MARITES BERNARDO et al. vs.

NLRC
G.R. No. 122917; July 12, 1999

FACTS: The petitioners are deaf-mutes who were hired from 1988 to 1993 by private
respondent Far East Bank and Trust Co. as Money Sorters and Counters through an
agreement called "Employment Contract for Handicapped Workers". The said
agreement provides for the hiring and re-hiring procedures; the amount of their
wages, which is P118.00 per day; the period of employment, which is 6 months
wherein they will work 8 hours a day, 5 days a week; and the description and
methods of their work (Sort out bills according to color; Count each denomination
per hundred, either manually or with the aid of a counting machine; Wrap and label
bills per hundred; Put the wrapped bills into bundles; and Submit bundled bills to
the bank teller for verification.) Many of their employments were renewed every six
months. Claiming that they should be considered as regular employees the
petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and recovery of various benefits.
Labor arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, pointing out that the terms
of the contract shall be the law between the parties. NLRC affirms Labor Arbiters
decision and also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are considered as regular employees.

HELD: The SC rules petition is meritorious. However, only the employees who
worked for more than six months and whose contracts were renewed are deemed
regular; hence, their dismissal from employment was illegal. The stipulations in the
employment contracts indubitably conform with Article 80, however, the application
of Article 280 of the Labor Code is justified because of the advent of RA No. 7277 or
The Magna Carta for Disabled Persons Law, which mandates that a qualified
disabled employee should be given the same terms and conditions of employment
as a qualified able-bodied person. Twenty-seven (27) of the petitioners are
considered regular employees by provision of law regardless of any agreement
between the parties, as embodied in Article 280 and Article 281 of the Labor Code.
Furthermore, the SC avers that the test is whether the former is usually necessary
or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. Hence, the employment
is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity, and while such activity
exist. Without a doubt, the task of counting and sorting bills is necessary and
desirable to the business of respondent bank. When the bank renewed the contract
after the lapse of the six-month probationary period, the employees thereby
became regular employees. Those who have worked for only 6 months and
employments were not renewed are not considered regular employees.

NITTO ENTERPRISES vs. NLRC and ROBERTO CAPILI

G.R. No. 114337; September 29, 1995

FACTS: Petitioner Nitto Enterprises, a glass and aluminum products manufacturing

and trading company, hired private respondent Roberto Capili in May 1990 as an
apprentice machinist, molder and core maker as evidenced by an apprenticeship
agreement for a period of six (6) months from May 28 to November 28 with a daily
wage rate of P66.75. On August 2, Capili, who was handling a piece of glass which
he was working on, accidentally injured an office secretary. Furthermore, Capili
entered a workshop within the office premises, which was outside his work station.
There, he operated one of the power press machines without authority, and in the
process injured his left thumb. The following day he was asked to resign by the
company. Three days after, Capili filed before the NLRC Arbitration Branch, National
Capital Region a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of other monetary
benefits. The Labor Arbiter held that the termination of Capili was valid and
dismissed the money claim for lack of merit. On appeal, NLRC reverses the Labor
Arbiters decision. The NLRC declared that Capili was a regular employee of Nitto
Enterprises and not merely an apprentice. Consequently, Labor Arbiter issued a Writ
of Execution ordering for the reinstatement of Capili and to collect his back wages.
Thus this petition by Nitto Enterprises before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC correctly ruled that Capili is a regular employee and
not an apprentice.

HELD: The SC rules in the affirmative; the apprenticeship agreement between

petitioner and private respondent was executed on May 28, 1990, allegedly
employing the Capili as an apprentice in the trade of core-maker or molder.
However, the apprenticeship Agreement was filed only on June 7. Notwithstanding
the absence of approval by the Department of Labor and Employment, the
apprenticeship agreement was enforced the day it was signed. The SC avers that
the act of filing the proposed apprenticeship program with the Department of Labor
and Employment is a preliminary step towards its final approval, and does not
instantly give rise to an employer-apprentice relationship. The SC ruled that Nitto
Enterprises did not comply with the requirements of the law. It is mandated that
apprenticeship agreements entered into by the employer and apprentice shall be
entered only in accordance with the apprenticeship program duly approved by the
Minister of Labor and Employment (now the Department of Labor and Employment).

Thus, according to the SC, the apprenticeship agreement between Nitto and Capili
has no force and effect; and Capili is considered to be a regular employee of the
company.

MAYON HOTEL & RESTAURANT vs. ROLANDO ADANA, et al.

G.R. No. 157634; May 16, 2005

FACTS: Petitioner Mayon Hotel & Restaurant (MHR) hired the 16 respondents in its
business located in Legaspi City. However, its operation was suspended on March
31, 1997 due to the expiration and non-renewal of the lease contract for the space
it rented. While waiting for the completion of the construction of its new site, MHR
continued its operation in another site with 9 of the respondents. When the new
sites construction was completed and petitioner resumed its business operation,
none of the respondents was called back to work. As a result, respondents filed
complaints for underpayment of wages, money claims and illegal dismissal. In its
answer, petitioner alleged business losses as their basis for not reinstating the
respondents.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondents were illegally dismissed by petitioner.
2. Whether or not respondents are entitled to their money claims due to
underpayment of wages, and nonpayment of holiday pay, rest day premium, SILP,
COLA, overtime pay, and night shift differential pay.

HELD:
1. Illegal Dismissal: claim for separation pay
Since April 1997 until the July 2000 decision by the Labor Arbiter, the employment
of all the respondents with petitioner had ceased, notwithstanding that the new
business location had been completed and the petitioner resumed its operation.
This is clearly a dismissal or the permanent severance of the worker from the
service on the initiative of the employer regardless of the reasons therefor. Article
286 of the Labor Code is clear there is termination of employment when an
otherwise bona fide suspension of work exceeds six (6) months. The cessation of

employment for more than six months was patent in the case at bar and the
employer has the burden of proving that the termination was for a just or authorized
cause.
While the Supreme Court recognizes the right of the employer to terminate the
services of an employee for a just or authorized cause, such dismissal must be
made within the parameters of law and pursuant to the tenets of fair play. And in
cases of termination disputes, the burden of proof is always lie on the employer to
prove that the dismissal was for a just or authorized cause. Where there is no
showing of a valid and legal cause for termination, the law considers the case a
matter of illegal dismissal.

2. Money claims
The Supreme Court reinstated the award of monetary claims granted by the Labor
Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter was correct in holding that the cost of meals purportedly
provided to the respondents cannot be deducted as part of their minimum wage.
Even if such meals were provided and indeed constituted facilities, such could not
be deducted without compliance with certain legal requirements. As stated in
Mabeza v. NLRC, the employer simply cannot deduct the value from the employee's
wages without satisfying the following parameters: (a) proof that such facilities are
customarily furnished by the trade; (b) the provision of deductible facilities is
voluntarily accepted in writing by the employee; and (c) the facilities are charged at
fair and reasonable value. The law is clear that mere availing of the employees to
such facilities is not sufficient to allow deductions from employees' wages. As for
petitioners repeated invocation of serious business losses as defense, the Supreme
Court posits that it is not a defense to deny payment of labor standard benefits. The
employer cannot exempt himself from liability to pay minimum wages because of
poor financial condition of the company. The labor arbiter found that petitioner had
validly terminated private respondents, there being just cause for the latters
dismissal. Nevertheless, he also ruled that petitioner had not complied with
minimum wage requirements in compensating private respondents, and had failed
to pay private respondents their 13th month pay. The NLRC, in its decision of
December 21, 1994, affirmed the validity of private respondents dismissal, but
found that said dismissal did not comply with the procedural requirements for
dismissing employees. Furthermore, it corrected the labor arbiters award of wage
differentials to Jesus Bandilao.

ANTONIO W. IRAN V. NLRC

G.R. No. 121927; April 22, 1998

FACTS: Petitioner Antonio Iran is engaged in softdrinks merchandising and

distribution in Mandaue City, Cebu, employing truck drivers who double as
salesmen, truck helpers, and non-field personnel in pursuit thereof. Petitioner hired
private respondents as drivers/salesmen and truck helpers.
Sometime in June 1991, petitioner discovered cash shortages and irregularities
allegedly committed by private respondents while conducting an audit of his
operations. Petitioner required private respondents to report for work everyday,
even if there was a pending investigation on the irregularities. However, they were
not allowed to go on their respective routes.
A few days thereafter, despite aforesaid order, private respondents stopped
reporting for work, which prompted petitioner to conclude that the former had
abandoned their employment. Consequently, petitioner terminated their services.
He also filed on November 7 a complaint for estafa against private respondents. On
the other hand, private respondents filed complaints against petitioner for illegal
dismissal, illegal deduction, underpayment of wages, premium pay for holiday and
rest day, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, allowances,
separation pay, recovery of cash bond, damages and attorneys fees.
The labor arbiter found that petitioner had validly terminated private respondents,
on the ground of existing just cause for the latters dismissal. Nevertheless, labor

arbiter also ruled that petitioner had not complied with minimum wage
requirements, and had failed to pay private respondents their 13th month pay.
The NLRC, in its December
respondents dismissal, but
procedural requirements for
labor arbiters award of wage

21, 1994 decision, affirmed the validity of private

found that said dismissal did not comply with the
dismissing employees. Furthermore, it corrected the
differentials to Jesus Bandilao.

ISSUE: Whether or not commissions are included in determining compliance with

the minimum wage requirement.

HELD: Supreme Court rules that petition has merit. While commissions are, indeed,
incentives or forms of encouragement to inspire employees to put a little more
industry on the jobs particularly assigned to them, still these are direct
remunerations for services rendered. In fact, commissions have been defined as the
recompense, compensation or reward of an agent, salesman, executor, trustee,
receiver, factor, broker or bailee, when the same is calculated as a percentage on
the amount of his transactions or on the profit to the principal. The nature of the
work of a salesman and the reason for such type of remuneration for services
rendered demonstrate clearly that commissions are part of a salesmans wage or
salary. Thus, the commissions earned by private respondents in selling softdrinks
constitute part of the compensation or remuneration paid to drivers/salesmen and
truck helpers for serving as such, and hence, must be considered part of the wages
paid them. Likewise, according to the Supreme Court, there is no law mandating
that commissions be paid only after the minimum wage has been paid to the
employee. Verily, the establishment of a minimum wage only sets a floor below
which an employees remuneration cannot fall, not that commissions are excluded
from wages in determining compliance with the minimum wage law.

SONGCO, ET AL. VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

G.R. Nos. 50999-51000; March 23, 1990

FACTS: Private respondent Zuellig filed an application for clearance to terminate

the services of petitioners Songco, Cipres and Manuel on the ground of
retrenchment due to financial losses. During the hearing, the parties agreed that
the sole issue to be resolved was the basis of the separation pay due to petitioners.
The salesmen received monthly salaries and commission for every sale they made.
The Collective Bargaining Agreements between Zuellig and the union of which
petitioners were members contained the following provision: "Any employee who is
separated from employment due to old age, sickness, death or permanent lay-off,
not due to the fault of said employee, shall receive from the company a retirement
gratuity in an amount equivalent to one (1) month's salary per year of service." The
Labor Arbiter ordered Zuellig to pay petitioners separation pay equivalent to one
month salary (exclusive of commissions, allowances, etc.) for every year of service
with the company. The National Labor Relations Commission sustained Labor
Arbiters decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not earned sales commissions and allowances should be

included in the monthly salary of Songco, et al. for the purpose of computing their
separation pay.

HELD: In the computation of backwages and separation pay, account must be taken
not only of the basic salary of the employee, but also of the transportation and
emergency living allowances. Even if the commissions were in the form of
incentives or encouragement, so that the salesman would be inspired to put a little
more industry on jobs particularly assigned to them, still these commissions are
direct remunerations for services rendered which contributed to the increase of
income of the employee. Commission is the recompense compensation or reward
of an agent, salesman, executor, trustee, receiver, factor, broker or bailee, when the
same is calculated as a percentage on the amount of his transactions or on the
profit to the principal. The nature of the work of a salesman and the reason for such
type of remuneration for services rendered demonstrate that commissions are part
of Songco, et al's wage or salary. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that
some salesmen do not receive any basic salary, but depend on commissions and
allowances or commissions alone, although an employer-employee relationship
exists.
If the commissions do not form part of the wage or salary, then in effect, it will be
saying that this kind of salesmen do not receive any salary and, therefore, not
entitled to separation pay in the event of discharge from employment. This narrow
interpretation is not in accord with the liberal spirit of the labor laws, and
considering the purpose of separation pay which is, to alleviate the difficulties which
confront a dismissed employee thrown to the streets to face the harsh necessities of
life.

ATOK-BIG WEDGE MUTUAL BENEFIT ASSOC. VS. ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY
INC.
G.R. No. L-7349, July 19, 1955

FACTS: On September 4, 1950, petitioner Atok-Big Wedge Mutual Benefit

Association, a labor union, demanded from the respondent Atok-Big Wedge Mining
Company, an increase of 50 centavos in the daily wage. In the course of the
meeting between the parties, some of the demands were granted and the others,
including the daily wage increase, were rejected. The Court fixed the minimum
wage at Php 2.65 with rice ration and Php 3.20 without rice ration, denying
deduction from the minimum wage, the value of housing facilities furnished by

respondent to its employees and efficiency bonus. Respondent subsequently

presented an urgent petition for authority to cease its operations and lay-off
employees due to heavy losses, increased taxes, high cost of materials, negligible
quantity of ore deposits, and the enforcement of the Minimum Wage Law.
Instead of hearing the petition, the Court convened the parties for voluntary
conciliation and mediation and, the parties thereafter reached an agreement of
valuing the facilities that will form part of the wages and to be charged in full or in
part by Respondent against laborer or employee in the exigencies of operation. The
petitioner argues that to allow the deduction of facilities appearing in the
Agreement would be contrary to the mandate of Section 19 of the Minimum Wage
Law, which states that an employer is not justified in reducing supplements
furnished on the date of enactment.

ISSUE: Whether or not facilities come within the term supplements.

Ruling: The Court rules in the negative. The meaning of the term "supplements" has
been fixed by the Code of Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Wage
Administration Office to implement the Minimum Wage Law as extra renumeration
received by wage earners from their employees and include but are not restricted to
pay for vacation and holidays not worked; paid sick leave or maternity leave;
overtime rate in excess of what is required by law; sick, pension, retirement, and
death benefits; profit-sharing; family allowances; Christmas, war risk and cost-ofliving bonuses; or other bonuses other than those paid as a reward for extra output
or time spent on the job.
"Supplements", therefore, constitute extra renumeration or special privileges or
benefits given to or received by the laborers over and above their ordinary earnings
or wages. Facilities, on the other hand, are items of expense necessary for the
laborer's and his family's existence and subsistence, so that by express provision of
the law they form part of the wage and when furnished by the employer are
deductible therefrom since if they are not so furnished, the laborer would spend and
pay for them just the same. It is thus clear that the facilities mentioned in the
agreement of October 29, 1952 do not come within the term "supplements" as used
in Art. 19 of the Minimum Wage Law.

NORMA MABEZA VS NLRC

G.R. No. 118506; April 18, 1997

FACTS: Mabeza was an employee hired by Hotel Supreme in Baguio City. In 1991, an
inspection was made by the DOLE at Hotel Supremeand the DOLE inspectors
discovered several violations by the hotel management. Immediately, the owner of
the hotel, Peter Ng,directed his employees to execute an affidavit which would
purport that they have no complaints whatsoever against Hotel Supreme. But
Mabeza refused to certify said affidavit with the fiscals office so this led to her
dismissal. She sued Peter Ng and one of her complaints against him is
underpayment because her wage was less than the minimum wage. Peter Ng
argued that the reason forsuch low payment was because she was being given free
lodging, water, electricity and water consumption by the hotel.

ISSUE: Whether or not such amenities provided by the hotel be considered as

facilities which are deductible from Mabezas wage.

HELD: Supreme Court rules in the negative. There are requisites before such can be
done:
1. Proof must be shown that such facilities are customarily furnished by the
trade.
2. The provision of deductible facilities must be voluntarily accepted in writing
by the employee.
3. Facilities must be charged at fair and reasonable value.
In the case at bar, none of these were complied with. More significantly, the food
and lodging, or the electricity and water consumed by Mabeza were not facilities
but supplements. A benefit or privilege granted to an employee for the convenience
of the employer is not a facility. The criterion in making a distinction between the
two not so much lies in the kind (food, lodging) but the purpose. Considering,
therefore, that hotel workers are required to work different shifts and are expected
to be available at various odd hours, their ready availability is a necessary matter in
the operations of a small hotel, such as Hotel Supreme.

MAKATI HABERDASHERY, INC. vs. NLRC

G.R. Nos. 83380-81; November 15, 1989

FACTS: Private respondents have been working for petitioner Makati Haberdashery,
Inc. as tailors, seamstress, sewers, basters and "plantsadoras". They are paid on a
piece-rate basis except respondents Maria Angeles and Leonila Serafina who are
paid on a monthly basis. In addition to their piece-rate, they are given a daily
allowance of three (P 3.00) pesos provided they report for work before 9:30 a.m.
everyday.

ISSUE: Whether or not there exists an employer-employee relationship between

petitioner and private respondents.

HELD: The Supreme Court rules that facts at bar indubitably reveal that the most
important requisite of control is present. As gleaned from the operations of
petitioner, when a customer enters into a contract with the haberdashery, the latter
directs an employee who may be a tailor, pattern maker, sewer or "plantsadora" to
take the customer's measurements, and to sew the pants, coat or shirt as specified
by the customer. Supervision is actively manifested in all these aspects- the manner
and quality of cutting, sewing and ironing. It is evident in the memorandum that the
petitioner has reserved the right to control its employees not only as to the result,
but also the means by which the same are to be accomplished. The fact that private
respondents are regular employees is further proven by the fact that they have to
report for work regularly from 9:30 a.m. to 6:00 or 7:00 p.m. and is paid an
additional allowance of P 3.00 daily if they report for work before 9:30 a.m. and
which is forfeited when they arrive at or after 9:30 a.m

BOLINAO, ET AL VS. PADOLINA

G.R. No. 81415; June 6, 1990

FACTS: Petitioners Bolinao, et al. were all former employees of Sabena Mining Corp.
(SMC). In 1982 and 1983 they were laid off without being recalled. Petitioners filed a
formal complaint for collection of unpaid wages, unused accrued vacation and sick
leave benefits, 13th month pay and separation pay before the NLRC against SMC
and Development Bank of the Philippines.
However, on May 1984, a compromise agreement was entered into by the parties,
wherein petitioners were to be paid on a staggered basis of the collective amount of
P385,583.95. The company faithfully complied with the scheduled payments only up
to March 1985 because it ceased operations effective April 1985. As a result of this,
petitioners moved for the issuance of a writ of execution.
The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution against the company to collect the
balance of P311, 580.14 On June 27, Deputy Sheriff garnished the remaining
amount of P150,279.64 in the savings account of the company at the DBP. However,
the same amount was previously garnished by two creditors of the company;
namely, Bank of America and Phelps Dodge (Phils.), Inc. Bank of America garnished
the amount in April, 1982 while Phelps Dodge garnished the amount in June, 1984.
RTC Manila issued an order denying the motion to intervene and dismissing the third
party claim, declaring that the garnishment made by its Deputy Sheriff in favor of
respondent Phelps Dodge, Phils., Inc. superior to the rights of petitioners.
Petitioners contend that under Article 110 of the Labor Code, the claims of the
laborers for unpaid wages and other monetary benefits due them for services
rendered prior to bankruptcy enjoy first preference in the satisfaction of credits
against a bankrupt company. Respondent however maintains that the right of
preference and first lien of petitioners, as former employees of SMC, under aforesaid
law and rules, are operative only in an insolvency court and in a bankrupt case.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners enjoy preferential right or claim over the funds of
Sabena Mining Corporation as provided for under the provisions of Article 110 of the
New Labor Code.

HELD: Supreme Court rules in the negative. It is clear from the provisions of Article
110 of the Labor Code and Section 10, Rule VIII, Book H of the Revised Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Labor Code that a declaration of bankruptcy or a
judicial liquidation must be present before the worker's preference may be enforced.
Thus, it was held that Article 110 of the Labor Code and its implementing rule

cannot be invoked absent a formal declaration of bankruptcy or a liquidation order.

In the case at bar, there was no showing of any insolvency proceeding or
declaration of bankruptcy or judicial liquidation that was being filed by Sabena
Mining Corporation. It is only an extra-judicial foreclosure that was being enunciated
as when DBP extrajudicially foreclosed the assets of SMC.
RUBBERWORLD INC. VS. NLRC
G.R. No. 128003; July 26, 2000

FACTS: Petitioner Rubberworld filed with the SEC a petition for suspension of
payments. SEC decided in favor of the request and accordingly issued an order for
the creation of a management committee; and all actions for claims against the
corporation pending before any court, tribunal, office, board, body were suspended.
The employees of Rubberworld, herein private respondents filed against the
corporation a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice. Petitioner
moved to suspend the proceedings on the basis of the SEC order. The Labor Arbiter
denied Rubberworlds motion, holding that claims as regards labor cases are not
included in the SEC order. Petitioner filed an appeal to the NLRC, which affirmed the
Labor Arbiters decision. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for suspension of payments filed under PD No.
902-A effectively suspends all actions against a corporation including labor claims.

HELD: Supreme Court rules in the affirmative. PD No. 902-A provides that upon the
appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board or body
pursuant to this decree, all actions for claims against corporations, partnerships, or
associations under management or receivership pending before any court, tribunal,
board or body shall be suspended accordingly. The provision of the relevant is very
clear. Upon the creation of a management committee or the appointment of a
receiver, all claims for actions shall be suspended. Nothing in the law that grants
exception in favor of labor claims is mentioned. To allow labor cases to proceed
clearly defeats the purpose of the automatic stay and severely encumbers the
management committees time and resources. The said committee would need to
defend against these suits, to the detriment of its primary duty to work towards
rehabilitating the corporation and making it viable again.
The preferential right of workers and employees under Article 110 of the Labor Code
may be invoked only upon the institution of insolvency or judicial liquidation
proceedings, and not during rehabilitation proceedings, of which the purpose is to
enable the company to be rehabilitated and thereby allow creditors to be paid their
claims from its earnings.

Supreme Court also notes that PD No. 902-A does not provide for the duration of the
automatic stay. And in the case at bar, the SEC order neither contains such. Hence,
the suspensive effect in this case has no time limit and remained in force as long as
reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose of the SEC order.

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HON. SECRETARY OF

LABOR, CRESENCIA DIFONTORUM, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. 79351; November 28, 1989

FACTS: Private respondents won a case for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice,
illegal deductions from salaries and violation of the minimum wage law against
Riverside Mills Corporation (RMC). As consequence to this, a writ of execution was
issued on October 22, 1985 , against the goods and chattel of RMC. The assets
however had already been foreclosed by petitioner DBP through extrajudicial
proceedings as early as 1983. Private respondents moved for the delivery of RMC
properties in possession of DBP, relying on the provisions of Article 110 of the Labor
Code, averring that the provision gives them first preference over the mortgaged
properties of RMC for the satisfaction of the judgment rendered in their favor. The
motion was granted. On appeal, the decision was affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 110 of the Labor Code finds application on the instant
case.

HELD: The Supreme Court points out Article 110 of the Labor Code, which provides
that in case of bankruptcy or liquidation of an employer's business, his workers
enjoy first preference as regards wages due them for services rendered during the
period prior to the bankruptcy or liquidation. The Supreme Court held that Article
110 cannot be applied in the instant case on the ground that the important requisite
that employer's business must be bankrupt is lacking. The Supreme Court
furthermore ruled that in the Philippine jurisdiction, bankruptcy, insolvency and
general judicial liquidation proceedings are the only means to establish that a
business is bankrupt or insolvent. Absent of such judicial declaration, the business
cannot be considered bankrupt for the purpose of applying the provisions of Article
110 of the Labor Code.