Tobias v.

Abalos
FACTS:
Prior to Republic Act No., 7675 also known as An Act Converting
the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to
be known as the City of Mandaluyong, Mandaluyong and San
Juan belonged to only one legislative district. A plebiscite was
held for the people of Mandaluyong whether or not they approved
of the said conversion. The plebiscite was only 14.41% of the
said conversion. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted yes whereas 7,
911 voted no.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was unconstitutional
citing Article VI, Sections 5(1), 4 and 26(1)
HELD/RULING:
For the purposes of discussion, lets breakdown all of the claimed
violations to the 1987 Constitution Section 26(1) every bill passed
by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof. The creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate
and distinct from the subject of its conversion. Moreover, a
liberal construction of the one-title-one-subject rule has been
liberally adopted by the court as to not impede legislation
(Lidasan v. Comelec). Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives
shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number
of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations. The Constitution
clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise
provided by law. The emphasis on the latter clause indicates
that the number of the House of Representatives may be
increased, if mandated via a legislative enactment. Therefore,
the increase in congressional representation is not
unconstitutional.
Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census,
the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standard provided in this section.
The argument on the violation of the above provision is absurd
since it was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon
and enacted the assailed law.
The petition is thereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED
BARA LIDASAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS:
RA 4790 creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of
Lanao Del Sur was enacted into law. Section 1 of the act reads:
XxxSECTION 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga,Langkong,
Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao,Tiongko,
Colodan, Kabamawakan, Kapatagan, Bongabong,Aipang,
Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatung,
in the Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan,Province of Lanao del
Sur, are separated from said municipalities and constituted into a
distinct and independent municipality of the same province to be
known as the Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur.
The seat of government of the municipality shall be in Tagalog
xxx
Bara Lidasan, petitioner in this instant case, filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition before the Commission on Elections
citing that the said law included two barrios from the Municipality
of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and, ten barrios that are parts
and parcel of the Municipality of Parang, also in the Province of
Cotabato, not Lanao del Sur thereby changing the boundaries of
the two provinces. Since elections are forth coming, the
COMELEC issued a resolution on August 15, 1967 which still puts
the twelve barrios from Cotabato Province under the new
Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur. The Office of
the President thereafter recommended to COMELEC that the
operation of the statute be suspended be suspended until
clarified by correcting legislation but the COMELEC declared that

the statute must be implemented unless declared

unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Does the title of RA 4790 conform to the constitutional
requirement that no bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the
title of the bill and whether RA 4790 is null and void.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled, to wit:
1. No, the title of RA 4790 does not conform with the
constitutional requirement regarding to title of statute since it is
misleading and deceptive as the legislation combines two
purposes in one statute, namely, creates the Municipality of
Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur from twenty barrios from the
Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, both of Lanao del Sur, and
dismembers two municipalities of the Province of Cotabato.
2. Yes, RA 4790 is null and void
LIDASAN v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS
On June 18, 1966, Chief Executive signed into law House Bill
(HB) 1247, now known as Republic Act (RA) 4790An Act
Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of
Lanao del Sur The new municipality of Dianaton, Lanao
del Sur includes: Kapatagan, Bongabong,
Aipang,Dagowan,Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain, Matimos, and
Magolatung. It also includes: barrios of Togaig and Madalum
(both situated in Buldon, Cotabato) and barrios of Bayanga,
Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan,
Magabo,Tangabao,Tiongko, Colodan, and Kabamawakan (all
situated in Parang, Cotabato)
Bara Lidasan, resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of
Parang, Cotabato affected by the implementation of RA 4790,
questions the constitutionality of RA 4790.
ISSUE
Whether or not RA 4790 is valid?
RULING
RA 4790 declared as NULL and VOID
Constitutional requirement foretasted that no bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall
be expressed in the title of the bill Constitutional provision
contains DUAL LIMITATIONS upon legislative power:
1. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, less than one
statute, of heterogeneous subjects.
2. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to
notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the
import of the single subject thereof. It violates
the constitutional requirement that the subject of the bill be
expressed in its title.
It did not inform the Congress the full impact of the Law.
Moreover, It did not inform the citizens of Buldon and Parangin
Cotabato that part of their territory is being taken away from
their towns and municipalities and that such will be added to the
Province of Lanao del Sur. The subject was the creation of the
municipality of Dianaton. Hence, it makes the title misleading and
deceptive
Even upon removing the barrios of Cotabato included in the
municipality of Dianaton, it is still unconstitutional because the
valid part is not independent of the invalid portion. Thus, it is
indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void in its totality.
Arroyo v De Venecia
Facts: Petitioners are members of the House of
Representatives. They brought this suit against respondents
charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners
claim are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is
tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he
was going to raise a question on the quorum, although until the
end of his interpellation he never did.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House
of Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified

by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as

having been finally passed by the House of Representatives and
by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was
signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22,
1996.

legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of

procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does
not present a situation in which a branch of the
government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of
its jurisdiction".

Issue: Whether R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was
passed in violation of the rules of the House;
Whether the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was
properly passed is false and spurious;
Whether the Chair, in the process of submitting and certifying the
law violated House Rules; and
Whether a certiorari/prohibition will be granted.

In view of House Rules:

No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which
specifically requires that in cases such as this involving approval
of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the
motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting.

Held: That after considering the arguments of the parties, the

Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a
grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240 This case is
therefore dismissed.
Ratio: To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be
to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our
government. It would be an unwarranted invasion of the
prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set
aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the
House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow
those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the
judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that
department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving
commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of
legislative skulduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power
and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it
to do so. The suggestion made in a case may instead
appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment
of a new law or the repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the
absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that
Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that
its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than
disrespect is due the judgment of that body.
In view of what is essential:
Merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than
constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art.
VI, 26-27 are VIOLATED.
First, in Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts
have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of
the body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary
rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the
courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded
by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to
conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action
(taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of
members have agreed to a particular measure.'"
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is
that they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily
procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to
them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if
the requisite numbers of members have agreed to a
particular measure.
In view of the Courts jurisdiction
This Court's function is merely to check whether or not the
governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a
different view. In the absence of a showing . . . of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion
for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power
to look into what it thinks is apparent error. If, then, the
established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the

Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous

action of the House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is
concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven
years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that if
somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate,
then the voting comes in.
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of
the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except
only in the following instances: upon the last and third
readings of a bill, at the request of one-fifth of the
Members present, and in re-passing a bill over the veto of
the President.
In view of grave abuse
Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the
jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or
quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power.
In view of the enrolled bill doctrine
Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the
Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the
certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it
was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due
enactment.
This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following
excerpt which embodies good, if old-fashioned democratic theory:
Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient
Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The
sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking
the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities
with the Constitution; but to represent ourselves with competent,
careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the
statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular
government.
(In view of justifiability according to PUNO, J)
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by
the petitioner are non-justifiable. Nor do I agree that we will
trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume
jurisdiction over the case at bar. Even in the United States, the
principle of separation of power is no longer an impregnable
impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases
involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.

The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of

proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be
attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are
open to the determination of the House, and it is no
impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be
better, more accurate, or even more just.

Mabanag vs Lopez Vito

Journal Adoption of the Enrolled Bill Theory
FACTS:
Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three
senators were suspended by senate due to election irregularities.
The 8 representatives were not allowed to take their seat in the
lower House except in the election of the House Speaker. They
argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered
in determining the required vote (of each house) in order to
pass the Resolution (proposing amendments to the Constitution)
which has been considered as an enrolled bill by then. At the
same time, the votes were already entered into the Journals of
the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but
it could have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these
members of Congress had been counted, the affirmative votes in
favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the
necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress.
Petitioners filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said
resolution amending the constitution. Respondents argued that
the SC cannot take cognizance of the case because the Court is
bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the
issue at bar. Whether or not they said resolution was duly
enacted by Congress
HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if
both the journals from each House and an authenticated copy of
the Act had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the
Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the
enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a
law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in section
313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC found in the journals no
signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not bother
itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one
had been introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule
of conclusiveness advocate, namely, look into the journals behind
the enrolled copy in order to determine the correctness of the
latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the
copy, be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy
appears to have been noted between the two documents and the
court did not say or so much as give to understand that if
discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals,
disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies "shall
be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof."
**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally
passed by both houses, signed by the proper officers of each,
approved by the president and filed by the secretary of state.
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as
amended by Act No. 2210, provides: "Official documents may be
proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the Philippine
Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided for
in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those
bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or
resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of secretary, or
printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the
Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is
an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and
secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the
provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof."
The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated
resolution (enrolled bill) by the legislature. In case of
conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over
those of the journals.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. Inc., v. Hon. Pedro Gimenez
FACTS:

Petitioner was engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin

glues. It sought the refund of the margin fees relying on RA 2609
(Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law) stating that the Central Bank
of the Philippines fixed a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign
exchange transactions. However, the Auditor of the Bank refused
to pass in audit and approved the said refunds upon the ground
that Petitioners separate importations of urea and formaldehyde
is not in accord with the provisions of Sec. 2, par. 18 of RA
2609.The pertinent portion of this statute reads: The margin
established by the Monetary Board shall be imposed upon the
sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:
XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and
hardwood when imported by and for the exclusive use of endusers
ISSUE:
W/N urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from the
payment of the margin fee.
HELD:
The term urea formaldehyde used in Sec. 2 of RA 2609 refers to
the finished product as expressed by the National Institute of
Science and Technology, and is distinct and separate from urea
and formaldehyde which are separate chemicals used in the
manufacture of synthetic resin. The one mentioned in the law is a
finished product, while the ones imported by the Petitioner are
raw materials. Hence, the importation of urea and
formaldehyde is not exempt from the imposition of the margin
fee.
Morales v Subido
Facts: "In the Senate, the Committee on Government
Reorganization, to which House Bill 6951 was referred, reported a
substitute measure. It is to this substitute bill that Section 10 of
the Act owes its present form and substance.
"It is be noted that the Rodrigo amendment was in the nature
of an addition to the phrase 'who has served the police
department of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of captain
and/or higher,' under which the petitioner herein, who is at least
a high school graduate (both parties agree that the petitioner
finished the second year of the law course) could possibly
qualify. However, somewhere in the legislative process the
phrase ["who has served the police department of a city
or"] was dropped and only the Rodrigo amendment was
retained."
The present insistence of the petitioner is that the
version of the provision, as amended at the behest of Sen.
Rodrigo, was the version approved by the Senate on third
reading, and that when the bill emerged from the conference
committee the only change made in the provision was the
insertion of the phrase "or has served as chief of police with
exemplary record."
In support of this assertion, the petitioner submitted certified
photostatic copies of the different drafts of House Bill 6951
showing the various changes made. In what purport to be the
page proofs of the bill as finally approved by both Houses of
Congress.
It is unmistakable up to this point that the phrase, "who has
served the police department of a city or," was still part of
the provision, but according to the petitioner the House bill
division deleted the entire provision and substituted what now is
Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966, which Section reads:
"Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of Police
Agency. No person may be appointed chief of a city police
agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized
institution of learning and has served either in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of
Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary
record, or has served in the police department of any

city with rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least

three years; or any high school graduate who has served as
officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the
rank of captain and/or higher."
The petitioner also submitted a certified photostatic copy of a
memorandum which according to him was signed by an
employee in the Senate bill division, and can be found attached
to the page proofs of the bill, explaining the change in Section 10,
thus: "Section 10 was recast for clarity. (with the consent
of Sen. Ganzon & Congressman Montano)."
Issue: Whether the change an employee, as purportedly was a
rewriting to suit some stylistic preferences, was in truth an
alteration of meaning.
Held: ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration
are denied.
Ratio: The respect due to the other branches of the Government
demands that we act upon the faith and credit of what the
officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their
respective departments. Otherwise we would be cast in the
unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine
what actually did happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with
consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process.
The investigation which the petitioner would like this Court to
make can be better done in Congress. After all, House cleaning
the immediate and imperative need for which seems to be
suggested by the petitioner can best be effected by the
occupants thereof.
If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before
it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the
Executive on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing
the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the
cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree."
In view of Harwood v Wentworth
What the Justice Harlan said in Harwood v. Wentworth: How
much greater is the danger of permitting the validity of a
legislative enactment to be questioned by evidence furnished by
the general endorsements made by clerks upon bills previous to
their final passage and enrolment, endorsements usually so
expressed as not to be intelligible to any one except those who
made them, and the scope and effect of which cannot in many
cases be understood unless supplemented by the recollection of
clerks as to what occurred in the hurry and confusion often
attendant upon legislative proceedings."
In view of two foreign landmark cases on enrolled bill
doctrine
Both Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark and Harwood v. Wentworth
involved claims similar to that made by the petitioner in this
case. In both the claims were rejected.
Thus, in Marshall Field & Co. it was contended that the Tariff
Act of October 1, 1890 was a nullity because "it is shown by the
congressional records of proceedings, reports of committees of
conference, and other papers printed by authority of Congress,
and having reference to House Bill 9416, that a section of the bill
as it finally passed, was not in the bill authenticated by the
signatures of the presiding officers of the respective houses of
Congress, and approved by the President."
In rejecting the contention, the United States Supreme Court
held that the signing by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and by the President of the Senate of an enrolled
bill is an official attestation by the two houses that such bill is the
one that has passed Congress. And when the bill thus attested is
signed by the President and deposited in the archives, its
authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be
deemed complete and unimpeachable.
In Harwood the claim was that an act of the legislature of
Arizona "contained, at the time of its final passage, provisions

that were omitted from it without authority of the council or the

house, before it was presented to the governor for his approval."
The Court reiterated its ruling in Marshall Field & Co.
In view of Mabanag v Lopez-Vito & CASCO v Gimenez
It was not until 1947 that the question was presented in
Mabanag v. Lopez-Vito, and we there held that an enrolled bill
"imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts." This court
held itself bound by an authenticated resolution, despite the fact
that the vote of three-fourths of the members of the Congress (as
required by the Constitution to approve proposals for
constitutional amendments) was not actually obtained on
account of the suspension of some members of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate.
Thus in Mabanag the enrolled bill theory was adopted.
Whatever doubt there might have been as to the status and force
of the theory in the Philippines, in view of the dissent of three
Justices in Mabanag, was finally laid to rest by the unanimous
decision in Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez. Speaking
for the Court, the then Justice (now Chief Justice) Concepcion
said: "Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill which
uses the term 'urea formaldehyde' instead of 'urea and
formaldehyde' is conclusive upon the courts as regards the
tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the
President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil., 118, 120; Mabanag vs.
Lopez-Vito, 78 Phil., 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684,
September 14, 1961).
Astorga v Villegas
Facts: On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local
application, was filed in the House of Representatives. It was
there passed on third reading without amendments on April 21,
1964. Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate for its
concurrence. It was referred to the Senate Committee on
Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by
Senator Gerardo M. Roxas.
The committee favorably recommended approval with a minor
amendment, suggested by Senator Roxas, that instead of the City
Engineer it be the President Protempore of the Municipal Board
who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's
incapacity to act as Mayor.
On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a
message to the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress
informing them that in view of the circumstances he was
officially withdrawing his signature on House Bill No.
9266 (which had been returned to the Senate the previous July
3), adding that "it would be untenable and against public policy
to convert into law what was not actually approved by the two
Houses of Congress."
Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio
Villegas, issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of
offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators
and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to
disregard the provisions of Republic Act 4065. He likewise issued
an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city
police force who had been assigned to the Vice-Mayor
presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065.
Issue: Whether the so-called RA 4065 became law and that ViceMayor Astorga should exercise any of the powers conferred by RA
4065.
Held: In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is
denied and the so-called Republic Act No. 4065 entitled "AN ACT
DEFINING THE POWERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE VICEMAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA, FURTHER AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE SECTIONS TEN AND ELEVEN OF REPUBLIC ACT
NUMBERED FOUR HUNDRED NINE, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE REVISED CHARTER OF THE CITY OF MANILA"
is declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore
did not become law. The temporary restraining order dated

April 28, 1965 is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as

to costs.
Ratio: It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based
mainly on "the respect due to coequal and independent
departments," which requires the judicial department "to
accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the
manner stated." Thus it has also been stated in other cases
that if the attestation is absent and the same is not
required for the validity of a statute, the courts may
resort to the journals and other records of Congress for
proof of its due enactment.
In view of the enrolled bill theory
The "enrolled bill" theory was relied upon merely to bolster the
ruling on the jurisdictional question, the reasoning being that "if a
political question conclusively binds the judges out of
respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or
resolution also binds the judges under the 'enrolled bill rule' born
of that respect." It is a declaration by the two houses, through
their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested,
has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch
of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to
the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress
shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested,
receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its
authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be
deemed complete and unimpeachable.
As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed
by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of
State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of
the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a
solemn assurance by the legislative and executive
departments of the government, charged, respectively,
with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it
was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and
independent departments requires the judicial department to act
upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress,
all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to
determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act,
so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution."
In view of Sec. 313 Act 190 of Rules of Evidence Code of
Civil Procedures
Justice Cesar Bengzon wrote a separate opinion, concurred in
by Justice Sabino Padilla, holding that the Court had jurisdiction to
resolve the question presented, and affirming categorically that
"the enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative
journals are conclusive upon us," specifically in view of
Section 313 of Act 190, as amended by Act No. 2210. This
provision in the Rules of Evidence in the old Code of Civil
Procedure appears indeed to be the only statutory basis on which
the "enrolled bill" theory rests. It reads:
"The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or of any
legislative body that may be provided for in the Philippine
Islands, or of Congress (may be proved) by the journals of those
bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or
resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary,
printed by their order; provided, that in the case of acts of the
Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is
in existence a copy signed by the presiding officers and
secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the
provisions of such acts and of the due enactment
thereof."
In view of neutralization
By the respect due to a co-equal department of the
government, is neutralized in this case by the fact that the
Senate President declared his signature on the bill to be
invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the
invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had
signed had never been approved by the Senate. Obviously
this declaration should be accorded even greater respect
than the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason
that is undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.
In view of the signatures
The law-making process in Congress ends when the bill is

approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to

the validity of the bill or cure any defect already present upon its
passage. In other words it is the approval by Congress and not
the signatures of the presiding officers that is
essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that "[e]very bill
passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law, be
presented to the President."
In view of the need to inquire through the Journal
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is
no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true
that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of
misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case.
This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House
Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text
passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and
circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to
the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that
substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the
floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in
the printed text sent to the President and signed by him.

IN RE SHOOP
FACTS
- Max Shoop is applying for admission to practice law in the
Philippines under Par. 4 of the Rules for the Examination of
Candidates for Admission to the Practice of Law. It was shown in
his application that he was practicing for more than 5 years in the
highest court of the State of New York.
- The said rule requires that:
New York State by comity confers the privilege of admission
without examination under similar circumstances to attorneys
admitted to practice in the Philippine Islands. (Aside from comity,
the satisfactory affidavits of applicants must show they have
practiced at least 5 years in any (district or circuit or highest)
court of the US or territory of it. But admission is still in the
discretion of the court.)
- The rule of New York court, on the other hand, permits
admission without examination in the discretion of the Appellate
Division in several cases:
1. Provided that the applicant also practiced 5 years as a member
of the bar in the highest law court in any other state or territory
of the American Union or in the District of Columbia
2. The applicant practiced 5 years in another country whose
jurisprudence is based on the principles of the English Common
Law (ECL).
ISSUE
WON under the New York rule as it exists the principle of comity
is established
HELD
- The Philippines is an UNORGANIZED TERRITORY of the US, under
a civil gov't. Established by the Congress
In interpreting and applying the bulk of the written laws of this
jurisdiction, and in rendering its decisions in cases NOT covered
by the letter of the written law, this court relies upon the theories
and precedents of Anglo-American cases, subject to the limited
exception of those instances where the remnants of the Spanish
written law present well-defined civil law theories and of the few
cases where such precedents are inconsistent with local customs
and institutions.
- The jurisprudence of this jurisdiction is based upon the ECL in its
present day form of Anglo-American Common Law to an almost
exclusive extent.
- New York permits conferring privileges on attorneys admitted to
practice in the Philippines similar to those privileges accorded by
the rule of this court. - Petition granted. Decision is based on the
interpretation of the NY rule; doesnt establish a precedent with
respect to future Applications.
Reasoning On TERRITORY:

a. Comity would exist if we are a territory of the US

b. We are NOT an organized territory incorporated into the United
States but
c. We are NOT a "foreign country" or "another country" either
d. Like Puerto Rico, we may not be incorporated but we are a
territory since the US Congress legislates for us and we have
been granted a form of territorial government, so to that extent
we are a territory according to the US Atty. Gen.
e. It is not believed that the New York court intended the word
territory" to be limited to the technical meaning of organized
territory or it would have used the more accurate expression.
f. Therefore, We have a basis of comity to satisfy the first
requirement since the full phraseology indicates a SWEEPING
INTENTION to include ALL of the territory of the US.
On COMMON LAW jurisdiction:
(On what principle/s is the present day jurisprudence based?)
g. In most of the States, including New York, codification and
statute law have come to be a very large proportion of the law of
the jurisdiction, the remaining proportion being a system of case
law which has its roots, to a large but not exclusive degree, in the
old English cases.
h. In speaking of a jurisprudence "based on the English Common
Law" it would seem proper to say that the jurisprudence of a
particular jurisdiction Is based upon the principles of that
Common Law if its statute law and its case law to a very large
extent includes the science and application of law as laid down
by the old English cases, as perpetuated and modified by the
American cases.
J. Common Law adopted by decision:
i. In the US, the ECL is blended with American codification and
remnants of the Spanish and French Civil Codes. There a legal
metamorphosis has occurred similar to that which is transpiring
in this jurisdiction today.
ii. New York uses the phrase "based on the English Common Law"
in a general sense
iii. And that such Common Law may become the basis of the
jurisprudence of the courts where practical considerations and
the effect of sovereignty gives round for such a decision.
iv. If in the Philippines, ECL principles as embodied in AngloAmerican jurisprudence are used and applied by the courts to the
extent that Common Law principles are NOT in conflict with the
LOCALWRITTEN laws, customs, and institutions as modified by the
change of sovereignty and subsequent legislation, and there is
NO OTHER FOREIGN case law system used to any substantial
extent, THEN it is proper to say in the sense of the New York rule
that the "jurisprudence" of the Philippines is based on the ECL.
K. IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS:
i. The extent of the English or Anglo-Am Common Law here has
not been definitely decided by the SC. But there is a similarity to
the quotations from the American decisions cited with reference
to the ECL.
ii. Alzua & Arnalot vs. Johnson: we apply Anglo-Am jurisprudence
only in "xxxso far as they are founded on sound principles
applicable to local conditions, and are not in conflict with existing
law; nevertheless, many of the rules, principles, and doctrines of
the Common Law have, to all intents and purposes, been
IMPORTED into this jurisdiction, a RESULT of the enactment of
new laws and the organization of new institutions by the
Congress of the USxxx"
iii. The Spanish judicial system was abrogated replaced with a
new one modelled after the judicial systems of the US. Therefore,
those Spanish doctrines and principles in conflict with the new
one were abrogated.
iv. US. v. De Guzman: For proper construction and application of
the terms and provisions we borrowed from or modelled upon
Anglo-Am precedents, we review the legislative history of such
enactments.
v. US. v. Abiog and Abiog: The courts are constantly guided by the
doctrines of Common Law. Neither ECL or American Common Law

is in force in this Islandssave only in so far as they are founded

on sound principles applicable to local conditions and aren't in
conflict with existing law."
vi. What we have is a PHILIPPINECOMMON LAW influenced by the
ECL or American Common Law.
vii. A great preponderance of the jurisprudence of our jurisdiction
is based upon Anglo-American case law precedents-exclusively in
applying those statutory laws which have been enacted since the
change of sovereignty and which conform more or less to the
American statutes, and-to a large extent in applying and
expanding the remnants of the Spanish codes and written laws.
L. PHILIPPINE STATUTE LAW:
i. The chief codes of Spain that were extended to us were as
follows: Penal Code, Code of Commerce, Ley Provisional, Code of
Criminal Procedure, and Code of Civil Procedure, Civil Code,
Marriage Law, Mortgage Law, Railway laws, Law of Waters.
ii. There were also special laws having limited application.
iii. The foregoing written laws had acquired the force of statute
law by change of sovereignty.
iv. There was no properly called Case Law of Spain since Spanish
jurisprudence does not recognize the principle of Stare Decisis.
1. Manresas discussion of Art. 6 of the civil shows how far from a
case law system is jurisprudence. Spanish courts are governed
by:
a. First, by written law
b. 2nd, by the customs of the place (derives its force because it is
the acknowledged manner on how things are done and not
jurisprudence)
c. 3rd, by judicial decision (when in practice, these were
considered last; the development of case law was impeded
because the courts were free to disregard any information or
decisions of other courts.)
d. 4th, by general principles of law
M.SPANISH STATUTE LAW
i. All portions of political law were abrogated immediately with
the change of sovereignty.
ii. All Spanish laws, customs, and rights of property inconsistent
with the Constitution and American principles and institutions
were superseded.
iii. It was as if Congress had enacted new laws for the Philippines
modelled upon those same Spanish statutes.
M.CASES UNDER AMERICAN DERIVED STATUTES
i. It appears that the bulk of present day Statute Law is derivative
from Anglo-American sources; derivative in a sense of having
been COPIED, and in the sense of having been enacted by
Congress or by virtue of its authority.
ii. In all of the cases, Anglo-American decisions and authorities
are used and relied upon to a greater or less degree. Although in
many cases, the use is by way of dictum, nevertheless, the net
result is the building up of a very substantial elaboration of AngloAmerican case law.
N.CASES UNDER SPANISH STATUTES
i. We use Anglo-Am cases in interpreting and applying the
remnants of the Spanish statutes thus showing how permanent
the hold of the Anglo-Am Common Law has on our jurisprudence.
ii. Anglo-Am case law plays a very great part in amplifying the
law on those subjects, which are still governed by the remaining
portions of the Spanish statutes, as exhibited in the groups of
cases cited in the footnotes.
iii. Anglo-Am case law has entered practically every field of law
and in the large majority of such subjects has formed the sole
basis for the guidance of the Court in developing jurisprudence.
iv. The result is that we've developed a Phil. Common Law which
is based almost exclusively, except in cases where conflicting
with local customs and institutions, upon Anglo-Am Common Law.
O.COLLATERAL INFLUENCES
i. There are no digests of Spanish decisions to aid the study of
Bench and Bar vs. the abundance of digests/reports/textbooks on
English/Am. courts.
ii. There is a prolific use of Anglo-Am authorities in the decisions
of the court, plus, the available sources for study and reference
on legal theories are mostly Anglo-American
iii. Therefore, there has been developed and will continue a
common law in our jurisprudence (i.e. Phil Common Law) based

upon the ECL in its present day form of an Anglo-Am CL, which is
effective in all of the subjects of law in this jurisdiction, in so far
as it does not conflict with the express language of the written
law (where the remnants of the Spanish written law present welldefined civil law theories) or with the local customs and
institutions.
Tolentino versus Secretary of Finance
Facts:
Petitioner seeks re consideration on the on the decision of the
Supreme Court dismissing the cases for the declaration of
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716 otherwise known as the
Expanded Value-added Tax Law. Petitioner claimed that the law
did not originate exclusively from the House of Representatives
as required by Art. VI Sec. 24 of the Constitution. Though its
original version House Bill No. 11197 was filed in the House of
Representatives then sent to the Senate where only first reading
was conducted and then the senate passed another version of
the bill (Senate Bill No. 1630). Tolentino contended that the
Senate should have amended the House Bill No. 11197 by
replacing it with the text of S. No. 1630. In this way, the bill
remains a House Bill and the Senate version becomes only the
text of the House Bill.
Issues:
1. Whether the Senates action renders R.A. No. 7716
constitutionally invalid.
2. Whether the Senate committed grave abuse of its discretion by
passing its own version of the Bill.
Held:
No, R.A. No. 7716 is not unconstitutional. It is not the only
instance in which the senate proposed an amendment to a House
revenue bill by enacting its own version. This has happened twice
during the eight Congress in R.A. No. 7369 and R.A. No. 7549.
Petitioners contention concerns only a matter of form and did not
establish any substantial difference on both Bills.
There was no grave abuse of discretion though Art. VI sec. 24
provides that all appropriation and revenue bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives; it further provides
that the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. It is an
accepted practice for the Senate to introduce what is known as
an amendment by substitution, which may entirely replace the
bill initiated in the House of Representatives.

CIR v Court of Tax Appeals

FACTS:
Manila Golf & Country Club, Inc., a non-stock corporation who
maintains a golf course and operates a clubhouse with a lounge,
bar & dining room exclusively for its members & guests claims
that they should have been exempt from payment of privilege
taxes were it not for the last paragraph of Section 191-A of RA No.
6110, otherwise known as "Omnibus Tax Law".
By virtue of RA No. 6110, the CIR assessed the Manila Golf and
Country Club fixed taxes as operators of golf links and restaurant,
and also percentage tax (caterer's tax) for its sale of foods and
fermented liquors/wines for the period covering September 1969
to December 1970 in the amount of P32,504.96 in which the club
protested claiming the assessment to be without basis because
Section 42 was vetoed by then President Marcos.
CIR denied the protestation of the club, who maintain that
Section 42 was not entirely vetoed but merely the words "hotel,
motels, resthouses" on the ground that it might restrain the
development of hotels which is essential to the tourism industry.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the presidential veto referred to the entire section
or merely to the imposition of 20% tax on gross receipt of
operators or proprietors of restaurants, refreshment parlors, bars
and other eating places which are maintained within the
premises or compound of a hotel, motel or resthouses.
DECISION:
The presidential veto referred merely to the inclusion of hotels,
motels, and rest houses in the 20% caterer's tax bracket but not
to the whole section. It was then agreed by the SC with then
Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza and his associates that
inclusion of hotels, motels, and rest houses in the 20% caterer's
tax bracket are "items" in themselves within the meaning of Sec.
20(3), Article VI of the 1935 Constitution. The Petition is granted.
Sec. 191-A of RA 6110 is valid and enforceable, hence the Manila
Golf and Country Club, Inc is liable for the amount assessed
against it.