
Worth stressing, in this connection, judicial admissions do not require proof and may not be contradicted in the absence of a
prior showing that the admissions had been made through palpable mistake.21

Furthermore, in the case of Toh v. Court of Appeals,22 this Court emphasized the consequence of admitting and dispensing with
the testimony of the proposed witness, thus:
The Court sees no cogent reason why the said witness should be examined any further since his testimony as
summarized in the offer made by counsel was expressly admitted by opposing counsel. With the said admission, the
testimony of said witness is uncontroverted and even admitted as fact by opposing counsel.23
On the issue of insufficient payment, Silot avers that he has rendered or provided labor for the total amount of P1,281,872.40,
and that de la Rosa has benefited and profited from these labors.24 Without the labors provided by Silot, the constructed building
would not have been painted, provided with electrical works and other works which were additional works on the building, and
that to sanction de la Rosa's claim would be to allow unjust enrichment on the part of de la Rosa.25 However, this claim has been
belied by the admission made by his own counsel, as plainly manifest in the transcript:
Atty. Terbio
The purpose for which this witness will testify are the following: If admitted, we are willing to dispense the
testimony. He will testify that in consideration of the 33% as mentioned in the contract, all the material
supplies during the making of the additional works mentioned were all considered; he will testify that
Silot was paid of all works that was performed as well as all materials supplied were considered, and that
the sum total of which is P2,504,469.65 and 33% of which is P826,474.98, and that De la Rosa paid the
total amount of P1,018,000.00, and therefore, there is an excess payment of P191,525.00; he will testify
that De la Rosa never received the demand or was confronted by Silot regarding an alleged balance, now,
if the counsel wish to admit this.
ATTY. SAN JOSE
We admit that.
ATTY. TERBIO
Because these are all evidentiary and this has not been adequately covered.
ATTY. SAN JOSE
We will admit that.26 (Emphasis supplied.)
Clearly, given the circumstances of this case, the Court of Appeals did not err in ordering petitioner to return to respondent the
amount of P191,525.02 overpayment.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated July 9, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 68062 is AFFIRMED. Petitioner Gregorio Silot, Jr. is hereby ordered to return the amount of P191,525.02 to
respondent Estrella de la Rosa, and to pay P20,000.00 as attorney's fees. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 181508

October 2, 2013

OSCAR CONSTANTINO, MAXIMA CONSTANTINO and CASIMIRA MATURINGAN, Petitioners,

vs.
HEIRS OF PEDRO CONSTANTINO, JR., represented by ASUNCION LAQUINDANUM, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the 31 May 2007
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81329, which reversed the 27 October 2003 Decision2of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 18 of Malolos City, Bulacan, in a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of "Pagmamana sa Labas ng
Hukuman," Tax Declaration Nos. 96-10022-02653 & 1002655, With Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction & Damages
docketed as Civil Case No. 630-M-99.
The facts
This involves a controversy over a parcel of land claimed to be part of an estate which needed to be proportionally subdivided
among heirs.
Pedro Constantino, Sr., (Pedro Sr.) ancestors of the petitioners and respondents, owned several parcels of land, one of which is
an unregistered parcel of land declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration 208143consisting of 240 square meters
situated at Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan. Pedro, Sr., upon his death, was survived by his six (6) children, namely: 1) PEDRO
CONSTANTINO, JR. (Pedro Jr.), the grandfather of the respondents; 2) ANTONIA CONSTANTINO, who later died without
issue; 3) CLARA CONSTANTINO, who also later died without issue; 4) BRUNOCONSTANTINO, who was survived by his 6
children including petitioner Casimira Constantino-Maturingan; 5) EDUARDO CONSTANTINO, who is survived by his daughter
Maura; and 6) SANTIAGO CONSTANTINO, who was survived by his five (5) children which includes petitioner Oscar
Constantino.4
On 17 June 1999, respondents Asuncion Laquindanum (Asuncion)and Josefina Cailipan (Josefina), great grandchildren of
Pedro Sr., in representation of Pedro, Jr. filed a complaint5
against petitioners Oscar Constantino, Maxima Constantino and Casimira Maturingan, grandchildren of Pedro Sr., for the
nullification of a document denominated as "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman" dated 10 August 1992,6Tax Declaration Nos.
96-10022 (02653)7 and 96-10022 (02655)8 and reinstatement of Tax Declaration No. 208149 in the name of Pedro Sr.
In the said complaint, respondents alleged that sometime in October 1998, petitioners asserted their claim of ownership over the
whole parcel of land (240 sq m) owned by the late Pedro Sr., to the exclusion of respondents who are occupying a portion
thereof. Upon verification, respondents learned that a Tax Declaration No. 02010-2170-33235 in the name of petitioner Oscar
Constantino and his cousin Maxima Constantino was unlawfully issued, which in effect canceled Tax Declaration No. 20814 in
the name of their ancestor Pedro Sr. The issuance of the new tax declaration was allegedly due to the execution of a simulated,
fabricated and fictitious document denominated as "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman," wherein the petitioners
misrepresented themselves as the sole and only heirs of Pedro Sr. It was further alleged that subsequently, the subject land was
divided equally between petitioners Oscar and Maxima resulting in the issuance of Tax Declaration No. 96-10022-0265310 in the
name of Oscar, with an area of 120sq m and the other half in the name of Maxima covered by Tax Declaration No. 96-1002202652.11 The share of Maxima was eventually conveyed to her sister, petitioner Casimira in whose name a new Tax Declaration
No. 96-10022-0265512 was issued.
Thus, respondents sought to annul the "Pagmamana sa Labas ngHukuman" as well as the Tax Declarations that were issued on
the basis of such document.
The petitioners, on the other hand, averred in their Answer With Counterclaim13 that Pedro Sr., upon his death, left several
parcels of land, namely: 1) a lot with an area of 240 sq m covered by Tax Declaration No.20814; 2) a lot with an area of 192 sq
m also situated at Sta. Monica,Hagonoy, Bulacan, previously covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534; and 3)an agricultural land
with an area of Four (4) hectares, more or less. The petitioners claimed that the document "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman"
pertaining to the 240 sq m lot was perfectly valid and legal, as it was a product of mutual and voluntary agreement between and
among the descendants of the deceased Pedro Sr.
Further, petitioners alleged that the respondents have no cause of action against them considering that the respondents lawful
share over the estate of Pedro Sr., had already been transferred to them as evidenced by the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
with Waiver14 dated 5 December 1968,executed by Angelo Constantino, Maria Constantino (mother of respondent Asuncion),

Arcadio Constantino and Mercedes Constantino, all heirs of Pedro Jr. In the said deed, respondents adjudicated unto
themselves to the exclusion of other heirs, the parcel of land with an area of 192 sq m by misrepresenting that they were "the
only legitimate heirs of Pedro Sr. Thus, petitioners claimed that in the manner similar to the assailed "Pagmamana sa Labas ng
Hukuman," they asserted their rights and ownership over the subject 240 sq m lot without damage to the respondents.
In essence, petitioners position was that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver which led to the issuance of Tax
Declaration No.9534 was acquiesced in by the other heirs of Pedro Sr., including the petitioners, on the understanding that the
respondent heirs of Pedro Jr. would no longer share and participate in the settlement and partition of the remaining lot covered
by the "
Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman."
On 15 August 2000, pre-trial conference15 was conducted wherein the parties entered into stipulations and admissions as well as
identification of the issues to be litigated. Thereupon, trial on the merits ensued.
On 27 October 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision16 in favor of the respondents finding that:
As a result of execution of "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" dated December 5, 1968 (Exh. "2") executed by the heirs of
Pedro Constantino, Jr., a son of Pedro Constantino, Sr. and the subsequent execution of another deed denominated as
"Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman" dated August 10, 1992 (Exh. "E") executed by the heirs of Santiago and Bruno
Constantino, also other sons of Pedro Constantino, Sr., to the exclusion of the other heirs, namely, those of ANTONIA, CLARA,
and EDUARDO CONSTANTINO, both plaintiffs and defendants acted equally at fault. They are in pari delicto, whereby the law
leaves them as they are and denies recovery by either one of them. (See:Yu Bun Guan v. Ong, 367 SCRA 559). Parties who are
equally guilty cannot complain against each other. (Sarmiento v. Salud, 45 SCRA 213.)
Supplementing the law on the matter, that is, the provision of Article 19 of the New Civil Code whereby every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith, is the legal maxim that "he who comes to court to demand equity must come with clean hands." (LBC Express, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 602).
Although, plaintiffs-heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr., including Asuncion Laquindanum and Josefina Cailipan, are not parties or
signatories to the "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" dated December 5, 1968, they are successors-in-interest of Pedro
Constantino, Jr. They areconsidered "privies" to said deed, and are bound by said extrajudicial settlement. (See: Cabresos v.
Tiro, 166 SCRA 400). In other words, they are "PRIVIES IN ESTATE". (Correa v. Pascual, 99 Phil. 696, 703).
Consequently, plaintiffs are now estopped from claiming otherwise. (See: PNB v. CA, 94 SCRA 357). They are estopped to
share in the real property subject matter of this case. In fine, they are not entitled to the reliefs prayed for. (Communication
Materials & Design, Inc. v. CA, 260 SCRA 673).
1wphi1

With respect to alleged damages claimed by plaintiffs against defendants in their Complaint and counterclaim for damages by
defendants against plaintiffs in their Answer, both claims are hereby dismissed for lack of valid factual and legal foundations.
Disposition
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises and disquisition, the deed denominated as "Pagmamana sa Labas ng
Hukuman" of August10, 1992 and Tax Declaration No. 96-10022-02653 in the name of Oscar Constantino and Tax Declaration
No. 96-10022-02655 in the name of Casimira C. Maturingan (from Maxima Constantino to Casimira C. Maturingan) stand.
Plaintiffs Complaint for nullification thereof with damages is hereby DISMISSED.17
Not convinced, the respondents appealed the afore quoted decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) raising, among others, the
erroneous application by the trial court of the doctrine of "in pari delicto" in declaring the validity of the document "Pagmamana
sa Labas ng Hukuman."
In its 31 May 2007 Decision,18 the CA ruled in favor of the respondents heirs of Pedro, Jr., declaring that the "Extrajudicial
Settlement with Waiver" dated 5 December 1968 they executed covering the 192 sq mlot actually belongs to Pedro Jr., hence,
not part of the estate of Pedro Sr. The CA rationated in this wise:
The 192 square meters lot which was adjudicated in the "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" dated 5 December 1968 among
the heirs of Pedro Jr. namely Angelo, Maria, Arcadio and Mercedes is a property belonging to Pedro Jr. although there is a
typographical error in that the name of Pedro Jr. was inadvertently typed only as Pedro Constantino. It is clear from the reading
of the document that a typographical error was committed because the four (4) children of PedroJr. by Felipa dela Cruz were

specifically identified. Further, during the presentation of evidence of the plaintiffs-appellants, it was rebutted that Pedro Sr. had
six (6) legitimate children namely: Pedro Jr., Antonia, Clara, Santiago, Bruno and Eduardo19 and Pedro Jr. had four (4).20
Thus, the CA went on to state that the respondents, heirs of Pedro Jr., did not adjudicate the 192 sq m lot unto themselves to the
exclusion of all the other heirs of Pedro Sr. Rather, the adjudication in the document entitled "Extrajudicial Settlement with
Waiver dated 5 December 1968 pertains to a different property and is valid absent any evidence to the contrary. Hence, it is
erroneous for the trial court to declare the parties in pari delicto.
The Issue
The petitioners now question the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the failure of the CA to appreciate the existence
of misrepresentation in both documents, thereby ignoring the propriety of the application of the in pari delicto doctrine. Likewise
assailed is the erroneous disregard by the CA of stipulations and admissions during the pre-trial conference on which the
application of the doctrine of in pari delicto was based.
Our Ruling
Latin for "in equal fault," in pari delicto connotes that two or more people are at fault or are guilty of a crime. Neither courts of law
nor equity will interpose to grant relief to the parties, when an illegal agreement has been made, and both parties stand in pari
delicto.21 Under the pari delicto doctrine, the parties to a controversy are equally culpable or guilty, they shall have no action
against each other, and it shall leave the parties where it finds them. This doctrine finds expression in the maxims "ex dolo malo
nonoritur actio" and "in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis."22
When circumstances are presented for the application of such doctrine, courts will take a hands off stance in interpreting the
contract for or against any of the parties. This is illustrated in the case of Packaging Products Corporation v. NLRC,23 where this
Court pronounced that:
This Court cannot give positive relief to either petitioner or respondent because we are asked to interpret and enforce an illegal
and immoral arrangement. (See Articles 1409, 1411, and 1412 of the Civil Code). Kickback arrangements in the purchase of raw
materials, equipment, supplies and other needs of offices, manufacturers, and industrialists are so widespread and pervasive
that nobody seems to know how to eliminate them. x x x.
Both the petitioners and the private respondent are in pari delicto. Neither one may expect positive relief from courts of justice in
the interpretation of their contract. The courts will leave them as they were at the time the case was filed.24
As a doctrine in civil law, the rule on pari delicto is principally governed by Articles 1411 and 1412 of the Civil Code, which state
that:
Article 1411. When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and the act constitutes a criminal
offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no action against each other, and both shall be prosecuted.
xxx xxx
Article 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the following
rules shall be observed:
xxx xxx
1. When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has given by virtue of the contract, or
demand the performance of the others undertaking;
xxx xxx.
The petition at bench does not speak of an illegal cause of contract constituting a criminal offense under Article 1411. Neither
can it be said that Article 1412 finds application although such provision which is part of Title II, Book IV of the Civil Code speaks
of contracts in general, as well as contracts which are null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 1409 of the Civil Code such as
the subject contracts, which as claimed, are violative of the mandatory provision of the law on legitimes.
We do not dispute that herein parties, through the Deeds they separately executed deprived each other of rightful shares in the
two lots subject of the separate contracts that is, if the two (2) parcels of land subject matter thereof, form part of the estate of
the late Pedro Sr.

It is asserted by the petitioners that their execution in 1992 of the contract denominated as "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman"
which excluded other heirs of Pedro Sr., was with an underlying agreement with the other heirs including Maria Constantino,
daughter of Pedro Jr. and grandmother of respondents.25 The agreement was for the other heirs to recognize the 192 square
meters lot subject matter of the "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" executed in 1968 as the share of the heirs of Pedro Sr. in
the estate of Pedro Sr., Petitioners respected such agreement, as in fact, Maria Laquindanum and that of her heirs, herein
respondents, were not disturbed in their possession or ownership over the said parcel of land; thus, the heirs of Pedro Jr. were
said to have acquiesced26 to the "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman" and the underlying agreement and therefore they have no
recourse or reason to question it taking cue from the doctrine of in paridelicto. This was the basis of the trial courts findings that
respondents are now estopped from claiming otherwise.27
We find that the trial court erroneously applied the doctrine.
This is not to say, however, that the CA was correct in upholding the validity of the contract denominated as "Pagmamana sa
Labas ng Hukuman." The CA decision being, likewise, based on pari delicto, is also incorrect.
Finding the inapplicability of the in pari delicto doctrine, We find occasion to stress that Article 1412 of the Civil Code that
breathes life to the doctrine speaks of the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract with an illegal cause or object which
does not constitute a criminal offense. It applies to contracts which are void for illegality of subject matter and not to contracts
rendered void for being simulated,28 or those in which the parties do not really intend to be bound thereby. Specifically, in pari
delicto situations involve the parties in one contract who are both at fault, such that neither can recover nor have any action
against each other.
In this case, there are two Deeds of extrajudicial assignments unto the signatories of the portions of the estate of an ancestor
common to them and another set of signatories likewise assigning unto themselves portions of the same estate. The separate
Deeds came into being out of an identical intention of the signatories in both to exclude their co-heirs of their rightful share in the
entire estate of Pedro Sr. It was, in reality, an assignment of specific portions of the estate of Pedro Sr., without resorting to a
lawful partition of estate as both sets of heirs intended to exclude the other heirs.
Clearly, the principle of in pari delicto cannot be applied. The inapplicability is dictated not only by the fact that two deeds, not
one contract, are involved, but because of the moreIMPORTANT reason that such an application would result in the validation
of both deeds instead of their nullification as necessitated by their illegality. It must be emphasized that the underlying
agreement resulting in the execution of the deeds is nothing but a void agreement. Article 1409 of the Civil Code provides that:
ART. 1409. The following contracts are in existent and void from the beginning:
(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law; morals, good customs, public order or public policy;
xxx

xxx

xxx

Corollarily, given the character and nature of the deeds as being void and in existent, it has, as a consequence, of no force and
effect from the beginning, as if it had never been entered into and which cannot be validated either by time or ratification.29
That said, we cannot give credence to the contention of respondents that no fault can be attributed to them or that they are free
from the effects of violation of any laws arising from the supposed unlawful agreement entered into between Maria
Laquindanum, their predecessor-in-interest, and the other heirs, including petitioners herein, based on the fact that they are not
signatories to said agreement, thus, the lack of any binding effect to them. Respondents argued and set forth as an issue during
the trial that they were not signatories to any of the contract or privies to such an arrangement. It is not disputed, however, that
respondents are successors-in-interest of Maria Laquindanum, one of the signatories in the Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver
who was also allegedly in agreement with the petitioners.
On this note, We agree with the trial court that respondents are "privies" to Maria Laquindanum. By the term "privies" is meant
those between whom an action is deemed binding although they are not literally parties to the said action.30 This Court, in Correa
v. Pascual,31 had occasion to explain that "privity in estate denotes the privity between assignor and assignee, donor and donee,
grantor and grantee, joint tenant for life and remainderman or reversioner and their respective assignees, vendor by deed of
warranty and a remote vendee or assignee. A privy in estate is one, it has been said, who derives his title to the property in
question by purchase; one who takes by conveyance." In fine, respondents, as successors-in-interest, derive their right from and
are in the same position as their predecessor in whose shoes they now stand. As such successors, respondents situation is
analogous to that of a transferee pendente lite illustrated in Santiago Land Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,32reiterating Fetalino v. Sanz33 where this Court held:

As such, he stands exactly in the shoes of his predecessor in interest, the original defendant, and is bound by the proceedings
had in the case before the property was transferred to him. He is a proper, but not an indispensable, party as he would, in any
event, have been bound by the judgment against his predecessor.34
Thus, any condition attached to the property or any agreement precipitating the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
with Waiver which was binding upon Maria Laquindanum is applicable to respondents who merely succeeded Maria.
This notwithstanding, it must however be shown that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver, referred to a property
owned by Pedro Sr. There is such basis from the facts of this case.
The records show that apart from respondent Asuncion Laquindanumss statement that the parcel of land subject matter of the
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver is not part of the estate of Pedro Sr., their common ancestor, no other evidence
was offered to support it. The CA in giving credence to the respondents claim, merely relied on the alleged typographical error in
the Deed. The basis for the CAs conclusion was the inclusion of the wife of Pedro Jr. and that of their children, which the CA
considered as proof that the property was owned by Pedro Jr. and not part of the estate of Pedro Sr. As pointed out by the
petitioners, the mention of the names of the children of Pedro Jr. in the Extrajudicial Settlement is not proof that the subject of
the deed is the property of Pedro Jr. Meant to exclude all the other heirs of Pedro Sr., only the children of Pedro Jr. appeared in
the Extrajudicial Settlement as heirs.
Weak as the reasoning is, the CA actually contradicted the admissions made no less by the respondents during the pre-trial
conference where they stipulated that the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534 consisting of 192 sq. m belongs to Pedro
Sr.35
A portion of the admission and stipulations made by both parties during the pre-trial is hereunder quoted, thus:
Respondents admissions:
"1. That the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534 previously owned by Pedro Constantino, Sr. was transferred to Maria
Constantino under Tax Declaration No. 9535; (highlighting ours)
1. The existence of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver per Doc. No.319, Page No. 44, Book No. 11, Series of 1968 by Notary
Public Romerico Flores, Jr."
Clearly, the above stipulation is an admission against respondents interest of the fact of ownership by Pedro Sr. of the 192 sq m
lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534, which was transferred to respondents mother, the daughter of Pedro Jr. Such that, in
one of the issues submitted to be resolved by the trial court, this was included: "Whether or not the "Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement with Waiver" is enforceable against the plaintiffs, thus curing the legal infirmities, if any, of the "Pagmamana sa Labas
ng Hukuman"36 an issue earlier mentioned.
Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions. Pre-trial admission in civil cases is one of the
instances of judicial admissions explicitly provided for under Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that the
contents of the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent course of the action, thereby, defining and limiting the issues to be
tried. In Bayas, et. al. v. Sandiganbayan, et. al.,37 this Court emphasized that:
Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the parties and their counsels, they become binding on the parties
who made them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or facts stipulated.38 Even if placed at a disadvantageous position,
a party may not be allowed to rescind them unilaterally, it must assume the consequences of the disadvantage.39 (Highlighting
ours)
Moreover, in Alfelor v. Halasan,40 this Court declared that:
A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge the fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof; production of
evidence is dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy. Consequently, an
admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to such
party, and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or
not. The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot
subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with what was pleaded.41 (Citations omitted)
We are aware that the last paragraph of Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court serves as a caveat for the rule of
conclusiveness of judicial admissions for, in the interest of justice, issues that may arise in the course of the proceedings but
which may not have been taken up in the pre-trial can still be taken up.

Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section 7. Record of pre-trial. The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be recorded. Upon the termination thereof, the court shall
issue an order which shall recite in detail the matters taken up in the conference, the action taken thereon, the amendments
allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements or admissions made by the parties as to any of the matters considered. Should
the action proceed to trial, the order shall, explicitly define and limit the issues to be tried. The contents of the order shall control
the subsequent course of the action, unless modified before trial to prevent injustice.
1awp++i1

In addition, Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, provides that:

An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The
admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made.
As contemplated in the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court, the general rule regarding conclusiveness of judicial
admission upon the party making it and the dispensation of proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the
admission was made through palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such admission was in fact made. The latter
exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he made such an admission.42
However, respondents failed to refute the earlier admission/stipulation before and during the trial. While denying ownership by
Pedro Sr. of the 192 sq m lot, respondent Asuncion Laquindanum, when placed on the stand, offered a vague explanation as to
how such parcel of land was acquired by Pedro Jr. A portion of her testimony43is hereto reproduced as follows:
"ATTY. DOMINGO:
Q: Do you know if as part of the estate of the late Pedro Constantino, Sr. is another parcel of land also situated at Sta. Maria,
Hagonoy, Bulacan with an area of 192 square meters?
A: It is not owned by Pedro Constantino, Sr., sir. It is our property owned by Pedro Constantino, Jr. that was inherited by my
mother Maria Constantino.
Q: And do you know how Pedro Constantino, Jr. acquired that parcel of land, the one that you mentioned a while ago?
A: Kinagisnan ko na po yong lupang yon pagkabata pa na yon e amin." (Highlighting ours)
The above assertion of denial is simply a self-serving declarationunsupported by evidence. This renders conclusive the
stipulations made during the pre-trial conference. Consequently, respondents are bound by the infirmities of the contract on
which they based their right over the property subject matter thereof. Considering that the infirmities in the two deeds relate to
exclusion of heirs, a circumvention of an heirs right to his or her legitime, it is apt to reiterate our ruling in Neri v. Heirs of Hadji
Yusop Uy,44 disposing that:
Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favour of spouses Uy, all the
heirs of Annunciation should have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then
minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them and
consequently, a total nullity. (Highlighting ours)
Further highlighting the effect of excluding the heirs in the settlement of estate, the case of Segura v. Segura,45elucidated thus:
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were
concerned. The rule covers only partition. The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs
who were entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule "no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon
any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the
excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years
from its execution x x x.
In light of the foregoing, while both parties acted in violation of the law on legitimes, the pari delicto rule, expressed in the
maxims "Ex dolo malo non oritur action" and "in pari delicto potior est condition defendentis," which refuses remedy to either
party to an illegal agreement and leaves them where they are, does not apply in this case. (Underline supplied)46 As held in De
Leon v. CA:47

In the ultimate analysis, therefore, both acted in violation of laws. However, the pari delicto rule expressed in the maxims "Ex
dolo malo non oritur action" and "In pari delicto potior est condition defendentis," which refuses remedy to either party to an
illegal agreement and leaves them where they are does not apply in this case.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Since the Letter-Agreement was repudiated before the purpose has been accomplished and to adhere to the pari delicto rule in
this case is to put a premium to the circumvention or the laws, positive relief should be granted to Macaria. Justice would be
served by allowing her to be placed in the position in which she was before the transaction was entered into.
Accordingly, in order not to put a premium to the circumvention or the laws as contemplated by the parties in the instant case,
we must declare both contracts as void. Indeed, any circumvention of the law cannot be48countenanced.
WHEREFORE, the 31 May 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81329 is hereby REVERSED. The
Pagmamana sa Lahas ng Hukuman and Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver are hereby declared void without prejudice to the
partition of the estate of Pedro Constantino Sr. with the full participation of all the latter's heirs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 152160

January 13, 2004

VIRGILIO BON, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:
Testimony of what one heard a party say is not necessarily hearsay. It is admissible in evidence, not to show that the statement
was true, but that it was in fact made. If credible, it may form part of the circumstantial evidence necessary to convict the
accused.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify the August 22, 2001 Decision2 and the
February 15, 2002 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA - GR CR No. 15673. The dispositive part of the assailed
Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 23, 1993 convicting [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon is hereby AFFIRMED with
modification on the penalty in that [petitioner] is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging
from ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum to fourteen (14) years [and] eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. Accused-appellant Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED."4
The assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The Antecedents
The antecedents are summarized by the CA as follows:
"[Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. were charged for violating Section 68 of PD 705, as amended[,]
together with Rosalio Bon under an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:
That sometime in the month of January or February, 1990, at Barangay Basud, Municipality of Sorsogon,
Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, cut, gather and manufacture into lumber four (4) narra trees, one (1) cuyao-yao tree, and one (1)
amugis tree, with an approximate volume of 4,315 bd. ft. and valued at approximately P25,000.00, without the
knowledge and consent of the owner Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza and without having first obtained from proper
authorities the necessary permit or license and/or legal supporting documents, to the damage and prejudice of
the Government and the owner in the aforementioned amount of P25,000.00.
Contrary to law.
"Upon arraignment on May 16, 1991, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon[,] Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. and Rosalio Bon entered a plea of
Not Guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, the trial of the case proceeded. The prosecution presented Nestor
Labayan[e], [Private Complainant] Teresita Dangalan-Mendoza, [Barangay] Tanod Julian Lascano, Alexander Mendones
[and] Manuel Dangalan as its witnesses. The defense, on the other hand, presented accused Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr.,
Rosalio Bon and Virgilio Bon.
"The evidence for the prosecution [w]as synthesized by the trial court, as follows:
Prosecutions evidence was supplied by Julian Lascano, Oscar Narvaez, Alexander Mendones, Manuel
Dangalan, Nestor Labayan[e] and Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] which shows that Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza]

owns a titled agricultural land under Title No. 6666 located in Basud, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, administered by
Virgilio Bon. Receiving information that trees inside the land were being stolen, cut [and] sawed into lumber by
her administrator and/or workers, she sent her brother Manuel Dangalan to investigate the report. On February 7,
1990, Manuel Dangalan sought the help of Barangay Captain Nestor Labayane, who in turn wrote a letter to one
of the [b]arangay [t]anod[s], Julian Lascano, to assist and investigate Teresita [Dangalan-Mendozas] complaint
of Illegal Cutting of Trees. On February 12, 1990, together with Julian Lascano, Manuel Dangalan, Ricardo
Valladolid, Natividad Legaspi and Virgilio Bon repaired to the land of Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza]. During their
investigation, the group discovered six (6) stumps of trees[:] four (4) Narra trees, one cuyao-yao tree and one
am[u]gis tree. Pictures were taken of the stumps x x x. On the land, Virgilio Bon admitted ordering the cutting and
sawing of the trees into lumber. Oscar Narvaez testified that sometime in January, 1990, he sawed the trees into
six flitches upon instruction of Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr.; Alexander Mendones, CENRO Officer, upon complaint of
Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] for Illegal Cutting of Trees repaired to the land on July 17, 1990, and found four
stumps of trees. Scaling the four stumps, it was his estimate that the lumber produced was 11.97 cubic meters
o[r] 4,315 board feet, with a value of P25,376.00 x x x.
"In their defense, all the three accused took the witness stand and denied the accusation. Their testimonies were
summarized by the trial court, as follows:
All the accused testified in their defense. Rosalio Bon, the son of Virgilio Bon denied the charge[.] [He said] that
he was in Manila from December 1989 and returned to Sorsogon on March 21, 1990. He mentioned that the
purpose of filing this case was to eject his father as tenant of the land.
Virgilio Bon testified that he is the tenant of the land of Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] [and was] instituted [as
such] by Teresitas father. He developed the land[,] planting coconuts, abaca and fruit trees. Teresita [DangalanMendoza] wanted to eject him as tenant. He and the private complainant [have] an agrarian case. Since Teresita
[Dangalan-Mendoza] refused to receive the landowners share of produce, he deposited the money in the Rural
Bank of Sorsogon in the name of Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] x x x. He denied cutting and gathering the trees
in the land and pointed to Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] as the one who ordered the trees [to be cut] and sawed
by Oscar Narvaez. Teresita [Dangalan-Mendoza] upon being confronted about the cutting of trees, ignored his
complaint.
Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr., son-in-law of Virgilio Bon, denied that he hired Oscar Narvaez to saw the lumber. Oscar
Narvaez [indicted] him of the crime because the former had a grudge against him. In a drinking spree, he
happened to box Oscar Narvaez[,] after [which he] heard [the latter threaten him with] revenge.
"On August 23, 1993, the trial court rendered its decision convicting [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr.
for the crime charged. Co-accused Rosalio Bon was acquitted. Aggrieved by the said decision, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon
and Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. interposed [an] appeal [to the CA]."5
In their appeal to the CA, petitioner and Jeniebre questioned the prosecution witnesses credibility and the sufficiency of the
evidence proving their guilt.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA sustained the trial courts assessment of the credibility of Prosecution Witnesses Julian Lascano and Manuel Dangalan.
Both testified that petitioner had admitted to having ordered the cutting of trees on Teresita Dangalan-Mendozas land.
Furthermore, the appellate court held that despite the absence of direct evidence in this case, the circumstantial evidence was
sufficient to convict petitioner. It ruled that the requirements for the sufficiency of the latter type of evidence under Section 4 of
Rule 1336 of the Rules of Court were amply satisfied by the following established facts: 1) in the presence of Dangalan, Lascano
and Natividad Legaspi, petitioner admitted that he had ordered the cutting of the trees; 2) on February 12, 1990, he and his son
Rosalio went to Dangalan-Mendoza, demanding that she pay the value of the trees cut; and 3) on February 13, 1990, petitioner
asked her to forgive him for cutting the trees.
The CA held, however, that the same circumstances did not support the conviction of Jeniebre. Aside from the testimony of
Oscar Narvaez that Jeniebre hired him to cut the trees into flitches, no other evidence was presented to show the latters
participation in the offense charged. Moreover, the appellate court held that the res inter alios acta rule under Section 28 of Rule
1307 of the Rules of Court would be violated by binding Jeniebre to petitioners admission, which did not constitute any of the
exceptions8 to this provision. It thus acquitted him.
As to petitioner, the CA modified the penalty imposed, pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code as amended,
Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, and Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

Hence, this Petition.9

Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"I
Whether hearsay testimony[,] which is denied by the alleged author under oath in open court, is admissible in evidence
against him.
"II
Whether hearsay testimony allegedly made to potential prosecution witnesses who are not police operatives or media
representatives is admissible in evidence against the author because what a man says against himself[,] if voluntary, is
believable for the reason that it is fair to presume that [it] correspond[s] with the truth and it is his fault if they do not (U.S.
v. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578, 583 (1912).
"III
Whether or not x x x the [testimonies of the] prosecution witnesses x x x that x x x petitioner Bon admitted his guilt to
them should be given high credence by the courts of justice considering that x x x many people who are being quoted in
media today x x x have been found to be x x x lying. In other words, how much probity should we give a lying witness?
"IV
Assuming arguendo that petitioner Bon ma[d]e the extra-judicial admission to the prosecution witnesses, [whether or not]
x x x the same [is constitutionally] admissible in evidence against him?"10
Simply put, the points challenged by petitioner are as follows: 1) the admissibility of his purported extrajudicial admission of the
allegation, testified to by the prosecution witnesses, that he had ordered the cutting of the trees; and 2) the credibility and the
sufficiency of the testimonies of those witnesses.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Admissibility of the Extrajudicial Admission
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the present Petition is grounded on Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 1
thereof, "only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth" may be raised. A reading of the pleadings reveals that petitioner
actually raised questions of fact -- the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and the sufficiency of the evidence against him.
Nonetheless, this Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion and after taking into account the attendant circumstances, opts to
take cognizance of and decide the factual issues raised in the Petition, in the interest of the proper administration of justice.11
In the main, petitioner contends that Lascanos and Dangalans separate testimonies12 regarding his alleged extrajudicial
admission constitute hearsay evidence and are, therefore, inadmissible. He also argues that his supposed admission should not
have been admitted, because it had been taken without the assistance of counsel at a time when he was already regarded as a
suspect.
We disagree.
Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states the rule on hearsay evidence as follows:
"Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. - A witness can testify only to those
facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise
provided in these rules."

Under the above rule, any evidence -- whether oral or documentary -- is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the
personal knowledge of the witness, but on that of some other person who is not on the witness stand.13 Hence, information that
is relayed to the former by the latter before it reaches the court is considered hearsay.14
In the instant case, Lascano and Dangalan testified that on February 12, 1990, they had heard petitioner admit to having ordered
the cutting of the trees. Their testimonies cannot be considered as hearsay for three reasons. First, they were indisputably
present and within hearing distance when he allegedly made the admission. Therefore, they testified to a matter of fact that had
been derived from their own perception.
Second, what was sought to be admitted as evidence was the fact that the utterance was actually made by petitioner, not
necessarily that the matters stated therein were true. On this basis, a statement attributed to a person who is not on the witness
stand is admissible; it is not covered by the hearsay rule.15 Gotesco Investment Corporation v. Chatto16 ruled that evidence
regarding the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, because the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue
or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of that fact.
Third, even assuming that the testimonies were hearsay, petitioner is barred from questioning the admission of Dangalans
testimony, because he failed to object to it at the time it was offered. It has been held that when parties fail to object to hearsay
evidence, they are deemed to have waived their right to do so; thus, it may be admitted.17 The absence of an objection is clearly
shown by the transcript of the stenographic notes, from which we quote:
"Atty. Fajardo:
Q Did you reach the land in question?
A Yes, sir.
Q And upon reaching the land in question, what did you do?
A We were able to see the cut trees.
Q And were you able to see who cut the trees?
A We were not able to see.
Q And how many trees were cut?
A There were newly cut trees and 4 others which have been cut for a long time.
Q What kind of trees were cut according to you?
A Narra, amogis and kuyawyaw.
Q Upon seeing these cut trees, what did you do?
A I asked Virgilio Bon why those trees were [cut] down and he said that he took the liberty of cutting those trees.
Q In your own understanding, [M]r. [W]itness, what did the accused mean when he said that he took [the] liberty of
cutting those trees?
A He caused the cutting of the trees.
Q And during the time you were conversing, were you alone?
A I was with the barangay tanod.
Q And who were the members of the barangay tanod who were with you at that time?
A Julian Lascano, Jr. and Natividad Legaspi."18

Moreover, a partys verbal admission that is established through the testimonies of the persons who heard it19 fall under Section
26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. According to this provision, "[t]he act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact may be given in evidence against him." This rule is based upon the notion that no man would make any declaration against
himself, unless it is true.20 The testimony of petitioner may, therefore, be received in evidence against him.
Regarding his alleged uncounselled admission, suffice it to stress that it was not given during a custodial investigation and,
certainly, not to police authorities. Custodial investigation has been defined as any questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of freedom of action in any significant way.21 We have
ruled previously that constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement that is not
elicited through questioning by the authorities, but is given in an ordinary manner.22
Verily, the inquiry on the illegal cutting of trees, which -- with the assistance of the barangay tanods23 -- was conducted by the
owners brother, Manuel Dangalan cannot be deemed a custodial investigation. Consequently, the guarantees of Section 12 (1)
of Article III24 of the 1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, cannot be successfully invoked by petitioner.25
Furthermore, allegations of impropriety committed during custodial investigation are relevant and material only to cases in which
an extrajudicial admission or confession is the basis of conviction.26 In the present case, the conviction of petitioner was not
deduced solely from his admission, but from the confluence of circumstantial evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
Second Issue:
Credibility and Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
The time-tested rule is that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve to be
respected because of its unique advantage of having observed their demeanor as they testified.27Equally established is the rule
that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when such findings affirm
those of the trial court,28 as in this case. This Court refrains from disturbing the CAs findings, if no glaring errors bordering on a
gross misapprehension of facts can be gleaned from them.29 We have no reason to depart from this rule. Hence, we affirm the
lower courts assessment of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
We now come to the sufficiency of the prosecutions evidence.
Section 68 of the Forestry Code, as amended,30 provides:
"SEC. 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. Any person who
shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the
legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or
corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers
are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission
on Immigration and Deportation.
"The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut,
gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in
the area where the timber or forest products are found."
Punishable under the above provision are the following acts: (1) cutting, gathering, collecting or removing timber or other forest
products from the places therein mentioned without any authority; and (b) possessing timber or other forest products without the
legal documents.31
Petitioner was charged with the first offense.32 It was thus necessary for the prosecution to prove the alleged illegal cutting,
gathering or manufacture of lumber from the trees.
It is undisputed that no direct evidence was presented. This kind of evidence, however, is not the only matrix from which the trial
court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt.33 Conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence, as long as the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain that leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.34
To sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary that the following elements concur:

1. There is more than one circumstance.

2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven.
3. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.35
Did the circumstances in this case satisfy the above requirements? We rule in the affirmative. In its assessment of the evidence,
the regional trial court (RTC) considered the following proven facts and circumstances:
"x x x Accused Virgilio Bon[,] being the tenant is in actual possession and control over the land, fruit trees and big trees.
Virgilio Bon has a better chance to cut and saw the lumber. He admitted before the [b]arangay [t]anod[,] Julian
Lascano[,] with other witnesses present[,] that he ordered the cutting of the trees[, and the] saw[ing thereof] by his sonin-law, accused Alejandro Jeniebre, Jr. His admission was corroborated by Oscar Narvaez, the one hired by Alejandro
Jeniebre, Jr., to saw the lumber. His extrajudicial confession is admissible evidence against him as it was voluntary and
not under custodial investigation."36
The appellate court, on the other hand, found that the following circumstances sufficiently proved petitioners culpability:
"x x x (1) [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon admitted in the presence of Manuel Dangalan, Julian Lascano and Natividad Legaspi
that he caused the cutting of the questioned trees; (2) [o]n February 12, 1990, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon and his son[,] x x x
Rosalio Bon[,] went to private complainant[,] demanding [that] the latter x x x pay the value of the questioned trees which
they had cut; (3) [o]n February 13, 1990, [Petitioner] Virgilio Bon went to private complainant to ask forgiveness for
cutting the trees."37
A review of the records also shows that the fact of the alleged cutting, gathering and manufacture of lumber from the trees was
proven by the prosecution through the following pieces of documentary evidence: photographs of tree stumps,38 the investigation
report of an officer of the Community Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO) that no permit was secured for the cutting of
the trees,39 and the CENROs computation of the value40of the timber generated from the felled trees. This fact, together with the
circumstantial evidence, indubitably points to no other conclusion than that petitioner was guilty as charged.
Correct Penalty
We now go to the penalty. We deem it necessary to discuss this matter because of the differing penalties imposed by the
appellate and the trial courts. The RTC imposed an indeterminate sentence of seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum; to eleven (11) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor as maximum. The
CA, however, increased the penalty to imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum; to fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Article 68 of the Revised Forestry Law, as amended by Executive Order No. 277,41 provides that any violation thereof "shall be
punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 30942 and 31043 of Revised Penal Code." This amendment -- which
eliminated the phrase "shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code" -- has already been interpreted by this Court. According to its interpretation, the quoted phrase means that the acts of
cutting, gathering, collecting, removing or possessing forest products without authority constitute distinct offenses that are now
independent of the crime of theft under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), but that the penalty to be
imposed is that which is provided under these articles.44
Both the trial court45 and the CA46 found that the value of the lumber was P12,000. Under Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC, the
statutory penalty should be two degrees higher than prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods;47 or prision
mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period. The Indeterminate Sentence Law,48 however, reduces
the sentence to an indeterminate penalty anywhere in the range of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum,
to 14 years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. Clearly, the sentences imposed by the trial court and the
CA are within the allowable range. In view, however, of the finding of the RTC that no mitigating or aggravating circumstance
attended the commission of the offense, the penalty it imposed was more in accord with the liberal spirit of the law towards the
accused. Hence, we adopt the trial courts indeterminate sentence of seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum; to eleven (11) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor as minimum; to eleven (11) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor as maximum. Costs against
appellant.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 200942

June 16, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
JORIE WAHIMAN y RAYOS, Accused-Appellant.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Appellant Jorie Wahiman y Rayos (appellant) was charged with the crime of murder for the death of Jose Buensuceso
(Buensuceso). During his arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty.1 Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution established that on April 2, 2003, at around 10 o'clock in the evening, Buensuceso, the manager of StanfilcoDole, Phils. in Malaybalay City, was on his way back to the company staff house on board his Isuzu pick-up after attending a
despedida for one of his employees.
While he was about to enter the gate of the staff house, he was gunned down by persons riding in tandem on a black
motorcycle. The guard on duty, David Azucena (Azucena), who was then opening the gate, identified one of the assailants as
herein appellant.
During trial, the prosecution submitted in evidence the extrajudicial confession of appellant taken during the preliminary
investigation of the case, admitting to the killing of Buensuceso. However, when it was appellants turn to testify, he narrated that
at the time of the killing, he was at Landing Casisang, Malaybalay City attending the birthday celebration of his brother-in-law.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
On February 16, 2009, the RTC rendered its Decision2 finding appellant guilty as charged, viz.:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is issued finding the accused Jorie Wahiman y Rayos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder and imposes upon him the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and directing him to pay the heirs of the victim the sum
of P75,000.00 as moral damages, P75,000.00 [as] civil indemnity and actual damages as follows:
P59,280,000.00 lost earning capacity of the deceased;
[P]25,000.00 actual damages; no receipt was presented for P220,000[;]
P1,500.00 Appearance fee; and
P50,000.00 Attorneys fee.
He shall serve his penalty in the National Penitentiary of Davao Penal [C]olony.
SO ORDERED.3
Ruling of the Court of Appeals (CA)
In his appeal, appellant argued that when his supposed extrajudicial confession was being taken, Atty. Michael Florentino
Dumlao (Atty. Dumlao), the lawyer who supposedly assisted him, was not around. He arrived only when appellant was about to
sign the extrajudicial confession.
Appellant also insisted that Azucena, the prosecutions alleged eyewitness, did not actually see him shooting the victim.

Appellants contentions were, however, disregarded by the CA.

In its Decision4 dated October 13, 2011, the CA found no reason to depart from the trial courts findings. It held that appellants
contention that he lacked legal intervention and assistance during the taking of his extrajudicial confession was totally belied by
the testimony of Atty. Dumlao that he rendered assistance to the appellant throughout the entire proceedings and carefully
explained to the latter the consequences of his admission. Besides, the voluntariness of the execution of the extrajudicial
confession was apparent considering that it is replete with details that only appellant would know. The appellate court brushed
aside appellants assertion of torture, the same being unsupported by medical certificate or marks of physical abuse. In any
case, he never bothered to narrate how he was tortured or to identify his alleged tormentors. Moreover, the ballistic examination
proved that the slugs used in killing Buensuceso were fired from the firearm earlier confiscated from appellant. The CA also
found no merit in appellants claim that Azucena did not actually see him shoot the victim. The CA opined that although Azucena
did not see appellant actually shoot the victim, he nonetheless saw appellant within seconds from hearing the gunshots fleeing
from the immediate vicinity of the crime scene aboard a motorcycle with a gun in hand. Based on the foregoing, the appellate
court found appellants denial and alibi undeserving of credence.
The dispositive portion of the CAs Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 16, [2009] decision rendered by Branch [8], Regional Trial Court, 9th Judicial
Region, Malaybalay City, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.5
Hence, this appeal.
Our Ruling
We totally agree with the RTC and the CA in finding that the guilt of appellant for the crime of murder was proved beyond
reasonable doubt. There is no doubt that on April 2, 2003, at around 10 oclock in the evening, appellant shot Buensuceso while
the latter was about to enter the gate of the staff house of Stanfilco-Dole in Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Moreover, we agree with
the findings of the RTC and the CA that appellants extrajudicial confession6 was voluntarily and duly executed and replete with
details that only appellant could supply, viz.:
x x x But before proceeding in questioning you, I am informing you that under our new constitution, you have the right to the
following:
A. You have the right to remain silent and not answer x x x my questions; it might be that I might use your answers as evidence
against you or favorable to you.
01. QUESTION: Do you understand your right?
ANSWER: Yes[,] Sir.
02. QUESTION: Are you going to use your right?
ANSWER: I would rather not[,] sir[,] because I would tell the truth as to what had happened.
B. You have the right to avail [of] the services of a counsel of your choice to help you in this investigation, and if you cant
afford to hire the services of a lawyer, the government will provide you with free legal services of a lawyer from the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
03. QUESTION: Do you understand your right?
ANSWER: Yes[,] sir.
04: QUESTION: Are you going to use your right?
ANSWER: I have my own lawyer, he is Atty. Michael Florentino Dumlao III, we already had a talk and he made me
understand x x x my rights, and he also made me understand about this investigation where I will voluntarily narrate what
I x x x [know].

05. QUESTION: Did anybody give you money or promised to give you a reward, or did anybody intimidate you in giving
this affidavit?
ANSWER: Nobody[,] sir.
06. QUESTION: Did you understand your rights that I told you?
ANSWER: Yes[,] sir.7
Appellant then proceeded to narrate that he was hired by Alex Laranjo (Laranjo) and Kid Canadilla (Canadilla), for and in behalf
of a certain Alonzo who owns a quarry in San Isidro, Valencia, to kill the victim for a fee. According to appellant, Alonzo wanted
the victim killed because the latter withheld the release of his collectibles from Stanfilco-Dole. Appellant then narrated how he
met with Laranjo, Canadilla and Alonzo; how he received payments and instructions; how he planned the killing; and how he
executed the plan. Appellant signed his extrajudicial confession, with the assistance of Atty. Dumlao, and subscribed the same
before Atty. Dennis B. Caayupan at the Office of the Clerk of Court.8
Moreover, Atty. Dumlao testified that he ably provided legal assistance to appellant all throughout the proceedings and carefully
explained to him the ramifications of his admission. He informed appellant of his rights and that anything he says may be used in
evidence against him. Notwithstanding, appellant insisted on giving his extrajudicial confession.9
In any event, it must be stressed that appellants conviction was not based solely on his extrajudicial confession. The
prosecution likewise presented the eyewitness account of Azucena who testified that immediately after hearing gunshots, he
saw appellant about 5 meters away from the Isuzu pick-up of the victim. Appellant was riding in tandem aboard a black
motorcycle and was holding a gun. The ballistic report also confirmed that the slugs found at the crime scene were fired from the
firearm earlier confiscated from the appellant. Moreover, appellant was not able to establish that it was physically impossible for
him to be present at the crime scene at the time of its commission.
The RTC and the CA thus properly found appellant guilty of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. However, it must be stated that appellant is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 or
the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.
Anent the damages awarded, we find that modification is in order.

1wphi1

Regarding the award for lost earnings, the general rule is that there must be documentary proof to support indemnity for loss of
earning capacity. Admittedly, there are exceptions to this rule, viz.:
By way of exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when
(1) the deceased is self-employed earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice may be
taken of the fact that in the deceaseds line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a
daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.10 Notably, this case does not fall under any of
the exceptions. The deceased victim could not be considered as a self-employed earning less than the minimum wage; neither
could he be considered employed as a daily wage worker. However, we are inclined to award lost earnings considering that the
deceased, as testified by his widow, was the manager of Stanfilco-Dole, Phils. in Malaybalay City and was receiving a monthly
salary of P95,000.00. He was 54 years of age when gunned down by appellant. This testimony was not objected to by appellant
or questioned during cross-examination or on appeal. Clearly, the existence of factual basis of the award has been satisfactorily
established. However, the amount of the award for lost earnings must be modified following the formula [2/3 x 80 age] x [gross
annual income - necessary expenses equivalent to 50% of the gross annual income]. Thus: [2/3 x (80-54)] [(P95,000 x 12)
50% (P95,000 x 12)] = P9,878,100.00.
In addition, the awards of actual damages in the amount of P25,000.00 must be deleted for lack of proof; in lieu thereof,
temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 is awarded. The awards of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00, and
moral damages in the amount of P75,000.00, are in line with prevailing jurisprudence. In addition, the heirs of the victim are
entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00. Finally, all damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6%
per annum from date of finality of this resolution until full payment. WHEREFORE, the assailed October 13, 2011 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 00830-MIN finding appellant Jorie Wahiman y Rayos guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that appellant is not eligible for parole; the award for lost earnings
is reduced to P9,878,100.00; the award of actual damages is deleted; in lieu thereof, appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim P25,000.00 as temperate damages; he is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim exemplary damages in the
amount of P30,000.00; and all damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this
resolution until full payment.
SO ORDERED.