In Canada, the minimum legal drinking age (MLDA) is nineteen, with the exception of

Alberta, Manitoba and Quebec, where it is eighteen. Regardless of this national

inconsistency, this poses an interesting moral conundrum for Canadian citizens, which MLDA
is morally right? Like most perplexing ethical dilemmas, this one has no simple answer and
as such is debatable.
For instance, here in Canada, citizens are legally regarded as adults once they turn eighteen.
It is for this reason that one can argue that Canadians have the right to consume alcoholic
beverages once they turn eighteen, as opposed to be hindered by having to wait an
additional year for no apparent reason. Also, from a Utilitarian (teleological) point of view,
one can make the case that having the MLDA at nineteen limits the maximization of
happiness for the greatest number. More specifically, those who are obligated to wait an
extra year to drink alcohol are obstructed, insofar as they lose a years worth of potential
happiness gained from consuming alcoholic beverages. As such, in this regard the MLDA at
nineteen would be deemed morally wrong due to the fact that it does not maximize
happiness or likewise bring the greatest good to the greatest number (Merrill 11).
On the other hand, one can also argue based on induction and from a Utilitarian perspective
that setting the MLDA to eighteen does not maximize the happiness inasmuch as it allows
for potential harm as a result of consuming alcohol. For instance, according to Zeigler, young
adults get drunk twice as fast as older adults, and have a harder time knowing when to stop.
Thus, young adults are more prone to ending up in dangerous situations like alcohol-induced
car crashes. In this respect, the MLDA at nineteen would prevent a years worth of potential
harm to young adults, thus rendering in morally right.
Perhaps the best way to solve this ethical dilemma from a teleological point of view would be
to perform the hedonic calculus; in brief, this is the Utiliarian theoretical formula for
measuring the resulting pleasure (measured in units of hedons) and/or pain (in negative
hedons) of an action. More specifically, a Utilitarian calculates the potential net pleasure
from having the MLDA be eighteen and nineteen separately; and whichever produces the
most net pleasure would be deemed morally correct (Zunjic). The main issue with the
hedonic calculus is its inherent relativity in terms of measuring how much pleasure and/or
pain (in hedons) will result from a given action. Additionally, it is difficult to definitively say
how many people will be affected by the MLDA at eighteen or nineteen. Due to the problem
of induction, it is incorrect to assume that the future will resemble the past in relevant
respects and therefore is hard to accurately deductively conclude that particular events or
reacitons will take place in the future (Vickers). In this respect, one can argue that this
ethical dilemma is only approachable from a theoretical perspective, as opposed to a
practical one.
From a Kantian (deontological) point of view, an action is moral if a maxim rooted in said
action can be applied universally (Merrill 11). As such, in this regard, applying the maxim I
am only able to consume alcoholic beverages once I am eighteen universally, does not
present any immediate contradictions, which according to Kants Categorical
Imperative renders it morally sound. The same thing can be said when universally applying
the maxim where the MLDA is nineteen. However, these two maxims do not work in
conjunction, and as such, Kantians are neutral in terms of deciding which MLDA is more just,

so long as both treat humans with respect (Merrill 23). Or perhaps, given that neither of the
aforementioned maxims violate any of the universal rights, which are arguably morally
absolute, from a Kantian perspective would once again deem these maxims morally
permissible.
As outlined above, this particular ethical dilemma is especially challenging in terms of its
impracticality, and hence why it is best to approach it in a theoretical manner as
aforementioned. In my opinion, since a Kantian would generally remain neutral in regards to
the MLDA and given that there is some merit to ethical pluralism I think the moral framework
that is best suited for this ethical dilemma is Utilitarianism (teleology). Even though one can
argue the antithesis, the MLDA at eighteen can be deemed morally right if and only if one
holds the view that those affected would potentially gain more pleasure than pain in the
year between the age of eighteen and nineteen.