G.R.No.

123936March4,1999
RONALDSORIANO,petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS HON. RODOLFO V. TOLEDANO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Third Judicial Region, Iba Zambales
THEPROVINCIALSHERIFF,ThirdJudicialRegion,Iba,ZambalesMs.NELDADAMAYCONG,SuprvisingParoleandProbationOfficerandOfficerin
Charge,ZambalesParoleandProbationOfficeandTHEPEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,respondents.

QUISUMBING,J.:
ThisisapetitionforcertiorariofthedecisionoftheCourtofAppealsinC.A.G.R.SPNo.35550,1whichupheldthetrialcourt'sordersholdingpetitionerincontemptand
revokinghisprobation.

Thefactofthecaseareasfollows:
Petitioner Ronald Santiago was convicted of the crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting to homicide, serious physical injuries and damage to property on
December7,1993.2HisapplicationforprobationwasgrantedonMarch8,1994,andamongthetermsandconditionsimposedbythetrialcourtwerethefollowing:3
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7.Heshallmeethisfamilyresponsibilities.
8. He shall devote himself to a specific employment and shall not change employment without prior notice to the supervising officer and/or shall
pursueaprescribedsecularstudyorvocationaltraining.
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11.HeistoindemnifytheheirsofthevictimIsidrinoDaluyongintheamountofP98,560.00asorderedbytheCourt.
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OnApril26,1994,AssistantProsecutorBenjaminAFaderafiledamotiontocancelpetitioner'sprobationduetohisfailuretosatisfyhiscivilliabilitytotheheirsof
thevictim,andasupplementalmotionallegingpetitioner'scommissionofanothercrimeforwhichatthattimehewasawaitingarraignment.TheZambalesParole
and Probation Office filed a comment recommending that the petitioner be allowed to continue with his probation and that he be required instead to submit a
programofpaymentofhiscivilliability.
OnJune20,1994,thetrialcourtdeniedtheprosecutor'smotionanddirectedpetitionertosubmitaprogramofpaymentofthecivilliabilityimposeduponhim.
Thereafter,probationofficerNeldaD.MaycongreceivedinformationthatpetitionersfatherwhoownedthevehicleinvolvedintheaccidentwhichkilledDaluyong,
receivedP16,500.00asinsurancepayment.ThisamountwasnotturnedovertotheheirsofDaluyongandDaMaycongconsideredthisaviolationoftheterms
andconditionsoftheprobation.Shesubmittedamanifestationtothetrialcourtprayingthatthepetitionerbemadetoexplainhisnoncompliancewiththecourt's
orderofJune20,1994,orthatbecitedforcontemptforsuchnoncompliance.DaMaycongalsoaskedthatpetitionerbemadetosubmitaprogramofpaymentas
soonaspossible.ThetrialcourtgrantedhisprayersinanorderdatedAugust15,1994.Petitionerwasonceagainorderedtosubmitshisprogramofpayment.

PetitionerinsteadfiledamotionforreconsiderationexplainingthathedidnotreceiveacopyofsaidorderonJune23,1994butfailedtonotifypetitioner.Thus,the
latterfailedtocomplywithsaidorder.
OnOctober4,1994,thetrialcourtissuedanorderdeclaringpetitionerincontemptofcourtforhisfailuretocomplywithitsordersofJune20,1994andAugust15,
1994.Thecourtlikewiserevokedthegrantofprobationtopetitionerandorderedthathebearrestedtoservethesentenceoriginallyimposeduponhim.According
tothetrialcourt,amongtheviolationcommittedbypetitionerasregardshisprobationarehisfailureto(1)meethisresponsibilitiestohisfamily,(2)engageina
specificemployment,and(3)cooperatewithhisprogramofsupervision.
PetitionerthenfiledaspecialcivilactionforcertiorariwiththeCourtofAppeals.Heclaimedthatrespondentjudgecommittedgraveabuseofdiscretionamounting
to lack of, or in excess of, jurisdiction in holding petitioner in contempt and revoking his probation. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, holding that
petitioner's"stubbornunwillingness"tocomplywiththeordersofthetrialcourt"showshisrefusaltoreformhimselfandtocorrectawrong."4
AccordingtotheCourtofAppeals:
Whereprobationwasapprovedandprobationerhasproventobeunrepentantanddisrespectfulandevenshowedcleardefiancetotwolawfulcourt
orders,asinthecaseofhereinpetitioner,thecourtisnotbarredfromrevokingthesame.5
Petitioner'smotionforreconsiderationwaslikewisedeniedbytheCourtofAppealsforlackofmerit.
Hence,thispetitionforreview,inwhichpetitionermakesthefollowingassignmentoferrors.6
1.RespondentCourtofAppealserredinfailingtorulethatrespondentjudgecommittedgraveabuseofdiscretioninfindingthattherewasdeliberate
refusalonthepartofpetitionertocomplywithhisordersdatedJune20,1994andAugust15,1994andsubsequentlydeclaringpetitionerincontempt.
2.RespondentCourtofAppealserredinfailingtorulethatrespondentjudgecommittedgraveabuseofdiscretioninrevokingtheprobationorderhe
earlierissuedinfavorofpetitioneronthegroundthatpetitionerfailedtosatisfytheawardofcivilindemnityfortheheirsoftheaccidentvictim.
3.RespondentCourtofAppealserredinfailingtorulethatrespondentjudgecommittedgraveabuseofdiscretioninrevokingtheprobationorderhe
earlierissuedinfavorofpetitioneronthegroundthatthelatterviolatedtheconditionsofhisprobationthreetimes.
Petitionerassertsthathehadnointentiontoignoretheordersofthetrialcourt.Thecourt'sorderofJune20,1994wasreceivedbyhiscounselwho,however,did
notnotifypetitioner.Petitionersaysthathis"formercounsel'sirresponsibledelay(ininforminghimoftheorder)shouldnotprejudicehim."7
He explains that his noncompliance with the order to submit a program of payment of his civil liability is, ultimately, due to his poor financial condition. He only
reliesonhisparentsforsupport.Heclaimsthatitisimpossibleforhimtoformulateapaymentprogrambecause,inthefirstplace,heisinnopositiontocomply
withthesame.
Petitioner avers that to require him to satisfy his civil liability in order to continue to avail of the benefits of probation is to violate the constitutional proscription
againstunequalprotectionofthelaw.Hesaysonlymoneyedprobationerswillbeabletobenefitfromprobationifsatisfactionofcivilliabilityismadeacondition.
Petitionercontendsthathisenjoymentofprobationshouldnotbemadetodependonthesatisfactionofhiscivilliability.HeinvokestheseparateopinionofJustice
IsaganiA.CruzinSalgadov.CourtofAppeals,8particularlyJusticeCruz'reservationaboutthevalidityofimposingsatisfactionofcivilliabilityasaconditionforprobation
suchanimpositionisinthenatureofanamendmentofthedecisionofthetrialcourtinthecriminalcaseagainsthim,whichcannotbeallowedsincethedecisionisalreadyfinal
andexecutory.HefurtherinvokesthemajoritydecisioninSalgadoandassertsthat"anyprogramofpaymentofcivilliabilitymusttakeintoconsiderationtheneedsandcapacity
ofpetitioner."9

Petitionerclaimsthathisfailuretomeethisresponsibilitiestohisfamilyandtoengageingainfulemploymentisnotdeliberatebutisduetohispoverty.Headds
thathisbeingunskilled,withacriminalrecordtohisname,doesnotexactlyenhancehischancesforemployment.
Finally,petitionercitesourdecisioninBaclayonv.Mutia:10
. . . Conditions should be interpreted with flexibility in their application and each case should be judged on its own merits on the basis of the
problems, needs and capacity of the probationer. The very liberality of the probation should not be made a tool by trial courts to stipulate instead
unrealisticterms.11
Inhiscomment,theSolicitorGeneralasksforthedismissalofthepetition.Theonlyissuetoberesolvedaccordingtohimiswhetherornotpetitionerhasviolated
thetermsandconditionsofhisprobationwarrantitsrevocation.TheSolicitorGeneralarguesthatpetitionerhascommittedviolations,thusjustifyingthetrialcourt'
s revocation of the grant of probation. He further points out that our ruling in Salgado is inapplicable to the case of petitioner since what was involved
inSalgadowasaprogramofpaymentalreadyimposeduponpetitionertherein.Inthiscase,however,itispetitionerwhoisbeingaskedtosubmithisownprogram
ofpaymentandhehadnotsubmittedanysuchprogram:
Theonlyissueforustoresolveinthiscaseiswhetherornottherevocationofpetitioner'sprobationislawfulandproper.
Petitioner asserts that his noncompliance with the orders of the trial court requiring him to submit a program of payment was not deliberate. To our mind, his
refusal to comply with said orders cannot be anything but deliberate. He had notice of both orders, although the notice of the order of June 20, 1994 came
belatedly. He has, up to this point, refused to comply with the trial court's directive, by questioning instead the constitutionality of the requirement imposed and
harpingonhisallegedpovertyasthereasonforhisfailuretocomply.
Contrarytohisassertion,thisrequirementisnotviolativeoftheequalprotectionclauseoftheConstitution.Notethatpaymentofthecivilliabilityisnotmadea
conditionprecedenttoprobation.Ifitwere,thenperhapstheremightbesomebasistopetitioner'sassertionthatonlymoneyedconvictsmayavailofthebenefits
of probation. In this case, however, petitioner's application for probation had already been granted. Satisfaction of his civil liability was not made a requirement
beforehecouldavailaprobation,butwasaconditionforhiscontinuedenjoymentofthesame.
The trial court could not have done away with imposing payment of civil liability as a condition for probation, as petitioner suggests. This is not an arbitrary
impositionbutonerequiredbylaw.Itisaconsequenceofpetitioner'shavingbeenconvictedofacrime,12andpetitionerisboundtosatisfythisobligationregardlessof
whetherornotheisplacedunderprobation.

Wefailtoseewhypetitionercannotcomplywithasimpleordertofurnishthetrialcourtwithaprogramofpaymentofhiscivilliability.Hemay,indeed,bepoor,but
thisispreciselythereasonwhythetrialcourtgavehimthechancetomakehisownprogramofpayment.Knowinghisownfinancialcondition,heisinthebest
positiontoformulateaprogramofpaymentthatfitshisneedsandcapacity.
Petitionerblameshisformercounsel's"irresponsibledelay"ininforminghimofthetrialcourt'sordertocomeupwithaprogramofpaymentforhisfailuretomake
suchaprogram.Petitionerwantstotakeexceptiontotherulethatnoticetocounselisnoticetoclient.
We find no reason to make an exception in this case. Petitioner's counsel has not been shown to be grossly irresponsible as to cause prejudice to petitioner's
rights.13Moreover,wenotethatpetitionerlaterondiscoveredthatsuchacourtorderwasreceivedbyhiscounsel.Hecouldhaveendeavoredtocomplywiththeorderthen.In
theJune20,1994order,hewasgiven10daysfromreceiptoftheorderwithinwhichtocomply.ThesameperiodwasgivenhimintheorderofAugust15,1994.Petitionerdoes
notclaimthathefailedtoreceivenoticeofthelatterorder.Infact,hesubmittedamotionforreconsiderationofsaidorder,butstillwithouttherequiredprogramofpayment.

No justifiable reason has been given by petitioner for ignoring those two orders. The trial court could not be faulted forcitinghim in contempt for his failure to
complywithitsorders.Nordiditabusegravelyitsdiscretioninissuingsaidorders.Hence,weareinfullagreementwithrespondentappellatecourt'sdecisionas

well.
Moreover,petitioner'scontinuedrefusaltosubmitaprogramofpayment,alongwithhisprayerforthedeletionoftherequirementofpaymentofcivilliabilityfrom
his probation order, creates the impression that he wants to completely avoid paying his civil liability. This he cannot do. He cannot escape payment of his civil
liability,withorwithoutaprogramofpayment.
Petitioner'srelianceonSalgadoismisplaced.Inthatcase,thetrialcourtitselfformulatedthemannerbywhichSalgadowastosatisfyhiscivilliability.Hewasable
tocomplyforafewmonths.Whenhestartedskippinghispayments,hisvictimsoughttheissuanceofawritofexecutiontoenforcefullpaymentofthecivilliability.
The trial court granted this motion and it was sustained by the Court of Appeals which ruled that the program of payment amounted to an amendment of the
decisionofthetrialcourtorderingpaymentofcivilliabilitybutwithoutaprogramofpayment.Sincethetrialcourt'sdecisionhadalreadybecomefinal,itcanno
longerbeamendedbyimposingaprogramofpayment,ininstallments,ofthecivilliability.
WeheldinSalgado,thattheprogramofpaymentisnotanamendmentofthedecisionofthetrialcourtbecauseitdoesnotincreaseordecreasetheliabilityand
theobligationtopayistobefulfilledduringtheperiodofprobation.
Unlikein Salgado, herein petitioner was being asked to make a program of payment. But he failed to do so. Hence, in this case, there is yet no program of
paymenttospeakof,becauseofpetitioner'sstubbornrefusalanddelayaswellasfailuretoabidebythetrialcourt'sorders.
Petitioner's reliance onBaclayonis likewise misplaced. In that case, what was being assailed as an unrealistic condition was the trial court's requirement that
petitioner therein, a teacher convicted of Serious Oral Defamation, refrain from exercising her profession. This condition was deemed unreasonable because
teachingwastheonlyprofessionsheknewanditappearedthatsheexcelledinteaching.NounrealisticconditionsimilartotheoneinBaclayanhasbeenimposed
uponpetitionerherein.
Asregardstheotherviolationscommittedbypetitioner,thequestionofwhetherornotpetitionerhas,indeed,violatedthetermsandconditionsofhisprobationis
evidentlyafactualonewhichhadalreadybeenpasseduponbyboththetrialcourtandtheCourtofAppeals.Settledistheruleinthisjurisdictionthatfindingsof
factofthetrialcourtareentitledtogreatweight,moresowhentheyareaffirmedbytheCourtofAppeals,14asinthiscase.
Besides,petitionerhimselfadmitsinhispetitionthatheisunemployedandonlydependsonhisparentsforsupport.Hecanbarelysupporthisfamily.15 Petitioner
oughttoberemindedofwhatisincumbentonaprobationer,includingthoserequirementsthatthetrialcourtmayset.

AsSection10oftheProbationLawstates:
Sec.10.ConditionsofProbation....
Thecourtmayalsorequiretheprobationerto:
(a)Cooperatewithaprogramofsupervision
(b)Meethisfamilyresponsibilities
(c)Devotehimselftoaspecificemploymentandnottochangesaidemploymentwithoutthepriorwrittenapprovaloftheprobationofficer
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(e)Pursueaprescribedsecularstudyorvocationaltraining

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Clearly,theseconditionsarenotwhimsofthetrialcourtbutarerequirementslaiddownbystatute.Theyareamongtheconditionsthatthetrialcourtisempowered
to impose and the petitioner, as probationer, is required to follow. Only by satisfying these conditions may the purposes of probation be fulfilled. These include
promoting the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with individualized treatment, and providing an opportunity for the reformation of a
penitentoffenderwhichmightbelessprobableifheweretoserveaprisonsentence.16aFailure to comply will result in the revocation of the order granting probation,
pursuanttotheProbationLaw:

Sec.11.EffetivityofProbationOrder.Aprobationordershalltakeeffectuponitsissuance,atwhichtimethecourtshallinformtheoffenderofthe
consequencesthereofandexplainthatuponhisfailuretocomplywithanyoftheconditionsprescribedinthesaidorderorhiscommissionofanother
offense,heshallservethepenaltyimposedfortheoffenseunderwhichhewasplacedonprobation."16b(Emphasissupplied.)
Probationisnotanabsoluteright.Itisamereprivilegewhosegrantrestsuponthediscretionofthetrialcourt.17Itsgrantissubjecttocertaintermsandconditionsthat
may be imposed by the trial court. Having the power to grant probation, it follows that the trial court also has the power to order its revocation in a proper case and under
appropriatecircumstances.

Moreover,havingadmittedlyviolatedthetermsandconditionsofhisprobation,petitionercannotnowassailtherevocationofhisprobation.Regrettably,hehas
squanderedtheopportunitygrantedhimbythetrialcourttoremainoutsideprisonbars,andmustnowsuffertheconsequencesofthoseaforecitedviolations.
WHEREFORE,thepetitionisherebyDENIEDandtheassaileddecisionoftheCourtofAppealsinC.A.G.R.SPNo.35550isAFFIRMED.
SOORDERED.