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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT


FOR THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF ILLINOIS
ADAMS COUNTY, QUINCY, ILLINOIS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
Plain
v.
CURTIS T. LOVELACE
Defendant.

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)
)
)
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Case No. 20l4-CF-488

STATES MOTION INLIMINE#1 TO ADMIT STATEMENT


NOW COME the People of the State of Illinois, by and through their attorneys, Edwin
Parkinson, Illinois States Attorney Special Prosecutor, and Julia Kaye Wykoff, as Special
Prosecutor, and respectfully posits to this Honorable Court as follows:
1. The State seeks to admit defendants statement to Erika Gomez, whereby an intoxicated
defendant recalled that he remember[ed] how it felt, her writhing under him[.]
2. Gomez would testi& that she and defendant attended a party with friends.
3. Defendant was very intoxicated, and he became upset.
4. Defendant was almost in tears, and stated that he remember[ed] how it felt, her writhing
under him[.]
5. Under the Illinois Rules of Evidence, All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by law. Illinois Rules of Evidence 402
6. However, Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence. Illinois Rules of Evidence 403.

7. Evidence is admissible if it is relevant to an issue in dispute and its probative value is


not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. People v. Aguilar, 265 Ill. App. 3d
105, 113, 637 N.E.2d 1221, 1226 (3dDist. 1994).
8. Evidence is relevant when it has any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of
consequence to the determination of an action more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence. People v. Aguilar, 265 Ill. App. 3d 105, 113, 637 N.E.2d 1221,
1226 (3dDist. 1994).
9. This statement is relevant to this cause, as the jury could draw a reasonable conclusion
that defendant spoke of the death of the victim, Cory Lovelace, during this incident.
10. After all, the main issue at dispute is whether defendant suffocated his wife on
Valentines Day of 2006.
11. A statement about her writhing under him makes the existence of a fact that is of
consequence to the determination of this action more or less probable than it would be
without this statement. See People v. Aguilar, 265 Ill. App. 3d 105, 113, 637 N.E.2d
1221, 1226 (3d Dist. 1994).
12. The State does not, however, contend that this statement constitutes evidence of other
crimes and bad acts. Rather, the State contends that this evidence is relevant as it relates
to the events charged in the instant cause. See People v. Pikes, 2013 IL 115171,

20,

998 N.E.2d 1247, 1254 (wherein the Illinois Supreme Court distinguishes rules of
relevancy against admission of other-crimes evidence).
13. Rather, this statement is simply relevant, substantive evidence to demonstrate he caused
the victims death.

14. Moreover, the statement constitutes an admission, as it is defendants own statement


made against defendants interests.
WHEREFORE, the People of the State of Illinois respectfully pray that this Honorable
Court grant the States motion and any and all other relief as this Honorable Court deems just
and equitable.
Respectfully submitted,
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

By:

(~VJLOiiJJJAfr1E((~

Julia aye Wykoff


Special Prosecutor
725 5. Second Street
Springfield, IL 62702

By:__
Edwin Parkinson
Special Prosecutor
725 S. Second Street
Springfield, IL 62702

et~7

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT


FOR THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF ILLINOIS
ADAMS COUNTY, QUINCY, ILLINOIS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
Plaint
v.
CURTIS T. LOVELACE
Defendant.

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)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 2014-CF-488

STATES MOTION IN LIMINE TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES AND


BAD ACTS #2
NOW COME the People of the State of Illinois, by and through their attorneys, Edwin
Parkinson, Illinois States Attorney Special Prosecutor, and Julia Kaye Wykoff, as Special
Prosecutor, and respectfully posits to this Honorable Court as follows:
I. In the instant cause, the State seeks to admit evidence that defendant was romantically
involved with, or at least romantically interested in, Erika Gomez prior to the death of his
wife, Cory Lovelace.
2. In an interview with police, Gomez indicated that she was in defendants Business Law
class, which began in January of 2006, the month before Corys death.
3. Once Gomez began defendants Business Law class, she started to see him everywhere.
4. Gomez indicated that she often worked out at the fitness center, but she intentionally
exercised at times when the gym was slow.
5. She began to see Lovelace at the fitness center, despite the fact that she had never seen
him there before.
6. All of a sudden defendant was at the fitness center every time Gomez was there.

7. Gomez also saw defendant frequently at the local grocery store, as well as at local bars.
8. Gomez maintains that the relationship was not romantic until August of 2006.
9. Dustin Strothoff will testify that he worked at the Quincy Regional Airport in the summer
of 1998, at which time Gomez was likewise employed with the airport.
10. Strothoff was defendants neighbor.
11. Strothoff observed defendant and Gomez at the fitness center together.
12. Strothoff observed the two work out, and he often saw them speaking together[.]
13. Strothoff lived in the same neighborhood as defendant, and he observed Gomezs vehicle
parked in front of defendants residence. He will testify that Gomez drove an older Saturn
or GEO Storm in a dark green or blue color.
14. Gomez would testify that she drove a green Neon and a dark blue Saturn during this time.
15. Strothoff knew what kind of vehicle Gomez drove, as he previously observed her arriving
or leaving the fitness center, where they exercised at the same time.
16. Strothoff observed Gomezs vehicle in front of defendants residence from the summer
before Corys death until after her death and they moved to their new house.
17. Strothoff would testify that the vehicle was parked in front of defendants home more
frequently after Corys death.
18. Following the first trial of this cause, in an e-mail to Detective Gibson, Gomez stated, I
did knew [sic] Curt when his wife was alive. I heard I was ruled out because I didnt
know Curt until after his wife died [sic] that is not correct. He was every where [sic] I
was both when she was alive and after her death[.] (See Peoples Exhibit 1)
19. The above-mentioned evidence is relevant in the instant cause.

20. Evidence is admissible if it is relevant to an issue in dispute and its probative value is
not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. People v. Aguilar, 265 Ill. App. 3d
105, 113, 637 N.E.2d 1221,1226 (3d Dist. 1994).
21. Evidence is relevant when it has any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of
consequence to the determination of an action more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence. People v. Aguilar, 265 Ill. App. 3d 105, 113, 637 N.E.2d 1221,
1226 (3d Dist. 1994).
22. The guilt or innocence of the accused is the issue in a criminal trial. People v. Ag-ullar,
265 Ill. App. 3d 105, 113, 637 N.E.2d 1221, 1226 (3d Dist. 1994).
23. This evidence is relevant, quite simply, to demonstrate the relationship of the parties.
24. Moreover, the evidence is relevant to demonstrate that defendant was romantically
interested in Erika Gomez.
25. It is well established that evidence of other offenses is not admissible for the purpose of
showing the defendants disposition or propensity to commit crime. People v. IlIgen, 145
Ill. 2d 353, 364, 583 N.E.2d 515, 519 (1991).
26. This rule is codified in the Illinois Rules of Evidence 404(a): Evidence of a persons
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion[.]
27. However, Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts

...

[may be] admissible for other

purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,


identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Illinois Rules of Evidence 404(b).

28. Such evidence is admissible, however, where relevant to prove inodus operandi, intent,
identity, motive or absence of mistake. People v. lllgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 36465, 583
N.E.2d 515, 519 (1991).
29. In fact, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that evidence of other offenses is admissible
if it is relevant for any purpose other than to show the propensity to commit crime.
People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 365, 583 N.E.2d 515, 519 (1991).
30. When evidence of other crimes is offered, the trial judge must weigh its probative value
against its prejudicial effect, and may exclude the evidence if its prejudicial effect
substantially outweighs its probative value. People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 365, 583
N.E.2d 515, 519 (1991)(internal citations omitted).
31. The above-mentioned evidence is admissible to demonstrate motive.
32. Motive, although not an element of murder, may be a material factor at issue in
establishing guilt, particularly when the only evidence is circumstantial. People v.
Hendricks, 137 Ill. 2d 31, 53, 560 N.E.2d 611, 621 (1990).
33. Thus, the State may offer evidence tending to establish a defendants motivation even
though it involves the potential of disclosing a defendants prior immoral or improper
conduct. People v. Hendricks, 137 Ill. 2d 31, 53, 560 N.E.2d 611, 621 (1990).
34. Evidence that defendant was romantically interested in Gomez is admissible bad-acts
evidence (defendants prior immoral or improper conduct) as it clearly demonstrates a
motive to want his wife, Cory Lovelace, dead. See People v. Hendricks, 137 Ill. 2d 31,
53, 560 N.E.2d 611, 621 (1990).
35. Such evidence is admissible to prove: motive, state of mind, intent, and knowledge.

WHEREFORE, the People of the State of Illinois respectfUlly pray that this Honorable
Court grant the States motion and any and all other relief as this Honorable Court deems just
and equitable.
Respectfully submitted,
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

B~:(~4AA~(a

Vth4Auo/L

Julia~aye Wykoff
Special Prosecutor
725 S. Second Street
Springfield, IL 62702

By:

&i2u4JtO1~

Edwin Parkinson
Special Prosecutor
725 5. Second Street
Springfield, IL 62702

C. ~Y

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT


FOR THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF ILLINOIS
ADAMS COUNTY, QUINCY, ILLINOIS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
Plaint(ff
v.
CURTIS T. LOVELACE
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 2014-CF-488

STATES MOTION INLIMINE TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES AND


BAD ACTS #3
NOW COME the People of the State of Illinois, by and through their attorneys, Edwin
Parkinson, Illinois States Attorney Special Prosecutor, and Julia Kaye Wykoff, as Special
Prosecutor, and respectfully posits to this Honorable Court as follows:
1. In the instant cause, the State seeks to admit evidence that defendant poisoned Erika
Gomez.
2. Gomez will testify that following a marital breakdown in December of 2012, defendant
moved out of the marital home.
3. Defendant rekindled a relationship with his current wife, at which point the marriage
between he and Erika Gomez crumbled.
4. In approximately December of 2012, following defendants moving-out, Gomez became
very ill.
5. She lost approximately 20 pounds, primarily from incessant vomiting.
6. Gomez also suffered from extreme fatigue, and she noticed white lines in her fingernails

and significant hair loss.

7. Gomezs daughter, Darlene Steinkamp, who also lived in the home, suffered from the
same symptoms.
8. At first, Gomez believed she and her daughter suffered from the flu.
9. Due to the above referenced symptoms, unbeknownst to defendant, Darlene stayed home
from school.
10. Darlene observed defendant in the kitchen. Darlene reported this incident to her mother,
Erika Gomez.
11. Following this incident, Gomez threw away all of the food in the home and changed the
locks to the home.
12. After taking these steps, both Gomez and Darlene recovered from their sickness.
13. Evidence of defendants poisoning of Gomez and her daughter was evidenced through a
public filing in Gomezs divorce case. (See Peoples Exhibit 1)
14. Moreover, evidence of poisoning is evidenced through e-mail correspondence between
Gomez and Detective Gibson. (See Peoples Exhibit 2)
15. The above-mentioned evidence is relevant in the instant cause and is admissible by
statute under 725 ILCS 5/115-7.45/115-7.4.
16. Under 725 ILCS 5/115-7.45/115-7.4(a), evidence in domestic violence cases, In a
criminal prosecution in which the defendant is accused of an offense of domestic
violence as defined in paragraphs (1) and (3) of Section 103 of the Illinois Domestic
Violence Act of 1986, or first degree murder or second degree murder when the
commission of the offense involves domestic violence, evidence of the defendants
commission of another offense or offenses of domestic violence is admissible, and may
be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant. (emphasis added).

17. Under 725 ILCS 5/11 5-7.45/115-7.4(b), In weighing the probative value of the evidence
against undue prejudice to the defendant, the court may consider: (1) the proximity in
time to the charged or predicate offense; (2) the degree of factual similarity to the
charged or predicate offense; or (3) other relevant facts and circumstances.
18. Evidence is admissible if it is relevant to an issue in dispute and its probative value is
not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. People v. Aguilar, 265 Ill. App. 3d

105, 113, 637 N.E.2d 1221, 1226 (3dDist. 1994).


19. Evidence is relevant when it has any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of
consequence to the determination of an action more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence. People v. Aguilar, 265 111. App. 3d 105, 113, 637 N.E.2d 1221,
1226 (3d Dist. 1994).
20. The guilt or innocence of the accused is the issue in a criminal trial. People v. Aguilar,
265 Ill. App. 3d 105, 113, 637 N.E.2d 1221, 1226 (3d Dist. 1994).
21. In the instant cause, defendant himself stated that the victim, Gory Lovelace, suffered
from flu-like symptoms in the days preceding her death.
22. Gory also suffered from extreme fatigue and vomiting prior to her death.
23. Symptoms of poisoning can closely mirror flu-like symptoms.
24. Moreover, defendants own expert, Dr. Shaku Teas, noted that she could not rule out
ethylene glycol as a factor in the death of Gory Lovelace.
25. Alternatively, the above-mentioned evidence is admissible as traditional other-crimes and
bad acts evidence.

26. It is well established that evidence of other offenses is not admissible for the purpose of
showing the defendants disposition or propensity to commit crime. People v. Illgen, 145
Ill. 2d 353, 364, 583 N.E.2d 515, 519 (1991).
27. This rule is codified in the Illinois Rules of Evidence 404(a): Evidence of a persons
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion[.j
28. However, Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts

...

[may be] admissible for other

purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,


identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Illinois Rules of Evidence 404(b); See also
People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 36465, 583 N.E.2d 515, 519 (1991).
29. In fact, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that evidence of other offenses is admissible
if it is relevant for any purpose other than to show the propensity to commit crime.
People v. lIlgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 365, 583 N.E.2d 515, 519 (1991).
30. When evidence of other crimes is offered, the trial judge must weigh its probative value
against its prejudicial effect, and may exclude the evidence if its prejudicial effect
substantially outweighs its probative value. People v. IlIgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 365, 583
N.E.2d 515, 519 (1991)(internal citations omitted).
31. The term other-crimes evidence encompasses misconduct or criminal acts that
occurred either before or after the allegedly criminal conduct for which the defendant is
standing trial. People v. Spyres, 359 Ill. App. 3d 1108, 1112, 835 N.E.2d 974, 977 (4th
Dist. 2005).
32. Despite the fact that this incident occurred in the years following Corys death, the
evidence is extremely probative, given the very similar symptoms displayed by both Cory

Lovelace and Erika Gomez, at a time when defendant was arguably interested in a new
woman.
33. In the instant cause, defendants conduct is admissible as other-crimes evidence to prove:
modus operandi, common plan, intent, preparation, opportunity, motive, knowledge, and
absence of mistake or accident.
34. Afler all, the act of poisoning someone carries with it a reasonable inference that the
conduct was premeditated, planned, and carried out.
35. Moreover, it demonstrates that defendant was able to form the requisite criminal intent
for first-degree murder. ([E]vidence of the defendants involvement in another offense
may be shown to establish the necessary criminal intent of the defendant in the offense
charged. People v. McKibbins, 96111. 2d 176, 186, 449 N.E.2d 821, 825 (1983).)
36. Thus, for these reasons, the evidence is relevant and is admissible other-crimes evidence
to prove: modus operandi, common plan, intent, preparation, opportunity, motive,
knowledge, and absence of mistake or accident.

WHEREFORE, the People of the State of Illinois respectfully pray that this Honorable
Court grant the States motion and any and all other relief as this Honorable Court deems just
and equitable.
Respectfully submitted,
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

By:

______________

Julia ye Wykoff
Special Prosecutor
725 5. Second Street
Springfield, IL 62702

By:

___________

Edwin Parkinson
Special Prosecutor
725 S. Second Street
Springfield, IL 62702

IN. THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT


ADAMS COUNTY, ILLINOIS
JASON 2. STEINKAMP,

)
)
)

Petitioner,
vs.

No. 99-D-366

ERIKA R. GOMEZ-STEINKAMP,

)
)

n/k/a ERIKA R. GOMEZ,


Respondent.

MOTION it TRANSFER POST-JUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS TO SANGMAON


COUNTY, OR FOR PROCEEDINGS REQUIRING RESPONDENTS
PRESENCE TO BE HELD IN MENARD OR ANY OTHER COUNTY OF THE
EIGHTH CIRCUIT OTHER THAN ADAMS

NOW COMES THE RESPONDENT, ERIKA R GOMEZ, by her attorney,


Samuel J. Cahnman, and for her Motion To Transfer Post-Judgment
ProceedingsTo Sangamon County, Or For Proceedings Requiring Respondents
Presence To be Held In Menard Or Any Other County Of The Eighth Circuit
Other Than Adams, states as follows:
Count I

Transfer To Sangamon

1. The only pending pleading is Petitioners Petition For Change Of Custody,

Modification Of Child Support And Other Relief, filed June 10, 2014
2.

Respondent believes said petition is moot and has filed a motion to that

effect.
Section 511 of the Illinois Marriage And Dissolution Of Marriage Act
prOvide~ that:
3.

If neither party continues to reside in the county wherein such


judgment was entered or last modified, the court on the motion
of either party or on its own motion may transfer a post-judgment
proceeding...to anothercounty or judicial circuit, as appropriate,
where either party resides. (750 ILCS 5/511)
4. Adams is the county wherein the instant judgment was entered and last
modified.
5. Neither party continues to reside in Adams County, as the Petitioner
resides in Sangamon County, and the Respondent in Arizona.
6. The Respondent was the second wife of Curtis Lovelace (hereinafter:
Lovelace), who is charged in 2014-CF-488 with the murder of his first wife.
7. Respondents divorce from Lovelace, finalized just prior to his being
charged with murder, was very bitter and acrimonious..
Respondent moved to Arizona, irteraia, to get away from Lovelace.
9. When this case was set for hearing on July 7,2016, Lovelade was

8.

incarcerated.

10.

Lovelace was just recently released from incarceration, when

bond was posted for him.


11.

Although the terms of Lovelaces bond include home confinement,

said conditions allow him to leave his house on Sundays to attend church.
12.

Further, there is never a guarantee that that a defendant will comply

with his bond conditions; whereas there is almost a 100 per cent guarantee that
an incarcerated defendant will not get out of jail.

13.

Due to Lovelaces release into the Quincy community, Respondent

is very fearful of her safety in Adams County and is adamant about not setting
foot in the county for the following reasons:
a. during their marriage Lovelace physically abused the
Respondent and attempted to poison her;
b. it has been reported in the newspaper that, while Resondent
did not testify at Lovelaces first trial, she may be a
witness for the prosecution at his second trial.
(Quincy Herald Whig, posted 6/6/10, updated 6/7/10);
c. according to said article, Lovelaces defense team is
subpoenaing phone records of contact between the
investigative detective and the Respondent;
d; although false, rumors are circulating in Quincy that
the case against Lovelace started because the Respondent
was dating said detective and fed him information
implicating Lovelace;
a Lovelade is a beloved figure in Quincy and his release
emboldened his many supporters, who have held
rallys for him;
f. Lovelaces father has threatened to hurt Respondent;
g~ Respondent also fears that Lovelaces, family or supporters,
emboldened by his release, could hurt her if she
returns to Quincy.
14.

Respondents fears are not unfounded, as the Springfield State

Journal-Register reported on June 292016 that a murder trial witness was shot
3

the night before the trial was to begin. (See Exhibit A attached hereto.)
WHEREFORE, the Respondent prays that this case be transferred for all
post-judgment probeedings to Sangamon County.
Count II
Hold Evidentiary Hearings In Menard Or Other Eighth Circuit County Not Adams
NOW COMES THE RESPONDENT, ER[KA R. Gomez, by her attorney,
Samuel J. Cahnman, and for Count II of her motion states:
1-2. Respondent realleges paragraphs 1-2 of Count I, as paragraphs 1-2 of
this Count II.
3-li. Respondent realleges paragrphs 6-14 of Count I, as paragraphs 3-11 of
this Count II.
13. In the event this Court denies Respondents request to transfer this case
to Sangamon County, this Court should exercise its discretion to hold any
proceedings requiring the Respondents presence in Menard County or another
county of the Eighth Judicial Circuit other than Adams.
WHREFORE, the Respondent prays for this Court to hold any hearings
requiring the Respondents presence in Menard County or another
County of the Eighth Judicial Circuit other than Adams.

C. -V
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF ILLINOIS
ADAMS COUNTY, QUINCY, ILLINOIS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILlINOIS,
Plaintiff
v.
CURTIS T. LOVELACE
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 2014-CF-488

STATES MOTION INLIMINE TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES AND


BAD ACTS #4
NOW COME the People of the State of Illinois, by and through their attorneys, Edwin
Parkinson, Illinois States Attorney Special Prosecutor, and Julia Kaye Wykoff, as Special
Prosecutor, and respectfully posits to this Honorable Court as follows:
1. In the instant cause, the State seeks to admit evidence of instances of domestic violence
between defendant and Erika Gomez, specifically instances of defendant grasping
Gomez s throat.
2. In approximately May of 2012, defendant got into a physical altercation with Gomez and
went for her throat.
3. Defendant engaged in heavy drinking all day, starting at approximately nine in the
morning.
4. The couple argued about defendants drinking, when defendant became violent and went
for her neck.
5. Instances of domestic violence between defendant and Erika Gomez are corroborated by
a 911 call made by Gomez. (See Peoples Exhibit 1)

6. Moreover, evidence of domestic violence is evidenced through e-mail correspondence


and attached photos between Gomez and Detective Gibson. (See Peoples Group Exhibit
2)
7. The above-mentioned evidence is relevant in the instant cause and is admissible by
statute under 725 ILCS 5/115-7.45/115-7.4.
8. Under 725 ILCS 5/115-7.45/115-7.4(a), evidence in domestic violence cases, In a
criminal prosecution in which the defendant is accused of an offense of domestic
violence as defined in paragraphs (1) and (3) of Section 103 of the Illinois Domestic
Violence Act of 1986, or first degree murder or second degree murder when the
commission of the offense involves domestic violence, evidence of the defendants
commission of another offense or offenses of domestic violence is admissible, and may
be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant. (emphasis added)
9. Under 725 ILCS 5/115-7.45/115-7.4(b), In weighing the probative value of the evidence
against undue prejudice to the defendant, the court may consider: (1) the proximity in
time to the charged or predicate offense; (2) the degree of factual similarity to the
charged or predicate offense; or (3) other relevant facts and circumstances.
10. Evidence is admissible if it is relevant to an issue in dispute and its probative value is
not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. People v. Aguilar, 265 Ill. App. 3d
105, 113, 637 N.E.2d 1221, 1226 (3dDist. 1994).
11. Evidence is relevant when it has any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of
consequence to the determination of an action more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence. People v. Aguilar, 265 Ill. App. 3d 105, 113, 637 N.E.2d 1221,
1226 (3d Dist. 1994).

12. The guilt or innocence of the accused is the issue in a criminal trial. People v. Aguilar,
265 Ill. App. 3d 105, 113, 637 N.E.2d 1221, 1226 (3d Dist. 1994).
13. In the instant cause, this evidence is relevant, for the States evidence demonstrates that
defendant smothered his wife, Cory Lovelace.
14. Moreover, the States evidence demonstrates clustered fingernail marks on the lefl/front
of the victim, Cory Lovelaces, neck.
15. Evidence that defendant abused Gomez, specifically grasping her neck, make this critical
fact of consequence in this action more probable than it would be without the evidence.
16. This evidence is particularly probative in a case

such as this

where defendant

maintains that he is innocent.


17. Alternatively, the State maintains that this evidence is admissible as other-crimes
evidence.
18. It is well established that evidence of other offenses is not admissible for the purpose of
showing the defendants disposition or propensity to commit crime. People v. Illgen, 145
Ill. 2d 353, 364, 583 N.E.2d 515, 519 (1991).
19. This rule is codified in the Illinois Rules of Evidence 404(a): Evidence of a persons
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion[.]
20. However, Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts

...

[may be] admissible for other

purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,


identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Illinois Rules of Evidence 404(b); See also
People v. lilgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 36465, 583 N.E.2d 515, 519 (1991).

21. In fact, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that evidence of other offenses is admissible
if it is relevant for any purpose other than to show the propensity to commit crime.
People v. Jllgen, 145 111. 2d 353, 365, 583 N.E.2d 515, 519 (1991).
22. When evidence of other crimes is offered, the trial judge must weigh its probative value
against its prejudicial effect, and may exclude the evidence if its prejudicial effect
substantially outweighs its probative value. People v. Jilgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 365, 583
N.E.2d 515, 519 (l99l)(internal citations omitted).
23. The term other-crimes evidence encompasses misconduct or criminal acts that
occurred either before or after the allegedly criminal conduct for which the defendant is
standing trial. People v. Spyres, 359 Ill. App. 3d 1108, 1112, 835 N.E.2d 974, 977 (4th
Dist. 2005)(emphasis added).
24. Despite the fact that this incident occurred in the years following Corys death, the
evidence is extremely probative.
25. The State contends that Cory Lovelace died as a result of smothering, with visible
clustered fingernail marks on her neck.
26. Gomez would testi~ that defendant became violent while drinlcing, and in so doing
would purposefully grasp her by the throat.
27. Given the similarities between the conduct, such evidence is admissible other-crimes
evidence to demonstrate modus operandi, common plan, preparation, knowledge, intent,
and absence of mistake or accident.
28. Moreover, it demonstrates that defendant was able to form the requisite criminal intent
for first-degree murder. ([E]videnee of the defendants involvement in another offense

may be shown to establish the necessary criminal intent of the defendant in the offense
charged. People v. McKibbins, 96 Ill. 2d 176, 186, 449 N.E.2d 821, 825 (1983).)
29. Thus, for these reasons, the evidence is relevant and is admissible other-crimes evidence
to prove: moclus operandi, common plan, preparation, knowledge, intent, and absence of
mistake or accident.
WHEREFORE, the People of the State of Illinois respectfully pray that this Honorable
Court grant the States motion and any and all other relief as this Honorable Court deems just
and equitable.
RespectfUlly submitted,
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

By: (~7uA]A 4?
Julia aye Wykoff
Special Prosecutor
725 5. Second Street
Springfield, IL 62702

&~

By:

Edwin Parkinson
Special Prosecutor
725 5. Second Street
Springfield, IL 62702

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT


FOR THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF ILLINOIS
ADAMS COUNTY, QUINCY, ILLINOIS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
Plaintiff
v.
CURTIS T. LOVELACE
Defendant.

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Case No. 2014-CF-488

STATES MOTION INLIMINE TO ADMIT EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES AND


BAD ACTS #5
NOW COME the People of the State of Illinois, by and through their attorneys, Edwin
Parkinson, Illinois States Attorney Special Prosecutor, and Julia Kaye Wykoff as Special
Prosecutor, and respectfully posits to this Honorable Court as follows:
1. In the instant cause, the State seeks to admit evidence of instances of domestic violence
between defendant and Erika Gomez, during which defendant would refer to Gomez as
Cory

the name of defendants first wife, the victim in the instant cause.

2. For example, defendant attacked Gomez in July of 2012, whereby he grabbed Gomez and
said, Cory, you cant do anything to me.
3. Gomez would testi& that defendant would drink heavily and fall into a fit of anger and
rage.
4. During these fits of rage, defendant would refer to Gomez as Cory.
5. On another occasion, she locked herself into a bedroom and placed a chair underneath a
doorknob to keep defendant away from her.
6. Defendant beat on the door and yelled, You shouldnt lock me out Cory.

7. Defendants children witnessed some of these incidents of domestic violence.


8. Instances of domestic violence between defendant and Erika Gomez are corroborated by
a 911 call made by Gomez. (See Peoples Exhibit 1)
9. Moreover, evidence of domestic violence is evidenced through e-mail correspondence
and corresponding attached photographs between Gomez and Detective Gibson. (See
Peoples Group Exhibit 2)
10. The above-mentioned evidence is relevant in the instant cause and is admissible by
statute under 725 ILCS 5/115-7.45/115-7.4.
11. Under 725 ILCS 5/115-7.45/115-7.4(a), evidence in domestic violence cases, In a
criminal prosecution in which the defendant is accused of an offense of domestic
violence as defined in paragraphs (1) and (3) of Section 103 of the Illinois Domestic
Violence Act of 1986, or first degree murder or second degree murder when the
commission of the offense involves domestic violence, evidence of the defendants
commission of another offense or offenses of domestic violence is admissible, and may
be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant. (emphasis added)
12. Under 725 ILCS 5/115-7.45/115-7.4(b), In weighing the probative value of the evidence
against undue prejudice to the defendant, the court may consider: (1) the proximity in
time to the charged or predicate offense; (2) the degree of factual similarity to the
charged or predicate offense; or (3) other relevant facts and circumstances.
13. Evidence is admissible if it is relevant to an issue in dispute and its probative value is
not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. People v. Ag-uilar, 265 Ill. App. 3d
105, 113, 637 N.E.2d 1221, 1226 (3dDist. 1994).

14. Evidence is relevant when it has any tendency to make the existence of a fact that is of
consequence to the determination of an action more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence. People v. Aguilar, 265 Ill. App. 3d 105, 113, 637 N.E.2d 1221,
1226 (3d Dist. 1994).
15. The guilt or innocence of the accused is the issue in a criminal trial. People v. Aguilar,
265 Ill. App. 3d 105, 113, 637 N.E.2d 1221, 1226 (3d Dist. 1994).
16. In the instant cause, this evidence is relevant, for the States evidence demonstrates that
defendant perpetrated an act of violence against his wife.
17. The State intends to present evidence that defendant and Cory would often fight, at times
physically, during bouts of drinking.
18. Moreover, the evidence is particularly probative, where defendant explicitly calls Gomez
Cory during instances of domestic violence.
19. This evidence is particularly probative in a case

such as this

where defendant

maintains that he is innocent.


20. Alternatively, the State maintains that this evidence is admissible as other-crimes
evidence.
21. It is well established that evidence of other offenses is not admissible for the purpose of
showing the defendants disposition or propensity to commit crime. People v. Illgen, 145
Ill. 2d 353, 364, 583 N.E.2d 515, 519 (1991).
22. Such a notion is codified in the Illinois Rules of Evidence 404(a): Evidence of a
persons character or a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving
action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion[.1

23. However, Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts

...

[may be] admissible for other

purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,


identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Illinois Rules of Evidence 404(b).
24. Such evidence is admissible, however, where relevant to prove modus operandi, intent,
identity, motive or absence of mistake. People v. Illgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 36465, 583
N.E.2d 515, 519 (1991).
25. In fact, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that evidence of other offenses is admissible
if it is relevant for any purpose other than to show the propensity to commit crime.
People v. lIlgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 365, 583 N.E.2d 515, 519 (1991).
26. When evidence of other crimes is offered, the trial judge must weigh its probative value
against its prejudicial effect, and may exclude the evidence if its prejudicial effect
substantially outweighs its probative value. People v. Jllgen, 145 Ill. 2d 353, 365, 583
N.E.2d 515, 519 (1991)(internal citations omitted).
27. The term other-crimes evidence encompasses misconduct or criminal acts that
occurred either before or after the allegedly criminal conduct for which the defendant is
standing trial. People v. Spyres, 359 Ill. App. 3d 1108, 1112, 835 N.E.2d 974, 977 (4th
Dist. 2005)(emphasis added).
28. Despite the fact that this incident occurred in the years following Corys death, the
evidence is extremely probative as it demonstrates defendants consciousness of guilt.
29. Such evidence is admissible as modus operandi, motive, opportunity, knowledge, intent,
common design, and absence of mistake or accident.
30. Moreover, it demonstrates that defendant was able to form the requisite criminal intent
for first-degree murder. ([E]vidence of the defendants involvement in another offense

may be shown to establish the necessary criminal intent of the defendant in the offense
charged. People v. McKibbins, 96111. 2d 176, 186, 449 N.E.2d 821, 825 (1983).)
31. Thus, for these reasons, the evidence is relevant and is admissible other-crimes evidence
to prove: modus operandi, motive, opportunity, knowledge, intent, common design,
absence of mistake or accident, consciousness of guilt, and the absence of an innocent
frame of mind.
WHEREFORE, the People of the State of Illinois respectfully pray that this Honorable
Court grant the States motion and any and all other relief as this Honorable Court deems just
and equitable.
Respectfully submitted,
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

By:

____________________

Julia aye Wykoff


Special Prosecutor
725 S. Second Street
Springfield, IL 62702

By:

i2A-n/)C~

Edwin Parkinson
Special Prosecutor
725 5. Second Street
Springfield, IL 62702