8"

Security Councl1. If any official information,

comes from any source, we shalI discuss and
study the matter further. 1 think the representative of lndonesia did not say whether he received
any information about this case from bis Government. ft seems that the oply official statemen~ we have heard .is that presented by Mr.
van Kleffens.

ciellement au Co~eil de scurit. Si le Conseil

reoit des renseignements officiels d'une scurce
quelconque, nous poursuivrons la discussion et
l'tude de cette affaire. Je crois que le reprsr..ntant de l'Inqonsie n'a pas dit s'il a ou non
reu de son Gouvernement des renseignements
ce sujet. Il semble que la seule dclaration officielle que nous avons entendue est celle qu'a prsente M. van Kleffens.
.

Mr. VAN KLEFFENS (Netherlands) : The statement was released by the Committee of Good
1
Offices itself.

M. ;VAN KLEFFENS (Pays-Bas) (traduit de

l'anglais): Cette dclaration a t publie par la
Commission Ges QOns offices elle-mme.

The PRESIDENT: Yes, yo;" have it, but it has

Le PRESIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) :
not yet come to the Security Council or to the Oui, vous l'avez, mais elle n'est pas encore parSecretariat.
' venue au Conseil de scurit, ni au Secrtariat.
Mr. VAN KLEFFENS (Netherlands): It iS a
public statement.

M. VAN KLEFFENS (Pays-Bas) (traduit de

l'anglaisJ: Il s'agit d'une dclaration publique.

The PRESIDENT: However, the Committee of

Good Offices has aIso sent us these four reports
which have been discussed, without expressing
any opinion of its own 'on these points, which
makes the task of the Security Council rather
difficult. It would have facilitated matters if they
had given their opinion on these points, and
perhaps the matter would have been settled.

Le' PRSIDENT (tra,duit de l'anglais):

La Commission" des bons offices nous a aussi
envoy quatre rapports, qui ont t discuts, sans
exprimer d'opinion personnelle l'gard de ces
diffrents points, ce qui rend la tche du Conseil
de scurit assez difficile. Les choses auraient t
plus simples si nous avions connu l'opinion de la
Commission sur ces diffrents points. La question aurait peut-tre t rgle.
Aprs deux sances consacres cette question,
personne n'a prsent de propositioIiI. Cet aprsmidi, nous entendrons le reprsentant de la Belgique, et, si aucune proposition n'est prsente
au Conseil au cours d:e cette sance, nous I\ous
bornerons accuser rception de ces "rapports
la Commission des bons offices et nous pourrions
lui delnander son opinion sur ces diffrents points
afin d'aider le Conseil de scurit prendre les
mesures ncessaires.

Now, after two meetings of the Security

Council and discussions on these points, no
proposaI has been submitted by any representative who has spoken on the subject. This after. nOon we shalI -ljsten to the represent.ative of
Belgium, and i{, after that statement, no proposaI
is submitted to the Security Council, we might
communicateto the Committee of Good Offices
merely that we have reeived these reports, and
we might ask their opinion on these points, in
order to help the Security Council to take the
proper steps.
We shalI now adjoum this meeting until
3 p.m. when we shall finish this matter. If it
does not take too long to conclude this matter,
we shalI continue with the third item on the
agenda, the third report of the Atomic Energy
-Commission.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

THREE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-THIRD

"MEETING
Reld at Lake Success, New York,

on Thursday, 17 June 1948, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. K

EL-KHOUP.I

(Syrla).

"-

Nous alIons levet'la sanc~ pour nour; runir

nouveau 15 heures pour en :finir avec cette
question. Si nous pouvons le faire assez rapidement, nous aborderons. ensuite le troisime rapport de la Commission de l'nergie atomique, qui
est le troisime point de l'ordre du jour.

. La silnce est leve 13 h. 20.

TROI5-CENT-VU'IGT-TROI5IEME SEANCE .
Tenue Lake Success, New':York,
le jeudi 17 juin 1948, 15 heures.
Prsident:M. F. EvKHOURI (Syrie).

Present: The representatives of the fol1owing

countries: Argentina, Belgium, Canada, China, .
Colombia, France, Syria, Ukrainian Soviet'
Socialist Rpuplic, Union of Soviet ~ocililist
Republics, Unitc;d Kingdom, United States of
America.

Prsents: .Les reprsentants des pays suivants:

Argentine, Belgique, Canada, Chines Colombie,
France, Syrie, Rpublique socialiste sovitique.
d'Ukraine, Union des Rpubliques socialistes
sovitiques, Royaume-Uni, Etats-Unis cl:'Am~
rique.

The agenda was t,hat of the 322nd meeting

(document SIAgenda322).

L'ordre du jour est celui de la 322me sance

(dOCUment SIAgenda322).

138

M
(rom
[322
incid
in th
Gao
whic
for a

affir
mer
gatio
ment
In
has s
Co
the
Mr.
Now,
whic
rand
Good
Co
there
the t
confe
Iacks?
Th
of res
dents
have
on th
byth
of G

f
ID_QL

ment
report

inW
8/689
valid
tne C
andis
much
shoul
likely
tl') it.

Ha
statem
nowb
to pla
The
thequ
before

of Goo

29

eU

'ce
et

:-

:m

lts

n-

'-

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la

r-

Lt.

ie
e.

1:

iS

rlS

es
:il
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tg

,
a

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,-

li

"

138. Continuation of the discussion on the

Indonesian question

138. Suite de la discussion sur la question

indonsienne

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Hood,

representative of Australia,' Mr. Plai,"epresentative of India; Mr. van Kleffens, representative
of the Netherlands; Mr. L6pez, representatve of
the Ph~lippines; and Mr. Palar, representative ot
the Republic of Indonesia, took their places at
the Security Council table.
'

Sur l'invitation du Prsident, M. Hood, reprsentant de l'Australie; M. Pillai, reprsentant

de l'Inde,' M. van Kleffens, reprsentant des
Pays-Bas; M. L6pez, reprsentant des Philippines; et M. Palar, reprsentant de la Rpub lique
d'Indonsie, prennent place la table du Conseil.

Mr. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgium) (translated

M. VAN LANGENHOVE (Belgique): On a fait
trom French):, During this morning's meeting allusion
ce matin [322me snce] un incident
[322nd meeting] a reference was made to an qui aurait marqu
, ces jours derniers, les travau x
incident which occurred during the last few'days de la
Con;unission des bons offices pour la ques
in the course of the work of the Committee of ~on
incionsienne et prov:oqu une interru ption
Good Offices on the Indonesian Question, and des ngocia
tions relatives au rglement' politique.
'which led to an interru ption of the negotiatio.ns
for a politicaI settlement.
The representative of the Netherlands has.
Le reprsentant des Pays-Bas a soulign que
affirmed that negonations have been suspended' cette interruption n'avait d'autre
objet que de
merely in order to allow the Netherlands dele- permettre la dlgation 'nerla
ndaise de deman gation to reques t' instructions from its Govern- der des instructions son Gouve
rnement.
ment.
In this connexion, the repres~ntative of China
Le reprsentant de la Chine a suggr, ce
has suggested that,th e President shouid ask the propos, que l~ Prsident deman
de la Commis,Committee to forwar d to the Security Council sion communication d'un
docum ent officiel que
the text of the official memor anduni which M. Du Bois a communiqu
M. van Mook. Or,
Mr. Du Bois has handed to Mr. van !Vlook. nous ne possdons aucune
information permetNow, we have no inform ation at our disposai tant de croire qu'il s'agisse l
d'un mmoire qui
which might lead, us to believe that. the memo- ait t adopt par la Comm
ission des bons offirandum had been endorsed by the Committee of ces, ni mme seulement !June
pice faisant partie
Good Offices, or that it ever was part of the de sa documentation officiel
le. A quel titre, ds
Committee's official papers. On what grounc!s, lors, le Conseil de
scurit en demanderait-il
therefore, should the Security Council request communication et lui confre
rait-il de cette mathe. transmission of m docum ent and thus nire une autorit que cette
pice n'a pas?
confer on it Jn authorita1ive charac ter which it
Jacks?
The Committee of Good Offices is composed
La Commission des bons offices est compose
of responsibk and exp\~fenced pe~ons. If inci- d'hommes responsables
et expriments. Si des
dents Iikely to affect the mission entrusted to it inciden1:s se sont produi
ts, de nature affecter sa
have oc;curreti, i1: will not fail to submit a report ~ion, elle ne manqu
era pas d'en faire rappor t.
on them. The mast recent resolutions adopte d Les dernires rsolutions
que le Conseil a adopby the Security Council requested the Committee tes invitaient la .Comm
ission tenir le Conseil
of Good Offices to keep the Council direc:tIy au couran t du progrs
du rglement politique
infQrmed of the progress of the poIiticaI settle-, en Indonsie [docum
ent S/678] et rendre frment in Indonesia [document S/678] and to quemm ent compte
au Conseil cie scrit de la
report frequently ta the Council on the situation situation dans le territoi
re' occidental de Java et
in Western Java and in Madur a [document dans Madou ra, [docum
ent 8/689] . Dans ces
S/689]. In these circumstances, 1 can see no conditions, je ne vois
aucune raison pour donner
valid reason to issue any further instructions to la Commission des
instructions nouvelles. Elle
the Committee. The Committee is on the spot ~st mieux place que
nous ne le sommes pour
and is in daily contac t with bath parties. It is discrner ce, qui est
opport un et ce qui, au conmuch better placed than we to appreciate wha.t traire, ne peut que
compliquer la tche difficile
should be done and what, on the other hand, is dont elle est charg
e.
likely to complicate the difficult mission entrustecl
tl'> it.
a

Having made this point, 1 shall confi."ie my

statement ta the facts mentioned in the reports
now before us and, in doing sa; 1 will endeav our'
ta place these facts in their correct perspective.
The last tim~ the Security Council considered
the question of Indone sia[31 6th meeting], it had
before it t1'le fust interim report of the Committee
of Good Offices [docum ent S/649 ].This report

Ceci dit, je limjterai mon expos aux faits qui

sont relats dans les rapports dont nous sommes
actuellement saisis. Ces faits, je voudrais essayer
de les placer dans leur exacte perspective.
La dernire fois que le Conseil de scurit examina l~ question Ge l'Indonsie [316me sance],
il avait devant lui le premier rappor t provisoire
de la Commission des bons offices [document

30
.

proyded the Council with an accon~ of two 1 8/649]. Ce rapport lui rendait {;ompte de deux
important results achieved. some little time pre- rsultats importants intervenus peu de temps auviously; to be more exact, on 17 J anuary. The paravant, le 17 janvier: premirement, la signafirst achievement was the signature of a truce ture d'une convention. d'armistice; deuxime:.
agreement, and the second was the acceptance by ment, l'acceptation par les deux parties d'un
bo~ parties of a number of principles designed certain nombre de principes. destins servir de '
~o serve as a basis .of an agreement for the con:- base d'accprd pour la conclusion d'un rglement
clusion of ~ political settlement in Indonesia 'politique en Indonsie [document S/649, pages
[document S/649, pages 105 and 111]. The 105 et 111]. Le Conseil de scurit prit
Security Council noted with satisfaction t4~se acte avec satisfaction de ces deux rsultats qui
two achievementswhich coincided 'exactly withrpondaient exactement au double objet de
'the twofold aim of .the original resolution of sa rsolution initiale du 1er aot [document
1 August [document S/459], namely, the cessa- S/459], savoir: la cessation des hostilits et le
tion of hostili,ties and the peaceful settlement of rglement pacifique du diffrend.
'
the dispute.
La Commission des bons offices fut invite, par
TheCommittee of Good Offices was then.
requested, in a resolution of 18 February une rsolution du 18 fvrier [document 8/678]
[document S/678] to which 1 have just alluded, laquelle je viens de faire allusion, tenir le
to keep the ,Council informed of the progress of 'Conseil au courant des progrs du rglement polithe political settlement. It wasin such conditions ,tique. C'est dans ces conditions qu'elle a prsent,
that the Committee submitted, on 19 May, a en date du 19 mai, un deuxime rapport prosecond interim rep6rt [document 8/787] which visoire [document SI7871 qui porte sUr les pr&grs accomplis jusqu'au 30 avril.
.covers the progress made up to 30 April.
Le premier point qui, mon avis, oit retenir
The first point which, in my opinion, warrants
our attention, bears on the implementation of ,notre attention concerne l'application de la
the truce agreemeI)t because the basic concem convention d'arinistice, car la proccupa,tior
of the Council since its inception has always been essentielle du Conseil fut, ds l'origine, de mettre
to put a stop to bloodshed and violence. Quite un terme ,l'effusion de sang et aux violences.
special attention was given to this 'point by the Ce point a fait pardculirement l'objet des qaSecurity Committee appointedby the parties vaux d1,l Comit de la scurit, cr par les parconcerned' with the lie1p of ,the Committeeof ties avec le concours de la Commission 'des bons
Good Offices. Chapter V of the report which offices. Le chapitre V du ~apport qui lui est
dea1swith this matter shows how the Committee consacr expose comment la Commission d($
of 'Good Offices called in the help of the Con- Dons 'offices a fait appel ~u concours de laComsular Commission and its military advisers,'ri1.im- mission consulaire et de ses conseillers militaires,
bering fifty-five (sinee reduced to forty~seven). au nombre de cinquante-cinq (rattien depuis
quarante-sept) .
Je ne m'arrterai pas la procdure qui fut
1 shan not dwell on the procedure which was
followed or on the difficulties which had to be , suivie, ni aux difficults qui durent tre sunnonovercome. 1 shall confine myself ta recordfugthe tes. Je me bornerai enregistrer le rsultat
atteint.
resultsachieved.
Les conseillers militaires e la CommiSsion ont
The Committee's military advisers announced
that, generally speaking, the appeal for a cease- fait connatre que, d'ne faon gnrale, l'invifire had met with complian.ce. The establishment tation cesser le feu' avait t respec.te. La q.\ and the demarcation of the boundaries of the termination et la dlimitaton de la ligne du
demilitarlzed zones were the, subject of agree- stat'i,(, quo et des zones 'dlimitarises ont -f:pt
ments in accordance with the teims of the truce l'objet d'accords, conformment la convention
agreement. Paragraphs. 8 and 9 of the truce d'armistice. Les paragraphes 8 et 9 de la convenagreement 1'tipulated that units of Republican tion-d'armistice prvoyaient que les lments de:ll
forces which were offering resistance behind the forces militaires rpublicaines qui poursuivaient
then advanced positions of the Netherlands forces la rsistance. derrire les positions avances actuel
should withdraw with their arms and war les des forces nr1andaises se retireraient avec '
materials towards territory held by the Republi- leurs armes et leur matriel de guerre' vers le
cns.. This withdrawal was effected without let territoire contrl par !a Rpublique; cette va~
or hindrance from beginning te end. '
cuation s'est, depuis le dbut, droule sans encombre.
A la troisime sance&'U Comit de la scurit,
At the third meeting of the Security Committee on 26 ]anuary,both parties were in agree- tenue le 26 janvier, les parties se sont trouves
ment in. aIlnouncing that the withdrawal of d'accord pour dclarer que l'vacuation, de fores
Republican forces, as arranged under the truce rpublicaines, en vertu de la convention d'armistice, avait t mene bien.
agreement had beensuccessfully completed.
Le Comit de la s~curit a t inform, le 23
On 2~ April, the Security Committe was
avril,
.qu'un accord tait intervenu au sujet de
informed that an agreement had been concluded
la
libration
des prisonniers de guerre et que cette
,-for the ielease of prlsoners of war" and that

rele
week
free
of
the
'othe
pro
A
Co
reach
as
tion
pero
Th
Co
of th
relate
the
took
repris
anyo

mg

Co
accor

Th
mit cl
to try
thep
conel
is tha:

oIGo
comp
diffic
agree
agree

, the si
for no
cases
andw
ator a
cessful
to ho
Good
Des

ency
belon
p~inci

theC
above
negoti

In or
cast a
future
of wh
inttee

pIes ha
org .
the a
autono

31

deux
auigname:.
d'un
rir de -

~ment

pages

prit
s qui
t de
:ment
et le

par
1678]
:r le
:polisent,
pro-

~,

: pm-

~tenir

le la
'a,tior
lettre
:nces.
s 1;ra: parbons
li est
1 dts
::lomaires,
luis
fut
monlUltat

nont

'invi'a. <;le du
: f~t
ntion
lven.s de:s
aient
:tael,
avec :rs le
va-:
s en-

llrit,
llves
0r:es
rmisle 23
~t de
cette

- f

releases had aIready h~gun. During the following

week about 1,500 war p~isoners had been set
free by the Netherlands authorities and six-all
of the lmown prisoners up to that point-by
the Republican authorities. Efforts ta trace
-other Netherlands missing personnel are still in
progress.
According to advice received by the Security
Committee on 24 March, an agreement has been
reached concerning technical considerations, such
as assembly points, routing, and sa forth in relation to the evacuation of families of military
pe1'?onne1. Such evacuation begant on 29 April.

libration avait commenc. La semaine suivante,

environ quinze cents prisonniers de guerre\ ont
t librl's par les autorits nerlandaises, t six
- c'e3t--dire tous les prisonniers connus jusqu'
prsent - par les -autorits rpublicaines. Les
efforts tendant retrouver les autres disparus
nerlandais se p:"ursuivent. . .

The two parties, however, have notified the.

Committee of Good Offices of cases of violation
of the truce agreement. Most of these violations re1ated to sub-paragraphs 7 (a) and 7 (b) of
the truce agreement, where!:?y -bath parties under-:
took to avoid "sabotage, intimidation and
reprisaIs" .and to "refrain from broadcasts or
any other fOTm of propaganda ai)ned at provokmg or disturbing troops and civilians". The
Committeehas dealt with these complaints in
accordance with its adopted procedure.

Les deux parties ont cependant signal -la

Commission des bons offices des cas de violation
de la. convention d'armistice; la plupart se rapportaient aux alinas 7 ) et 7 b) de la convention d"armistice, par lesquels les. parties s'engageaient viter "le ~abotage, rintimidation, les
reprsailles", .et "s'abstenir de toute_ mission
radiophonique et de toute autre forme de propagande visant semer la provocation parmi les
troupes et les civils". La Commissio:.l a donn
suite : ces plaintes suivant la .procdure qu'elle
a adopte.

The Committee deemed it unnecessary to submit detailed comments on these accusations or

to try ta apportion the relative responsibility of
the parties concerned.In my opinion, the main
conclusion to be drawn from this brief analysis
is that, according ta the' report of the Committee
of Good Offices, the appeal for a cease-fire was
complied ~th on the -whole nd that the main
diffici.ties affecting the application of the truce
agreement have so far been settled by mean.'S of
agreements concluded between the parties.
This,assUred1y, is anachievement of which
- the significanc.e should not be under-estimated,
for nothing comparable is to 'be found in similar
cases with which the Council has had.ta deal,
and we can only express the hope that the Med].ator and the Truce Commission will be as successful in. Pal~tine. This result is .a great credit
to bot! parties, as weIl as to the Committee of
Good l,ffices and its staff.

A son avis,il n'est pas ncessaire de prsentr

ciesobservations .dtailles ~ur ces accusations,
ni d'essayer d'valuer la responsabilit relative
des parties. La principale conclwion que l'on
dove retenir decette rapi<:le analyse est, mon
avis, que, suivant les '.ermes du rapport ::le la
Commission des bons offices, l'invitation cesser
le feu a,. d'une faon gnrale, etrespec~e; que
les principales difficults dans la mise~!, excution
de la convention. d'ar.mistice ont t jusqu'ici surmontes par voie d'acords intervenus entreles
parties.
\C'est assurment l un rsultat dont il ne faut
pas sous-estimer l'importance, car on n'en trouve
point jusqu'ici -d' quival~nt dans les cas .analogues dnt le Conseil aeu s'occuper; et on ne
peut que formuler l'espoir quele Mdiateur et
-la Commission~e trve soient aussi heUreux en
Palestine. Ce rsultat fait honneur la fois aun
deux.parties et la Commission des bons offices
ainsi qu' ses collaborateurs.

Despite _the importance of this resu1t, a tend..;

ency has been shown to consider it as aIready
belonging topast history. It q.oes not form the
p~incipal subject of th~ second interim report of
the Committeeof Goo Offices which is devoted,
abov~ aU, to the pr~gress achieved in the political
negotiations.
-

Quelque important-que soit ce rsultat, il s'est

manifest une tendance le. considrer comme
appartenant dj au pass;'Une forme pas l'objet
principal du deuxime rapport provis6ire d~ la
Commission des bons offices; celui-ci est vant
tout consacr aux progrs raliss dans les ngociations politiques.

This is a matter of great'scope and complexity.

In .order to realize this, it is only necessary tQ

Il s'agit l de matires trs vaStes et d'une

grande complexit. Pour s'en convaincre, il suffit
de jeter un coup d'ilsUl'les principes directeurs
de la future fdration et de la future union, dont
un sous~comit ci.u Comit des affaires politiques
a> entrepris .l'tude. Ces principes concernent .les
grande lignes de l'organisation fdrale des
Etats-Unis d'Indonsie, les dispositions cle leur
constitution; le statut des Etats _autonomes,
l'orgnisation de l'Union nerando-indon~

cast aglance at the guiding principles of the

future federation and the future union the study
of. which has been undertaken by a' sub-comnuttee of the Political Comnlttee. Thse principIes have to do with the framework of the federaI
organization of the United States of IndonSia
the articles of its constitution, the status of i~
autonoL10US States, the organization of th

Suivant une ommUIication faite le 24 mars

au Comit de la scurit, un accord est intervenu
sur tous les aspects techniques, tels qe les lieux
de rassemblement et les itinraires, en ce' qui
concerne l'vacuation et la protection &es farrillles du personnel militaire. Cette vacuation
a commenc le 29 avril.

32
NetherJands-Indonesian Union, the organization
of justice, the organization of nation~l defence
and the regime to be applied during the period
of transition. In a parallel way, the Economie
and Financial Commit.. -~ has been studying the'
working of the Indone..dn Republie in the economic and financial- field and a report on the
subject described an agreement reached on
21 April b~tween the parties on the principles
of economic unity of the future fede:ation and
of IDe unity of the monetary system.
The financial system of Indonesia was also the
subject of discussion, during which'draft scheme..,
wer~ submitted by the two parties. Prelim.1ary
poI1S were drawn up on the questions of public
works, road systems, irrigation, highways nd
bridges, and raiIroads.

people which
hest suited to
offred the he:>
clrcumstances.
sorne others th,
conformity witl
democracies or
shown in the c

sienne, l'organisation de la justice, l'orga~

nisation de la dfense nationale, le rgime
appliable dans la priode transitoire. Para~
lllement, le Comit conomique et financier
tudie le fonctionnemnt de IR fdration
indonsienne dans le domaine conomiqti~ et
financier, et un rapport ce sujet f3.Sant tat,
le 21 avril, d'un accord entre les parties quant
aux principes d:e l'unit conomique de la future
fdration et de l'unit du systme montaire.

Le rgime financier de l'Indonstf' fit galement l'objet de scussions au cours desquelles

des projets furent prsents par les deux parties.
Des rapports prliminaires ont t rdigs sur les
questions de travaux publics, sur le systme routier, l'irrigation, les ponts et'chausses et les chemins de fer.
Bref, si l'on essaie de dresser un bilan d'en~
fu summing up ~hat has been done, it has to
be recogrnzed that in less than three months-I semble de eette activit, on est amen constater
say ,three months, for the report takes us only que, en moins de trois mois - je dis en moins
to 30 April-a huge programme has been drawn de tro~ mois paree que le rapport. ne relate les
up and the necessary machinery for its imple.men- faits que jusqu'au 30 avril - un vaste pro
.tation has been created. This work is still in gramme a t labor, et que les rouages ncessai~
progress. .On certain points agreements have l'es sa ralisation ont t crs. Le travail est en
been reached and on others studies and negotia- cours. Sur certafus points, des accords sont dj
tiom are being continued. On still other points, intervenus. Sur d'autres, Ip.s tudes et les ngodisagreement has arisen, and it is naturaIly on ciations se poursuivent. Sur d'autres encore, des
dsaccords ont surgi et c'est naturellement sur
these tliat attention tends to he centred.
cemc-ci que l'attention tend se concentrer.
Je voudrais maintenant examiner succincte
1 should like to xainine briefly the nature of
these disagreements and the way in which they. ment quelle est la nature de ces dsaccords et en
afIeci: the Security Council. Basically, they are quoi ils concernent le Conseil de scurit. Les
all the outcome of divergen(.Q in the interpreta- dsaccords dont il s'agit rs~tent essentiellement
tien of certain basic principles adopted by both de divergences d'interprtation de certains des
parties on bard the USS "Renville". They principes de base adopts par les parties, en jan~
concern mafuly the constitution of the provisional vier dernier, bord du btiment amricain.
Federal Government of Indonesia-a matter ta "Renville". Ils concernent principaienient la
which chapter VI of the second interimreport cons.tution du gouvernement fdral provisoire
of the Committee of Good Offices is devoted-. de l'Inddnsie - objet auquel est consacr le
the conference of Bandtmg and the decisions chapitre VI du deuxime rapport provisoire de
taken in connexion with the autonomy of West la Commission des bons offices - la Confrence .
de Bandoeng et les dcisions intervenues en ce
Java and of MaC;ura.
qui conceme)'autonomie ~'U territoire occidental
de Java et de l'le de Madoura.
Ces trois 'dernires questions font l'objet de
These three Q71estiOns fomi the subjeet of
special reports, sin;-~ the Security Council; in its rapports spciaux, le Conseil de scurit ayant
/ resolution .of 28 February [document 8/689], invit la.Commission. des bons offices, dans sa
requested the Corunittee of Good Offices to pay rsolution du 28 fvrier [document 8/678J; r
special attention to . the . development jf the accorder une attention. particulire l'volution
political situation in the two regions to which de la situatio~ politique dans les deux dernires
1 have referred.
rgions que j'ai mentionnes.
La Commission des bons offices relate .les faits.
The Committee of. Oood Offices relates the
facts. in the reports, but -refrains" as it should, Elle s'abstient, conformment au rle qui est le
from drawing any conclusions. Having read these . sien, de formuler aucune conclusion. Ayant
repor.s, it is of course the ulldemable right of pris cClnnaissances de ces rapports, il est assureah and every number of the Counci! toform ment loisible chacun d:es membres du Conseil
bis own persona! opinion.
d scurit de se faire uile opinion personnelle.
Some tJ$k thatthe steps taken by either the
Certains peuvent penser que les initiatives
Netherlands authoritiesor by the Republica.n prises, soit par les autorits nerlandaises,soit
authoritiesin - Indonesia are-or arenot....... par .lesautorit~ de laRI':ipublique d'Indonsie
appropriate and inconformitywith the principles soht--. oU ne sent pas- la fois opporturies et
adopted on 17 June dn board the "Renville". confonnes aux .J?rincipes adopts le 17. janvier
Others may feel that the consultationswiththe bord .du "Rem'ille". D'autres peuvent estimer

Still other pe
troversies are 0
of the fact that
tutions which
provisional ch
principles ado
populations co
biscite and tha
organized unde
tee of Good 0
sorne other me
But while it
, the Security C
on this matter,
itself. The Sec
justice nor an
body. Its r.Iuty .
designed to sec
security when
however, does
an opinion onbetween States,
Now, what is
nesian affair?
mitted to the C
. This is what l
parties to cease
th~ dispute b
initial stage, se
as to the compe
th matter, and
Without justifica
sovereignty of
and that it was c
Agreements [do
111],- t least
aceomplished f
question of co
rem~ed in sus
It was in such
the Security Co
to offer its good
tribute towards
differences, in a
1 August [docu
~5, August cone
Its readiness, if
m the settle.men
the Council co
The Council'
Parties, which re
proposed commit
of (iood Offices .
fore, not the autc
Councll imposed

_..__ . . .
~

------~~~.~'C

people which took place followed the methods

best suited to the circumstances and that they
offred the be:it guarantees compl: -ble with such
circumstances. The opinion may be he1d by
sorne others that these consultations were not in
eonformity with the methods used in the western
denlocracies or with thm:e to which preference ;!l
shown in the countries of Eastern Europe.

.r~

._"--

33
ql~?\<

les c-,

"ant les

ti",ns populaires ont eu lieu sui-

..nones 1~1 plus adaptes aux circons-

tances et qu'elles offraient le maximum de garanties compatibles avec celle-s-ci. D'autres peuvent
tre d'avi., qu'elles ne sont conformes ni aux
mthodes de consultation populaire en honneur
dans les dmocraties occidentales, ni celles
auxquelles les Etats de l'Europe orientale don
nent la prfrence.
Still other people may consider that these conCertains encore peuvent consi~er que ces
troversies are of but limited importance, in view controverses n'ont qu'un intrt limit, attendu
of the faet that both parties agree that the insti que les deux parties sont d'accord pour dire que
tutions which have been created are of a purely les institutions qui ont t cres ont un caracprovisional character and that, according ta the tre purement provisoire; que, conformment
principles adopted, the future destiny of the aux pr:incipes adopts, c'est un plbiscite qui
populations concerned will be decided by ple- doit d(;tenniner le sort ultrieur des populations
biscite and that the plebiscite will uItimately be intre.~,ses, et que ce plbiscite serait ventuelleorganized under the supervision of the Commit- ment effectu sous le contrle de la Commission
tee of Good Offices, unless both parties agree to des bons offices, moins que les parties ne se
sorne other method.
1me.ttent d'accord sur un autre mode de consu!tation.
But while it is admissible for each member of' Mais, s'il est loisible chacun d'avoir son api, the Security Council to have a perSonal opi..aion nion personnelle ce sujet, il en va auttement du
on this matter, this is not the case for the Couilcil Conseil de scurit. Le Conseil n'est ni une. cour
itself. The Security Couneil is neither a court of de justice ni un corps arbitral; c'est un organe
justice nor an arbitration board; it is a political politique. Sa fonction est de pourvoir aux mesures
body. Its dUty is to provde appropriate measnre.s propres ~:U"er le maintien de la paix et de la
designed to secure the maintenance of peace and scurit, lorsque celles-ci sont en danger. Mais
security when these are in danger. The Charter, la Charte ne lui confre pas le droit de se prohowever, does not confer on it the right to give noncer sur l'interprtation des accords entre
an opinion on-the interpretation of agreements Etats, comme le pOU.,'Tait faire un juge ou un
between States, as a judge or,an arbiter might do. arbitre.
Now, what is the actual position in the IndoOr, quelle est la situation dans l'affaire
nesian affair.? When that affair was frr3t sub- d'Indonsie? Quand le Conseil de scurit en fut
IIlitted to the Couneil, hostilities were in progress. saisi, des h3tilits taient en cours. C'est ce qui
- This is what led 'the Council to request both amena Je Conseil inviter les parties cesser
parties to cease hostilities forthwith and to sett1e immdiatement les hostilits et rgler leur dl{their dispute by peaceful means. During this frenG par des moyens pacifiques. Cependant
initial stage, severa! members expressed doubts plusieurs membres, au cours de cette phase ini...
as to the competence of theCouncil ta deal with tiale, mirent des doutes au sujet de la compthe matter, and these dov.bts were certainly not tence du Conseil de scurit et ces doutes
mthout justifica~on in view of the fact thBt the n'taient assurment pas sans justification; attensovereignty of the Netherlands was not contested du que la souverainet des Pays-Bas n'tait pas
and that it was confirmed anew by th "Renville" conteste et qu'elle a t confirme nouveau par
Agre~el.ltiS [document 8/649. pages 105 and les accords du "Renville", tout au moins jusqu',
111],~ at least unt a politica1 se~Jement was an la ralisation du rglement politique. Quoi qu'il
aecomplished facto However that may be, the en soit, la question de comptence, n'ayant pas
question of competen was not solved; it t lucide, demeura rserve et reste rserve.
rem~ed in suspense and it is still in suspense.
It was in such circumstances that ~n 25 August
C'est dans ces conditions que, le 25 aot, le
the Security Couneil decided [document 8/525~ . Conseil de scurit Gcida [document S/525]
to.offer its good offices to the parties so as ta 'con:- 1d'offrir ses bons ufficf'".;S aux parties, en vue de
tf.ibute towards the peaceful 8ettlement of their contribuer au rglement pacifique de leur diffdifferences, in accordance with the resolution of rend, suivant le vu de la rsolution du 1er aot.
1 August [document 8;459]. The l'esolution of [document 8/459]. La rsolution ajoutait: "Si
~5 August conc1ud~d: "The Council expresses les ,parties intresses en font la demande, le
~ts readiness, if the parties so request, to assist Conseil est dispos contribuer au Tglement de
ln the se~emeJ'1.t through a small committee of
ce diffrenQ au moyen d':une commission du
the Conncil consisting of three members...".
Conseil.:'
T!te Council's offer was' accepted by both
L'offre faite par le Conseil de scurit fut
parties, which requested the appointment ofthe accepte par les parties; celles-ci Gemandrent
proposed committee. In this.way, the Comrittee la constitution de la commission propose.. La
of Good Offices came into being. It was, tliere- Commission des bons offices fut ainsi cre. Elle
fore, not the outcome ofa decision of the Security ne rsulte donc pas d'une dcision du Conseil
Conneil. imposed on the parties, but of a request de scurit impose aux parties, mais d'une de-

34
made by them and of an offer which they
accepted in consequence. Thus, it is on the basis
of an offer of good offices that the Commit~e's
intervention, with a view to a pcaceful settle..
ment, was made.
When the 'Renville'~ Agreement was con..
cluded, it was maintained by sorne members that
it was incumbent on the Security Council to
make sure that the Indonesian Republic would
not compromise its rights and claims by signing
the truce agreement. In such discreet fashion,
these members expressed their fear that the
Netherlands might abuse ts superiority. These
fears would seem to have no foundation whatsoever. To become onvinced of that, it is enough
to recall the circuID~tances attending the negotiations for a peaceful settlement, the basic
priuciples of which were adopted on board the
"Renville".
These negotiations are, in principle, bilateral.
Their object is to determine the future status of
the Netherlands Indies over which, as both
parties have agreed, sovereignty belongs and shall
continue to belong to the Netherlands until a
new arrangement is made.
Nvertheless, the Committee of Good Offices
is clasely associated with these negotiations. As
it points out in this report, work is in progress in
the four principal committees which the Committee of Good Offices ~tself was requested to
appoint. This work is directed by a steering
committee on which sit representativ~ of the
Committee of Good Offices, and the chairman
of the Committee of Good Offices also serves as
chairman of the principal committees.

.'

In this way,. the negotiations are being carried

out under thescrutiny and with the collabl1\"ation of the representatives of AtrJtralia, Belgium,
and the United States of America, acting on
behalf of the Security Councll.
. Of ourse, the common ties of unity linking
Belgium and the Netherlands are weIl known,
but they in no way prevent Belgium from being
sympathetic toward the aspirations of the Indo..
nesian peoples. In any case, despite the opposite
view expressed this morning by the representative of the USSR, it would, in my opinion, be
paradoxical to maintain that Australia :md the
United States of Amedea are indifferent ta the
rights, claiins and position of the Indonesian
peoples.
The methods which have been adopted by the
Committee of Good Offices offer strong guaran..
tees for the realization of the principles of independence and co-operation, on which the parties
have reached agreement. .
\
By way of comparison, the members of the
Council cari,. moreover, consider other situations
and other disputes brought ta the notice of the
Council. 1 am convinced that they will find no
cases whre the quest of a peacefulsettlement
has ben pursued in such abroad spirit of international agreemnt:

mand qu'elles ont formule et d'une offre

qu'elles ont accepte en consquence. Tel est. le
cadre - celui des bon!: offices - dans lequel se
place l'intervention dl'. Conseil quant au rglement pacifique.
Quand les accords. du "Renville" furent conclus, certains ont soutenu que le Conseil de
scurit avait la responsabilit de veiller ce que
la Rpublique iL'In'onsie n'ait pas, par la signature de la convention d'armistice, compromis ses
droits et ses revendications. Ils manifestrent ainsi
discrtement leur crainte que les Pays-Bas n'abu_
sent da leur supriorit. Ces craintes apparaissent
comme entirement dpourvues de fondement.
Pour en tre convaincu) il suffit de songer aux
conditions dans lesquelles se sont poursuivies les
ngociations ayant pour objet de raliser le rglement politique dont les principes furent adopts
bord du "Renville".
Ces ngociations sont, dans leur principe., bilatrales; elles ont pour objet le statut futur des
Indes nerla:nd'aises, sur lesquelles, ainsi que les
deux parties l'ont dclar d'un commun accord,
la souverainet appartient et continuera, jusqu'
nouvel ordre, appartenir aux Pays-Bas.
Nanmoins, la Commission des bons 'offices est
largement associe ces pourparlers. Comme elle
l'expose dans son rapport, les travaux s'accomplissent au sein des quatre comits principaux
que la Commission des bons offices a t ellemme invite nommer, et dont le travail est
dirig par. un comit directeur o sigent des
reprsentants de la Commission des bons offices,
la prsidence des com~I:-~principaux tant assure
par !~ Prsident de la Commission des bons
offices.
Ainsi, les ngociations se sont poursuivies sous
le regar~ et avec la participation des reprsentants de l'Australie, des Etats-Unis et de la Belgique, agissant au nom du Conseil de scurit.
Sans doute, les liens qui unissent la Belgique
et les Pays-Bas sont bien connus; ils n'empchent
d'ailleurs nullement la Belgique d'tre sympathique aux aspirations des populations indonsiennes. En tout cas, et malgr l'opinion contraire
qu'a dfendue ce matin le reprsentant de
l'URSS,il serait, ~elon moi, paradoxal de soutenir
que l'Australie et les Etats..Unis sont indiffrents
aux droits, aux prtentions ou la position des
populations indonsiennes.
La mthode t.l.dopte par la Commission t:'es
bons offices offre donc de srieuses garanties
l'gard de la ralisation des principes d'indpendance et de coopration sur lesquels les parties
se sont mises d'accord:
Les memb~es du Conseil de scurit. peuvent
d'ailleurs p::.'~pdre, titre de comparison, d'autres sitUl~tioii$: et d'autres diffren's dont le
Conseil a"isaisi. Je ne crois pas qu'ils trouveront des cas o la recherche d'tine solution pacifique se soit poursuivie dans un esprit international aussi large.

Throughout
two interim l'
Offices, the C
and the result
opinion, cause
acted. It mig
Security Coun
my opinion, t
would be an e
warn both the
the Committe
extent and, s .
It has been a
parties and, wi
ration of both,
arouse their di.
, a friendly sett
facilitating it.
As regards t
recent c.'CperieJ
conciliation. 1
Council drew
stance of the
encountered 0
even the Co 1
tioned by one
several of the
There are n
in Indonesia.
jeopardized b
done is ta settl
of extreIely c
it is necessary
patknce and
Ml'. Hsu (
This morning
President sho
Committee mf
Council a co
Du Bois to M.
suggestion, he
in which that
that incident is
prepired to a
sentative of th
in the negotia
When Ml'.
believe. he was
has been made
cerning what i
Madura. 1 thi
may have a \
justified by t
been distribut
communiqu i
Offices on the
ing passage is

"The Austr
tatives have n
that the worki
, tions, which se
bath parties a

35
Throughout the whole period covered by the
two interim reports of the Committee of Good
Offices, the Committee has acted with prudence,
and the results achieved so far cannat, in my
opinion, cause it to feel any regret at having sa
acted. It might be tempted to rush matters; the
Securit)' Council might be so tempted itself. In
my opinion, to give way to such temptation
would be an error against which 1 should like ta
warn bath the Committee and th.e Council. Let
the Committee of Good Offices appraise the
extent and, still more, the nature, of its authority.
It has been appointed at the request of bath
parties and, without the confidence and collaboration of both, it would be impotent. Were it ta
arouse their distrust, its intervention woulc! make
\ a friendly settlement more difficult, instead of
facilitating it.
As regards the Council itself, it has had some
recent e.xperience of the delicacy of the job of
conciliation. In the India-Pakistan situation, the
Council drew up recommendations on the substance of the dispute. These prorosals have
encountered opposition from both parties and
even the Council's competence has been questioned by one of the parties in connexion with
severa! of the points under dispute.
There are no longer any hostilities taking place
in Indonesia. International peace is no longer
jeopardized by events there. 'What has to be
done is ta settle in a peaceful manner a number
of extrerricly complicated questions. To do this,
it is necessary, above all, to display good will,
patience and pcrsevelence.

Pendant toute la priode que couvrent les deux

rapports provisoires de la Commission des bons
offices, celle-ci a agi prudemment. Les rsultats
atteints ne doivent pas, mon avis, le lui faire
regretter. Elle pourrait tre tente de prcipiter
les choses; le Conseil de scurit lui-mme pourrait avoir cette tentation. Y cder serait, selon
moi, une erreur con'cre laquelle je voudrais les
mettre l'un et l'autre en garde. Que la Commission des bons offices mesure bien l'tendue et,
plus encore, la natuFe de son autorit. Elle a t
cre la deman::e des parties; sans la confiance
- et sans la coopration des parties, elle serait impuissante. Si elle suscitait leur mfiance, ses interventions" loin de faciliter un rglement amiable,
le rendraient dsormais plus difficile.
Quand au Conseil lui-mme! il vtent de faire
l'exprience du caractre dlicat des fonctions de
conciliateur. Dans l'affaire Inde-Pakistan, il a
formul des recommandations visant le fond du
diffrend. Celles-ci se heurtent l'opposition des
parties et la comptence mme du Conseil est ::nie par l'une d'elles sur plusieurs des points en
litige.
Il n'y a plus d'hostilits en cours en Indonsie.
La. paix internationale n'y est pas menace. Il
s'agit de rsoudre ptl.cifiquement des problmes
d'une extrme complexit. Pour y russir, il faut
avant tout de la bonne volont, de la patience
et de la persvrance.

Mr. Hsu (China): 1 want ta clarify a point.

This morning Mr. Tsiang suggested thal: the
President should request the United Nations
Committee <!lf Good Offices ta forward to the
Council a confidential document sent by Mr.
Du Bois to M:r. van Mook. When he made that
suggestion, he did not have in mind the incident
in which that document was involved. As far as
that incident is concez:ned, our delegation is quite
prepared to accept the assurance of the representative of the Netherlands that the interruption
in the negotiations is only temporary.

M. Hsu (Chine) (traduit de l'anglais): Je

voudrais prcser un point: ce matin M. Tsiang
a dclar que le Prsident pourrait peut-tre inviter la Commission des bons offices de l'Organisation ::es Nations Unies communiquer au
Conseil un document confidentiel ach-ess par
M. Du Bois M. van Mook. En faisant cette
proposition, M. Tsiang ne songeait pas l'incident provoqu 'par ce document. En ce qui concerne cet incident, notrc: d8gation est toute dis..
pose accepter du reprsentant des Pays-Bas
l'assurance que les ngociations ne sont interrom~
pues que temporairement.
When Mr. Tsiang made the suggestion, 1
Je crois que, en faisant cette proppsition; M.
believe. he was thinking of the complaint which Tsiang pensait aux plaintes formules par la
has been made by the Indonesian Republic con- Rpublique indonsienne au sujet des vnements
cernil1g what is taking place in Western Java and qui se droulent actuellement dans le territoire
Madura. 1 think his suspicion that the document occidental de Java et l'ne de Madoura. Il :-ae
may have a ,connexion with the complaint is semble que le communiqu de presse qui vient
justified by the Press release which has just d'tre distribu justifie les soupons ::e M. Tsiang
been distributed. This Prt:Ss release reprmts a quant au lien qui peut exister entre ce doc4ment
communiqu issued by the Committee of Good et ces plaintes. Cet extrait de presse est la repr~ffices on the Indonesian Question. The follow- duction d'une communication publie par la
mg passage i8 from that communiql.).e:
Commission des bons ('D;ce,Q pour la question
indonsienne. Le conimuluqu contient le passage suivant:
:'The Australian and United States represen. "Les reprsentants de l'Australie et des Etatstatives have naturally been disappointea to learn Unis ont t naturellement dus d'apprendre
t~at the working paper COI. :aining their sugges- que le document de travail ((ans lequel ils avaient
, tIons, which seem to havebeen in line with what fait figurer des propositions qui leur semblaient
both parties are seeking to achieve, cannot be cOJ.:lformes aux objectifs poursuivis par les deu~
.. ,--~-,~~lt!_l'!!l~'U'.\~;_I,.tll!.t.,n!1IllII_!W}fJ.!i!

...

1-,"

~
vP,

36
discussed. If, as' the Netherlallds Government'
has stated, their efforts in this case have harnpered, rather than promoted, a solution of the
dispute, they can only express their deepest
regret. However, they cannot agree that the
working paper conflicts with the 'Renvilleu principles. On the contrary, it seems to them to have
an outstanding fidelity to those principlesu [Press

However, 1 do not think that Mr. Tsiang bas

any intention of. insisting that the document be
, transmitted immediately, because, as is known,
the Council is not contemplating taking any
action right away. Evidently, therefore, there is
no ~ecessity for insisting upon the securing of
,this document immediately. Our delegation,
however, wishes to reserve its right to raise the
question again when .1t considers that the situation makes it necessary.

parties, n'a pu faire l'objet d'une discussion. S'il

est vrai, comme ra dclar le>Gouvernement des
Pays-Bas, que leurs efforts, en l'occurrence, ont
entrav plutt que fa.cilit la solution du diffdend, ils ne peuvent qu'exprimer leur plus profond regret. Cependant, ils ne peu,'ent admettre
que ce document de travail soit contraire aux
pril1cipes du "Renville)). Il semble tre, au contraire, strictement fic.'le ces principes" [communiqu de presse SC/684].
n apparatt donc clairement qu'il existe un
certain rapport entre ce document et la question
l'tude, et que la proposition de M. Tsiang
tendant ce que ce d'Ocument soit communiqu
pour information au Conseil de scurit - ventuellement titre confidentiel- est parfaitement
justifie.
Cependant, je ne pense pas que M. Tsiang ait
l'intention d'insister pour que le document soit
communiqu immdiatement au Conseil, puisque, comme chacun sait, celui-ci n'lenvisage pas
de prendre des mesures immdiates. Il n'est donc
videmment pas ncessaire d'essayer d'obtenir ce
document immdiatement. Notre dlgation tient
toutefois se rserver le droit de soulever de nouveau la question lorsqu'elle estimera que la situation l'exige.

Mr. TARASENKO (Ukr~ian Soviet Socialist

Republic) (tTanslated trom Russian): 1 should
like to ask whether the document under discussion, mentioned by the representative of India
h..u; 'been published in the American Press'
including Time magazine?
'

Mo' TARASSENKO (Rpublique socialiste sovitique ~Ukraine) (traduit du Tusse): J'ai une
question poser. Est-ce que le document dont il
s'agit et dont nous a fait part le reprsentant de
l'Inde a t reproduit dans la presse. des EtatsUnis et, notamment, dans la revue Time?

release SC(684].

Therefore, it can readily be sn that the

document has some bearing upon the question
under discussion and that the suggestion made
by Mr. Tsiang to have it communicated to the
Security Couneil-perhaps in a confidential way
for it~ information-is justified.

Le PRE JtNT (traduit de l'anglais):

The PRESIDENT: We do not ka"1-N whether the
document has been published. The mem.hers of Nous' ne savons pas si le document a t publi.
the Security Couneil would not be able to give Les membres du Conseil de scurit ne sont pas.
a reply to the question. Perhaps sbmeone present - en mesure <le rpondre cette question. Peuthere could give us some correct information on tre l'un des reprsentants assis cette table
the subject. If.the Indian representative knows pourrait-ilnous donner des renseignements exacts
anything about the matter, he may inform' us. ce sujet? Si le reprsentant de l'Inde possd~
However, 1 would ask him only to give a "vesu quelque information sur ce point, il pourrait nous
u answer
. to the qutstion
0 fthe representa
. en faire part. Je lui Gemanderai simplement de
or "no
tive of the Ukrainian. Soviet Socialist Republic. rpondre par "oui" ou "non)) la question pose
par le reprsentant de l'Ukraine.
Mr. PILLAI (India): 1 shaH do that. However, per'haps the President will aIIow me ta read
an excerpt' from an article which appeared in
this morning's New YOTk Herald Tribune, on
page 16, under the headia,g "Indonesia Talks
Halted, Dutcl1 Angry at 'Leak' u.

'"!t was understood that the American-Aus-

naHan formula p;rovided:

"1. Election within three months of a constituent ~embly.
.
.
"2. This assembly ta have dual status as a
provisional parliament.
"3. Any final agreeIl1ent must provide an
IndonesianUnion in which the Netherlands and
the United, StateS ofIndonesia,would have equal
parmership as sovereign States.

M. PILLAI (Inde) (traduit de l'anglais): Volontiers. Cependant, le Prsident m'autorisera

peut-tre donner, lecture d'un passage de l'article ,qui a paru ce matin dans le New York
Herald Tribune, pa:ge J6, sou~ le titre "Inter-,
ruption des ngociations en Indonsie; les Nerlandais expriment leur mcontentement en face
des "fuites)) qui se sont produites)).
"La formule amricano-australienne prconisait, semble-t-il, les dispositions suivantes:
"1. L'lection' d'une assemble constituante
dans les trois mos.
"2. Cette assemble exercerait en Meme temps
les fonctions Ge parlement provisoire.
"3. Tout accord final devrait prv"ir l'tablissement .d'une union indon.sienne laquelle les
PaysuBas et les Etats-Unis d'Indonsieparticiperaient sur un pied d'galit en qualit d'Etats
souverains.

"4. The
provisionai f
president w
cabinet.

"5. Six j
future States
and supervise
in Republic

CCG. As s
the States w
immediately
ment powers.
The PRES
to undertake
the' Security
tion on tI'1es
discuss the m
The Secu
from the Co
reply ta the
bl'.ss of the
these lasf fe
tin, 1 thin
Security Co
leam from th
the suspensio
tions depen
ties in conn~
ing agI't~eme
negotiations
sucb a devel

It is imp
know wheth
a suspension
its causes, j
ta xpress th
think we mi
~ood Offices
of negotiatio
duration.
have an op
whicl1 might
Security .Cou

At the sam
to continue t
to achieving
the provision
.ather ~istin
the Committ
ta the comp
side, with th
ments. Dur'
Couneil, cert
ance to one
part\es char
The Secudty
ing the facts
which is oil t
ing the facts
of each par
with the pro

U4. The provisional parliam.ent to fonu a

provisional federaI government by e1ecting a
president who would naroe a premier and
cabinet.
U5. Six joint commissions would define the
future States of the United States of Indonesia
and supervise restor~tion of foreign property now
in Republican hands.
'

u4. Le parlement provisoire devnrlt instituer

un gouvernement fdral provisoire en lisant un
prsident qui dsignerait un prsident du Conseil
et un Conseil de ministres.
U5. S~ commissions mixtes dtermineraient
les futurs Etats composant les Etats-Unis d'Indonsie et contrleraient la restitution des biens
trangers qui se trouvent actuellement entre les
1 mains d'es Rpublicains.
u6. As saon as provisional governments for
u6. Aussitt que les gouvernements provisoires
the States were formed, the Netherlands would des Etats sennent forn-.s, les Pays-Bas accordeimmediate1y give them full internal self-govern.. . raient immdiatement une complte autonomie
ment powers."
en matire de politique intrieure."
The PRESIDENT: 1 do not think it is necessary
ta undertake a discussion of newspaper articles in
the' Security Counci1. We shalI request informatian on these matters from official sources and
discuss the matters l~ter.

Le PRSIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) :

Je ne pense pas qu'il soit ncessaire d'engager~
au Conseil de scurit. une discussion sur des articles de journaux. Nous essaierons d'obtenir de
source officielle des renseignements sur ces questions et nous les discuterons plus tard.

The Security Council has ~-eceived reports

from the C-nmmittee of Good O!Hes and has to
reply to the Committee in sorne way. On the
bF.ss of the discussion that has taken pb.ce at
these lasf few mee~ngs on the Indonesian questin, 1 think it may be concluded that the
Security Council wishes, in the fust place, to
leam from the Committee of Good Offices about
the suspension of negotiations. On those negotiations depends the development of political activities in conne...o.on \Vith the fulfilment of the existing agI't~ements between the two parties. If the
negotiations are suspended now, that means that
such a development will aIso be suspended.

Le Conseil de scurit a reu des r.apports de la

Commission des bons offices et doit lui rpondre
d'une faon ou d'une autre. TI ressort, je crois, des
dbats qui ont lieu sur la question indonsienne
au cours des dernires sances, que le Conseil
de scurit voudrait que la Commission des bons
offices lui donne, avant tout, des prcisions au
sujet de la suspension des ngociations. C'est de
ces ngociations que dpend l'volu~on de la
situation politique. en ce qui concerne l'applica- .
tion des accords existant entre les deux parties.
Si les ngociations sont maintenant suspendues,
cela signifie galement un arrt de cette volution
politique.

TI importe que. le Conseil Ge scurit sache s'il

It is important for the Security Council to
know whether it is true that there has been such est exact qu'une telle suspension des ngociations
a suspension of negotiations and so, to know s'est produite et, si elle s'est effectivement proits causes, justification and duration. In arder duite, qu'il en connaisse les causes, les motifs et
to xpress the attitude of the Security Council, 1 la dure. Pour exprimer l'attitude du Conseil de
think we might first put to the Committee of scurit, je pense que nous pourrions d'abord
&>ad Offices this question about the suspemon poser la Commission des bons offices ces ql'esof negotiations and its causes, justification and tions relatives la suspension des ngociations,
duration. The Committee of Good Offices would ses causes, ses motifs et sa dure. La Commishave an opportunity to offer an explanation sion des bons offices aurait ainsi l'occasion d'offrir
which might Perhaps prove satisfactory to the une explication que, peut-tre, le Conseil de scuSecurity Council.
rit estimera satisfaisante.
At the same time, we might ask the Committee
En mme temps, nou~ pourrions demander
ta continue tendering its good offices' 'with a view la Commission de con'Lnuer exercer ses bons
to achieving a correct and peaceful fulfilment of offices afin d'aboutir une application loyale et
the provisions of the "Renville" Agreement and pacifique des dispositions de l'Accord du "Ren.other ~isting agreements. We might aIso ask ville" et des autres accords existants. Nous pourthe Committee to advise the Security Council as rions galement demander la Commission de
ta the compliance or non-:compliance, by each faire savoir au Conseil d~ scurit dans quelle
side, with the provisions of the existing agree- mesure les deux parties se sont conformes ou
ments. During the discussions in the Security non aux dispositic!!S des accords existants. Au
Council, certain ~embers attributed non-compli- cours .de. nos dbats, certains reprsentants au
ance to one party or the other, while each of the Conseil ont dclar que la non-observation des
part\es charged the other with non-compliance. dispositions tait le fait de l'une ou de l'autre parThe Security Couneil has no means of establish- tie, tandis que chaque partie a accus l'aatte c..'e
ing the faets. The Committee of Good Offices, ne pas avoir respect ses dispositions. Le Conseil
which is ol the scene, has the means of estabHsh, de scurit n'a aucun moyen d'tablir les faits. En
ing the factsand informing the Security Counc revanche, la Commjssion des bons offices, qui est
of eaclr party's compliance or non-compliance sur' place, a ies moyens de faire indiquer au
withthe provisions of the agreements.
Conseil dans quelle mesure chaque partie .~e
conforme ou non auxdispt>!i9usdesaccoids.

38
1 think it would also be helpful to send to the
Committee of Good Offices, for its information,
the verbatim records of the proceedings of these
last few meetings on the Indonesian question.
Having sent that material. and those auestions
to the Committee, the Couneil would thn await
a reply from it.
.
.Since no representative has submitted a draft
resolution on this subject-it may be that members clid not think it necessary to have a definite
resolution on these points-I shall, with the
agreement of the Security Council, send a cablegrm to the Chairman of the Committee of Good
Offices, asking the questions which 1 have outIined. If there is no objection to that procedure,
we will now cl '\Se our discussion of this case,
pending the receipt of new material which will
necessitate a furtber meeting of the Security
Couneil.

Je pense qu'il serait galement bon d'adt~er

la Commission des bons offices, titre d'infor~
mation, les procs-verbaux des dernires sances
consacres la question indonsienne. Une fois
qu'il aura adress cette C:-QClunentation . la Commission des bons offices, le Conseil devra attendre
la rponse de la Commission.
Comme aucun reprsentant n'a introduit de
projet de rsolution ce sujet - peut-:tre les
membres du Conseil ont-ils' estim qu'il n'tait
pas ncessaire d'adopter une rsolution prcise
sur ce point - je me propose, avec l'accord du
Conseil de scurit, d'adresser un cblogramme
au Prsident de la Commission des bons offices,
pour lui poser les questions que je viens de mentionner. S'il n'y a pas d'objection, nous ajournerons maintenant nos C;-bats sur la question, en
attendant de recevoir la documentation nouvelle
qui ncessitera une nouvelle runion du Conse~
de scurit.

Mr. JESSUP (United States of America): 1

M. JESSUP (Etats-Unis d'Amrique) (traduit
am in general agreement with the line of action de l'anglais): J'approuve, d'une manire gnwhich the President has suggested in terms of rale, les mesures que le Prsident vient de propoa request which he might address to the Chair- .ser, sous famie d'une demande adresser au
man of the Committee of Good Offices with a Prsident de la Commission des bons offices pour
view to securing certain additional information obtenir un supplment d'information, destin au
for the Secufty Couneil. 1 believe that the last Conseil de scurit. J'estime que le dernier paraparagraph of the resolution of the Security graphe de la rsolution ~'U Conseil en date du
Council dated 18 Februa.ry [document 8/678], 18 fvrier [document 8/678], que le reprsen.ta which the representative of Belgium referred tant de la Belgique a mentionn tout l'heure,
earlier, would probably suffice. That paragraph serait probablement suffisant. Ce paragraphe dstated:
cl~e:

ttRequests . .. The Co:mr.:nttee of Good Offices

ta keep the Council clirectly informed about the
political settlement in Indouesia."

'''Invite .. la Commission des bons offices

tenir directement le Conseil au courant des progrs du rglement politique en Indonsie.",
1 have rio doubt that the Committee of Good
Je suis certain que la Commissin des bons
Offices woUld inform the Security Council con- offices renseignera spqntanment [e Conseil de
, c~ming th~e ev~ts which have been t1le subject scurit sur les vnements qui ont suscit aujourof much discussIOn today. However, 1 would see d'hui tant de discussions. Cependant, je ne vois
no objection to bringing ta the special attention pas d'inconvnient ce qu'on insiste particulire-.
of the Committee the concern which the Council ment auprs de la Commission des bons offices
has felt regarding this matter. But 1 believe that sur l'inquitude que cette affaire cause auConseil
there is a particular frame of reference in which de scurit~. Mais j'estime que; pour toutes les
any communication moule! be addressed to communications adresser au Prsic:'ent de la
the Chairman of the Committee. Ii seems to me Commission, le Conseil doit suivre certaines rthat the Security Couneil is, happily, still oper- gles~ TI me semble que le Conseil de s~curit conating in this matter in the general realm of tinue fort heureusment agir dans cette affaire
agreement of the parties. We are not dealing en considrant qu, d'une faon gnrale, l'acwith .a situation in whicl1 failure has resultd cord rgne entre les parties. Nous ne sommes pas
from the efforts of the Security Council and the en face d'uD,.e situation o les efforts du Conseil
Committee of Good Offices. We are not sitting de scurit et de ~a Commission des bons offices,
in judgment on a case in which one or the auraient abouti un chec. Nous n'avons oas
other party has brought about a failure of neg- juger d'une affaire dans laquelle l'une ou l'~utre
tiations. We are not, it seems ta me eDgaged in des parties a provoqu l'chec de ces ngociaa post-mortem. What we are interested in, is the tions. Nous n'avons pas, si j'ose dire, pratiquer
continuance of the negotiations and their succcss- une autopsie. Ce qui nous intresse, c'est la contifuI outcome.
nuation des ngociations et ~eur russite.' .
Ma dlgation a accueilli' avec une grande
My delegation we1comed very heartily the
statement of the representative of the Nether- satisfaction la dclaration faite ce matin par le
lands this moming to the effectthat the original , reprsentant Ges Pays-Bas, selon laquelle la preimpression created by. the Press communiqu mire impression cre par le communiqu de
conceming the suspension of the negotiations was presse relatif la suspension des ngociations
notwholly accurate. He pointe el out that there n'tait pas absolument fonde. Lerepr~sentant
hadmerely been a discontinuance of certain parts des P~ys-B3;S a: fait observer qu'il y a eu simple-.
of the discussion pendingthe receipt of instruc- ment interruption des ngociations portant sur

tions fro
gation 0
much th
will be r
. will per
aspects
parties.
contempl
the Secu
wOuld b
Committ
negotiati
Iams
wish to
which, .
qose1y .
might ha
were true
that it,
itself und
parties, a
were mer
on the s
Council,
tions bet
at each
that they
this par
that part)
the situa
the Secur
Council .
wisely foll
on the c
a large
to those
mediato
seems 'to
if the Sec
Good 0
negotiatio
other, ta
Council
in this ,co
contentio

Nothin
ous to ,th
function t
tion of th
as to the
that side
Moreover
be truea comm
Security
the Corn
record of
ceding m
the occasi
weIl he p
the time
we shoul
Committe
Securty
pertinent

'.

s
s

39
tions from Tht Hague by the Netherlands dele- certains aspects qe la question, en attendant que
gation on the spot. My delegation hopes very la dlgation des Pays-Bas, qui est sur les' lieux,
much that the instructions which were awaited reoive des instructions de La Haye. Ma dlwill be received promptly and that their tenor gation espre vivement que les instructions atten. will permit the immediate resumption of. aU. 1 dues arriveront rapidement et que leur teneur
aspects of the negotiations between the two permettra la reprise immdiate de l'ensemble des
parties. Therefore it seems to me that we should ngociations engages. entre les deux parties. C'est
contemplate that the only, action ~ppropriate for pourquoi il me semble que les seules mesures judithe Security Council to take is action which cieuses que le Conseil de scurit puisse envisager
would be helpful to the parties and to the sont celles qui aideron~ les ~eux parties et la
Committee of Good Offices in furthering the Commission des bons offices poursuivre les
negotiations.
ngociations.
1 am sure that the Security Council would not
Je suis sr que le Conseil de scurit ne tiendra
wish to transmit any instructions or requests pas envoyer d'instructions ou de demandes que
which, in the judgment of the C9nunittee so la Commission, qui est en contact troit avec la
qosely in tcuch with the situation as it exists, situation relle, jugerait de nature la gner dans
might hamper it in its work. 1 think that if it ses travaux. Je pense'que, s'il tait exact que le
were true that the SeGurity Council had decided Conseil de scurit ait dcid d'~ntreprendre luithat it, at this distance from the scene, would mme, de si loin, l'uvre de mdiation entre les
itself undertake the actual mediation between the p~es et que la Commission des bons offices departies, and if the Cornmittee of Good Offices vienne alors simplement un auxiliaire charg de
were merely an agent for collecting information recueillir ~es renseignements sur place et de les
on the spot and transmitting it'to the Security transmettre au Conseil de' scurit qui, alors,
Council, which would then conduct th negotia- conduirait lui-mme les ngociations entre les
tions between the parties, we might very well ask deux parties, nous pourrions, dans ce cas, deat cach point that they tell us aU these facts, mander tout moment la Commission de nous
that they giv~ us their judgment as to whether renseigner sur la situation, de nous dire si, son
this party is correct in its assertion or whetht;r avis, les affirmations de telle ou telle partie 'sont
that party is correct. But that; 1 take it; is not justifies. Mais il est vident que ce n'est .pas le
the situation. ,That is not the practice which cas. Ce n'est pas la pratique que suit le Conseil
the Security Council is following. The Security de scurit; le Conseil a adopt dans le cas prCouncil in this case is following, as 1 think it has sent la mthode qu'il a employe, fort judicieuwisely followed in other cases-notably at present sement, je crois, dans d'autres cas - notamment,
on the case of Palestine-the practice of leaving l'heure actuelle, dans l'affaire _:e Palestine a large measure of responsibility and discretion mtpode qui consiste laisser unegran~e marge
to those on the spot who are charged ~th the de responsabilit et d'inc;1.pendance. ceux qui,
mediatory function. 'l'hat being the situation, it sur place, sont chargs d'une mission de mdiaseems 'to me that it would b most 1.lllfortunate tidn. Dalls ces circonstances, il me semble. qu'il
if the Security Counil forced the Committee of serait trs fcheux que le Conseil de scurit obliGood Offices, at various stages of a' delicate get la Commission des bons offices se ranger,
negotiatioll, to take sides with one party or the au cours des diffr~ntes phases d'une ngociation
other, ta keep l'eporting back to the Security. dlicate, aux cts de l'une ou de l'autre des
Council the. fact thatthey think this side is right parties, et informer le Conseil de scurit du
in this .contention and that side is right in that fait que, son avis, telle ou telle partie a raison
contention.
cet gard et que l'al,ltre partie a r~ison tel
autre gard.
.
Nothing, it seems tome, could be mort injuriA mon a-ris, rien ne pourrait comprom~ttre
ous tothe continuing conduct of the, mediatory ci:avaptage le succs d'une mission de mdiation
f?nction th~ to compel the person in the posi- que d'obliger celui qui exerce les fonctions de
tion of the mediator to make public declarations mdiateur se prononcer puJ>liquemfu"1tslll,' le
as to the justification of t.'le position of this or bien-fond de la position adopte par telle ou
that side at various stages of the proceedings. telle partie, au. cours des diff~rentes phases des
Moreover, it sems to me tl].at it may very weli ngociations. En outre, il me semble la foi~
be true-I hope it will he true-that by the time souhaitabk d fort probable que, au moment o
a communication from the President of the les communications du PrSident du Conseil de
Security Conncil could reach tI-.e Chairman of scurit auront pu atteindre lePrsident de la
the Committee of Good Offices, by the time the Commission des bons offices, au moment o le
rec~rd of o~r proceedings in this and the pre- procs-verbal de nos dlibrations d'aujourd'hui
cedmg meetmgs could he transmitted to them, et ~es sances prcdentes lui sera parvenu, la
the occasion. for sending.the inquiry may very raison d'tre d'une enqute relative cette interwell be past in terms of the discontinuance, for ruption momentane' des ngociations aura bel
the time being; of the discussions. 1 believe that et bien disparu. J'estime que nous devrions laiswe should leave it to thediscretiori of the ser la Commission des bons offices le soin d
Committee . of Hood Offices to furnish the fournir au Conseil de scurit les rehseignem~nts
Securty Council with the informatiot.'. which is dont il a besoin pour atteindre le but qu'il s'est
pertinent and necessary for the purposes of the propos. Ce que le Conseil de scurit se propose'
1

---~--

__

---:~.'
40

---

Council. 'l'hase purposes~ surely~ are to continue

to exer~e good offices through the Committe
and to further the progress of the negotiations
betwe~'l t.lte parties.

de, faire, c'est certainement de continuer exercer ses bons officc=s par l'intermdiaire de la Commission et p,'encourager !a bonne marche des
ngociations entre les parties.

. ThU$~ in my op4tion~ we should not attempt to

press 1~ Committee'of Good Offices to ~egister
j'dgrnent on the merits of the positions take..Jl by
the parties~ and we should not attempt toelicit
positions taken by the Committee on questions
of the justification or nan-justification of those
positions. That type of request to the Committee~
that type of information~ would perhaps be of
great importance and of necessity to the Security
Couneil if we were unhappily in the position of
dealing with a situation in which the negotiations
had broken down. That not being the case
according to our information at the present time~
it seems to me that we should be very careful
to do nothing wl>ich might in any way hinder
the resumption of the negotiations and their continuance to' a successful conclusion.

Nous ne devrions donc pas, mon avis, insister

auprs de la Commission des bons offices pour
qu'elle porte un jugement'sur le bien-fonC:: d
telle ou telle proposition prise par les parties ni
essayer de prciser l'avis de la Commission sur le
bien-fond ou le mal-fond de ces positions. TI
serait peut-tre trs important et trs utile pour le
Conseil de scurit d'adresser des questions de ce
genre' la Commission et de lui demander des
. renseignements de cet ordre si, par malheur, nous
tions en prsence d'une rupture des ngociations.
Mais, d'aprs les informations dont nous disposons, ce n'est pas le cas, et il me semble que nous
~evrions veiller soigneusement ne rien faire
qui puisse en quelque faon empcher la reprise
des ngociations et mettre obstacle leur heureuse conclusion.

Mr. TARASENKO (Ukrainian Soviet SociaIist

Republic) (translated trom Russian):. 1 should
first like to say' a few words about the report.
The Committee of Good Offic~ is endeavpuring
to demonstrate neutrality~ to present the events
unfolding before its eyes as a neutral and objective observer. Its report consequently contains a
catalogue of dry facts presented, on the one hand,
by the Netherlands Government and, on the
other, by the Republican Govemment. But
where can we find its own opinion of these
events, its own point of view on any important
question affecting the life of a whole people?
No one mows. How can this seeming neutraIity
and objectivitybe explained?

M~ TARASSENKO (Rpublique socialiste sovitique d'Ukraine) (traduit du r~se): Tout

d'abord, je voudrais dire quelques mots au sujet
du rapport lui-mme. La Commission des bons
offices s'efforce faire montre de neutralit et
prsenter les vnements qui se droulent sous
ses yeux comme si elle en tait un tmoin neutre
et impartial. C'est pourquoi, dans son rapport,
elle se borne numrer les faits, tels qu'ils lui
ont t prsents par le Gouvernement des PaysBas d'une part, et par le Gouvernement de la
Rpublique d'autre part. Mais que pense de ces
vnements la Commission lle-mme? Quelle
est son opinion sur telle ou telle question importante qui affecte la vie de tout un peuple? On
n'ensait rien. Conunnt s'expliquer cette neutr!-lit et cette impartialit affectes?

1 think the explanation is that the Committee

is simply at'raid of giving an objective and correct
opinion on events, for that would mean 'condemning the Netherlands Government. J1irst of
aIl, it would mean admitting and focussing before
the eyes of the whole world certain facts which
are disagreeable ta the Committee, particularly
the burning desire of the peoples of Indonesia to
rid themselves of their l"';!l.vited "authorities"
which are really enslavers~

A mon avis, la Commission a tout simpl "lIent

peur de porter un jugement impartial et luitable sur les vnements actuels, car, pour ce
faire, elle devrait con~amner le Gouvernement
des Pays-Bas et reconnatre, dvant le monde entier, certains faits fort dsagrables pour elle.
En effet, les peuples d'Indonsie cherchent se
dbal-rasser de leurs oppresseurs nerlan~ais; la
Commission devrait- donc admettre et constater
expressm~nt devant le monde entier que ces
peuples ont l'ardent dsir de se dbarrasser des
intrus qui se 'patent du nom & "autorits", mais
qui, en ralit, ne sont que des oppresseurs.

Second1y, it would mean recognizing that evn

now the Netherlands are continuing calmIy and
cynically to stifle the freedom of the Iildonesian
people, and that they will not renounce this
policy'"in the future; that cvery possible expedient is being used to crush the attempts of the
Indonesian people to huild their own State independentIy, without. the help of "well-wishers" in'
the. form of Dutch colonists, owners ofrubber
pTantation.s and oil-fields. The Committee of
Good Offices could not, condone this. and that

D'autre part, elle devrait admettre que les

Pays-Bas persistent vouloir touffer, cyniquemen.t et de sang-froid, la libert du peuple indonsien et qu;ils n'ont aucune .intention de renoncer ces desseins l'avenir. Il faudrait donc
reconnatre qu'on ne nglige aucun moyen pour
touffer dfinitivement les aspirations du peuple
indonsien qui cherche organiser sa vie nationale en toute indpendance, c'est--dire sans
l'aide "bienveillante" des Nerlandais, qu'ils
soient colonisateurs, planteurs de caoutchouc ou

is wh
thep

Ish
Unite
cIear t
many
to the
on ith
is be .
States
United
an obj
for the
questio
persiste
Nether

At
represe
facts b
tions a
States.
Press
wereho
ing oil

41

:-

l-

is why we observe such apparent detachment in

the presentation of the events in Indonesia.

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The speech made by the Australian representative who stated that the remar-ks made by the
representative of the USSR could not apply to
the Australian member of the Committee of
Good Offices, orny goes to confirm what 1 have
just said. The fact is that the Australian representative wishes to dissociate himself from the
general position taken by the Committee of
Good Offices, of which he does not approve.
True, 1 am some.what disturbed at the fact that
l cannot see in these reports any point of view
peculiar to the Australian member of the Committee of Good Offices, any opinion which would
reflect what the Australian representative has
just said. AlI his statementS confirm that the
Committee of Good Offices has taken up 'a position for which he does not wish to be responsible.
Whether 'this g really the case or not is another
question.
The speech made by the Belgian presentative
at the present meeting, and Belgium's gerieral
attitude to the colonial question, do not permit
us to expect an objective attitude with respect to
the events in Indonesia on the part of the Belgian
'Government, and of its representative on t}1e
Committee of Good Offices. It is c1ear that the
interests of other colonial ccuntries, in addition
to those of the Netherlands, are affcted, inc1uding those of Be1gium. We cannot therefore
expect from the Be1gian Government a fait,
objective and sympathetic attitude to the movement of national liberation of the Indonesian
people.

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r
s
s
s

c
r

propritaires de gisements ptrolifres et de raffineries de ptrole. La Commissir.Jn des bons offices

n'a pu se dcider le recClnnatre. C'est de l
que vient cette impartialit apparente dans l'expos des vnements qui se droulent actuellement en Indonsie.
Le renFcsentant de l'Australie a dclar que les
observations du reprsentant de l'URSS nesauraient s'appliquer au m~m'6re a~tralien de 1!1
Commission des bons offices. MaIS cela ne falt
que confirmer ce que je viens de dire. En effet,
le reprsentant de l'Australie cherc?e. se ds~
li~ariser de l'ensemble de la .CommISSlon, dont il
n'approuve pas l'.attitude. A vrai. dire,.ie ... ;~
quelque peu surprIS que les vu~ CJ.Ul auraIent ete
exprimes par le membre alli.tr~en de la Commission des bons offices et qui seraient conformes
la dclaration que vient de nous faire l~ reprsentant de l'Australie, ne figurent pas dam; ces
rapports. Quoi qu'il en soit, cette ddaration du
reprsentant de.l'Australie confirme nette~ent
que la CommisSion des bons offices a effectivement adopt cette attitude et qu'il ne veut pas
en partager la responsabilit., Est-ce exact? cela
est une autre question.
La dclaration que le reprsentan~ de la Belgique a faite au cours de la prsente siance et'
l'attitude que son pays a adopte l'gard de la
question Ges colonies ne permettent point d'esprer que le. Gouvernement belge et son reprsentant la Commission des bons offices feraient
preuve d'impartialit en ce qui concern~ les vnements qui se droulent en Indonsie. n est
clair qu'il ne s'agit pas seulement des intrts
coloniaux des Pays-Bas; les intrts des autres
, Puissances coloniales, et en particulier de la, Belgique, sont galement mis en cause. On ne saurait
donc esprer que le Gouvernement belge fasse
preuve d'inipartialit ou, encore moins, qu'il
manifeste de la sympathie l'gard du mouvement
de libration nationale du peuple indo,
neslen'
, Je voudrais dire quelques mots au sujet de
l'attitude a~optepar les Etats-Unis l'gard de
cette question. Nous la connaissons tous. Cette
attitude, on nous l'a expose bien des fois dj
au cours des sances du Conseil de scurit consacres, la question d'I!',ldansie, et il n'est point
besoin de s'y attarder. Je voudrlS simplement
vous rappeler ce qu'il y a derrire cette attitude
adopte par les Etats-Unis l'ga~d d~ la q.uestion indonsienne. Pourquoi les Etats-Ums se
refusent-ils si obstinment. envisager cette question d'une faon impartiale? Pourquoi s'obstinent-ils, tout au long de cette, discussion, _au
Conseil ~e scurit, soutenir les Pays-Bas,
soutenir les agresseurs nerlandais?
Au cours de la dernre sance [322me
sance]~ le reprsentant de l'Inde. a mentionn
quelques faits intressants au sujet de l'empn'1r7lt
qu'on est en train de ngocier avec les Etats-l ills.
D'autre part, la pres.se a rapport rcemment
que plusieurs compagnies.ptrolires amricaines
mnent galement des ngociations en Indonsie
en vue d'obtenir des' concessions; bien' entendu,

.1 should also like to refer ta, the position of the

United States in this matter, a position which is
cIear to a11 of us and has been revealed at so
many sessions 'of the Security Council devoted'
to the Indonesian question that i need not dwell
on it here. 1 wish only to reca11 once again what
is behind th position' taken up. bythe United
States on the Indonesian question. Why does the
United States so stubborn1y refuse to take up
an objective attitude Q. the matter? Why has it,
for the space of a whole year during which the
question was examined by the Security Council,
persistentIy followed the policy of supporting the
Netherlands, the Dutch aggressors?

At the last meting [322nd' meetitzg], the

of India fu~nished sorne interesting
facts about the 'loan, concerning which conversations are now taking place with the United
States. It was also recentIy announced in the
Press that a number of American oil companies
~ere holding conversations in Indonesia concernmg oil concessions. These conversations
.
.were
repr~entative

42
not ~ing.conrlucted with the peoples of Indo- ce n'est pas avec le .peuple indonsien ni avec le
nesia, not with the Republican Government, but Gouvernement de la Rpublique qu'on. mne ces
with the Netherlands Govemmentand their ngociations, mais bien avec le Gouvernement
representatives. Th conversations were about des Pays-Bas ou avec ses reprsentants. Or, ces
land and oil wells which came, not under the , ngociations portent sur des gisemen~ et des puits
jurisdiction .of the Netherlands, but of the de ptrole situs dans le territoire contrl par le
Republican Government. Clearly, hl such cir- Gouvernement de la Rpublique et non pas par
cumstances, and with such a composition of the les Pays-Bas. Vu cet tat de choses et cette comCommittee of so-called Gaod Offices, we cannot position cie la Commission dite des bons offices,
expect any objectivity. That '.8 the first point 1 on ne peut, bien ent<:ndu, s'atten~e une attiwish to mak.
tude impartiale. Telle est la premire remarque
que je tenais .faire.
Secondly, in spite of the ostentatious "neuDeuximement, malgr la "neutralit" de comtrality" displayed by the Committee of Good mande dont la Commission des bons offices a fait
Offices in its preparation of these documents- preuve en rdigeant ces documents - c'est
the first, second, and third reports-in spite of dire ses premir, deuxime et troisime rapports
the wishes of the authors of the documents, 1 - malgr le dsir et la volont des auteurs de ces
.think it is possible to discern in them the real documents, la situation. qui existe en Indonsie
state of affqirs in Indonesia. Even these tenden- apparat sous son vrai jour. Mme ce rapport
tious docurp.ents make it possible to jud:ge the partial permet de juger de la faon donL le
attitude of the Netherlands Government towards Gouvernement nerlandais entend s'acQuitter
its own obligations, an attitude which may be de ses engagements. Il est permis de dir qu'il
described as a complete disregard of those obli- n'en tient aucun compte. Tant que ces engagegatio~. They are recognized when they are ments lui paraissent avantageux, le Gouverneuseful, butas soon as they cease to heuseful, they ment des Pays-Bas les recol1..nat. Mais, ds qu'ils
cessent de l'tre, il ne se gne pas pour les violer
are trampled underfoot and cast aside.
et les fouler aux pieds.
Il n'est point besoin de lire entre les lignes de
At the cost of but litde effort ID. rl without
reading between the fines, it is possible to realize, ce rapport que l'on prtend neutre; en effet, il
even from this so-called neutral. report, that the slJ.ffit de ge donner la peine. d'analyser ce docupeople of Indonesa have not become reconciled ment et les faits qu'il prsente~ pour se rendre
ta the present state of affairS nd that they are cmpte que le peuple indonsien ne s'e;st pas
continuing thtrir attempts ta rid themselves of rsign cet tat de choses et qu'il dsire se dbarrasser des Nerlandais.
the Dutch.
Je voudrais dire maintenant quelques mots sur
. .l .should: iike tQsay a few words bout the
so-calld ''Renville' Agreement. As we know, l'Accord dit du "Renville". Nous savons. tous daris
the IIidonesian Repblic was forced, under the quelles circ;)nstances cet accord a t accept.
circumstances, to acept the enslavng conditions La Rpublique d'lndonsie a t contrainte
of that Agreement.. 1 spoke about this question d'accepter les conditions de servitude qu'il corn':'
a~ the rime' the Agreemen~ was made, and portait. J'i pris la parole sur cette question
showed why the Indonesian Republic was forced l'poque et j'ai montr les motifs qui on~ forc
to accept its exceptionally oppressive terms. The la Rpublique. d'Indonsie accepter les condireason was, it will be remembered, that. British, tions extrmement dures que lui imposait cet
Japanese and Netherlands troops imposed a war Accord. En effet, vous vous souviendrez que les
of. attrition on the I1donesian Republic and forces armes britanniques, japonaises et nerlanpeople.. 1 wi...sh to emphasize that that war was daises ont 'impos une guerre d'usure la Rpuimposed by Japanese troops in alliance with bliqu.e d'Indonsie et au peuple indonsien. Je
British; and Netherlan,ds troops. To make this le souligne: les troupes japonaises, allies au.."
absolutely c1ear, let me be specific once again. troupes britanniques et nerlandaises, leur ont
After the defea~ of Japan, after the.surl'ender of. impos cette guerre. Pour viter tout malentendu
that country, Japanese traops togetherwith et toute aI!1bigut, je prcise une fois de plus :
Bri~h and: Netherlands troops,continued the . aprs la- dbcle et la capitulation du Japon, les
war against thepeoples of Indonesia.
troupes japonaises, .cte cte avec des troupes
britanniques et nerlandaises, ont continu
fairela gm:rre aux p~uples d'Indonsie~
Le blocus touffait l'conomie de l'Indonsie
The econorilic blockade stifled theeconomy of
Indonesia and d.ily aggravated .the situation of et aggravait de jour en jour la situation de la
the Republic. At the same. time, sorne interna- . Rpublique d'Indon~;sie. En mme temps, cer-.
tional organizations whih had close and direct taines organisations internationales, ayant des
relations with the United Nations, hastened ta rapports trs troite:: ave~ l'Organisation' ds Na:come 'totheaid of the Netherlands in thestruggle tions Unies, se s.ont empresse~ de venir en aide
against t~e Indonesian p~op!e. 1 have in mind aux Pays-Ba'3=l'Ji lutta.ient contre le pepleI!-dothe.grant ofa.loan l?f 195 million dollars to ~he nsien. 1':,.'1 \ .c.~ le pr2t de 195 millions de dolNetherlands by the International Bank in August lars que la :e"':l:C1u~ .intenladonalea accord aux
947. There was, it is tI1;1e, a hypotritical reserva- Pays-Bas en aout 19'1": Il est vrai que, enaccor-

tion t
utilize

th5sw

as the
nomic
agains
consid
nomic

CIe
Repu
terms
no aIt
oppr
favou
lated
Gave
lands
it can
with
bu~

their

sovere
territo
In
tions
existe
to e
"Ren
A
senta
that
cratic
nesia,
appos'
Gove
-demo
those
introd
which

43

le
:es
:nt
:es
lits
le
lar

m-

es,
:tilue

ait

ds

ces

:Sle

ort
le
ter
l'il
gene,'ils
11er
de

, il

cudie

pas

dsur

ans

)t.
nte

lm-

Irc
Ldi
cet
les
anpu-

Je

au.'C
ont
ldu
us:
les
Ipes
, ,
~ a

,sie
da
cer- .
des
Nade
Ldo-

dolaux

cor-

tion to the efIect that the loan must not be

utilized in the struggle against Indonesia. But
tIDs was no more than a meaningless restriction,
as the Netherlands are throwing aU their economic anG military resources into the s.truggle
against Indonesia, and 195 million dollars will
considerably strengthen their military and economic potential.
Clear1y, under such conditions the Indonesian
Republic was obliged to accept the enslaving
terms of the "Renville" Agreement. 'fhere was
no alternatiVl~. And now even this agreement,
oppressive against the Indonesian Republic and
favouring the Netherlands, is ~eing ruthlessly violated and trampled upon by the Netherlands
Government. Why is this? Because the Netherlands Government has come to the conclusion that
it can try to grasp ev.en more, to do awayentirely
with the Indonesian Republic, and tonip in the
bucl the struggle of the Indonesian people for
'
their national and economic liberatinn.

1 may be told I am mistaken. If so, 1 can

point to the creation of puppet States; to the
division of Indonesia into a number of small
States, which, as the representative of the USSR
hasalready pointed out today [322nd .meeting],
are ruled by quislings ready to serve the' Dutch for
money; to the proclamation of the "United
States of In.donesia" for the purpose of doing
away with the Indonesi~, Republic; 1 can point
to these and many other facts which show how
flagrantly the N etherlands has disregarded its
obligations.
Now the Netherlands is endeavouring to gain
still more, to deprive the Indonesian Republic of
its sovereign rights. During a recent meeting
[316th meeting], the Netherland's representative
even expressed surprise that there could be any
doubt about the legality of the Netherlands'
sovereign rights over the whole ,of Indonesian
territory.
In face of such a situation, .the normal condi~
tions-indeed, any conditions--necessary for the
existence of the Indonesian Republic, cease
to exist, even within the framework of the
"Renville" Agreement..
A number of speakers, including. the representative of the .Netherkads, have emphasized.
that the Netherlands is- the upholder of democratic tl aditions, .which it is introducmg in Indonesia, but the whole report is an indication of the
opposite, for it shows how the Netherlan:B
Go'vernmeIit, through its officials, tramples on
'democratic principles and democratic order in
!hose territo:i:iesof Indonesia where they were
mtt:0duced by the Republican Government and
WhlCh the Dutch have now se!7.ed again.
. .

dant ce prt, on avait fait une clause hypocrite

selon laquelle il ne devrait pas tre utilis dans
la lutte contre l'Indonsie. Mais ce n'tait l
qu'une rserve de pure forme: en effet, pour
lutter contre l'Indonsie, les Pays-Bas ont d
mobiliser toutes leurs forces conomiques et militaires, et il est vident que ces 195 millions de
dollars ont contribu renforr considrablement leur potentiel militaire et conomique.
li va sans dire que, en prsence d'une telle
situation, la Rpublique d'Indonsie s'est vue
contrainte d'accepter les conditions de servitude
que lui imposait l'Accord du 'Renville"; elle
n'avait pas le choix. Et voici que le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas viole ce mm.e Accord du
"Renville" qui est si asservissant pour les Indonsiens et si favorable aux Nerlandais. Pourquoi
,le fait-il? parce que le Gouvernement des PaysBas s'est dit qu'il pourrait tenter maintenant
d'obtenir encore davantage, de mettre fin l'existence mme de la Rpubliqu d'Indonsie et
d'touffer dans l'uf la lutte mene par le peuple
indonsien pour sa libration nationale et conomique.
On pourrait m'objecter, certes, qu'::l n'en est
pas ainsi. Nanmc;>ins, je 'pourrais citer certains
faits qui montrent que les Pays-Bas. ont viol
d'une faon flagrante les engagements qu'ils
avaient assums. Ainsi, ils ont cr des Etats fantoches; ils ont morcel l'Indonsie en plusieurs
petits Etat, la tte desquels, comme l'a dit
aujourd'hui [322me sance] le reprsentant de
l'URSS, ils ont ,plac des quislings prts les
servir n'importe quel prix; ils ont proclam les
"Etats-Unis d'Indonsie"pour en finir avec
l'existence mme de la Rpublique d'Indonsie,
etc.

Maintenant, les Pays-Bas vont encore plus loin

et cherchent dpouiller la Rpublique d'Indonsie de ses droits souverains. Au cours d'une des
dernires sances [316me sance],e reprsentant des Pays-Bas s'est mme montr surpris que
l'on ait pu contester la lgitimit de la souverainet des Pays-Bas sur l'ensemble du territoire
de l':{ndonsie.
,Dans ces circonstances, non seulement il ne
saurait y avoir de conditions normales; maiS
l'existence et la vie mmes de la Rpublique
d'Indonsie ne pourraient tre assures, mme'
dans le cadre de l'Accord du "Renville".
Certains orateurs, notamment le reprsentant des Pays-Bas, ont affirm que les Pays-~as
reprsenteraient en Indonsie les traditions dmocratiques et qu'ils y auraientimplant des institutions dmocratiques; mai& le rapport tout entier
est l pour prouver le contraire. TI montre, en
effet, que le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas. et les
fonctionnaires qui le reprsentent en Indonsie ne
font aucun cas G:es principes et des institutions
dmocratiques et que, dans les rgions dont ils
s'emparent de nouveau, ils dtruisent le rgime
dmocratique qui y a t institu par le Gou~
,
,
1veinement de la Rpublique d'Indonsie.
n suffit d'examinr les faitd mentionns dans
.An analysis of ilie fact,6 set forth in Jle report
will show that. the thir, ~nd. last West Java ce rapport pour conclure que la troillime et der-

Conference, in which one hundred representatives took part, co!15Sted mainly of persons
directly or indirectly appointed by the Netherlands -authorities.
.

1 think the people of Indonesia 'Would prefer

not to have such samples of "dei'llocracy". They
woulG certainly be better off without them.
The representativ~ of the Netherlands cornplained at the last meeting [316th meeting] that
the Indonesian population and the Republican
leaders were still clinging to their old aspirations,
that is, aspirations to obtain thdr independence
and the right freely to decide their own fate. He
stated the conditions for a successful solution of
the Indonesian problem, name1y that the Republic should undergo a change of mind and heart.

The behaviolU of the Netherlands Govermnent

in Indonesia, the actiom ana, tnetho& used ta
achieve its ends, show very clearly what is meant
by this change. The . Idonesian people are faced
with the demand to return to the positit>~ they
occupied before the war, a position of complete
colonial dependence upon the Netherlands.

Clearly such an approach cannot lead to a

solution cf the problem which would, in the
least, satisfy the Indonesian people. The Netherlands Govemment's.attitude being what it is, it
is obviously futile to expec~ that the Netherlands
and Indonesia can achieve any positive results
through conversations, the more so if one takes
into account the role played by i:he Committee
of Good -Offices; for the aims of ilie two sicies
are different: on one side there 1.:; the wish com-, p:etely to restore theold ord(er, and, on the other,
the reluctance of the Indonenan people to return
to tbat arder.

In ,\>';.ew of the favourable attitude of the Cornmittee of Good Offices ta. the aims and desires
of the .Netherlands Government,Iittle can be
expected from such.conversations. Nevertheless,
the conversations were arbitrarily broken off on
the NI~therlands side. Ta othis, rcourse was
had to forgery.. After the statement of ~e representative of fuma, there can remain no doubt
that it .was indee forgery.. With the. aid. of such
forgeries, it is hoped to justifY,the prepara.tion of
.new violence against the Indonesian people. At
present the NetherlandS Government mpreparing
to. use its military or economic superiority te
deprive the Indonesian p~ople of the fruits of
victory which they wonafter years of stubbom .
fighting.
"

nire Confrence pour le territoire occidental

de Jr.Lva, confrence laquelle ont particip une
centaine de reprsentants, tait compose de personnes dsignes direciement ou indirectement
par Ica autorits nerlandaises.
Je pense que le peuple indonsien ne tenait
aucunement connaitre un rgime "dmocratique" de ce genre. TI n'aurait rien perdu ne pas
le connatre; au contraire, il y aurait gagn.
Au cours d'une sance prcdente [316me
sance], le reprsentant des Pays-Bas s'est plaint
que la population de l'Indonsie et les hommes
politiques rpubliccJns n'ont toujours pas re-nonc leur ancien rve, et vewent obtenir l'indpendance et le droit de dcider eux-mmes de
leur sort. Le reprsentant des Pays-Bas a propos
un plan qui permettrait de rgler la qUe<ltion
indonsienn.e d'une faon satisfaisante. Selon ce
plan, la Rpublique devrait modifier- son tat
d'esprit, transformer son me.
Si l'on considre l'attitude du Gouvernement
nerlandais en Indonsie, si l'on tient compte de
ses actes et deS mthodes dont il s'est servi pour
atteindre ses buts, on peut dterminer coup
sr la nature des modifications prconises par
ce Gouvernement. On exige que le peuple indonsien accepte le rtablissement du rgime colonial d'avant-guen-e, c'est--dire d'un rgime 'de
subordination complte aux Pays-Bas. .
TI est clair que, si l'on aborde le problme de
cette faon, on ne saurait espr(:x' une solution
tant soit peu satisfaisante pour le peuple indonsien. TI est vident que, en !.)rsence de l'attitude adopte par l: Gouvernement nerlandais .
l'g~d de cette question, on ne peut s'attendre
ce que les ngociations entre les Pays-Bas abou.tissent un rsultat satisfaisant, SUl'tO:t-t z! l'on
tient compte du rle jou par la Commission des.
bons offices; en effet, les bU+c; (l..~;; deux parties en
prsence sont diffrents: d'une part.. le Gouverilement nerlandais s'efforce de rtablir l'ancien
rgime; d'autre part, le peuple indonsien refuse .
de l'accpter..

Si l'on tient compte de l'attitude favorable

de la Commission des bons offices l'gard des
desseins ei des aspirations du Gouvernement
nerlandais, on ne peut gure esprer que de
tels pourparlers abou9r0nt un rsultat favorable. Cependant, mme dans ces conditions, ces
pourparlers ont tdlibrment rompus par les
Pays-Bas. Il' a fallu, pour cela, procder' des
falsific~~tions;en e.ffet, aprs la dclaration du
re.prsentant de l'Inde, nous ne pouvons douter
qu'il s'agit d'un faux. A l'aide de ces falsifications, les Pays-Bas veulent justifier les actes de
violence qu'ils' se prparent dclencher contre
k p<:'YJ,~,1e d'lridonsie. Le Gquvemement ner~
&
,.
. de sa supenon
,. t'e
lrj.3'"'i~~ Si<l!''P:r<etC
a tirer
parti
lk',rr.ique et militaire. pour- priver le peuple
indonsien des fl'Uits d'une victoire qu'il a rem:porte aprs 'plusieurs annes de lutte opinitre.
Au cours d'nedes dernires sances [316me
At a receilt meeting [316th. meeting], the
Netherlands. represntativeinyoked the. history sance], le reprsentant des Pays-Bas ainvoqti
.aI\d traditionsolhis country. 1 donotquiJe see J'histoire et les truditions de son pays: Ce.tte allu

<

howhistory
Netherlands
daims to s .
will hardly
view.

Someepiso
are certainly
and Iwould
There was a
bis grandees
the people of
to put an
freedom, an
which they f
of the people
Gueux, was c
traditions th
was rderring.

More vivi
occupation
people reme
under the for
the Netherl
tioJ} of the 1
can there he
the Netherl
way in whir.
viewed the -,

Thus, l' .
tion in this ca
goveming cirl
history, then
~f dubious val
lands represer
The Nethe
presented the
tum, declarin
doed not inte
ings in futur
vene betwee
and that the
played altoge
will in atten .
listening to
Netherlands
unequivocally
intend to to
future, that i

If we look'
this century;
performed by
ble the action
Inent is abcu
be infectious,
~e conseque

45
howhistory and traditions come to the aid of the 1sion me semble dplace; je ne vois pas pourquoi
Netherlands Government in establishing their l'histoire et les traditions doivent aider le Goudaims to seize Indonesia. The facts of history vernement des Pays-Bas justifier l'occupation
will hardly bear out Mr. van Kleffen's point of de l'Indonsie par les Nerlandais. Si l'on veut,
view.
malgr tout, invoquer l'histoire, on peut galement rappeler certains faits d'un autre ordre qui
vont plutt l'encontre de la thse de M. van
Kleffens.
Sorne episcdes in the history of the ~etherlands
are certainly worth examining on this occasion,
and 1 would like to ti'We1l on them for a moment.
There was a time when the King of Spain and
bis grandees were filled with indignation because
the people of the Netherlands were endeavouring
to put an end to Spanish ne and win their
freedom, and because of the stubbornness with
which they fought. Yet in the end the struggle
of the people, the bravery and obstinacy of the
Gueux, was crowned with &uccess. ls it to those
traditions that the Netherlands representative
was rd'erring?

Il y a, en effet, dans l'histoire des Pays-Bas,

un <.~rtain nombre d'vneme..lts qu'il v aurait
lieu de rappeler ce propos et au sujet desquels
je voudrais -dire quelques mots. TI fut un temps
o les fOis et les grands d'Espagne taient outrs
de voir que le peuple des Pays-Bas s'efforait de
secouer le joug espagnol ,t d'obtenir la libert,
et s'indignaient de l'opinitret dont le peuple
nerlandais faisait preuve dans sa lutte contre
l'Espagne. Mais nous nous souvenons que, en fin
de compte, la lutte du peuple, la bravoure et la
tnacit des Gueux ont t couronnes de succs. Peut-tre le reprsentant des Pays-Bas voudra-t-il mms parler de cet exemple historique et
de ces tradtions.

More vivid in our memory is the Hitlerite

On garde encore le souvenir de la rcente
occupation of the Netherlands. The Dutch occupation des Pays-Bas par les forees hitlt;'
people remember the "blessings" they enjoyed riennes. Le peuple nerJand:.Js se souvient de
under the fordgn aggressor. Why, then~ cannot cette occupation et des "attraits" que prsente
the NetherlanC:'S Government vislialize the posi- l'existence sous la domination d'un envahisseur
tioJ} of the Indonesian people? Wha: grounds tranger. Pourquoi le Gouvernement nerlancan there be to think ihat this people looks upon dais ne peut-il comprendre la situation du peuple
the Netherlands occupation differently irom the ' indonsien? Quelles raisons y a-t-il de croire que
way in whir,h the people o~ the Netherlands le peuple indonsien ne juge pas l'occupation
viewed the Hitlerite occupation?
nerlandaise ccrrnne le peuple des P;"J,ys-Bas jugeait l'occup!.ITon hitlrienne?

Thus, 1 think the lessom of history ~~ld tradition in this case are twvfold. If the Netherlands
goveming circles have dtawn on the lessons of
history, then what they have learned has been
d dubious value, as the statements of the Netherlands representative have confirmed.

Il me semble donc que, dans le cas prsent, les

leons de l'histoire et les traditions historiques ont
une double signification. Si les milieux gouvernementaux nerlandais ont vraiment tir les enseignements de l'histoire, ceux-ci sont d'un caractre fort douteux, comme le confirment d'ailleurs
les dclarations du reprsentant des Pays-Bas.

The Netherlanrll representativ has in effect

Le reprsentant ds Pays-Bas a adress, en fait,
presented the Security Council with an ultima- un ultimatum au Conseil de scurit. TI a dclar
mm, declaring that the Netherlands Govemment que le Gouvernement des. Pays-Bas n'avait plus
doed not intend to appear at the Council meet- -l'intention de se faire reprsenter aux sances du
ings in future, that the Conncil must not inter- Conseil de scurit, que ce dernier ne devait pas
vene between the NetherlanQ.'<) and Indonesia, intervenir dans les relations entre ls Pays-Bas et
and that the N etherlands Govemment has dis- l'Indonsie, et que le Gtluvemement des Paysplayed altogether too mu('h patience and good Bas avait fait preuve de trop de patience et de
will in attending the meetings of the Cauncil and bienveillance en assistant aux sance du Conseil
listening to the criticismS of its actions. The de scurit et en coutant les critiques qu'on lui
Netherlands repres~lt~tive stated, clearly and adressait. Le reprsentant des Pays-Bas a dclar
unequivocally, that his GovernmentJ does not clairement et sans quivoque que le Gouyerneintend to tolerate this state of affairs in the l'J.~nt des Pays-Bas n'a.vait pas l'intention de tolfuture, that it will boycott the Security Council. rer une telle situation et qu'il se proposait de
boycotter le Conseil de scurit.

If we look back at the history, of the 'thirties of

this century, we rnay discoyer a number of actions
performed by cenain States whch closely re'5em-

Si nous .IiOUS reportons l'histoire de la troisime dcade du XXme sicle, nous verrons
que, dans bin des cas, l'attitude de crtains
ble the action ta which the Netherlands Go'Vem- btats a t en tous points semhlable celle qu.~
me~t is abeut to have recourse. Examples may' le Gouvernement des Pays-Bas ente:n,d adopter
be infectious, but we should !10~ lose sight of what maintenant. Certes, les exemples ~nt~ontagieux,
the consequences may be.
mais il va.udrait mieux~ nanmcirlS, smg:e..uux
consquences qu'entra1n:el'a une telle attitude.

46
The representative of the Netherlands expressed surprise that the Security Council should
examine the question of Indonesia at a time when
other more compelling international events are
taking place. Here is a clear case of an attempt
to take aG.vantage of the international situation
quietly to put an end to the Indonesian Republic,
in the belief that the Security Council and the
United Nations are preoccupied with more
impr,.-tant matters and have no time for Indonesia.
1 consider the representative of the Netherlands to be mistaken in this view. The Security
Council cannot oveFlook the events in Indonesia.
The Security Council is in dutY bound to intervene in the events in Indonesia and te recall to
order those who over-reach themselves.

Le reprsentant des Pays-Bas s'est montr

fort surpris de voir que le Conseil de scurit
examine la question de l'Indonsie, alors qu'il
existe d'autres vnements internationaux bien
plus importants. Les Pays-Bas veulent manifestement profiter de la situation internationale pour
en finir avec la Rpublique d'Indonsie, car ils
sont convaincus que le Conseil de scurit et
l'Organisation des Nations Unies ont des questions bien plus importantes rgler et ne peuvent
donc pas s'occuper de l'Indonsie.
me semble que le reprsentant des Pays.
Bas a tort. Le Conseil de scurit ne peut se
dsintresser des vnments qui se droulent en
Indonsie. Le Conseil de scurit peut et doit
intervenir dans les vnements d'Indonsie et
rappeler l'ordre ceux qui ont perdu tout sens
de la mesure.

1 think the Secrity Councl1 should play a

more active part in the Indonesian question and
should lend legitimate assistance to the In&onesian people, even though this may not be to
the liking of sorne countries represented on the
Council and may to sorne ,extent affect the
colonial interests of sorne represented on the
Council. TheCouncil must rise above these considerations, and on the finn basis of the United
Nations Charter and of the aims of the United
Nations, it must consider the solution of this
question fairly and objectively. It cannat remain
aloof and, like Pontius Pilate, wash its hands of
the matter. It cannot stand aside otl the pretext
that there exists the Committee of Good Offices.
We can all see that the Committee is incapable
of solving this problem, t}lat it cannot influence
the course of events, the more so as its composition prevents it from seeking a just solution.

li me semble que le Conseil de scurit devrait

s'occuper plus activement de la question d'Indonsie et qu'il devrait aider comme il convient le
peuple indonsien, mme si cela dplait cer
tains pays reprsents au Conseil et si cela affecte
dans une certaine mesure les intrts coloniaux
de cerf':-ins de ses Etats mmbres. n faut que le
Conseil de scurit se place au-dessus de ces
,considrations et qu'il cherche trancher cette
question d'une faon juste et quitable, en tenant
compte des fonctionq dont il a t investi et en
restant fidle la C1iartc des Nations Unies et
aux t.ches que FOrganisatim des NHtions Unies
s'est assignes. Il ne peut rester l'I;art de cette
question et s'en laver les mains en suivant l'exemple de Ponce Pilate. Le Conseil de scurit ne
peut se dsi"1tresser de cette question sous prtexte qu'il existe une Oommis&ion des bons offices.
Comme nous le savons tous, la Commission n'est
pas mme de rsoudre cette question. Elle est
incapable de rr.sou&e ce problme d'autant plus
que, en raison de sa composition, elle n tient pas
exercer une influence en vue de parvenir une
, solutionequitable de ce problme.

One last remark. 1 see no need at the momev.c

to interrupt the' examination of the IndoneSLm
question. We still have one document [document
8/842] a fourth report submitte& yesterdaywhich may serv,e as a basis of discussion by the
Council. It would be wrong to deferthe consideration' of the question indfinitely. Such a
delay would serve only to aggravate the position
in Inc1lonesia.'

two

Je voudrais faire une dernire, dclaration. TI

me semble qu'il n'y a pas lieu d'lterrompre la
discussion de la question indonsienne en ce mo
ment. Nous avons reu un nouveau document
- le quatrime rapport [document 8/842] ,.qui ne nous est parvenu qu'hier, et qui donnera
peut-tre lieu ne discussion du Conseil de
scurit. Il serait peu sage de remettre J'examen
de la question indonsienne une date indtermine. Une telle dcision ne contribuerait qu'
aggraver la situation en Indonsie.

Mr. Hoon (Australia): Thereare

points
M. Hoon (Australie) (traduit de l'anglais):
arising out of the President's suggestionto the La proposition faite au Conseil de scurit par
Security CouniLwhlc!t~I should like tohave le Prsident soulve deux questions sur lesquelles
made clear to me. First, 1 think that the Soonrity j'aimerais avoir quelques prcisions. Tout
Council will findthat in the contemplatedreport d'abord, je rois'que le COI~seil de Bcurit troufrom the Committee of Good Offices, there will vera ample matiere examen et discussion 'dans
he no lack of material or substance to consider le rapport que ISon sollicite de ia Commission des
and to debate.Moreover, it w;li he material bons offices. En outre, la. teneur de ce rapport
which willcarrywith It its ovm sense Cif urgency. . a,ura, par elle-mme, v.n caractre d'extrme
1 trust, with alleal'1v'..stne&il, that it ~il1 become urgence. J'espre fennement qu'il sera possible
. possible to fix a def1:ul:e date for th,1I': next me~t de fIXer une date prcis~ pour la prochaine ruing of the Security COU.'lclJ. ,,~! f~~ qu,~nonpf nion du Conseil de scurit sur la question

InC:;:onesia; a

period of .

that were do
Committee 0
. would appre
rate, as much

The PRE
changed since
sentative of
to adjourn
result, but '
before us, w
sending a cab
tee of Good
the points 1
b modified .
the: represent
his reply. As
be ~istributed
another mee
request of an
or on the ini
ance wih th

At present
meeting to
tomorrow, sa
to discuss. Tl
have made
supported a;:;.
discussed or
bring forwar
a meeting w'
Mr. GRO
Republics) (t
examining f
Committee
16 June [do
was difficult t
ment in the
only natural
referred to i
matter of co
Federal Con
and would s

A number
Council are
tasks of the
of the Indone
other questlo
apart from
official infor
know the' 0
cerned about
would certai
cussing the 1

47
In~'Onesia; a definite date within a very short
period of time~ a period of days. Secondly, if
that were done, it could be communicated ta the
Committee of Good Offices that the Council
. would appreciate receiving their report or, at any
rate, as much of it as possible, prior ta that date.

d'Indonsie - une date prcise, dans un. avenir

trs proche, quelques jours au plus. D'au.cre part,
s'il en est ainsi dcid, le Conseil pom:rait faire
savoir la COI! 'lSSion des bons offices qu'il lui
serait reconnaissant d'envoyer son rapport ou,
du moins, une bonne partie de ce rapport, avant
cette date.

Le PRSIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) :

The PRESIDENT: The situation has not
changed since 1 spoke previously. Like the repre- La .situation n'a pas chang depuIS ma dernire
sentative of the Ukrainian SSR, 1 am unwilling intervention. De mme que le reprsenta."l~ de
to adjourn this meeting without any concrete l'Ukraine, je ne voudrais pas lever cette sance
result, but since there is 110 concrete proposai sans que des rsultats concrets aient t obtenus,
before us, we shall have to sati"fy ourselves by ; mais, puisque aucune proposition concrte ne
sending a cable to the Chairman of the Commit- nous a t prsente, nous devrons nous contenter
tee of Good Offices asking for information on d'adresser un cblogramme au Prsident de la.
the points 1 have mentioned, points which' will Commission' des bons offices, lui demandant des
b modified in accordance with the remarks of renseignements sur les pOLlts que j'ai mentionthe representative of the United States, and await ns, compte tenu des modifications prconises
his reply. As saon as the reply is received, it will par le reprsentant des Etats-Unis. Ap(~ quoi
be ~istributed to the members as a document and nous n'aurons qu' attendre la rponse. Ds
another meeting will be convoked, either at the qu'elle nous sera parvenue, cette rponse sera
request of any member of the Security Council communique aux membres du Conseil sous
or on the initiative of the President, in accord- forme de document, et une nouvdIe sance sera
ance wih the rules of procedure.
convoque, soit sur la demande d'un membre du
Conseil de scurit, soit sur l'initiative du Prsident, conformment au rglement intrieur.
At present, 1 do not see any use in fixing a
Pour le moment, je ne VOL'3 pas i'utilit de fixer
meeting to he held within a limited time- une date prcise pour cette runion - demain,
tomorrow, say, or next week-if there is nothing par exemple, ou la semaine .prochaine - ' s'il .
to discuss. The members of the Security Council n'y a rien discuter. Les membres du Conseil
have made their statements, and none of them de scurit ont fait leurs dclarations, aucun d'ensupported ai~y concrete proposal, nor was any tre eux n'a prsent de rsolution concrte, et
discussed or voted upon. Should any member aucune proposition n'a t discute ou 'mise aux
bring forward a proposai and call for a meeting, voix. Si un membre du Conseil prsente une
a meeting will be convoked irnmediately.
proposition et demande une runion, le Conseil
sera immdiatement convoqu.
Mr. GROMYKO (Union of Soviet Socialist
M. GROMYKO (Union des Rpubliques sodaRepublics) (translated trom Russian): We are 'listes sovitiques) (traduit du russe): Nous somexarnining four dOCiuments receive~ from the mes en train d'e..xaminer quatre documents qui
Committee of Three. One of them, dated nous ont t prsents par la Commission d~
16 June [document S/~42], came yesterday. It trois: l'un de ces docurr,~nt.s [document 8/842]
was difficult ta read this somewhat lengthy docu- nous est parvenu hier e~ ,} est dat du 16 jUat.
ment in the time available; consequentIy it is Matriellement, il n'a gure t possible d'tuonly natural that speakers today have not dier ce document, qui est fort volumineux. Aussi,
referred ta it at all, aIthough it deals with a les orateurs qui ont pris la parole aujourd'hui
matter of considerable importance, namely, the 'l':mt-ils laiss entirement de ct, bien qu'il
Federal Conference, which opened on 27. May traite d'une question assez llportante. .Il est
and would seem to be still in progress.
consacr la question de la Confrence fdrale
qi s'est ouverte le 27 mai et qui semble pour,:
suivre ses travaux l'heure actuelle.
A number of representatives on the Security
Certains membres du Conseil de scurit ne
Council are not cIear as to the nature, aims and connaissent pas l'objet de cette confrence. Quels
tasks of the Conference, and as to the attitude sont les objectifs qu'elle doit atteindre et les
of the Indonesian Government to'",ard it. Various tches qu'elle doit accomplir? Quelle est l'attiother quest\ons aIso have to be cleare~ up, and tude du Gouvernement indonsien son gard?
apart from this report~ we havereceived no Il y aurait lieu d'lucider certaines autres quesofficial information whatever, We do not even tions encore. En dehors de ce rapport, nous
know the official opinions of the parties con- n'avons reu aucun renseignement officiel des
cerned about this Conferene. Consequently, it parties J'fl",'ud de cette confrence. Il serait
would certainly be premature to continue dis- donc prn ,"
de reprendre la discussion'de la
cussing tIle Indonesian question at this meeting. question ".luonsienne au cours de la prsente
sance.
~ h~ve no;obj~ction to the Cow.r.llttee of Three
Je ne m;opposerai pas ce qe nous deman
, belng asked for additionaI information, if it can dions la Oommission des trois des renseigne-

48

"

~"""

be available within the next few ays. But

whether we obtain this informati'Jn saon or not,
the examination of the Indonesian question must
he continued. Ii may he difficult to fix a date for
th,e next meeting, but it is essential for us to
agree that the next meeting should b held in the
near future.
. No proposaI has been made today; however.
Perhaps one will be made at the next session,.and
we shalI then examine the adttional documents
and information received from the Committee of
Three, including theCommittee's report of
which 1 have already spoken and whicll w~ have
not yet discussed.
The PRESIDENT: That is what 1 said: as soon
aS a proposal is ready, the date of the meeting
will be' :fi.xed. 1 have no objection if we :fix a
meeting for' next week, on either T!lesday or
Wednesday. li there is no objection, we shalI
have it on Wednesday at 2.30 p.m.

ments complementaires, pourvu que ces renseignements nous parviennent rapidement. Mais,
quel que soit le dlai dans lequel nous recevrons
ces renseignements, il faudrait continuer examiner la question indonsienne. Peut-tre est-il .
difficille de fixer ds maintenant une date pour
la prochaine sance, mais il faut, en tout cas, se
mettre d'accord pour que la prochaine runion
se tienne le plus tt possible.
Aucune proposition ne nous a t soumise
aujourd'hui. TI se peut qu'on en introduise au
cours de la prochaine sance. Dans ce cas, nous
examinerons ,les documents et les renseignements
supplmentaires manant de la Commission des
trois, et notamment le rapport de cette Commission que j'ai. dj mentionn et que nous n'avons
pas encore examin.

about the s
other comm
ing at whi
presented.
3 copyof
Seeurity Co

Mr.PA
ation seems t
began this
which a fou
yet studed c
last night.
fourth repo
like to do so
to say some
representativ
[316th meet
to do that at

Le l'RSIDENT (traduit de l'anglais):

C'est bien ce <'(ue j'ai dit: aussitt qu'une proposition sera prte, la date de la runion sera fixe.
Je ne vois pas d'inconvnient ce que nous prvoyions aussi une runion pour la semaine prochaine, mardi ou mercredi, S'il n'y a pas d'objection, nous nous runirons mercredi 14 h. 30.

General McNAUGHTON (Canada): 1 asked

Le gnral McNAUGHTON (Canada) (traduit
for permission to speak only in ord~rto express de l'anglais) : J'ai demand la parole simplement
a little anxiety about the procedure which the pour exprimer quelque inquitude au sujet de la
Presi~ent has indicated would he adopted in
procdure que le Prsident a annonce pour les
communicating with the Committee of Good cammunicationsdu Conseil avec la Commission
Offices in Indonesia. 1 should like to draw atten- des bons (lffices en Indonsie. Je voudrais attirer
tion to the fact that the charter under which l'attention du Conseil sur le fait que c'est notrethat Committee is operating is our resolution of rsolution du 28 fvrier 1948 [document 8/689]
-28 February 1948 [document 8/689]. 1 should qui dfinit,en somme, le mandat de la Commislike to make it clear that any communications to sion. Je tiens prciser que toutes les commuthe Committee, other than such further resolu- nications adresses la Commission, , l'exception
tions a'.:t the Secrity Couneil may adopt, cannot, des rsolutions qu'adoptera ventuellement le
of course, affect in any way the functions of that Conseil de scurit, il~ peuvent naturellement
Committee, which is one of good' offices only. 1 affecter d'aucune manire les fonctions de cette
thinkthat is something about which we have to . Commission, qui a exclusivement pour tche
he very, very careful.
d'exercer ses bons offices. Je crois qu'il nous faut
n'avancer sur ce terrain qu'avec la plus grande
prudence.
.
Une autre question laquelle nous devons
Another matter about which we should be
careful, as the representanve of the United States faire trs attention est, comme l'a fait observer
has pointed out, is that no communications from le reprsentant des Etats-Unis, le fait qu'aucune
this Securitydouncil must affct the proper initi- communication du 'Conseil de scurit ne doit
ative on the spot of 'i,hatCommittee ta discharge affecter les facultf.s d'initiative de cette Commis- .
the' duties .with whieh it has been entrusted.. It sion et l'empcher d'accomplir sur place la mis
sems to me that the best way to put the Commit- sion dont elle a t charge. Je pense que le
tee in min,:! of what we are thinking about in the meilleur, moyen pour le Conseil de scurit de
Security Couneil and what we wish, is that we tenir la Commission au courant de ce qui se
should transmit ta it copies of our proceedings, passe et de ,lui faire connaitre nos vux, est de .
as ! think was suggested earlier in the day. As 1 lui communiquer les procs-verbaux de nos dlisaiG, 1 do hqpe that we will bring tothe mincIs .. brations, comme on l'a dj, je crois, propos
of 'L'te members of, the Corrnriittee the facts that aujourd'hui. Je le rpte, j'espre fermement
theSecurity Council does not wsn in any way que ;1,e~';::; ~erons. clairement comprendre la
what<.::ver to have,them departfrom the mandate Comr.'m~::i3n qlie le Conseil de scurit ne tient
wmch they have already been given, and that we nul1em.:'~-,t . ;z.. voir s'carter du mandat qui lui
hope theywill keep us informed, as indeed the a M ;,:':~,nf{d; i.:t qu'il esp~re qu'elle nous tiendra
resolution of 28 February r~quires,but that we au ,eourl:!.UC des vnements, comme le prvoit
do not'wish,them ta feel that their initiative has d'ailleurs la rsolution du 28 fvrier, mais que
nous nevowons pas qu~elle s'estime, en aucune
heen restrieted in any way, shap~, or form.
.
faon, gne .dans ses initiatives.
Le PRSIDENT '. (traduit de ['anglais) :
'The PRESIDENT ~ In that case it would be
bette:r tosatisfyourselves with as~gthem only Dansee cas, il vaudrait, mieux que nous nous
"~""

'-'.""

The PREs
Council that
scheduled to
Committee
teeship syste
islands. As
agenda, tha
Atomic Ene
of the Ukr .
wh' has ask
not a pressin
poned until
day next at
On Wednes
tinue our
question.

The

49
about the suspension of negotiatioris, leaving any
other communica.tion until after our next meeting at which certain concrete proposaIs may he
presented. As the same time we shall send them
3. copy of the :eport of the proceedings o~ the
Security Council.

bornions demander la Commission des prcisions, sur la suspension des ngociations, quitte
lui adresser d'autres ccmmunications la suite
de notre prochaine saIlte au cours de laquelle
seront peut-tre prsentes des propositions
concrtes. En mme temps, nous lui adresserons
copie des procs-verbaux des sances du Conseil
de scurit.

Mr. PALAR (Indonesian Republic): The situation seems to me to have become confused. We
began this discussion with three. reports, after
which a fourth was introduced, which 1 have not
yet studied carefully since 1 receivecl it on1y late
last night. 1 reserve the right ta discuss this
fourth report at the next meeting, but 1 should
like to do something more, since 1 feel the need
to say something bout the speech made by the
representative of the Netherlands las1l' Thursday
[316th meeting]. 1 think 1 aIso have the right
to do that at the next meeting.

M. PALAR (Indonsie) (traduit de l'anglais):

TI me semble que la situation est devenue confuse.
Nous avons commenc cette discussion avec trois
rapports; un quatrime a t introduit plus tard,
que je n'ai pas encore pu tudier srieusement,
puisque je ne l'ai reu que tard dans la soire
d'hia-. Je me rserve:I.e droit de discuter ce qua
trime rapport au cours de la prochaine sance
et je vourais aborder galement une autre question. J'ai, en effet, certaines remarques faire
au sujet du discours prononc jeudi dernier
[316me sance] par le reprsentant des PaysBas~ Je pense que j'aurai galement la possibilit
de le fa::-e lors de l ~aine sance.

Le PRSIDENT (traduit de l'anglais) :

The PRESIDENT: 1 would remind the Security
Council that tomorrow morning at 10.30 we are Je rappelle au Conseil de scurit que nous dtscheduled to meet to discuss the report of the vons nous runir demain matin, 10 h. 30, pour
Committee of Experts with regard to the trus- discuter le rapport du Comit d'experts charg
teeship system as applied to the stra~egic Pacifie d'tudier l'application du rgime de tutelle dans
islands. As for the remaining item on today's les zones stratgiques des fies 1"1'1 Pacifique. En ce
agenda, that dealing with the report /Of the qui concerne le dernier point de l'ordre du jour
Atomic Energy Commission, the zoepresentative de la pr$ente sance, qui a trait aux rapports
of ~e Ukrainian SSR is the on1y representative de la Commission lie l'nergie atomique, seul le
who has asked permission to speak, and as it is reprsentant de l'Ubainea demand la parole,
not a pressing matter, 1 think it might be post- et, comme il ne s'agit pas d'une question urgente,
poned until next week. We shalI meet on Toes- je pense que nous pouvons en remettre l',examen
day next at 2.30 p.rn. to discuss that question. la semaine prochaine. Nous nous runirons mardi
On Wednesday, at the same hour, we shall con- prochain, 14 h. 30, pour dis~uter cette question.
tinue our examination af the Indonesian Mercredi, la mme heure, nous reprendrons
question.
l'examen de la question indonsienne.

The meeting rose al 6.05 p.m.

La sance est leve 18 h. 95.