G.R. No.

L-2068

October 20, 1948

DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS, petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO G. LUCERO, Judge of First Instance of Pampanga, respondent.
TUASON, J.:

preliminary examination before the issuance of the order of arrest." We called

attention to the fact that "the constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by
the witnesses against him does not apply to preliminary hearings' nor will the
absence of a preliminary examination be an infringement of his right to confront
witnesses." As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation may be done away with
entirely without infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the due
process clause to a fair trial.

The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga after he had been bound over to that court for trial,
praying that the record of the case be remanded to the justice of the peace court of
Masantol, the court of origin, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the
complainant and her witnesses in connection with their testimony, on the strength of
which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused. The motion was denied and
that denial is the subject matter of this proceeding.

The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority went farther
than the majority and denied even any discretion on the part of the justice of the
peace or judge holding the preliminary investigation to compel the complainant and
his witnesses to testify anew.

According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's attorney to the Court of

First Instance in support of his motion, the accused, assisted by counsel, appeared at
the preliminary investigation. In that investigation, the justice of the peace informed
him of the charges and asked him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he
entered the plea of not guilty. "Then his counsel moved that the complainant present
her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in
the manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor
objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection was sustained. "In view
thereof, the accused's counsel announced his intention to renounce his right to
present evidence," and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to the court of first
instance.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ., concur.

Leaving aside the question whether the accused, after renouncing his right to present
evidence, and by reason of that waiver he was committed to the corresponding court
for trial, is estopped, we are of the opinion that the respondent judge did not act in
excess of his jurisdiction or in abuse of discretion in refusing to grant the accused's
motion to return the record for the purpose set out therein. In Dequito and Saling
Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336, recently promulgated, in which case the
respondent justice of the peace had allowed the accused, over the complaint's
objection, to recall the complainant and her witnesses at the preliminary
investigation so that they might be cross-examined, we sustained the justice of the
peace's order. We said that section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the sound
discretion of the justice of the peace on the matter. We said that "while section 11 of
Rule 108 defines the bounds of the defendant's right in the preliminary investigation,
there is nothing in it or any other law restricting the authority, inherent in a court of
justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably calculated to bring out the truth."
But we made it clear that the "defendant can not, as a matter of right, compel the
complaint and his witnesses to repeat in his presence what they had said at the

Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed with costs
against the petitioner.

G.R. No. 180016

April 29, 2014

LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, dated November 5, 2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz (petitioner), seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution2 dated
September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification
the Decision3 dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San
Fernando City, finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal
Code.
The antecedent facts follow.
Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale
Casino in Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then engaged
in the business of lending money to casino players and, upon hearing that the former
had some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the
same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis.
Private complainant agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the
following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's
necklace and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of P98,000.00, as
evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the
proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60
days. The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or
returning the pieces of jewelry. When private complainant was able to meet
petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the said items
entrusted to him, but to no avail.
Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa, which reads
as follows:
That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, after having received from one Danilo Tangcoy, one (1) men's diamond
ring, 18k, worth P45,000.00; one (1) three-baht men's bracelet, 22k,
worth P25,000.00; one (1) two-baht ladies' bracelet, 22k, worth P12,000.00, or in the
total amount of Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos (P98,000.00), Philippine currency,

under expressed obligation on the part of said accused to remit the proceeds of the
sale of the said items or to return the same, if not sold, said accused, once in
possession of the said items, with intent to defraud, and with unfaithfulness and
abuse of confidence, and far from complying with his aforestated obligation, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert
to his own personal use and benefit the aforesaid jewelries (sic) or the proceeds of
the sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, the accused failed and refused to
return the said items or to remit the amount of Ninety- Eight Thousand Pesos
(P98,000.00), Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of said Danilo
Tangcoy in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of
not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone testimony of
Danilo Tangcoy. On the other hand, the defense presented the lone testimony of
petitioner, which can be summarized, as follows:
Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who
is engaged in the financing business of extending loans to Base employees. For every
collection made, they earn a commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any
business with private complainant.
However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which
he was made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then dated
May 2, 1991 and used as evidence against him for the supposed agreement to sell the
subject pieces of jewelry, which he did not even see.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged in the Information. The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the felony of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) of the
Revised Penal Code;
there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating circumstance/s
to vary the penalty imposable;
accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of deprivation of
liberty consisting of an imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of
FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision Correccional in its medium
period AS MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of
Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period AS MAXIMUM; to indemnify private

complainant Danilo Tangcoy the amount ofP98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay
the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner
and affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated July 30,
2004 of the RTC of San Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION on the imposable prison term, such that accused-appellant shall
suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each
additional P10,000.00, or a total of 7 years. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with this Court
the present petition stating the following grounds:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE ADMISSION AND
APPRECIATION BY THE LOWER COURT OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE, INCLUDING ITS
EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE MERE MACHINE COPIES, AS THIS VIOLATES THE BEST EVIDENCE
RULE;
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S
FINDING THAT THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT FATALLY DEFECTIVE
ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID NOT CHARGE THE OFFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE IN THAT 1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE SUBJECT
[PIECES OF] JEWELRY SHOULD BE RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, OR THE MONEY TO
BE REMITTED, IF SOLD;
2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATION AS OF 05 JULY 1991 WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE
TESTIFIED TO BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WHICH WAS 02 MAY 1991;
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S
FINDING THAT DEMAND TO RETURN THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY, IF UNSOLD, OR
REMIT THE PROCEEDS, IF SOLD AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE WAS PROVED;
D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S
FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S CASE WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
ALTHOUGH 1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2) VERSIONS OF THE
INCIDENT;

2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER ACCUSED IS MORE STRAIGHTFORWARD

AND LOGICAL, CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN EXPERIENCE;
3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN AND APPLIED TO THIS CASE;
4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE STATE.

In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated
the following counter-arguments:
The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to object to their
admissibility.
The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established the
designation of the offense and the acts complained of.
The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged.
This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.
The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even
more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any
showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or that they are
so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.4 Petitioner is of the
opinion that the CA erred in affirming the factual findings of the trial court. He now
comes to this Court raising both procedural and substantive issues.
According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court,
admitting in evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and its
submarkings, although the same was merely a photocopy, thus, violating the best
evidence rule. However, the records show that petitioner never objected to the
admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified
upon in court by private complainant. The CA also correctly pointed out that
petitioner also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecution's formal
offer of evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt. The established
doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the
time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived. 5
Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally defective
Information filed against him. He contends that the Information does not contain the
period when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to be returned and that the date
when the crime occurred was different from the one testified to by private
complainant. This argument is untenable. The CA did not err in finding that the
Information was substantially complete and in reiterating that objections as to the
matters of form and substance in the Information cannot be made for the first time on

appeal. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of
money or property received to the prejudice of the owner6 and that the time of
occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion of the
period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the
Information, do not make the latter fatally defective. The CA ruled:
x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory
designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. Then
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that a complaint or information is
sufficient if it states the name of the accused;
the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. In the
case at bar, a reading of the subject Information shows compliance with the
foregoing rule. That the time of the commission of the offense was stated as " on or
about the fifth (5th) day of July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the prosecution's cause
considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time
only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense. The gravamen of the
crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of
the offender. Thus, aside from the fact that the date of the commission thereof is not
an essential element of the crime herein charged, the failure of the prosecution to
specify the exact date does not render the Information ipso facto defective.
Moreover, the said date is also near the due date within which accused-appellant
should have delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces of jewelry] as
testified upon by Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance with the rules.
Accused-appellant, therefore, cannot now be allowed to claim that he was not
properly apprised of the charges proferred against him.7
It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, which reads:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow.
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or
any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or
for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery
of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially

guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other

property; x x x
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money,
goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty
to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such
receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.8
Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the
offended party on the offender, was not proved. This Court disagrees. In his
testimony, private complainant narrated how he was able to locate petitioner after
almost two (2) months from the time he gave the pieces of jewelry and asked
petitioner about the same items with the latter promising to pay them. Thus:
PROS. MARTINEZ
q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this transaction could
have been finished on 5 July 1991, the question is what happens (sic) when the
deadline came?
a I went looking for him, sir.
q For whom?
a Lito Corpuz, sir.
q Were you able to look (sic) for him?
a I looked for him for a week, sir.
q Did you know his residence?
a Yes, sir.
q Did you go there?
a Yes, sir.
q Did you find him?
a No, sir.
q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991?
a I talked to him, sir.
q How many times?
a Two times, sir.
q What did you talk (sic) to him?
a About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir.
q Referring to Exhibit A-2?
a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I asked him where the items are and he
promised me that he will pay these amount, sir.
q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him partially or full?
a No, sir.9

No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand.10 Demand need
not even be formal; it may be verbal.11 The specific word "demand" need not even be
used to show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a

mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be
tantamount to a demand.12 As expounded in Asejo v. People:13
With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under
this kind of estafa need not be formal or written. The appellate court observed that
the law is silent with regard to the form of demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b),
thus:
When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written demand be
necessary, the law would have stated so. Otherwise, the word "demand" should be
interpreted in its general meaning as to include both written and oral demand. Thus,
the failure of the prosecution to present a written demand as evidence is not fatal.
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money
entrusted to the accused, we held that the query was tantamount to a demand, thus:
x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence
of the crime of embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to account, upon
demand for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation. The same way, however, be established by other proof, such as
that introduced in the case at bar.14
In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to prove
the existence of all the elements of the crime. Private complainant gave petitioner the
pieces of jewelry in trust, or on commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May
2, 1991 with an obligation to sell or return the same within sixty (60) days, if unsold.
There was misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of those
pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return the same pieces of
jewelry within or after the agreed period despite demand from the private
complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.
Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is questioned by
petitioner, the same is unmeritorious. Settled is the rule that in assessing the
credibility of witnesses, this Court gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial
court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and
their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts,
which merely rely on the records of the case.15 The assessment by the trial court is
even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some
fact or circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding is
affirmed by the CA.16 Truth is established not by the number of witnesses, but by the
quality of their testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of evidence,
the witnesses are to be weighed not numbered. 17
As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this
case, the question of the continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of

crimes involving property came up. The legislature apparently pegged these penalties
to the value of the money and property in 1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal
Code. Since the members of the division reached no unanimity on this question and
since the issues are of first impression, they decided to refer the case to the Court en
banc for consideration and resolution. Thus, several amici curiae were invited at the
behest of the Court to give their academic opinions on the matter. Among those that
graciously complied were Dean Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria,
Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate President, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives. The parties were later heard on oral arguments before the Court en
banc, with Atty. Mario L. Bautista appearing as counsel de oficio of the petitioner.
After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this Court
finds the following:
There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that
the courts continue to impose on crimes against property committed today, based on
the amount of damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932.
However, this Court cannot modify the said range of penalties because that would
constitute judicial legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in amending
the penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's
decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power of another branch of the
government. This, however, does not render the whole situation without any remedy.
It can be appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
had anticipated this matter by including Article 5, which reads:
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but
which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a
court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not
punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to
believe that said act should be made the subject of penal legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending
the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this
Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into
consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense. 18
The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of a
case which is not punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the
remedy is to render the proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, the reasons why the same act should be the
subject of penal legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable act is present but is
not the subject of any penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to inform the Chief
Executive of the need to make that act punishable by law through legislation. The

second paragraph is similar to the first except for the situation wherein the act is
already punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as
excessive. The remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend the
execution of the sentence but to submit to the Chief Executive the reasons why the
court considers the said penalty to be non-commensurate with the act committed.
Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive, this time, of the need for a
legislation to provide the proper penalty.
In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,19 Guillermo B. Guevara
opined that in Article 5, the duty of the court is merely to report to the Chief
Executive, with a recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal
provisions which it believes to be harsh. Thus:
This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sige
lege," that is, that there can exist no punishable act except those previously and
specifically provided for by penal statute.
No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it
necessary to prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice will be
entirely powerless to punish such act.
Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution of a
sentence on the ground that the strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code
would cause excessive or harsh penalty. All that the Court could do in such
eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief Executive with a recommendation for
an amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh.20
Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired Chief Justice
Ramon C. Aquino and retired Associate Justice Carolina C. Grio-Aquino, in their
book, The Revised Penal Code,21 echoed the above-cited commentary, thus:
The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian principle that
justice must be tempered with mercy. Generally, the courts have nothing to do with
the wisdom or justness of the penalties fixed by law. "Whether or not the penalties
prescribed by law upon conviction of violations of particular statutes are too severe
or are not severe enough, are questions as to which commentators on the law may
fairly differ; but it is the duty of the courts to enforce the will of the legislator in all
cases unless it clearly appears that a given penalty falls within the prohibited class of
excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment." A petition for clemency should be
addressed to the Chief Executive.22
There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be
based on the current inflation rate or at the ratio of P1.00 is equal to P100.00 .
However, it would be dangerous as this would result in uncertainties, as opposed to
the definite imposition of the penalties. It must be remembered that the economy

fluctuates and if the proposed imposition of the penalties in crimes against property
be adopted, the penalties will not cease to change, thus, making the RPC, a selfamending law. Had the framers of the RPC intended that to be so, it should have
provided the same, instead, it included the earlier cited Article 5 as a remedy. It is
also improper to presume why the present legislature has not made any moves to
amend the subject penalties in order to conform with the present times. For all we
know, the legislature intends to retain the same penalties in order to deter the further
commission of those punishable acts which have increased tremendously through the
years. In fact, in recent moves of the legislature, it is apparent that it aims to broaden
the coverage of those who violate penal laws. In the crime of Plunder, from its
original minimum amount of P100,000,000.00 plundered, the legislature lowered it
toP50,000,000.00. In the same way, the legislature lowered the threshold amount
upon which the Anti-Money Laundering Act may apply, from P1,000,000.00
to P500,000.00.
It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present penalties do
not seem to be excessive compared to the proposed imposition of their corresponding
penalties. In Theft, the provisions state that:
Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos, but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount
the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this
paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total
of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such
cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the
penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case
may be.
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods,
if the value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed
12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods,
if the value of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not
exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, if the value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but
does not exceed 200 pesos.

5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not
exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does
not exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed
under the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding
article and the value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such
value exceeds said amount, the provision of any of the five preceding
subdivisions shall be made applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos,
when the value of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall
have acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning
a livelihood for the support of himself or his family.
In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is P6,000.00, the above-provision
states that the penalty is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods (6
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Applying the proposal, if the value of the
thing stolen is P6,000.00, the penalty is imprisonment of arresto mayor in its medium
period to prision correccional minimum period (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4
months). It would seem that under the present law, the penalty imposed is almost the
same as the penalty proposed. In fact, after the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law under the existing law, the minimum penalty is still lowered by one
degree; hence, the minimum penalty is arresto mayor in its medium period to
maximum period (2 months and 1 day to 6 months), making the offender qualified
for pardon or parole after serving the said minimum period and may even apply for
probation. Moreover, under the proposal, the minimum penalty after applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto
mayor in its minimum period (21 days to 2 months) is not too far from the minimum
period under the existing law. Thus, it would seem that the present penalty imposed
under the law is not at all excessive. The same is also true in the crime of Estafa. 23
Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value of the thing stolen
in the crime of Theft and the damage caused in the crime of Estafa, the gap between
the minimum and the maximum amounts, which is the basis of determining the
proper penalty to be imposed, would be too wide and the penalty imposable would
no longer be commensurate to the act committed and the value of the thing stolen or
the damage caused:
I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would be modified
but the penalties are not changed:

1. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00 will become P1,200,000.00 to P2,200,000.00, punished

by prision mayor minimum to prision mayor medium (6 years and 1 day to 10
years).
2. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to P1,200,000.00, punished by
prision correccional medium and to prision correccional maximum (2 years, 4
months and 1 day to 6 years).24
3. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00, punishable by
prision correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day
to 4 years and 2 months).
4. P50.00 to P200.00 will become P5,000.00 to P20,000.00, punishable by arresto
mayor medium to prision correccional minimum (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and
4 months).
5. P5.00 to P50.00 will become P500.00 to P5,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor
(1 month and 1 day to 6 months).
6. P5.00 will become P500.00, punishable by arresto mayor minimum to arresto
mayor medium.
x x x x.
II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value would also be modified but
the penalties are not changed, as follows:
1st. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00, will become P1,200,000.00 to P2,200,000.00,
punishable by prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (4 years, 2
months and 1 day to 8 years).25
2nd. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to P1,200,000.00,
punishable by prision correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).26
3rd. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00, punishable by
arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2
years and 4 months).
4th. P200.00 will become P20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum (4
months and 1 day to 6 months).

An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed amici
curiae, is that the incremental penalty provided under Article 315 of the RPC violates
the Equal Protection Clause.

The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is determined
according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and
yonder is that of reasonableness,27 which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.28
According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest on
substantial distinctions asP10,000.00 may have been substantial in the past, but it is
not so today, which violates the first requisite; the IPR was devised so that those who
commit estafa involving higher amounts would receive heavier penalties; however,
this is no longer achieved, because a person who steals P142,000.00 would receive
the same penalty as someone who steals hundreds of millions, which violates the
second requisite; and, the IPR violates requisite no. 3, considering that the IPR is
limited to existing conditions at the time the law was promulgated, conditions that no
longer exist today.
Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and declares the
incremental penalty in Article 315 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection
clause, what then is the penalty that should be applied in case the amount of the thing
subject matter of the crime exceeds P22,000.00? It seems that the proposition poses
more questions than answers, which leads us even more to conclude that the
appropriate remedy is to refer these matters to Congress for them to exercise their
inherent power to legislate laws.
Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR
unconstitutional, the remedy is to go to Congress. Thus:
xxxx
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be struck down
as unconstitutional because it is absurd.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and unusual punishment.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the amount is more than
Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:

Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare the incremental
penalty rule unconstitutional, then that would ... the void should be filled by
Congress.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One Hundred Thousand
(P100,000.00) Pesos ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
Well, my presen ... (interrupted)
JUSTICE PERALTA:
For every One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos in excess of Twenty-Two
Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos you were suggesting an additional penalty of one (1)
year, did I get you right?
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory interpretation.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Ah ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of the law...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
But if we de ... (interrupted)
DEAN DIOKNO:
....then....
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as unsconstitutional, the court
cannot fix the amount ...
DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of Twenty-Two
Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The Court cannot do that.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Could not be.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The only remedy is to go to Congress...
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... and determine the value or the amount.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:

That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year in excess of
Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
Thank you, Dean.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Thank you.
x x x x29

There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or imprisonment are dependent
on the subject matter of the crime and which, by adopting the proposal, may create
serious implications. For example, in the crime of Malversation, the penalty imposed
depends on the amount of the money malversed by the public official, thus:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation.
Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for
public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or
shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to
take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty
of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:

Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment. Citing Solem v. Helm,30 Dean Diokno avers that the
United States Federal Supreme Court has expanded the application of a similar
Constitutional provision prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, to the duration of
the penalty, and not just its form. The court therein ruled that three things must be
done to decide whether a sentence is proportional to a specific crime, viz.; (1)
Compare the nature and gravity of the offense, and the harshness of the penalty; (2)
Compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, i.e.,
whether more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty or to less serious
penalties; and (3) Compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime
in other jurisdictions.

1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods,

if the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not
exceed two hundred pesos.

However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present case, because
in Solem what respondent therein deemed cruel was the penalty imposed by the state
court of South Dakota after it took into account the latters recidivist statute and not
the original penalty for uttering a "no account" check. Normally, the maximum
punishment for the crime would have been five years imprisonment and a $5,000.00
fine. Nonetheless, respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole under South Dakotas recidivist statute because of his six prior
felony convictions. Surely, the factual antecedents of Solem are different from the
present controversy.

4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods,

if the amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than
twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty
shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.

With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true that the imposable
penalty for the offense is high. Nevertheless, the rationale for the imposition of a
higher penalty against a domestic servant is the fact that in the commission of the
crime, the helper will essentially gravely abuse the trust and confidence reposed
upon her by her employer. After accepting and allowing the helper to be a member of
the household, thus entrusting upon such person the protection and safekeeping of
the employers loved ones and properties, a subsequent betrayal of that trust is so
repulsive as to warrant the necessity of imposing a higher penalty to deter the
commission of such wrongful acts.

2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
amount involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six
thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six
thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos.

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual
special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or
equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property
with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be
prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use.
The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein the Government loses money
due to the unlawful acts of the offender. Thus, following the proposal, if the amount
malversed is P200.00 (under the existing law), the amount now becomes P20,000.00
and the penalty is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years
4 months and 1 day to 6 years). The penalty may not be commensurate to the act of
embezzlement ofP20,000.00 compared to the acts committed by public officials
punishable by a special law, i.e., Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, specifically Section 3,31 wherein the injury caused to the

government is not generally defined by any monetary amount, the penalty (6 years
and 1 month to 15 years)32under the Anti-Graft Law will now become higher. This
should not be the case, because in the crime of malversation, the public official takes
advantage of his public position to embezzle the fund or property of the government
entrusted to him.
The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with force upon things
(inhabited or uninhabited) where the value of the thing unlawfully taken and the act
of unlawful entry are the bases of the penalty imposable, and also, in Malicious
Mischief, where the penalty of imprisonment or fine is dependent on the cost of the
damage caused.
In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if we increase the
value of the thing unlawfully taken, as proposed in the ponencia, the sole basis of the
penalty will now be the value of the thing unlawfully taken and no longer the
element of force employed in entering the premises. It may likewise cause an
inequity between the crime of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling under Article 280, and
this kind of robbery because the former is punishable by prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a fine
not exceeding P1,000.00 (P100,000.00 now if the ratio is 1:100) where entrance to
the premises is with violence or intimidation, which is the main justification of the
penalty. Whereas in the crime of Robbery with force upon things, it is punished with
a penalty of prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years) if the intruder is unarmed
without the penalty of Fine despite the fact that it is not merely the illegal entry that
is the basis of the penalty but likewise the unlawful taking.
Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329, the highest penalty
that can be imposed is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months
and 1 day to 6 months) if the value of the damage caused exceeds P1,000.00, but
under the proposal, the value of the damage will now become P100,000.00 (1:100),
and still punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months). And, if the
value of the damaged property does not exceed P200.00, the penalty is arresto menor
or a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more than P200.00,
if the amount involved does not exceed P200.00 or cannot be estimated. Under the
proposal, P200.00 will now become P20,000.00, which simply means that the fine
of P200.00 under the existing law will now become P20,000.00. The amount of Fine
under this situation will now become excessive and afflictive in nature despite the
fact that the offense is categorized as a light felony penalized with a light penalty
under Article 26 of the RPC.33 Unless we also amend Article 26 of the RPC, there
will be grave implications on the penalty of Fine, but changing the same through
Court decision, either expressly or impliedly, may not be legally and constitutionally
feasible.
There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC that may also be
affected by the proposal, such as those that impose imprisonment and/or Fine as a
penalty based on the value of the damage caused, to wit: Article 311 (Theft of the

property of the National Library and National Museum), Article 312 (Occupation of
real property or usurpation of real rights in property), Article 313 (Altering
boundaries or landmarks), Article 316 (Other forms of swindling), Article 317
(Swindling a minor), Article 318 (Other deceits), Article 328 (Special cases of
malicious mischief) and Article 331 (Destroying or damaging statues, public
monuments or paintings). Other crimes that impose Fine as a penalty will also be
affected, such as: Article 213 (Frauds against the public treasury and similar
offenses), Article 215 (Prohibited Transactions),
Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Article 218
(Failure of accountable officer to render accounts), Article 219 (Failure of a
responsible public officer to render accounts before leaving the country).
In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It will also affect
crimes which are punishable by special penal laws, such as Illegal Logging or
Violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended.34 The law treats
cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber or other forest products without
license as an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified
theft.35 Under the law, the offender shall be punished with the penalties imposed
under Articles 309 and 31036 of the Revised Penal Code, which means that the
penalty imposable for the offense is, again, based on the value of the timber or forest
products involved in the offense. Now, if we accept the said proposal in the crime of
Theft, will this particular crime of Illegal Logging be amended also in so far as the
penalty is concerned because the penalty is dependent on Articles 309 and 310 of the
RPC? The answer is in the negative because the soundness of this particular law is
not in question.
With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and
Special Laws, and other related provisions of these laws affected by the proposal, a
thorough study is needed to determine its effectivity and necessity. There may be
some provisions of the law that should be amended; nevertheless, this Court is in no
position to conclude as to the intentions of the framers of the Revised Penal Code by
merely making a study of the applicability of the penalties imposable in the present
times. Such is not within the competence of the Court but of the Legislature which is
empowered to conduct public hearings on the matter, consult legal luminaries and
who, after due proceedings, can decide whether or not to amend or to revise the
questioned law or other laws, or even create a new legislation which will adopt to the
times.
Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the Revised
Penal Code. During the oral arguments, counsel for the Senate informed the Court
that at present, fifty-six (56) bills are now pending in the Senate seeking to amend
the Revised Penal Code,37 each one proposing much needed change and updates to
archaic laws that were promulgated decades ago when the political, socio-economic,
and cultural settings were far different from todays conditions.

Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that
it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of
such application or construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under
the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the
law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms.38 The Court
should apply the law in a manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit,
especially when the law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court
should shy away from encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal branch
of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable breach of the
doctrine of separation of powers by means of judicial legislation.

the adoption of the suggested ratio. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law
only imposes a minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is P3,000.00.
The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the
award cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be
validly modified and increased when the present circumstance warrants it.
Corollarily, moral damages under Article 222039 of the Civil Code also does not fix
the amount of damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court,
depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of the private offended party. The
amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it
does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.

Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a Fine;
hence, it can be increased by the Court when appropriate. Article 2206 of the Civil
Code provides:

In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense committed
as tantamount to cruel punishment. However, all penalties are generally harsh, being
punitive in nature. Whether or not they are excessive or amount to cruel punishment
is a matter that should be left to lawmakers. It is the prerogative of the courts to
apply the law, especially when they are clear and not subject to any other
interpretation than that which is plainly written.

Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall
be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the
deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such
indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless
the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the
defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions
of Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's
inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand
support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five
years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of
the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of
the death of the deceased.
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of
monetary restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that
was done to the latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect.
Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to
the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to
pay the victim a sum of money as restitution. Clearly, this award of civil indemnity
due to the death of the victim could not be contemplated as akin to the value of a
thing that is unlawfully taken which is the basis in the imposition of the proper
penalty in certain crimes. Thus, the reasoning in increasing the value of civil
indemnity awarded in some offense cannot be the same reasoning that would sustain

Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio Carpios opinions is
that the incremental penalty provision should be declared unconstitutional and that
the courts should only impose the penalty corresponding to the amount
of P22,000.00, regardless if the actual amount involved exceeds P22,000.00. As
suggested, however, from now until the law is properly amended by Congress, all
crimes of Estafa will no longer be punished by the appropriate penalty. A conundrum
in the regular course of criminal justice would occur when every accused convicted
of the crime of estafa will be meted penalties different from the proper penalty that
should be imposed. Such drastic twist in the application of the law has no legal basis
and directly runs counter to what the law provides.
It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the dispensation of
criminal justice by the Ramos Administration by virtue of Republic Act No. 765940 in
December 1993. The said law has been questioned before this Court. There is,
arguably, no punishment more cruel than that of death. Yet still, from the time the
death penalty was re-imposed until its lifting in June 2006 by Republic Act No.
9346,41 the Court did not impede the imposition of the death penalty on the ground
that it is a "cruel punishment" within the purview of Section 19 (1),42Article III of the
Constitution. Ultimately, it was through an act of Congress suspending the
imposition of the death penalty that led to its non-imposition and not via the
intervention of the Court.
Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot declare
the provision of the law from which the proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in
the present action. Not only is it violative of due process, considering that the State
and the concerned parties were not given the opportunity to comment on the subject
matter, it is settled that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked
collaterally because constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not

collaterally,43 more so in the present controversy wherein the issues never touched
upon the constitutionality of any of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments
is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity
in respect of duration or amount, and applies to punishments which public sentiment
has regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or
in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the
like. Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.44
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a
penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized
by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual. Expressed in other terms,
it has been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and
plainly oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock
the moral sense of the community."45
Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the law and
adapt it to our modern time.
The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely adjusting the
questioned monetary values to the present value of money based only on the current
inflation rate. There are other factors and variables that need to be taken into
consideration, researched, and deliberated upon before the said values could be
accurately and properly adjusted. The effects on the society, the injured party, the
accused, its socio-economic impact, and the likes must be painstakingly evaluated
and weighed upon in order to arrive at a wholistic change that all of us believe
should be made to our existing law. Dejectedly, the Court is ill-equipped, has no
resources, and lacks sufficient personnel to conduct public hearings and sponsor
studies and surveys to validly effect these changes in our Revised Penal Code. This
function clearly and appropriately belongs to Congress. Even Professor Tadiar
concedes to this conclusion, to wit:
xxxx
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to determine the value of Peso you
have to take into consideration several factors.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yes.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Per capita income.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Per capita income.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Consumer price index.

PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yeah.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Inflation ...
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yes.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those factors?
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso can be determined utilizing all
of those economic terms.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, but ...
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
And I dont think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon and peg the value
to One Hundred (P100.00) Pesos to ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
... One (P1.00.00) Peso in 1930.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
That is legislative in nature.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
That is my position that the Supreme Court ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, okay.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:

... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order to adjust, to make
the adjustment that is a power that belongs to the legislature.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Thank you, Professor.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Thank you.46
Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno echoes
the view that the role of the Court is not merely to dispense justice, but also the
active duty to prevent injustice. Thus, in order to prevent injustice in the present
controversy, the Court should not impose an obsolete penalty pegged eighty three
years ago, but consider the proposed ratio of 1:100 as simply compensating for
inflation. Furthermore, the Court has in the past taken into consideration "changed
conditions" or "significant changes in circumstances" in its decisions.

Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delving into the
validity of the substance of a statute. The issue is no different from the Courts
adjustment of indemnity in crimes against persons, which the Court had previously
adjusted in light of current times, like in the case of People v. Pantoja. 47 Besides,
Article 10 of the Civil Code mandates a presumption that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.
With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Justice and my
Colleagues, all the proposals ultimately lead to prohibited judicial legislation. Short
of being repetitious and as extensively discussed above, it is truly beyond the powers
of the Court to legislate laws, such immense power belongs to Congress and the
Court should refrain from crossing this clear-cut divide. With regard to civil
indemnity, as elucidated before, this refers to civil liability which is awarded to the
offended party as a kind of monetary restitution. It is truly based on the value of
money. The same cannot be said on penalties because, as earlier stated, penalties are
not only based on the value of money, but on several other factors. Further, since the
law is silent as to the maximum amount that can be awarded and only pegged the
minimum sum, increasing the amount granted as civil indemnity is not proscribed.
Thus, it can be adjusted in light of current conditions.
Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA modified the
ruling of the RTC. The RTC imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional in its medium period, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal in its minimum
period, as maximum. However, the CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of
prision mayor, as maximum, plus one (1) year for each additionalP10,000.00, or a
total of seven (7) years.
In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's ruling in Cosme, Jr. v.
People48 is highly instructive, thus:
With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:
ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the
means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed
22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed
twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may

be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall
be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three, periods, in
which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the division of the time included in
the penalty into three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed,
forming one period of each of the three portions. Applying the latter provisions, the
maximum, medium and minimum periods of the penalty prescribed are:
Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years
Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days
Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days 49
To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisin correccional
maximum to prisin mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of
time each of which portion shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with
Article 6550 of the RPC.51 In the present case, the amount involved is P98,000.00,
which exceeds P22,000.00, thus, the maximum penalty imposable should be within
the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor.
Article 315 also states that a period of one year shall be added to the penalty for
every additional P10,000.00 defrauded in excess of P22,000.00, but in no case shall
the total penalty which may be imposed exceed 20 years.
Considering that the amount of P98,000.00 is P76,000.00 more than the P22,000.00
ceiling set by law, then, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, the
maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor
minimum would be increased by 7 years. Taking the maximum of the prescribed
penalty, which is 8 years, plus an additional 7 years, the maximum of the
indeterminate penalty is 15 years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed by law for
the estafa charge against petitioner is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor
minimum, the penalty next lower would then be prision correccional in its minimum
and medium periods.
Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.
One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial
duty of lawmaking. The Court should not pre-empt Congress and usurp its inherent
powers of making and enacting laws. While it may be the most expeditious
approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare
trespass on prohibited judicial legislation.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of

petitioner Lito Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March
22, 2007 and Resolution dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed with modification the Decision dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of
the Revised Penal Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the
penalty imposed is the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE
(3) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prision correccional, as
minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be
furnished the President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of
Justice.
Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
G.R. No. 17584

March 8, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GREGORIO SANTIAGO, defendant-appellant.
L. Porter Hamilton for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
Having caused the death of Porfirio Parondo, a boy 7 years old, by striking him with
automobile that he was driving, the herein appellant was prosecuted for the crime of
homicide by reckless negligence and was sentenced to suffer one year and one day
of prision correccional, and to pay the costs of the trial.
Not agreeable with that sentence he now comes to this court alleging that the court
below committed four errors, to wit:
1. The trial court erred in not taking judicial notice of the fact that the
appellant was being prosecuted in conformity with Act No. 2886 of the

Philippine Legislature and that the Act is unconstitutional and gave no

jurisdiction in this case.
2. The lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint after the
presentation of the evidence in the case, if not before, for the reason that
said Act No. 2886 is unconstitutional and the proceedings had in the case
under the provisions of the Act constitute a prosecution of appellant without
due process of law.
3. The court a quo erred in not finding that it lacked jurisdiction over the
person of the accused and over the subject- matter of the complaint.
4. The trial court erred in finding the appellant guilty of the crime charged
and in sentencing him to one year and one day of prison correccional and to
the payment of costs.
With regard to the questions of fact, we have to say that we have examined the
record and find that the conclusions of the trial judge, as contained in his wellwritten decision, are sufficiently sustained by the evidence submitted.
The accused was driving an automobile at the rate of 30 miles an hour on a highway
6 meter wide, notwithstanding the fact that he had to pass a narrow space between a
wagon standing on one side of the road and a heap of stones on the other side where
the were two young boys, the appellant did not take the precaution required by the
circumstances by slowing his machine, and did not proceed with the vigilant care
that under the circumstances an ordinary prudent man would take in order to avoid
possible accidents that might occur, as unfortunately did occur, as his automobile ran
over the boy Porfirio Parondo who was instantly killed as the result of the accident.
These facts are so well established in the records that there cannot be a shade of
doubt about them.
Coming now to the other assignments of error, it will be seen that they deal with the
fundamental questions as to whether or not Act No. 2886, under which the complaint
in the present case was filed, is valid and constitutional.
This Act is attacked on account of the amendments that it introduces in General
Orders No. 58, the defense arguing that the Philippine Legislature was, and is, not
authorized to amend General Orders No. 58, as it did by amending section 2 thereof
because its provisions have the character of constitutional law. Said section 2
provides as follows:
All prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the United
States against the persons charged with the offenses. (G. O. No. 58, sec. 2 ).

Act No. 2886, which amends it, by virtue of which the People of the Philippine
Island is made the plaintiff in this information, contains the following provisions in
section 1:
SECTION 1. Section two of General Orders, Numbered Fifty-eight, series
of nineteen hundred, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 2. All prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name
of the People of the Philippine Islands against the persons charged
with the offense."
Let us examine the question.
For practical reasons, the procedure in criminal matters is not incorporated in the
Constitutions of the States, but is left in the hand of the legislatures, so that it falls
within the realm of public statutory law.
As has been said by Chief Justice Marshall:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the Subdivisions of which
its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be
carried into execution, would partake of a prolixity of a legal code, and
could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be
understood by the public. (M'Culloch vs. Maryland [1819], 4 Wheat., 316,
407; 4 L. ed., 579.)
That is why, in pursuance of the Constitution of the United States, each States, each
State has the authority, under its police power, to define and punish crimes and to lay
down the rules of criminal procedure.
The states, as a part of their police power, have a large measure of
discretion in creating and defining criminal offenses. . . .
A Statute relating to criminal procedure is void as a denial of the equal
protection of the laws if it prescribes a different procedure in the case of
persons in like situation. Subject to this limitation, however, the legislature
has large measure of discretion in prescribing the modes of criminal
procedure. . . . (12 C.J., 1185, 1186. See Collins vs. Johnston, 237 U.S.,
502; 35 s. Ct. Rep. 649; 59 L. ed., 1071; Shevlin-Carpenter Co. vs.
Minnesota, 218 U.S., 57; 30 S. Ct. Rep., 663; 54 L. ed., 930; Lynn vs.
Flancders, 141 Ga., 500; 81 S.E., 205.)
This power of the States of the North American Union was also granted to its
territories such as the Philippines:

The plenary legislative power which Congress possesses over the territories
and possessions of the United States may be exercised by that body itself,
or, as is much more often the case, it may be delegated to a local agency,
such as a legislature, the organization of which proceeds upon much the
same lines as in the several States or in Congress, which is often taken as a
model, and whose powers are limited by the Organic Act; but within the
scope of such act is has complete authority to legislate, . . . and in general,
to legislate upon all subjects within the police power of the territory. (38
Cyc., 205-207.)
The powers of the territorial legislatures are derived from Congress. By act
of Congress their power extends "to all rightful subjects of legislation not
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States;" and this
includes the power to define and punish crimes. (16 C. J., 62.)
And in the exercise of such powers the military government of the army of
occupation, functioning as a territorial legislature, thought it convenient to establish
new rules of procedure in criminal matters, by the issuance of General Orders No.
58, the preamble of which reads:
In the interests of justice, and to safeguard the civil liberties of the
inhabitants of these Islands, the criminal code of procedure now in force
therein is hereby amended in certain of its important provisions, as
indicated in the following enumerated sections. (Emphasis ours.)
Its main purpose is, therefore, limited to criminal procedure and its intention is to
give to its provisions the effect of law in criminal matters. For that reason it provides
in section 1 that:
The following provisions shall have the force and effect of law in criminal
matters in the Philippine Islands from and after the 15th day of May, 1900,
but existing laws on the same subjects shall remain valid except in so far as
hereinafter modified or repealed expressly or by necessary implication.
From what has been said it clearly follows that the provisions of this General Order
do not the nature of constitutional law either by reason of its character or by reason
of the authority that enacted it into law.
It cannot be said that it has acquired this character because this order was made its
own by the Congress of the United States for, as a mater of fact, this body never
adopted it as a law of its own creation either before the promulgation of Act No.
2886, herein discussed, or, to our knowledge, to this date.
Since the provisions of this General Order have the character of statutory law, the
power of the Legislature to amend it is self-evident, even if the question is

considered only on principle. Our present Legislature, which has enacted Act No.
2886, the subject of our inquiry, is the legal successor to the Military Government as
a legislative body.
Since the advent of the American sovereignty in the Philippines the legislative
branch of our government has undergone transformations and has developed itself
until it attained its present form. Firstly, it was the Military Government of the army
of occupation which, in accordance with international law and practice, was vested
with legislative functions and in fact did legislate; afterwards, complying with the
instructions of President McKinley which later were ratified by Congress (sec. 1 of
the Act of July 1, 1902) the legislative powers of the Military Government were
transferred to the Philippine Commission; then, under the provisions of section 7 of
the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, the Philippine Assembly was created and it
functioned as a colegislative body with the Philippine Commission. Finally, by virtue
of the provisions of sections 12 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, known as
the Jones Law, the Philippine Commission gave way to the Philippine Senate, the
Philippine Assembly became the House of Representatives, and thus was formed the
present Legislature composed of two Houses which has enacted the aforesaid Act
No. 2886.
As a matter of fact, Act No. 2886 is not the first law that amends General Orders No.
58. The Philippine Commission, at various times, had amended it by the enactment
of laws among which we may cite Act No. 194, regarding preliminary investigation,
Act No. 440 relating to counsels de oficio and Act No. 590 about preliminary
investigations by justices of the peace of provincial capitals. Later on, and before the
enactment of Act No. 2886, herein controverted, the Legislature had also amended
this General Orders No. 58 by the enactment of Act No. 2677 regarding appeals to
the Supreme Court of causes originating in the justice of the peace courts and by Act
No. 2709 which deals with the exclusion of accused persons from the information in
order to be utilized as state's witnesses.
These amendments repeatedly made by the Philippine Commission as well as by our
present Legislature are perfectly within the scope of the powers of the said legislative
bodies as the successors of the Military Government that promulgated General
Orders No. 58.
No proof is required to demonstrate that the present Legislature had, and had, the
power to enact and amend laws. (U.S. vs. Bull. 15 Phil., 7.) That it has the power to
legislate on criminal matters is very evident from the wording of section 7 of the
Jones Law which says:
That the legislative authority herein provided shall have power, when not
inconsistent with this Act, by due enactment to amend, alter, modify, or
repeal any law, civil or criminal, continued in force by this Act as it may
from time to time see fit.

It is urged the right to prosecute and punish crimes is an attributed of sovereignty.

This assertion is right; but it is also true that by reason of the principle of
territoriality as applied in the supression, of crimes, such power is delegated to
subordinate government subdivisions such as territories. As we have seen in the
beginning, the territorial legislatures have the power to define and punish crimes, a
power also possessed by the Philippine Legislature by virtue of the provisions of
sections 7, already quoted, of the Jones Law. These territorial governments are local
agencies of the Federal Government, wherein sovereignty resides; and when the
territorial government of the Philippines prosecutes and punishes public crimes it
does so by virtue of the authority delegated to it by the supreme power of the Nation.
This delegation may be made either expressly as in the case of the several States of
the Union and incorporated territories like Porto Rico and Hawaii, or tacitly as is the
case with the Philippines, which is an organized territory though not incorporated
with the Union. (Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional Law, 181-205.)
This tacit delegation to our Government needs no demonstration. As a matter of fact,
the crimes committed within our territory, even before section 2 of General Orders
No. 58 was amended, were prosecuted and punished in this jurisdiction as is done at
present; but then as now the repression of crimes was done, and is still done, under
the sovereign authority of the United States, whose name appears as the heading in
all pleadings in criminal causes and in other judicial papers and notarial acts.
The use of such a heading is prescribed for civil cases in form 1 of section 784 of the
Code of Civil Procedure; in criminal causes the constant practice followed in this
jurisdiction established its use; and in notarial matters its use is provided by section
127 of Act No. 496. This long continued practice in criminal matters and the legal
provision relating to civil cases and notarial acts have not been amended by any law,
much less by Act No. 2886, the subject of the present inquiry.
There is not a single constitutional provision applicable to the Philippines prescribing
the name to be used as party plaintiff in criminal cases.
The fact that the political status of this country is as yet undetermined and in a
transitory stage, is, in our opinion, responsible for the fact that there is no positive
provision in our constitutional law regarding the use of the name of the People of the
Philippine Islands, as party plaintiff, in criminal prosecutions, as is otherwise the
case in the respective constitutional charters of the States of the Union and
incorporated territories a situation which must not be understood as depriving the
Government of the Philippines of its power, however delegated, to prosecute public
crimes. The fact is undeniable that the present government of the Philippines, created
by the Congress of the United States, is autonomous.
This autonomy of the Government of the Philippines reaches all judicial actions, the
case at bar being one of them; as an example of such autonomy, this Government, the

same as that of Hawaii and Porto Rico (People of Porto Rico vs. Rosaly y Castillo
[1913], 227 U.S., 270; 57 L. ed., 507; 33 Sup. Ct. Rep., 352) cannot be sued without
its consent. (Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 34 Phil., 311; L. S.
Moon & Co. vs. Harrison, p. 27, ante.) The doctrine, laid down in these cases,
acknowledges the prerogative of personality in the Government of the Philippines,
which, if it is sufficient to shield it from any responsibility in court in its own name
unless it consents thereto, it should be also, as sufficiently authoritative in law, to
give that government the right to prosecute in court in its own name whomsoever
violates within its territory the penal laws in force therein.
However, limiting ourselves to the question relative to the form of the complaint in
criminal matters, it is within the power of the Legislature to prescribe the form of the
criminal complaint as long as the constitutional provision of the accused to be
informed of the nature of the accusation is not violated.
Under the Constitution of the United States and by like provisions in the
constitutions of the various states, the accused is entitled to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him . . .
It is within the power of the legislatures under such a constitutional
provision to prescribe the form of the indictment or information, and such
form may omit averments regarded as necessary at common law. (22 Cyc.,
285.)
All these considerations a priori are strengthened a posteriori by the important
reason disclosed by the following fact that the Congress has tacitly approved Act
No. 2886. Both the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, section 86, and the Jones Law,
last paragraph of section 19, provide that all the laws enacted by the Government of
the Philippines or its Legislature shall be forwarded to the Congress of the United
States, which body reserves the right and power to annul them. And presuming, as
legally we must, that the provisions of these laws have been complied with, it is
undisputed that the Congress of the United States did not annul any of those acts
already adverted to Nos. 194, 440, 490 (of the Philippine Commission), and 2677,
2709 and the one now in question No. 2886 (of the present Legislature) all of
which were amendatory of General Orders No. 58. The Act now under discussion
(No. 2886) took effect on February 24, 1920, and the criminal complaint in this case
was filed on May 10, 1920. The silence of Congress regarding those laws
amendatory of the said General Order must be considered as an act of approval.
If Congress fails to notice or take action on any territorial legislation the
reasonable inference is that it approves such act. (26 R.C.L.,
679; vide Clinton vs. Englebrcht, 13 Wall., 434; 20 [L. ed.] 659; Tiaco vs.
Forbes, 228 U.S., 549; 33 S. Ct. Rep., 585; 57 [L. ed.], 960; Nixon vs. Reid,
8 S.d., 507; 67 N.W., 57; 32 L.R.A., 315.)

Furthermore, supposing for the sake of argument, that the mention of the People of
the Philippine Islands as plaintiff in the title of the information constitutes a vice or
defect, the same is not fatal when, as in the present case, it was not objected to in the
court below.
An indictment must, in many states under express statutory or constitutional
provision, show by its title or by proper recitals in the caption or elsewhere
that the prosecution is in the name and by the authority of the state, the
commonwealth, or the people of the state, according to the practice in the
particular jurisdictions; but omissions or defects in this respect may be
supplied or cured by other parts of the records, and the omissions of such a
recital or defects therein, even when required by the constitution or by
statute, is a defect of form within a statute requiring exceptions for defect of
form to be made before trial. (23 Cyc., 237, 238.)
We hold that the provisions of sections 2 of General Orders No. 58, as amended by
Act No. 2886, do not partake of the same character as the provisions of a
constitution; that the said Act No. 2886 is valid and is not violative of any
constitutional provisions and that the court a quo did not commit any of the errors
assigned.
The sentence appealed from is hereby affirmed, the appellant being furthermore
sentenced to the accessory penalties prescribed in article 61 of the Penal Code, and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000 and to the payment of the
costs of both instances. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avancea and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Ostrand and Johns, JJ., concur in the result.

G.R. No. L-11676

October 17, 1916

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANDRES PABLO, defendant-appellant.
TORRES, J.:
At about noon of the 21st of October, 1915, Andres Pablo, a policeman of the
municipality of Balanga, went by order of his chief to the barrio of Tuyo to raid
a jueteng game which, according to the information lodged, was being conducted in
that place; but before the said officer arrived there the players, perhaps advised of his
approach by a spy, left and ran away; however, on his arrival at a vacant lot the
defendant there found Francisco Dato and, at a short distance away, a low table.
After a search of the premises he also found thereon a tambiolo(receptacle) and
37 bolas (balls). Notwithstanding that the officer had seen the men Maximo Malicsi
and Antonio Rodrigo leave the said lot, yet, as at first he had seen no material proof
that the game was being played, he refrained from arresting them, and on leaving the
place only arrested Francisco Daro, who had remained there.
In reporting to his chief what had occurred, the policeman presented a memorandum
containing the following statement: "In the barrio of Tuyo I raided a jueteng na
bilat game, seized a tambiolo and bolas, and saw thecabecillas Maximo MAlicsi and
Antonio Rodrigo and the gambler Francisco Dato. I saw the two cabecillas escape."
In consequence, chief of police Jose D. Reyes, on October 22, 1915, filed a
complaint in the court of justice of the peace charging the said Rodrigo, Malicsi, and
Dato with having gambled at jueteng, in violation of municipal ordinance No. 5. As a
result of this complaint the accused were arrested, but were afterwards admitted to
bail.
At the hearing of the case Francisco Dato pleaded guilty. The other two accused,
Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo, pleaded not guilty; therefore, during the trial
the chief of police presented the memorandum exhibited by the policeman Andres
Pablo, who testified under oath that on the date mentioned he and Tomas de Leon
went to the said barrio to raid a jueteng game, but that before they arrived there they
saw from afar that some persons started to run toward the hills; that when witness
and his companion arrived at a vacant lot they saw Francisco Dato and a low table
there, and the table caused them to suspect that a jueteng game was being carried on;
that in fact they did find on one side of the lot a tambiolo and 37 bolas, but that they
did not see the accused Rodrigo and Malicsi on the said lot, nor did they see them
run; and that only afterwards did the witness learn that these latter were
the cabecillas or ringleaders in the jueteng game, from information given him by an
unknown person. In view of this testimony by the police officer who made the arrest
and of the other evidence adduced at the trial the court acquitted the defendants

Antonio Rodrigo and Maximo Malicsi and sentenced only Francisco Dato, as a
gambler.
Before the case came to trial in the justice of the peace court the policeman Andres
Pablo had an interview and conference with the accused Malicsi and ROdrigo in the
house of Valentin Sioson. On this occasion he was instructed not to testify against
Malicsi and Rodrigo, and in fact received through Gregorio Ganzon the sum of P5.
By reason of the foregoing and after making a preliminary investigation the
provincial fiscal, on December 1, 1915, filed an information in the Court of First
Instance of Bataan charging Andres Pablo with the crime of perjury, under the
provisions of section 3 of Act No. 1697. The following is an extract from the
complaint:
That on or about November 6, 1915, in the municipality of Balanga, Bataan,
P.I., and within the jurisdiction of this court, the said accused, Andres Pablo,
during the hearing in the justice of the peace court of Balanga of the
criminal cause No. 787, entitled the United States vs. Antonio Rodrigo and
Maximo Malicsi, for violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 5 of the
municipality of Balanga, did, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously affirm
and swear in legal form before the justice of the peace court as follow: `We
did not there overtake the accused Antonio Rodrigo and Maximo Malicsi,
nor did we even see them run,' the said statement being utterly false, as the
accused well knew that it was, and material to the decision of the said
criminal cause No. 787, United States vs. Antonio Rodrigo and Maximo
Malicsi. An act committed with violation of law.
The case came to trial and on December 28, 1915, the court rendered judgment
therein sentencing the defendant to the penalty of two years' imprisonment, to pay a
fine of P100 and, in case of insolvency, to the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment, and to pay the costs. The defendant was also disqualified from
thereafter holding any public office and from testifying in the courts of the Philippine
Islands until the said disqualification should be removed. From this judgment he
appealed.
Francisco Dato, on testifying as a witness, said that when the policemen Andres
Pablo and Tomas de Leon arrived at the place where the jueteng was being played,
they found the defendant gamblers, Malicsi and Rodrigo; that, prior to the hearing of
the case in the justice of the peace court, Malicsi and Rodrigo ordered him to call
Andres Pablo, who, together with witness, went to the house of Valentin Sioson,
where they held a conference; that witness pleaded guilty in the justice of the peace
court, in fulfillment of his part of an agreement made between himself and his two
coaccused, Malicsi and Rodrigo, who promised him that they would support his
family during the time he might be a prisoner in jail; that Andres Pablo did not know
that they were gamblers, because he did not find them in the place where the game

was in progress, but that when witness was being taken to the municipal building by
the policemen he told them who the gamblers were who had run away and whom
Andres Pablo could have seen.
Maximo Malicsi corroborated the foregoing testimony and further stated that, on the
arrival of the policemen who made the arrest and while they were looking for
the tambiolo, he succeeded in escaping; that Andres Pablo had known him for a long
time and could have arrested him had he wished to do so; that prior to the hearing he
and his codefendants, ROdrigo and Dato, did in fact meet in the house of Valentin
Sioson, on which occasion they agreed that they would give the policemen Andres
Pablo P20, provided witness and Rodrigo were excluded from the charge; and that
only P15 was delivered to the said Pablo, through Gregorio Ganzon. This statement
was corroborated by the latter, though he said nothing about what amount of money
he delivered to the policeman Pablo.
The defendant Andres Pablo testified under oath that, on his being asked by the
justice of the peace how he could have seen Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo,
he replied that he did not see them at the place where the game was being conducted
nor did he see them run away from there, for he only found the table, the tambiolo,
thebolas, and Francisco Dato; that he did not surprise the game because the players
ran away before he arrived on the lot where, after fifteen minutes' search, he found
only the tambiolo and the bolas; that on arriving at the place where the game was
played, they found only Francisco Dato and some women in the Street, and as Dato
had already gone away, witness' companion, the policeman Tomas de Leon, got on
his bicycle and went after him; and that he found the tambiolo at a distance of about
6 meters from a low table standing on the lot.
From the facts above related, it is concluded that the defendant Andres Pablo, who
pleaded not guilty, falsely testified under oath in the justice of the peace court of
Balanga, Bataan, in saying he had not seen the alleged gamblers Maximo Malicsi
and Antonio Rodrigo in the place where, according to the complaint filed, the game
of jueteng was being played and where the defendant and his companion, the
policeman Tomas de Leon, had found a table, tambiolo and bolas, used in the game
of jueteng, while it was proved at the trial that he did not them and did overtake them
while they were still in the place where the game was being played. But
notwithstanding his having seen them there, upon testifying in the cause prosecuted
against these men and another for gambling, he stated that he had not seen them
there, knowing that he was not telling the truth and was false to the oath he had
taken, and he did so willfully and deliberately on account of his agreement with the
men, Malicsi and Rodrigo, and in consideration of a bribe of P15 which he had
received in payment for his false testimony he afterwards gave.
Francisco Dato and Gregorio Ganzon corroborated the assertion that the policeman
Andres Pablo undertook to exclude the gamblers, Malicsi and Rodrigo, from the
charge and from his testimony in consideration for P15 which he received through
Gregorio Ganzon.

Andres Pablo was charged with the crime of perjury and was afterwards convicted
under Act No. 1697, which (according to the principle laid down by this court in
various decisions that are already well-settled rules of law) repealed the provisions
contained in articles 318 to 324 of the Penal Code relative to false testimony.
By the second paragraph of the final section of the last article of the Administrative
Code, or Act No. 2657, there was repealed, among the other statutes therein
mentioned, the said Act No. 1697 relating to perjury, and the repealing clause of the
said Administrative Code does not say under what other penal law in force the crime
of false testimony, at least, if not that of perjury, shall be punished.
Under these circumstances, may the crime of perjury or of false testimony go
unpunished, and is there no penal sanction whatever in this country for this crime?
May the truth be freely perverted in testimony given under oath and which, for the
very reason that it may save a guilty person from punishment, may also result in the
conviction and punishment of an innocent person? If all this is not possible and is not
right before the law and good morals in a society of even mediocre culture, it must
be acknowledged that it is imperatively necessary to punish the crime of perjury or
of false testimony a crime which can produce incalculable and far-reaching harm
to society and cause infinite disturbance of social order.
The right of prosecution and punishment for a crime is one of the attributes that by a
natural law belongs to the sovereign power instinctively charged by the common will
of the members of society to look after, guard and defend the interests of the
community, the individual and social rights and the liberties of every citizen and the
guaranty of the exercise of his rights.
The power to punish evildoers has never been attacked or challenged, as the
necessity for its existence has been recognized even by the most backward peoples.
At times the criticism has been made that certain penalties are cruel, barbarous, and
atrocious; at other, that they are light and inadequate to the nature and gravity of the
offense, but the imposition of punishment is admitted to be just by the whole human
race, and even barbarians and savages themselves, who are ignorant of all
civilization, are no exception.lawphil.net
Notwithstanding that the said Act No. 1697 (which, as interpreted by this court in its
decisions, was deemed to have repealed the aforementioned article of the Penal Code
relating to false testimony, comprised within the term of perjury) did not expressly
repeal the said articles of the Penal Code; and as the said final article of the
Administrative Code, in totally repealing Act No. 1697, does not explicitly provide
that the mentioned articles of the Penal Code are also repealed, the will of the
legislation not being expressly and clearly stated with respect to the complete or
partial repeal of the said articles of the Penal Code, in the manner that it has totally
repealed the said Act No. 1697 relating its perjury; and, furthermore, as it is
imperative that society punish those of its members who are guilty of perjury or false

testimony, and it cannot be conceived that these crimes should go unpunished or be

freely committed without punishment of any kind, it must be conceded that there
must be in this country some prior, preexistent law that punishes perjury or false
testimony.
There certainly are laws which deal with perjury or false testimony, like Law 7 et
seq. of Title 2, third Partida.
However, since the Penal Code went into force, the crime of false testimony has been
punished under the said articles of the said Code, which as we have already said,
have not been specifically repealed by the said Act No. 1697, but since its enactment,
have not been applied, by the mere interpretation given to them by this court in its
decisions; yet, from the moment that Act was repealed by the Administrative Code,
the needs of society have made it necessary that the said articles 318 to 324 should
be deemed to be in force, inasmuch as the Administrative Code, in repealing the said
Act relating to perjury, has not explicitly provided that the said articles of the Penal
Code have likewise been repealed.
This manner of understanding and construing the statutes applicable to the crime of
false testimony or perjury is in harmony with the provision of Law 11, Title 2, Book
3, of the Novisima Recopilacion which says::
All the laws of the kingdom, not expressly repealed by other subsequent
laws, must be literally obeyed and the excuse that they are not in use cannot
avail; for the Catholic kings and their successors so ordered in numerous
laws, and so also have I ordered on different occasions, and even though
they were repealed, it is seen that they have been revived by the decree
which I issued in conformity with them although they were not expressly
designated. The council will be informed thereof and will take account of
the importance of the matter.
It is, then, assumed that the said articles of the Penal Code are in force and are
properly applicable to crimes of false testimony. Therefore, in consideration of the
fact that in the case at bar the evidence shows it to have been duly proven that the
defendant, Andres Pablo, in testifying in the cause prosecuted for gambling
at jueteng, perverted the truth, for the purpose of favoring the alleged gamblers,
Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo, with the aggravating circumstance of the
crime being committed through bribery, for it was also proved that the defendant
Pablo received P15 in order that he should make no mention of the said two
gamblers in his sworn testimony, whereby he knowingly perverted the truth, we hold
that, in the commission of the crime of false testimony, there concurred the
aggravating circumstance of price or reward, No. 3 of article 10 of the Code, with no
mitigating circumstance to offset the effects of the said aggravating one; wherefore
the defendant has incurred the maximum period of the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum degree to prision correccional in its medium degree, and a fine.

For the foregoing reasons, we hereby reverse the judgment appealed from and
sentence Andres Pablo to the penalty of two years four months and one day
of prision correccional, to pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, and, in case of insolvency, to
suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, which shall not exceed one-third
of the principal penalty. He shall also pay the costs of both instances. So ordered.

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third

Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

DECISION

Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have

transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are
reproduced hereunder:

BELLOSILLO, J.:
JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his
pen in defense of the rights of the individual from the vast powers of the State and
the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating
the limits on individuality beyond which the State cannot tread - asserting that
"individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very little regard to social
interference - he veritably acknowledges that the exercise of rights and liberties is
imbued with a civic obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all cost,
against those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says -

Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business,

enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two
(2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees,
agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the
following means or similar schemes:

The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in

interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection.The
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.

(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage,

kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public office concerned;

Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to
self-preservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the
body politic, it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel
obeisance to its collective wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance.

(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the

National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or
government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism

wrought changes in the social order, carrying with it a new formulation of
fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary
socio-political ideologies. In the process, the web of rights and State impositions
became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors, the
skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often outright collision, between the law as
the expression of the will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its members to
preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is when individual
rights are pitted against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest
test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted
under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),[1]as amended
by RA 7659,[2] wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively
fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the
constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject
the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality mainly because, according to
him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable
doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens
rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are

(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds

or raids on the public treasury;

(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock,

equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future
employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or
influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage
and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by
himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt
or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or
total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime
of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who
participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing

to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition
of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be
considered by the court.The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and
their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of
stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State
(underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it
shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in
furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire illgotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan
eight (8) separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation
of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562,
inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No.
26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564,
for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565,
for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case
to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of
the charges in the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for
reconsideration/reinvestigation
of
the
offenses
under
specifications
"a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and
other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds
raised were only lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of
offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity
of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never
raised in that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility
of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in
Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER
exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June
2001 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No.
26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable
offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and
that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21
June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and five (5)

days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9
July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18
September 2001, the issues for resolution in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a)
The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires
less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the
rights of the accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080
is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power of Congress to so
classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of
legislation is predicated on the basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed
to be in harmony with the Constitution. [3] Courts invariably train their sights on this
fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is
the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong predilection for
constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of
the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been
said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial branch accords to its
coordinate branch - the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the
courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of
its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for
the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the
majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the
fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution
and forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in
favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing
therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an
interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question of constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon [4] we held that as
long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the constitutionality of the
challenged law will not be touched and the case will be decided on other available
grounds. Yet the force of the presumption is not sufficient to catapult a
fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course,
where the law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic
law, it must be struck down on sight lest the positive commands of the fundamental
law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the
party challenging the validity of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge
of
doubt
that
there
is
indeed
an
infringement
of
the
constitution, for absent such a showing, there
can
be
no
finding
of
unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put
by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."[5] And petitioner has miserably failed

in the instant case to discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of
constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and welldefined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his
violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and
conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with
reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus 1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through
misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on
the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift,
share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person
and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of
the office or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance
or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly
or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation
including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or
undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies
or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to
benefit particular persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official
position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people
and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed,
accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would
inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its
penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its
application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and more
importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed,
it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the
act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at
least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1,
par. (d), of the Plunder Law.

In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law,
indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which
petitioner is alleged to have committed:
"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the
Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a.
'JOSE VELARDE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang,
Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio
Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and
John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A.
No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito
Estrada,THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his coaccused,WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY
OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES
AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS
OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR
INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass,
accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY ORINDIRECTLY, ill-gotten
wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY
SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY
ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO
THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of
overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as
follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES,
MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTYFIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM
ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE,
KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR in connection with co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose
'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF
ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating,
converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR
PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED

THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion

of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax
share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself
and/orin connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN
DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND
OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italic supplied).

Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory
definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination
or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the
word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder
Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence,
violative of his fundamental right to due process.

(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND
BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE
351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security
System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE
BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE
BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
(P1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR
MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED
FIFTY PESOS (P744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE
OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION
FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS
AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY COLLECTING OR
RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR
PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF
STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION
SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS,
FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE
DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT
NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'

The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered

uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the
employment of terms without defining them; [6] much less do we have to define every
word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command
requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is
not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the
words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity
of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the
whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.

(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES,

PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY
BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the
amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY
THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
(P3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT
NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."

Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in
spatial and temporal succession.

We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is

obviously none - that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to
proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily
understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited
acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the
accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.

Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a

statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and
signification,[7] unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special
legal meaning to those words.[8] The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily,
untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a
manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the
following commonly accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of
combining. To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure
individual characters.

That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood

in their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on
the bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:
DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991
REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say THROUGH A
COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE
HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean to say, if there are two or more means, we
mean to say that number one and two or number one and something else are included, how about a series
of the same act? For example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be included also?
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.
REP. ISIDRO: Series.
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that REP. GARCIA: Two.

REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one
enumeration.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It
cannot be a repetition of the same act.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
REP. GARCIA: A series.
REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we
seem to say that two or more, di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very
good suggestion because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here
a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So x x x x
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term series?
REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes one or maybe even two acts may
already result in such a big amount, on line 25, wouldthe Sponsor consider deleting the words
a series of overt or, to read, therefore: or conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such as.
Remove the idea of necessitating a series. Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because a series implies several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But
when we say acts of plunder there should be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.

Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least

two (2) acts falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par.
(d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent
conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d),
subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or
criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par.
(d),
say,
misappropriation,
malversation
and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar.
(1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for
"combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically
providing for it in the law.

As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan [9] that
this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or
series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1
(d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is
directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an
'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common goal. As
commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan
of action or method' which the principal accused and public officer and others
conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative,
if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple
accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a
common goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair
warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances,
petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly
misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most commonly
stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the
offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can
understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against
that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be
clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that
men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its
application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2)
respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing
of the Government muscle.[10] But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations
that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify
a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet
fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper
construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever
directed against such activities.[11] With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked
where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is
whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed
conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. [12] It must be
stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree
of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical
exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous
specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly

delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more
explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the
nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all
other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court that the allegations that the
Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires
the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law."[13] The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand,
decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." [14]
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is
overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is
that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent
construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no
requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct
could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." [15] The possible
harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is
outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and
perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly
broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed
for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as
in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free
speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S.
Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not
recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment."[16] In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,[17] the Court ruled that "claims of facial
overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms,
seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws
that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held
that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists

under which the Act would be valid."[18] As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that
a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed
cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others."[19]
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical
tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they
are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do
service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the
established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not
be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as
applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional."[20] As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First
Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial
invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are
invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant."[21] Consequently, there is no
basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face
and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on
the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities
are constitutionally protected.[22] It constitutes a departure from the case and
controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made
without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts.[23] But, as the U.S.
Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris[24]
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring
correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an
appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all
the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed
statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for
deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as
"manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last
resort,"[25]and is generally disfavored.[26] In determining the constitutionality of a
statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case
must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged. [27]
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity
of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is
more imagined than real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by
dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the
want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision of the law should be

construed in relation and with reference to every other part. To be sure, it will take
more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched presumption of
constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign
ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted
for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated
upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even
registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and
sound constitutional anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan[28] must be mentioned if only to
illustrate and emphasize the point that courts are loathed to declare a statute void for
uncertainty unless the law itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is
susceptible of no reasonable construction that will support and give it effect.In that
case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 3,
par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for being vague.Petitioners
posited, among others, that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic
with no common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative
precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it does
not give fair warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners
further argued that the Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to
wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving of
"unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of
"unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in the discharge
of their official function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against them was violated because they were left to guess which of
the three (3) offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the constitutional defect of
vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and
inexcusable negligence" merely describe the different modes by which the offense
penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be committed, and the use of all these
phrases in the same Information does not mean that the indictment charges three (3)
distinct offenses.
The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official
support; unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third International Dictionary, p. 2514);
or without justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US
Dept. of Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent
Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a
corrupt practice and make unlawful the act of the public officer in:
x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest

partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [e],

Rep. Act 3019, as amended).
It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions
penalize is the act of a public officer, in the discharge of his official, administrative
or judicial functions, in giving any private party benefits, advantage or preference
which is unjustified, unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason,
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in
the use of the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, which was understood in its primary and general
acceptation. Consequently, in that case, petitioners' objection thereto was held
inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4
of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it
requires only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or
conspiracy SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it
shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in
furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a
criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his
favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and
unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that
culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. [29] The use of the "reasonable
doubt" standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the
community in the application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of
criminal law be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt
whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society
that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his
government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a
proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard
has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to
the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon
proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged.[30] The following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and
Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score during the deliberations in the floor of the House of
Representatives are elucidating -

DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9

October 1990
MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that
what is alleged in the information must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him guilty of the other acts
enumerated in the information, does that not work against the right of the
accused especially so if the amount committed, say, by falsification is less
than P100 million, but the totality of the crime committed is P100 million
since there is malversation, bribery, falsification of public document,
coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged. For example, Mr.
Speaker, there is an enumeration of the things taken by the robber in the
information three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be
proved beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction
of a crime for which he was charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of
diamond earrings the prosecution proved two. Now, what is required to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime
of plunder the totality of the amount is very important, I feel that such a
series of overt criminal acts has to be taken singly. For instance, in the act
of bribery, he was able to accumulate only P50,000 and in the crime of
extortion, he was only able to accumulate P1 million. Now, when we add
the totality of the other acts as required under this bill through the
interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so how can
we now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an
essential element of the crime, there is a need to prove that element beyond
reasonable doubt. For example, one essential element of the crime is that
the amount involved is P100 million. Now, in a series of defalcations and
other acts of corruption in the enumeration the total amount would be P110
or P120 million, but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we
will sum up the amounts involved in those transactions which were
proved. Now, if the amount involved in these transactions, proved beyond
reasonable doubt, is P100 million, then there is a crime of
plunder (underscoring supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner
refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still
remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element
necessary to constitute the crime.

The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the
crime suffers from a dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the
prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts
sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and
involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and
every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed by the accused in
furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an
Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public
treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient
to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided
only that they amounted to at least P50,000,000.00.[31]
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical
conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or
amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern arises where the prosecution
is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par.
(d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion
is consistent with reason and common sense. There would be no other explanation
for a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy
to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth." The prosecution is therefore not
required to make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily
follows with the establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his
submission that "pattern" is "a very important element of the crime of plunder;" and
that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive
element of the crime," such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of
plunder JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under
the Plunder Law without applying Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if there
is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of the acts complained
of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes
enumerated in the Revised Penal Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are
proved beyond reasonable doubt without applying Section 4, can you not
have a conviction under the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in
convicting an accused charged for violation of the Plunder Law?

ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a
substantive element of the law x x x x

be treated independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the objectives of the
statute can best be achieved.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when

there is proof beyond reasonable doubt on the acts charged constituting
plunder?

As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is
a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his
Concurring Opinion -

ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a
rule of evidence and it contains a substantive element of the crime of
plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid Section 4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as
the predicate crimes charged are concerned that you do not have to go that
far by applying Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very
important element of the crime of plunder and that cannot be avoided by
the prosecution.[32]
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of
plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec.
1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening
clause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of
plunder x x x x
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution
of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not
define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in
furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive
law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had,
for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender
that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is
flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed
from the rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law;
after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than
enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability clause Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application
thereof to any person or circumstance
is held invalid, the remaining provisions ofthis Act and the application of such
provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being
declared invalid as a result of the nullity of some of its provisions, assuming that to
be the case although it is not really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly

x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens
rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended
information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully
and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens
rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following
remarks of Senator Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:
SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would
not be evidence for each and every individual criminal act but only evidence
sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder.[33]
However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the
transcript quoted by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained
in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's view, would provide for a
speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of cases?
SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .[34]
Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit
plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further
the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a
pattern of overt or ciminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the
elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
Indeed, 2 provides that Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an
offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such
offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance
of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code,
shall be considered by the court.

The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal

Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens
rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is
determined by his criminal intent. It is true that 2 refers to "any person who
participates with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing
to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it does not
apply as well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes
said: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what
they omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as
saying what they obviously mean."[35]
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be
deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993
to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No.
7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v.
Echegaray:[36]
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very
nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like
an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his
or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the
victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive
arson resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death
of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape,
parricide,infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is
detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the
victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with
homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the
owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are
penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and
implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political
and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and
provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt
tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the
Philippine Government must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of
corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched
itself in the structures of society and the psyche of the populace. [With the
government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its
people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of government funds
translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the
very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous
are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson

resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or

officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and
damage to society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies
that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or
inherently wrong, they are mala in se[37] and it does not matter that such acts are
punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes
are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as
though they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P.
Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent
wrongness of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory
law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now
too late in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been
eternally consigned by People v. Echegaray[38] to the archives of jurisprudential
history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid
stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in
the Constitution now as an integral part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of
officials in high places which have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft
and corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous
people relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the
government. Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly
sophisticated,
extraordinarily
methodical
and
economicallycatastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law,
especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption
which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume
the moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living
testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus
secure society against the avarice and other venalities in public office.
These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few
issues of national importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated
by petitioner's ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution
and
trial
under
a
virginal
statute. This
continuing
saga has driven awedge of dissension among our people that may linger for a long
time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above factionalism
and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known
as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL.Consequently,
the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Osmea III, and Wigberto E. Taada filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
docketed as G.R. No. 179157.
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE vs ANTI TERRORISM COUNCIL
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 9372 (RA 9372), An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from
Terrorism, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007,[1] signed into law
on March 6, 2007.
Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007,[2] petitioner Southern
Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., a non-government organization, and Atty.
Soliman Santos, Jr., a concerned citizen, taxpayer and lawyer, filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition on July 16, 2007 docketed as G.R. No. 178552. On even
date, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), National Federation of Labor UnionsKilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), and Center for Trade Union and Human
Rights (CTUHR), represented by their respective officers [3] who are also bringing the
action in their capacity as citizens, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
docketed as G.R. No. 178554.
The following day, July 17, 2007, organizations Bagong Alyansang Makabayan
(BAYAN), General Alliance Binding Women for Reforms, Integrity, Equality,
Leadership and Action (GABRIELA), Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP),
Movement of Concerned Citizens for Civil Liberties (MCCCL), Confederation for
Unity, Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees (COURAGE),
Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap (KADAMAY), Solidarity of Cavite Workers
(SCW), League of Filipino Students (LFS), Anakbayan, Pambansang Lakas ng
Kilusang Mamamalakaya (PAMALAKAYA), Alliance of Concerned Teachers
(ACT), Migrante, Health Alliance for Democracy (HEAD), and Agham, represented
by their respective officers,[4] and joined by concerned citizens and taxpayers
Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Dr. Bienvenido Lumbera, Renato Constantino, Jr., Sister
Mary John Manansan, OSB, Dean Consuelo Paz, Atty. Josefina Lichauco, Retired
Col. Gerry Cunanan, Carlitos Siguion-Reyna, Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo,
Renato Reyes, Danilo Ramos, Emerenciana de Jesus, Rita Baua and Rey Claro
Casambre filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No.
178581.
On August 6, 2007, Karapatan and its alliance member organizations Hustisya,
Desaparecidos, Samahan ng mga Ex-Detainees Laban sa Detensyon at para sa
Amnestiya (SELDA), Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace (EMJP), and
Promotion of Church Peoples Response (PCPR), which were represented by their
respective officers[5] who are also bringing action on their own behalf, filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178890.
On August 29, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Counsels for the
Defense of Liberty (CODAL),[6] Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal, Sergio

Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog (BAYAN-ST), other regional

chapters and organizations mostly based in the Southern Tagalog Region, [7] and
individuals[8] followed suit by filing on September 19, 2007 a petition for certiorari
and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179461 that replicates the allegations raised in
the BAYAN petition in G.R. No. 178581.
Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism
Council[9] composed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary
Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice
Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense
Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local
Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as
members. All the petitions, except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine
National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.
The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions likewise impleaded President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the support agencies for the Anti-Terrorism Council
like the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, National Bureau of
Investigation, Bureau of Immigration, Office of Civil Defense, Intelligence Service
of the AFP, Anti-Money Laundering Center, Philippine Center on Transnational
Crime, and the PNP intelligence and investigative elements.
The petitions fail.
Petitioners
resort
certiorari is improper

to

Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial
or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is clear:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying
that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting

such incidental reliefs as law and

require. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

justice

may

Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how
respondents acted without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy aside, the petitions fail just the same.
In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting
requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners must
possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the
case.[10]
In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the most
essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous.
Petitioners
standi

lack

locus

Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.[11]
Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary [12] summarized the rule
on locus standi, thus:
Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a
party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a
direct and personal interest. It must show not only that the law or
any governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in
immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result
of its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to be
denied some right or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or

that it is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by

reason of the statute or act complained of.
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional
question, it must show that (1) it has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action. (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected
communist fronts by the government, especially the military; whereas individual
petitioners invariably invoke the transcendental importance doctrine and their status
as citizens and taxpayers.
While Chavez v. PCGG[13] holds that transcendental public importance dispenses
with the requirement that petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of
suffering direct and personal injury, cases involving the constitutionality
of penal legislation belong to an altogether different genus of constitutional
litigation. Compelling State and societal interests in the proscription of harmful
conduct, as will later be elucidated, necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus
standi.
Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA 9372.
KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP and PCR, petitioners
in G.R. No. 178890, allege that they have been subjected to close security
surveillance by state security forces, their members followed by suspicious persons
and vehicles with dark windshields, and their offices monitored by men with military
build. They likewise claim that they have been branded as enemies of the [S]tate.[14]
Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) correctly points out that petitioners have yet to show
any connection between the purported surveillance and the implementation of RA
9372.
BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS,
Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD and Agham, petitionerorganizations in G.R. No. 178581, would like the Court to take judicial notice of
respondents alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National Peoples
Army (NPA). The tagging, according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of
proscription without following the procedure under the law.[15] The petition
of BAYAN-ST, et al. in G.R. No. 179461 pleads the same allegations.

The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged tagging of petitioners.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material
requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general
knowledge; (2)it must be well and authoritatively settled and
not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within
the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in
determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is
that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited
to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.
Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a
reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within
the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of
accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.
Things of common knowledge, of which courts take judicial
matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of
the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are
generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready
and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally
known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or
other publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are of
such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may
be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every
person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a
wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as
being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take
judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the
existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no
constructive knowledge.[16] (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of judicial
notice. Petitioners apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no
specific charge or proscription under RA 9372 has been filed against them, three
years after its effectivity, belies any claim of imminence of their perceived threat
emanating from the so-called tagging.

classified the CPP, NPA and Abu Sayyaf Group as foreign terrorist organizations. The
Court takes note of the joint statement of Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and
Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo Administration would adopt the US
and EU classification of the CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations. [19] Such
statement notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before the courts an application
to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed
organizations under RA 9372. Again, RA 9372 has been in effect for three years
now. From July 2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations have conducted their
activities fully and freely without any threat of, much less an actual, prosecution or
proscription under RA 9372.
Parenthetically, the Fourteenth Congress, in a resolution initiated by Party-list
Representatives Saturnino Ocampo, Teodoro Casio, Rafael Mariano and Luzviminda
Ilagan,[20] urged the government to resume peace negotiations with the NDF by
removing the impediments thereto, one of which is the adoption of designation of the
CPP and NPA by the US and EU as foreign terrorist organizations. Considering the
policy statement of the Aquino Administration [21] of resuming peace talks with the
NDF, the government is not imminently disposed to ask for the judicial proscription
of the CPP-NPA consortium and its allied organizations.
More important, there are other parties not before the Court with direct and specific
interests in the questions being raised.[22] Of recent development is the filing of
the first case for proscription under Section 17[23] of RA 9372 by the Department of
Justice before the Basilan Regional Trial Court against the Abu Sayyaf Group.
[24]
Petitioner-organizations do not in the least allege any link to the Abu
Sayyaf Group.
Some petitioners attempt, in vain though, to show the imminence of a prosecution
under RA 9372 by alluding to past rebellion charges against them.
In Ladlad v. Velasco,[25] the Court ordered the dismissal of rebellion charges filed in
2006 against then Party-List Representatives Crispin Beltran and Rafael Mariano of
Anakpawis, Liza Maza of GABRIELA, and Joel Virador, Teodoro Casio and
Saturnino Ocampo of Bayan Muna. Also named in the dismissed rebellion charges
were petitioners Rey Claro Casambre, Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes,
Rita Baua, Emerencia de Jesus and Danilo Ramos; and accused of being front
organizations for the Communist movement were petitioner-organizations KMU,
BAYAN, GABRIELA, PAMALAKAYA, KMP, KADAMAY, LFS and COURAGE.
[26]

The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R. No. 178554,
who merely harp as well on their supposed link to the CPP and NPA. They fail to
particularize how the implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372 would result
in direct injury to their organization and members.
While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared terrorist organization, the
United States of America[17] (US) and the European Union[18] (EU) have both

The dismissed rebellion charges, however, do not save the day for petitioners. For
one, those charges were filed in 2006, prior to the enactment of RA 9372, and
dismissed by this Court. For another, rebellion is defined and punished under the
Revised Penal Code.Prosecution for rebellion is not made more imminent by the
enactment of RA 9372, nor does the enactment thereof make it easier to charge a
person with rebellion, its elements not having been altered.

Conversely, previously filed but dismissed rebellion charges bear no relation to

prospective charges under RA 9372. It cannot be overemphasized that three years
after the enactment of RA 9372, none of petitioners has been charged.
Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157 base their claim of locus standi on
their sworn duty to uphold the Constitution.The IBP zeroes in on Section 21 of RA
9372 directing it to render assistance to those arrested or detained under the law.
The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not, however,
suffice to clothe the IBP or any of its members with standing. [27] The IBP failed to
sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate under the assailed statute revolts against its
constitutional rights and duties. Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL have not
pointed to even a single arrest or detention effected under RA 9372.
Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who claims to have been the subject
of political surveillance, also lacks locus standi. Prescinding from the veracity, let
alone legal basis, of the claim of political surveillance, the Court finds that she has
not shown even the slightest threat of being charged under RA 9372. Similarly
lacking in locus standi are former Senator Wigberto Taada and Senator Sergio
Osmea III, who cite their being respectively a human rights advocate and an
oppositor to the passage of RA 9372. Outside these gratuitous statements, no
concrete injury to them has been pinpointed.
Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and Atty. Soliman
Santos Jr. in G.R. No. 178552 also conveniently state that the issues they raise are
of transcendental importance, which must be settled early and are of far-reaching
implications,without mention of any specific provision of RA 9372 under which they
have been charged, or may be charged. Mere invocation of human rights advocacy
has nowhere been held sufficient to clothe litigants with locus standi. Petitioners
must show an actual, or immediate danger of sustaining, direct injury as a result of
the laws enforcement. To rule otherwise would be to corrupt the settled doctrine
of locus standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by the general public.
Neither
can locus
standi be
conferred
upon
individual
petitioners
as taxpayers and citizens. A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise of
the spending or taxing power of Congress,[28] whereas citizen standing must rest on
direct and personal interest in the proceeding. [29]
RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from
Congress for its implementation, while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has
alleged any direct and personal interest in the implementation of the law.
It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a
public right, do not establish locus standi.Evidence of a direct and personal interest is
key.

Petitioners fail to present

an
actual
case
or
controversy
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or
controversy.
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.[30] (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

As early as Angara v. Electoral Commission,[31] the Court ruled that the power of
judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies to be exercised after full
opportunity of argument by the parties. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision
of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.[32]
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC [33] cannot be
more emphatic:
[C]ourts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic
questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually
challenging. The controversy must be justiciabledefinite and
concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must
show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the
one hand, and a denial thereof on the other hand; that is, it
must concern a real and not merely a theoretical question
or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial
controversyadmitting of specific relief through a decree
conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion
advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of
facts. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus,
a
petition
to
declare
unconstitutional
a
law
converting
the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City was held to be premature as
it was tacked on uncertain, contingent events.[34] Similarly, a petition that fails to
allege that an application for a license to operate a radio or television station has
been denied or granted by the authorities does not present a justiciable controversy,
and merely wheedles the Court to rule on a hypothetical problem.[35]
The Court dismissed the petition in Philippine Press Institute v. Commission on
Elections[36] for failure to cite any specific affirmative action of the Commission on
Elections to implement the assailed resolution. It refused, in Abbas v. Commission on
Elections,[37] to rule on the religious freedom claim of the therein petitioners based
merely on a perceived potential conflict between the provisions of the Muslim Code
and those of the national law, there being no actual controversy between real
litigants.

prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an advisory
opinion, which is not its function.[43]
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory
relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory
actions characterized by double contingency, where both the activity the petitioners
intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely
theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.[44]
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the
present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such
possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law
may be abused.[45]Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts
may step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable.

The list of cases denying claims resting on purely hypothetical or anticipatory

grounds goes on ad infinitum.
The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived
threat to any constitutional interest suffices to provide a basis for mounting a
constitutional challenge. This, however, is qualified by the requirement that there
must besufficient facts to enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues. [38]
Very recently, the US Supreme Court, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,
[39]
allowed the pre-enforcement review of a criminal statute, challenged on vagueness
grounds, since plaintiffs faced a credible threat of prosecution and should not be
required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking
relief.[40] The plaintiffs therein filed an action before a federal court to assail the
constitutionality of the material support statute, 18 U.S.C. 2339B (a) (1),
[41]
proscribing the provision of material support to organizations declared by the
Secretary of State as foreign terrorist organizations. They claimed that
theyintended to provide support for the humanitarian and political activities of two
such organizations.
Prevailing American jurisprudence allows an adjudication on the merits when an
anticipatory petition clearly shows that the challenged prohibition forbids the
conduct or activity that a petitioner seeks to do, as there would then be a
justiciable controversy.[42]
Unlike the plaintiffs in Holder, however, herein petitioners have failed to show that
the
challenged
provisions
of
RA
9372
forbidconstitutionally
protected conduct or activity that they seek to do. No demonstrable threat has been
established, much less a real and existing one.
Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic surveillance and supposedly being
tagged as communist fronts in no way approximate a credible threat of

A facial invalidation of a statute is

allowed only in free speech cases,
wherein
certain
rules
of
constitutional litigation are rightly
excepted
Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the
definition of the crime of terrorism[46] under RA 9372 in that terms like widespread
and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace and coerce the government to
give in to an unlawful demand are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with
no standard to measure the prohibited acts.
Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and
overbreadth find no application in the present case since these doctrines apply only
to free speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.
For a jurisprudentially guided understanding of these doctrines, it is imperative to
outline the schools of thought on whether the void-for-vagueness and overbreadth
doctrines are equally applicable grounds to assail a penal statute.
Respondents interpret recent jurisprudence as slanting toward the idea of limiting the
application of the two doctrines to free speech cases. They particularly
cite Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan[47] and Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.[48]
The Court clarifies.
At issue in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan was whether the word intervene in Section
5[49] of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was intrinsically vague and
impermissibly broad. The Court stated that the overbreadth and the vagueness

doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases, and are not appropriate
for testing the validity of penal statutes. [50] It added that, at any rate, the challenged
provision, under which the therein petitioner was charged, is not vague.[51]
While in the subsequent case of Romualdez v. Commission on Elections,[52] the Court
stated that a facial invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate, it nonetheless
proceeded to conduct a vagueness analysis, and concluded that the therein subject
election offense[53] under the Voters Registration Act of 1996, with which the therein
petitioners were charged, is couched in precise language.[54]
The two Romualdez cases rely heavily on the Separate Opinion [55] of Justice Vicente
V. Mendoza in the Estrada case, where the Court found the Anti-Plunder Law
(Republic Act No. 7080) clear and free from ambiguity respecting the definition of
the crime of plunder.
The position taken by Justice Mendoza in Estrada relates these two doctrines to the
concept of a facial invalidation as opposed to an as-applied challenge. He basically
postulated that allegations that a penal statute is vague and overbroad do not justify a
facial review of its validity. The pertinent portion of the Concurring Opinion of
Justice Mendoza, which was quoted at length in the main Estradadecision, reads:
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute
and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect"
upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate
or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests
itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally
protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly
broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute
drawn with narrow specificity." The possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed
by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred
and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory
effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal
statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very
existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason
alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot
take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have
special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for
testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put
it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized

an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First

Amendment." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that
"claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases
involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken
words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all,
have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws
that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it
has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most
difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must
establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act
would be valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a
litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its
possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that
is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as
applied to the conduct of others."
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and
vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their
faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in
American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do
service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to
such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of
a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the
ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other
persons or other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in
the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically
produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter
of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a
particular defendant." Consequently, there is no basis for
petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its
face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in
striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied
to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally
protected. It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy
requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made
without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. But,
as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed
statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring
correction of these deficiencies before the statute
is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate
task for the judiciary. The combination of the

relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact

on the legislative process of the relief sought, and
above all the speculative and amorphous nature of
the required line-by-line analysis of detailed
statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of case that
is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional
questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has
been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed
"sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored. In
determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions
which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined
in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged.
[56]
(Underscoring supplied.)
The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking relation of
the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines
as
grounds
for
a facial orasapplied challenge against a penal statute (under a claim of violation of due process of
law) or a speech regulation (under a claim of abridgement of the freedom of speech
and cognate rights).
To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate
on the same plane.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.[57] Theoverbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state
regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.[58]
As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that
individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from
that behavior, even though some of it is protected.[59]
A facial challenge is likewise different from an as-applied challenge.
Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts
affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law,
pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the

parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
activities.[60]
Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle[61] in his concurring opinion that the
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not
applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount
a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth
grounds.
The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to
avert the chilling effect on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all
times be abridged.[62] As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal
statutes that generally bear an in terrorem effect in deterring socially harmful
conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly
considered innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading
the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.[63]
The Court reiterated that there are critical limitations by which a criminal statute may
be challenged and underscored that an on-its-face invalidation of penal statutes x x x
may not be allowed.[64]
[T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free
speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be
facially challenged.Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be
subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial
challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes
may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong
criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case of penal
statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the
grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete
controversy before judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A
facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and
speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third
parties who are not before it. As I have said in my opposition to the
allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test
will impair the States ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there
would be nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating the
States power to prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to third
parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that
the law is clear as applied to him. [65] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is
limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial
challenge, applicable only to free speech cases.

By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of
invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost
always under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the
substantially overbroad regulation.Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly
analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as
applied to the litigants.
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it
marks an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional
litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the
courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by
invalidating its improper applications on a case to case
basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the
rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In
overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted
to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire
statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the
overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized
court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to
depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the
"chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties
not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an
overbroad laws "very existence may cause others not before the
court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that
deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties. [66] (Emphasis in
the original omitted; underscoring supplied.)
In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least two
cases,[67] observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth
doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment, [68] and that claims of
facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their
terms, seek to regulate only spoken words.[69] InVirginia v. Hicks,[70] it was held that
rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that
is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly
broad statutes are justified by the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally
protected expression.[71]
Since a penal statute may only be
assailed for being vague as applied to
petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis
of the definition of terrorism in RA 9372
is legally impermissible absent anactual
or imminent charge against them

While Estrada did not apply the overbreadth doctrine, it did not preclude the
operation of the vagueness test on the Anti-Plunder Law as applied to the therein
petitioner, finding, however, that there was no basis to review the law on its face and
in its entirety.[72]It stressed that statutes found vague as a matter of due
process typically are invalidated only 'as applied' to a particular defendant.[73]
American jurisprudence[74] instructs that vagueness challenges that do not involve the
First Amendment must be examined in light of the specific facts of the case at hand
and not with regard to the statute's facial validity.
For more than 125 years, the US Supreme Court has evaluated defendants claims
that criminal statutes are unconstitutionally vague, developing a doctrine hailed as
among the most important guarantees of liberty under law.[75]
In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process
clause has been utilized in examining the constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at
least three cases,[76] the Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an
ordinance penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of
illegal recruitment punishable under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the
vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the
petitioners
in
these
three
cases,
similar
to
those
in
the
two Romualdez and Estrada cases, were actually charged with the therein assailed
penal statute, unlike in the present case.
There is no merit in the claim
that RA 9372 regulates speech
so as to permit a facial
analysis of its validity
From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of RA
9372, the following elements may be culled: (1) the offender commits an act
punishable under any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under any
of the enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate crime
sows and creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among
the populace; and (3) the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government
to give in to an unlawful demand.
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech,
petitioners contend that the element of unlawful demand in the definition of
terrorism[77] must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression
protected by the free speech clause.
The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to penalize is conduct, not
speech.

Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a
predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying
phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the government
to accede to an unlawful demand. Given the presence of the first element, any
attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative component of the
prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech.
Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly
focuses on just one particle of an element of the crime. Almost every commission of
a crime entails some mincing of words on the part of the offender like in declaring to
launch overt criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the amount of ransom or
conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful transaction. An analogy in
one U.S. case[78] illustrated that the fact that the prohibition on discrimination in
hiring on the basis of race will require an employer to take down a sign reading
White Applicants Only hardly means that the law should be analyzed as one
regulating speech rather than conduct.
Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the criminal
conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish socially harmful conduct nor the
essence of the whole act as conduct and not speech. This holds true a fortiori in the
present case where the expression figures only as an inevitable incident of making
the element of coercion perceptible.
[I]t is true that the agreements and course of conduct here were as in
most instances brought about through speaking or writing. But it has
never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to
make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was, in
part, initiated,evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either
spoken, written, or printed. Such an expansive interpretation of the
constitutional guaranties of speech and press would make it
practically impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in
restraint of trade as well as many other agreements and conspiracies
deemed injurious to society.[79] (italics and underscoring supplied)
Certain kinds of speech have been treated as unprotected conduct, because they
merely evidence a prohibited conduct.[80] Since speech is not involved here, the Court
cannot heed the call for a facial analysis.
IN FINE, Estrada and the other cited authorities engaged in a vagueness analysis of
the therein subject penal statute as applied to the therein petitioners inasmuch as they
were actually charged with the pertinent crimes challenged on vagueness
grounds. The Court in said cases, however, found no basis to review the assailed
penal statute on its face and in its entirety.
In Holder, on the other hand, the US Supreme Court allowed the pre-enforcement
review of a criminal statute, challenged on vagueness grounds, since the therein

plaintiffs faced a credible threat of prosecution and should not be required to await
and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.
As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a
credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372.Even a limited vagueness analysis of
the assailed definition of terrorism is thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds
litigants that judicial power neither contemplates speculative counseling on a statutes
future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be used as an
extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.

G.R. No. L-64279 April 30, 1984

ANSELMO L. PESIGAN and MARCELINO L. PESIGAN, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE DOMINGO MEDINA ANGELES, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City
Branch 129, acting for REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of Camarines Norte, now
presided over by JUDGE NICANOR ORIO, Daet Branch 40; DRA. BELLA S.
MIRANDA, ARNULFO V. ZENAROSA, ET AL., respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
At issue in this case is the enforceability, before publication in the Official Gazette
of June 14, 1982, of Presidential Executive Order No. 626-A dated October 25,
1980, providing for the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos
transported from one province to another.
Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelo L. Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in an Isuzu
ten-wheeler truck in the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from
Sipocot, Camarines Sur with Padre Garcia, Batangas, as the destination.
They were provided with (1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian of
Camarines Sur, issued under the Revised Administrative Code and Presidential
Decree No. 533, the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974; (2) a permit to transport large
cattle issued under the authority of the provincial commander; and (3) three
certificates of inspection, one from the Constabulary command attesting that the
carabaos were not included in the list of lost, stolen and questionable animals; one
from the LIvestock inspector, Bureau of Animal Industry of Libmanan, Camarines
Sur and one from the mayor of Sipocot.
In spite of the permit to transport and the said four certificates, the carabaos, while
passing at Basud, Camarines Norte, were confiscated by Lieutenant Arnulfo V.
Zenarosa, the town's police station commander, and by Doctor Bella S. Miranda,
provincial veterinarian. The confiscation was basis on the aforementioned Executive
Order No. 626-A which provides "that henceforth, no carabao, regardless of age, sex,
physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one
province to another. The carabaos or carabeef transported in violation of this
Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the
government to be distributed ... to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos" (78 OG 3144).
Doctor Miranda distributed the carabaos among twenty-five farmers of Basud, and to
a farmer from the Vinzons municipal nursery (Annex 1).

The Pesigans filed against Zenarosa and Doctor Miranda an action for replevin for
the recovery of the carabaos allegedly valued at P70,000 and damages of P92,000.
The replevin order could not be executed by the sheriff. In his order of April 25,
1983 Judge Domingo Medina Angeles, who heard the case at Daet and who was later
transferred to Caloocan City, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.
The Pesigans appealed to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and section
25 of the Interim Rules and pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440, a 1968 law which
superseded Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
We hold that the said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans
on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is a penal regulation published more
than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became
effective only fifteen days thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and
section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code.
The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars and
regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public
of the contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons
affected thereby. (People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Lim Hoa Ting vs. Central
Bank of the Phils., 104 Phil. 573; Balbuna vs. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150.)
The Spanish Supreme Court ruled that "bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se
comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y
Reales ordenes dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de
su potestad (1 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., p. 146.)
Thus, in the Que Po Lay case, a person, convicted by the trial court of having
violated Central Bank Circular No. 20 and sentenced to six months' imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P1,000, was acquitted by this Court because the circular was
published in the Official Gazette three months after his conviction. He was not bound
by the circular.
That ruling applies to a violation of Executive Order No. 626-A because
its confiscation and forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. Justice
and fairness dictate that the public must be informed of that provision by means of
publication in the Gazette before violators of the executive order can be bound
thereby.
The cases of Police Commission vs. Bello, L-29960, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 230
and Philippine Blooming Mills vs. Social Security System, 124 Phil. 499, cited by the
respondents, do not involve the enforcement of any penal regulation.
Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential executive orders having
general applicability should be published in the Official Gazette. It provides that

"every order or document which shag prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have
general applicability and legal effect."
Indeed, the practice has always been to publish executive orders in the Gazette.
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that even bureau
"regulations and orders shall become effective only when approved by the
Department Head and published in the Official Gazette or otherwise publicly
promulgated". (See Commissioner of Civil Service vs. Cruz, 122 Phil. 1015.)
In the instant case, the livestock inspector and the provincial veterinarian of
Camarines Norte and the head of the Public Affairs Office of the Ministry of
Agriculture were unaware of Executive Order No. 626-A. The Pesigans could not
have been expected to be cognizant of such an executive order.
It results that they have a cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The
summary confiscation was not in order. The recipients of the carabaos should return
them to the Pesigans. However, they cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas
because they are now bound by the said executive order. Neither can they recover
damages. Doctor Miranda and Zenarosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture
and dispersal of the carabaos.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal and the confiscation and dispersal
of the carabaos are reversed and set aside. Respondents Miranda and Zenarosa are
ordered to restore the carabaos, with the requisite documents, to the petitioners, who
as owners are entitled to possess the same, with the right to dispose of them in Basud
or Sipocot, Camarines Sur. No costs.
SO ORDERED.1wph1.t

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF
ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM,
INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the
President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive
Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as
Director, Malacaang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his
capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right
recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as
the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official
Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the
Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative
orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265,
286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429,
445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718,
731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143,
1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 18191826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161,
173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239,
241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397,
405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602,
609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532,
1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 16121628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 17461751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-

1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847,

1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952,
1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510,
522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593,
594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94,
95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347,

348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed
outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring
the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that
petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged nonpublication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the
requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being
"aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation,
board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the
use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required
to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts
of the defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition
concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty,
they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino
vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of
mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has
some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be
protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for
the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be
subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the

question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and
the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he
has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a
citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal
Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is
anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private
individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the
Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in
the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T.
Trent said:

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of

said article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this Court has ruled that publication in the
Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not
provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for
determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its
publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority

supports the proposition that the relator is a proper party to
proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be
enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think
that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that
it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case
without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under
the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist,
the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well
lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule
insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances
which surround this case are different from those in the United
States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these
proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not
the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and
represent the people in cases of this character.

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided, ...

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the

effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other
statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said
Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette,
even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all
important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the,
Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative
orders and proclamations, except such as have no general
applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts
of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or
classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law;
and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of
the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general
applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be
published. ...

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in
the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right
sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less
than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this
proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the
same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally
empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in
this case.

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate
notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of
the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had
no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua
non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for
their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in
question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the
publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have
bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature.
While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations

in the Batasan Pambansaand for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative
recordsno such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President.
Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential
decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court
of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los
reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de
conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be
published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon
respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to
be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be
published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with
no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such
publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for
fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the
people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such
as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that
they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature"
or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that
before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs.
COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions
which all form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due
process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as
the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts
of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may
know where to obtain their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which
have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court,
quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on
acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were
published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to
whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced

or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar
situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth
in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of
Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law;
that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no
duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree.
Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry.
Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that
such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of
unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual
existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative
fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct,
private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become
vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality
and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the
nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand
examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those
which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it
is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement
of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the
right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor
before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their
publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have
consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a
new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the
presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette,
only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939,
inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of
these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever
their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has
ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the
Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise
the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding
on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently

recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment

that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of
criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in
some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take
effect immediately.

the delegates who must be "beholden to no one but to God, country and conscience,"
are interests that should be accorded primacy.1

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official

Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and
unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

The claim of petitioner that the challenged provision constitutes an ex post facto law
is likewise untenable.

SO ORDERED.

The petitioner should therefore be accordingly guided by the pronouncements in the

cases of Imbong and Gonzales. 2

An ex post facto law is one which:.

G.R. No. L-32485 October 22, 1970

(1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and
which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act;

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF THE

PETITIONER'S RIGHTS AND DUTIES UNDER SEC. 8 OF R.A. No. 6132.

(2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when

committed;

KAY VILLEGAS KAMI, INC., petitioner.

(3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than

the law annexed to the crime when committed;

MAKASIAR, J.:.
This petition for declaratory relief was filed by Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., claiming to
be a duly recognized and existing non-stock and non-profit corporation created under
the laws of the land, and praying for a determination of the validity of Sec. 8 of R.A.
No. 6132 and a declaration of petitioner's rights and duties thereunder. In paragraph
7 of its petition, petitioner avers that it has printed materials designed to propagate its
ideology and program of government, which materials include Annex B; and that in
paragraph 11 of said petition, petitioner intends to pursue its purposes by supporting
delegates to the Constitutional Convention who will propagate its ideology.

(4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction

upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of
the commission of the offense;
(5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect
imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which
when done was lawful; and
(6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection
to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.3

Petitioner, in paragraph 7 of its petition, actually impugns because it quoted, only the
first paragraph of Sec. 8(a) on the ground that it violates the due process clause, right
of association, and freedom of expression and that it is an ex post facto law.

From the aforesaid definition as well as classification of ex post facto laws, the
constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal laws which are given retroactive
effect.4

The first three grounds were overruled by this Court when it held that the questioned
provision is a valid limitation on the due process, freedom of expression, freedom of
association, freedom of assembly and equal protection clauses; for the same is
designed to prevent the clear and present danger of the twin substantive evils,
namely, the prostitution of electoral process and denial of the equal protection of the
laws. Moreover, under the balancing-of-interests test, the cleansing of the electoral
process, the guarantee of equal change for all candidates, and the independence of

While it is true that Sec. 18 penalizes a violation of any provision of R.A. No. 6132
including Sec. 8(a) thereof, the penalty is imposed only for acts committed after the
approval of the law and not those perpetrated prior thereto. There is nothing in the
law that remotely insinuates that Secs. 8(a) and 18, or any other provision thereof,
shall apply to acts carried out prior to its approval. On the contrary, See. 23 directs
that the entire law shall be effective upon its approval. It was approved on August 24,
1970.WHEREFORE, the prayer of the petition is hereby denied and paragraph 1 of
Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is not unconstitutional. Without costs.

G.R. No. L-46228 January 17, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROLANDO R. VILLARAZA (as City Judge of Cagayan de Oro City),
and CAESAR PUERTO,respondents.
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the jurisdiction of a city court in estafa cases.
On December 3, 1975 an assistant city fiscal charged Caesar Puerto with estafa in the
city court of Cagayan de Oro City for having issued on October 16, 1974 two
bouncing checks for the total sum of P4, 966. 63 (Criminal Case No. 32140).
City Judge Rolando R. Villaraza in his order March 31, 1976 noted that the accused
had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. He directed that the
case be elevated, for trial, to the court of First Instance or the Circuit Criminal Court.
Upon petition of the prosecution, the Court of first Instance of Misamis Oriental,
Cagayan de Oro Branch VIII, in its order of February 3, 1977 returned the case to the
city court because in its opinion the case falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of
the two courts and, the city court, as the first court which took cognizance of the
case, should try it.
Disagreeing with the Court of First Instance, respondent city judge in his order of
April 21, 1977 directed the re-elevation of the case. His view is that the case falls
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance because estafa
committed by the accused is punishable by prision mayor medium under Presidential
Decree No. 818 which took effect on October 22, 1975 and which amended article
315 of the Revised Penal Code.
That order of respondent judge is assailed in the petition for certiorari filed in this
Court on May 27, 1977 by the office of the city fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City.
We hold that the case was properly filed with the city court which has original
jurisdiction over it. The estafa imputed to Caesar Puerto is punishable under article
315 of the Revised Penal Code by arresto mayor maximum to prision
correccional minimum or four months and one day to two years and four months.
The penalty of prision mayor medium, or eight years and one day to ten years,
imposed by Presidential Decree No. 818, applies only to swindling by means of
issuing bouncing checks which was committed or after October 22, 1975.

That increased penalty does not apply to the estafa committed by Puerto on October
16, 1974. To apply it to Puerto would make the decree an ex post facto law. Its
retroactive application is prohibited by articles 21 and 22 of the Revised Penal Code
and section 12, Article IV of the Constitution.
The city court has original jurisdiction over the case because the penultimate
paragraph or section 87 of the Judiciary Law, as amended by Republic Acts Nos.
2613 and 3828, provides that "judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the
Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an offense committed within their
respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not
exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six years or fine not
exceeding six thousand pesos or both."
As section 87 itself shows, that jurisdiction is concurrent with the court of First
Instance which is empowered to try "all criminal cases in which the penalty provided
by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two hundred
pesos" (Sec. 44[f], Judiciary Law. See People vs. Nazareno, L-40037, April 30, 1976,
70 SCRA 531).
It was not necessary for the city court to have conducted the preliminary
investigation of the case. The filing of the information by the fiscal presupposes that
he had conducted the requisite preliminary investigation pursuant to Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court and Republic Act No. 5180, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
77.
WHEREFORE, the order of the Court of First Instance, returning the case to the city
court, is affirmed and the two orders of the respondent city judge, elevating the case
to the Court of First Instance, are set aside. The city court is directed to try the case.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SIMEON. FERRER (in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac, Branch I), FELICIANO CO alias LEONCIO CO alias
"Bob," and NILO S. TAYAG alias Romy Reyes alias "Taba,"respondents.

(a) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or with

insult to public authorities;
(b) That the crime was committed by a band; and afford impunity.
(c) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford
impunity.
Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.

CASTRO, J.:p
I. Statement of the Case
Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion
Act, 1 which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and other "subversive
associations," and punishes any person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts
affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a member" of the Party or of any other
similar "subversive" organization.
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the AntiSubversion Act was filed against the respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac. On March 10 Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted a preliminary
investigation and, finding a prima facie case against Co, directed the Government
prosecutors to file the corresponding information. The twice-amended information,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 27, recites:
That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the
Municipality of Capas, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,
feloniously became an officer and/or ranking leader of the
Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal
organization aimed to overthrow the Government of the
Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any
other illegal means for the purpose of establishing in the
Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the government under
the control and domination of an alien power, by being an
instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, the training school of
recruits of the New People's Army, the military arm of the said
Communist Party of the Philippines.
That in the commission of the above offense, the following
aggravating circumstances are present, to wit:

Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the same
court, sharing the respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion. After
preliminary investigation was had, an information was filed, which, as amended,
reads:
The undersigned provincial Fiscal of Tarlac and State Prosecutors
duly designated by the Secretary of Justice to collaborate with the
Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac, pursuant to the Order dated June 5,
above entitled case, hereby accuse Nilo S. Tayag, alias Romy
Reyes alias TABA, ARTHUR GARCIA, RENATO (REY)
CASIPE, ABELARDO GARCIA, MANUEL ALAVADO,
BENJAMIN BIE alias COMMANDER MELODY and several
JOHN DOES, whose identities are still unknown, for violation of
REPUBLIC ACT No. 1700, otherwise known as the AntiSubversion Law, committed as follows:
That in or about March 1969 and for sometime prior thereto and
thereafter, in the Province of Tarlac, within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, and elsewhere in the Philippines, the abovenamed accused knowingly, willfully and by overt acts organized,
joined and/or remained as offices and/or ranking leaders, of the
KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a subversive organization as
defined in Republic Act No. 1700; that BENJAMIN BIE and
COMMANDER MELODY, in addition thereto, knowingly,
willfully and by over acts joined and/or remained as a member and
became an officer and/or ranking leader not only of the Communist
Party of the Philippines but also of the New People's Army, the
military arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines; and that
all the above-named accused, as such officers and/or ranking
leaders of the aforestated subversive organizations, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there
knowingly, willfully and feloniously commit subversive and/or
seditious acts, by inciting, instigating and stirring the people to
unite and rise publicly and tumultuously and take up arms against
the government, and/or engage in rebellious conspiracies and riots

to overthrow the government of the Republic of the Philippines by

force, violence, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means
among which are the following:
1. On several occasions within the province of Tarlac, the accused
conducted meetings and/or seminars wherein the said accused
delivered speeches instigating and inciting the people to unite, rise
in arms and overthrow the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines, by force, violence, deceit, subversion and/or other
illegal means; and toward this end, the said accused organized,
among others a chapter of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN in
barrio Motrico, La Paz, Tarlac for the avowed purpose of
undertaking or promoting an armed revolution, subversive and/or
seditious propaganda, conspiracies, and/or riots and/or other illegal
means to discredit and overthrow the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines and to established in the Philippines a
Communist regime.
2. The accused NILO TAYAG alias ROMY REYES alias TABA,
together with FRANCISCO PORTEM alias KIKO Gonzales and
others, pursued the above subversive and/or seditious activities in
San Pablo City by recruiting members for the New People's Army,
and/or by instigating and inciting the people to organize and unite
for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines through armed revolution, deceit, subversion and/or
other illegal means, and establishing in the Philippines a
Communist Government.
That the following aggravating circumstances attended the
commission of the offense: (a) aid of armed men or persons to
insure or afford impunity; and (b) craft, fraud, or disguise was
employed.
On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute on the
grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than one
subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denied him the equal protection of
the laws.
Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of
September 15, 1970, declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of
attainder and that it is vague and overboard, and dismissed the informations against
the two accused. The Government appealed. We resolved to treat its appeal as a
special civil action for certiorari.
II. Is the Act a Bill of Attainder?

Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex
port facto law shall be enacted." 2A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishment without trial. 3 Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial
determination of guilt. 4 The constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to
implement the principle of separation of powers 5 by confining legislatures to
rule-making 6 and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial
function. 7 History in perspective, bills of attainder were employed to suppress
unpopular causes and political minorities, 8 and it is against this evil that the
constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite class, the
imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatizea statute as
a bill of attainder. 9
In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by the court a quo as a
bill of attainder because it "tars and feathers" the Communist Party of the Philippines
as a "continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country; its existence, a
'clear, present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines.'" By means of the
Act, the trial court said, Congress usurped "the powers of the judge," and assumed
"judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CCP without any of the forms or
safeguards of judicial trial." Finally, according to the trial court, "if the only issue [to
be determined] is whether or not the accused is a knowing and voluntary member,
the law is still a bill of attainder because it has expressly created a presumption of
organizational guilt which the accused can never hope to overthrow."
1. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not
specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the
purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an organized
conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition,
stated in section 4, against membership in the outlawed organization. The term
"Communist Party of the Philippines" issued solely for definitional purposes. In fact
the Act applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any
other organization having the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on
individuals but on conduct. 10
This feature of the Act distinguishes it from section 504 of the U.S. Federal LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 11 which, in U.S. vs.
Brown, 12 was held to be a bill of attainder and therefore unconstitutional. Section
504 provided in its pertinent parts as follows:
(a) No person who is or has been a member of the Communist
Party ... shall serve
(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive board
or similar governing body, business agent, manager, organizer, or
other employee (other than as an employee performing exclusively
clerical or custodial duties) of any labor organization.

during or for five years after the termination of his membership in

the Communist Party....
(b) Any person who willfully violates this section shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or
both.
This statute specified the Communist Party, and imposes disability and penalties on
its members. Membership in the Party, without more, ipso facto disqualifies a person
from becoming an officer or a member of the governing body of any labor
organization. As the Supreme Court of the United States pointed out:
Under the line of cases just outlined, sec. 504 of the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a
bill of attainder. Congress undoubtedly possesses power under the
Commerce Clause to enact legislation designed to keep from
positions affecting interstate commerce persons who may use of
such positions to bring about political strikes. In section 504,
however, Congress has exceeded the authority granted it by the
Constitution. The statute does not set forth a generally applicable
rule decreeing that any person who commits certain acts or
possesses certain characteristics (acts and characteristics which, in
Congress' view, make them likely to initiate political strikes) shall
not hold union office, and leaves to courts and juries the job of
deciding what persons have committed the specified acts or
possessed the specified characteristics. Instead, it designates in no
uncertain terms the persons who possess the feared
characteristics and therefore cannot hold union office without
incurring criminal liability members of the Communist Party.
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 US
1, 6 L ed 2d 625, 81 S CT 1357, lend a support to our conclusion.
That case involved an appeal from an order by the Control Board
ordering the Communist Party to register as a "Communist-action
organization," under the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950,
64 Stat 987, 50 USC sec. 781 et seq. (1958 ed). The definition of
"Communist-action organization" which the Board is to apply is
set forth in sec. 3 of the Act:
[A]ny organization in the United States ... which (i)is substantially
directed, dominated, or controlled by the foreign government or
foreign organization controlling the world Communist movement
referred to in section 2 of this title, and(ii) operates primarily to
advance the objectives of such world Communist movement... 64
Stat 989, 50 USC sec. 782 (1958 ed.)

A majority of the Court rejected the argument that the Act was a
bill of attainder, reasoning that sec. 3 does not specify the persons
or groups upon which the deprivations setforth in the Act are to be
imposed, but instead sets forth a general definition. Although the
Board has determined in 1953 that the Communist Party was a
"Communist-action organization," the Court found the statutory
definition not to be so narrow as to insure that the Party would
always come within it:
In this proceeding the Board had found, and the Court of Appeals
has sustained its conclusion, that the Communist Party, by virtud of
the activities in which it now engages, comes within the terms of
the Act. If the Party should at anytime choose to abandon these
activities, after it is once registered pursuant to sec. 7, the Act
provides adequate means of relief. (367 US, at 87, 6 L ed 2d at
683)
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally
unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more, would
suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has
to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the
accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined
the Party, knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its
basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by force deceit, and other
illegal means and place the country under the control and domination of a foreign
power.
As to the claim that under the statute organizationl guilt is nonetheless imputed
despite the requirement of proof of knowing membership in the Party, suffice it to
say that is precisely the nature of conspiracy, which has been referred to as a
"dragneet device" whereby all who participate in the criminal covenant are liable.
The contention would be correct if the statute were construed as punishing mere
membership devoid of any specific intent to further the unlawful goals of the
Party. 13 But the statute specifically required that membership must be knowing or
active, with specific intent to further the illegal objectives of the Party. That is what
section 4 means when it requires that membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to
have been acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." 14 The ingredient of
specific intent to pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by "overt
acts." 15 This constitutes an element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of
guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of direct participation in the
organization's unlawful activities, while the latter requires proof of mere adherence
to the organization's illegal objectives.
2. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this
feature is not enough to render it a bill of attainder. A statute prohibiting partners or
employees of securities underwriting firms from serving as officers or employees of

national banks on the basis of a legislative finding that the persons mentioned would
be subject to the temptation to commit acts deemed inimical to the national economy,
has been declared not to be a bill of attainder. 16 Similarly, a statute requiring every
secret, oath-bound society having a membership of at least twenty to register, and
punishing any person who becomes a member of such society which fails to register
or remains a member thereof, was declared valid even if in its operation it was
shown to apply only to the members of the Ku Klux Klan. 17
In the Philippines the validity of section 23 (b) of the Industrial Peace
Act, 18 requiring labor unions to file with the Department of Labor affidavits of union
officers "to the effect that they are not members of the Communist Party and that
they are not members of any organization which teaches the overthrow of the
Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional method," was upheld by
this Court. 19
Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily
ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them
without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder. 20 It is upon this ground that
statutes which disqualified those who had taken part in the rebellion against the
Government of the United States during the Civil War from holding office, 21 or from
exercising their profession, 22 or which prohibited the payment of further
compensation to individuals named in the Act on the basis of a finding that they had
engages in subversive activities,23 or which made it a crime for a member of the
Communist Party to serve as an officer or employee of a labor union, 24have been
invalidated as bills of attainder.
But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally acknowledged to be
certain as to be "judicially noticeable," the legislature may apply its own rules, and
judicial hearing is not needed fairly to make such determination. 25
In New York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman, 26 the New York legislature passed a law
requiring every secret, oath-bound society with a membership of at least twenty to
register, and punishing any person who joined or remained a member of such a
society failing to register. While the statute did not specify the Ku Klux Klan, in its
operation the law applied to the KKK exclusively. In sustaining the statute against
the claim that it discriminated against the Ku Klux Klan while exempting other
secret, oath-bound organizations like masonic societies and the Knights of
Columbus, the United States Supreme Court relied on common knowledge of the
nature and activities of the Ku Klux Klan. The Court said:
The courts below recognized the principle shown in the cases just
cited and reached the conclusion that the classification was
justified by a difference between the two classes of associations
shown by experience, and that the difference consisted (a) in a
manifest tendency on the part of one class to make the secrecy

surrounding its purpose and membership a cloak for acts and

conduct inimical to personal rights and public welfare, and (b) in
the absence of such a tendency on the part of the other class. In
pointing out this difference one of the courts said of the Ku Klux
Klan, the principal association in the included class: "It is a matter
of common knowledge that this organization functions largely at
night, its members disguised by hoods and gowns and doing things
calculated to strike terror into the minds of the people;" and later
said of the other class: "These organizations and their purposes are
well known, many of them having been in existence for many
years. Many of them are oath-bound and secret. But we hear no
complaint against them regarding violation of the peace or
interfering with the rights of others." Another of the courts said: "It
is a matter of common knowledge that the association or
organization of which the relator is concededly a member exercises
activities tending to the prejudice and intimidation of sundry
classes of our citizens. But the legislation is not confined to this
society;" and later said of the other class: "Labor unions have a
recognized lawful purpose. The benevolent orders mentioned in
the Benevolent Orders Law have already received legislative
scrutiny and have been granted special privileges so that the
legislature may well consider them beneficial rather than harmful
agencies." The third court, after recognizing "the potentialities of
evil in secret societies," and observing that "the danger of certain
organizations has been judicially demonstrated," meaning in
that state, said: "Benevolent orders, labor unions and college
fraternities have existed for many years, and, while not immune
from hostile criticism, have on the whole justified their existence."
We assume that the legislature had before it such information as
was readily available including the published report of a hearing,
before a committee of the House of Representatives of the 57th
Congress relating to the formation, purposes and activities of the
Klu Klux Klan. If so it was advised putting aside controverted
evidence that the order was a revival of the Ku Klux Klan of an
earlier time with additional features borrowed from the Know
Nothing and the A. P. A. orders of other periods; that its
memberships was limited to native-born, gentile, protestant whites;
that in part of its constitution and printed creed it proclaimed the
widest freedom for all and full adherence to the Constitution of the
United States; in another exacted of its member an oath to shield
and preserve "white supremacy;" and in still another declared any
person actively opposing its principles to be "a dangerous
ingredient in the body politic of our country and an enemy to the
weal of our national commonwealth;" that it was conducting a
crusade against Catholics, Jews, and Negroes, and stimulating

hurtful religious and race prejudices; that it was striving for

political power and assuming a sort of guardianship over the
administration of local, state and national affairs; and that at times
it was taking into its own hands the punishment of what some of its
members conceived to be crimes. 27
In the Philippines the character of the Communist Party has been the object of
continuing scrutiny by this Court. In 1932 we found the Communist Party of the
Philippines to be an illegal association. 28 In 1969 we again found that the objective
of the Party was the "overthrow of the Philippine Government by armed struggle and
to establish in the Philippines a communist form of government similar to that of
Soviet Russia and Red China." 29 More recently, in Lansang vs. Garcia, 30we noted
the growth of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the organization of
Communist fronts among youth organizations such as the Kabataang Makabayan
(KM) and the emergence of the New People's Army. After meticulously reviewing
the evidence, we said: "We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a
sizeable group of men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government
and have thus been and still are engaged in rebellion against the Government of the
Philippines.
3. Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it may fall
within the ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also necessary that
it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct. This requirement follows from the
nature of a bill of attainder as a legislative adjudication of guilt. As Justice
Frankfurter observed, "frequently a bill of attainder was ... doubly objectionable
because of its ex post factofeatures. This is the historic explanation for uniting the
two mischiefs in one
clause 'No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.' ... Therefore, if
[a statute] is a bill of attainder it is also an ex post facto law. But if it is not an ex post
facto law, the reasons that establish that it is not are persuasive that it cannot be a bill
of attainder." 31
Thus in Gardner vs. Board of Public Works, 32 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
validity of the Charter of the City of Los Angeles which provided:
... [N]o person shall hold or retain or be eligible for any public
office or employment in the service of the City of Los Angeles, in
any office or department thereof, either elective or appointive, who
has within five (5) years prior to the effective date of this section
advised, advocated, or taught, or who may, after this section
becomes effective, become a member of or affiliated with any
group, society, association, organization or party which advises,
advocates or teaches or has within said period of five (5) years
advised, advocated, or taught the overthrow by force or violence of
the Government of the United States of America or of the State of
California.

In upholding the statute, the Court stressed the prospective application of the Act to
the petitioner therein, thus:
... Immaterial here is any opinion we might have as to the charter
provision insofar as it purported to apply restrospectively for a
five-year period to its effective date. We assume that under the
Federal Constitution the Charter Amendment is valid to the extent
that it bars from the city's public service persons who,
subsequently to its adoption in 1941, advise, advocate, or reach the
violent overthrow of the Government or who are or become
affiliated with any group doing so. The provisions operating thus
prospectively were a reasonable regulation to protect the municipal
service by establishing an employment qualification of loyalty to
the State and the United States.
... Unlike the provisions of the charter and ordinance under which
petitioners were removed, the statute in the Lovett case did not
declare general and prospectively operative standards of
qualification and eligibility for public employment. Rather, by its
terms it prohibited any further payment of compensationto named
individuals or employees. Under these circumstances, viewed
against the legislative background, the statutewas held to have
imposed penalties without judicial trial.
Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is thatCongress thereby assumed
judicial magistracy, them it mustbe demonstrated that the statute claimed to be a bill
of attainderreaches past conduct and that the penalties it imposesare inescapable. As
the U.S. Supreme Court observedwith respect to the U.S. Federal Subversive
Activities ControlAct of 1950:
Nor is the statute made an act of "outlawry" or of attainderby the
fact that the conduct which it regulates is describedwith such
particularity that, in probability, few organizationswill come within
the statutory terms. Legislatures may act tocurb behaviour which
they regard as harmful to the public welfare,whether that conduct
is found to be engaged in by manypersons or by one. So long as
the incidence of legislation issuch that the persons who engage in
the regulated conduct, bethey many or few, can escape regulation
merely by altering thecourse of their own present activities, there
can be no complaintof an attainder. 33
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of theAnti-Subversion Act. Section 4
thereof expressly statesthat the prohibition therein applies only to acts
committed"After the approval of this Act." Only those who "knowingly,willfully and
by overt acts affiliate themselves with,become or remain members of the Communist

Party of thePhilippines and/or its successors or of any subversive association"after

June 20, 1957, are punished. Those whowere members of the Party or of any other
subversive associationat the time of the enactment of the law, weregiven the
opportunity of purging themselves of liability byrenouncing in writing and under
oath their membershipin the Party. The law expressly provides that such
renunciationshall operate to exempt such persons from penalliability. 34 The penalties
prescribed by the Act are thereforenot inescapable.
III. The Act and the Requirements of Due Process
1. As already stated, the legislative declaration in section 2 of the Act that the
Communist Party of the Philippinesis an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of
theGovernment is inteded not to provide the basis for a legislativefinding of guilt of
the members of the Party butrather to justify the proscription spelled out in section 4.
Freedom of expression and freedom of association are sofundamental that they are
thought by some to occupy a"preferred position" in the hierarchy of constitutional
values. 35 Accordingly, any limitation on their exercise mustbe justified by the
existence of a substantive evil. This isthe reason why before enacting the statute in
question Congressconducted careful investigations and then stated itsfindings in the
preamble, thus:
... [T]he Communist Party of the Philippines althoughpurportedly a
political party, is in fact an organized conspiracyto overthrow the
Government of the Republic of the Philippinesnot only by force
and violence but also by deceit, subversionand other illegal means,
for the purpose of establishing in thePhilippines a totalitarian
regime subject to alien dominationand control;
... [T]he continued existence and activities of the CommunistParty
of the Philippines constitutes a clear, present andgrave danger to
the security of the Philippines;
... [I]n the face of the organized, systematice and
persistentsubversion, national in scope but international in
direction,posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines and its
activities,there is urgent need for special legislation to cope
withthis continuing menace to the freedom and security of the
country.
In truth, the constitutionality of the Act would be opento question if, instead of
making these findings in enactingthe statute, Congress omitted to do so.
In saying that by means of the Act Congress has assumed judicial magistracy, the
trial courd failed to takeproper account of the distinction between legislative

fact and adjudicative fact. Professor Paul Freund elucidatesthe crucial distinction,
thus:
... A law forbidding the sale of beverages containingmore than 3.2 per cent of alcohol
would raise a question of legislativefact, i.e., whether this standard has a reasonable
relationto public health, morals, and the enforcement problem. Alaw forbidding the
sale of intoxicating beverages (assuming itis not so vague as to require
supplementation by rule-making)would raise a question of adjudicative fact, i.e.,
whether thisor that beverage is intoxicating within the meaning of the statuteand the
limits on governmental action imposed by the Constitution. Of course what we mean
by fact in each case is itselfan ultimate conclusion founded on underlying facts and
oncriteria of judgment for weighing them.
A conventional formulation is that legislative facts those facts which are relevant to
the legislative judgment will not be canvassed save to determine whether there is a
rationalbasis for believing that they exist, while adjudicativefacts those which tie
the legislative enactment to the litigant are to be demonstrated and found according
to the ordinarystandards prevailing for judicial trials. 36

The test formulated in Nebbia vs. new York, 37 andadopted by this Court in Lansang
vs. Garcia, 38 is that 'if laws are seen to have a reasonable relation to a
proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the
requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect
renders a court functus officio." The recital of legislative findings implements this
test.
With respect to a similar statement of legislative findingsin the U.S. Federal
Subversive Activities Control Actof 1950 (that "Communist-action organizations"
are controlledby the foreign government controlling the worldCommunist movement
and that they operate primarily to"advance the objectives of such world Communist
movement"),the U.S. Supreme Court said:
It is not for the courts to reexamine the validity of theselegislative findings and reject
them....They are the productof extensive investigation by Committes of Congress over
morethan a decade and a half. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.502, 516, 530. We
certainly cannot dismiss them as unfoundedirrational imaginings. ... And if we accept
them, as we mustas a not unentertainable appraisal by Congress of the threatwhich
Communist organizations pose not only to existing governmentin the United States,
but to the United States as asovereign, independent Nation. ...we must recognize that
thepower of Congress to regulate Communist organizations of thisnature is
extensive. 39

This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of thelegislative findings articulated in

the Anti-Subversion Act.
That the Government has a right to protect itself againstsubversion is a proposition
too plain to require elaboration.Self-preservation is the "ultimate value" of society. It

surpasses and transcendes every other value, "forif a society cannot protect its very
structure from armedinternal attack, ...no subordinate value can be protected" 40 As
Chief Justice Vinson so aptly said in Dennis vs. United States: 41
Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the argumentthat there
is a 'right' to rebellion against dictatorial governmentsis without
force where the existing structure of government provides for
peaceful and orderly change. We rejectany principle of
governmental helplessness in the face of preparationfor revolution,
which principle, carried to its logical conclusion,must lead to
anarchy. No one could conceive that it isnot within the power of
Congress to prohibit acts intended tooverthrow the government by
force and violence.
2. By carefully delimiting the reach of the Act to conduct (as explicitly described in
sectin 4 thereof), Congressreaffirmed its respect for the rule that "even throughthe
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial,that purpose cannot be pursued
by means that broadly stiflefundamental personal liberties when the end can be more
narrowly achieved." 42 The requirement of knowing membership,as distinguished
from nominalmembership, hasbeen held as a sufficient basis for penalizing
membershipin a subversive organization. 43 For, as has been stated:
Membership in an organization renders aid and encouragement to
the organization; and when membership is acceptedor retained
with knowledge that the organization is engaged inan unlawful
purpose, the one accepting or retaining membershipwith such
knowledge makes himself a party to the unlawfulenterprise in
which it is engaged. 44
3. The argument that the Act is unconstitutionallyoverbroad because section 2 merely
speaks of "overthrow"of the Government and overthrow may be achieved
by peaceful means, misconceives the function of the phrase"knowingly, willfully and
by overt acts" in section 4. Section 2 is merely a legislative declaration; the
definitionsof and the penalties prescribed for the different acts prescribedare stated in
section 4 which requires that membershipin the Communist Party of the Philippines,
to be unlawful, must be acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." Indeed,
the first "whereas" clause makes clear thatthe overthrow contemplated is "overthrow
not only by forceand violence but also be deceit, subversion and other illegalmeans."
The absence of this qualificatio in section 2 appearsto be due more to an oversight
rather than to deliberateomission.
Moreover, the word "overthrow' sufficiently connotesthe use of violent and other
illegal means. Only in a metaphoricalsense may one speak of peaceful overthrow
ofgovernments, and certainly the law does not speak in metaphors.In the case of the
Anti-Subversion Act, the use ofthe word "overthrow" in a metaphorical sense is

hardlyconsistent with the clearly delineated objective of the "overthrow,"namely,

"establishing in the Philippines a totalitarianregime and place [sic] the Government
under thecontrol and domination of an alien power." What thisCourt once said in a
prosecution for sedition is appropos: "The language used by the appellant clearly
imported anoverthrow of the Government by violence, and it should beinterpreted in
the plain and obvious sense in which it wasevidently intended to be understood. The
word 'overthrow'could not have been intended as referring to an ordinarychange by
the exercise of the elective franchise. The useof the whip [which the accused
exhorted his audience to useagainst the Constabulary], an instrument designed
toleave marks on the sides of adversaries, is inconsistentwith the mild interpretation
which the appellant wouldhave us impute to the language." 45
IV. The Act and the Guaranty of Free Expression
As already pointed out, the Act is aimed against conspiracies to overthrow the
Government by force, violence orother illegal means. Whatever interest in freedom
of speechand freedom of association is infringed by the prohibitionagainst knowing
membership in the Communist Party ofthe Philippines, is so indirect and so
insubstantial as to beclearly and heavily outweighed by the overriding
considerationsof national security and the preservartion of democraticinstitutions in
his country.
The membership clause of the U.S. Federal Smith Actis similar in many respects to
the membership provision ofthe Anti-Subversion Act. The former provides:
Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize anysociety,
group, or assembly of persons who teach, advocate, orencourage
the overthrow or destruction of any such governmentby force or
violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliatedwith, any such
society, group or assembly of persons, knowingthe purpose thereof

Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned notmore than

twenty years, or both, and shall be ineligible for emplymentby the
United States or any department or agencythereof, for the five
years next following his conviction.... 46
In sustaining the validity of this provision, the "Court said in Scales vs. United
States: 47
It was settled in Dennis that advocacy with which we arehere concerned is not
constitutionally protected speech, and itwas further established that a combination to
promote suchadvocacy, albeit under the aegis of what purports to be a politicalparty, is
not such association as is protected by the firstAmendment. We can discern no reason
why membership, whenit constitutes a purposeful form of complicity in a group

engagingin this same forbidden advocacy, should receive anygreater degree of protection
from the guarantees of that Amendment.

Moreover, as was held in another case, where the problemsof accommodating the
exigencies of self-preservationand the values of liberty are as complex and intricate
as inthe situation described in the legislative findings stated inthe U.S. Federal
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950,the legislative judgment as to how that
threat may best bemet consistently with the safeguards of personal freedomsis not to
be set aside merely because the judgment of judgeswould, in the first instance, have
chosen other methods. 48 For in truth, legislation, "whether it restrains freedom tohire
or freedom to speak, is itself an effort at compromisebetween the claims of the social
order and individual freedom,and when the legislative compromise in either case
isbrought to the judicial test the court stands one step removedfrom the conflict and
its resolution through law." 49
V. The Act and its Title
The respondent Tayag invokes the constitutional commandthat "no bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the
title of the bill." 50
What is assailed as not germane to or embraced in thetitle of the Act is the last
proviso of section 4 which reads:
And provided, finally, That one who conspires with anyother person to overthrow the
Government of the Republic ofthe Philippines, or the government of any of its political
subdivisionsby force, violence, deceit, subversion or illegal means,for the purpose of
placing such Government or political subdivisionunder the control and domination of any
lien power, shallbe punished by prision correccional to prision mayor with allthe
accessory penalties provided therefor in the same code.

It is argued that the said proviso, in reality, punishes notonly membership in the
Communist Party of the Philippinesor similar associations, but as well "any
conspiracyby two persons to overthrow the national or any local governmentby
illegal means, even if their intent is not to establisha totalitarian regime, burt a
democratic regime, evenif their purpose is not to place the nation under an
aliencommunist power, but under an alien democratic power likethe United States or
England or Malaysia or even an anti-communistpower like Spain, Japan, Thailand or
Taiwanor Indonesia."
The Act, in addition to its main title ("An Act to Outlawthe Communist Party of the
Philippines and SimilarAssociations, Penalizing Membership Therein, and forOther
Purposes"), has a short title. Section 1 providesthat "This Act shall be known as the
Anti-Subversion Act."Together with the main title, the short title of the
statuteunequivocally indicates that the subject matter is subversionin general which
has for its fundamental purpose the substitutionof a foreign totalitarian regime in

place of theexisting Government and not merely subversion by

Communistconspiracies..
The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an indexof its contents, and need not
recite the details of the Act. 51 It is a valid title if it indicates in broad but clear
termsthe nature, scope, and consequences of the proposed lawand its operation. 52 A
narrow or technical construction isto be avoided, and the statute will be read fairly
and reasonablyin order not to thwart the legislative intent. We holdthat the AntiSubversion Act fully satisfies these requirements.
VI. Conclusion and Guidelines
In conclusion, even as we uphold the validity of theAnti-Subversion Act, we cannot
overemphasize the needfor prudence and circumspection in its enforcement,
operatingas it does in the sensitive area of freedom of expressionand belief.
Accordingly, we set the following basic guidelines to be observed in any prosecution
under the Act.The Government, in addition to proving such circumstancesas may
affect liability, must establish the following elementsof the crime of joining the
Communist Party of the Philippinesor any other subversive association:
(1) In the case of subversive organizations other thanthe Communist Party of the Philippines,
(a) that thepurpose of the organization is to overthrow the presentGovernment of the
Philippines and to establish in thiscountry a totalitarian regime under the domination of
aforeign power; (b) that the accused joined such organization;and (c) that he did so knowingly,
willfully and byovert acts; and
(2) In the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines,(a) that the CPP continues to pursue
the objectiveswhich led Congress in 1957 to declare it to be an organizedconspiracy for the
overthrow of the Government by illegalmeans for the purpose of placing the country under
thecontrol of a foreign power; (b) that the accused joined theCPP; and (c) that he did so
willfully, knowingly and byovert acts.

We refrain from making any pronouncement as to thecrime or remaining a member

of the Communist Party ofthe Philippines or of any other subversive association:
weleave this matter to future determination.ACCORDINGLY, the questioned
resolution of September15, 1970 is set aside, and these two cases are
herebyremanded to the court a quo for trial on the merits. Costs de oficio.
G.R. No. L-18208

February 14, 1922

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VICENTE DIAZ CONDE and APOLINARIA R. DE CONDE, defendantsappellants.

JOHNSON, J.:
It appears from the record that on the 6th day of May, 1921, a complaint was
presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, charging the defendants
with a violation of the Usury Law (Act No. 2655). Upon said complaint they were
each arrested, arraigned, and pleaded not guilty. The cause was finally brought on for
trial on the 1st day of September, 1921. At the close of the trial, and after a
consideration of the evidence adduced, the Honorable M. V. del Rosario, judge,
found that the defendants were guilty of the crime charged in the complaint and
sentenced each of them to pay a fine of P120 and, in case of insolvency, to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of the law. From that
sentence each of the defendants appealed to this court.
The appellants now contend: (a) That the contract upon which the alleged usurious
interest was collected was executed before Act No. 2655 was adopted; (b) that at the
time said contract was made (December 30, 1915), there was no usury law in force in
the Philippine Islands; (c) that said Act No. 2655 did not become effective until the
1st day of May, 1916, or four months and a half after the contract in question was
executed; (d) that said law could have no retroactive effect or operation, and (e) that
said law impairs the obligation of a contract, and that for all of said reasons the
judgment imposed by the lower court should be revoked; that the complaint should
be dismissed, and that they should each be discharged from the custody of the law.
The essential facts constituting the basis of the criminal action are not in dispute, and
may be stated as follows: (1) That on the 30th day of December, 1915, the alleged
offended persons Bartolome Oliveros and Engracia Lianco executed and delivered to
the defendants a contract (Exhibit B) evidencing the fact that the former had
borrowed from the latter the sum of P300, and (2) that, by virtue of the terms of said
contract, the said Bartolome Oliveros and Engracia Lianco obligated themselves to
pay to the defendants interest at the rate of five per cent (5%) per month, payable
within the first ten days of each and every month, the first payment to be made on
the 10th day of January, 1916. There were other terms in the contract which,
however, are not important for the decision in the present case.
The lower court, in the course of its opinion, stated that at the time of the execution
and delivery of said contract (Exhibit B), there was no law in force in the Philippine
Islands punishing usury; but, inasmuch as the defendants had collected a usurious
rate of interest after the adoption of the Usury Law in the Philippine Islands (Act No.
2655), they were guilty of a violation of that law and should be punished in
accordance with its provisions.
The law, we think, is well established that when a contract contains an obligation to
pay interest upon the principal, the interest thereby becomes part of the principal and
is included within the promise to pay. In other words, the obligation to pay interest
on money due under a contract, be it express or implied, is a part of the obligation of

the contract. Laws adopted after the execution of a contract, changing or altering the
rate of interest, cannot be made to apply to such contract without violating the
provisions of the constitution which prohibit the adoption of a law "impairing the
obligation of contract." (8 Cyc., 996; 12 Corpus Juris, 1058-1059.)
The obligation of the contract is the law which binds the parties to perform their
agreement if it is not contrary to the law of the land, morals or public order. That law
must govern and control the contract in every aspect in which it is intended to bear
upon it, whether it affect its validity, construction, or discharge. Any law which
enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intention of the parties, necessarily
impairs the contract itself. If a law impairs the obligation of a contract, it is
prohibited by the Jones Law, and is null and void. The laws in force in the Philippine
Islands prior to any legislation by the American sovereignty, prohibited the
Legislature from giving to any penal law a retroactive effect unless such law was
favorable to the person accused. (Articles 21 and 22, Penal Code.)
A law imposing a new penalty, or a new liability or disability, or giving a new right
of action, must not be construed as having a retroactive effect. It is an elementary
rule of contract that the laws in force at the time the contract was made must govern
its interpretation and application. Laws must be construed prospectively and not
retrospectively. If a contract is legal at its inception, it cannot be rendered illegal by
any subsequent legislation. If that were permitted then the obligations of a contract
might be impaired, which is prohibited by the organic law of the Philippine Islands.
(U.S. vs. Constantino Tan Quingco Chua, 39 Phil., 552; Aguilar vs. Rubiato and
Gonzales Vila, 40 Phil., 570.)
Ex post facto laws, unless they are favorable to the defendant, are prohibited in this
jurisdiction. Every law that makes an action, done before the passage of the law, and
which was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action, is an ex post
facto law. In the present case Act No. 2655 made an act which had been done before
the law was adopted, a criminal act, and to make said Act applicable to the act
complained of would be to give it an ex post facto operation. The Legislature is
prohibited from adopting a law which will make an act done before its adoption a
crime. A law may be given a retroactive effect in civil action, providing it is curative
in character, but ex post facto laws are absolutely prohibited unless its retroactive
effect is favorable to the defendant.For the reason, therefore, that the acts complained
of in the present case were legal at the time of their occurrence, they cannot be made
criminal by any subsequent or ex post facto legislation. What the courts may say,
considering the provisions of article 1255 of the Civil Code, when a civil action is
brought upon said contract, cannot now be determined. A contract may be annulled
by the courts when it is shown that it is against morals or public order.For all of the
foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion, and so decide, that the acts complained of
by the defendants did not constitute a crime at the time they were committed, and
therefore the sentence of the lower court should be, and is hereby, revoked; and it is
hereby ordered and decreed that the complaint be dismissed, and that the defendants
be discharged from the custody of the law, with costs de oficio. So ordered.