JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

1. DE LEON VS. CA
2. FABIAN VS. DESIERTO
FACTS:
Petitioner Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and
President of PROMAT Construction Development Corporation
which was engaged in the construction business. Private
respondent Nestor Agustin was the District Engineer of the First
Metro Manila Engineering District. PROMAT participated in the
bidding for government construction projects, and private
respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official position,
inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair
lasted for some time, in the course of which, private respondent
gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it in
problems concerning the same in his office. When petitioner tried
to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and
resisted her attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of
harassment, intimidation and threats. Petitioner filed an
administrative complaint against private respondent.
Ombudsman found private respondent guilty of misconduct and
meted out the penalty of suspension without pay for 1 year. After
private respondent moved for reconsideration, the Ombudsman
discovered that the private respondents new counsel had been
his classmate and close associate, hence, he inhibited himself.
The case was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman who
exonerated private respondent from the administrative charges.
Petitioner appealed to the SC by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
ISSUE/S:
W/N Section 27 of RA 6770 which provides for appeals in
administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the
Ombudsman to the SC in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is valid.
HELD:
The revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from
quasi-judicial agencies to the SC via a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45. Under the present Rule 45, appeals may
be brought through a petition for review on certiorari but only from
judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Sec. 1
thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial
agencies are now required to be brought to the CA on a verified
petition for review, under the requirements and conditions in Rule
43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to provide for a
uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies.
Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the
SC from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the
proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI of the Constitution against a law
which increases the appellate jurisdiction of the SC.
3. RE: CLASSIFYING AND STRENGTHENING THE
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATIVE SETUP OF THE PHILJA
Adolfo requests permanent- co terminus chancellor

4. FORTICH VS. CORONA

FACTS:
On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President (OP) issued a
win-win Resolution which reopened case O.P. Case No. 96-C6424. The said Resolution substantially modified its March 29,
1996 Decision. The OP had long declared the said Decision final
& executory after the DARs Motion for Reconsideration was
denied for having been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary
period.
The SC then struck down as void the OPs act, it being in gross
disregard of the rules & basic legal precept that accord finality to
administrative determinations.
The respondents contended in their instant motion that the winwin Resolution of November 7, 1997 is not void since it seeks to
correct an erroneous ruling, hence, the March 29, 1996
decisioncould not as yet become final and executory as to be
beyond modification. They further explained that the DARs
failure to file their Motion for Reconsideration on time was
excusable.
ISSUE/S:
a. W/N the DARs late filing of the Motion for Reconsideration is
excusable.
b. W/N the respondents have shown a justifiable reason for the
relaxation of rules.
c. W/N the issue is a question of technicality.
HELD:
a. No. Sec.7 of Administrative Order No. 18, dated February 12,
1987, mandates that decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of
the President shallbecome final after the lapse of 15 days from
receipt of a copy therof xxx unless a Motion for Reconsideration
thereof is filed within such period.
The respondents explanation that the DARs office procedure
made it impossibleto file its Motion for Reconsideration on time
since the said decision had to be referred to its different
departments cannot be considered a valid justification. While
there is nothing wrong with such referral, the DAR must not
disregard the reglementary period fixed by law, rule or regulation.
The rules relating to reglementary period should not be made
subservient to the internal office procedure of an administrative
body.
b. No. The final & executory character of the OP Decision can no
longer be disturbed or substantially modified. Res judicata has set
in and the adjudicated affair should forever be put to rest.
Procedural rules should be treated with utmost respect and due
regard since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of
cases to remedy the worsening problem of delay in the resolution
of rival claims and in the administration of justice.
TheConstitution guarantees that all persons shall have a right to
the speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasijudicial and administrative bodies.
While a litigation is not a game of technicalities, every case must
be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to
ensure an orderly & speedy administration of justice. The
flexibility in the relaxation of rules was never intended to forge a

bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. A

liberal interpretation & application of the rules of procedure can
only be resorted to in proper cases and under justifiable causes
and circumstances.
c. No. It is a question of substance & merit.
A decision/resolution/order of an administrative body, court or
tribunal which is declared void on the ground that the same was
rendered Without or in Excess of Jurisdiction, or with Grave
Abuse of Discretion, is a mere technicality of law or
procedure. Jurisdiction is an essential and mandatory
requirement before a case or controversy can be acted on.
Moreover, an act is still invalid if done in excess of jurisdiction or
with
grave
abuse
of
discretion.
In the instant case, several fatal violations of law were committed.
These grave breaches of law, rules & settled jurisprudence are
clearly substantial, not of technical nature.
When the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared final and
executory, vested rights were acquired by the petitioners, and all
others who should be benefited by the said Decision.
In the words of the learned Justice Artemio V. Panganiban
in Videogram Regulatory Board vs CA, et al., just as a losing
party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed
period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the
finality of the resolution of his/her case.
5. GARCIA VS. PP
6. PRIMICIAS VS. OCAMPO
7. CANLAS VS. NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION
FACTS:
Petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land. Their dwellings
have been demolished or is about to be demolished pursuant to a
court judgment. They filed a petition for writ of amparo to summon
some unprincipled Land Officials as they allege to answer their
participation in the issuance of fraudulent titles to NAPICO.
ISSUE/S:
W/N writ of amparo is proper in this case.
HELD:
No. Writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose
right to life, liberty, and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The threatened demolition is not included among the enumeration
of rights protected by the writ. Their claim to their dwelling does
not constitute right to life, liberty, and security.
8. TAPUZ VS. DEL ROSARIO
FACTS:
The private respondents spouses Sanson filed with the Aklan
MCTC a complaint for forcible entry and damages with a prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
against the petitioners and other John Does numbering about
120.
The private respondents alleged in their complaint that: (1) they
are the registered owners of the disputed land; (2) they were the
disputed lands prior possessors when the petitioners armed

with bolos and carrying suspected firearms and together with

unidentified persons entered the disputed land by force and
intimidation, without the private respondents permission and
against the objections of the private respondents security men,
and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.
In their Answer, the petitioners denied the material allegations and
essentially claimed that: (1) they are the actual and prior
possessors of the disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private
respondents are the intruders; and (3) the private respondents
certificate of title to the disputed property is spurious. They asked
for the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a counterclaim
for damages.
The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered a decision in the
private respondents favor, finding prior possession through the
construction of perimeter fence in 1993.
The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to RTC.
On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents motion
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction upon
posting of a bond. The writ authorizing the immediate
implementation of the MCTC decision was actually issued by
respondent Judge del Rosario after the private respondents had
complied with the imposed condition. The petitioners moved to
reconsider the issuance of the writ; the private respondents, on
the other hand, filed a motion for demolition.
The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners MR
and to Defer Enforcement of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.
Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition. The
respondent Judge nevertheless issued via a Special Order a writ
of demolition to be implemented fifteen (15) days after the
Sheriffs written notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish
their house/s to allow the private respondents to effectively take
actual possession of the land.
The petitioners thereafter filed a Petition for Review of the
Permanent Mandatory Injunction and Order of Demolition in CA.
Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff issued the Notice to Vacate and
for Demolition. Hence, the present petition for certiorari with writs
of amparo and habeas data.
ISSUE/S:
W/N petition for certiorari with writ of amparo and habeas data is
proper.
HELD:
No. We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of
habeas data fatally defective, both in substance and in form. The
petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo, on the other hand,
is fatally defective with respect to content and substance.
Based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the
petition, that the petition for certiorari to nullify the assailed RTC
orders has been filed out of time. Based on the same material
antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have been guilty of
willful and deliberate misrepresentation before this Court and, at
the very least, of forum shopping. In sum, the petition for certiorari

should be dismissed for the cited formal deficiencies, for violation

of the non-forum shopping rule, for having been filed out of time,
and for substantive deficiencies.

judgment has already been rendered that by granting the TRO,

the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an
executive function.

To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally
conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number
of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack
of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary
concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the
rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and
independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing
Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is
not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous
and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and
the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands requires that
every petition for the issuance of the Writ must be supported by
justifying allegations of fact.

HELD:
No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the
source of power of the President to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after
conviction by final judgment. The provision, however, cannot be
interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the
enforcement of their decisions after their finality.

On the whole, what is clear from these statements both sworn

and unsworn is the overriding involvement of property issues as
the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of
the property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues
relating to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned
except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has been
alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to
the extent of the threats and harassments implied from the
presence of armed men bare to the waist and the alleged
pointing and firing of weapons. Notably, none of the supporting
affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights to life,
liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or is continuing.

10. FUENTES VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO

FACTS:
Pursuant to the governments plan to construct its first fly-over in
Davao City, the Republic of the Philippines filed an expropriation
case against the owners of the properties affected by the project.
The expropriation case was presided by Judge Renato A.
Fuentes. The government won the expropriation case. DPWH still
owed the defendants-lot owners. The lower court granted Tessie
Amadeos motion for the issuance of a writ of execution against
the DPWH to satisfy her unpaid claim. On May 3, 1994,
respondent Sheriff Paralisan issued a Notice of Levy, addressed
to the Regional Director of the DPWH, Davao City, describing the
properties subject of the levy as All scrap iron/junks found in the
premises of the Department of Public Works and Highways depot
at Panacan, Davao City. The auction sale pushed through
and Alex Bacquial emerged as the highest bidder. Meanwhile,
Alex Bacquial, together with respondent Sheriff Paralisan,
attempted to withdraw the auctioned properties on May 19,
1994. They were, however, prevented from doing so by the
custodian of the subject DPWH properties, a certain Engr. Ramon
Alejo, who claimed that his office was totally unaware of the
auction sale, and informed the sheriff that many of the properties
within the holding area of the depot were still serviceable and
were due for repair and rehabilitation.

These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas

Data requires as a minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally
deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of
unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the
right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not
alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for information under
the control of police authorities other than those it has already set
forth as integral annexes. The necessity or justification for the
issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts
made to secure information, has not also been shown. In sum, the
prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more
than the fishing expedition that this Court in the course of
drafting the Rule on habeas data had in mind in defining what
the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the
outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas
data is fully in order. Petition denied.
9. ECHAGARAY VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
FACTS:
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution
of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The
public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance of the
TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on
finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the
executive to grant reprieve.
ISSUE/S:
W/N the court abused its discretion in granting a TRO on the
execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of

The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to

save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the
simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the
Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final
conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate
powers of the three branches of our government.

On the basis of letters from Congressman Manuel M. Garcia of

the Second District of Davao City and Engineer Ramon A. Alejo,
the Court Administrator, Supreme Court directed Judge Renato A.
Fuentes and Sheriff Norberto Paralisan to comment on the report
recommending the filing of an administrative case against the
sheriff and other persons responsible for the anomalous
implementation of the writ of execution. The Department of Public
Works and Highways, through the Solicitor General, filed an
administrative complaint against Sheriff Norberto Paralisan for
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao recommended that
Judge Renato A. Fuentes be charged before the Sandiganbayan
with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3 (e) and likewise
be administratively charged before the Supreme Court with acts
unbecoming of a judge.

Director Valenzuela filed with the Office of the Deputy

Ombudsman for Mindanao a criminal complaint charging Judge
Rentao A. Fuentes with violation of Republic Act No. 3019,
Section 3 (e).
Fuentes filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a
motion to dismiss complaint and/or manifestation to forward all
records to the Supreme Court.
Petitioner alleged that the respondent Ombudsman-Mindanao
committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when he initiated a criminal complaint
against petitioner for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Section 3
[e]. And he conducted an investigation of said complaint against
petitioner. Thus, he encroached on the power of the Supreme
Court of administrative supervision over all courts and its
personnel.
The Solicitor General submitted that the Ombudsman may
conduct an investigation because the Supreme Court is not in
possession of any record which would verify the propriety of the
issuance of the questioned order and writ. Moreover, the Court
Administrator has not filed any administrative case against
petitioner judge that would pose similar issues on the present
inquiry of the Ombudsman-Mindanao.
ISSUE/S:
W/N the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a
judge in the exercise of his official functions alleged to be in
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the
absence of an administrative charge for the same acts before the
Supreme Court.
HELD:
No. Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman
Act of 1989, provides: Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or
on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in
the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any
stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the
investigation of such cases.
Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or
administrative complaint before his office against petitioner judge,
pursuant to his power to investigate public officers. The
Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for
appropriate action.
Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the
Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and
court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of
Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.
Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the
judges and court personnel and take the proper administrative
action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the
land. No other branch of government may intrude into this power,

without running afoul of the independence of the judiciary and the

doctrine of separation of powers.
Petitioners questioned order directing the attachment of
government property and issuing a writ of execution were done in
relation to his office, well within his official functions. The order
may be erroneous or void for lack or excess of
jurisdiction. However, whether or not such order of execution was
valid under the given circumstances, must be inquired into in the
course of the judicial action only by the Supreme Court that is
tasked to supervise the courts. No other entity or official of the
Government, not the prosecution or investigation service of any
other branch, not any functionary thereof, has competence to
review a judicial order or decision--whether final and executory or
not--and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a
criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust
judgment or order.
11. PRUDENTIAL BANK VS. CASTRO
12. MENDOZA VS. CFI
13. FR. MARTINEZ VS. CA
14. TICHANGCO VS. ENRIQUEZ
15. PP VS. JUDGE GACOTT
16. MACEDA VS. VASQUEZ
FACTS:
Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the
Office of the Ombudsman against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio
Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda
has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and
criminal cases which have been submitted for decision for a
period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or
before January 31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner
Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and
10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision.
Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda falsified his
certificates of service for 17 months.
ISSUE/S:
W/N the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an
encroachment into the SCs constitutional duty of supervision over
all inferior courts.
HELD:
A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively
liable to the SC for serious misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule
140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under
the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by
the Court with regard to his certificates of service, the
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches
into the Courts power of administrative supervision over all courts
and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers.
Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel,
from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal
trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can
oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all
laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if

they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government

may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine
of separation of powers.
Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court
employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman
must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC
for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted
within the scope of their administrative duties.

17. DAYOT VS. JUDGE GARCIA

18. DE GUZMAN VS. JUDGE SISON
19. RE: DEROGATORY NEWS ITEM CHARGING CA
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DEMETRIO DEMETRIA WITH
INTERFERENCE ON BEHALF OF A SUSPECTED DRUG
QUEEN
20. DIZON VS. JUDGE LOPEZ