Downfall of Barings Bank due to Rogue Trader

Barings Bank and
Nick Leeson
2016 met gruodio mnesio 1 diena
Barings Bank and Nick Leeson

Nicholas Leeson was a rogue trader who reduced
the value of the venerable Baring Brothers & Co.
(BB&Co) Bank from roughly $500 million dollars to
$1.60. Lesson traded futures contracts on the
Nikkei 225 and on Japanese government bonds
without authorization while management at
Barings, the Singapore International Monetary
Exchange, the Osaka Stock Exchange, and other
governing bodies in Britain and Singapore
disregarded or failed to recognize the potential for
financial disaster. The failure of Barings Bank
provides a lesson in the risks and responsibilities
involved in organizing and monitoring derivatives
trading.
2

Baring Brothers History
Baring Brothers had a long history in the London
financial district, with the distinction of having gone
global with its operations in the eighteenth century.
Founded in the late 1700s, the bank was turned into a
general-banking and mercantile operation by Sir
Francis Baring. During his tenure, the bank developed
several lines of business: underwriting bonds,
accepting deposits, and trading commodities.
Baring Brothers reached the height of its reputation after
the Napoleonic Wars in Europe. The bank led the
funding of the French reparations to the victors and
was lauded, in 1812 by the French Duc de Richelieu,
4

as the "sixth power in Europe," after Great Britain,
France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia. Baring
Brothers helped finance the Louisiana Purchase for
the United States, underwrote railroad
construction in Canada, and financed other
projects throughout the Americas. One of those
other projects was underwriting a 1,2 million
share issue for the Buenos Aires Water Supply and
Drainage Co. in 1890. The issue did not sell, but
Baring Brothers had already sent the money and
was on the brink of failure when the Bank of
England organized a consortium to bail it out.
Thereafter, it was known as Baring Brothers & Co.
6

For all its long history in cross-border transactions,
the bank never grew along with the size of the
markets it served. In 1995, Baring Brothers & Co.
remained a small, family controlled bank ranked
474th in the world banking market.
Barings entered the securities market in 1984 when it
acquired the Far East department of Henderson
Crothwaite (British stockbrokers). This new entity
at Barings was called Baring Securities Ltd. (BSL).
Christopher Heath, a specialist in Japanese
instruments, managed to maintain independent
control of Baring Securities until 1993.

During eight consecutive profitable years, everyone at
Barings became accustomed to large bonuses,
largely funded by profits in Baring Securities. In
1989, BSL provided 5O million of 65 million total
profit for Barings. Unfortunately, the losses incurred
in 1992 led to Heath being asked to resign in March
1993.
Nicholas Leeson
Nicholas Leeson was two days shy of his twentyeighth birthday when his trading activities forced
Baring Brothers into bankruptcy. Leeson left a note
on his desk saying "I'm 'sorry" and bolted to Kuala
Lumpur with his wife following shortly thereafter.
8

Nick Leeson was born in Watford, England, just
outside of London. His father was a plasterer and
his mother was a nurse. He was the oldest of four
children. Leeson did not attend university;
instead, he went directly to work in London upon
completion of high school. He worked with a
British bank, Coutts & Co., and then Morgan
Stanley, before moving to Barings Securities
London in 1989.
10

Nick Leeson was twenty-two years old when he was
hired for the position at Baring Securities London
(BSLL). BSLL was looking to fill a position settling
trades completed in Japan. Leeson, who had
experience at Morgan Stanley settling futures and
options in Japan, was a good replacement. He
worked hard, kept to himself, and was known as
someone anxious to learn and eager to please. He
was subsequently selected as a member of a team
of four people assigned to straighten out back
office problems in Jakarta.
11

In 1992, he was selected to run the back office for the
new Baring Futures Singapore (BFS), a subsidiary
that would trade futures and options. His exact
responsibilities were somewhat unclear, although they
did include responsibility for both the back office
accounting and control functions as well as for
executing clients orders. This was when Leeson's
unauthorized trading activities began. On his
initiative, Leeson sat for and passed the futurestrading exam to become registered as an associated
person with the Singapore International Monetary
Exchange (SIMEX).
12

He did not need the license to fulfill his
responsibilities, but he did need it to execute
trades. To meet his Baring's responsibilities, he
only needed to take orders from clients, and pass
them to a trader for execution.
In 1992, Leeson established the error account 88888
(eight is considered a lucky number by the
Chinese), which, according to SIMEX investigators,
he immediately began using to conceal
unauthorized trading activities. While a legitimate
error account, numbered 99002, was known to
BSLL, the 88888 account did not show on files or
statements transmitted from Singapore to London.
13

Account 88888 was known to SIMEX, but as a
customer account, not as an error account. Leeson
had to represent it differently to each group
because he could not hide the existence of 88888
from SIMEX, and he could not explain its volume
and balance to BSLL (but he could hide it from
them).
14

Derivatives
Since the early 1970s, derivatives have
increasingly been used by firms to manage their
exposure to risks. When a derivative is purchased,
only part of the value of the underlying asset is at
risk, while the opportunity to benefit from
favorable price fluctuations is retained. Derivatives
can offer potentially enormous gains, which can
lead to their use as speculative instruments. They
also offer potentially debilitating losses, depending
on the positions taken.
15

Nick Leeson was trading futures and options on the Nikkei
225, an index of Japanese securities. Leeson was long
Nikkei 225 futures, short Japanese government bond
futures, and short both put and call options on the
Nikkei index. He was betting that the Nikkei index would
rise. He was wrong and ended up losing $1.39 billion.
For Leeson to suffer losses of this magnitude in futures
positions during January and February of 1995, he had
to have held approximately one quarter of the entire
open interest on the Osaka and Singapore stock
exchanges. Unfortunately, since management had given
such free rein to Leeson by allowing him to control both
front and back office operations, this level of investment
went undetected by the firm.
16

Leeson offset any losses incurred on his long positions
in Nikkei futures by writing Nikkei options. That is,
when Leeson purchased futures contracts, he was
required to pay cash, a margin of 15% of the
contract's value to SIMEX, and when the losses on
the contracts accumulated, additional margin was
required because futures contracts are marked-tomarket on a daily basis. However, when he wrote
the options, he received cash, in the form of
premiums. The premiums from the Nikkei options
served two purposes: (1) they were used to hide
losses created by the futures, which would
otherwise have shown in BFS financial statements,
17

and (2) the premiums served to cover the margin calls on
the futures. Leeson was able to do this due to the
nature of the Japanese futures market at this time. In
Japan, margin is posted on a net basis for all
customers. Therefore, if many customers were short
index futures, the firm can take long positions without
having to post cash margin. In addition, daily
settlement was one-sided. That is, losers must cover
their losses daily, but winners were not permitted to
withdraw gains. Therefore, it was possible to cover the
firm's losses with customer gains.
18

Another aspect of the Japanese futures market,
which enabled Leeson to do this, was that the
exchange did not require a separation between
customer and proprietary funds. Therefore, it was
impossible to distinguish between the firm's and
the customers' positions.
The Nikkei 225 experienced an extended bull run
throughout the late 1980s, reaching a height of
close to 40,000 in 1989. By mid 1994, Leeson was
convinced that since the Nikkei had fallen to half
of its 1989 high, and interest rates were low, it
would likely recover in the near future.
19

He was convinced it would not fall below 19,000 and he
was willing to put a lot of Barings money at risk
based on that belief. However, a rise in interest
rates would hurt him and, accordingly, be took short
positions in Japanese government bonds futures
contracts that would pay off if interest rates rose.
Leeson's options positions were founded on his belief
that volatility would be low. In fact, he had traded
enough contracts by the time of the collapse that he
was causing volatility to remain low. Increasingly, he
had to write a larger volume of options in order to
get the same amount of premiums.
20

When it became increasingly difficult for the options'
premiums to cover the margin calls on the
futures, Leeson requested money from London. By
February 23, 1995, BSLL had sent approximately
$600 million to BFS. BSLL funded his request with
little information, and with the understanding that
a portion of the money was "loans to clients," as
portrayed on the BFS balance sheet.
21

The Losses
Leeson began trading futures in July 1992 and by
the end of the month, he had bought and sold
2,051 Nikkei futures, suffering a loss of
approximately $64,000 immediately. By the end of
the year, his losses in account 88888 were more
than $3.2 million. The numbers turned somewhat
in his favor by mid-1993 when the losses
amounted to only $40,000. Unfortunately, Leeson
intended to keep trading until his numbers were
positive. By the end of 1993, the losses were
approximately $30 million.
22

At this point, Leeson wrote options for approximately
$35 million to offset the futures losses and to
avoid suspicion from London and the auditors.
Throughout this time period, Leeson was reporting
record profits, and was being heralded as a
superstar.
By the end of 1994, the Nikkei had fallen to just
under 20,000 and Leeson's losses approached
$330 million. Meanwhile, Barings executives were
expecting an estimated $20 million in profits from
BFS for 1994.
23

Leeson's activities in the first few months of 1995
were like those of any self-respecting speculator.
On January 13, 1995, the Nikkei reached 19,331
and Barings was long 3,024 Nikkei futures
contracts. But, on January 17, 1995, an
earthquake measuring 7.2 devastated the
Japanese city of Kobe. The Nikkei plummeted
below 18,840 by January 20, at which point
Leeson doubled his contracts to 7,135. This
process continued as the Nikkei fell to 18,000 on
February 23, 1995, and Leeson's exposure grew to
more than 55,399 unhedged Nikkei futures.
24

Compounding the problem, interest rates did not rise
as Leeson had expected and he was losing on the
Japanese government bond futures as well.
By Friday, February 24, 1995, Barings and the
world discovered that Leeson had incurred losses
approaching $1.1 billion, more than double the
capitalization of the bank. The bank was headed
toward bankruptcy. When the markets opened in
Singapore and Osaka on Monday, the exchanges
would declare Barings in default on its margins.
25

Throughout that weekend, the Bank of England
hosted meetings in London to try to form a
consortium to bail out Barings. Barclays Bank
assumed the leadership role and was able to
attain commitments for $900 million for three
months. Unfortunately for Barings, no one would
assume the contingent risk of additional, but as
yet undiscovered losses, and the efforts failed. At
the time, it was already known that on Monday,
February 27, 1995, there would be an additional
$370 million in losses from Barings positions,
bringing the total loss to $1.39 billion. Barings was
bankrupt.
26
1. What was Nick Leeson's strategy to

earn trading profits on derivatives?
27

He dealt in 6 main financial futures and some options on them, as
follows:
1. Nikkei 225 contract traded on SIMEX in Singapore;
2. Nikkei 225 contract traded on OSE (Osaka Stock Exchange) in
Japan;
3. 10-year JGB (Japanese government bonds) contract traded on
SIMEX in Singapore;
4. 10-year JGB contract traded on TSE (Tokyo Stock Exchange) in
Japan;
5. 3-month Euroyen contract traded on SIMEX in Singapore;
6. 3-month Euroyen contract traded on TIFFE (Tokyo Financial
Futures Exchange) in Japan.
Around 1993 arbitrage business began to be an important part of
Barings Far Eastern operations.
28
An arbitrage
An arbitrage is a type of transaction or portfolio.
Actually, the term is used in two different ways, so
it refers to either of two very different types of
transactions or portfolios. People also speak of
arbitrage as an activitythe activity of seeking out
and implementing either of the two types of
arbitrage transactions or portfolios. An
arbitrageur is an individual or institution who
engages in such arbitrage.
29
An arbitrage
In finance theory, an arbitrage is a "free lunch"a
transaction or portfolio that makes a profit without
risk. Suppose a futures contract trades on two
different exchanges. If, at one point in time, the
contract is bid at USD 45.02 on one exchange and
offered at USD 45.00 on the other, a trader could
purchase the contract at one price and sell it at
the other to make a risk-free profit of a USD 0.02.
30
A short straddle
Short straddle
A short straddle is a non-directional
options trading strategy that involves
simultaneously selling a put and a call
of the same underlying security,
strike price and expiration date.
31
A short straddle
32
A short straddle
The profit is limited to the premiums of
the put and call, but it is risky if the
underlying security's price goes up or
down much. The deal breaks even if
the intrinsic value of the put or the
call equals the sum of the premiums
of the put and call.
33
A short straddle
A short straddle position is highly
risky, because the potential loss is
unlimited, whereas profitability is
limited to the premium gained by the
initial sale of the options. The Collar
is a more conservative "opposite" that
limits gains and losses.
34
1. What was Nick Leesons strategy to earn

trading profits on derivatives?
Answer: Nick Leeson was trading futures and
options on the Nikkei 225, an index of Japanese
securities. He was long Nikkei 225 futures, short
Japanese government bond futures, and
short both put and call options on the Nikkei
Index. He was betting that the Nikkei index
would rise, but instead, it fell, causing him to
lose $1.39 billion.
35
36
2. What went wrong that caused his

strategy to fail?
37
Barings Bank and Nick Leeson +

The beginning of the end occurred on January 16,
1995, when Leeson placed a short straddle in the
Stock Exchange of Singapore and Tokyo stock
exchanges, essentially betting that the Japanese
stock market would not move significantly
overnight. However, the Kobe earthquake hit early
in the morning on January 17, sending Asian
markets, and Leeson's investments, into a tailspin.
Leeson attempted to recoup his losses by making a
series of increasingly risky new investments, this
time betting that the Nikkei Stock Average would
make a rapid recovery. But the recovery failed to
materialize, and he succeeded only in digging a
deeper hole.
38

What went wrong that caused his strategy to
fail?
Answer: Nick Leesons strategy failed because the
Nikkei 225 index kept falling while he continued to
bet that it would rise.
39
3. Why did Nick Leeson establish a

bogus error account (88888) when a
legitimate account (99002) already
existed?
40

Why did Nick Leeson establish a bogus error account
(88888) when a legitimate account (99002) already
existed?
Answer: Nick Leeson established a bogus error account
(88888) when a legitimate account (99002) already existed
in order to conceal his unauthorized trading activities. While
the legitimate error account was known to Barings Securities
in London, the bogus account was not. However, the bogus
account was known to SIMEX as a customer account, not as
an error account. In this way Leeson could hide his balances
and losses from Londonbut not Singapore. One the other
hand, SIMEX thought the bogus error account, 88888, was a
legitimate customer account rather than a proprietary
Barings account.
41
4. Why did Barings and its auditors not

discover that the error account was
used by Leeson for unauthorized
trading?
42

Why did Barings and its auditors not discover that
the error account was used by Leeson for
unauthorized trading?
Answer: Internal Reasons. Leeson engaged in
unauthorized trading, as well as fraud. However, it is
clear that he was hidden in the organized chaos that
characterized Barings. There were no clearly laid
down reporting lines with regard to Leeson, through
the management chain to Ron Baker [Head of
Financial Products Group for Barings] (Bank of
England, p. 235). In fact, it seems there were
several people responsible for monitoring Leesons
performance, each of whom assumed the other was
watching more closely than he.
43

In August 1994, James Baker completed an internal
audit of the Singapore office. He made several
recommendations that should have alerted Barings
executives to the potential for unauthorized
trading: (a) segregation of front and back office
activitiesa fundamental principle in the industry,
(b) a comprehensive review of Leesons funding
requirements, and (c) position limits on Leesons
activities. None of these had been acted upon by
the time of the banks collapse. With regard to the
first concern, Simon Jones, Director of BFS and
Finance Director of BSS, in Singapore, offered
assurances that he would address the segregation
issue.
44

However, he never took action to segregate Leesons
front and back office activities. Tony Hawes,
Barings Treasurer in London agreed to complete a
review of the funding requirements within the
coming year. Ian Hopkins, Director and Head of
Treasury and Risk in London, placed the issue of
position limits on the risk committees agenda, but
it had not been decided when the collapse
occurred.
45

According to the Bank of England report, senior
management in London considered Jones a poor
communicator and were concerned that he was not
as involved as he should have been in the affairs of
BFS. In fact, Peter Norris, the chief executive officer
for Baring Securities Limited wanted to replace
Jones. Jones, however, was protected by James Bax,
Managing Director of Baring Securities Singapore,
who was well liked in London. The Bank of England
also found fault with the process of funding Leesons
activities from London. First, there was no clear
understanding of whether the funds were needed for
clients or for Barings own accounts, making
reconciliation impossible.
46

Second, given the large amounts, credit checks
should have been completed as well. The report
places the responsibility for the lack of due
diligence with Tony Hawes, Ian Hopkins, and the
Chairman of the Barings Credit Committee. The
issue of proper reconciliation arose as early as
April 1992 when Gordon Bowser, the risk manager
in London, recommended that a reconciliation
process be developed. Unfortunately, Bowser left
Simon Jones and Tony Dickel, who had sent
Leeson to Singapore, to agree on a procedure.
47

With internal conflict over who was responsible for
Leesons activities, no agreement was reached
between those two, and Leeson was left to
establish reconciliation procedures for himself.
There are numerous similar examples of internal
conflict benefitting Leesons covert trading
throughout the three years. But one of the late
failures occurred in January 1995 when SIMEX
raised concern over Barings ability to meet its
large margins. In a letter dated January 11, 1995,
and addressed to Simon Jones, SIMEX officials
noted that there should have been an additional
$100 million in the margin account for 88888.
48

Jones passed the letter to Leeson to draft a esponse.
External Reasons. In January 1995, SIMEX was
getting close to Leesons activities, but had not yet
managed to determine what was happening. In
response to a second letter dated January 27,
1995 and sent to James Bax in Singapore, SIMEX
expressed concerns regarding Barings ability to
fund its margin calls. Bax referred the letter to
London, and SIMEX received reassurance that
opposite positions were held in Japan.
Unfortunately, SIMEX officials did not follow up
with the Osaka Stock Exchange to verify the
existence of those positions.
49
5. Why did none of the regulatory

authorities in Singapore, Japan, and
the United Kingdom discover the true
use of the error account?
50
51

Why did none of the regulatory authorities in
Singapore, Japan, and the United Kingdom
not discover the true use of the error
account?
Answer: SIMEX assumed that Barings was
hedging and not speculating when it granted an
exemption on the number of contracts that
Barings could hold. Due to Barings reputation for
being a conservative firm, the exchange and
clearing houses were operating under a false
sense of security.
52

In addition, the speculative position of Barings was
hidden due to use of an omnibus account to clear
trades. With an omnibus account, the identity of
the brokers customers is hidden from the
exchange and the clearinghouse. Several incidents
in London also made Leesons activities easier to
manage and hide. The Bank of England had a
Large Exposure rule where a bank could not lend
more than 25% of its capital to any one entity.
However, Barings had requested that an exception
be made, arguing that an exchange should not be
treated as one entity.
53

Christopher Thompson, the supervisor in charge of
Barings activities, acknowledged receipt of the
request and said he would review it. In the
meantime, he offered an informal concession for
Japan, which Barings took the liberty of also
applying to Singapore and Hong Kong. Thompson
did not respond for a year, and when he did on
February 1, 1995, the answer was that an
exception could not be made for exchanges and
that the positions taken under the informal
concession should be unwound.
54

The second incident was the solo-consolidation of
Baring Securities Ltd and Baring Brothers & Co.
This allowed them to be treated as one entity for
capital adequacy and large exposure purposes.
This meant Leeson had access to a larger amount
of capital. The Bank of England found the process
of solo-consolidation to have been too informal
and the results to have facilitated Leesons
fraudulent activities.
55
6. Why was Barings Bank willing to

transfer large cash sums to Barings
Futures Singapore?
56

Why was Barings Bank willing to transfer
large cash sums to Barings Futures
Singapore?
Answer: Barings Bank believed that the large
cash sums transferred to Barings Futures
Singapore was for loans to customers as portrayed
on the Barings Futures Singapore balance sheet.
57
Sources of Funding for BSS During

Early 1995
Baring Securities (Singapore) Limited (BSS)
58
7. Why did the attempt by the Bank of

England to organize a bailout for
Barings fail?
59

Why did the attempt by the Bank of England to
organize a bailout for Barings fail?
Answer: The attempt by the Bank of England to
organize a bailout for Barings failed because no
one would assume the contingent risk of
additional, but as yet undiscovered losses.
60
8. Suggest regulatory and management

reforms that might prevent a future
debacle of the type that bankrupted
Barings .
61

Suggest regulatory and management reforms
that might prevent a future debacle of the
type that bankrupted Barings.
Answer: Due to incidents of staggering losses to
corporate and banking entities as early as 1993,
calls for financial reforms, particularly in relation to
derivatives, had been ongoing for quite some time.
However, it took the Baring Brothers bankruptcy to
finally bring about action. The Bank of England,
SIMEX and the Group of Thirty all created reports
on how regulators, administrators, legislators,
international firms and associations could address
the issues of regulating financial activities.
62

The Bank of England wrote a report describing how
the losses occurred, why they went unnoticed
within and outside Barings, and lessons learned.
How the losses occurred and why they went
unnoticed has already been explained. The Bank
produced five lessons from the bankruptcy. They
are (Bank of England Report):
(a) Management teams have a duty to understand
fully the businesses they manage
(b) Responsibility for each business activity has to
be clearly established and communicated;
(c) Clear segregation of duties is fundamental to
any effective control system;
63

(d) Relevant internal controls, including independent
risk management, have to be established for all
business activities;
(e) Top management and the Audit Committee have
to ensure that significant weaknesses, identified to
them by internal audit or otherwise, are resolved
quickly.
Despite these simplistic recommendations, at least one
and usually several, of the points was the reason why
firms lost large sums of money within the derivatives
market. SIMEX, like the other exchanges in the
world, implemented changes to decrease default and
counterparty risk as well as systemic risks.
64

These changes were made as a direct result
of the Barings collapse. SIMEX joined with other
exchanges to share information about similar
positions participants held on different exchanges.
To reduce the risk of nonpayment of contracts,
SIMEX and other exchanges placed the resources
of their entire membership behind the
settlements. The Group of Thirty based out of
Washington, DC, has become particularly
concerned with the risks derivatives pose. Since
1995, it has issued several publications to address
these problems.
65

The first of these was published in August 1996, and
is titled International Insolvencies in the Financial
Sector, Discussion Draft. This document advances
fourteen ideas to reduce the risk in the financial
sector particularly with regard to derivatives (see
Exhibit 2 for the complete list).
The second publication printed in April of 1997 is
titled International Insolvencies in the Financial
Sector, Summary of Comments from Respondent
Countries on Discussion Draft. This publication
gives the responses and opinions of those member
countries to the proposed reforms.
66

The support for these reforms was generally very
strong among all the countries that responded.
Germany and other countries did mention several
drawbacks to some of the reforms, but they, too,
were generally supportive. Ironically, Singapore
expressed reservations or outright opposition to five
of the reforms (#1, 2, 4, 6 and 9).1
A third publication dealing with the aftermath of
Barings, is titled Global Institutions, National
Supervision and Systemic Risk (1997). This
discusses reforms that have already been put in
place. These reforms include expanded use of
netting and collateral; improvements in measuring
risk;
67

greater disclosure of off-balance-sheet risk;
substantial increases in equity capital of major
financial institutions; financial sector
consolidation; and the growth of securitization.
68

Postscript: ING, a Dutch insurance company, was
looking to enter the banking business, especially
in Asia. It paid one pound sterling for Baring
Brothers and added an additional $1 billion to pay
off the debts Baring Brothers had accumulated
and restore the banks capital position. In
addition, ING also had to pay $677 million to the
holders of subordinated debt that was issued by
Barings plc, the holding company, just before the
bankruptcy. Legally, ING was not liable for the
bonds, but since the bondholders were Barings
best customers, ING had to make good on the
notes in order to save the customer relationships.
69

On February 23, 1995, Nick Leeson fled in his
Mercedes across the bridge from Singapore to
Malaysia. He hid out in Thailand for the next week
with his wife and was caught flying into Germany
one week later. He was extradited back to
Singapore, stood trial and was subsequently
sentenced to 6.5 years in a Singapore prison for
fraud. In August 1998, Leeson underwent surgery
for colon cancer and began receiving
chemotherapy. Despite his condition, authorities in
Singapore did not release Leeson until June 1999.
70
71
72
Nick Leeson
73

Christopher Thompson was the Bank of England
supervisor in charge of Baring Brothers at the time
of the bankruptcy. He was responsible for allowing
Baring Brothers to invest over the legal limit of
25% of its capital in the SIMEX and OSE. The day
before the Bank of England report was to be
published about the Baring Brothers collapse,
Thompson resigned.
74
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Barings Bank and Nick Leeson

Barings Bank and Nick Leeson

5. Why did none of the regulatory

Barings Bank and Nick Leeson

Barings Bank and Nick Leeson

Barings Bank and Nick Leeson

Barings Bank and Nick Leeson

Barings Bank and Nick Leeson

Barings Bank and Nick Leeson

6. Why was Barings Bank willing to

Barings Bank and Nick Leeson

Sources of Funding for BSS During

Barings Bank and Nick Leeson

7. Why did the attempt by the Bank of

Barings Bank and Nick Leeson

Barings Bank and Nick Leeson