Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
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SECOND DIVISION
ROGER CABUHAT AND CONCHITA
CABUHAT,
Petitioners,
- versus -
Promulgated:
29
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Decision
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to secure a two (2) million peso loan. The
mortgage was annotated on August 31, 1993 as Entry No. 6501.2
DBP allegedly released/cancelled this mortgage on October 26, 1998.3
Four days later on October 30, 1998, Conchita and Roger mortgaged
the subject lot to DBP again to secure their outstanding six (6) million peso
loan. The mortgage was annotated on November 27, 1998 as Entry No.
11815.4
The Cabuhats failed to pay their loan, prompting DBP to extrajudicially foreclose the property. DBP won the public auction at a bid of
P2,001,900. DBP received a Certificate of Sale dated June 28, 1999.5
On July 6, 1999, the Certificate of Sale was annotated on OCT No. C6
2372.
Decision
Citing the June 29, 1999 Certificate of Sale, they claimed that the
foreclosure was executed pursuant to the cancelled August 31, 1993
mortgage instead of the existing October 30, 1998 mortgage. 13 Hence,
the foreclosure and the writ of possession were void because they stemmed
from an inexistent contract.14
They further invoked the RTCs equity jurisdiction to suspend the
implementation of the writ of possession.15
On October 28, 2011, the RTC refused to suspend the implementation
of the writ due to its ministerial character. However, it required DBP to
comment on the motion/petition.16
On November 22, 2011, the writ of possession was finally
implemented.
In its December 9, 2011 Comment,17 DBP pointed out that it already
sold and turned-over the subject lot to a buyer on November 22, 2011.
Therefore, it no longer had any legal interest in the case.
DBP further pointed out that the Cabuhats were forum shopping
because they had already filed a complaint to set aside the same foreclosure
proceedings and to nullify the 1998 mortgage. 18 The case was pending
before the RTC, Puerto Princesa, Branch 95, and docketed as Civil Case No.
4546.
In their Reply,19 the Cabuhats emphasized that DBP only raised two
issues: (1) its lack of legal interest in the suit; and (2) the Cabuhats alleged
forum shopping. They insisted that unlike Land Case No. 1741, Civil Case
No. 4546 involves the 1998 mortgage, not the cancelled 1993 mortgage.
On April 4, 2012, the Cabuhats filed an Omnibus Motion praying for
RTC to immediately resolve: (1) DBPs opposition20 and (2) the validity of
an extrajudicial foreclosure of an inexistent/cancelled mortgage.21
On June 27, 2012, the RTC issued the assailed Order. The RTC held
that DBP remains a real party-in-interest despite the sale because there had
been no motion for substitution of the parties.22 It also denied the DBPs
forum shopping argument because an ex parte proceeding for the issuance of
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
Id. at 50-51.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 69-70.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 24.
Decision
a writ of possession is not a judgment on the merits that can amount to res
judicata.23
However, the RTC dismissed the Cabuhats petition. It reasoned that
under Section 8 of Act No. 3135, a petition to set aside the foreclosure sale
and cancel the writ of possession can only be filed within the 30-day period
immediately after the purchaser acquires possession. Considering that it
filed before the DBP entered possession, the petition was premature.
The Cabuhats moved for reconsideration 24 but the RTC denied the
motion. Hence, the present petition.
The Arguments
The Cabuhats justify their direct resort to this Court by asserting that
they only raise pure questions of law. 25 They argue that the RTC
misinterpreted Section 8 of Act No. 3135 because the law does not prohibit
the mortgagor from filing the petition to set aside the foreclosure before the
purchaser actually acquires possession.
They argue that the dismissal of their petition based on a ground that
DBP did not raise is invalid.26 Lastly, they insist that the foreclosure was
void because: (1) DBP did not have a special power of authority to foreclose
the property; and (2) the foreclosure was made pursuant to the
cancelled/inexistent 1993 mortgage.27
DBP counters that it foreclosed the property pursuant to the October
30, 1998 mortgage after the Cabuhats failed to pay their loan. 28 It also
reiterates that it already lost legal interest over the property and moves to be
substituted by the buyer.29
Citing Sps. Ong v. Court of Appeals,30 DBP also adopts the RTCs
interpretation of Section 8 of Act No. 3135.31
Further, DBP points out that the Cabuhats already have a pending case
to set aside the foreclosure sale in Civil Case No. 4546. DBP emphasizes
that in their complaint, the Cabuhats admitted that the foreclosure was made
pursuant to the 1998 mortgage.32
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
Id.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 121-122.
388 Phil. 857 (2000).
Rollo, p. 123.
Id. at 125.
Decision
Lastly, DBP protests that the existence or validity of the mortgage and
the foreclosure sale is a factual matter and an improper subject of a review
on certiorari.33
Our Ruling
We DENY the petition for lack of merit.
At the outset, we note that, as DBP observed, the petition does not
raise pure questions of law. Despite the Cabuhats insistence, DBP maintains
that the foreclosure was based on the 1998 mortgage a valid and existing
agreement. The Cabuhats contention that the foreclosure was made
pursuant to a void/cancelled/inexistent mortgage is a question of fact beyond
the scope of this review. This alone warrants the outright dismissal of the
petition for being the wrong remedy.
Even if the rules of procedure were relaxed to accommodate the
petition, it should still be denied for lack of merit.
We agree with the Cabuhats that the RTC misinterpreted the
reglementary period under Section 8 of Act No. 3135. It held that a petition
to set aside the sale and cancel the writ of possession cannot be filed until
the purchaser is placed in possession of the property. However, this finds no
support in the law:
Section 8. The debtor may, in the proceedings in which possession was
requested, but not later than thirty days after the purchaser was given
possession, petition that the sale be set aside and the writ of possession
cancelled x x x. (emphasis supplied)
The provision does not prohibit a purchaser from filing the petition
before the purchaser enters into possession. The limitation merely prohibits
the filing of the petition beyond thirty days from the purchasers possession
of the property.
The rationale for the 30-day period and the reckoning point of the
purchasers possession is the character of the proceedings. A petition to set
aside the sale and/or cancel the writ of possession is filed in the same
proceedings in which possession is requested. Under Section 7 of Act No.
3135, this proceeding is ex parte and non-litigious; there is no need to notify
or hear the mortgagor.
Considering that Act No. 3135 does not require the creditor to notify
the debtor or the mortgagor of the extrajudicial foreclosure, it is possible that
a mortgagor will not discover the proceedings until the writ of possession is
implemented.
33
Id. at 128.
Decision
Section 1. When a sale is made under a special power inserted in or attached to any real-estate
mortgage hereafter made as security for the payment of money or the fulfillment of any other
obligation, the provisions of the following election shall govern as to the manner in which the sale
and redemption shall be effected, whether or not provision for the same is made in the power.
Sec. 2. Said sale cannot be made legally outside of the province in which the property sold is
situated; and in case the place within said province in which the sale is to be made is subject to
stipulation, such sale shall be made in said place or in the municipal building of the municipality
in which the property or part thereof is situated.
Sec. 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than twenty days in at least
three public places of the municipality or city where the property is situated, and if such property
is worth more than four hundred pesos, such notice shall also be published once a week for at least
three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city.
Sec. 4. The sale shall be made at public auction, between the hours of nine in the morning and four
in the afternoon; and shall be under the direction of the sheriff of the province, the justice or
auxiliary justice of the peace of the municipality in which such sale has to be made, or a notary
public of said municipality, who shall be entitled to collect a fee of five pesos each day of actual
work performed, in addition to his expenses.
Decision
ARTUROD.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
35
r:
Decision
(On Leave)
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
JOSE
CA~ENDOZA
As~~~Jdstice
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.
~
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
....,,.