REYES v. COMELEC; G.R. No.

207264, June 25, 2013

Facts:
The COMELEC granted Joseph Socorro Tan's amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel
the CoC of Regina Ongsiako Reyes on the ground that it contained material representations. Reyes
filed an MR which the COMELEC en banc denied on 14 May 2013.
Four days thereafter or on 18 May 2013, Reyes was proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013
Elections
On June 5, 2013, COMELEC declared the 14 May 2013 Resolution final and Executory. On the
same day, petitioner took her oath of office before Feliciano Belmonte, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives. She has yet to assume office at that time, as her term officially starts at noon of
June 30, 2013.
According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when she was duly proclaimed
because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET has the exclusive
jurisdiction to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the Members of the House of Representatives.
Issue:
WON the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when Reyes was duly proclaimed because
pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, the HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to
be the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications" of the Members
of the House of Representatives.
Held:
NO, COMELEC retains jurisdiction for the following reasons:
1. HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioners qualifications, as well as over the
assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with said tribunal. Petitioner has not
averred that she has filed such action.
2. The jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a Member of the House
of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Despite her proclamation and oath, Reyes is yet to be considered a Member of the House of the
Representatives. Her term of being an official member has not started yet.
For one to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence
of these requisites: (1) valid proclamation; (2) proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.
Thus the petitioner cannot be considered a member of the HR yet as she has not assumed office
yet. Also, the 2nd requirement was not validly complied with as a valid oath must be made (1) before
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although she made the
oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it was made during plenary or in open
session and, thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of office was indeed complied.

\Tanada vs HRET
Facts:
Wigberto Tanada, a candidate for the position of Congress Representative, filed twin petitions before
the COMELEC to cancel the COC of Alvin John Tanada for false representations and to declare him
as a nuisance candidate. On April 25, 2013, the COMELEC en banc granted to cancel the COC of
Alvin John for false representations. The petition to declare him as nuisance candidate however was
denied. After 12 days, Wigberto again sought reconsideration of the denial of his petition on the
basis of a newly discovered evidence. Comes election day and the name of Alvin John remained in
the ballots, whichafter Angelica Tan was the winning candidate, and Wigberto only second.
Wigberto filed with the Quezon Provincial Board of Canvassers (Quezon PBOC) his petition to
correct manifest mistakes concerning the cancelled CoC of Alvin John and a motion to consolidate
Alvin Johns votes with the votes he garnered. The PBOC denied his petition and then proclaimed
Angelica as the winner.
Wigberto filed a supplemental petition before the COMELEC 2nd Div. to annul the proclamation of
Tan. Before the SC, Wigberto filed a certiorari assailing the April 25, 2013 COMELEC en bancs
ruling declaring Alvin John not a nuisance candidate and an election protest claiming that fraud has
been perpetrated. Then, Wigberto also filed an election protest before HRET.
Meanwhile, on June 28, 2013, the COMELEC 2nd Div. annulled the proclamation of Tan and
directed the Quezon PBOC to credit the votes of Alvin John to Wigberto, and to declare the winner
after the re-computation of the votes. However, Tan had by then taken her oath and assumed office
past noon time of June 30, 2013, thereby rendering the adverse resolution on her proclamation
moot.
On October 22, 2013, the SC promulgated its resolution in G.R. Nos. 207199-200 dismissing
Wigberto's petition and directed Wigberto to file the protest before the proper tribunal which is the
HRET.
Before the HRET, the election protest was dismissed for being insufficient/ in form and substance
and for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
WON Public respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, when it whimsically, capriciously, and arbitrarily: limited its own jurisdiction in election
protests as defined by the Constitution, the law, and jurisprudence; declared that an election protest
is limited to the opening of ballot boxes and the revision of ballots; and declared that it cannot look
into the fraudulent fielding of a nuisance candidate as perpetrated by herein private respondent,
because it has no power to review, modify, or reverse the factual finding of the COMELEC en
nuisance candidates.
RULING:
No, The HRET did not commit any grave abuse of discretion. The jurisdiction of the HRET, as

circumscribed under Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution, is limited to the election, returns, and
qualification of the members of the House of Representatives. Thus, it cannot rule over an election
protest involving Alvin John who is a non-member. HRET lacks the authority to rule whether a
candidate is indeed a nuisance candidate and is not vested with appellate jurisdiction over rulings on
cancellation cases promulgated by the COMELEC en banc. It is not enough for Wigberto to have
Alvin John's COC cancelled, because the effect of such cancellation only leads to stray votes. Alvin
John must also be declared a nuisance candidate, because only then will Alvin John's votes be
credited to Wigberto. However, COMELEC En Banc's ruling on Alvin John's nuisance candidacy had
long become final, since Wigberto filed his petition beyond the period provided by the COMELEC
Rules of Procedu

F. PIMENTEL, et al. v. HRET

GR No. 141489
November 29, 2002
FACTS
Petitions for prohibition and mandamus and writ for preliminary injunction were filed. The petitioners
assail the composition of House of the Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and Commission
on Appointments (CA). They want the respondents to include the party-list representatives in the
HRET and CA.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the present composition of HRET violates the constitutional requirement of the
proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in the HRET.
2. Whether or not the present membership of the House in the CA violates the constitutional
requirement of the proportional representation because there are no party-list representatives in the
CA.
3. Whether or not the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include party-list
representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
RULING
1. No. The Constitution grants to the House of the Representatives the power to choose who among
their members who would occupy the seats allotted in the HRET. Article VI, Section 17 of the
Constitution states that each chambers of the Congress has the right to choose in their members
who would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chambers electoral tribunal.
(The party-list representatives did not designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the
petitions, the House did not consider any party-list representative for election to the HRET or the
CA.)
2. No. Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution states that the Senate and the House of the
Representatives has the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for
Senators and 12 seats for House members in the CA.

[These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4(a) of the 1998 Rules of the HRET.
The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being
subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation. However, under the
doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this
constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.]
3. No. There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA. Under
Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and the
CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves.

Limkaichong vs comelec
Jocelyn sy Limkaichong filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of congressman of first
district of negros oriental. Two petitions for disqualification were filed against her because she is not
a citizen of the Philippines. She claimed however that she is a citizen of the Philippines because she
was born to a naturalized Filipino Father and a filipino mother, who reacquired her status due to her
husbands ( referring to the father of limkaichong)naturalization. On election day, these petitions
remained pending. Limkaichong emerged as a winner. Comelec second division disqualified her as a
candidate and instructed the provincial supervisor to suspend her proclamation. the Comelec en
banc however issued a resolution adopting the guidelines of not suspending the proclamation of
winning candidates with pending disqualification. Thus, limkaichong was declared as an elected
member of the house of representatives
Issue:
WON the house of representatives electoral tribunal shall assume jurisdiction in lieu of comelec over
the issue on limkaichong's citizenship?
HELD:
Yes. Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office as member
of the house of represntatives, the COMELEc's jurisdiction over elextion contests relating to election
returns and qualification ends and HrETs own jurisdiction begins. In this case, limkaichong was
already proclaimed as the winner thus, COMELEC loses its jurisdiction and her disqualification case
now lies to the HREt.
ISSUE:
WON the speaker of the house of representatives may be compelled to prohibit LImkaichong to
assume her duties as a member of the house of representatives

HELD:
No. The enrollment of a member in he house of representatives is a ministerial duty of the secretary
general and house of representatives upon presentation by such member of a valid certificate of
proclamation and oath of office. Under the circumstances, the house of representative and ifs
officials are with recourse except to honor the validity of the proclamation of Limkaichong unless
cancelled, revoked or nullified with due process of law. Only upon determination of the HRet
pursuant to a final and executory order that The house of representatives may exclude limkaichong
as a member of the house.
Note:
only the state through its representatives may question the illegality and invalidity of the procured
certificate of naturalization in the appropriate denaturalization proceeding and it is not a matter that
may be raised by private persons in an election case.
LikeShow more reactions
Comment

E. GARCIA et al v. HRET
GR No. 134792
August 12, 1999
FACTS
The petitioners filed a petition for quo warranto before the House of the Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) against Congressman Harry Angping on May 29, 1998. They are claiming that
Angping was not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
HRET issued a resolution on June 10, 1998, dismissing the petition for quo warranto for failure to
pay of the required P5,000.00 cash deposit. Upon receiving the HRET Resolution, the petitioners
paid the P5,000.00 cash deposit and attached the receipt to the Motion for Reconsideration that they
had filed on June 26, 1998. However it was denied by the HRET in view of their Rule 32.
ISSUE
Whether or not the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for quo
warranto of petitioners in refusing to reinstate the petition after paying the P5,000.00 cash
requirement.
RULING
No. The Court finds no reason to annul the decision of HRET because the discretion was based on

well-formed legal basis. It is stated in 1998 HRET Rule 32, that it is required to pay P5,000.00
deposit in addition to filing fees for quo warranto cases. The observance of the HRET Rules of
Procedure must be taken seriously if they are to attain their objective, the speedy and orderly
determination of the true will of the electorate. Correlatively, their lawyers, appearing before the
HRET, are expected to comply properly with the procedural requirements laid down by the tribunal
without being formally ordered to do so. They cannot righteously impute abuse of discretion to the
tribunal if by reason of non-observance of those requirements it decides to dismiss their petition.
Imperative justice requires the proper observance of technicalities precisely designed to ensure its
proper and swift dispensation.

Coseteng vs. Mitra

The congressional elections resulted in the election on thr House of Representatives from diverse
political parties. Petitioner Anna Dominique M.L. Coseteng was the only candidate from KAIBA
political party.
Contention of the petitioner: Coseteng claims that she is qualified to sit in the Commission on
Appointments as a representative to the minority because she has the support of nine congressmen
and congresswomen of the minority.
Issue: WON Coseteng's claim to the position is valid.
Ruling:
No. Because the indorsements she received from the 9 other congressmen is inconsiquential
because ther are not members of her party ( remember that she was the only one who won from
KAIBA) and they signed 9 identical indorsements in favor of her rival, Congressman Verano Yap.

Angara v. Electoral Commission

63 Phil. 134
G.R No. L-45081, July 15, 1936
Facts:
Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were
candidates voted for the positon of member of the National Assembly of the Province of Tayabas.
Angara won the most number of votes and took his oath of office. The National Assembly on
December 3, 1935 submitted Resolution No. 8 which declared with finality the victory of Angara. On
December 8, Ynsua filed before the National Assembly a motion protesting against the election of
Angara and that he should be declared as a winner or the election for the positon be nullified. The
Electoral Commission adopted a resolution on Dec. 9 as the last day of filing of election protest. The
petitioner then filed before the Electoral Commission a motion to dismiss the protest that the
objection against him was filed out of the prescribed period. Angara contented that the Constitution
confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission as regards to the merits of contested
elections to the National Assembly.
Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject
matter of the controversy
Whether or not the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in

assuming the cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the
previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly.
Ruling:
Yes, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the
constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.
In cases of conflict between several departments and among agencies thereof, the judiciary, with the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve the
conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
No, the Electoral the Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua
against the election of the petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly
of December 3, 1935 cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing protest within
such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

Vinzonz chato vs comelec

Facts:
Renato unico and liwayway vinzons chato were the contenders for the position of congressman in a
province. Come election, unico was proclaimed and has taken oath, assumed office as a member of
the house of representatives. Chato, on the other hand questioned the validity of the proclamation of
unico on the ground that the comelec commited grave abuse of discretion when the comelec issued
the resolution that it had lost jurisdiction over chato's petition

issue:
WON the comelec enbanc lost its jurisdiction on the petition filed by Chato
held:
Yes, comelec already lost its jurisdiction on the petition filed by Chato. The court ruled that once a
winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office as a member of the
House of representatives, the Comelec's jurisdiction on election, returns and qualification ends and
the HOuse of representatives electoral tribunal (HRET) begins. hence, since renato unico has been
proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office, it is constitutional that Comelec denied the petition of
chato on the ground that it had lost jurisdiction because the matters are best addressed to the sound
judgment and discretion of the HRET

ABAYON VS. HRET GR 189466

FACTS: petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list
organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections.
Respondents filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against petitioner Abayon. They
claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since
it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. It was Aangat Tayo that was
taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its nominee. All
questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat
Tayo.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
HELD: YES, Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are elected members of the
House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to
hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once
the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken
his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELECs
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction
begins. The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but
upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.

Neri vs Senate Committee

GR No 180643 March 25, 2008
FACTS:
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a
contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and
services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of
China.

The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing
Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their
influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in
one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of
COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further
narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not
to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the
communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in
Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for
his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege?
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege
First, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e.
the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President
to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
Second, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the
operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of
President Arroyos cabinet.
And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of executive privilege
violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at

all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was
questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer
more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive
privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III
provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,
as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and

Investigations
GR NO 180643 Sept 4, 2008
Section 22
Facts:
On September 26, 2007, Neri; appeared before the respondent
committees and testified for about 11 hours on the matters concerning the
National Broadband Project, a project awarded to a Chinese company ZTE.
The Petitioner therein disclosed that when he was offered by Abalos a bribe
of 200 million pesos to approve the project, he informed PGMA of the
attempt and she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However when he
was probed further on PGMAs and petitioners discussions relating to the
NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking exec privilege. The
questions that he refused to answer were:
1. whether or not PGMA followed up the NBN Project.
2. whether or not PGMA directed him to prioritize it.
3. whether or not PGMA directed him to approve it.
The petitioner did not appear before the respondent committees
upon orders of the President invoking exec privilege. He explained that the
questions asked of him are covered by exec privilege. He was cited in
contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and
detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.

Issues:
1. Is there a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege
in our legal system?
2. WON there is a factual or legal basis to hold the communications elicited
be covered by the exec. Priv.
3. WON the communications elicited in the questions covered y exec.priv.
are critical to the exercise of the respondents functions.
4. Did the respondent committee commit a grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the contempt order?
Held:
1. YES, presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the
operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of
powers under the constitution.
- The constitutional infirmity found in the blanket authorization to invoke
exec privilege granted by the President to exec officials in sec 2(b) of
E.O. 464 does not apply in this case. In this case, it was the President
herself, through exec sec. Ermita, who invoked exec privilege on a
specific matter involving an exec agreement between Philippines and
China, which was the subject of the 3 questions asked.
- If what is involved is the presumptive privilege of presidential
communications when invoked by the President on a matter clearly
within the domain of the Executive, the said presumption dictates that
the same be recognized.
2.Respondent alleges that the elements of the presidential
communications privilege are not present.
a) Power to enter into executive agreement is a quintessential and non delegable
b) Doctrine of operational proximity
c) Presidents claim of executive privilege is not merely based on
generalized interest; the Court did not disregard the 1987 consti:
transparency, accountability and disclosure of information.
3. The respondent simply generalized that the information re: 3 questions is
pertinent to the exercise of the power to legislate and a broad and nonspecific
reference to pending senate bill.
- the information being elicited is not so critical after all.

- The general thrust of the three questions is to trace the alleged bribery to
the OP. While it may be worthy, it is not the job of the legislature to
perform. Legislature: make laws and not adjudicate or prosecute.
- Legislative inquiries (Sec 10, Senate rules and procedures) are not subject
to exacting standards of evidence to arrive at accurate factual findings to
which to apply the law.
4. YES, an unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an
unchecked executive generates its own abuses.
- Constant exposure to congressional subpoena takes its toll on the ability of
the executive to function effectively.
- The Legislative inquiry must be confined to permissible areas and thus
prevent roving commissions. ( kilbourn v. Thompson)
- When a constitutional requirement exists, the Court has the duty to look
into the Congress compliance. We cannot turn a blind eye to possible
violations of the Constitution simply out of courtesy.
- The court although a co-equal branch of government to the legislature,
must look into the internal rules of congress w/ regard to ensuring
compliance by congress to it. Since, the issuance of a contempt order must
be done by a vote of majority of all its members. The issuance of the order
was w/o concurrence of the majority.

G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008

ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND
SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY
FACTS:
The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong
Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National
Broadband Network (NBN) Project. The Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of
China.
In connection with the project, various Resolutions were introduced in the Senate. At the same time,
the investigation was claimed to be relevant to the consideration of three (3) pending bills. The
petitioner, NEDA head, was among those invited for the investigation of the Senate Committee. He
was summoned to appear and testify on various dates. However, he only attended in one hearing
wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs.
He disclosed that then COMELEC Chairman Abalos tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for
his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the
bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking executive privilege. Petitioner refused to answer questions on: (a) whether or not
President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve it.
In a letter, Exec. Sec. Ermita requested respondent Committee to dispense with petitioners
testimony on the ground of executive privilege.
The November 20 hearing was not attended by the petitioner. Thus, the respondent Committee
issued a show case Letter requiring him to explain. The respondent replied that it was not his
intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were those
he claimed to be covered by executive privilege.
In addition, petitioner submitted a Letter stating that his non-appearance was upon the order of the
President and that his conversation with President Arroyo dealt with delicate and sensitive national
security and diplomatic matters.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner can validly invoke executive privilege to exempt him from the inquiries
of Congress in aid of legislation.

DECISION:
Yes. The Court ruled that the only way to exempt executive officials from the conduct of inquiries by
Congress in aid of legislation is through a valid claim of executive privilege.
Jurisprudence teaches that for the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim of
privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter. The Letter of
Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement. It serves as the formal claim of privilege.
---------------------(Motion for reconsideration po ito ng Senate for the above decision. Facts are substantially the
same)
G.R. No. 180643, September 04, 2008
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC
OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND
SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY
FACTS:
In these proceedings, this Court has been called upon to exercise its power of review and arbitrate a
hotly, even acrimoniously, debated dispute between the Courts co-equal branches of government.
Petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified for about eleven (11) hours on
matters concerning the National Broadband Project (the NBN Project), a project awarded by the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to Zhong Xing Telecommunications
Equipment (ZTE). Petitioner disclosed that then COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200
Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed
President Arroyo of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However,
when probed further on President Arroyo and petitioners discussions relating to the NBN Project,
petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. To be specific, petitioner refused to
answer questions on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether
or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve it.
Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioners answers to these three questions by
requiring him to appear and testify once more on November 20, 2007. Executive Secretary Eduardo
R. Ermita wrote to a Letter to respondent Committees requesting them to dispense with petitioners
testimony on the ground of executive privilege.
The senate thereafter issued a show cause order, unsatisfied with the reply, therefore, issued an
Order citing Neri in contempt and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate
Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Committees have shown that the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are critical aid in legislation

DECISION:
No. Respondent Committees failed to show that the communications elicited by the three questions
are critical to the exercise of their functions.
Clearly, the need for hard facts in crafting legislation cannot be equated with the compelling or
demonstratively critical and specific need for facts which is so essential to the judicial power to
adjudicate actual controversies.
A factual basis for situations covered by bills is not critically needed before legislatives bodies can
come up with relevant legislation unlike in the adjudication of cases by courts of law. Interestingly,
during the Oral Argument before this Court, the counsel for respondent Committees impliedly
admitted that the Senate could still come up with legislations even without petitioner answering the
three (3) questions. In other words, the information being elicited is not so critical after all.