01 Salas V Jarencio (1972)

Legal Doctrine
Regardless of the source or classification of land in the possession of a municipality, excepting
those acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is held in trust for
the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary purposes:
Facts
On February 24, 1919, the 4th Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, acting as a land
registration court, rendered judgment declaring the City of Manila the owner in fee simple of a parcel
of land containing an area of 9,689.8 square meters, more or less. On various dates in 1924, the City
of Manila sold portions of the aforementioned parcel of land in favor of Pura Villanueva. On September
21, 1960, the Municipal Board of Manila, presided by then Vice-Mayor Antonio J. Villegas, adopted a
resolution requesting His Excellency, the President of the Philippines to consider the feasibility of
declaring the City property bounded by Florida, San Andres, and Nebraska Streets, containing a total
area of 7,450 square meters as a patrimonial property of the City of Manila for the purpose of
reselling these lots to the actual occupants thereof. There is therefore a precedent that this parcel of
land could be subdivided and sold to bona fide occupants. The bill was passed by the Senate and
approved by the President and became RA 4118.
Issues and Decisions
1. Is the property involved private or patrimonial property of the City of Manila?
NO, it is the property of the State.
2. Is Republic Act No. 4118 valid and not repugnant to the Constitution?
YES, it is valid.
Ratio
1. Is the property involved private or patrimonial property of the City of Manila?
NO, it is the property of the State.
The rule is that when it comes to property of the municipality which it did not acquire in
its private or corporate capacity with its own funds, the legislature can transfer its
administration and disposition to an agency of the National Government to be disposed of
according to its discretion.
The possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its
private or corporate capacity, such property is held in trust for the State for the benefit of its
inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary purposes. The City of Manila,
although declared by the Cadastral Court as owner in fee simple, has not shown by any shred
of evidence in what manner it acquired said land as its private or patrimonial property. The
presumption is that such land came from the State upon the creation of the municipality. That
it has in its name a registered title is not questioned, but this title should be deemed to be held
in trust for the State as the land covered thereby was part of the territory of the City of Manila
granted by the sovereign upon its creation.
Therefore, the land in question pertains to the State and the City of Manila merely acted
as trustee for the benefit of the people therein for whom the State can legislate in the exercise
of its legitimate powers.
2. Is Republic Act No. 4118 valid and not repugnant to the Constitution?
YES, it is valid.
Consequently, the City of Manila was not deprived of anything it owns, either under the
due process clause or under the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution. If it failed to

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get from the Congress the concession it sought of having the land involved given to it as its
patrimonial property, the Courts possess no power to grant that relief. Republic Act No. 4118
does not, therefore, suffers from any constitutional infirmity.

02 Province of Zamboanga vs. City of Zamboanga (1968)

Facts
Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga
used to be the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province. On October 12,
1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the Municipality of
Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Sec. 50 of the Act also provided that Buildings
and properties which the province shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital
to another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price
to be fixed by the Auditor General. The properties and buildings referred to
consisted of 50 lots and some buildings constructed thereon, located in the City of
Zamboanga and covered individually by Torrens certificates of title in the name of
Zamboanga Province.
On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the province of
Zamboanga into two (2): Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur.
Properties and the obligations of the province of Zamboanga shall be divided
equitably between the Province of Zamboanga del Norte and the Province of
Zamboanga del Sur by the President of the Philippines, upon the recommendation
of the Auditor General. However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act 3039was
approved amending Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39 by providing that all
buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga
and located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge,
in favor of the said City of Zamboanga.
Issue
Whether Zamboanga del Norte is deprived of its private properties
without due process and just compensation.
Ruling
The fact that the 26 lots are registered strengthens the proposition that they
are truly private in nature. On the other hand, that the24 lots used for
governmental purposes are also registered is of no significance since registration
cannot convert public property to private. Applying Art. 424 of NCC, all the
properties in question, except the two (2) lots used as High School playgrounds,
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could be considered as patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga province.

Even the capital site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school sites will
be considered patrimonial for the are not for public use. They would fall under the
phrase "public works for public service"

04 Director of Lands vs. IAC

Facts
The land in question is situated in Obando, Bulacan. It adjoins the
Kailogan River and private respondent Valeriano have converted it into
a fishpond. In their application in 1976, private respondents claimed
that they are the co-owners in fee simple of the land partly through
inheritance and partly by purchase and that; it is not within any forest
or military reservation. The Republic of the Phil., represented by the
Dir. of the Bureau of Forest Development, opposed the application on
the principal ground that the land applied for is WITHIN
THEUNCLASSIFIED REGION of Obando, Bulacan and that such area are
denominated as FORESTLANDS-do not form part of the disposable and
alienable portion of the public domain. The Trial Court ordered
registration of the subject land in favor of the Valerianos. This was
affirmed by the CA which said in part that since the subject property is
entirely devoted to fishpond purposes; it cannot be categorized as part
of forest lands.
Issue
Whether the courts can reclassify the subject public land
Held
Courts cannot reclassify... it is beyond their competence and
jurisdiction. The classification of public lands is an exclusive
prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government (Bureau of
Forest Development) and not of the Courts. In the absence of such
classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is released
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therefrom and rendered open to disposition. Since the subject property

is still unclassified, whatever possession Applicants (Valeriano) may
have had, and, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership. The
conversion of the subject property into a fishpond by Applicants does
not automatically render the property as alienable and disposable. The
recommendation of the District Forester for release of subject property
from unclassified region is not the ultimate word on the matter.

05 Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Cabangis

Facts
A certain lots were formerly a part of a large parcel of land belonging to the predecessor
of the herein claimants and appellees. From the year 1896 said land began to wear away, due
to the action of the waves of Manila Bay, until the year 1901 when the said lots became
completely submerged in water in ordinary tides, and remained in such a state until 1912when
the Government undertook the dredging of Vitas Estuary in order to facilitate navigation,
depositing all the sand and silt taken from thebe of the estuary on the low lands which were
completely covered with water, surrounding that belonging to the Philippine Manufacturing
Company, thereby slowly and gradually forming the lots, the subject matter of this proceeding.
Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in not holding that the lots in question are of the
public domain the same having been gained from the sea by accession, by fillings made by the
Bureau of Public Works and by the construction of the break-water.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that the lots in question having disappeared on account of the
gradual erosion due to the ebb and flow of the tide, and having remained in such a state until
they were reclaimed from the sea by the filling in done by the Government, they are public
land in the sense that neither the herein claimants-appellees nor their predecessors did
anything to prevent their destruction. By virtue whereof, the judgment appealed from the
lower court is reversed.

08 Sanchez vs. Asingan

Doctrine
Property owned by the State which is not intended for public use or public service is
patrimonial.There is no reimbursement if lessee derived substantial benefit from the use of
said property.
Facts

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Petitioner occupied a parcel of land owned by the municipality, with the implied consent of the
latter, and built buildings of light materials rent was paid. When a new set of officials took over, the
council gave notice to petitioner to vacate the land within 5 months.
Petitioner refused and filed for prohibition stating that the land belonged to the province and
the municipality had no standing to seek their ejectment and in case they should be ejected, prayed
for reimbursement, citing the Rojas case.
ISSUE
Whether the land is public or patrimonial.
HELD
The land is patrimonial property of the municipality. It was not for public use not was it for
public service. There is to be no reimbursement. Unlike the Rojas case, the land here is not of public
character. The implied lease agreement is therefore valid and may be terminated upon notice.
Assuming that the property is public, there can still be no reimbursement as petitioner derived
substantial benefit from the use of the property.

06 Laurel vs. Garcia

Doctrine: A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or
ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such.
Facts:
The subject Roppongi property is one of the four properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine
government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on 9 May 1956, the other lots being the
Nampeidai Property (site of Philippine Embassy Chancery), the Kobe Commercial Property (Commercial lot used
as warehouse and parking lot of consulate staff), and the Kobe Residential Property (a vacant residential lot).The
properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese government for national development
projects are part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their
suffering during World War II.
The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued at $550 million would be payable in 20
years in accordance with annual schedules of procurements to be fixed by the Philippine and Japanese
governments (Article 2, Reparations Agreement). The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese
government under the Second Year Schedule and listed under the heading Government Sector, through
Reparations Contract 300 dated 27 June 1958. The Roponggi property consists of the land and building for the
Chancery of the Philippine Embassy. As intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter
was transferred to Nampeidai on 22 July 1976 when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. Due to the
failure of our government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi property has remained undeveloped since
that time.
During the incumbency of President Aquino, a proposal was made by former Philippine Ambassador to
Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to lease the subject property to Kajima Corporation, a Japanese firm, in exchange of the
construction of 2 buildings in Roppongi, 1 building in Nampeidai, and the renovation of the Philippine Chancery
in Nampeidai. The Government did not act favorably to said proposal, but instead, on 11 August 1986, President
Aquino created a committee to study the disposition or utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo
and Kobe though AO-3, and AO 3-A to 3-D. On 25 July 1987, the President issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino
citizens or entities to avail of reparations capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition.
The four properties in Japan including the Roppongi were specifically mentioned in the first Whereas clause.
Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government has been pushing, with great
vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot.
Two petitions for prohibition were filed seeking to enjoin respondents, their representatives and agents
from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 sq. m. of land at 306 Ropponggi, 5-Chome Minato-ku,

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Tokyo, Japan scheduled on 21 February 1990; the temporary restraining order of which was granted by the court
on 20 February 1990. In G.R. No. 92047, a writ of mandamus was prayed for to compel the respondents to fully
disclose to the public the basis of their decision to push through with the sale of the Roppongi property in spite
of strong public opposition and to explain the proceedings which effectively prevent the participation of Filipino
citizens and entities in the bidding process.
Issues: Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine Government?
Does
the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property?
Held: No, The Roppongi property was acquired together with the other properties through reparation
agreements. They were assigned to the government sector and that the Roppongi property was specifically
designated under the agreement to house the Philippine embassy. It is of public dominion unless it is
convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. The respondents have failed to do so.
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its
ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and payment, in application to the satisfaction of
collective needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as the juridical person but
the citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation.
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service doesnt
automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn
from public use. A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or
ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such.

07 Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas

Facts
A parcel of land forming a part of the public plaza was leased to
the defendants on which their house has been constructed and had
been occupying the same. The plaintiff ordered the defendants to
vacate the said land as it formed integral part of the public plaza. The
defendants refused to vacate the said land because they had acquired
the right of possession to it and further alleged that the lease
agreement provided that they can only be ordered to vacate the said
property if the municipality needed it for decoration or public use.
The trial court held that the municipality had no legal claim to the
property. This case was appealed through bill of exceptions.
Issue
Whether the lease agreement between the parties was valid
Ruling
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The lease was null and void.

Ratio Decidendi
The defendant has no right to continue to occupy the land for it is
an integral part of the plaza which is for public use and is reserved for
the common benefit. Property for public use in provinces and in towns
comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets,
fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and public works of
general service supported by said towns or provinces.
The said Plaza being a promenade for public use, the municipal council
of Cavite could not in 1907 withdraw or exclude from public use a
portion thereof in order to lease it for the sole benefit of the defendant
Hilaria Rojas. The plaintiff municipality exceeded its authority in the
exercise of its powers by executing a contract over a thing of which it
could not dispose, nor is it empowered so to do. The Civil Code, articles
1271, prescribes that everything which is not outside the commerce of
man may be the object of a contract, and plazas and streets are
outside of this commerce. Therefore, it must be concluded that the
said lease is null and void.
09 City of Cebu vs. NAWASA

Facts
The Municipality of Cebu (Cebu) constructed sewer and drainage facilities,
known as the Osmena Waterworks System. In 1948, the Public Service Commission
(PSC) granted Cebu a certificate of public convenience to operate and maintain the
Osmena Waterworks System. In 1955, RA 1383 created the National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority(NAWASA) to have jurisdiction, supervision and control over all
territory embraced by Metropolitan Water District (MWD) as well as areas served by
existing government-owned waterworks in cities, municipalities and municipal
districts. Section 8 of RA 1383 dissolved the MWD and transferred its records, assets
and liabilities to NAWASA.
Cebu filed a complaint for declaratory relief against NAWASA.
Lower Court's Ruling
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The CFI held that RA 1383 is unconstitutional insofar as it vests NAWASA

ownership over the Osmena Waterworks System without just compensation.
NAWASA, however, has the right of control, jurisdiction and supervision over the
Osmena Waterworks System.
Issues
1. Whether RA 1383 provides for automatic expropriation of the Osmena
Waterworks System;
2. Whether the Osmena Waterworks System is proprietary; and Whether RA
1383 is a valid exercise of police power.
Supreme Court's Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CFI. RA 1383 failed to present
what kind of assets from NAWASA shall be received in equal value by the cities,
municipalities, and other government-owned waterworks and sewerage systems in
exchange for their assets. This kind of compensation does not satisfy constitutional
provisions. The Osmena Waterworks System is proprietary. Only those of the general
public who pay the required rental or charge authorized by the System make use of
the water. The system serves all who pay charges.
It is open to the public (thus making it public service), but only upon payment
of a certain rental (thus making it proprietary). A municipal water system designed to
supply water to the inhabitants for a profit is a corporate function of the municipality.
Finally, the transfer of ownership of the Osmena Waterworks System to another
governmental agency is not a valid exercise of police power. While the power to
enact laws intended to promote public order, safety, health, morals and general
welfare is inherent in every sovereign state, such power is not without limitations,
such as the constitutional prohibition against the taking of private property for public
use without just compensation. RA 1383 is violative of the Constitution because of
the lack of provision regarding effective payment of just compensation.

11 Municipality of Oas vs. Roa

LAW
Art 453
FACTS
The Municipality brought the action for the recovery of a tract
of land in the pueblo of Oas, claiming that it was a part of the
public square of said town, while Roa alleged that he was the
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owner of the property. The defendant admitted in writing that he

knew that the land is owned by the Municipality and that Jose
Castillo, whom he bought the property, did not own the land.
When Roa constructed a substantial building on the property in
question after he acquired the property from Castillo, the
Municipality did not oppose the construction.
ISSUE
Whether the municipality owns the land.
HELD
Yes. The defendant was not a purchaser in good faith. The
plaintiff, having permitted the erection by the defendant of a
building on the land without objection, acted in bad faith. The
rights of the parties must, therefore, be determined as if they both
had acted in good faith. To the case are applicable those
provisions of the Civil Code which relate to the construction by one
person of a building upon land belonging to another. Article 364
(now Art.453) of the Civil Code is as follows: "When there has been
bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, sowed, or
planted on another's land, but also on the part of the owner of the
latter, the rights of both shall be the same as if they had acted in
good faith. The Supreme declared that the Municipality is the
owner of the land and that it has the option of buying the building
thereon, which is the property of the defendant, or of selling to
him the land on which it stands.

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