Beruflich Dokumente
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FLORES VS DRILON,
BITONIO V COA
ISSUE: Whether or not the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of
R.A. 7227 violates the constitutional proscription against
appointment or designation of elective officials to other
government posts
Arguments of COA:
1. Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants holding
other offices in addition to primary office are not allowed to
receive compensation to subsequent office
Argument of Bitonio:
Rank equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant
Secretary and other appointive officials below the rank of
Assistant secretary are not covered by the prohibition
ISSUE
Whether or not the ALTERNATES OF
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIES are entitled for
additional compensation
RULING
No. Since the Executive Department Secretaries,
as ex-officio members of the NHA Board, are
prohibited
from
receiving
extra
(additional)
compensation, whether it be in the form of a per diem
or an honorarium or an allowance, or some other
such euphemism," it follows that petitioners who sit as
their alternates cannot likewise be entitled to receive
such compensation. A contrary rule would give
petitioners a better right than their principals.
Note:
*The ex-officio position being actually and in legal
contemplation part of the principal office, it follows
that the official concerned has no right to receive
additional compensation for his services in the said
position. The reason is that these services are
already paid for and covered by the compensation
attached to his principal office.
*The acts of the alternates shall be considered the
acts of their principal
Funa v Ermita
FACTS:
On October 4, 2006, President Gloria MacapagalArroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista
(Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC).
On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of
then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr.,
Bautista was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC),
Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent
capacity as DOTC Undersecretary.
During the pendency of this petition, Bautista was
appointed Administrator of the MARINA and she
assumed her duties and responsibilities as such
on February 2, 2009.
OF
VALENZUELA
AND
ISSUE:
(1) whether, during the period of the ban on
appointments imposed by Section 15, Article
VII of the Constitution, the President is
nonetheless required to fill vacancies in the
judiciary (lower courts), in view of Sections 4(1)
and 9 of Article VIII
(2) whether he can make appointments to the
judiciary during the period of the ban in the
interest of public service.
FACTS: Referred to the Court En Banc by the Chief
Justice are the appointments signed by His Excellency
the President under the date of March 30, 1998 of Hon.
Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as
Judges of the Regional Trial Court of Branch 62, Baguio
City
and
of
Branch
24,
Cabanatuan
City,
respectively. The appointments were received at the
Chief Justice's chambers on May 12, 1998. The referral
was made in view of the serious constitutional issue
concerning said appointments arising from the
pertinent antecedents.
The issue was first ventilated at the meeting of the
Judicial and Bar Council on March 9, 1998. The meeting
had been called, according to the Chief Justice as Ex
Officio Chairman, to discuss the question raised by
some sectors about the "constitutionality of ***
appointments" to the Court of Appeals, specifically, in
light of the forthcoming presidential elections.
RULING:
The Court further Resolved that
(1) pending the foregoing proceedings and the
deliberation by the Court on the matter, and
and
3.2.
3.
by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the presynchronization period pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this
law as the only measure that Congress can make.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially
executive in nature, and the limitations on or qualifications to
the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these
limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be
recognized. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution.
This provision classifies into four groups the officers
that the President can appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments;
ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or
naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are
vested in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by
law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
Since the Presidents authority to appoint OICs
emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the third group of
officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed
law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
Kinds of Presidential Appointment
a. Submission to Commission on Appointments
aa. regular appointment
ab. ad interim appointments
Pimentel vs. Ermita
Facts: This is a petition to declare unconstitutional the
appointments issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
through Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita to Florencio B.
Abad, Avelino J. Cruz, Jr., Michael T. Defensor, Joseph H.
Durano, Raul M. Gonzalez, Alberto G. Romulo, Rene C. Villa,
and Arthur C. Yap as acting secretaries of their respective
departments.
On August 2004, Arroyo issued appointments to respondents
as acting secretaries of their respective departments.
Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004. On 23 September
2004, President Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to
respondents as secretaries of the departments to which they
were previously appointed in an acting capacity.
Issue: Is President Arroyo appointment of respondents as
acting secretaries without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments while Congress is in session, constitutional?
Held: Yes. The power to appoint is essentially executive in
nature, and the legislature may not interfere with the exercise
of this executive power except in those instances when the
Constitution expressly allows it to interfere. Limitations on the
executive power to appoint are construed strictly against the
legislature. The scope of the legislature\'92s interference in the
executive\'92s power to appoint is limited to the power to
prescribe the qualifications to an appointive office. Congress
cannot appoint a person to an office in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to that office. Neither may Congress impose on
2.
FACTS:
Gabriel C. Singson was appointed Governor of the Bangko
Sentral by President Fidel V. Ramos in 1993.
Jesus Armando Tarrosa, as a "taxpayer", filed a petition for
prohibition questioning the appointment of Singson for not
having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments as
required by the provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653, which
established the Bangko Sentral as the Central Monetary
Authority of the Philippines.
The Secretary of Budget and Management was impleaded for
disbursing public funds in payment of the salaries and
emoluments of respondent Singson.
In their comment, respondents claim that Congress exceeded
its legislative powers in requiring the confirmation by the CA of
the appointment of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral. They
contend that an appointment to the said position is not among
the appointments which have to be confirmed by the CA, citing
Section 16 of Article VI of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Governor of the BSP is subject to COAs
confirmation.
RULING:
PETITION DENIED.
Appointment to the position of the Governor of the BSP is not
one of those that need confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments. Congress cannot expand the confirmation
powers of the Commission on Appointments and require
confirmation of appointment of other government officials not
expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of
Article VII of the Constitution.
Manalo v Sistoza
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 6975 was passed in 1990. This law created
the Department of Interior and Local Government.
Sections 26 and 31 thereof, also provided on the manner as to
how officers of the Philippine National Police are to be
appointed. It was provided that the PNP Chief as well as
certain police officers including Directors and Chief
Superintendents, after being appointed by the President, must
be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments before said
officers can take their office.
In 1992, Pres. Corazon Aquino appointed Pedro Sistoza et. al
as Directors and Chief Superintendents within the PNP.
Said appointments were not confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments.
Thus, Jesulito Manalo questioned the validity of the
appointments made. He contends that without the confirmation
by the Commission, Sistoza et. al are acting without
jurisdiction, their appointment being contrary to the provisions
of R.A. 6975.
He then went to the Supreme Court asking the court to carry
out the provisions of the said law. Manalo also insists that the
law is a valid law, as it enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality, and hence, it must be carried out by the
courts.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Sections 26 and 31 of RA 6975 are valid
2. Whether or not PNP officers are similar to the AFP, whose
positions need CA confirmation
3. Whether or not Salvador Enriquez III acted with grave abuse
of discretion
RULING:
PETITION DISMISSED.
1. Partly. Sections 26 and 31 go against the Constitution
because according to Sec. 16, Art. 7, the PNP officers do not
fall under the first group which requires the confirmation of the
CA. However, the remainder of RA 6975 remains valid
because assailed provisions are severable from the main
statute.
2. No. The constitution expressly provides for their distinction
according to Sections 24 and 6 of Art. 16. Also, RA 6975
provides that no element of the police force shall be military
nor shall any position thereof be occupied by active members
of the AFP.
3. No. The disbursements and emoluments disbursed for the
respondents are valid.
Soriano v. Lista
FACTS:
Eight officers of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) were
promoted by the President to Vice Admiral, Rear Admiral,
Commodore, Naval Captain, and they assumed office without
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (COA).
Petitioner, as a taxpayer, filed a petition with the Supreme
Court questioning the constitutionality of their assumption of
office, which requires confirmation of the COA.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioner has locus standi
2. Whether or not appointments of PCG officers, need CA
confirmation
RULING:
PETITION DISMISSED.
1. Petitioner has no locus standi. A party bringing a suit
challenging the constitutionality of an act must show not only
that the law or act is invalid, but also that he has sustained, or
is in immediate or imminent danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of its enforcement and not merely that he
suffers thereby in some indefinite way.
The instant petition cannot even be classified as a taxpayers
suit because petitioner has no interest as such and this case
does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing power.
2. Now that the PCG is under the DOTC and no longer part of
the Philippine Navy or the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the
promotions and appointments of respondent officers of the
PCG, or any PCG officer from the rank of captain and higher
for that matter, do not require confirmation by the CA.
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall
also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
Facts:
The National Power Corporation (NPC) was created to
generate hydraulic power from all water sources in the
Philippines. Its main source of funds is through bonds, and
such bonds shall be exempted from taxes.
A lot of laws related to the NPC was enacted thereafter but
retained the exemption of the payment of the debt of NPC.
Then came PD 1931 which reiterated the repeal of all tax
exemptions of government-owned and controlled corporations,
but gave the power to the President and the Minister of
Finance to restore such exemptions taking into account the
following:
LACSON-MAGALLANES V. PAO
(1)
the effect on the relative price levels;
(2)
the relative contribution of the corporation to the
revenue generation effort;
(3)
the nature of the activity in which the corporation is
engaged in; or
(4)
In general, the greater national interest to be served.
Facts:
1.
Ruling
Jose Pao [a farmer] and 19 othersapplie d for the purchase
just 90 hectares of the now agricultural land. LMC, however,
filed for sales application of the entire land.Pao protested that
they are actual occupants of the 90-ha portion.
The Director of Lands (DoL) gave due course to LMCs sales
application and dismissed Paos claims. Pao appealed to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (SoA&NR) but
was likewise dismissed. The case was elevated to the
President.
The Executive Secretary, by the authority of the President,
reversed the decision of the DoL and the SoA&NR stating that
it would be for the public interest that appellants, who are
mostly landless farmers who depend on the land for their
existence, be allocated that portion on which they have made
improvements.
LMC protested to the Court of First Instance and alleged that:
(1)
the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources has full force and effect;
(2)
the decision of the Executive Secretary is contrary to
law and of no legal force and effect.
Upon dismissal of the case, the LMC appealed to SC.
Issue related to Section 17:
1.
Ruling:
Yes, the President can delegate the power of control to the
Executive Secretary except for cases where he is required by
the Constitution to act in person. The President is not
expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive
and administrative functions. Thus, the decision of the
Executive Secretary has full force and effect.
MACEDA V. MACARAIG
Yes, the President has the power exempt NPC from tax for the
greater national interest that NPC will serve. Further rules
withdrawing the exemption bestowed upon the corporation
through the power vested upon the President cannot declare
such exemption invalid.
Roque v. Director of Lands (1976)
Facts:
In settling the dispute on the ownership of Lot No. 4507
between Roque who allegedly occupied the portion since 1937
and Facun who filed a homestead application in 1935 and
submitted final proof in 1939, the Department of Agriculture
and Natural Resources decided in favor of Roque. However,
upon re investigation it is found out that Roque submitted his
sales application for the disputed portion in 1948, only during
the course of the investigation of his protest. It was also
verified during the re investigation that Roque entered upon the
disputed portion in 1951. So the President, through respondent
Assistant Executive Secretary awarded the land in favor of the
Facun.
The Roque prayed that the order of the respondent Honorable
Director of Lands and the decision of the respondent
Honorable Assistant Executive Secretary, be set aside on the
alleged ground that the said order of the Director of Lands was
issued with grave abuse of discretion, consisting of unqualified
reliance and the biased report and recommendation. He also
asserted that the decision of the Honorable Executive
Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction and committed grave
abuse of discretion disregarding the sales award of the land in
question in favor of Facun having already paid for the price of
the same, and praying further that the decision of the
Honorable Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
(which is in his favor) be sustained. Respondent Jose Facun,
through Atty. Cipriano A. Tan, filed an answer to the petition
denying specifically the allegation of abuse of discretion,
arbitrariness and excess of jurisdiction of the Honorable
Main Issue: W/N the President has the power to take direct
action on the case of petitioner even if he belongs to the
*Note/Explanation
(Ang-Angco's contention): petitioner is an officer who belongs to the classified civil service and is not a
presidential appointee, but one appointed by the Secretary of Finance under the Revised Administrative
Code, thus believes that he cannot be removed from the service by the President in utter disregard of the
provisions of the Civil Service Act of 1959.
(Contention ng respondents): But it is their theory that the pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law
applicable to employees in the classified service do not apply to the particular case of petitioner since to hold
otherwise would be to deprive the President of his power of control over the officers and employees of the
executive branch of the government. In other words, respondents contend that, whether the officers or
employees concerned are presidential appointees or belong to the classified service, if they are all officers
and employees in the executive department, they all come under the control of the President and, therefore,
his power of removal may be exercised over them directly without distinction.
Ruling:
The power of Executive Control may extend to the power to
investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who
belong under the executive department IF they are presidential
appointees but not with regard to those under the classified
service.
Even granting for administrative purposes, the President of the
Philippines is considered as the Department Head of the Civil
Service Commission, his power to remove is still subject to the
Civil Service Act of 1959, and we already know with regard to
officers and employees who belong to classified service the
finality of the action is given to the Commissioner of Civil
Service or the Civil Board of Appeals.
This is in line with Art VII Sec 10 (3) of the Constitution. The
Congress has provided by law a procedure for their removal
(i.e. Civil Service Act of 1959) thus Ang-Angco's situation is not
covered by the Executive's power to remove a person from the
office.