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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.

MATEO
G.R. No. 147678-87, July 7, 2004
Facts: Appellant Efren Mateo was charged with ten
counts of rape by his step-daughter Imelda Mateo.
During the trial, Imeldas testimonies regarding the
rape incident were inconsistent. She said in one
occasion that incident of rape happened inside her
bedroom, but other times, she told the court that it
happened in their sala. She also told the court that
the appellant would cover her mouth but when
asked again, she said that he did not. Despite the
irreconcilable testimony of the victim, the trial
court found the accused guilty of the crime of rape
and sentenced him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The Solicitor General assails the factual
findings of the trial and recommends an acquittal of
the
appellant.
Issue: Whether or
appeallable
to

not this case is


the
Supreme

directly
Court.

Held: While the Fundamental Law requires a


mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases
where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua,
life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has
it proscribed an intermediate review. If only to
ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is
imposed, the Court now deems it wise and
compelling to provide in these cases a review by
the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to
the Supreme Court. Where life and liberty are at
stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or
innocence must be accorded an accused, and no
case in the evaluation of the facts can ever be
overdone. A prior determination by the Court of
Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would
minimize the possibility of an error of judgment. If
the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it
could then render judgment imposing the
corresponding penalty as the circumstances so
warrant, refrain from entering judgment and
elevate the entire records of the case to the
Supreme
Court
for
its
final
disposition.
Under the Constitution, the power to amend rules
of procedure is constitutionally vested in the
Supreme
Court

Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall


have
the
following
powers:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice,
and
procedure
in
all
courts.
Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more
squarely within the rule-making prerogative of the

Supreme Court than the law-making power of


Congress. The rule here announced additionally
allowing an intermediate review by the Court of
Appeals, a subordinate appellate court, before the
case is elevated to the Supreme Court on
automatic review is such a procedural matter.
Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure, more particularly Section 3 and
Section 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124,
Section of Rule 125, and any other rule insofar as
they provide for direct appeals from the Regional
Trial Courts to the Supreme Court in cases where
the penalty imposed is death reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, as well as the resolution of the
Supreme Court en banc, dated 19 September 1995,
in Internal Rules of the Supreme Court in cases
similarly involving the death penalty, are to be
deemed modified accordingly. A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC.

G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998


ST.
MARTIN
FUNERAL
HOME,
petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL
LABOR
RELATIONS
COMMISSION
and
BIENVENIDO ARICAYOS, respondents.
FACTS: Private respondent alleges that he started
working as Operations Manager of petitioner St.
Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995.
However, there was no contract of employment
executed between him and petitioner nor was his
name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On
January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his
employment
for
allegedly
misappropriating
P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by
petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).
Petitioner on the other hand claims that private
respondent was not its employee but only the uncle
of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St.
Martins Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private
respondent, who was formerly working as an
overseas contract worker, asked for financial
assistance from the mother of Amelita. Since then,
as an indication of gratitude, private respondent
voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in
overseeing the business.
January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away,
so the latter then took over the management of the
business. She then discovered that there were
arrears in the payment of taxes and other
government fees, although the records purported
to show that the same were already paid. Amelita
then made some changes in the business operation
and private respondent and his wife were no longer

CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM

allowed to participate in the management thereof.


As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint
charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his
employment.
the labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner on October 25, 1996 declaring that no
employer-employee relationship existed between
the parties and, therefore, his office had no
jurisdiction over the case.
Private respondent appealed to the NLRC. NLRC
remanded the case to LA. MR was filed by the
petitioner which was denied.
RULING:
1) HISTORY: the legal history of the NLRC. It was
first established in the Department of Labor by P.D.
No. 21 on October 14, 1972, and its decisions were
expressly declared to be appealable to the
Secretary of Labor and, ultimately, to the President
of the Philippines.
May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code
of the Philippines, the same to take effect six
months after its promulgation. 8 Created and
regulated therein is the present NLRC which was
attached to the Department of Labor and
Employment for program and policy coordination
only. 9 Initially, Article 302 (now, Article 223)
thereof also granted an aggrieved party the
remedy of appeal from the decision of the NLRC to
the Secretary of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391
subsequently
amended
said
provision
and
abolished such appeals. No appellate review has
since then been provided for.
the argument that this Court has no jurisdiction to
review the decisions of the NLRC, and formerly of
the Secretary of Labor, since there is no legal
provision for appellate review thereof, the Court
nevertheless rejected that thesis. It held that there
is an underlying power of the courts to scrutinize
the acts of such agencies on questions of law and
jurisdiction even though no right of review is given
by statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to
keep the administrative agency within its
jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the
parties; and that it is that part of the checks and
balances which restricts the separation of powers
and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.
The remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file
a motion for reconsideration as a precondition for
any further or subsequent remedy, 12 and then
seasonably avail of the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65, 13 for which said Rule has
now fixed the reglementary period of sixty days

from notice of the decision. Curiously, although the


10-day period for finality of the decision of the
NLRC may already have lapsed as contemplated in
Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held
that this Court may still take cognizance of the
petition for certiorari on jurisdictional and due
process
considerations
if filed
within
the
reglementary period under Rule 65.
The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion
that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the
Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative
intendment was that the special civil action of
certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for
judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of
the word appeal in relation thereto and in the
instances we have noted could have been a lapsus
plumae because appeals by certiorari and the
original action for certiorari are both modes of
judicial review addressed to the appellate courts.
The important distinction between them, however,
and with which the Court is particularly concerned
here is that the special civil action of certiorari is
within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this
Court and the Court of Appeals; 23 whereas to
indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari
to the Supreme Court are allowed would not
subserve, but would subvert, the intention of
Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech
on Senate Bill No. 1495.
2)
Appeal.
-review of NLRC Decision is through Rule 65.
-jurisdiction:
SC
AND
CA
-by way of hierarchy: the review shall be initially
filed before CA.

In

re: Letter of Associate


Reynato S. Puno

Justice

Facts:
- The petitioner, Reynato S. Puno, was first
appointed as Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals on 1980.
- On 1983, the Court of Appeals was reorganized
and became the Intermediate Appellate Court
pursuant to BP Blg. 129.
- On 1984, petitioner was appointed to be Deputy
Minister of Justice in the Ministry of Justice. Thus,
he ceased to be a member of the Judiciary.
- After February 1986 EDSA Revolution, there was a
reorganization of the entire government, including
the Judiciary.
- A Screening Committee for the reorganization of
the Intermediate Appelate Court and lower courts
recommended the return of petitioner as Associate
Justice of the new court of Appeals and assigned

CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM

him the rank of number 11 in the roster of


appellate court justices.
- When the appointments were signed by Pres.
Aquino, petitioner's seniority ranking changes from
number 11 to 26.
- Then, petitioner alleged that the change in
seniority ranking was due to "inadvertence" of the
President, otherwise, it would run counter to the
provisions of Section 2 of E.O. No. 33.
- Petitioner Justice Reynato S. Puno wrote a letter to
the Court seeking the correction of his seniority
ranking in the Court of Appeals.
- The Court en banc granted Justice Puno's request.
- A motion for reconsideration was later filed by
Associate Justices Campos Jr. and Javellana who are
affected by the ordered correction.
- They alleged that petitioner could not claim
reappointment because the courts where he had
previously been appointed ceased to exist at the
date of his last appointment.
Issue: WON the present Court of Appeals is merely
a continuation of the old Court of Appeals and
Intermediate Appellate Court existing before the
promulgation of E.O. No. 33.
Held: The Court held that the Court of Appeals and
Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to E.O.
No. 33 phased out as part of the legal system
abolished by the 1987 Revolution. The Court of
Appeals that was established under E.O. No. 33 is
considered as an entirely new court.
The present Court of Appeals is a new entity,
different and distinct from the courts existing
before E.O. No. 33. It was created in the wake of
the massive reorganization launched by the
revolutionary government of Corazon Aquino in the
aftermath of the people power in 1986.
Revolution is defined as "the complete overthrow of
the established government in any country or state
by those who were previously subject to it." or "as
sudden. radical and fundamental change in the
government or political system, usually effected
with violence or at least some acts of violence."

G.R. No. L-63557


October 28, 1983
LINGNER & FISHER GMBH, petitioner,
vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
HON. RICARDO L. PRONOVE JR. and
PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL LABORATORIES,
INC., respondents.
.

FACTS: DEUTCHE MILCHWERKE DR. A. SAUER


(DMW) and Philippine Chemical Laboratories, Inc.
(PHILCHEM),
both
manufactures
and
sells
chemicals,
executed
a
so-called
Agency
AGREEMENT. It provides in their agreement that the
term was five years and renewable automatically
for five years unless one party gives due notice of
termination to the other, and PHILCEM shall be
entitled for royalty upon the termination of the
contract. In their agreement, it also provides that
all legal settlements within the compass of this
AGREEMENT shall fall under the jurisdiction of
Philippine courts.
Subsequently, the DMW interests were acquired by
LINGNER & FISHER GMBH LINGNER for brevity), a
subsidiary of BEECHAM. After the expiration of the
term, it was automatically renewed. Through the
law firm of De Leon et al, (the Law Firm, for brevity)
PHILCHEM was advised that LINGNER was
interested in continuing business relationship with
PHILCHEM
PHILCHEM presented a claim to LINGNER for
P1,055,000.00 under the ROYALTY CLAUSE. No
settlement having been arrived. PHILCHEM filed a
complaint against BEECHAM alone in a civil case.
The summons issued could not be served on
BEECHAM, the Sheriff having reported that
BEECHAM was neither a company registered in the
Philippines, nor resident at the given address.
PHILCHEM then filed an amended complaint, this
time making LINGNER and BEECHAM as the
defendant. LINGNER, moved for dismissal on the
grounds (a) that LINGNER was not a foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines and
hence could not be sued locally, and, (b) that
LINGNER could not be served with summons
through the Law Firm
The Trial Court denied the Motion to Dismiss,
assuming that LINGNER could be sued in this
jurisdiction, and holding that LINGNER can be
served with summons through the Law Firm.
Upon appeal by LINGNER, it reiterated that the plea
that summons could not be validly seved on it
through the Law Firm. and it also requested that a
hearing be held, conformably to the provisions of
Section 9(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, on the
question of whether or not LINGNER was doing
business in this country.
The Appellate Court held that summons served
through the Law Firm was valid and it further ruled
that receiving evidence on whether or not LINGNER

CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM

was doing business in the Philippines could not be


justified under the cited Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
ISSUE: Whether or not LINGNER was doing
business in the Philippines, hence shall fall under
the jurisdiction under the Philippine courts; and
summons could be served.
HELD: Evidence whether LINGNER is doing
business in the Philippines is no longer necessary in
view of the fact that PHILCHEM and LINGNER were
contractees in the AGREEMENT and the claim of
PHILCHEM is based on the ROYALTY CLAUSE of that
AGREEMENT. Whether LINGNER is or is not doing
business in the Philippines will not matter because
the parties had expressly stipulated in the
AGREEMENT that all controversies based on the
AGREEMENT "shall fall under the jurisdiction of
Philippine courts". In other words, there was a
covenant on venue to the effect that LINGNER can
be sued by PHILCHEM before Philippine Courts in
regards to a controversy related to the
AGREEMENT.
Therefore, The now Regional Trial Court is hereby
directed to allow PHILCHEM to apply for the
issuance of summons on petitioner LINGNER under
the provisions of Section 17, Rule 14 in relation to
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and after issues have
been joined, to proceed to trial and judgment
accordingly. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-36098 January 21, 1983


ORTIGAS
&
COMPANY,
LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, petitioner,
vs. JUDGE
JOSE B. HERRERA, respondent.
On August 14, 1969, petitioner and private
respondent entered into an agreement thereby for
and in consideration of P55,430.00, the former
agreed to sell to the latter a parcel of land with a
special condition that should private respondent as
purchaser complete the construction including the
painting of his residential house on said lot within
two (2) years from August 14, 1969, petitioner, as
owner, has agreed to refund to private respondent
the amount of P10.00 per square meter. When the
aforesaid special condition was fulfilled, private
respondent, on May 17, 1971 accordingly notified
in writing the petitioner of the same and requested
for his refund amounting to P4,820.00.
Upon failure of petitioner to pay his obligation,
private respondent on May 6, 1972 filed a
complaint for sum of money and damages with the
City Court of Manila, Branch II, against petitioner

docketed as Civil Case No. 211673. A motion to


dismiss was filed by petitioner on grounds of lack of
jurisdiction, failure of the complaint to state a
cause of action and improper avenue. City Court
Judge Jose B. Herrera in his order dated June 27,
1972 held in abeyance the resolution on the motion
until after the trial of the case on the merits.
A reconsideration of the said order having been
denied, petitioner on October 12, 1972 filed with
the Court of First Instance of Manila Branch XXVII, a
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction docketed as Civil Case No.
88510. A motion to dismiss was filed by private
respondent, and on November 17, 1972, the
petition was dismissed on the ground that the claim
of private respondent in his complaint, being less
than P10,000.00, is within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the city court.
Petitioner thus filed the present petition and argues
among others that: (a) as determined from the
allegations of the complaint, the action is for
specific performance of contract; and (b) actions in
which the subject of litigation is not capable of
pecuniary estimation such as complaints for
specific performance of contract are exclusively
cognizable by the Court of First Instance. Hence,
the decisive question to be resolved in this present
petition is whether or not the City Court of Manila,
Branch II, has jurisdiction over the complaint.
The action involved in this case is one for specific
performance and not for a sum of money and
wherefore incapable of pecuniary estimation
because what private respondent seeks is the
performance of petitioner's obligation under a
written contract to make a refund but under certain
specific conditions still to be proven or established.
In a case for the recovery of a sum of money, as
the collection of a debt, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation (Lapitan vs.
Scandia Inc., 24 SCRA 479) because the obligation
to pay the debt is not conditioned upon any specific
fact or matter. But when a party to a contract has
agreed to refund to the other party a sum of money
upon compliance by the latter of certain conditions
and only upon compliance therewith may what is
legally due him under the written contract be
demanded, the action is one not capable of
pecuniary estimation. The payment of a sum of
money is only incidental which can only be ordered
after a determination of certain acts the
performance of which being the more basic issue to
be inquired into.
Although private respondent's complaint in the
court a quo is designated as one for a sum of

CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM

money and damages, an analysis of all the factual


allegations of the complaint patently shows that
what private respondent seeks is the performance
of petitioner's obligation under the written contract
to make the refund of the rate of P10.00 per square
meter or in the total amount of P4,820.00, but only
after proof of having himself fulfilled the conditions
that will give rise to petitioner's obligation, a
matter clearly incapable of pecuniary estimation.

1. The sum of P73,867.42 plus


interest
and
other
charges
commencing from January 1, 1988
until fully paid;

In view of the foregoing, the Court RESOLVED to


reverse the order appealed from and the complaint
filed with the City Court of Manila, Branch II,
docketed as Civil Case No. 211673 is hereby
ordered dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

3. Costs against the defendant.

2. Such sum which shall not be less


than P2,000.00 or 25% of the
amount of delinquency whichever is
greater, as and for attorney's fees.

4. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 90503 September 27, 1990

On September 28, 1988 the trial court issued an


order directing the issuance of a writ of execution
to enforce its decision that had become final and
executory.

NESTOR
SANDOVAL, petitioner,
vs.
HON. DOROTEO CAEBA, Presiding
Judge, RTC, Manila, Branch 20, DEPUTY
SHERIFF OF MANILA (RTC, Manila, Branch
20),
and
ESTATE
DEVELOPERS
&
INVESTORS CORPORATION, respondents.

On September 30, 1988 petitioner filed a motion to


vacate judgment and to dismiss the complaint on
the ground that the lower court has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter and that its decision is null
and void. A motion for reconsideration of the writ of
execution was also filed by petitioner. An opposition
to both motions was filed by private respondent to
which a reply was filed by petitioner.

The issue in this petition is whether or not the


ordinary courts have jurisdiction over the
collection of unpaid installments regarding a
subdivision lot.

On February 17, 1989 the trial court denied the


motion to vacate the judgment on the ground that
it is now beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to do
so. It directed the issuance of a writ of execution
anew.

FACTS:
On August 20, 1987 ESTATE DEVELOPERS &
INVESTORS CORPORATION filed a complaint in
the RTC of Manila for the collection of unpaid
installments regarding a subdivision lot, pursuant
to a promissory note, plus interest. On January 29,
1988 the trial court rendered a decision declaring
the petitioner in default, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, on the
allegations and the
prayer
of
the
complaint
and
the
evidence adduced in
support
therefor,
judgment is hereby
rendered, ordering the
defendant
to
pay
plaintiff the following:

Hence the herein petition wherein it is alleged that


the trial court committed a grave abuse of
discretion as follows:
5.1. The respondent Judge gravely
abused his discretion and acted
without
jurisdiction
in
taking
cognizance of the complaint before
him
notwithstanding
that exclusive and original jurisdictio
n over the subject-matter thereof is
vested with the Housing and Land
Use
Regulatory
Board
(HLURB)
pursuant to PD 957.
5.2. The respondent Judge gravely
abused his discretion and acted
without jurisdiction in refusing to
vacate
his
judgment
rendered
without jurisdiction and in issuing a
writ of execution to implement his
abovesaid void judgment. 2

CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM

Considering that the trial court has no jurisdiction


under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the
decision it rendered is null and void ab initio. It is as
if no decision was rendered by the trial court at all.

RULING:
The petition is impressed with merit.
Under Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 957 the
National Housing Authority (NHA) was given the
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide certain
cases as follows:
SEC.1. In the exercise of its function
to regulate the real estate trade and
business and in addition to its
powers provided for in Presidential
Decree No. 957, the National Housing
Authority
shall
have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
of the following nature:
A. Unsound
practices:

real

estate

The trial court, rather than reiterating the issuance


of a writ of execution in this case, which it did,
should have recalled and cancelled the writ of
execution of the judgment.

G.R. No. L-65021 November 21, 1991


BENGUET CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
HON OSCAR L. LEVISTE, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court (National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch XCVII, Quezon
City)
and
HELEN
DIZONREYES, respondents.

business

B. Claims involving refund and any


other claims filed by subdivision lot
or condominium unit buyer against
the project owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman;and
C.
Cases involving
specific
performance of contractual and
statutory obligations filed by buyers
of subdivision lot or condominium
unit against the owner, developer,
dealer,
broker
or
salesman.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The language of this section, particularly, the
second portion thereof, leaves no room for doubt
that exclusive jurisdiction over the case
between
the
petitioner
and
private
respondent is vested not on the RTC but on
the NHA. The NHA was re-named Human
Settlements Regulatory Commission and thereafter
it was re-named as the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB). 3
Undeniably the sum of money sought to be
collected by private respondent from petitioner
represented unpaid installments of a subdivision lot
which the petitioner purchased. Petitioner alleges
that he suspended payments thereof because of
the failure of the developer to develop the
subdivision pursuant to their agreement.

Facts:
1. Private respondent alleged that she is the
claimowner of 11 mining claims all located
in the province of Zambales.
2. On January 15, 1967, she executed a Special
Power of Attorney constituting her father,
Celestino M. Dizon, as her attorney-in-fact
with full powers to "transfer, assign and
dispose of her 11 mining claims.
3. On January 21, 1967, Celestino M. Dizon,
acting as such attorney-in-fact for private
respondent and other claimowners, entered
into an Agreement, with Dizon Mine
whereby the latter was granted the right to
explore, develop, exploit and operate the 57
mining claims owned by the claimowners
including the 11 claims of private
respondent.
4. Seven (7) years later, on December 17,
1974, private respondent and the other
claimowners executed a Deed of Ratification
of Assignment, confirming the assignment,
transfer and conveyance unto Dizon Mines
and its assigns and successors of the rights
to possess, occupy, explore, develop and
operate all the aforesaid mining claims.
5. Almost three (3) months after the Deed of
Ratification
was
executed,
private
respondent revoked Special Power of
Attorney of January 15, 1967, stating that
"while there is no question that I still have
complete and full trust and confidence in
the judgment and wisdom of my father, it is
not my wish to add any more to his already
many a mounting problems.

CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM

6. However, in spite of said notice, on


September 6, 1975, Dizon Mines and
Benguet entered into an Operations
Agreement whereby the former transferred
to the latter the possession of the 57 mining
claims for the purpose of exploring,
developing
and
operating
them
for
production and marketing of marketable
products under the terms and conditions
specified therein.
7. Private
respondent
prayed
that
the
Operations Agreement be declared null and
void and inoperative insofar as it covers her
eleven (11) lode mining claims.
8. Invoking Section 7 (c) of Presidential Decree
No. 1281 and the ruling in Twin Peaks
Mining Association vs. Navarro and Philex
Mining Corp., petitioner contends that the
RTC has no jurisdiction over the civil case at
bar as jurisdiction over actions to cancel
mining contracts is vested exclusively in the
Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences.
9. It likewise adverts to the decision of the
Secretary of Natural Resources dated March
17, 1976 on the private respondent's
opposition to the registration of the subject
Operations Agreement. It claims that that
decision had become final upon private
respondent's failure to appeal to the Office
of the President, constitutes res judicata to
the question of the validity of the
Operations Agreement.
Issue: Whether or not the court is without
jurisdiction over the subject matter and nature of
the action. YES.
Ruling: Presidential Decree No. 1281 which took
effect on January 16,1978 vests the Bureau of
Mines with jurisdictional supervision and control
over all holders of mining claims or applicants for
and/or grantees of mining licenses, permits, leases
and/or operators thereof, including mining service
contracts and service contractors insofar as their
mining activities are concerned. To effectively
discharge its task as the Government's arm in the
administration and disposition of mineral resources,
Section 7 of P.D. No. 1281 confers upon the Bureau
quasi-judicial powers as follows:
Sec. 7. In addition to its regulatory and
adjudicative
functions
over
companies,
partnerships or persons engaged in mining
exploration, development and exploitation, the
Bureau of Mines shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide case
involving:

(c) cancellation and/or enforcement of mining


contracts
due
to
the
refusal
of
the
claimowner/operator to abide by the terms and
conditions thereof.
Analyzing the objectives of P.D. 1281, particularly
said Section 7 thereof, the Court in Twin Peaks
Mining Association, the case relied upon by
petitioner, noted that the trend is to make the
adjudication
of
mining
cases
a
purely
administrative matter.
In the case at bar, it is not disputed that the subject
agreement is a mining contract and private
respondent, in seeking a judicial declaration of its
nullity, does not wish to abide by its terms and
conditions. These elements alone bring the action
within the ambit of Section 7 of P.D. 1281.
Whatever the basis for the refusal to abide by the
contract's terms and conditions, the basic issue
remains one of its cancellation, which is precisely
what P.D. No. 1281 places within the exclusive
original jurisdiction for the Bureau.

Machete, et al. vs. CA


20,1995)
GR 109093

(November

Facts:
Private respondent Celestino Villalon filed a
complaint with the RTC of Tagbilaran City against
herein petitioners for collection of back rentals and
damages arising from a leasehold agreement.
Petitioners claim that jurisdiction over the
complaint is vested with the DAR and not the RTC
since the case arose out of agrarian relations.
Petitioners move to dismiss the complaint which
the trial court granted. The RTC also denied the
motion for reconsideration. Respondent sought for
the annulment of both orders, which was granted
by the CA. Thus, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the
complaint.
Held:
No. Section 17 of E.O. 229 vested the DAR with
quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters as well as exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving
implementation of agrarian reform except those

CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM

falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the


Department of Agriculture and Department of
Environment and Natural Resources in accordance
with law.
There exists an agrarian dispute in the case at
bench which is exclusively cognizable by the
DARAB. The failure of petitioners to pay back
rentals pursuant to the leasehold contract with
private respondent is an issue which is clearly
beyond the legal competence of the trial court to
resolve. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does
not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction
over which is initially lodged with an administrative
body of special competence.

Lupangco vs. CA (G.R. No. 77372)


Facts:
On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued
Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional
Instructions to Examinees," to all those applying for
admission to take the licensure examinations in
accountancy:
No examinee shall attend any review class,
briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or
shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any
tip from any school, college or university, or any
review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer,
instructor official or employee of any of the
aforementioned or similar institutions during the
three
days
immediately
proceeding
every
examination day including examination day.
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be
subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art.
III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission.
On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all
reviewees preparing to take the licensure
examinations in accountancy schedule on October
25 and November 2 of the same year, filed on their
own behalf of all others similarly situated like them,
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint
for injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a
writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent
PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the abovementioned resolution and to declare the same
unconstitutional.
Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on
October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower
court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the
enforcement of its resolution. In an Order of
October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it

had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the


respondent commission from enforcing and giving
effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be
unconstitutional.
Not
satisfied
therewith,
respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, an appeal
with the Court of Appeals. The petition was
granted.
Issue:
Whether or not Resolution No. 105 is constitutional.
Held:
CA stated as basis its conclusion that PCS and RTC
are co-equal branches. They relied heavily on the
case of National Electrification Administration vs.
Mendoza where the Court held that a Court of First
Instance cannot interfere with the orders of SEC,
the two being a co-equal branch.
SC said the cases cited by CA are not in point. It is
glaringly apparent that the reason why the Court
ruled that the Court of First Instance could not
interfere with the orders of SEC was that this was
provided for by the law. Nowhere in the said cases
was it held that a Court of First Instance has no
jurisdiction over all other government agencies. On
the contrary, the ruling was specifically limited to
the SEC. The respondent court erred when it place
he SEC and PRC in the same category. There is no
law providing for the next course of action for a
party who wants to question a ruling or order of the
PRC. What is clear from PD No. 223 is that PRC is
attached to the Office of the President for general
direction and coordination. Well settled in our
jurisprudence the view that even acts of the Office
of the President may be reviewed by the RTC. In
view of the foregoing, SC rules that RTC has
jurisdiction to entertain the case and enjoin PRC
from enforcing its resolution.
As to the validity of Resolution No. 105, although
the resolution has a commendable purpose which
is to preserve the integrity and purity of the
licensure
examinations,
the
resolution
is
unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even
attend and review class, briefing, conference or the
like or receive hand-out, review material, or any tip
from any school, college or university, or any
review center. The unreasonableness is more
obvious in that one who is caught committing the
prohibited acts even without ill motives will be
barred from taking future examinations.
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and
arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees right
to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. PRC has
no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how
they should prepare themselves for the licensure
examinations specially if the steps they take are
lawful.

CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM

Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is


that it violates the academic freedom of the
schools concerned. PRC cannot interfere with the
conduct of review that review schools and centers
believe would best enable their enrollees to pass
the examination. Unless the means and methods of
instruction are clearly found to be inefficient,
impractical, or riddled with corruption, review
schools and centers may not be stopped from
helping out their students.
The enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a
guarantee that the alleged leakages in the
licensure examinations will be eradicated or at
least minimized. What is needed to be done by the
respondent is to find out the source of such
leakages and stop it right there.
The decision of the CA was REVERSE and SET
ASIDE.

[G.R. No. 101345. December 1, 1992.]


NONITO J. BERNARDO, Petitioner, v.
CALTEX
(PHILIPPINES),
INC., Respondent.
FACTS: The "operator/dealer" involved is the
petitioner, Nonito J. Bernardo, and the "oil
company," the respondent Caltex (Philippines), Inc..
Bernardo operates two (2) Caltex gasoline stations.
On December 3, 1990, Bernardo Placed with the
Caltex Pandacan Terminal an order for 10,000 liters
of diesel fuel. He made full payment therefor in the
sum of P57,937.50 on the same day. On December
4, 1990, he placed with the same terminal another
order, this time for 10,000 liters of premium
gasoline for which he also made full payment in
the amount of P84,193.50 on December 5, 1990.
Bernardo sent his tanker to the Pandacan Terminal
as early as 11:20 oclock in the morning of
December 5, 1990, to take delivery of the
petroleum products thus purchased. But despite
waiting until 6 P.M. on that day, the tankers driver
failed to take delivery, because Caltexs computers
system had allegedly malfunctioned and broken
down. It appears that on that same day, December
5, 1930, the Energy Regulatory Board announced
an increase in the prices of petroleum products
effective at 6 oclock in the evening of that day.
According to Caltex," (a)t exactly 6:00 in the
evening of December 5, 1990, . . . (it) had to cut-off
the delivery or hauling by dealers of products in
order to make the necessary adjustments in its
computers as a result of the price increase.
Demands subsequently made by Bernardo for

delivery of the petroleum products paid for by him,


10 were refused by Caltex unless Bernardo paid the
difference between the old and new prices. Caltex
claimed, in justification of its refusal, that when
Bernardo demanded "delivery of his orders, the
prices had already increased due to the ERB order
on
December
5,
1990,"
On January 8, 1991, Bernardo filed a complaint in
the Regional Trial Court at Quezon City Caltex
moved to dismiss under date of January 23, 1991,
on the ground that (a) venue was improperly laid
it being provided in the parties Purchase and Sale
Agreement that in case "of any judicial proceedings
to enforce any or all of the terms or conditions of . .
. (said) Agreement, BUYER shall submit itself to the
jurisdiction of the Court of the City of Manila or to
SELLERs places of transactions at SELLERs option.
ISSUE: W/N the Energy Regulatory Board or the
Courts have original jurisdiction over the instant
case
HELD: The controversy between Caltex and
Bernardo cannot be characterized as a dispute
within the original jurisdiction of the Energy
Regulatory Board, which as already stated, extends
to" (a)ll disputes between any operator/dealer and
an oil company regarding dealership agreement
except those arising out of their relationship as
debtor and creditor . . . ." It is rather one cognizable
by the Regional Trial Court, as a dispute indeed
"arising out of their relationship as debtor and
creditor." As the facts make clearly apparent, there
is no "unsettled dispute as regards the pricing of
the . . . (petroleum) products," as the Regional Trial
Court opines in its challenged Order of August 14,
1991. On the contrary, the parties are in
agreement about the prices of the petroleum
products in question which became effective on
December 5, 1990 at 6 oclock P.M., and those
prevailing prior thereto. Their disagreement is as
regards which of the two sets of prices shall apply
to the transactions subject of Bernardos complaint.
Neither do the parties impugn the validity or the
propriety or wisdom of the specific exercise by the
Energy Regulatory Board of its power "to fix and
regulate the prices of petroleum products," or its
power of supervision over the operations and
activities, generally, of persons and entities dealing
in oil and petroleum products, as said Regional Trial
Court posits in its order of August 14, 1991. What
the controversy is all about, to repeat, is simply the
prices at which the petroleum products shall be
deemed to have been purchased from Caltex by
Bernabe in December, 1990. This is obviously a
civil law question, one determinable according to
the provisions of the Civil Code and hence, beyond

CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM

the cognizance of the Energy Regulatory Board of


the Oil Industry Commission.

MANCHESTER
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, ET AL.,
petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
STEPHEN RO
XAS, ANDREW
LUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE
MAISIP,
respondents.
FACTS:
A complaint for specific performance was filed
by Manchester Development Corporation against
City Land Development Corporation to compel
the latter to execute a deed of sale in favor
Manchester. Manchester also alleged that City Land
forfeited the formers tender of payment for a
certain transaction thereby causing damages to
Manchester amounting to P78,750,000.00. This
amount was alleged in the BODY of their Complaint
but it was not reiterated in the PRAYER of same
complaint. Manchester paid a docket fee of
P410.00 only. Said docket fee is premised on the
allegation of Manchester that their action is
primarily for specific performance hence it is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. The court ruled
that there is an under assessment of docket fees
hence it ordered Manchester to amend its
complaint. Manchester complied but what it did
was to lower the amount of claim for damages
to
P10M. Said amount was however again not stated
in the PRAYER.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amended complaint should be
admitted.
HELD:
No. The docket fee, its computation, should be
based on the original complaint. A case is
deemed filed only
upon
payment
of
the
appropriate docket fee regardless of the actual
date of filing in court. Here, since the proper
docket fee was not paid for the original complaint,
its as if there is no complaint to speak of. As a
consequence, there is no original complaint
duly filed which can be amended. So, any

subsequent proceeding taken in consideration of


the amended complaint is void.
Manchesters defense that this case is primarily
an action for specific performance is not
merited. The Supreme Court ruled that based on
the allegations and the prayer of the complaint,
this case is an action for damages and for specific
performance. Hence, it is capable of pecuniary
estimation. Further, the amount for damages in
the original complaint was already provided in
the body of the complaint. Its omission in the
PRAYER clearly constitutes
an attempt to evade the payment of the proper
filing fees. To stop the happenstance of similar
irregularities in the future, the Supreme Court
ruled that from this case on, all complaints,
petitions, answers and other similar pleadings
should specify the amount of damages being
prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but
also in the prayer, and said damages shall be
considered in the assessment of the filing fees in
any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with
this requirement shall not bib accepted nor
admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from
the record.
by Godofredo Pineda at the RTC of Tagum for
recovery of possession (accion publiciana) against
three defendants, namely Antonio Noel, Ponciano
Panes, and Maximo Tacay. Pineda was the owner of
790 sq. meter land evidence by TCT No. T-56560.
The previous owner of such land allowed the three
defendants to use or occupy the same by mere
tolerance. Pineda having himself the need to use
the property, demanded the defendants to vacate
the premises and pay reasonable rental therefore,
but such demands were refused. The complaint
was challenged in the Motions to Dismiss filed by
each defendant alleging that it did not specify the
amounts of actual, nominal and exemplary
damages, nor the assessed value of the property,
that being a ground to bar the determination of the
RTCs jurisdiction in deciding the case. The Motions
to Dismiss were denied and the claims for damages
in the complaint were expunged for failure to
specify the amounts. Thus, the defendants filed a
Joint Petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition, as well as a temporary restraining order
against the RTC.
ISSUE: WON THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES CLAIMED
AND THE ASSESSED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY ARE
RELEVANT IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE
COURTS JURISDICTION IN A CASE FOR RECOVERY
OF POSSESSION OF PROPERTY.
HELD: Yes. Where the action involves real property
and a related claim for damages as well, the legal
fees shall be assessed on the basis of both (a) the
value of the property and (b) the total amount of

CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM

10

related damages sought. The Court acquires


jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the
initiatory pleading is accompanied by the payment
of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid at
the time of the filing of the pleading, as of the time
of full payment of the fees within such reasonable
time as the court may grant, unless, of course,
prescription has set in the meantime. But where-as
in the case at bar-the fees prescribed for an action
involving real property have been paid, but the
amounts of certain of the related damages (actual,
moral and nominal) being demanded are
unspecified, the action may not be dismissed. The
Court undeniably has jurisdiction over the action
involving the real property, acquiring it upon the
filing of the complaint or similar pleading and
payment of the prescribed fee. And it is not
divested of that authority by the circumstance that
it may not have acquired jurisdiction over the
accompanying claims for damages because of lack
of specification thereof. What should be done is
simply to expunge those claims for damages as to
which no amounts are stated, which is what the
respondent Courts did, or allow, on motion, a
reasonable time for the amendment of the
complaints so as to allege the precise amount of
each item of damages and accept payment of the
requisite fees therefore within the relevant
prescriptive period.

TACAY v RTC of TAGUM DIGEST


MAXIMO TACAY, PONCIANO PANES and ANTONIA
NOEL,
petitioners,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TAGUM Davao del
Norte, Branches 1 and 2, Presided by Hon. Marcial
Fernandez and Hon. Jesus Matas, respectively,
PATSITA
GAMUTAN,
Clerk
of
Court,
and
GODOFREDO
PINEDA,
respondents.
G.R. Nos. 88075-77 December 20, 1989
FACTS: These were two separate cases originally
filed by Godofredo Pineda at the RTC of Tagum for
recovery of possession (accion publiciana) against
three defendants, namely Antonio Noel, Ponciano
Panes, and Maximo Tacay. Pineda was the owner of
790 sq. meter land evidence by TCT No. T-56560.
The previous owner of such land allowed the three
defendants to use or occupy the same by mere
tolerance. Pineda having himself the need to use
the property, demanded the defendants to vacate
the premises and pay reasonable rental therefore,
but such demands were refused. The complaint
was challenged in the Motions to Dismiss filed by
each defendant alleging that it did not specify the
amounts of actual, nominal and exemplary
damages, nor the assessed value of the property,
that being a ground to bar the determination of the
RTCs jurisdiction in deciding the case. The Motions

to Dismiss were denied and the claims for damages


in the complaint were expunged for failure to
specify the amounts. Thus, the defendants filed a
Joint Petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition, as well as a temporary restraining order
against the RTC.
ISSUE: WON THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES CLAIMED
AND THE ASSESSED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY ARE
RELEVANT IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE
COURTS JURISDICTION IN A CASE FOR RECOVERY
OF POSSESSION OF PROPERTY.
HELD: Yes. Where the action involves real property
and a related claim for damages as well, the legal
fees shall be assessed on the basis of both (a) the
value of the property and (b) the total amount of
related damages sought. The Court acquires
jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the
initiatory pleading is accompanied by the payment
of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid at
the time of the filing of the pleading, as of the time
of full payment of the fees within such reasonable
time as the court may grant, unless, of course,
prescription has set in the meantime. But where-as
in the case at bar-the fees prescribed for an action
involving real property have been paid, but the
amounts of certain of the related damages (actual,
moral and nominal) being demanded are
unspecified, the action may not be dismissed. The
Court undeniably has jurisdiction over the action
involving the real property, acquiring it upon the
filing of the complaint or similar pleading and
payment of the prescribed fee. And it is not
divested of that authority by the circumstance that
it may not have acquired jurisdiction over the
accompanying claims for damages because of lack
of specification thereof. What should be done is
simply to expunge those claims for damages as to
which no amounts are stated, which is what the
respondent Courts did, or allow, on motion, a
reasonable time for the amendment of the
complaints so as to allege the precise amount of
each item of damages and accept payment of the
requisite fees therefore within the relevant
prescriptive period.

ELENA JANE DUARTE, Petitioner, vs.


MIGUEL
SAMUEL
A.E.
DURAN,
Respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts: Respondent sold to petitioner with the help
of a common friend, Dy, a laptop computer which
petitioner paid through installment basis for a total
of P15k. Petitioner gave P5k as initial payment, and
then later paid P3k as promised, wherein Dy signed
a handwritten receipt allegedly made by petitioner

CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM

11

as proof of payment. But when Dy returned to get


the remaining balance, petitioner offered to pay
only P2k claiming that the laptop was only worth
P10k. Due to the refusal of petitioner to pay the
remaining balance, respondent sent petitioner a
demand letter.
Petitioner claimed that there was no contract of
sale. Petitioner said that respondent loaned P5k
and left the laptop with petitioner as security. When
petitioner refused to give it back, Dy then asked
petitioner to lend an additional P3k to respondent.
Petitioner gave the money under agreement that
the amounts she lent to respondent would be
considered as partial payments for the laptop in
case she decides to buy it. Sometime in March
2002, petitioner decided not to buy the laptop.
Respondent, however, refused to pay and insisted
that petitioner purchase the laptop instead.
MTCC: ruled in favor of respondent.
RTC: reversed the MTCC Decision.
CA: reversed the RTC Decision and reinstated the
Decision of the MTCC. Denied MR of petitioner.
Petitioners Arguments: filing of the Petition for
Review with the CA on June 1, 2004 was beyond
the reglementary period. Respondent received a
copy of the RTC Decision on March 25, 2004, filed a
Motion for Reconsideration on April 12, 2004 since
April 9 and 10 were holidays and April 11, 2004 was
a Sunday, and received a copy of the RTC Order
denying his MR on May 27, 2004. Thus, he only had
one day left from May 27, 2004 within which to file
a Petition for Review with the CA.
Respondents Arguments: Petition for Review
was timely filed with the CA because he has 15
days from receipt of the RTC Order dated May 13,
2004 within which to file a Petition for Review with
the CA under Section 1 of Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court. Respondent defends the ruling of the CA by
arguing that the receipt dated February 18, 2002 is
an actionable document, and thus, petitioners
failure to deny under oath its genuineness and due
execution constitutes an admission thereof.
Issue: WON the respondents filing of the Petition
for Review with the CA was beyond the
reglementary period.
Ruling: The Petition for Review was timely filed
with the CA.
Neypes v. Court of Appeals: litigants must be given
a fresh period of 15 days within which to appeal,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration

under Rules 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45 of the Rules of


Court.
Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. Homena-Valencia:
above ruling retroactively applies even to cases
pending prior to the promulgation of Neypes on
September 14, 2005, there being no vested rights
in the rules of procedure.
Since the instant case was pending in the CA at the
time Neypes was promulgated, respondent is
entitled to a fresh period of 15 days, counted from
May 27, 2004, the date respondent received the
RTC Order dated May 13, 2004 denying his motion
for reconsideration of the RTC Decision dated March
19, 2004 or until June 11, 2004, within which to file
his Petition for Review with the CA. Thus, we find
that when he filed the Petition for Review with the
CA on June 1, 2004, his period to appeal had not
yet lapsed.

CABILI,- versus -BALINDONG


A.M. No. RTJ-10-2225
(formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 09-3182-RTJ)
Fact
Civil Case No. 06-2954[2] is an action for
damages in Branch 6 of the Iligan City
RTC against the Mindanao State University
(MSU), et al., arising from a vehicular accident that
caused the death of Jesus Ledesma and physical
injuries to several others.
On November 29, 1997, the Iligan City RTC
rendered a Decision, holding the MSU liable for
damages. The (CA) affirmed the RTC decision and
the CA decision subsequently lapsed to finality.
On January 19, 2009, Entry of Judgment was made.
[3]

On March 10, 2009, the Iligan City RTC


issued a writ of execution. [4] The MSU, failed to
comply with the writ; thus, on March 24, 2009,
Sheriff Gerard Peter Gaje served a Notice of
Garnishment on the MSUs depository bank, the
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Marawi City
Branch.[5]
The Office of the Solicitor General
opposed the motion for execution, albeit
belatedly, in behalf of MSU.[6] The Iligan City
RTC denied the opposition in its March 31,
2009 Order. The MSU responded to the denial
by filing on April 1, 2009 a petition with the
Marawi
City
RTC, for
prohibition
and mandamus with an application for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or preliminary injunction against
the LBP and Sheriff Gaje.[7] The petition of

CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM

12

MSU was raffled to the RTC, Marawi City,


Branch 8, presided by respondent Judge.
The respondent Judge issued a TRO
restraining
Sheriff
Gaje
from
garnishing P2,726,189.90 from MSUs LBP-Marawi
City Branch account.[9]
On May 8, 2009, complainant Atty. Tomas
Ong Cabili, counsel of the private plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 06-2954, filed the complaint charging the
respondent Judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law,
Grave Abuse of Authority, Abuse of Discretion,
and/or Grave Misconduct Prejudicial to the Interest
of the Judicial Service for interfering with the order
of a co-equal court, Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC,
by issuing the TRO to enjoin Sheriff Gaje from
garnishing P2,726,189.90 from MSUs LBP-Marawi
City Branch account.[13]
The respondent Judge denied that he
interfered with the order of Branch 6 of the Iligan
City RTC.
In its December 3, 2009 Report, the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) found the
respondent Judge guilty of gross ignorance of the
law for violating the elementary rule of noninterference with the proceedings of a court of coequal jurisdiction.[16] It recommended a fine
of P40,000.00, noting that this is the
respondent Judges second offense.
Issue: WON respondent judge committed
grave abuse of authority, gross ignorance of
the law and abuse of discretion for
interfering with the order of a co-equal court.
The Courts Ruling
Yes.
The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference
in the regular orders or judgments of a co-equal
court is an elementary principle in the
administration of justice:[22] no court can interfere
by injunction with the judgments or orders of
another
court
of
concurrent
jurisdiction having the power to grant the relief
sought by the injunction.[23] The rationale for the
rule is founded on the concept of jurisdiction: a
court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and
renders judgment therein has jurisdiction over its
judgment, to the exclusion of all other
coordinate courts, for its execution and over
all
its
incidents,
and
to
control,
in
furtherance of justice, the conduct of
ministerial officers acting in connection with
this judgment.[24]

Thus, we have repeatedly held that a case


where an execution order has been issued is
considered as still pending, so that all the
proceedings on the execution are still proceedings
in the suit.[25] A court which issued a writ of
execution has the inherent power, for the
advancement of justice, to correct errors of its
ministerial officers and to control its own processes.
[26]
To hold otherwise would be to divide the
jurisdiction of the appropriate forum in the
resolution of incidents arising in execution
proceedings. Splitting of jurisdiction is obnoxious to
the orderly administration of justice.[27]
In the present case, the respondent Judge
clearly ignored the principle of judicial stability by
issuing a TRO to temporarily restrain [36] Sheriff Gaje
from enforcing the writ of execution issued by a coequal court, Branch 6 of the Iligan City RTC, and
from pursuing the garnishment of the amount
of P2,726,189.90 from MSUs account with the LBP,
Marawi City Branch. The respondent Judge was
aware that he was acting on matters pertaining to
the execution phase of a final decision of a coequal and coordinate court since he even quoted
MSUs allegations in his April 8, 2009 Order.[37]
The respondent Judge should have refrained
from acting on the petition because Branch 6 of the
Iligan City RTC retains jurisdiction to rule on any
question on the enforcement of the writ of
execution. Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
(terceria), cited in the course of the Courts
deliberations, finds no application to this case since
this provision applies to claims made by a third
person, other than the judgment obligor or his
agent;[38] a third-party claimant of a property
under execution may file a claim with another
court[39] which, in the exercise of its own
jurisdiction, may issue a temporary restraining
order. In this case, the petition for injunction
before the respondent Judge was filed by
MSU itself, the judgment obligor. If Sheriff Gaje
committed any irregularity or exceeded his
authority in the enforcement of the writ, the proper
recourse for MSU was to file a motion with, or an
application for relief from, the same court which
issued the decision, not from any other court, [40] or
to elevate the matter to the CA on a petition
for certiorari.[41] In this case, MSU filed the proper
motion with the Iligan City RTC (the issuing court),
but, upon denial, proceeded to seek recourse
through another co-equal court presided over by
the respondent Judge.

CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM

13

TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY


Jurisdiction) 23 SCRA 29

Question

on

CFI's

TIJAM vs. SIBONGHANOY (23 SCRA 29)


(Question on Court of First Instance's* Jurisdiction)
Digested
Case
FACTS: Tijam filed for recovery of P1,908 + legal
interest from Sibongahanoy. Defendants filed a
counter bond with Manila Surety and Fidelity Co
(Surety). Judgement was in favour of the plaintiffs,
a writ of execution was issued against the
defendant. Defendants moved for writ of execution
against surety which was granted. Surety moved to
quash the writ but was denied, appealed to CA
without raising the issue on lack of jurisdiction.
CA affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then
filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view of the
effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before
the filing of the petition for recovery. Act placed
original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all
civil actions for demands not exceeding 2,000
exclusive of interest. CA set aside its earlier
decision and referred the case to SC since it has
exclusive jurisdiction over "all cases in which the
jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue.
ISSUE: WON Surety bond is estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the CFI Cebu for the
first
time
upon
appeal.
HELD: YES, SC believes that that the Surety is now
barred by laches from invoking this plea after
almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its
motion to dismiss raising the question of lack of
jurisdiction for the first time - A party may be
estopped or barred from raising a question in
different ways and for different reasons. Thus we
speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by
record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a
general sense is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier - Furthermore, it has
also been held that after voluntarily submitting a
cause and encountering an adverse decision on the
merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirable
practice" of a party submitting his case for decision
and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable,
and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when
adverse.
: Other merits on the appeal : The surety insists
that the lower court should have granted its motion

to quash the writ of execution because the same


was issued without the summary hearing Summary hearing is "not intended to be carried on
in the formal manner in which ordinary actions are
prosecuted" (83 C.J.S. 792). It is, rather, a
procedure by which a question is resolved "with
dispatch, with the least possible delay, and in
preference to ordinary legal and regular judicial
proceedings" (Ibid, p. 790). What is essential is that
"the defendant is notified or summoned to appear
and is given an opportunity to hear what is urged
upon him, and to interpose a defense, after which
follows an adjudication of the rights of the parties In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of
the plaintiffs' motion for execution and of the date
when the same would be submitted for
consideration. In fact, the surety's counsel was
present in court when the motion was called, and it
was upon his request that the court a quo gave him
a period of four days within which to file an answer.
Yet he allowed that period to lapse without filing an
answer or objection. The surety cannot now,
therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day
in court. The orders appealed from are affirmed.
*now MTC

G.R. No. 173915


February 22, 2010
IRENE SANTE AND REYNALDO SANTE,
Petitioners, - versus - HON. EDILBERTO T.
CLARAVALL,
in
his
capacity
as
Presiding
Judge
of
Branch
60,
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
and VITA N. KALASHIAN,
Respondents.
FACTS: 1) In April 2004, private respondent Vita
Kalashian filed before RTC Baguio a complaint for
damages against petitioners Irene Sante and
Reynaldo Sante. Respondent alleged that while she
was inside the Police Station in Pangasinan, and in
the presence of other persons and police officers,
Irene Sante uttered the words, How many rounds
of sex did you have last night with your boss, Bert?
You fuckin bitch! Bert refers to a friend of the
respondent and one of her hired security guards in
said station, and a suspect in the killing of
petitioners close relative.
Petitioners also allegedly went around Pangasinan
telling people that she is protecting and cuddling
the suspects in the aforesaid killing. Thus,
respondent prayed for the following:

CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM

14

Moral Damages

300,000

Exemplary Damages

50, 000

Attorneys fees

50, 000

Litigation expenses

20, 000

2) Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the


ground of jurisdiction. They claimed that the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities instead of RTC Baguio
should take cognizance. They argued that the
amount of the claim for moral damages was not
more
than
the
jurisdictional
amount
of
P300,000.00, because the claim for exemplary
damages should be excluded in computing the total
claim.
3) The trial court denied the motion to dismiss on
the ground that the amount of demand P420,000
was above the jurisdictional amount for MTCCs
outside Metro Manila.
4) Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the CA. Meanwhile, respondent
filed an amended complaint increasing the claim
for moral damages to P1,000,000. Petitioners then
filed a motion to dismiss which was denied.
5) Petitioners AGAIN filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with the CA, raising that RTC Baguio
committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the
amended complaint. CA ruled in favor of
petitioners, stating that MTCC had jurisdiction
because considering ONLY the demand for
P300,000 moral damages. The CA held that the
demand for exemplary damages was merely
incidental.
6) Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUES:
a) Whether RTC acquired jurisdiction of the case
b) Whether RTC committed grave abuse
discretion in allowing the amended complaint

attorneys fees and litigation expenses, should be


included in determining jurisdiction.
The exclusion of the term damages of whatever
kind in determining the jurisdictional amount
under B.P. Blg. 129 applies to cases where the
damages are merely incidental to or a consequence
of the main cause of action. However, in cases
where the claim for damages is the main
cause of action, or one of the causes of
action, the amount of such claim shall be
considered in determining the jurisdiction of
the court.
In the instant case, the complaint filed is for the
recovery of damages for the acts of the petitioners.
The complaint principally sought an award of moral
and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees
and litigation expenses, for the alleged shame and
injury suffered by respondent. Jurisdiction is
conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the
complaint since the latter comprises a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the
plaintiffs causes of action. It is clear, based on the
allegations of the complaint, that respondents
main action is for damages. Hence, the other
forms of damages being claimed by respondent,
e.g., exemplary damages, attorneys fees and
litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to or
consequences of the main action but constitute the
primary relief prayed for in the complaint.
Considering that the total amount of damages
claimed was P420,000.00, the Court of Appeals was
correct in ruling that the RTC had jurisdiction over
the case.
The Supreme Court also stated that since at the
time of the filing of the complaint on April 5, 2004,
the MTCCs jurisdictional amount has already been
adjusted to P300,000.00, there is no doubt that the
RTC has jurisdiction over the case sice the tital
amount of damages being claimed y the petitioner
in the case was P420,000.00.

of

HELD: YES. RTC acquired jurisdiction. Hence, there


was no grave abuse of discretion.
PETITIONERS CONTENTION: The claim for moral
damages, in the amount of P300,000.00 in the
original complaint, is the main action. The
exemplary damages being discretionary should not
be included in the computation of the jurisdictional
amount. Thus, RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in allowing the amended complaint.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: The nature of her
complaint is for recovery of damages. As such, the
totality of the claim for damages, including the
exemplary damages as well as the other damages
alleged and prayed in the complaint, such as

G.R. No. 171092 March 15, 2010


EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER, Petitioner, vs.
BRITISH AIRWAYS, Respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Jurisdiction is a power introduced for the public
good, on account of the necessity of dispensing
justice.
EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER, Petitioner,
vs.
BRITISH AIRWAYS, Respondent.
Facts: On April 28, 2005, petitioner Edna Diago
Lhuillier filed a Complaint 2 for damages against

CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM

15

respondent British Airways before the Regional Trial


Court (RTC) of Makati City. She alleged that on
February 28, 2005, she took respondents flight 548
from London, United Kingdom to Rome, Italy. Once
on board, she allegedly requested Julian Halliday
(Halliday), one of the respondents flight
attendants, to assist her in placing her hand-carried
luggage in the overhead bin. However, Halliday
allegedly refused to help and assist her, and even
sarcastically remarked that "If I were to help all 300
passengers in this flight, I would have a broken
back!"
Petitioner further alleged that when the
plane was about to land in Rome, Italy, another
flight attendant, Nickolas Kerrigan (Kerrigan),
singled her out from among all the passengers in
the business class section to lecture on plane
safety. Allegedly, Kerrigan made her appear to the
other passengers to be ignorant, uneducated,
stupid, and in need of lecturing on the safety rules
and regulations of the plane. Affronted, petitioner
assured Kerrigan that she knew the planes safety
regulations being a frequent traveler. Thereupon,
Kerrigan allegedly thrust his face a mere few
centimeters away from that of the petitioner and
menacingly told her that "We dont like your
attitude."
Upon arrival in Rome, petitioner complained
to respondents ground manager and demanded an
apology. However, the latter declared that the flight
stewards were "only doing their job."
Thus, petitioner filed the complaint for
damages, praying that respondent be ordered to
pay P5 million as moral damages, P2 million as
nominal damages, P1 million as exemplary
damages, P300,000.00
as
attorneys
fees,P200,000.00 as litigation expenses, and cost
of the suit.
Issue: Whether Philippine courts have jurisdiction
over a tortious conduct committed against a
Filipino citizen and resident by airline personnel of
a foreign carrier travelling beyond the territorial
limit of any foreign country; and thus is outside the
ambit of the Warsaw Convention.
Held: The Warsaw Convention applies because the
air travel, where the alleged tortious conduct
occurred, was between the United Kingdom and
Italy, which are both signatories to the Warsaw
Convention.
Article 1 of the Warsaw Convention provides:
1.
This
Convention
applies
to
all international
carriage of
persons,
luggage or goods performed by aircraft for
reward. It applies equally to gratuitous
carriage by aircraft performed by an air
transport undertaking.

2. For the purposes of this Convention the


expression "international carriage" means
any carriage in which, according to the
contract made by the parties, the place of
departure and the place of destination,
whether or not there be a break in the
carriage or a transhipment, are situated
either within the territories of two High
Contracting Parties, or within the territory of
a single High Contracting Party, if there is an
agreed stopping place within a territory
subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty,
mandate or authority of another Power,
even though that Power is not a party to this
Convention. A carriage without such an
agreed stopping place between territories
subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty,
mandate or authority of the same High
Contracting Party is not deemed to be
international for the purposes of this
Convention. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, when the place of departure and the place of
destination in a contract of carriage are situated
within the territories of two High Contracting
Parties, said carriage is deemed an "international
carriage". The High Contracting Parties referred to
herein were the signatories to the Warsaw
Convention and those which subsequently adhered
to it.
In the case at bench, petitioners place of
departure was London, United Kingdom while her
place of destination was Rome, Italy. Both the
United Kingdom and Italy signed and ratified the
Warsaw Convention. As such, the transport of the
petitioner is deemed to be an "international
carriage" within the contemplation of the Warsaw
Convention.

DE LA LLANA VS ALBA
FACTS: In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled
An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating
Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, was
passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in Olongapo,
was assailing its validity because, first of all, he
would be one of the judges that would be removed
because of the reorganization and second, he said
such law would contravene the constitutional
provision which provides the security of tenure of
judges of the courts. He averred that only the
Supreme Court can remove judges NOT the
Congress.

CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM

16

ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La


Llana can be validly removed by the legislature by
such statute (BP 129).
HELD: Yes. The
SC
ruled
the
following
way: Moreover, this Court is empowered to
discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of
at least eight members, order their dismissal.
Thus it possesses the competence to remove
judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President
who was vested with such power.
Removal is, of course, to be distinguished
from termination by virtue of the abolition of
the office. There can be no tenure to a nonexistent office. After the abolition, there is in
law no occupant. In case of removal, there is
an office with an occupant who would thereby
lose his position. It is in that sense that from
the standpoint of strict law, the question of
any impairment of security of tenure does not
arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior
courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As
to its effect, no distinction exists between removal
and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is
devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member
of the judiciary. In the implementation of the
assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in
accordance
with
accepted
principles
of
constitutional construction that as far as incumbent
justices and judges are concerned, this Court be
consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest
consideration. No fear need be entertained that
there is a failure to accord respect to the basic
principle that this Court does not render advisory
opinions.
No question of law is involved. If such were the
case, certainly this Court could not have its say
prior to the action taken by either of the two
departments. Even then, it could do so but only by
way of deciding a case where the matter has been
put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who
shall be appointed to the vacant positions created
by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of
the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is
no departure therefore from the tried and tested
ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be
achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude
any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of
the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior
courts, the power of removal of the present
incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or
disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free
from any unconstitutional taint, even one not
readily discernible except to those predisposed to
view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction
would be in accordance with the basic principle
that in the choice of alternatives between one

which would save and another which would


invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.

C.T. TORRES ENTERPRISES, INC. v HIBIONADA,


DIONGON & PLEASANTVILLE DEVELOPMENT
CORP.
FACTS
As agent of Pleasantville Development Corp
(Pleasantville), C.T. Torres Enterprises (Torres) sold
a subdivision lot to Diongon. Having completed the
payments on installment, Diongon demanded the
delivery of the certificate of title to the subject
land. However, neither Pleasantville nor Torres
complied. This prompted Diongon to file a
complaint for specific performance with the RTC of
Negros Occidental.
Torres filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the case, as
it was the HLURB, which was the competent body
to hear and decide the case.
RTC denied the motion to dismiss on the premise
that pursuant to BP 129, a complaint for specific
performance with damages is a justiciable issue
under the New Civil Code and jurisdiction to hear
such issue is vested in the regular courts.
ISSUE
W/N the RTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide the
case
HELD
NO. The RTC failed to consider the express
provisions of PD 1344 and related decrees and
erred in supposing that only the regular courts can
interpret and apply the provisions of the Civil Code,
to the exclusion of the quasi-judicial bodies.
PD 957 (Subdivision and Condo Buyers'
Protective Decree) provides that the NHA
shall have the exclusive authority to
regulate the real estate trade and business.
PD 1344 empowered the NHA to issue writs of
execution in the enforcement of its
decisions under PD 957 and specified its
quasi-judicial
jurisdiction
over
cases
involving
specific
performance
of
contractual and statutory obligations filed
by buyers of subdivision lots or condo units,
among others.
EO 648 transferred the regulatory functions

CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM

17

conferred on the NHA (under PDs 957 and


1344) to the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission (HSRC), which was renamed
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) by EO 90.
Under PD 1344, it is clear that the complaint for
specific performance for damages filed by Diongon
with the RTC comes under the jurisdiction of the
HLURB. Diongon was a buyer of a subdivision lot
seeking specific performance of the seller's
obligation to deliver to him the corresponding
certificate of title.
The argument that only courts of justice can
adjudicate claims resoluble under the Civil Code is
out of step with the fast changing times. There are
hundreds of admin bodies now performing this
function by virtue of a valid authorization from the
legislature. This quasi-judicial function is exercised
by them as an incident of the principal power
entrusted to them of regulating certain activities
falling under their expertise.
A statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in
an admin agency over certain disputes and
controversies falling within the agency's special
expertise. The very definition of an admin agency
includes its being vested with quasi-judicial powers.
The ever increasing variety of powers and functions
given to admin agencies recognizes the need for
the active intervention of the admin agencies in
matters calling for technical knowledge and speed
in countless controversies which cannot possibly be
handled by the regular courts.
****
FAJARDO v BAUTISTA
*****
Benguet Corporation vs Oscar Leviste GR No.
L-65021
Benguet Corporation vs Hon. Oscar L. Leviste
GR No. L-65021
November 21,1991
Facts:
Helen Dizon-Reyes (private-respondent), "Helen"
for brevity, filed a case before RTC-Quezon City
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-30171 alleging
ownership over 11 mining claims and seeking the
cancellation of the Operations Agreement entered
into by Dizon Mines and Benguet Corporation.
The antecedent of the facts are as follows:

1. Helen appointed his father Celestino M. Dizon,


"Celestino" for brevity, by virtue of an SPA to be
her lawful representative to transfer, assign and
dispose her 11 mining claims.
2. Celestino, entered into an Agreement with
Dizon Mine granting Dizon Mine to explore,
develop, exploit and operate 57 mining claims,
which includes the 11 mining claims of Helen.
3. Helen and other claim-owners executed a Deed
of
Ratification
of
Assignment
thereby
confirming,
transferring,
conveying
and
assigning Dizon Mines to possess, occupy,
explore, develop and operate the mining claims.
4. Helen thereafter revoked the SPA. However
despite this revocation, Dizon Mines and
Benguet Corp. entered into an Operation
Agreement transferring to Benguet Corp. the
possession of the 57 mining claims.
5. Helen now claims that the Operation Agreement
lacks legal basis due to her revocation of the
SPA.
6. Benguet Corp. moved for the Dismissal of the
case based on different grounds, the cardinal
ground which is the focus of this case is that
the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter and nature of the action and the venue
was improperly laid.
Issue:
Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over
cancellation of mining contracts.
Ruling:
No, Section 7 of PD 1281 provides:
Section 7. In addition to its regulatory and
adjudicative functions over companies, partnership
or persons engaged in mining exploration,
development and exploitation, the Bureau of Mines
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases involving:
xxxx xxxx xxxx
(c) cancellation and/or enforcement of mining
contracts
due
to
refusal
of
the
claimowner/operator to abide the terms and conditions
thereof.
The court ruled that the subject agreement of this
case is a mining contract and Helen is seeking for
its nullity, does not wish to abide the terms and
condition of the said contract, thereby the said
case is within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Mines by virtue of Section 7 of PD 1281.
Sun v CA G.R. No. 89741 March 13, 1991
J. Paras
Facts:

CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM

18

Tan took from Sun Insurance a Php 300,000 policy


to cover his electrical store in Iloilo city. Tans
request for an indemnity in 1983 was repeatedly
denied, firstly in 1984. He wrote for a
reconsideration in the same year. This was rejected
in 1985, prompting him to file a civil case in the
same year. The insurance company filed a motion
to dismiss due to prescription in 1987, but this was
denied. The company went to the court of appeals
to petition the same thing, but this was denied.
Issue:
1. WON the filing of a motion for reconsideration
interrupts the twelve months prescriptive period to
contest the denial of the insurance claim.
2. WON the rejection of the claim shall be deemed
final only if it contains words to the effect that
denial is final. (ie. the first letter in 1984)
3. When does the cause of action accrue?
Held:
1.No
2.No
3. At the time of the first rejection of the insurance
company
Ratio:
1. The policy states in section 27.
Action or suit clause If a claim be made and
rejected and an action or suit be not commenced
either in the Insurance Commission or in any court
of competent jurisdiction within twelve (12) months
from receipt of notice of such rejection, or in case
of arbitration taking place as provided herein,
within twelve (12) months after due notice of the
award made by the arbitrator or arbitrators or
umpire, then the claim shall for all purposes be
deemed to have been abandoned and shall not
thereafter be recoverable hereunder.
Respondent Tan admitted that he received a copy
of the letter of rejection on April 2, 1984. Thus, the
12-month prescriptive period started to run from
the said date of April 2, 1984, under section 27.
2. It was clear in the letter.
Ang v. Fulton Fire Insurance Co.- The condition
contained in an insurance policy that claims must
be presented within one year after rejection is not
merely a procedural requirement but an important
matter essential to a prompt settlement of claims
against insurance companies as it demands that
insurance suits be brought by the insured while the
evidence as to the origin and cause of destruction
have not yet disappeared.

Therefore, there was a necessity of bringing suits


against the Insurer within one year from the
rejection of the claim. (1984) The contention of the
respondents that the one-year prescriptive period
does not start to run until the petition for
reconsideration had been resolved by the insurer
(1985), runs counter to the doctrine.
The provision in the contract was pursuant to Sec.
63.
A condition, stipulation or agreement in any policy
of insurance, limiting the time for commencing an
action thereunder to a period of less than one year
from the time when the cause of action accrues, is
void.
3. Eagle star- The right of the insured to the
payment of his loss accrues from the happening of
the loss. However, the cause of action in an
insurance contract does not accrue until the
insured's claim is finally rejected by the insurer.
This is because before such final rejection there is
no real necessity for bringing suit.
The cause of action, then, started when the insurer
denied his claim in the first instance(1984). This
rejection of a petition for reconsideration as
insisted by respondents wasnt the beginning of the
cause of action.
(PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIM)
G.R. No. 158090, October 04, 2010
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
(GSIS), PETITIONER, VS. HEIRS OF FERNANDO
F. CABALLERO
FACTS:
Fernando and his wife, Sylvia Caballero, secured a
mortgage secured by their residential lot from
petitioner Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) in the amount of P20,000.00. However,
Fernando defaulted on the payment of his loan with
the GSIS.
GSIS wrote a letter to Fernando,
informing him of the consolidation of title in its
favor, and requesting payment of monthly rental in
view of Fernando's continued occupancy of the
subject property. Negotiation as to repurchase also
takes place.
GSIS scheduled the subject property for a 2nd
public bidding after a failed negotiation with
Fernando to buy back his property. In this bidding,
Jocelyn Caballero, Fernandos daughter submitted a
bid but unfortunately defeated by CMTC. With this,
Fernando, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Kabacan, Cotabato a Complaint against CMTC,

CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM

19

the GSIS and its responsible officers Fernando


prayed, among others, that judgment be rendered:
declaring GSIS Board of Trustees Resolution No.
199, dated May 16, 1989, null and void for the
irregularities in the conduct of the bidding.
GSIS and its officers filed their Answer with
Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim. GSIS
alleged that Fernando owed of P130,365.81,
representing back rentals, including additional
interests from January 1973 to February 1987, and
the additional amount of P249,800.00. Caballero,
on the other hand, alleged that GSIS's counterclaim
is permissive and its failure to pay the prescribed
docket fees results into the dismissal of its claim.
After trial, the RTC, in its Decision, 1994, ruled in
favor of GSIS and dismissed the complaint. In the
same decision, the trial court granted GSIS's
counterclaim and directed Fernando to pay GSIS
the rentals paid by CMTC in the amount of
P249,800.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed an error of law in
holding that GSISs counterclaim of rentals
collected by the Caballeros against CMTC is in the
nature of a permissive counterclaim which required
the payment of GSIS of docket fees before the Trial
Court can acquire jurisdiction over the said
counterclaim.
HELD
YES. The test was also established by the Supreme
Court in this case to determine whether a
counterclaim is compulsory or not. The Court has
devised the following tests: (a) Are the issues of
fact and law raised by the claim and by the
counterclaim largely the same? (b) Would res
judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's
claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?
(c) Will substantially the same evidence support or
refute plaintiff's claim as well as the defendant's
counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical relation
between the claim and the counterclaim? A positive
answer to all four questions would indicate that the
counterclaim
is
compulsory.
Tested against the above-mentioned criteria, the
SC agreed with the CA's view that GSIS's
counterclaim for the recovery of the amount
representing rentals collected by Fernando from the
CMTC is permissive. The evidence needed by
Fernando to cause the annulment of the bid award,
deed of absolute sale and TCT is different from that

required to establish GSIS's claim for the recovery


of
rentals.
The issue in the main action, i.e., the nullity or
validity of the bid award, deed of absolute sale and
TCT in favor of CMTC, is entirely different from the
issue in the counterclaim, i.e., whether GSIS is
entitled to receive the CMTC's rent payments over
the subject property when it (GSIS) became the
owner of the subject property by virtue of the
consolidation of ownership of the property in its
favor.
The rule in permissive counterclaims is that for the
trial
court
to
acquire
jurisdiction,
the
counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed
docket fees. This, GSIS did not do, because it
asserted that its claim for the collection of rental
payments was a compulsory counterclaim. Since
petitioner failed to pay the docket fees, the RTC did
not acquire jurisdiction over its permissive
counterclaim. The judgment rendered by the RTC,
insofar as it ordered Fernando to pay GSIS the
rentals which he collected from CMTC, is considered
null and void. Any decision rendered without
jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck
down at any time, even on appeal before this
Court.
G.R. No. 170251, June 01 : 2011 CELIA S. VDA.
DE HERRERA, Petitioner, v. EMELITA
BERNARDO, EVELYN BERNARDO AS GUARDIAN
OF ERLYN, CRISLYN AND CRISANTO
BERNARDO, Respondents.
FACTS: Respondents heirs of Crisanto S. Bernardo,
represented by Emelita Bernardo, filed a complaint
before the Commission on the Settlement of Land
Problems (COSLAP) against Alfredo Herrera
(Alfredo) for interference, disturbance, unlawful
claim, harassment and trespassing over a portion
of a parcel of land situated at Barangay Dalig,
Cardona, Rizal, with an area of 7,993 square
meters. Respondents claimed that said parcel of
land was originally owned by their predecessor-ininterest, Crisanto Bernardo, and was later on
acquired by Crisanto S. Bernardo.The parcel of land
was later on covered by Tax Declaration No. CD006-0828 under the name of the respondents.
Petitioner, on the other hand, alleged that the
portion of the subject property consisting of about
700 square meters was bought by Diosdado
Herrera, Alfredo's father, from a certain Domingo
Villaran. Upon the death of Diosdado Herrera,
Alfredo inherited the 700-square-meter lot. The
COSLAP ruled that respondents have a rightful
claim over the subject property.ggrieved, petitioner

CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM

20

Celia S. Vda. de Herrera, as the surviving spouse of


Alfredo, filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.
The CA ruled that the COSLAP has exclusive
jurisdiction over the present case and, even
assuming that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over
the land dispute of the parties herein, petitioner is
already estopped from raising the issue of
jurisdiction because Alfredo failed to raise the issue
of lack of jurisdiction before the COSLAP and he
actively participated in the proceedings before the
said body. Petitioner averred that the COSLAP has
no adjudicatory powers to settle and decide the
question of ownership over the subject land.
Further, the present case cannot be classified as
explosive in nature as the parties never resorted to
violence in resolving the controversy. Petitioner
submits that it is the Regional Trial Court which has
jurisdiction over controversies relative to ownership
of the subject property.
ISSUE: Whether COSLAP has jurisdiction to decide
the question of ownership between the parties.
HELD: YES. CIVIL LAW: Jurisdiction of COSLAP The
COSLAP was created by virtue of Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 561, issued on September 21, 1979 by
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos.It is an
administrative body established as a means of
providing a mechanism for the expeditious
settlement of land problems among small settlers,
landowners and members of the cultural minorities
to avoid social unrest. Administrative agencies, like
the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction
that can only wield powers which are specifically
granted to it by its enabling statute.[8]Under
Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP has two
options in acting on a land dispute or problem
lodged before it, to wit: (a) refer the matter to the
agency
having
appropriate
jurisdiction
for
settlement/resolution; or (b) assume jurisdiction if
the matter is one of those enumerated in
paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of the law, if such case is
critical and explosive in nature, taking into account
the large number of parties involved, the presence
or emergence of social unrest, or other similar
critical situations requiring immediate action. In
resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a
case or to refer the same to the particular agency
concerned, the COSLAP has to consider the nature
or classification of the land involved, the parties to
the case, the nature of the questions raised, and
the need for immediate and urgent action thereon
to prevent injuries to persons and damage or
destruction to property. The law does not vest
jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land dispute or
problem In the instant case, the COSLAP has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of respondents'
complaint.The present case does not fall under any

of the cases enumerated under Section 3,


paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of E.O. No. 561.The dispute
between the parties is not critical and explosive in
nature, nor does it involve a large number of
parties, nor is there a presence or emergence of
social tension or unrest. It can also hardly be
characterized as involving a critical situation that
requires immediate action. Respondents' cause of
action before the COSLAP pertains to their claim of
ownership over the subject property, which is an
action involving title to or possession of real
property, or any interest therein, the jurisdiction of
which is vested with the Regional Trial Courts or the
Municipal Trial Courts depending on the assessed
value of the subject property Since the COSLAP has
no jurisdiction over the action, all the proceedings
therein, including the decision rendered, are null
and void. A judgment issued by a quasi-judicial
body without jurisdiction is void. It cannot be the
source of any right or create any obligation. All acts
performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating
from it have no legal effect. Having no legal effect,
the situation is the same as it would be as if there
was no judgment at all. It leaves the parties in the
position they were before the proceedings.
Respondents' allegation that petitioner is estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP by
reason of laches does not hold water. Petitioner is
not estopped from raising the jurisdictional issue,
because it may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by
waiver or by estoppel.[18] The fact that a person
attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a
court does not estop him from thereafter
challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter,
since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by
mere consent of the parties PETITION GRANTED.
BF CITILAND CORPORATION V. MARILYN B.
OTAKE
NATURE: Petition for review of the Resolutions of
CA under RULE 45
FACTS: BF Citiland Corporation is the registered
owner of a lot in Paraaque City, with an assessed
value of P48K. (based on Tax Declaration).
On 24 February 1987, respondent Merlinda B.
Bodullo bought the adjoining lot.
However, records show respondent occupied not
just the lot she purchased. She also encroached
upon petitioner's lot.
On 13 October 2000, petitioner filed in the
Metropolitan Trial Court a complaint for accion

CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM

21

publiciana praying:
1) that judgment be rendered ordering respondent
to vacate the subject lot;
2) that respondent be ordered to pay P15,000.00
per month by way of reasonable compensation
for the use of the lot.
The MeTC ruled in favor of BF Citiland (except rent
was P10K/month), even ordering Bodullo to pay
P20K attys fees & costs of the suit.
The MeTC also issued writ of execution & granted
the motion for special order of demolition.
Merlinda Bodulla filed in the RTC a petition for
certiorari under RULE 65, seeking dismissal of the
case in the MeTC for lack of jurisdiction.
RTC reversed the MeTC case dismissed, for lack of
jurisdiction;
alleging that a suit for accion
publiciana fell under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the RTC.
BF Citiland claimed Bodullon was estopped for
participating in all the proceedings of the MeTC.
Bodullon countered: lack of jurisdiction can be
raised any time.
BF Citiland filed a petition for review under RULE
42: PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM REGIONAL
TRIAL COURTS TO THE COURT OF APPEALS.
CA dismissed case - saying the proper appeal from
the RTC decision is by way of notice of appeal.
Hence, BF Citiland filed this Petition for Review in
the SC.
ISSUES:
1) What is the proper mode of appeal from the
decision of the RTC?
2) Who has jurisdiction on the accion publiciana
case?
HELD:
1.) Notice of Appeal because the RTC decided
the case in the exercise of its Original Jurisdiction.
i.e. The case filed in the RTC was an Original Action
for Petition for Review on Certiorari under RULE
65.
RULES OF COURT:
RULE 41: APPEAL FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURTS
SECTION 2. MODES OF APPEAL -

(a) ORDINARY APPEAL. - The appeal to the Court


of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of
appeal with the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from and
serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.
xxx
(b) PETITION FOR REVIEW. - The appeal to the
Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for
review in accordance with Rule 42. (Emphasis
supplied) x x x
However, in numerous cases, this Court has
allowed liberal construction of the rules when to do
so would serve the demands of substantial justice.
Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is
frowned upon.
Thus, notwithstanding petitioner's wrong mode of
appeal, the Court of Appeals should not have so
easily dismissed the petition.
2.) MeTC Under BP 129, as amended,
jurisdiction even in accion publiciana cases is
determined by the assessed value of the property.
With the modifications introduced by REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 7691, the jurisdiction of regional trial
courts has been limited to real actions where the
assessed value exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00
if the action is filed in Metro Manila.
If the assessed value is below the said amounts,
the action must be brought before first level courts.
SEC. 33. JURISDICTION OF METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS,
AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS IN
CIVIL CASES. - Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
xxx
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions
which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value1 of the property or interest
therein does not exceed Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in
1

CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM

22

Metro Manila, where such assessed value


does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses, and costs:
Provided, That in cases of land not declared
for taxation purposes, the value of such
property shall be determined by the
assessed value of the adjacent lots.
(Emphasis supplied)
The subject lot, with an assessed value below the
jurisdictional limit of P50,000.00 for Metro Manila,
comes within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the MeTC under BP 129, as amended.
DISPOSITION:
petition.

WHEREFORE,

we

GRANT the

We SET ASIDE the Resolutions dated 28 July 2005


and 5 July 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 88995.
We REINSTATE the 25 April 2003 Decision and the
20 June 2003 Order of the Metropolitan Trial Court
(Branch 77) of Paraaque City in Civil Case No.
11868.
Costs against petitioner.

ALLAN C. GO, doing business under the name


and style ACG Express Liner,, petitioner,
vs
MORTIMER F. CORDERO, respondent
G.R. No. 164703
May 4, 2010
Facts:
Sometime in 1996, Mortimer F. Cordero, VicePresident of Pamana Marketing Corporation
(Pamana), ventured into the business of marketing
inter-island passenger vessels. After contacting
various overseas fast ferry manufacturers from all
over the world, he came to meet Tony Robinson, an
Australian national based in Brisbane, Australia,
who is the Managing Director of Aluminium Fast
Ferries Australia (AFFA).
Between June and August 1997, Robinson signed
documents appointing Cordero as the exclusive
distributor of AFFA catamaran and other fast ferry
vessels in the Philippines. As such exclusive
distributor, Cordero offered for sale to prospective

buyers the 25-meter Aluminium Passenger


catamaran known as the SEACAT 25.
After negotiations with Felipe Landicho and Vincent
Tecson, lawyers of Allan C. Go who is the
owner/operator of ACG Express Liner of Cebu City,
a single proprietorship, Cordero was able to close a
deal for the purchase of two (2) SEACAT 25 as
evidenced by the Memorandum of Agreement
dated August 7, 1997. Accordingly, the parties
executed Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 for one
(1) high-speed catamaran (SEACAT 25) for the price
of US$1,465,512.00. Per agreement between
Robinson and Cordero, the latter shall receive
commissions totalling US$328,742.00, or 22.43% of
the purchase price, from the sale of each vessel.
Cordero made two (2) trips to the AFFA Shipyard in
Brisbane, Australia, and on one (1) occasion even
accompanied Go and his family and Landicho, to
monitor the progress of the building of the vessel.
He shouldered all the expenses for airfare, food,
hotel
accommodations,
transportation
and
entertainment during these trips. He also spent for
long distance telephone calls to communicate
regularly with Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landicho.
However, Cordero later discovered that Go was
dealing directly with Robinson when he was
informed by Dennis Padua of Wartsila Philippines
that Go was canvassing for a second catamaran
engine from their company which provided the ship
engine for the first SEACAT 25. Padua told Cordero
that Go instructed him to fax the requested
quotation of the second engine to the Park Royal
Hotel in Brisbane where Go was then staying.
Cordero tried to contact Go and Landicho to
confirm the matter but they were nowhere to be
found, while Robinson refused to answer his calls.
Cordero immediately flew to Brisbane to clarify
matters with Robinson, only to find out that Go and
Landicho
were
already there
in Brisbane
negotiating for the sale of the second SEACAT 25.
Despite repeated follow-up calls, no explanation
was given by Robinson, Go, Landicho and Tecson
who even made Cordero believe there would be no
further sale between AFFA and ACG Express Liner.
On August 21, 1998, Cordero instituted Civil Case
No. 98-35332 seeking to hold Robinson, Go, Tecson
and Landicho liable jointly and solidarily for
conniving and conspiring together in violating his
exclusive distributorship in bad faith and wanton
disregard of his rights, thus depriving him of his
due commissions (balance of unpaid commission
from the sale of the first vessel in the amount of
US$31,522.01 and unpaid commission for the sale
of the second vessel in the amount of
US$328,742.00) and causing him actual, moral
and exemplary damages, including P800,000.00
representing expenses for airplane travel to
Australia,
telecommunications
bills
and

CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM

23

entertainment, on account of AFFAs untimely


cancellation of the exclusive distributorship
agreement. Cordero also prayed for the award of
moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorneys fees and litigation expenses.
Robinson filed a motion to dismiss grounded on
lack of jurisdiction over his person and failure to
state a cause of action, asserting that there was no
act committed in violation of the distributorship
agreement. Said motion was denied by the trial
court on December 20, 1999. Robinson was
likewise declared in default for failure to file his
answer within the period granted by the trial
court. As for Go and Tecson, their motion to
dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action
was likewise denied by the trial court on February
26, 1999. Subsequently, they filed their Answer
denying that they have anything to do with the
termination by AFFA of Corderos authority as
exclusive distributor in the Philippines. On the
contrary, they averred it was Cordero who stopped
communicating with Go in connection with the
purchase of the first vessel from AFFA and was not
doing his part in making progress status reports
and airing the clients grievances to his principal,
AFFA, such that Go engaged the services of
Landicho to fly to Australia and attend to the
documents needed for shipment of the vessel to
the Philippines. As to the inquiry for the Philippine
price for a Wartsila ship engine for AFFAs other ongoing vessel construction, this was merely
requested by Robinson but which Cordero
misinterpreted as indication that Go was buying a
second vessel. Moreover, Landicho and Tecson had
no transaction whatsoever with Cordero who had
no document to show any such shipbuilding
contract. As to the supposed meeting to settle
their dispute, this was due to the malicious demand
of Cordero to be given US$3,000,000 as otherwise
he will expose in the media the alleged
undervaluation of the vessel with the BOC. In any
case, Cordero no longer had cause of action for his
commission for the sale of the second vessel under
the memorandum of agreement dated August 7,
1997 considering the termination of his authority
by AFFAs lawyers on June 26, 1998.
On May 31, 2000, the trial court rendered its
judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against
defendants Allan C. Go, Tony Robinson, Felipe
Landicho, and Vincent Tecson. On January 29, 2001,
the CA rendered judgment granting the petition for
certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 60354 and setting aside
the trial courts orders of execution pending appeal.
The case before the Supreme Court is a
consolidation of the petitions for review under Rule
45 separately filed by Go (G.R. No. 164703) and
Cordero (G.R. No. 164747).
Issue:

(1) Whether petitioner Cordero has the legal


personality to sue the respondents for breach of
contract; and
(2) whether the respondents may be held liable for
damages to Cordero for his unpaid commissions
and termination of his exclusive distributorship
appointment by the principal, AFFA.
Held:
While it is true that a third person cannot possibly
be sued for breach of contract because only parties
can breach contractual provisions, a contracting
party may sue a third person not for breach but for
inducing another to commit such breach. Article
1314 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1314. Any third person who induces
another to violate his contract shall be liable for
damages to the other contracting party.
The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence
of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the
third person of the existence of a contract; and (3)
interference of the third person is without legal
justification.
The presence of the first and second elements is
not disputed. Through the letters issued by
Robinson attesting that Cordero is the exclusive
distributor of AFFA in the Philippines, respondents
were clearly aware of the contract between Cordero
and AFFA represented by Robinson. In fact,
evidence on record showed that respondents
initially dealt with and recognized Cordero as such
exclusive dealer of AFFA high-speed catamaran
vessels in the Philippines. In that capacity as
exclusive distributor, petitioner Go entered into the
Memorandum of Agreement and Shipbuilding
Contract No. 7825 with Cordero in behalf of AFFA.
The rule is that the defendant found guilty of
interference with contractual relations cannot be
held liable for more than the amount for which the
party who was inducted to break the contract can
be held liable. Respondents Go, Landicho and
Tecson were therefore correctly held liable for the
balance of petitioner Corderos commission from
the sale of the first SEACAT 25, in the amount of
US$31,522.09 or its peso equivalent, which
AFFA/Robinson did not pay in violation of the
exclusive distributorship agreement, with interest
at the rate of 6% per annum from June 24, 1998
until the same is fully paid.
Respondents having acted in bad faith, moral
damages may be recovered under Article 2219 of
the Civil Code.
In Go vs. Cordero, however, the Supreme Court
clarified that although the Motion to Dismiss filed
by Robinson specifically stated as one (1) of the

CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM

24

grounds the lack of personal jurisdiction, it must


be noted that he had earlier filed a Motion for
Time to file an appropriate responsive pleading
even beyond the time provided in the summons by
publication. Such motion did not state that it was a
conditional appearance entered to question the
regularity of the service of summons, but an
appearance submitting to the jurisdiction of the
court by acknowledging the summons by
publication issued by the court and praying for
additional
time
to
file
a
responsive
pleading. Consequently, Robinson
having
acknowledged the summons by publication
and also having invoked the jurisdiction of
the trial court to secure affirmative relief in
his motion for additional time, he effectively
submitted voluntarily to the trial courts
jurisdiction. He is now estopped from
asserting otherwise, even before this Court.
OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATION vs. HERTZ
PHIL.EXCLUSIVE CARS, INC.
G.R. No. 183035
January 9, 2013
SERENO, CJ.:
FACTS:
On 12 December 2002, Optima entered into a
Contract of Lease with Hertz Phil over a 131square-meter office unit and a parking slot in the
Optima Building for a period of three years
commencing on 1 March 2003 and ending on 28
February 2006. On 9 March 2004, the parties
amended their lease agreement by shortening the
lease period to two years and five months,
commencing on 1 October 2003 and ending on 28
February 2006.
Renovations in the Optima Building commenced in
January and ended in November 2005. As a result,
Hertz alleged that it experienced a 50% drop in
monthly sales and a significant decrease in its
personnels productivity. It then requested a 50%
discount on its rent for the months of May, June,
July and August 2005. Optima granted the request
of Hertz. However, the latter still failed to pay its
rental for seven months and utility bills for four
months.
On 8 December 2005, Optima wrote another letter
to Hertz, reminding the latter that the Contract of
Lease could be renewed only by a new negotiation
between the parties and upon written notice by the
lessee to the lessor at least 90 days prior to the
termination of the lease period. As no letter was
received from Hertz regarding its intention to seek
negotiation and extension of the lease contract
within the 90-day period, Optima informed it that

the lease would expire on 28 February 2006 and


would not be renewed.
On 21 December 2005, Hertz wrote a letter
belatedly advising Optima of the formers desire to
negotiate and extend the lease. However, as the
Contract of Lease provided that the notice to
negotiate its renewal must be given by the lessee
at least 90 days prior to the expiration of the
contract,
petitioner
no
longer
entertained
respondents notice.
On 1 March 2006, Optima, through counsel, wrote
Hertz a letter requiring the latter to surrender and
vacate the leased premises in view of the
expiration of the Contract of Lease on 28 February
2006. It likewise demanded payment of the sum of
420,967.28 in rental arrearages, unpaid utility bills
and other charges. Hertz, however, refused to
vacate the leased premises. As a result, Optima
were constrained to file before the MeTC a
Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages with
Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and/or Preliminary
Mandatory
Injunction
(Unlawful
Detainer
Complaint) against Hertz.
The MeTC ruled that petitioner Optima had
established its right to evict Hertz from the subject
premises due to nonpayment of rentals and the
expiration of the period of lease. Hertz appealed
the MeTCs Decision to the RTC, and finding no
compelling reason to warrant the reversal of the
MeTCs Decision, the RTC affirmed it by dismissing
the appeal. On appeal to the CA, it ruled that, due
to the improper service of summons, the MeTC
failed to acquire jurisdiction over the person of
respondent Hertz.
Aggrieved by the ruling of the appellate court,
petitioner then filed the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the expiry of the period agreed
upon by the parties is a ground for judicial
ejectment
HELD:
The pertinent provision of the Contract of Lease
reads:
x x x. The lease can be renewed only by a new
negotiation between the parties upon written
notice by the LESSEE to be given to the LESSOR at
least 90 days prior to termination of the above
lease period.
As the lease was set to expire on 28 February 2006,
Hertz had until 30 November 2005 within which to
express its interest in negotiating an extension of
the lease with Optima. However, Hertz failed to
communicate its intention to negotiate for an
extension of the lease within the time agreed upon
by the parties. Thus, by its own provisions, the
Contract of Lease expired on 28 February 2006.

CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM

25

Under the Civil Code, the expiry of the period


agreed upon by the parties is likewise a ground for
judicial ejectment.
MAXIMO TACAY, PONCIANO PANES and
ANTONIA NOEL, petitioners, vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TAGUM Davao del
Norte, Branches 1 and 2, Presided by Hon.
Marcial Fernandez and Hon. Jesus Matas,
respectively, PATSITA GAMUTAN, Clerk of
Court, and GODOFREDO PINEDA, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 88075-77 December 20, 1989
FACTS: These were two separate cases originally
filed by Godofredo Pineda at the RTC of Tagum for
recovery of possession (accion publiciana) against
three defendants, namely Antonio Noel, Ponciano
Panes, and Maximo Tacay. Pineda was the owner of
790 sq. meter land evidence by TCT No. T-56560.
The previous owner of such land allowed the three
defendants to use or occupy the same by mere
tolerance. Pineda having himself the need to use
the property, demanded the defendants to vacate
the premises and pay reasonable rental therefore,
but such demands were refused. The complaint
was challenged in the Motions to Dismiss filed by
each defendant alleging that it did not specify the
amounts of actual, nominal and exemplary
damages, nor the assessed value of the property,
that being a ground to bar the determination of the
RTCs jurisdiction in deciding the case. The Motions
to Dismiss were denied and the claims for damages
in the complaint were expunged for failure to
specify the amounts. Thus, the defendants filed a
Joint Petition for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition, as well as a temporary restraining order
against the RTC.
ISSUE: WON THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES
CLAIMED AND THE ASSESSED VALUE OF THE
PROPERTY
ARE
RELEVANT
IN
THE
DETERMINATION
OF
THE
COURTS
JURISDICTION IN A CASE FOR RECOVERY OF
POSSESSION OF PROPERTY.
HELD: Yes. Where the action involves real property
and a related claim for damages as well, the legal
fees shall be assessed on the basis of both (a) the
value of the property and (b) the total amount of
related damages sought. The Court acquires
jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the
initiatory pleading is accompanied by the payment
of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid at
the time of the filing of the pleading, as of the time
of full payment of the fees within such reasonable
time as the court may grant, unless, of course,
prescription has set in the meantime. But where-as

in the case at bar-the fees prescribed for an action


involving real property have been paid, but the
amounts of certain of the related damages (actual,
moral and nominal) being demanded are
unspecified, the action may not be dismissed. The
Court undeniably has jurisdiction over the action
involving the real property, acquiring it upon the
filing of the complaint or similar pleading and
payment of the prescribed fee. And it is not
divested of that authority by the circumstance that
it may not have acquired jurisdiction over the
accompanying claims for damages because of lack
of specification thereof. What should be done is
simply to expunge those claims for damages as to
which no amounts are stated, which is what the
respondent Courts did, or allow, on motion, a
reasonable time for the amendment of the
complaints so as to allege the precise amount of
each item of damages and accept payment of the
requisite fees therefore within the relevant
prescriptive period.
DY v Hon. Bibat- Palamos
Hierarchy of courts; exceptions to the
doctrine.
Under the principle of hierarchy of courts, direct
recourse to this
Court is improper because the Supreme Court is a
court of last resort and must remain to be so in
order for it to satisfactorily perform its
constitutional functions, thereby allowing it to
devote its time and attention to matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction and preventing the
overcrowding of its docket.16 Nonetheless, the
invocation of this Courts original jurisdiction
to issue writs of certiorari has been allowed in
certain instances on the ground of special and
important reasons clearly stated in the petition,
such as, (1) when dictated by the public welfare
and the advancement of public policy; (2) when
demanded by the broader interest of justice; (3)
when the challenged orders were patent nullities;
or (4) when analogous exceptional and compelling
circumstances called for and justified the
immediate and direct handling of the case.
Desierto vs Heirs of Margarita Ventura
GR No 151800 November 5, 2009
Facts:
Heirs of Margarita Ventura ( the Heirs) filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman a complaint for
Falsification of Public Documents and violation of
Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 against Zenaida Palacio and

CIVPRO 1ST SET PRELIM

26

spouses Edilberto and Celerina Darang. Palacio


being the OIC of DAR designated Celerina to
investigate the claims of the Heirs agaist her
former husband Edilberto. Celerina supported the
report with public documents which she falsified
and Palacio issed a recommendation based on that
report to award the landholding in dispute to
Edilberto.
The DARAB recommended that the charged against
the respondents be dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence. The CA then took cognizance of the case
and granted the provisional dismissal the complaint
against respondent for violation of Sec 3 (e) of RA
3019 but denied the dismissal of the complaint for
falsification of public documents.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction over
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Ruling:
The CA has jurisdiction over orders, directives and
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases only. It cannot,
therefore, review the orders, directives or decisions
of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal or nonadministrative cases.
That since the CA has no jurisdiction over decisions
and orders of the Ombudsman in criminal cases, its
ruling on the case is void.
Sante vs Claraval
Topic: Jurisdiction
Nature: Petition for certiorari
Facts:
1) In April 2004, private respondent Vita Kalashian
filed before RTC Baguio a complaint for damages
against petitioners Irene Sante and Reynaldo
Sante. Respondent alleged that while she was
inside the Police Station in Pangasinan, and in the
presence of other persons and police officers, Irene
Sante uttered the words, How many rounds of sex
did you have last night with your boss, Bert? You
fuckin bitch! Bert refers to a friend of the
respondent and one of her hired security guards in
said station, and a suspect in the killing of
petitioners close relative.
Petitioners also allegedly went around Pangasinan
telling people that she is protecting and cuddling
the suspects in the aforesaid killing. Thus,
respondent prayed for the following:
Moral Damages
300,000
Exemplary Damages
50, 000
Attorneys fees
50, 000
Litigation expenses
20, 000

2) Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the


ground of jurisdiction. They claimed that the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities instead of RTC Baguio
should take cognizance. They argued that the
amount of the claim for moral damages was not
more
than
the
jurisdictional
amount
of
P300,000.00, because the claim for exemplary
damages should be excluded in computing the total
claim.
3) The trial court denied the motion to dismiss on
the ground that the amount of demand P420,000
was above the jurisdictional amount for MTCCs
outside Metro Manila.
4) Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the CA. Meanwhile, respondent
filed an amended complaint increasing the claim
for moral damages to P1,000,000. Petitioners then
filed a motion to dismiss which was denied.
5) Petitioners AGAIN filed a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with the CA, raising that RTC Baguio
committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the
amended complaint. CA ruled in favor of
petitioners, stating that MTCC had jurisdiction
because considering ONLY the demand for
P300,000 moral damages. The CA held that the
demand for exemplary damages was merely
incidental.
6) Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Issues:
Whether RTC acquired jurisdiction of the case
Whether RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
in allowing the amended complaint
Held: YES. RTC acquired jurisdiction. Hence, there
was no grave abuse of discretion.
Ratio Decidendi:
PETITIONERS CONTENTION: The claim for moral
damages, in the amount of P300,000.00 in the
original complaint, is the main action. The
exemplary damages being discretionary should not
be included in the computation of the jurisdictional
amount. Thus, RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in allowing the amended complaint.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: The nature of her
complaint is for recovery of damages. As such, the
totality of the claim for damages, including the
exemplary damages as well as the other damages
alleged and prayed in the complaint, such as
attorneys fees and litigation expenses, should be
included in determining jurisdiction.
The exclusion of the term damages of whatever
kind in determining the jurisdictional amount
under B.P. Blg. 129 applies to cases where the
damages are merely incidental to or a consequence
of the main cause of action. However, in cases
where the claim for damages is the main
cause of action, or one of the causes of
action, the amount of such claim shall be

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considered in determining the jurisdiction of


the court.
In the instant case, the complaint filed is for the
recovery of damages for the acts of the petitioners.
The complaint principally sought an award of moral
and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees
and litigation expenses, for the alleged shame and
injury suffered by respondent. Jurisdiction is conferred
by law based on the facts alleged in the complaint
since the latter comprises a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs causes of
action. It is clear, based on the allegations of the
complaint, that respondents main action is for
damages. Hence, the other forms of damages being
claimed by respondent, e.g., exemplary damages,
attorneys fees and litigation expenses, are not
merely incidental to or consequences of the main
action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in
the complaint.
Considering that the total amount of damages
claimed was P420,000.00, the Court of Appeals was
correct in ruling that the RTC had jurisdiction over
the case.
NEYPES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 141524
September 14, 2005
469 SCRA 633
CORONA, J.:
Facts:
Petitioners filed an action for annulment of
judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance
and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before
the RTC against the private respondents. Later, in
an order, the trial court dismissed petitioners
complaint on the ground of prescription. Petitioners
allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal
on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter
or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for
reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court
issued another order dismissing the motion for
reconsideration which petitioners received on July
22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998,
petitioners filed a notice of appeal and paid the
appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied
the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight
days late. This was received by petitioners on July
31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration but this too was denied in an order
dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for
certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners
assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal
before the CA. In the appellate court, petitioners
claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice

of appeal. They argued that the 15-day


reglementary period to appeal started to run only
on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they
received the final order of the trial court denying
their motion for reconsideration. When they filed
their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five
days had elapsed and they were well within the
reglementary period for appeal. On September 16,
1999, the CA dismissed the petition. It ruled that
the 15-day period to appeal should have been
reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they
received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing
their complaint. According to the appellate court,
the order was the final order appealable under
the Rules.
Issues:
I. Whether or not receipt of a final order
triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary
period to appeal the February 12, 1998 order
dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order
dismissing the Motion for Reconsideration
II. Whether or not petitioners filed their
notice of appeal on time.
Held:
I. The July 1, 1998 order dismissing the
motion for reconsideration should be deemed as
the final order. In the case of Quelnan v. VHF
Philippines, Inc., the trial court declared petitioner
non-suited
and
accordingly
dismissed
his
complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal,
he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When
the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later
on received another order, this time dismissing his
omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal.
But this was likewise dismissed for having been
filed out of time. The court a quo ruled that
petitioner should have appealed within 15 days
after the dismissal of his complaint since this was
the final order that was appealable under the Rules.
The SC reversed the trial court and declared that it
was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of
an order of dismissal of a complaint which
constituted the final order as it was what ended the
issues raised there. This pronouncement was
reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v.
Haldeman et al. where the SC again considered the
order
denying
petitioners
motion
for
reconsideration as the final order which finally
disposed of the issues involved in the case. Based
on the aforementioned cases, the SC sustained
petitioners view that the order dated July 1, 1998
denying their motion for reconsideration was the
final order contemplated in the Rules.

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II. Yes. To standardize the appeal periods


provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems
it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply
to Rule 40, Rule 42, Rule 43 and Rule 45 but does
not apply to Rule 64(Review of Judgments and Final
Orders or Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections and the Commission on Audit) because
Rule 64 is derived from the Constitution. It is
likewise doubtful whether it will apply to criminal
cases. The new rule aims to regiment or make the
appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt
of the order denying the motion for new trial,
motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial)
or any final order or resolution.
This pronouncement is not inconsistent with
Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that
the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from
notice of judgment or final order appealed from.
The use of the disjunctive word or signifies
disassociation and independence of one thing from
another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the
sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use
of or in the above provision supposes that the
notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from
the notice of judgment or within 15 days from
notice of the final order, which we already
determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order
denying the motion for a new trial or
reconsideration.

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