4th IMS Unision Moot Memo

.
TEAM CODE: TE-1-R
IN THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
APPEAL NO.____/2016
CLUBBED WITH
WRIT PETITION NOS.___/2016 & ___/2016
IN THE MATTER
OF
Tomar Rashid & Ors.
Petitioners
v.
Union of Indiana
Respondent
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL MOOT

COURT COMPETITION, 2016
IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016
CONTENTS
LIST OF
ABBREVIATIONS..3
INDEX OF
AUTHORITIES4-7
STATEMENT OF
JURISDICTION.8
STATEMENT OF
FACTS.9
STATEMENT OF
ISSUES...10
SUMMARY OF
ARGUMENTS11
ARGUMENTS
ADVANCED12
1. THE WRIT PETITION IS NOT
MAINTAINABLE...12
1.1.
That the Petitioner No.1s Fundamental Right to Peaceful Assembly was not Infringed by
the State..
1.2.
.12-14
That there exists an Alternate and Efficacious Remedy
1.3.
14-15
That the rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedy is not Violative of Art.
1.4.
3215
That in any case no Fundamental Rights were
Violated15
2. SECTION 124A OF THE INDIANA PENAL CODE, 1860 IS NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL..15
1

2.1.
That there is a presumption of constitutionality..
2.2.
..16-17
That Section 124A does not Violate Art. 19(1) (a) of the
2.3.
Constitution..17-20
That Section 124A does not Violate Art. 14 of the
2.4.
Constitution.21
That Section 124A does not Violate Art. 21 of the Constitution
21
3. THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED SHOULD BE UPHELD...
21-22
4. 24A OF THE PRESS COUNCILS ACT, 1978 IS NOT ULTRA-VIRES THE
CONSTITUTION..24
4.1.
That there is Presumption of Constitutionality of a law
4.2.
23-24
That 24A does not Violate Art. 14 of the Constitution
24-25
4.3.
That 24A does not Violate Art. 19(1) (a)
4.4.
25-27
That the Restriction Placed by 24A is Reasonable and falls under the Ambit of Art. 21 of
the
Constitution
.27
PRAYER
..28
BIBLIOGRAPHY..
.29
INDEX OF ABBREVIATION
Abbreviation
Definition
&
And
AC
Appeal Cases
AIR
All India Reporter

All.
Art.
Allahabad
Article
Cr.P.C.
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Govt.
Government
HL
IPC
House of Lords
Indiana Penal Code, 1860
Ker.
Mad.
Kerala
Madras
Para.
PCI
Paragraph
Press Councils Act, 1978
r/w
Read With
Section
SC
Supreme Court
SCALE
SCC
Supreme Court Almanac

Supreme Court Cases
SCJ
SCR
Supreme Court Journal

Supreme Court Report
UOI
Union of India
v.
Versus
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
S.No.
Case
Citation
1.
2.
3.
4.
A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras

AG v. HRH Prince Ernest Augustus
Amrit Banaspati Ltd v. Union of India
AP Coop All Seeds growers Federation Ltd. V. D.
(1950) SCR 88 (253-4)

(1957) 1 All ER 49
AIR 1995 SC 1340
(2007) 13 SCC 320
5.
Achyuta Rao
Arun Jaitley v. State Of U.P
APPLICATION U/S 482 No.
Arunachala Nadar, M.C.V.S. v. State of Madras

Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam
Asstt. Collector of Central Excise v. Jainson Hosiery
B.R. Enterprises v. State of Uttar Pradesh
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab
Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd. v. Union of India
Bombay v. F.N. Balsara
- 32703 of 2015
AIR 1950 SC 300
(2011) 3 SCC 377
AIR 1979 SC 1889
AIR 1999 SC 1867
AIR 1982 SC 1325
AIR 1973 SC 106
AIR 1951 SC 318
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

13.
Captain Subhash Kumar v. The Principal Officer,
1991 (2) SCC 449
14.
15.
16.
17.
Mercantile Marine Deptt.

Charanjit lal Chowdhary v Union of India
Chief Justice, Andhra Pradesh v. LVA Dikshitulu
CIT v. S. Teja Singh
Commissioner of Income Tax v. Hindustan Bulk
AIR 1951 SC 41
AIR 1979 SC 628
AIR 1959 SC 352
(2003) 3 SCC 57
18.
Carriers
Confederation of Ex-serviceman Association v. Union
(2006) 8 SCC 399
19.
20.
21.
of India
Daryao v. The State of Uttar Pradesh
Delhi Cloth and Gen. Mill Co. Ltd. V. Union of India
Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor
AIR 1961 SC 1457.

AIR 1983 SC 937
AIR 1991 SC 101
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
Congress
Dr. D.C. Saxena v.Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India
Express Newspapers v. Union of India
Girdharilal & Sons v. Balbirnath Mathur
Gopalan v. State of Madras
Harakchand v. Union of India
Hardik Bharatbhai Patel Thro. His Fater Bharatbhai
(1996) 5 SCC 216

AIR 1958 SC 578
AIR 1986 SC 1099
(1950) SCR 88
AIR 1970 SC 1453
Special Criminal Application
28.
Narsibhai Patel v. State Of Gujarat

In Re Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary &
No. 6330 of 2015

(2012) 5 SCC 1
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
Ors
Indra Das v. State of Assam (2011) 3 SCC 380
Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar
Krishna Kakkanth v. Govt. of Kerala
Laxmi v. State of U.P.
M. Pentiah v. Veeramallappa Muddala
M.J. Sivani v. State of Karnataka
Madhav Hayawadanrao Hoskot v. State of
(2011) 3 SCC 380

AIR 1962 SC 955
AIR 1997 SC 128
AIR 1971 SC 873
AIR 1961 SC 1107
AIR 1995 SC 1770
(1978) 3 SCC 544
36.
37.
Maharashtra
Mahant Moti Das v. S.P. Sahi
Management of Advance Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
AIR 1959 SC 942

AIR 1970 SC 1126
38.
39.
Gurudasmal
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India
Maranadu & Anr v. State by Inspector of Police, Tamil
AIR 1978 SC 597

(2008) Cr LJ 4562 (SC)
40.
41.
Nadu
Maunsell v. Olins
Municipal Corporation, City of Ahmedabad v. Jan
(1975) I All ER 16 (HL)

AIR 1986 SC 1205
42.
43.
44.
Mohd. Usmanbhai
Municipal Council, Madurai v. Narayanan
Mylapore Club v. State of Tamil Nadu
Naraindas v. State of M.P.
AIR 1975 SC 2193

(2005) 12 SCC 752
AIR 1974 SC 1232

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
Narendra Kumar v. Union of India

Nazir Khan And Others v. State Of Delhi
O.K. Ghosh v. E.X. Joseph
Om Kumar v. Union of India
Osmania University Teachers Assoctn. v. State of A.P.
P.P. Enterprises v. Union of India
Philips India Ltd. v. Labour Court
Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner
Prithi Pal Singh v. Union of India
R.K. Garg v Union of India
Ram Krishna Dalmia v. S.R. Tendolkar
Ramjilal v. Income Tax Officer
Ramkrishna Dalmia v. Tendolkar
RMD Chamarbaugwala v. Union of India
Santosh Singh v. Delhi Administration
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India
State of Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell & Co.
State of Madras v. V.G. Row
Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton) Ltd.
Sukhnandan v. Union of India
Sunil Fulchand Shah v. Union of India
Superintendent Central Prison v. Ram Manohar Lohia,
Thakorebhai v. State of Gujrat
Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam
Union of India v Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving
AIR 1960 SC 430

(2003)8 SCC 461
AIR 1963 SC 812
AIR 2000 SC 3689
(1987) 4 SCC 671
1982 C.C. (Cr.)341
(1985) 3 SCC 103
AIR 1963 SC 996.
AIR 1982 SC 1413
1985 1 SCC 641
AIR 1958 SC 638
AIR 1951 SC 97.
AIR 1957 SC 532
AIR 1957 SC 628
AIR 1973 SC 1091
(2015) 5 SCC 1
AIR 1996 SC 1628 at 1641
1952 AIR 196
(1978) 1 All ER 948 (HL)
AIR 1982 SC 902
AIR 2000 SC 1023
AIR 1960 SC 633
AIR 1975 SC 270
AIR 1990 SC 123
AIR 2001 SC 724
70.
Co. Ltd.
Vrajlal Manilal & Co. v. State of Madhya Pradesh
AIR 1970 SC 129
BOOKS REFERRED
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
V. DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (10th ed. 1959)

ARVIND P. DATAR, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (2nd ed. Reprint 2010)
DR. DURGA BASU, INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (20th ed. Reprint 2012)
DR. J.N.PANDEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (38th ed. 2002)
DR.DURGA BASU, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (8th ed. 2011)
7

6. H.M.SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (4th ed.)
7. A. SABITHA, PUBLIC HEALTH: ENFORCEMENT AND LAW (1st ed. 2008).
8. JUSTICE G.P.SINGH, PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (12th ed. Reprint 2011)
9. M.P.JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 2003)
10. DARREN J OBYRNE, HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION (1st ed. 2003).
11. DURGA DAS BASU, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3rd ed. 2008).
12. COLETTE DAIUTE, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT & POLITICAL VIOLENCE (1st ed. 2010).
14. R. SATYA NARAYANA, NATURAL JUSTICE: EXPOANDING HORIZONS (1st ed. 2008).
CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES, CONVENTIONS, ARTICLES ET AL.

1. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966.
2. International Convention on Civil and Political Rights, 1966.
3. United Nation Declaration of Human Rights, 1948.
4. Constitution of India, 1950.
5. Indian Penal Code, 1966.
6. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1925.
7. Press Council of India Act, 1978.
ARTICLE
1. Goran Simic, Universal Jurisdiction and its Interplay with Sovereign Immunity 1 INDIAN JOURNAL
OF LAW AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
121 (New Delhi 2016)
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Petitioners have approached the Honble Supreme Court of Indiana that has the jurisdiction to
hear this matter under Art. 131, Art. 139A and Art. 32 of the Constitution of Indiana. The Respondent
humbly submits to the same.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I
Indiana is a federal republic country situated in south-east Asia along the equator. The country
gained freedom in 1957 after a long drawn struggle against a European nation which established the
common law system. New Delporto is an education hub of the country as the city has some of the
best colleges & universities of the nation. One such university is Great Northern University (GNU)
which has earned special reputation in the field of research and academic contributions.
9
II
On June 8, 2016, a countrywide strike was called by the parent body of GNUSU and during the
strike; a national highway was allegedly blocked by the supporters of AISU in Utkal, another Union
Territory in Indiana. The protestors were lathi charged by the police and some of them were
seriously injured and were subsequently admitted to the hospital.
III
On 16th of June, 2016, a rally was organized in New Delporto by GNUSU to show solidarity to the
injured students of Utkal. Meanwhile, some posters were put up across the campus of GNU which
claimed that the rally was also in solidarity with the hanging of Chengiz Khan. As the rally began,
the protestors began to shout slogans against the so called dictatorship of the government and
pledged to fight against the government till the date
IV
As the monsoon session began, the government by virtue of its majority made an amendment to the
Press Councils Act, 1978. 14A was incorporated into the Act. One of them, Mr. Kamal Kapoor
filed a petition in the Supreme Court of Indiana and challenged the constitutionality of 14A of the
Press Councils Act, 1978. The Supreme Court of Indiana in the interest of justice clubbed the 3
matters given their inter connection and listed them for final hearing.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE WRIT PETITION IS MAINTAINABLE.
2. WHETHER OR NOT 124A OF THE INDIANA PENAL CODE, 1860 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE TO BE QUASHED.
4. WHETHER
OR NOT
24A
OF THE
PRESS COUNCILS ACT, 1978
CONSTITUTION.
10
IS
ULTRA-VIRES
THE
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. THE WRIT PETITION IS NOT MAINTAINABLE.

It is the humble submission of the Respondent that the instant Writ Petition is not maintainable
because Petitioner No.1s Fundamental Right to Peaceful Assembly has not been infringed by the as
11

the Petitioner was part of an unlawful assembly and the Police rightfully dispersed them using
necessary force and consequently Petitioner No.1 is not entitled to compensation.
2. 124A OF THE INDIANA PENAL CODE, 1860 IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
It is respectfully urged that 124A is not unconstitutional because it does not violate any
Fundamental Rights given in Part III of the Constitution.
3.
THE
CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED SHOULD BE UPHELD.
The Respondent vociferously argues that the conviction of the accused should be upheld, as the
speech made by Petitioner No.2 was seditious.
4. 24A OF THE PRESS COUNCILS ACT, 1978 IS INTRA-VIRES THE CONSTITUTION
It is respectfully submitted that 24A of the PCI Act, 1978 is intra-vires the Constitution as it falls
within and is constitutionally protected by Art.19(3) that lays out the reasonable restrictions that can
be put on free speech.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1 THE WRIT PETITION IS NOT MAINTAINABLE.

It is humbly submitted that Petitioner No.1s Fundamental Right to assemble peacefully and without
arms was not violated by the State and same is contended on the following grounds:
12

1.1. PETITIONERS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY WAS NOT INFRINGED BY THE
STATE.
141 (fourth) of the IPC defines Unlawful Assembly as:
An assembly of five or more persons is designated an Unlawful Assembly, if
the common object of the persons composing that assembly is by means of
criminal force, or show of criminal force, to any person, to take or obtain
possession of any property, or to deprive any person of the enjoyment of a
right of way, or of the use of water or other incorporeal right of which he is in
possession or enjoyment, or to enforce any right or supposed right.
The right to peacefully assemble and without arms is given in Art. 19(1) (b) of the Constitution and,
idem quod other rights, a bar has been placed on the same provided under Art. 19(3) which lists the
reasonable restrictions that can be constitutionally put on the same and it states:
Art. 19(3) Nothing in sub clause (b) of the said clause shall affect the
operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the State from
making any law imposing, in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of
India or public order, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right
conferred by the said sub clause
In the present factual matrix, the members of GNUSU and AISU blocked a National Highway, with
the present and immediate purpose of carrying a protest into effect. 1 This act of blocking a National
1 Maranadu & Anr v. State by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, (2008) Cr LJ 4562 (SC).
13

Highway potentially caused the citizens using and/or depending on the highway for business, transit
of goods, medical emergencies, or other purposes a considerable loss.
The respondents submit that the blocking of highway by the protester amounted in violation of law
as the National highway is for the regular movement of traffic making it of paramount importance.
The decision to choose national highway as the location of protest is in itself violation of law. The
right which flows from Art. 19 (1) (b) is not a right to hold a meeting at any place and time. It is a
right which can be regulated.2
It is not surprising that the Constitution makers conferred a fundamental right on all citizens
'to assemble peaceably and without arms'. While prior to the coming into force of the Constitution
the right to assemble could have been abridged or taken away by law, now that cannot be done
except by imposing reasonable restrictions within Art. 19(3). It is urged that the right to assemble
does not mean that that right can be exercised at any and every place.
The action of lathi charge by police is just as they followed due process. Any action taken by a
public authority which is entrusted with the statutory power has to be tested by the application of two
standards- first, the action must be within the scope of the authority conferred by law and, second, it
must be reasonable. If any action, within the scope of the authority conferred by law is found to be
unreasonable, it means that the procedure established under which that action is taken is itself
unreasonable.3
2 In Re Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary & Ors, (2012) 5 SCC 1.
3 In Re Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary & Ors, (2012) 5 SCC 1.
14

The concept of 'procedure established by law' changed its character after the judgment of this Court
in the case of Maneka Gandhi v. UOI 4 where this Court took the view as under:
The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically is an
essential element of equality or non arbitrariness, pervades Art. 14 like a
brooding omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by Art. 21 must answer
the test of reasonableness in order to be right and just and fair and not arbitrary
fanciful or oppressive otherwise it would be no procedure at all and the
requirement of Art. 21 would not be satisfied.
4 AIR 1978 SC 597.
15

This was also noted in the case of Madhav Hayawadanrao Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra5 where
this Court took the following view:
Procedure established by law are words of deep meaning for all lovers of liberty
and judicial sentinels.
It is furthermore submitted by the respondent that the right to protest of the petitioner does not have
to be at the cost of others. It is pertinent to mention that the protesters blocked the highway which is
of paramount national interest while stopping the movement of the traffic; thus taking away the
Fundamental Right to movement of the masses which has been enshrined under Art. 19(1)(d) of the
Constitution.
In Dr. D.C. Saxena v.Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India 6 , this Court held:
There is a correlative duty not to interfere with the liberty of others. Each is
entitled to dignity of person and of reputation. Nobody has a right to denigrate
others' right to person or reputation.
5 (1978) 3 SCC 544.
6 (1996) 5 SCC 216.
16
The Police, in compliance with the law, dispersed the unlawful assembly using standard practice as
given in various police manuals, upon the mob conducting itself in such a manner that showed a
determination not to disperse, and by continuing to block a National Highway.
1.2. THAT THEIR EXISTS AN ALTERNATE AND EFFICACIOUS REMEDY.
It was held this Honble apex court in Asstt. Collector of Central Excise v. Jainson Hosiery 7 where
there is alternative statutory remedy court should not intervene. In the instant matter, it is the humble
submission of the Respondent that the Petitioners remedy, if any, lays in tort and not under writ
jurisdiction of the Apex Court. Thus, the present writ petition in not maintainable and should be
dismissed at once.
1.3. THE RULE OF EXHAUSTION OF LOCAL REMEDIES IS NOT A VIOLATION OF ART. 32.
The Petitioner may contend that the rule of exhaustion of local remedies is unconstitutional and
volatile of the guarantee in Art. 32(1). However, it is submitted that the right under Art. 32(1) is not
so absolute that no rules of procedure apply to it. Art. 32(1) confers a right to move the SC by
"appropriate proceedings". Appropriate proceedings interpreted to mean procedure relating to
form, conditions of lodgment of petitions, and compliance with a reasonable directions8. Indeed,
7 AIR 1979 SC 1889.
8 Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, AIR 1963 SC 996.
17

procedural factors such as res judicata,9 delay in filing the petition and parallel proceedings in
another Court are considered before entertaining the appropriateness of a particular proceeding. It is
submitted that the rule of exhaustion of local remedies is another such procedural guideline and does
not violate the right under Art. 32.
1.4. IN ANY CASE, NO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED.
The jurisdiction under Art.32 can be invoked only when Fundamental Rights are violated. It has been
held that if a right, other than a fundamental right, is claimed to be violated then such questions can
be addressed only in the appropriate proceedings and not on an application under Art. 32. 10 In the
instant case, it is submitted no fundamental rights of the Petitioner have been violated; therefore, this
petition must fail.
9 Daryao v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1961 SC 1457.
10 Ramjilal v. Income Tax Officer, AIR 1951 SC 97.
18

2
124A
OF
THE INDIANA PENAL CODE, 1860
IS NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
It is the humble submission of the Respondents that S. 124A of the Indiana Penal Code, 1860 is
not unconstitutional. This is extremely necessary for the security of state and maintaining
peace and public tranquility.
2.1 THAT THERE IS A PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY

The power to legislate is a plenary power vested in the legislature and unless those who challenge
the legislation clearly establish that their fundamental rights under the Constitution are affected or
that the legislature lacked legislative competence, they do not succeed in their challenge to the
enactment brought forward in the wisdom of the legislature. Challenge on ground of wisdom of
legislation is not permissible as it is for the legislature to balance various interests.11
The Legislature composed as it is of the elected representatives of the people is presumed to know
and be aware of the needs of the people and what is good or bad for them and that a Court cannot sit
in judgment over the wisdom of the legislature. 12 The Legislature appreciates and understands the
11 Mylapore Club v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2005) 12 SCC 752.
12 State of Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell & Co., AIR 1996 SC 1628 at 1641.
19

needs of the people, that it knows what is good or bad for them, that the laws it enacts are directed to
problems which are made manifest by experience, that the elected representatives in a legislature
enact laws which they consider to be reasonable, for the purposes for which these laws are enacted
and that a legislature would not deliberately flout a constitutional safeguard or right.13
The courts are not to be concerned with the need or propriety of laws. The judicial function is not to
canvass the legislative judgement, or to hold the impugned statute to be ill-advised or unjustified or
not justified by the facts on which it is based. The function of the Courts is to see whether the law in
question transgresses any constitutional restriction imposed on the legislature.14
13 Ram Krishna Dalmia v. S.R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 638; Vrajlal Manilal & Co. v. State of Madhya
Pradesh, AIR 1970 SC 129; Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 1325.
14 Charanjit Lal Chowdhary v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41.
20

First, attempt should be made by the Courts to uphold the charged provision and not to invalidate it
merely because one of the possible interpretations leads to such a result, howsoever attractive it may
be.15
Therefore usually the presumption is in the favour of the Constitutionality of the statute and the onus
to prove that it is unconstitutional lies upon the person who is challenging it. 16 The allegations
regarding the violation of a constitutional provision should be specific, clear and unambiguous and it
is for the person who impeaches the law as violative of the constitutional guarantee to show that the
15 B.R. Enterprises v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1999 SC 1867.
16 Charanjit lal Chowdhary v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41; Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, AIR 1951 SC
318; Mahant Moti Das v. S.P. Sahi, AIR 1959 SC 942; Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor
Congress, AIR 1991 SC 101.
21

particular provision is infirm for the reasons stated by him. 17 Such grounds must be corroborated by
Constitutional provisions, such as, Art. 14, 19 or 21.
Moreover, it is a well settled principle of interpretation that a statute must be interpreted in the light
of the intention of the legislature the mens or sentential legis,18 as a whole in its context ex
visceribus actus19 and in way to make it effective ut res magis valeat quam pereat.20
When more than one interpretation may be given to a legal provision, it must uphold that
17 Amrit Banaspati Ltd v. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 1340 at 1343.
18 RMD Chamarbaugwala v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 628; Chief Justice, Andhra Pradesh v. LVA
Dikshitulu,
AIR 1979 SC 628; Prithi Pal Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 1413; Girdharilal & Sons v.
Balbirnath
Mathur, AIR 1986 SC 1099; Maunsell v. Olins, (1975) I All ER 16 (HL); Stock v. Frank Jones (Tipton)
Ltd.,
(1978) 1 All ER 948 (HL).
19
Philips India Ltd. v. Labour Court, (1985) 3 SCC 103; Osmania University Teachers Association v. State
of A.P.,
(1987) 4 SCC 671; Captain Subhash Kumar v. The Principal Officer, Mercantile Marine Deptt., 1991 (2)
SCC
449; Union of India v. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. (2001) 4 SCC 139 (Constitution
Bench); AG
v. HRH Prince Ernest Augustus, (1957) 1 All ER 49.
22

interpretation that makes a provision constitutional. Any interpretation that makes a provision ultra
vires the Constitution must be rejected. 21 Therefore, the court is to presume that the impugned law is
constitutional until it has compelling grounds to declare it unconstitutional.
In Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar,22 which is the locus classicus and binding authority on the issue of
sedition, 124A was interpreted in the narrower sense and was thus sustained against a challenge
under Art. 19(2). Sedition was defined as meaning words, deeds or writings having a tendency or
intention to disturb public tranquility, to create public disturbance or to promote disorder. The
20
CIT v. S. Teja Singh, AIR 1959 SC 352; M. Pentiah v. Veeramallappa Muddala, AIR 1961 SC 1107;
Tinsukhia
Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam, AIR 1990 SC 123; Management of Advance Insurance Co.
Ltd. v.
Gurudasmal, AIR 1970 SC 1126; Municipal Council, Madurai v. Narayanan, AIR 1975 SC 2193;
Commissioner
of Income Tax v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3 SCC 57.
21
RMD Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India, 1957 SCR 930.

22
23

Supreme Court rejected the broader view of 124A that incitement to public order was not an
essential element of the offence of sedition under this section. This broad view would have made
124A unconstitutional vis-a-vis Art. 19(1)(a) read with Art. 19(2).
2.2 THAT 124A
OF THE
INDIANA PENAL CODE, 1860
DOES NOT VIOLATE
ARTICLE 19(1)(a)
While it is necessary to maintain and preserve freedom of speech and expression in a democracy, so
also it is necessary to place some curbs on this freedom for the maintenance of social order. No right
is an absolute right in a welfare state, all individual rights are subservient to the rights of the public
at large. There cannot be any such thing as absolute or uncontrolled liberty wholly freed from
restraint for that would lead to anarchy and disorder. The possession and enjoyment of all rights are
subject to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed to be essential to the safety, health, peace,
general order and morals of the community. What the Constitution attempts in declaring the rights
off the people is to strike a balance between individual and social control. Art. 19 gives a list of
individual liberties and prescribes in the various clauses the restraints that may be placed upon them
by law so that they do not conflict with public welfare or general morality.23
Accordingly, under Art. 19(2), the state may make a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the
exercise of the right to freedom of speech and expression in the interests of the securities of the
AIR 1962 SC 955.
23
Gopalan v. State of Madras, (1950) SCR 88 (253-4); Santokh Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1973
SC.
24

State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency, morality, sovereignty and integrity
of India, or in relation to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to an offence.
The Constitution of India guarantees the right to freedom of Speech and expression, under Art. 19(1)
(a), but the same are subject to reasonable restriction imposed under Clause (2) of Art. 19.
The test of reasonableness of restriction has to be considered in each case in the light of the nature of
right infringed, the purpose of the restriction, the extent and nature of the mischief required to be
suppressed and the prevailing social order and conditions at the time. There can be no abstract
standard of reasonableness and our Constitution provides reasonably precise general guidance in that
matter.24
In determining the reasonableness of a law challenged as an unreasonable restriction upon a
Fundamental Right guaranteed by Art. 19, the court has to balance the need for individual liberty
with the need for social control and the magnitude of the evil which is the purpose of the restrictions
to curb or eliminate so that the freedom guaranteed to the individual subserves the larger public
interests.25 The expression reasonable restriction signifies that the limitation imposed on a person
24
Santosh Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1973 SC 1091.
25
Harakchand v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 1453.
25

in the enjoyment of the right should not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature beyond what is
required in the interest of the public.26
The question of what constitutes a reasonable restriction upon an Art. 19(1) fundamental right, for
the purposes of Art. 19(2) to 19(6), was answered by the Supreme Court as early as 1952, in State of
Madras v. V.G. Row27. The Court outlined a classic proportionality enquiry, holding that in
adjudicating reasonableness:
the nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restriction
imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the
imposition, the prevailing conditions at the time, should all enter into the judicial verdict...
While upholding the constitutinal validity of 124A of the IPC, a Constitution Bench of the
Supreme Court through its pronouncement in Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar28 observed that:
26
P.P. Enterprises v. Union of India; 1982 C.C. (Cr.)341.

27
1952 AIR 196.

28
26

..the security of the State, which depends upon the maintenance of law and order is the very basic
consideration upon which legislation, with a view to punishing offences against the State, is
undertaken. Such a legislation has, on the one hand, fully to protect and guarantee the freedom of
speech and expression, which is the sine quo non of a democratic form of Government that our
Constitution has established But the freedom has to be guarded again becoming a licence for
vilification and condemnation of the Government established by law, in words which incite violence
or have the tendency to create public disorder. A citizen has a right to say or write whatever he likes
about the Government, or its measures, by way of criticism or comment, so long as he does not incite
people to violence against the Government established by law or with the intention of creating
public disorder.
It is the fundamental right of every citizen to have his own political theories and ideas and to
propagate them and work for their establishment so long as he does not seek to do so by force and
violence or contravene any provision of law. What is not permissible in order to attain such object is
any act which have the effect of bringing or which attempt to bring into hatred or contempt or
excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards the Government established by law.29
supra note 22.

29
Hardik Bharatbhai Patel Thro. His Fater Bharatbhai Narsibhai Patel v. State Of Gujarat, Special Criminal
Application (Quashing) No. 6330 of 2015.
27

In another landmark judgemnet,30 the Apex Court made certain observations about the freedom under
Art. 19(1)(a). The Court observed that:
"There are three concepts which are fundamental in understanding the reach
of this most basic of human rights. The first is discussion, the second is
advocacy, and the third is incitement. Mere discussion or even advocacy of a
particular cause howsoever unpopular is at the heart of Article 19(1)(a). It is
only when such discussion or advocacy reaches the level of incitement that
Article 19(2) kicks in. It is at this stage that a law may be made curtailing the
speech or expression that leads inexorably to or tends to cause public disorder
or tends to cause or tends to affect the sovereignty & integrity of India, the
security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, etc."
Under certain circumstances, therefore, a law depriving a citizen of his Fundamental Right may be
regarded as reasonable.31 The offence of sedition does not penalize discussion or advocacy. It
does not curb the freedom to have healthy political discussions. It only comes into the picture when
the words or actions of a person reach the level of incitement, which is likely to disrupt the security
30
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1.
31
Narendra Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 430.
28

of state, public order and public tranquility. Hence, there is no extinction of the Freedom of Speech
and Expression. If at all, it is merely a regulation.
Under Art. 19(2), a restriction can be imposed in the interests of public order, security of state, etc.
However, the restrictions imposed in the interest of security of state to be a reasonable restriction,
should be one that has a proximate and reasonable connection32 or nexus with security of State.33
The provisions of the 124A read as a whole, along with the Explanations, make it reasonably clear
that the sections penalises only such activities that are intended, or have a tendency, to create
disorder or disturbance of public peace by inciting violence. The Explanations appended to the main
body of the section make it clear that criticism of public measures or comment on Government
action, however strongly worded, would be within reasonable limits and would be consistent with
the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression. It is only when the words, written or
spoken etc., which have the pernicious tendency or intention of creating public dis order or
disturbance of law and order that the law steps in to prevent such activities in the interest of public
order. So construed the section strikes the correct balance between individual fundamental rights and
the interest of public order.
32
Arunachala Nadar, M.C.V.S. v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 300.
33
O.K. Ghosh v. E.X. Joseph, AIR 1963 SC 812.
29

124A has a direct and proximate nexus to its object i.e. security of state. It is a regulatory measure
which inter-alia provides against apprehended threat the security of the state. It has a direct nexus to
preservation of public tranquility. Therefore, even if it operates harshly in isolated cases, its ultimate
object is the maintenance of security of state and public order.
2.3. THAT 124A DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 14
It is humbly submitted that 124A is not violative of A.14 of the Constitution. When a statute is
impugned under Art. 14, it is the function of the court to decide whether the statute is so arbitrary or
unreasonable that it has to be struck down. Mere factor that some hardship or injustice is caused to
someone is no ground to strike down the rule altogether if otherwise the rule appears to be just, fair
and reasonable and not constitutional.34 The test of arbitrariness lies in whether the provision is
reasonable, and whether there is a nexus between the restriction imposed by the provision, and the
object sought to be achieved by it. 124A imposes restriction on the fundamental right to freedom of
speech and expression in the interest of security of state and for maintenance of public order.
Therefore, there is a nexus between the restriction imposed by 124A and the its object. Therefore,
124A doesnt violate Art. 14.
2.4. THAT 124A DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 21
It is reverentially submitted that 124A is not violative of Art.14 of the Constitution. The right of
life and liberty so guaranteed under Art. 21 is subject to the rule of proportionality. Where individual
liberty comes into conflict with an interest of the security of the state or public order, the liberty of
the individual must give way to the larger interest of the nation. 124A penalizes those acts which
induce discontent and insurrection, stir up opposition to the Government, and bring the
34
AP Coop All Seeds growers Federation Ltd. v. D. Achyuta Rao, (2007) 13 SCC 320.
30

administration of justice into contempt; and the very tendency of sedition is to incite the people to
insurrection and rebellion. 35
Since the restriction imposed under 124A is a reasonable restriction under Art. 19(2), this penal
provision constitutes procedure established law. Hence, it is not a violation of Art. 21 of the
Constitution.
3
THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED SHOULD BE UPHELD.
It is the humble submission of the Respondents that the Petitioner is guilty of committing the crime
of Sedition under 124-A, IPC. In order for an individuals words to be within the ambit of 124A,
they would necessarily have to qualify as having a ''pernicious tendency of creating public disorder
or disturbance of law and order. Only then would the law step in to prevent such activity.36
The essentials of the offence under 124-A is:
1. Bringing or attempting to bring into hatred or contempt or exciting or attempting
to excite disaffection towards, the Government of India.
35
Nazir Khan And Others v. State Of Delhi, (2003)8 SCC 461 at para 37.
36
Arun Jaitley v. State Of U.P, APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 32703 of 2015.
31

2. Such act or attempt may be done (i) by words, either spoken or written, or (ii) by
signs, or (iii) by visible representation.37
The Supreme Court of United state laid down the test of clear and present danger in the case of
Brandenburg v. Ohio38, which requires that restrictions cannot be placed on speech unless it is
directed to inciting, and is likely to incite imminent lawless action. The Supreme Court has applied
the same test in deciding several cases.39
37
PILLAI, Criminal Law 1131 (K. I. Vibhute eds., 2009).

38
23 L Ed 2d 430: 395 US 444 (1969).

39
Indra Das v. State of Assam, (2011) 3 SCC 380; Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam, (2011) 3 SCC 377;
Shreya
32

In the instant case, the speech of the Petitioner satisfies the conditions that are necessary for it to be
considered as seditious under the meaning of 124A. The students of the political bodies in GNU
have a notorious reputation for resorting to violence40 and the GNUSU has always been opposed to
the IPP government because of opposite political ideology. The Petitioner claimed in his speech that
they will seek independence of Mashkir at any cost. 41 This statement was clearly aimed at exciting
disaffection towards the government. Moreover, the petitioner holds an important post as the
President of largest student union of GNU, and has a substantial influence over other members. 42
Making provocative remarks about a Mashkir is bound to add fuel to the unrest. The petitioners
Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1.
40
Moot Proposition, Para 4.

41
id, at para 11.

42
33

comments also gained endorsement from the Prime Minister of Paristan. 43 This created a situation of
clear and present danger capable of inciting imminent lawless action.
Therefore, it is humbly contended that the Petitioners speech was seditious in nature, inciting hatred
against the established order and harms the systematic peace of the country; hence, this Honble
Court should uphold the conviction.
4
24A OF THE PRESS COUNCILS ACT, 1978 IS NOT ULTRA VIRES THE CONSTITUTION.
It is reverentially submitted by the Respondents that 24A of the Press Council Act, 1978 is not in
violation of the provisions of the Constitution.
4.1 THAT THERE IS A PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LAW.
The power to legislate is a plenary power vested in the legislature and unless these who challenge the
legislation clearly establish that their fundamental rights under the Constitution are affected or that
the legislature lacked legislative competence, they do not succeed in their challenge to the enactment
brought forward in the wisdom of the legislature.
A statute cannot be struck down merely because the Court thinks it to be arbitrary or unreasonable.
Any such ground of invalidity must be related to a Constitutional provision, such as, Arts. 14, 19 or
21. Challenge on ground of wisdom of legislation is not permissible as it is for the legislature to
balance various interests.44
id, at para 5.
43
id, at para 13.

44
34

The Legislature appreciates and understands the needs of the people, that it knows what is good or
bad for them, that the laws it enacts are directed to problems which are made manifest by experience,
that the elected representatives in a legislature enact laws which they consider to be reasonable, for
the purposes for which these laws are enacted and that a legislature would not deliberately flout a
constitutional safeguard or right.45
The Legislature composed as it is of the elected representatives of the people is presumed to know
and be aware of the needs of the people and what is good or bad for them and that a Court cannot sit
in judgment over the wisdom of the Legislature.46 Therefore usually the presumption is in the favor
of the Constitutionality of the statute and the onus to prove that it is unconstitutional lies upon the
Mylapore Club v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2005) 12 SCC 752.
45
Ram Krishna Dalmia v. S.R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 638; Vrajlal Manilal & Co. v. State of Madhya
Pradesh, AIR 1970 SC 129; Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 1325.
46
State of Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell & Co., AIR 1996 SC 1628.
35

person who is challenging it.47 The allegations regarding the violation of a constitutional provision
should be specific, clear and unambiguous and it is for the person who impeaches the law as
violative of the constitutional guarantee to show that the particular provision is infirm for the reasons
stated by him.48
The Courts are not concerned with the need or propriety of laws. The judicial function is not to
canvass the legislative judgement, or to hold the impugned statute to be ill-advised or unjustified or
not justified by the facts on which it is based. The function of the Courts is to see whether the law in
47
Charanjit Lal Chowdhary v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41; Bombay v. F.N. Balsara, AIR 1951 SC 318;
Mahant Moti Das v. S.P. Sahi, AIR 1959 SC 942; Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor
Congress, AIR 1991 SC 101.
48
Amrit Banaspati Ltd v. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 1340.
36

question transgresses any constitutional restriction imposed on the legislature. 49 Therefore a law
cannot be struck down merely because the court thinks it to be unjustified or unwise.50
In the case of Delhi Cloth and Gen. Mill Co. Ltd. V. Union of India, the Supreme Court has stated:
What form a regulatory measure must take is for the legislature to decide and
the court would not examine its wisdom or efficacy excepts to the extent that
Art. 13 of the Constitution is attracted.51
49
Charanjit lal Chowdhary v. Union of India, AIR 1951 SC 41.
50
State of Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell & Co., AIR 1996 SC 1628.
51
AIR 1983 SC 937.
37

4.2. THAT 24A OF THE PRESS COUNCILS ACT, 1978 DOES NOT VIOLATE ART. 14.
Firstly, the print media is a disseminator of information, and is responsible for educating the masses
about various socio-political issues, making it imperative to have a legal provision that covers
expediently the need of the country. Like individual rights, the freedom of press cannot be absolute
and should be reconciled with collective interests of the Society. Sovereignty and integrity of a state
are crucial to its existence. Therefore, it becomes the impediment of the state to ensure that there is
no threat to its existence. 24A intends to achieve the same.
Secondly, the possibility of abuse of a statute otherwise valid does not impart to it any invalidity. 52
Some constitutional infirmity has to be found before invalidating an Act. Once the policy is laid
down by law it cannot be held invalid merely on the ground that the discretion conferred by it may
be abused in some cases and may be exercised in a manner, which is in fact discriminatory. 53 If the
power is actually abused in any case the exercise of the power is actually abused in any case, the
52
R.K. Garg v. Union of India, 1985 1 SCC 641; Union of India v. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Co.
Ltd., AIR 2001 SC 724.
53
Ramkrishna Dalmia v. Tendolkar, AIR 1957 SC 532.
38

exercise of the power may be challenged as discriminatory or mala fide, 54 but the statute will not fail
on that ground.55
The Supreme Court has reiterated the principle that mere likelihood of abuse of discretionary power
conferred under statute would not render the statutory provision unconstitutional. Mere factor that
some hardship or injustice is caused to someone is no ground to strike down the rule altogether if
otherwise the rule appears to be just, fair and reasonable and not constitutional.56
54
Naraindas v. State of M.P., AIR 1974 SC 1232; Thakorebhai v. State of Gujrat; AIR 1975 SC 270.
55
Ramkrishna Dalmia v. Tendolkar, AIR 1957 SC 532.
56
AP Coop All Seeds Growers Federation Ltd. v.. D. Achyuta Rao, (2007) 13 SCC 320.
39

A statute carries with it a presumption of constitutionality. Such a presumption extends also in
relation to a law, which has enacted for reasonable restrictions on the fundamental right. A further
presumption may also be drawn that the statutory authority would not exercise the power arbitrarily.
24A is the substantive law whereas the safeguards against its improper use have been adequately
provided in the Press Council (Procedure for Enquiry) Regulations, 1979.
4.3.
THAT 24A DOES NOT VIOLATE ART. 19(1)(a).
Firstly, that 24A is reasonable restriction under Art. 19(2) of the Constitution. There cannot be any
such thing as absolute or uncontrolled liberty wholly freed from restraint for that would lead to
anarchy and disorder. Art. 19 give a list of individual liberties and prescribe in the various clauses the
restraints that may be placed upon them by law so that they do not conflict with public welfare or
general morality.57 While it is necessary to maintain and preserve freedom of speech and expression
in a democracy, so also it is necessary to place some curbs on this freedom for the maintenance of
social order. Accordingly, under Art. 19(2), the state may make a law imposing reasonable
restrictions on the exercise of the right to freedom of speech and expression in the interests of the
securities of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency, morality,
sovereignty and integrity of India, or in relation to contempt of Court, defamation or incitement to
an offence.
57
Gopalan v. State of Madras, (1950) SCR 88; Santosh Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1973 SC 1091;
Laxmi v. State of U.P., AIR 1971 SC 873.
40

In Santosh Singh v. Delhi Administration,58 it was held that the test of reasonableness of restriction
has to be considered in each case in the light of the nature of right infringed, the purpose of the
restriction, the extent and nature of the mischief required to be suppressed and the prevailing social
order and conditions at the time. There can be no abstract standard of reasonableness and our
Constitution provides reasonably precise general guidance in that matter.
When a law is impugned as having imposed a restriction upon a Fundamental Right, what the Court
has to examine is the substance of the legislation without being beguiled by the mere appearance of
the legislation.59 Regulation and not extinction is, generally speaking, the extent to which
permissible restriction may go in order to satisfy the test of reasonableness.60 The possible or remote
58
AIR 1973 SC 1091
59
Express Newspapers v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 578; Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd. v. Union of India,
AIR 1973 SC 106; Sukhnandan v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 902.
60
41

effects of legislation upon any fundamental right cannot be said to constitute a restriction upon the
right.61
In determining the reasonableness of a law challenged as an unreasonable restriction upon a
Fundamental Right guaranteed by Art. 19, the court has to balance the need for individual liberty
with the need for social control and the magnitude of the evil which is the purpose of the restrictions
to curb or eliminate so that the freedom guaranteed to the individual sub serves the larger public
interests.62 No restriction can be said to be unreasonable merely because in a given case it operates
harshly.63
Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 106.
61
Express Newspapers v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 578; Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd. v. Union of India,
AIR 1973 SC 106; Sukhnandan v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 902.
62
Harakchand v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 1453.
63
42

24A lays down mere regulatory measures for control of publications that threaten the sovereignty
and integrity of the country or manipulate the public opinion against the elected govt. 64 Hence, there
is no extinction of the Freedom of Speech and Expression. If at all, it is just regulation. Hence, it
is submitted that the restriction imposed by 66A is a reasonable restriction under Art. 19(2).
Secondly, that 24A has a Direct and Proximate nexus to its object. The limitation imposed in the
interests of public order to be a reasonable restriction, should be one which has a proximate
connection or approximate and reasonable connection65 or nexus with public order, but not one
Krishna Kakkanth v. Govt. of Kerala, AIR 1997 SC 128; See also, Municipal Corporation, City of
Ahmedabad v. Jan Mohd. Usmanbhai, AIR 1986 SC 1205; M.J. Sivani v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1995 SC
1770.
64
Moot Para 14.

65
Arunachala Nadar, M.C.V.S. v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 300.
43

which is far-fetched, hypothetical, problematic or too remote. 66 It must be rationally proximate and
direct to be called reasonable.67
Under Art. 19(2), a restriction can be imposed in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of
India. The expression in the interests of gives a greater leeway to the legislature to curtail freedom
of speech and expression. However, the restrictions imposed must have a reasonable and rational
relation with the integrity and sovereignty of state.
It is, therefore, humbly submitted that Art. 24A has a direct and proximate nexus to its object i.e.
protecting sovereignty and integrity of the state. It has a direct nexus to preservation of public
tranquility, as it can be used to make sure that the press doesnt exercise its freedom in a way that
threatens peace and security.
4.4 THAT THE RESTRICTION IMPOSED BY 24A IS REASONABLE AND FALLS UNDER THE AMBIT
OF ART.
21.
66
Superintendent Central Prison v. Ram Manohar Lohia, AIR 1960 SC 633.
67
O.K. Ghosh v. E.X. Joseph, AIR 1963 SC 812.
44

Individual rights cannot be absolute in a welfare state. It has to be subservient to the Rights of the
public at large.68 The right of life and liberty so guaranteed under Art.21 is also subject to the rule of
proportionality.69 Where individual liberty comes into conflict with an interest of the security of the
state or public order, the liberty of the individual must give way to the larger interest of the nation.70
68
Confederation of Ex-serviceman Association v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 399; AIR 2006 SC 2945.
69
Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386; AIR 2000 SC 3689.

70
Sunil Fulchand Shah v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 1023.
45
PRAYER
In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is most respectfully prayed that this Honble
Court may be pleased to:
1. DISMISS the Writ Petition filed by Petitioner No.1.

AND
2. DISMISS the Writ Petition filed by Petitioner No. 2s Counsel and uphold Petitioner No.2s
Conviction.
AND
3. DISMISS the Writ Petition filed by Petitioner No. 3.
AND
4. PASS any other order and directions, as this Honble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts
and circumstances of the case in the interest of justice and in favour of the Respondent.
46
Respondent
Date:
Place:
Through:
Advocate
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS REFERRED
1. V. DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (10th ed. 1959)
2. ARVIND P. DATAR, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (2nd ed. Reprint 2010)
3. DR. DURGA BASU, INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (20th ed. Reprint 2012)
4. DR. J.N.PANDEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (38th ed. 2002)
5. DR.DURGA BASU, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (8th ed. 2011)
6. H.M.SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (4th ed.)
7. A. SABITHA, PUBLIC HEALTH: ENFORCEMENT AND LAW (1st ed. 2008).
8. JUSTICE G.P.SINGH, PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (12th ed. Reprint 2011)
9. M.P.JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 2003)
11. DURGA DAS BASU, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3rd ed. 2008).
12. COLETTE DAIUTE, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT & POLITICAL VIOLENCE (1st ed. 2010).
14. R. SATYA NARAYANA, NATURAL JUSTICE: EXPOANDING HORIZONS (1st ed. 2008).
ARTICLE
1. Goran Simic, Universal Jurisdiction and its Interplay with Sovereign Immunity 1 INDIAN
JOURNAL OF LAW AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 121 (New Delhi 2016)
47

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TEAM CODE: TE-1-R

IN THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

Tomar Rashid & Ors.

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL MOOT

IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

That there is a presumption of constitutionality..

That 24A does not Violate Art. 19(1) (a)

IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

All India Reporter

IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

Supreme Court Almanac

Supreme Court Journal

IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

A. K. Gopalan v. State of Madras

(1950) SCR 88 (253-4)

APPLICATION U/S 482 No.

Arunachala Nadar, M.C.V.S. v. State of Madras

IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

Captain Subhash Kumar v. The Principal Officer,

1991 (2) SCC 449

Mercantile Marine Deptt.

(2006) 8 SCC 399

AIR 1961 SC 1457.

(1996) 5 SCC 216

Narsibhai Patel v. State Of Gujarat

No. 6330 of 2015

(2011) 3 SCC 380

AIR 1959 SC 942

AIR 1978 SC 597

(1975) I All ER 16 (HL)

AIR 1975 SC 2193

IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

Narendra Kumar v. Union of India

AIR 1960 SC 430

AIR 1970 SC 129

V. DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (10th ed. 1959)

IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES, CONVENTIONS, ARTICLES ET AL.

121 (New Delhi 2016)

IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

PRESS COUNCILS ACT, 1978

IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

1. THE WRIT PETITION IS NOT MAINTAINABLE.

IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED SHOULD BE UPHELD.

1 THE WRIT PETITION IS NOT MAINTAINABLE.

IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

3 In Re Ramlila Maidan Incident v. Home Secretary & Ors, (2012) 5 SCC 1.

IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

4 AIR 1978 SC 597.

IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

6 (1996) 5 SCC 216.

IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

8 Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, AIR 1963 SC 996.

IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016

9 Daryao v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1961 SC 1457.

10 Ramjilal v. Income Tax Officer, AIR 1951 SC 97.

IMS UNISON UNIVERSITY 4TH NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2016