When is a donation perfected?

Donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee (Art. 734, NCC).

What are the requisites of donation?

1. Donor must have Capacity to make the donation
2. He must have donative Intent (animus donandi)
3. There must be Delivery
4. Donee must Accept or consent to the donation during the lifetime of the donor and of the donee in case of
donation inter vivos (Art. 746, NCC); whereas in case of donation mortis causa, acceptance is made after
donors death because they partake of a will (Art. 728, NCC)

Up to what extent may a donation cover?

It may comprehend all the present property of the donor, or part thereof, provided he reserves, in full
ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of himself, and of all relatives who, at the time of
the acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled to be supported by the donor. (Art. 750, NCC)

Can future properties be subject of donation?

No, donations cannot comprehend future properties
Note: Future property means anything which the donor cannot dispose of at the time of the donation. (Art.
751, NCC)

What is the formalities required for donation of real and personal properties?

1. of movable property:
a. With simultaneous delivery of property donated: i. for P 5,000 or less - may be oral/written ii. for
more than P 5,000 written in public or private document.
b. Without simultaneous delivery:
The donation and acceptance must be written in a public or private instrument (Statute of Frauds),
regardless of value. Otherwise, donation is unenforceable

2. Of immovable property:
a. Must be in a public instrument specifying
i.

the property donated and

ii.

ii.the burdens assumed by the donee

b. Acceptance may be made:

i.

In the same instrument or

ii.

In another public instrument, notified to the donor in authentic form, and noted in both deeds.
Otherwise, donation is void.

What is the status of an inofficious donation?

During the lifetime of the donor, the inofficious donation is effective since the excessiveness of the donation
can only be determined after the donors death.
Note: Consequently, the donee is entitled to the fruits of the property donated during the lifetime of the donor
(Art. 771, Pineda Property, p. 599, 1999 ed)

What are the grounds for revocation of donation?

1. Under Art. 760 a. Birth of a donors child or children (legitimate, legitimated, or illegitimate) after the
donation, even though born after his death. b. Appearance of a donors child who is missing and thought to
be dead by the donor c. Subsequent adoption by the donor of a minor child.
2. Under Art. 764 When the donee fails to comply with any of the conditions which the donor imposed upon
the donee.
3. Under Art. 765 by reason of ingratitude
a. If the donee should commit some offense against the person, the honor or the property of the donor,
or of his wife or children under his parental authority.
b. If the donee imputes to the donor any criminal offense, or any act involving moral turpitude, even
though he should prove it, unless the crime or act has been committed against the donee himself, his
wife or children under his authority
c. If he unduly refuses him support when the donee is legally or morally bound to give support to the
donor Note: Once a donation is perfected, it cannot be revoked without the consent of the donee
except on grounds provided by law (Arts. 760, 764, 765, NCC).

What is easement of light (jus luminum)?

The right to admit light from neighboring estate by virtue of the opening of a window or the making of certain
openings.

What is easement of view (jus prospectus)?

The right to make openings or windows to enjoy the view thru the estate of another and the power to prevent
all constructions or works which could obstruct such view or make the same difficult.
Note: It necessarily includes easement of light.

What is the prescriptive period for acquisition of easement of light and view?
10 years.

From when does the prescriptive period start to run?

The reckoning point depends on whether the easement is positive or negative which, in turn, is dependent
on where the opening is made if it is made:
1.

On ones own wall and the wall does not extend over the property of another The easement is
negative. Commencement of Period of prescription-starts from the time formal prohibition is made.

Reason: The owner merely exercises his right of dominion and not of an easement. Negative easement is
not automatically vested as formal prohibition is a pre-requisite.
2. Thru a party wall or on ones own wall which extends over the neighboring estate The easement is
positive. Commencment of Period of prescription starts from the time the window is opened.
Reason: owner of the neighboring estate who has a right to close it up allows an encumbrance on his
property.

What are the requisites for easement on right of way?

1. The easement must be established at the point least Prejudicial to the servient estate
2. Claimant must be an Owner of enclosed immovable or with real right
3. There must be no adequate Outlet to a public highway
4. The right of way must be absolutely Necessary not mere convenience
5. The isolation must not be Due to the claimants own act
6. There must be payment of proper Indemnity.

Can easement of right of way be acquired by prescription?

No, because it is discontinuous or intermittent (Ronquillo, et al. vs. Roco, GR No. L-10619, Feb. 28, 1958).

What if the property is not the shortest way and will not cause the least damage
to the servient estate?
The way which will cause the least damage should be used even if it will not be the shortest. The easement
of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and where the distance
from the dominant estate to a public highway is the shortest. In case of conflict, the criterion of least
prejudice prevails over the criterion of shortest distance.

What are the rights of the usufructuary as to the thing and its fruits?
1. To Receive the fruits of the property in usufruct and half of the hidden treasure he accidentally finds
on the property (Arts. 566, 438, NCC)
2. To enjoy any Increase which the thing in usufruct may acquire through accession (Art. 571, NCC)
3. To personally Enjoy the thing or lease it to another (Arts. 572-577, NCC) generally for the same or
shorter period as the usufruct
4. To make such Improvements or expenses on the property he may deem proper and to remove the
improvements provided no damage is caused to the property (Art. 579, NCC)
5. To Set-off the improvements he may have made on the property against any damage to the same
(Art. 580, NCC)
6. To Retain the thing until he is reimbursed for advances for extraordinary expenses and taxes on the
capital (Art. 612, NCC)
7. To Collect reimbursements from the owner for indispensable extra ordinary repairs, taxes on the
capital he advanced, and damages caused to him
8. To Remove improvements made by him if the same will not injure the property

What are the rights of the usufructuary as to the usufruct itself?

a. To Alienate or mortgage the right of usufruct (Art. 572, NCC) XPN: parental usufruct (Arts. 225, 226
FC)
b. In a usufruct to Recover property/real right, to bring the action and to oblige the owner thereof to give
him the proper authority and the necessary proof to bring the action (Art. 578, NCC)
c. In a usufruct of part of a Common property, to exercise all the rights pertaining to the co- owner with
respect to the administration and collection of fruits or interests.

EXTINCTION/TERMINATION OF USUFRUCT
How is usufruct extinguished?
1. Acquisitive Prescription
Note: the use by a third person and not the non-use by the usufructuary
2. Total Loss of the thing Note: if the loss is only partial, the usufruct continues with the remaining part.
3. Death of the usufructuary; unless a contrary intention appears. Reason: Usufruct is constituted
essentially as a lifetime benefit for the usufructuary or in consideration of his person.
4. Termination of right of the person constituting the usufruct
5. Expiration of the period or fulfillment of the resolutory condition
6. Renunciation by the usufructuary. Note: it partakes the nature of a condonation or donation, it must
comply with the forms of donation.
7. Merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person who becomes the absolute owner thereof.
(Art. 1275, NCC)

What happens when a co-owner sells the whole property as his?

The sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale.
Note: A sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null
and void but affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his
grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common (Paulmitan vs. CA, GR No. 51584, Nov. 25, 1992.)

RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTIONS FOR EXPENSES

What are the expenses which the co-owners can be compelled to contribute?
Only necessary expenses. Useful expenses and those for pure luxury are not included.

What are those acts which require the majority consent of the co-owners?
a. Management
b. Enjoyment
c. Improvement or embellishment

What is the remedy in case the minority opposes the decision of the majority in
co-ownership?
Minority may appeal to the court against the majoritys decision if the same is seriously prejudicial.

What is avulsion?
It is the deposit of known (identifiable) portion of land detached from the property of another which is
attached to the property of another as a result of the effect of the current of a river, creek or torrent.

Note: Art. 459 states that Whenever the current of a river, creek, or torrent segregates from an estate on its
banks a known portion of land and transfers it to another estate, the owner of the land to which the
segregated portion belonged retains the ownership of it, provided he removes it within 2 years.

What are the requisites of avulsion?

1. Transfer is caused by the Current of a river, creek, or torrent.
2. Transfer is sudden or Abrupt
3. The Portion of the land transported is known or identifiable.

What is the rule on acquisition of titles over an avulsion?

General Rule: Original owner retains title.
Exceptions: The owner must remove (not merely claim) the transported portion within 2 years to
retain ownership, otherwise, the land not removed shall belong to the owner of the land to which it
has been adjudicated in case of:
1. Abandonment; or
2. Expiration of 2 years, whether the failure to remove be voluntary or involuntary, and irrespective of
the area of the portion known to have been transferred.

Abandoned Land
Land devoted to any crop at least one year prior to the notice of expropriation, but was not utilized by the
owner for his benefit for the past five years prior to such notice of expropriation. Sec. 166, Code of Agrarian
Reforms

NOCEDA VS. DIRECTO

The Act of Usurpation by the donee of the donors land is an act of ingratitude. The law does not require
conviction in order to revoke the donation; only preponderance of evidence is needed in an action to revoke
instituted by the donor.
Note: An action for revocation of a donation based on ingratitude must file the action to revoke his donation
within 1 year from the time he had knowledge of the ingratitude of the donee (not from the occurrence of the
act of ingratitude).

FACTS:
Directo, Noceda, and Arbizo (the daughter, grandson, and widow, respectively of the late Celestino Arbizo)
extra-judicially settled a parcel of land. Directos share was 11,426 square meters, Noceda got 13,294
square meters, and the remaining 41,810 square meters went to Maria Arbizo. On the same day, Directo
donated 625 sq.m. of her share to her nephew.
However, a few months later, another extra-judicial settlement-partition of the same lot was executed. 3/5 of
the lot was awarded to Arbizo (widow) while Directo and Noceda (daughter and grandson) got only 1/5 each.
Sometime on the same year when the partitions happened, the nephew (donee) constructed his house on
the land donated to him by Directo. On the other hand, Directo fenced the portion allotted to her in the
extrajudicial settlement, excluding the donated portion, and constructed thereon three huts.
Around 3 years later, the nephew removed the fence earlier constructed by Directo, occupied the 3 huts, and
fenced the entire land of Directo without her consent. The latter demanded Noceda to vacate her land, but
Noceda refused.
Hence, Directo filed a complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership and rescission/annulment of
donation, against Noceda before the lower court. A survey was conducted and it was found that the area
stated in the settlement was smaller than the actual area of the lot. The TC declared the second extrajudicial settlement-partition and the deed of donation revoked (because of ingratitude). The court ordered the
nephew (done) to vacate and reconvey the property to Directo. CA affirmed.
The nephew contends that there was no real partition and thus, there is no basis for the charge of usurpation
and ingratitude. He also contends that granting revocation is proper, the 1 year period for such revocation
has already lapsed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in revoking the deed of donation

RULING: NO
The court held that:We find unmeritorious petitioners argument that since there was no effective and real
partition of the subject lot there exists no basis for the charge of usurpation and hence there is also no basis
for finding ingratitude against him.
It was established that petitioner Noceda occupied not only the portion donated to him by Directo but he also
fenced the whole area of Lot C which belongs to Directo; thus, petitioners act of occupying the portion
pertaining to Directo without the latters knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation which is an offense
against the property of the donor and considered as an act of ingratitude of a donee against the donor. The
law does not require conviction of the donee; it is enough that the offense be proved in the action for
revocation.

Donee alleged that he usurped donors property in the 1st week of September 1985 while the complaint for
revocation was filed on September 16, 1986; thus, more than one (1) year had passed from the alleged
usurpation by petitioner of private respondents share in Lot 1121.
Article 769 expressly states that:
a. the donor must file the action to revoke his donation within one year from the time he had knowledge
of the ingratitude of the done; and that;
b. it must be shown that it was possible for the donor to institute the said action within the same period.

The concurrence of these two requisites must be shown by the donee in order to bar the present action,
which he failed to do so. He reckoned the one year prescriptive period from the occurrence of the usurpation
and not from the time the latter had the knowledge of the usurpation. He also failed to prove that at the time
Directo acquired knowledge of his usurpation, it was possible for him to institute an action for revocation of
her donation. [NOCEDA VS. DIRECTO- Revocation of a Donation Based on
Ingratitude].

EDUARTE V. CA- Revocation of Donation

All crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes for revocation of donation.

FACTS:
Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of a parcel of land. He executed a deed of donation inter vivos of
of the land to his niece, Helen Doria. Subsequently, he executed another deed of donation inter vivos
ceding the other of the property to Helen Doria. Helen Doria donated a protion of the lot (157 sqm) to the
Calauan Christian Reformed Church. Helen Doria sold and conveyed the remaining portion save some 700
meters for his residence. Pedro Calapine sought to annul the sale and donation to eduarte and CCRC on the
ground that the deed of donation was a forgery and that Doria was unworthy of his liberality claiming
ingratitude (commission of offense against the person, honor or property of donor [par. 1])

ISSUE:
W/N the falsification of public document committed by Doria is an act of ingratitude against Calapine
(considering that falsification is a crime against public interest)?

RULING: YES

In commentaries of Tolentino, it is said that all crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are
causes of revocation. Petitioner attempted to categorize the offenses according to their classification under
the RPC by deleting the first sentence. However, this is unwarranted considering that illegal detention,
threats and coercion are considered crimes against the person of the donor despite the fact that they are
classified as crimes against personal liberty and security under the RPC.

Note: Eduarte and the Church still won although the donation was deemed by the Court to be revocable. The
Court applied the CHAIN OF TITLE THEORY because the lands were registered lands and it has already
passed from the forger (Doria) to innocent purchasers for value (Eduarte, et al.).

AUSTRIA-MAGAT VS. CA- Donation Inter Vivos

When the deed of donation provides that the donor will not dispose or take away the property donated, he is
in effect making a donation inter vivos.
Here, the 2nd characteristic of a donation mortis causa (revocable at will) is absent.

FACTS:
Cavite,
1953:
Basilisa Comerciant, mom to five children, executed a Deed of Donation to her five children covered by
Transfer Certificate 3268, with an area of 150 square meters. The said document reads as follows:
xxx Kusang loob na ibinibigay ko at ipinagkakaloob ng ganap at hindi na mababawi sa naulit ng apat na
anak ko at sa kanilang mga tagamagmana (sic),xxx

Thereafter,
the
parties
executed
another
notarized
document
that
stated
xxx Na ang titulo numero TCT-T-2260 (RT-4036) ng Lungsod ng Kabite, bahay sa loteng tirahan ng Bagong
Pook na nababanggit sa nasabing kasulatan, ay mananatili sa poder o possession ng Ina, na si Basilisa
Comerciante habang siya ay nabubuhay at Gayon din ang nasabing Titulo ay hindi mapapasangla o
maipagbibili ang lupa habang maybuhay ang nasabing Basilisa Comerciante. Xxx
On Feb 1979, Basilia executed a Deed of Sale in favor of Apolinaria Austria Magat for P5000. Basilias
children contested the act, saying that the donation was intervivos and thereby irrevocable. The trial court
disagreed, stating it was mortis causa and therefore revocable. The case went to the CA and the case was
reversed. CA found the document to be intervivos because of the phrase ganap at hindi na mababawi sa
naulit

Basilia, to their mind, definitely had no plans of revoking the donation. The document executed thereafter
upheld such irrevocability.
The parties proceeded to the Supreme Court

ISSUE:
Whether or not the deed of donation was intervivos.

HELD: YES.
The court found that whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends on whether the donor
intended to transfer ownership over the properties upon the execution of the deed.

In Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, the court recalls the characteristics of a donation mortis causa,:
1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what amounts
to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the
property while alive;
2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of
the properties conveyed;
3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
For the case at bar, the phrase hindi na mababawi definitely exudes the character of an intervivos
agreement. The other provisions therein which seemingly make the donation mortis causa do not go
against the irrevocable character of the subject donation. According to the petitioner, the provisions
which state that the same will only take effect upon the death of the donor and that there is a
prohibition to alienate, encumber is mortis causa. The court disagrees. The said provisions should
be harmonized with its express irrevocability. In Bonsato where the donation per the deed of
donation would also take effect upon the death of the donor with reservation for the donor to enjoy
the fruits of the land, the Court held that the said statements only mean that after the donors death,
the donation will take effect so as to make the donees the absolute owners of the donated property,
free from all liens and encumbrances.

In Gestopa v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the prohibition to alienate does not necessarily defeat the
inter vivos character of the donation. It even highlights the fact that what remains with the donor is the right
of usufruct and not anymore the naked title of ownership over the property donated. In the case at bar, the
provision in the deed of donation that the donated property will remain in the possession of the donor just

goes to show that the donor has given up his naked title of ownership thereto and has maintained only the
right to use (jus utendi) and possess (jus possidendi) the subject donated property.

Furthermore, the act of selling the property to petitioner herein cannot be construed as a valid act of
revocation of donation. A formal case ought to be filed pursuant to Art 764 which speaks of an action bearing
a prescriptive period of 4 years from non-compliance with the deed of donation. In this case, the 4 year
prescriptive period does not even apply because none of the terms (if any) were even violated.

PARKS V. PROVINCE OF TARLAC- Donation with a Condition

A condition which cannot be complied with except after giving effect to the donation is not a condition
precedent.

FACTS:
In 1910, Concepcion Cirer and James Hill donated parcels of land to the municipality of Tarlac on the
condition that it be used absolutely and exclusively for the erection of a central school and public parks, the
work to commence within six months. The president of the municipality of Tarlac accepted and registered the
donation.
In 1921, Cirer and Hill sold the same property to George L. Parks.
Later on the, the municipality of Tarlac transferred their rights in the property to the Province of Tarlac.
Parks filed a complaint seeking the annulment of the donation and asking that he be declared the absolute
owner of the property. Parks allege that the conditions of the donation were not complied with.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation was coupled with a condition precedent? W/N the action to revoke has
prescribed?

HELD:
No. The condition to erect a school within six months is not a condition precedent. The characteristic of a
condition precedent is that the acquisition of the right is not effected while said condition is not complied with
or is not deemed complied with. Meanwhile nothing is acquired and there is only an expectancy of a right.
Consequently, when a condition is imposed, the compliance of which cannot be effected except when the
right is deemed acquired, such condition cannot be a condition precedent. In the present case the condition

that a public school be erected and a public park be made of the donated land could not be complied with
except after giving effect to the donation.
The action to revoke the donation has prescribed. The prescriptive periods are: 5 years for the revocation by
the subsequent birth of children, 1 year if by reason of ingratitude. If no special period is prescribed, 10
years, for an onerous donation following the law of contracts and general rules on prescription. The donation
was made in 1910, the cause of action accrued in 1911, while the action to revoke was filed 1924, twenty
three years later.

CENTRAL PHILIPPINE UNIVERSITY VS. CA- Resolutory Condition

When a person donates land to another on the condition that a construction be made, the condition is akin to
a resolutory (not suspensive) one. The non-compliance to the condition extinguishes the right to the
donation, but it need not occur first in order for the donation to be effected and validated.

FACTS:
In 1939, the late Don Ramon Lopez was a member of the board of trustees of Central Philippine University
when he executed a donation to the school, stating that the land must be for exclusive use of a medical
college. 50 years later, The heirs of Ramon Lopez filed an action to annul the donation, stating the failure of
the school to construct the medical college over the land. RTC ruled in favor of respondents, which the CA
affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether there is a resolutory condition
RULING:
The donation was an onerous one, where failure of the school to construct a medical college would give the
heirs the power to revoke the donation, reverting the property back to the heirs of the donor. It is therefore a
resolutory condition. Although, the period was not stated, and the courts should have fixed a period, in this
case, 50 years has lapsed since the donation was executed, thus fixing a period would serve no purpose
and the property must already be reverted back.

Dissenting Opinion:
Davide considered the donation as "modal" where the obligations are unconditional, and the fulfillment,
performance, existence or extinguishment is not dependent on any future and uncertain event. It is more
accurate to say that the condition stated is not a resolutory condition, rather a obligation itself, being an

onerous donation. Since this is an onerous donation, it has to comply with the rules on Oblicon, and
therefore the courts should have fixed a period.

DE LUNA VS. JUDGE ABRIGO- Onerous Donation

FACTS:
De Luna donated a portion of a 75 sq. m. lot to the Luzonian University Foundation. The donation was
embodied in a Deed of Donation Intervivos and was subject to certain terms and conditions. In case of
violation or non-compliance, the property would automatically revert to the donor. When the Foundation
failed to comply with the conditions, de Luna revived the said donation by executing a Revival of Donation
Intervivos with the following terms and conditions:
1) The Donee shall construct on the land and at its expense a Chapel, Nursery, and Kindergarten
School to be named after St. Veronica
2) Construction shall start immediately and must be at least 70% completed three years from the date
of the Deed unless the Donor grants extensions
3) Automatic reversion in case of violation
The Foundation accepted and the donation was registered and annotated in the TCT. By a Deed of
Segregation, the foundation was issued a TCT for area the lot donated while the remaining area was
retained by the De Luna.
The children and only heirs of the late De Luna (died after the donation) filed a complaint with the RTC for
the cancellation of the donation on the ground that the terms were violated. The Foundation defended itself
by saying that it had partially and substantially complied with the conditions and that the donor granted it an
indefinite extension of time to complete construction.
The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground of prescription (for being filed after 4 years). The heirs did not
file an MR and went straight to the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether the action prescribes in 4 years (based on art. 764 NCC-judicial decree of revocation of the
donation) or in 10 years (based on art. 1144 enforcement of a written contract)

RULING: 10 years
The donation subject of this case is one with an onerous cause.

Under the old Civil Code, it is a settled rule that donations with an onerous cause are governed not by the
law on donations but by the rules on contract. On the matter of prescription of actions for the revocation of
onerous donation, it was held that the general rules on prescription apply. The same rules apply under the
New Civil Code as provided in Article 733 thereof which provides:
Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and remuneratory donations
by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden imposed.
It is true that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions for the revocation of a donation must be
brought within four (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation. However, said article
does not apply to onerous donations in view of the specific provision of Article 733 providing that onerous
donations are governed by the rules on contracts. The rules on prescription and not the rules on donation
applies in the case at bar.

ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP VS. SPS. DE CASTRO, GRANADOS AND

TOLENTINO- Rescission of Contract
Judicial declaration for rescission of a contract is not necessary where the contract provides for its automatic
revocation in case of violation of any of its terms and conditions.

FACTS:
In 1930, the Sps. Eusebio De Castro and Martina Rieta, now both deceased, executed a deed of donation in
favor of the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila covering Lot 626 in Kawit, Cavite with the condition that
the done shall not dispose or sell the property within a period of 100 years from the execution of the deed of
donation otherwise a violation would render it null and void and the property would revert to the estate of the
donors. In 1980, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Imus, the administrator of all properties in the province of
Cavite, sold the property in favor of Sps. Florencio and Soledad Ignao. As a result, a TCT was issued in
favor of the spouses.
Marina Rieta Granados and Theresa Rieta Tolentino filed a complaint for nullification of deed of donation,
rescission of contract and reconveyance of real property against Sps. Ignao and the R.C. Bishop of Imus
and the R.C. Archbishop of Manila.
The RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription which was reversed by the CA thus the case
at bar.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the action has already prescribed?
(2) Whether or not the condition is valid?

RULING: NO to both issues

1) An action to enforce a contract prescribed in 10 years hence the action has not yet prescribed. Art. 764
provides that an action for revocation must be brought within 4 years from the non-compliance of the
conditions, however, this will only apply when the parties have not agreed on the automatic revocation of the
donaton. In the case at bar, the deed of donation expressly provides for the automatic revocation of the
property donated in case of violation therefore judicial declaration is not necessary. Judicial declaration is
only for determination of the propriety of the rescission sought. When such propriety is sustained, the
decision of the court will be merely declaratory of the revocation but it is not itself the revocatory act.
2) Although the action may not be dismissed on the ground of prescription, it may be dismissed on the
ground of lack of cause of action. The cause of action was based on a breach of the resolutory condition,
however the condition is not valid for being contrary to public policy. Donation is a mode of acquiring
ownership and it results in an effective transfer of title over the property from the donor to the done. Although
the donor may impose conditions in the deed of donation, it must not be contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order and public policy.

The condition in the case at bar, which is a prohibition of alienation for 100 years, is patently unreasonable
and an undue restriction on the right of the done to dispose of the property donated, which right is an
indispensable attribute of ownership. Since it is an considered as an illegal or impossible condition, it will be
considered as not having been imposed. Therefore no breach was committed.

CRUZ VS. CA- Revocation of Donation

Although in the case of the subsequent adoption of a minor by one who had previously donated some or all
of his properties to another, the donor may sue for the annulment or reduction of the donation within four
years from the date of adoption, he may only do so if the donation impairs the legitime of the adopted, taking
into account the whole estate of the donor at the time of the adoption of the child.

FACTS:
Eduvigis J. Cruz, a childless widow, donated a residential lot together with the two-door apartment erected
thereon to her grandnieces private respondents herein. Later, Eduvigis Cruz judicially adopted Cresencia
Ocreto, a minor, after which she extrajudicially tried to revoke the donation, but the donees resisted.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation may be revoked in this case despite the fact that the donor had sufficient
property left with her.

RULING: No.
Although in the case of the subsequent adoption of a minor by one who had previously donated some or all
of his properties to another, the donor may sue for the annulment or reduction of the donation within four
years from the date of adoption, he may only do so if the donation impairs the legitime of the adopted, taking
into account the whole estate of the donor at the time of the adoption of the child. (Civil Code, Articles 760,
761 and 763). Of course, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff-donor, who must allege and establish the
requirements prescribed by law, on the basis of which annulment or reduction of the donation can be
adjudged.
Unfortunately, in the case at bar, the complaint for annulment does not allege that the subject donation
impairs the legitime of the adopted child. Indeed it contains no indication at all of the total assets of the
donor.
Nor is there proof of impairment of legitime. On the contrary, there is unrebutted evidence that the donor has
another piece of land (27,342 sq. m.) situated in Dolores, Taytay, Rizal worth P273,420.00 in 1977, although
then subject to litigation.
The legal situation of petitioner-donor, as plaintiff, is made worse by the factual finding of the Court of
Appeals that the grandfather of the donees was the owner pro indiviso of one-half of the donated land, the
effect of which is to reduce the value of the donation which can then more easily be taken from the portion of
the estate within the free disposal of petitioner.

GENATO vs. DE LORENZO- Donation in a Public Document

The delivery by the donor and the acceptance by done must be simultaneous and the acceptance by a
person other than the true done must be authorized by a proper power of attorney set forth in a public
document

FACTS:
The property under dispute in this case is the 530 shares of stocks of Genato Commercal Corporation,
which has P100 par value, of the deceased Simona B. De Genato (Director and secretary-treasurer of the
said company). The petitioners herein, 2 heirs of Simona, are claiming that they own 530 shares of stocks of
Genato Commercal Corporation because of the donation made by Simona to them.
Respondents (other remaining heirs), however, are trying to recover from the petitioners, their co-heirs, the
said stocks so they can include it in the intestate estate which should later be distributed among all the
surviving children of the decedent.

Four or five days after having Florentino Genato elected and designated as Assitant Secretary-Treasurer of
the Corporation, 265 shares were issued in favour of Florentino Genato and another 265 were issued in
favour of Francisco G. Genato. These were not presented as evidence in the course of the trial; they were
merely mentioned by Florentino Genato in the course of his testimony as a witness.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid donation?

RULING:
NO. There was no valid donation for lack of proper acceptance. Incontestably, one of the two donees was
not present at the delivery, and there is no showing that Francisco Genato had authorized his brother,
Florentino to accept for both of them. The delivery by the donor and the acceptance by done must be
simultaneous and the acceptance by a person other than the true done must be authorized by a proper
power of attorney set forth in a public document. None has been claimed to exist in this case.

CAGAOAN VS. CAGAOAN- Donation in Good Faith

An ordinary donee of a land who causes the donation to be recorded in the Mortgage Law Register in bad
faith or with notice of the rights of an adverse claimant requires no additional rights against such claimant
through the inscription in the registry.

FACTS:
Eugenio and Felix Cagaoan are sons of Gregorio Cagaoan. In 1915, Gregorio executed a deed of gift of 4
parcels of land in Pangasinan in favor of Felix (without delivery of actual possession) and in 1918 in favor of
Eugenio (who immediately took possession) over a parcel of land, which is the same as parcel no. 4 in the
deed of gift in favor of Felix.
Immediately, Eugenio took possession of the land donated, but failed to have the donation recorded with the
RD. However, Felixs deed was registered in 1919 and took possession of Parcel Nos. 1, 2 and 3 since 1915.
He has never had possession of Parcel No. 4.
After Eugenio had taken possession, Felix had caused his title to be recorded in the Mortgage Law Register,
having full notice of the donation made to Eugenio.

Eugenio instituted an action to declare him the owner of the parcel of land donated to him and to set aside
the donation in favor of Felix on the ground of fraud. RTC ruled in favor of Felix ordered Eugenio to surrender
possession of the land to him.

ISSUE:
Who owns the parcel of land in dispute?

HELD: EUGENIO.
It clearly appears the Felix had full notice of the Eugenios claim to the land before he had his deed of gift
recorded with the RD. Thus, he may not be considered a third person within the meaning of Art. 34 of the
Mortgage Law, and his position was in no wise improved by the inscription of his document. Eugenio, having
first taken possession in good faith, must therefore be considered to have a better right to the land in
question.

REPUBLIC vs. GUZMAN- Essential Elements of a Donation

Three
essential
elements
1.
Reduction
in
the
2.
Increase
in
the
3. Intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi

of
patrimony
patrimony

a
of
of

the
the

donation:
donor
donee

It is also required that the donation be made in a public document and that its acceptance be made in the
same deed of donation or in a separate public document, which has to be recorded as well.

FACTS:
David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son of the spouses Simeon Guzman (naturalized
American) and Helen Meyers Guzman (American citizen). In 1968, Simeon died leaving to his heirs, Helen
and David, an estate consisting of several parcels of land in Bulacan.
In 1970, Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate, dividing and
adjudicating to themselves all of the property, and registered it to the RD a year after.
In 1981, Helen executed a Deed of Quitclaim, assigning, transferring and conveying her share of the
properties to David. But since it was not registered, she executed another Deed of Quitclaim to confirm the
first.

In 1994, Atty. Batongbacal wrote the OSG andfurnished it with documents showing that Davids ownership of
of the estate was defective. He argued that Art. XII of the Constitution only allows Filipinos to acquire
private lands in the country. The only instances when a foreigner may acquire private property are by
hereditary succession and if he was formerly a natural-born citizen who lost his Filipino citizenship.
Moreover, it contends that the Deeds of Quitclaim executed by Helen were really donations inter vivos.
Republic filed with RTC a Petition for Escheat praying that of Davids interest be forfeited in its favor. RTC
dismissed. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a donation inter vivos
HELD: NO.
Not all the elements of a donation are present. The transfer of the properties by virtue of a Deed of Quitclaim
resulted in the (1) reduction of her patrimony as donor and the (2) consequent increase in the patrimony of
David as donee. However, Helens (3) intention to perform an act of liberality in favor of David was not
sufficiently established. The 2 Quitclaims reveal that Helen intended to convey to her son certain parcels of
land and to re-affirm it, she executed a waiver and renunciation of her rights over these properties. It is clear
that Helen merely contemplated a waiver of her rights, title, interest over the lands in favor of David, not a
donation. She was also aware that donation was not possible.
Moreover, the essential element of acceptance in the proper form and registration to make the donation valid
is lacking. The SPA executed by David in favor of Atty. Abela was not his acceptance, but an
acknowledgment that David owns the property referred to and that he authorizes Atty. Abela to sell the same
in his name. Further, there was nothing in the SPA to show that he indeed accept the donation.
However, the inexistence of a donation does not make the repudiation of Helen in favor David valid. There is
NO valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen had already accepted her share of the inheritance when she,
together with David, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate, dividing and adjudicating
between them all the properties. By virtue of that settlement, the properties were registered in their names
and for 11 years, they possessed the land in the concept of owner. Thus, the 2 Quitclaims have no legal
force and effect. Helen still owns of the property.

DANGUILAN VS. MELAD- Onerous Donations

An onerous donation is not covered by Article 749. There is no need for a public instrument. A private
document is enough to make an onerous donation valid.

FACTS:

Respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner for recovery of a farm lot and a residential lot which she
claimed she had purchased from Domingo Melad, the original owner, and were now being unlawfully
withheld by the defendant. In his answer, the petitioner denied the allegation and averred that he was the
owner of the said lots of which he had been in open, continuous and adverse possession, having acquired
them from Domingo Melad in 1941 and 1943 by donation.
For his part, the Petitioner testified that he was the husband of Isidra Melad, Domingo's niece, whom he and
his wife Juana Malupang had taken into their home as their ward as they had no children of their own. He
and his wife lived with the couple in their house on the residential lot and helped Domingo with the cultivation
of the farm. Domingo Melad signed in a private instrument in which he gave the defendant the farm and in
another private instrument in which he also gave him the residential lot, on the understanding that the latter
would take care of the grantor and would bury him upon his death.
I, DOMINGO MELAD do hereby declare in this receipt the truth of my giving to Felix Danguilan, my
agricultural land...that I hereby declare and bind myself that there is no one to whom I will deliver this land
except to him as he will be the one responsible for me in the event that I will die and also for all other things
needed and necessary for me...
I, DOMINGO MELAD, declare the truth that I have delivered my residential lot to Felix Danguilan because
he will be the one to take care of SHELTERING me or bury me when I die...
Respondent attacked the alleged donations on the ground that that they were donations of real property and
as such should have been effected through a public instrument.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation was valid

RULING:
It is our view, considering the language of the two instruments, that Domingo Melad did intend to donate the
properties to the petitioner, as the private respondent contends. We do not think, however, that the donee
was moved by pure liberality. While truly donations, the conveyances were onerous donations as the
properties were given to the petitioner in exchange for his obligation to take care of the donee for the rest of
his life and provide for his burial. Hence, it was not covered by the rule in Article 749 of the Civil Code
requiring donations of real properties to be effected through a public instrument. The case at bar comes
squarely under the doctrine laid down in Manalo v. De Mesa, where the Court held:
There can be no doubt that the donation in question was made for a valuable consideration, since the
donors made it conditional upon the donees' bearing the expenses that might be occasioned by the death
and burial of the donor Placida Manalo, a condition and obligation. Therefore, in order to determine whether
or not said donation is valid and effective it should be sufficient to demonstrate that, as a contract, it
embraces the conditions the law requires and is valid and effective, although not recorded in a public
instrument.

The private respondent argues that as there was no equivalence between the value of the lands donated
and the services for which they were being exchanged, the two transactions should be considered pure or
gratuitous donations of real rights, hence, they should have been effected through a public instrument and
not mere private writings. However, no evidence has been adduced to support her contention that the values
exchanged were disproportionate or unequal.

As to the claim of Respondent that there was a deed of sale, assuming that the sale was valid, there was no
trasnfer of ownership because the land was never delivered to Respondent. It is true that the same article
declares that the execution of a public instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object
of the contract, but, in order that this symbolic delivery may produce the effect of tradition, it is necessary
that the vendor shall have had such control over the thing sold that, at the moment of the sale, its material
delivery could have been made. It is not enough to confer upon the purchaser the ownership and the right of
possession. There is no dispute that it is the petitioner and not the private respondent who is in actual
possession of the litigated properties.

LAGAZO V. CABANLIT- Pure Donation, Onerous Donation

Acceptance if the donation is indispensable. Its absence (in an authentic form for immovables) make a
donation null and void.
Note: The donation, following the theory of cognition (Article 1319, Civil Code), is
perfected only upon the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee."

FACTS:
Petitioner filed an action seeking to recover from defendant a parcel of land which the former claims to have
acquired from his grandmother by donation. Respondent on the other hand, put up the defense that when
the alleged donation was executed, he had already acquired the property by a Deed of Assignment
(allegedly executed before the Deed of Donation to Plaintiff) from a transferee (the former agent) of
petitioners grandmother. Defendant also claims that petitioner failed to accept the donation whether in the
same deed of donation or in a separate instrument rendering the donation null and void. Petitioner defends
that the donation in any case was onerous as he wsd the one who paid the lands amortization.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation is simple or onerous.

RULING:
A simple or pure donation is one whose cause is pure liberality (no strings attached), while an onerous
donation is one which is subject to burdens, charges or future services equal to or more in value than the
thing donated. Article 733 of the Civil Code, donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules
on contracts; hence, the formalities required for a valid simple donation are not applicable.
We rule that the donation was simple, not onerous. Even conceding that petitioner's full payment of the
purchase price of the lot might have been a burden to him, such payment was not however imposed by the
donor as a condition for the donation. Rather, the deed explicitly stated:
That...the DONOR hereby voluntarily and freely gives, by way of donation unto said DONEE...the above
described real property, together with all the buildings and improvements found therein, free from all lines
[sic] and encumbrances and charges whatsoever;
The payments even seem to have been made pursuant to the power of attorney executed by Catalina Reyes
in favor of petitioner, her grandson, authorizing him to execute acts necessary for the fulfillment of her
obligations.
As a pure or simple donation, the following provisions of the Civil Code are applicable:
Art. 734. The donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the
donee.
Art. 746. Acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the donor and the donee.
Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public
instrument, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee
must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation and in a separate public document, but it shall
not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in authentic form, and
this step shall be noted in both instruments.
The donation, following the theory of cognition (Article 1319, Civil Code), is perfected only upon the moment
the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee."

QUIJADA VS. CA- Resolutory Condition in Donations

When a person donates land to another on a condition. The condition imposed is not a condition precedent
or a suspensive condition but a resolutory one.

FACTS:
Petitioners are the children of the late Trinidad Quijada. Trinidad and her siblings executed a deed of
donation of a two-hectare lot in favor of the Municipality of Talacogon (Agusan del Sur), exclusively for the
purpose of constructing the proposed provincial high school. However, possession remained with Trinidad.
She subsequently sold the two hectares on two separate occasions to Regalado Mondejar, who sold it to
different persons. Eventually, the Municipality, failing to construct the high school, reverted ownership to the
donors. Petitioners filed an action for quieting of title and recovery of possession and ownership. RTC ruled
in favor of petitioners, but CA reversed.

ISSUE:
1.

Whether the deed of donation had a suspensive condition or a resolutory condition

2. Whether the sale was valid

RULING:
When the donation was accepted, the ownership was transferred to the school, only subject to a condition
that a school must be constructed over the lot. Since ownership was transferred, and failure to fulfill the
condition reverts the ownership back to the donor, it is a resolutory condition.
(Not really a discussion in Property) When Trinidad sold the parcels of land to Mondejar, she was not the
owner of the land. Petitioners also did not sleep on their rights to recover the possession and ownership over
the property since they immediately filed the action when the municipality passed the resolution, reverting
the ownership of land to the donors. However, a sale being a consensual contract, it can be perfected upon
meeting of the minds, and completing the three essential elements of a valid contract of sale. Even when
Trinidad was not the owner when the sale was perfected, tradition through delivery is only important upon
the consummation stage. Such transfer of ownership through actual or constructive delivery only happened
when the lands reverted back to petitioners. Art 1434 is applicable, stating that seller's "title passes by
operation if law to the buyer," and therefore making the sale valid. The donated lots cannot be considered
outside the commerce of man, since nowhere in the law states that properties owned by municipality would
be as such.

GESTOPA VS. CA FACTS- Acceptance in Donation

Acceptance is a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, are
not required to be accepted by the donee during the donors lifetime.

FACTS:
Spouses Danlag own six parcels of land. To four parcels of land, they executed a donation mortis causa in
favor of respondent Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil, reserving donor's rights to amend, cancel, or revoke the
donation and to sell or encumber such properties. Years later, they executed another donation, this time inter
vivos, to six parcels of land in favor of respondents, reserving their rights to the fruits of the land during their
lifetime and for prohibiting the donee to sell or dispose the properties donated. Subsequently, the spouses
sold 2 parcels to herein petitioners, spouses Gestopa, and eventually revoking the donation. Respondent
filed a petition to quiet title, stating that she had already become the owner of the parcels of land. Trial Court
ruled in favor of petitioners, but CA reversed.

ISSUE:
Whether the (second) donation was inter vivos or mortis causa

RULING:
It was donation inter vivos. The spouses were aware of the difference between the two donations, and that
they needed to execute another deed of donation inter vivos, since it has a different application to a donation
mortis causa. Also, the court stated four reasons to the matter:
(1) that the spouses donated the parcels of land out of love and affection, a clear indication of a donation
inter vivos;
(2) the reservation of a lifetime usufruct;
(3) reservation of sufficient properties for maintenance that shows the intention to part with their six lot;
and
(4) respondent's acceptance, contained in the deed of donation. Once a deed of donation has been
accepted, it cannot be revoked, except for officiousness or ingratitude, which the spouses failed to
invoke.

REYES V. MOSQUEDA- Donation Inter Vivos

The nature of the disposition made is the determinative factor which makes the donation inter vivos or
mortis causa and not the title given to a deed of donation.

FACTS:
Dr. Emilio Pascual died intestate and was survived by his sister Ursula Pascual and the children of his late
sisters, herein petitioners Ruperto Reyes et. al. The heirs of Dr. Pascual filed Special Proceedings No. 7330-M in the CFI for the administration of Pascuals estate. Ursula then filed a motion to exclude some
properties included alleging that these were donated to her in a donation mortis causa in 1966. This was
granted by the CFI without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. An appeal was made to
the SC. The SC then issued a TRO enjoining the CFI from enforcing the order.
Among the properties donated to Ursula is lot 24 which was also donated in 1969 in a deed of donation inter
vivos in favor of Ofelia Parungao who was then a minor at the time of the donation. When she reached the
age of majority, she had the donation registered but found out that the certificate of title was missing so she
filed a petition for reconstitution of title which was granted and she registered the donation and was issued a
new TCT in her name.

Ursula then sold the lot in favor of the Reyes. Benjamin Reyes filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of
Ofelias TCT which prompted Ofelia to file a petition for recovery of possession against Benjamin Reyes. The
CFI issued a joint decision for the 2 cases ruling that Ofelias TCT was null and void. The IAC affirmed thus
an appeal to the SC.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the probate has jurisdiction to exclude properties donated
(2) Whether or not the donation executed in favor of Ursula was a donation inter vivos

to

Ursula

RULING:
(1) YES
It was stressed in the order of the probate court that it was without prejudice to the final determination in a
separate action. It is well-settled that although a probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties, it can determine whether or not the properties should be included in the inventory to be
administered. Such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action.
(2)
YES
Although the donation was entitled donations mortis causa it has been held that dispositions in a deed of

donation do not depend on the title or term used in the deed of donation. It is the body of the document
which should be considered in ascertaining the intention of the donor.
For a donation to be a donation mortis causa, the following characteristics should be present:
1. It conveys no title before the death of the transferor or the transferor retains ownership over the
property
2. Before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will
3. The transfer is void should the transferor survive the transferee

The following are not present in the case. The transfer of ownership was immediate and independent of the
death of the donor. The provision stating that the donor has reserved sufficient properties for himself to
maintain him for life confirms the intention of the donor to give naked ownership immediately after execution
of the deed of donation.

ALEJANDRO V. GERALDEZ- Donation Mortis Causa

All provisions of a deed of donation should be construed together in case of conflicting statements in order to
determine whether it is inter vivos or mortis causa.

FACTS:
Sps. Gavino Diaz and Severa Mendoza executed a Deed of Donation in favor of their children, Olimpia,
Angel and Andrea Diaz. In the deed of donation, the Sps. Donated 8 lots, with reservations on certain lots, to
their children and daughters-in-law and with conditions that they are not allowed to alienate the same to 3rd
persons while the couple are still alive and that they shall continue to administer the same until their death.
The donees manifested their acceptance in the same deed of donation. When Gavino died, Severa executed
a deed of donation in favor of Angel and Andrea, giving the siblings each a portion of Lot 2377-A. When
Severa died, Andrea sued Angel to have the lots 2377-A and 2502 partitioned. Teodorico Alejandro, the
surviving spouse of Olimpia, moved to intervene claiming 1/3 portion of Lot 2502.
The CFI ruled that the donation was a donation mortis causa because the ownership of the properties
donated did not pass to the donees during the donors lifetime but was transmitted to the donees only
upon the death of the donors. It, however, sustained the partition of Lot 2502 since it was an extrajudicial
partition. Both parties appealed to the SC, Andrea contending that it is a donation inter vivos while Alejandro
contending it to be mortis causa.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation is a donation inter vivos or mortis causa

RULING:
Donation inter vivos
The donation is a donation inter vivos because it took effect during the lifetime of the donors as provided in
Art. 729. It was stipulated in the deed that out of love and affection by the donors to the donees, the latter
are donating wholeheartedly and unconditionally free from any kind of lien and debt. Likewise, it was
accepted by the donees which is a requirement for donations inter vivos. Donations mortis causa are never
accepted during the donors lifetime.
The reservation clause which provides that the donees cannot sell the lots to 3rd persons while the couple is
still alive implies that the ownership already passed.
Although there was a stipulation where the couple reserved to themselves the administration, ownership and
rights over the properties mentioned, this should not be construed as to mean that ownership will pass only
after their death. This refers to the beneficial ownership and not the naked title and what the donors reserved
to themselves by means of that clause was the management of the donated lots and the fruits thereof.

BONSATO V. UTEA, 95 Phil 481

If the donation conveys the ownership and only reserves for himself during his lifetime the owners share of
the fruits or proceeds, and the deed expressly declares the act to be irrevocable, it is not a donation
mortis causa, but a conveyance inter vivos.

FACTS:
Josefa Utea and other heirs of deceased Domingo Bonsato and Andrea Nacario filed a complaint to annul
the donations of several parcels of land made by Domingo Bonsato in favor of Juan and Felipe Bonsato. The
donations were embodied in two Notarial deeds which the Josefa Utea and the heirs allege were obtained
thru fraudulent inducement.
In the Notarial deeds, the donor reserved for himself a portion of the fruits of the properties and expressed
that after the death of the donor, the aforesaid donation shall become effective.
CFI ruled that the donation was inter vivos therefor valid. CA ruled it was mortis causa therefore invalid for
not following the required formalities.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation was inter vivos?

HELD:
Inter Vivos. If the donation conveys the ownership and only reserves for himself during his lifetime the
owners share of the fruits or proceeds, and the deed expressly declares the act to be irrevocable, it is
not a donation mortis causa, but a conveyance inter vivos.
The solemnities required for a donation inter vivos are those prescribed by Art.749 of the Civil Code. But
only half of the property conveyed shall be valid since the property is conjugal and only Domingo made the
conveyance without any consent from Andrea.

Note: Many portions of the case are in Spanish.

MAGLASANG VS. HEIRS OF CORAZON CABATINGAN

383 SCRA 6- Donation Mortis Causa
In a donation mortis causa, the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive.

FACTS:
On February 1992, Conchita Cabatingan executed in favor of her brother, Nicolas Cabatingan, a "Deed of
Conditional of Donation Inter Vivos for House and Lot." Four (4) other deeds of donation were subsequently
executed by Conchita Cabatingan on January 1995, bestowing upon: (a) petitioner Estela C. Maglasang, two
(2) parcels of land;(b) Nicolas Cabatingan, a portion of a parcel of land; and (c) Merly S. Cabatingan, a
portion of land.These deeds of donation contain similar provisions, to wit:
"That for and in consideration of the love and affection of the DONOR for the DONEE, x x x the DONOR
does hereby, by these presents, transfer, convey, by way of donation, unto the DONEE the above-described
property, together with the buildings and all improvements existing thereon, to become effective upon the
death of the DONOR; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in the event that the DONEE should die before the
DONOR, the present donation shall be deemed automatically rescinded and of no further force and effect; x
x x"3 (Emphasis Ours)
On May 1995, Conchita Cabatingan died.

Upon learning of the existence of the foregoing donations, respondents (Heirs of Corazon Cabatingan) filed
an action for Annulment And/Or Declaration of Nullity of Deeds of Donations and Accounting, seeking the
annulment of said four (4) deeds of donation executed. Heirs allege, inter alia, that petitioners, fraudulently
caused the donations and that the documents are void for failing to comply with the provisions of the Civil
Code regarding formalities of wills and testaments, considering that these are donations mortis causa.
RTC ruled that the donation was mortis causa thus void for not following the requisite forms.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation was mortis causa?
HELD:
Mortis Causa.
In a donation mortis causa, "the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still
alive." In determining whether a donation is one of mortis causa, the following characteristics must be taken
into account:
(1) It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control
of the property while alive;

(2) That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of
the properties conveyed; and

(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
In the present case, the nature of the donations as mortis causa is confirmed by the fact that the
donations do not contain any clear provision that intends to pass proprietary rights to petitioners prior
to Cabatingan's death. The phrase "to become effective upon the death of the DONOR" admits of no
other interpretation but that Cabatingan did not intend to transfer the ownership of the properties to
petitioners during her lifetime.

For a donation mortis causa to be valid it must conform with the following requisites:
ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator
himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction,

and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one
another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will,
shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the
pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written , and the fact that the
testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his
express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the
will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.
ART. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The
notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of
Court. (n)

DAVID VS. SISON

(Donation Mortis Causa: Essential Rights of Ownership)
When the donor maintains the essential rights of ownership over the property during his lifetime, the
donation is mortis causa.

FACTS:
Manila, 1943: The Administrator of deceased Ms. David was ordered by the court to pay the lawyer of
deceased the amount of P18,000 for legal services rendered. The lawyer, on the other hand, wanted about
P81,000. (chaching!!!) which was equivalent to 5% of the inventoried estate. Administrator thought that too
high and said hed be happy to pay P3,000.

Both parties based their claims on the central issue of the donation by Ms. David. If the donation was mortis
causa, then the donation should be inventoried with the estate and therefore the lawyer can get his lofty
demand. Should the donation have been intervivos, then the donation wouldnt be inventoried and therefore
the administrator can pay the lower sum contended.

The lower court analyzed a few paragraphs of the deed (in tagalog) and concluded that the deed partook of
the nature mortis causa.

"Na and naturang "donor," Margarita David y Puato, alang-alang sa malaki niyang pagtigin, pagligap at
pagmamahal sa mga nabanguit na "donees" Narcisa de la Fuente at Priscila de la Fuente, sa pamamagitan
nang kasulatang ito, malayang ibinigay at ipinagkakaloob sa mga naturang Narcisa de la Fuente at Priscila
de la Fuente, at sa kanilang mga tagapagmana, "albacea" at "Administradores", sa habang panahon, ang
kanyang mga titulo, interes at participacion sa mag sumusunod na ari-arian na pawang malines sa lahat
nang mga pananagutan: (Rec. on Appeal, pp. 209, 210.)
Datapwa't ang lahat nang mga tubo at pakinabangan nang nagbibigay o "donor" na si Margarita David y
Puato hanggang siya ay hindi binabawian nang buhay nang maykapal; at ang mga pinagbibigyan na si
Narcisa de la Fuente at Priscila de la Fuente ay hindi maaaring maipagbili, maisangal, a maipagpalit o sa
ano pa man paraan, kung walang kaalaman at pahintulot nang naturang Margarita David y Puato.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Deed of Donation is Mortis Causa

HELD:
Yes.
The deed of donation makes it clear that all rents, proceeds, fruits, of the donated properties shall remain for
the exclusive benefit and disposal of the donor, Margartia David, during her lifetime and that, without the
knowledge consent of the donor, the donated properties could not be disposed of in any way, whether by
sale, mortgage, barter, or in any other way possible, thus making the donees just as paper owners of the
properties.
The court then concluded that the donation in question is a donation mortis causa, because the combined
effect of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed of donation and of the above-quoted
clauses thereof could not have taken effect before the death of Margarita David. According to the terms of
the deed, the most essential elements of ownership the right to dispose of the donated properties and the
right to enjoy the products, profits, possession remained with Margarita David during her lifetime, and
would accrue to the donees only after Margarita David's death.
While the donation in question is a donation mortis causa, the court declined to rule that the donated
properties should be included in the inventory of the estate and should follow the same proceedings as if
they were not donated at all.
The court then awarded the lawyer P10,000 instead of the P81,000 he craved.

SICAD VS. CA- Donation Mortis Causa

The real nature of a deed is to be ascertained by both its language and the intention of the parties as
demonstrated by the circumstances attendant upon its execution.

FACTS:
Capiz, Dec 1979: Granny Aurora Montinola, out of the charitable goodness of her heart, drew up a Deed in
favor of her darling grandkids Catalino, Judy and Jesus- all of them Valderramas. The deed bore the title
Deed of Donation Intervivos.
Thereafter, Auroras able secretary presented the Deed to the Registrar for the purpose of canceling the
original title and obtaining a transfer certificate of title in favor of the three donees.
A twist of events followed. The duplicate title never reached the donees; Aurora retained the document and
maintained possession of the property for ten years after the transfer.
The tipping point arrived when Aurora then alienated the land to spouses Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad.
Simultaneously with alienation, Aurora issued a Deed of Revocation of Donation. She asserted that the
donation took the nature of mortis causa and was therefore revocable anytime. She further averred that the
same failed to follow the formality of wills, and therefore was nullity.
Auroras grandchildren found their grandmas reversal vexing. They insisted that the Deed was one intervivos
and
therefore
irrevocable.
The
RTC
adjudicated
and
found
for
the
grandchildren.
Aurora took the case to the CA but, alas, kicked the bucket during proceedings.
The Spouses Sicad who were in possession of the property took Auroras her place in the litigation. Sadly,
the CA reaffirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Donation took the nature of one inter vivos

HELD: No.
The donation is mortis causa.
The court found circumstances signifying that Aurora never intended the donation to take effect within her
lifetime. First, she expressed that the donation take effect 10 years after her death. Second, she inserted a

prohibition on the sale of the property during the 10 year period. Third, she continued to possess the
property as well as the fruits and authorized such enjoyment in the deed of donation. Fourth, she retained
the certificate of title and subsequently alienated it in favor of the Sicads. All these are indisputable acts of
ownership.
The court then concluded that the real nature of a deed is to be ascertained by both its language and the
intention of the parties as demonstrated by the circumstances attendant upon its execution.
The deed subject of litigation is one mortis causa because it stipulated that all rents, proceeds, fruits, of
the donated properties shall remain for the exclusive benefit and disposal of the donor, during her lifetime;
and that, without the knowledge and consent of the donor, the donated properties could not be disposed of
in any way, whether by sale, mortgage, barter, or in any other way possible.
A donation which pretends to be one inter vivos but withholds form the donee that right to dispose of the
donated property during the donors lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In a donation mortis causa the
right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive.
Because of Auroras actions, nothing was transferred by the deed of donation in question to her
grandchildren. They did not get possession of the property donated. They did not acquire the right to the
fruits thereof, or any other right of dominion over the property. More importantly, they did not acquire the right
to dispose of the property this would accrue to them only after ten years from Auroras death. Moreover,
they never saw what the certificate of title looked like.
These circumstances ultimately lead to the conclusion that the donation in question was a donation mortis
causa, envisioning a transfer of ownership only after the donor knocks on Heavens door.

PUIG v. PENAFLORIDA- Donation Mortis Causa or Inter Vivos

The reservation by the donor of the right to dispose of the property during her lifetime in the deed does not
indicate that title had passed to the donee in her lifetime but that the donor merely reserves power to destroy
the donation at any time.

FACTS:
Carmen Ubalde Vda. de Parcon died in the City of Iloilo, without forced heirs, leaving certain properties in
the City and province of Iloilo. She left a will and was survived by nephews and nieces, children of her
predeceased brother, Catalino Ubalde, and sister, Luisa Ubalde, married to Ariston Magbanua. Besides her
will, the deceased had executed two notarial deeds of donation. One, entitled DONACION MORTIS CAUSA,
was executed on November 24, 1948, in favor of her niece, Estela Magbanua. The deceased executed

another deed of donation, also entitled "ESCRITURA DE DONACION MORTIS CAUSA" in favor of the same
donee, Estela Magbanua Peaflorida, conveying to her three parcels of land.

Defendants-appellants Estela Magbanua Peaflorida, et al., insist that the reservation by the donor of the
right to dispose of the property during her lifetime in the deed of December 28, 1949 indicates that title had
passed to the donee in her lifetime, otherwise, it is argued, the reservation would be superfluous.

ISSUE:
Is the donation mortis causa or inter vivos?

HELD:
The Court in its decision took to account not only the foregoing circumstance but also the fact that the
deceased expressly and consistently declared her conveyance to be one of donation mortis causa, and
further forbade the registration of the deed until after her death.

The power, as reserved in the deed, was a power to destroy the donation at any time, and that it meant that
the transfer is not binding on the grantor until her death made it impossible to channel the property
elsewhere.

HOWARD vs. PADILLA- Formalities of Donation

Donations must conform with the formalities set by law.

FACTS:
Marie Howard is the widow of the donor. The donated propert was conjugal in nature. The CA ruled that the
donation was inter vivos, not mortis causa. As such it is valid and irrevocable. It is valid, however, only up to
the extent of the share of the donor in the property.

ISSUE:
Is the donation mortis causa or inter vivos?

HELD:

The donation is mortis causa which takes effect upon the death of the donor. Therefore, the donation not
having conformed with the formalities of the law, the same is void.

JUTIC vs. CA- Intent to Donate

A letter showing an intention to donate is not sufficient to prove donation; and most certainly not the form
required by law in donations.

FACTS:
The properties of Arsenio Seville, who had no wife or children, here are under dispute which includes 2
parcels of agricultural land. Petitioners herein are heirs of Melquiades Seville who was one of the siblings of
the deceased Arsenio Seville. Respondents are other heirs claiming rightful ownership over the properties.
The petitioners claim that the 2 parcels of land with improvements thereon was donated to their father in an
affidavit executed by Arsenio Seville to Melquindes Seville. It stated that the latter was the only one to who
the former intended (note: this is only a manifest intention or desire similar to the previous case- the last part
of the document says That I make this affidavit to amek manifest my intention and desire as to the way the
above mentioned property...) to inherit all his properties.

ISSUES:
Whether or not there was a valid donation from Arsenio Seville to Melquiades Seville?

RULING: NO.
A close reading of the letter reveals that it is not a donation inters vivos or motis causa but a mere
declaration of an intention and a desire. The fact that the property was mortgage by Arsenio with the
knowledge of the Melquiades shows that ownership has not yet transferred. Also when Arsenio died,
payments to the loan for which the property was mortgaged stopped and was not continued by the
petitioners. It was even foreclosed but was later on redeemed by one of Arsenios brothers, Zoilo, who is
also one of the respondents.
Petitioners has a rightful claim over the property based on the fact that they are heirs of Arsenio but not
because of the alleged affidavit executed in favour of Melquidas.
Also it is worth noting that the signed affidavit is a forgery because Arsenio Sevile was illiterate during his
lifetime. He could not write his name and only affixed his thumbmak in the REM mentioned earlier.

ALDABA vs. CA- Donation

A letter showing an intention to donate is not sufficient to prove donation; and most certainly not the form
required by law in donations.

FACTS:
Two lots owned by Belen Aldaba are being disputed in this case. Petitoners Dr. Vicente Aldaba and Jane
Aldaba, father and daughter, lived with Belen Aldaba for 10 years and took care of her until her death. Belen
had presumptive heirs her surviving husband Estanislao Bautista, and her brother Cesar Aldaba
(represented as the respondents in this case.) After the death of Belen, the respondents asked the
petitioners to leave the premises and upon their refusal, the former instituted an ejectment case. The
petitioners argue that Belen really intended to donate the property to them as evidence by the note written by
Belen to them which reads, Huag kayong umalis diyan. Talagang iyan ay para sa inyo. Alam nila na iyan
ay sa inyo. They also argue that the property was for compensation of their services which amounted to
P53,000. The respondents contend that the letter no way proves a donation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a disposition of property by Belen in favour of the petitioners?

RULING: NO
For the following reasons:
(1) The note was insufficient conveyance, and hence could not be considered as evidence of a donation
with onerous caus. The note can be considered, at most, as indicative of the intention to donate.
(2) no notarial document was executed by Belen to the petitioners during those 10 years.
(3) P53,000 worth of services made by the petitioners no way proves the alleged donation. If at all, the
petitioners believed that the gratuitous use of the property was not sufficient to compensate them for
their services, they could have presented their claims in the intestate proceedings, which they
themselves could have initiated, if none was instituted.
The SC emphasized that there was no express agreement between the parties and that respondents Jane
did not even expect to be compensated.

PEARL & DEAN PHIL INC. VS. SHOEMART

(Trademark, Copyright and Patents)
Trademark, copyright and patents are different intellectual property rights that cannot be interchanged with
one another. A trademark is any visible sign capable of distinguishing the goods or services of an enterprise
and shall include a stamped or marked container of goods. The scope of a copyright is confined to literary
and artistic works which are original intellectual creations in the literary and artistic domain. Patentable
inventions refer to any technical solution of a problem in any field of human activity which is new, involves an
inventive step and is industrially applicable.

FACTS:
Pearl and Dean is a corporation in the manufacture of advertising display units also known as light boxes,
which were manufactured by Metro Industrial Services. A copyright Registration was obtained in 1981.
These were marketed in the name of "Poster Ads". They also applied for a registration of trademark with the
Bureau of Patents in 1983, but was only approved in 19988. In 1985, petitioner had n agreement with
respondent Shoemart Inc (SMI) to install these light boxes in their Makati and Cubao branch, Only the
Makati branch was able to sigh the agreement. In 1986, the contract was rescinded unilaterally by SMI, and
instead contracted with Metro Industrial Services. They installed these lightboxes in different SM city
branches, including Cubao and Makati, with association with North Edsa Marketing Inc (NEMI), SMI's sister
company. Petitioner requested SMI and NEMI to put down their installations of the light boxes, and payment
of compensatory damages worth P20M. Claiming that respondents failed to comply, they filed a case for
infringement of trademark and copyright, unfair competition and damages. RTC ruled in favor of petitioner,
but CA reversed.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether there was a copyright infringement
(2) Whether there was a patent infringement
(3) Whether there was a trademark infringement
(4) Whether there was unfair competition

RULING: No to all.

(1) Copyright is a statutory right, subject to the terms and conditions specified in the statute. Therefore, it can
only cover the works falling within the statutory enumeration or description. Since the copyright was
classified under class "O" works, which includes "prints, pictorial illustrations, advertising copies, labels, tags
and box wraps," and does not include the light box itself. A lightbox, even admitted by the president of
petitioner company, was neither a literary nor an artistic work but an engineering or marketing invention, thus
not included under a copyright.
(2) Petitioner was not able to secure a patent for its lightboxes, and cannot legally prevent anyone from
manufacturing or commercially using the same. Patent has a three-fold purpose: a) to foster and reward
invention; b) promotes disclosures of invention and permit public to use the same upon expiration; c)
stringent requirements for patent protection to ensure in the public domain remain there for free use of the
public. Since petitioner was not able to go through such examination, it cannot exclude others from
manufacturing, or selling such lightboxes. No patent, no protection.
(3) The certificate of registration issued by the Director of Patents gives exclusive right to use its own symbol
only to the description specified in the certificate. It cannot prevent others to use the same trademark with a
different description.
(4) "Poster Ads" is a general term that cannot be associated specifically to Pearl and Dean, thus it cannot be
considered to use such term to be unfair competition against the petitioner.

LYCEUM OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA

(Doctrine of Secondary Meaning)
Doctrine of secondary meaning can be extended to corporation name but must comply with the requirement
that it has been used so long and so exclusively by one and that the said name has come to mean that it is
referred to as that corporation.

FACTS:
Petitioner is an educational institution duly registered with the SEC since Sept 1950. Before the case at bar,
Petitioner commenced a proceeding against Lyceum of Baguio with the SEC to require it to change its
corporate name and adopt a new one not similar or identical to the Petitioner. SEC granted noting that there
was substantial because of the dominant word Lyceum. CA and SC affirmed. Petitioner filed similar
complaint against other schools and obtain a favorable decision from the hearing officer. On appeal, SEC En
banc reversed the decision and held that the word Lyceum have not become so identified with the petitioner
and that the use thereof will cause confusion to the general public.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the corporate names of the private respondents are identical with or deceptively similar to
that of the petitioner.
2. Whether or not the use by the petitioner of Lyceum in its corporate name has been for such length of time
and with such exclusivity as to have become associated or identified with the petitioner institution in the mind
of the general public (Doctrine of Secondary meaning).

RULING:
NO to both.
True enough, the corporate names of the parties carry the word Lyceum but confusion and deception are
precluded by the appending of geographic names. Lyceum generally refers to a school or an institution of
learning and it is natural to use this word to designate an entity which is organized and operating as an
educational institution.
Doctrine of Secondary meaning is a word of phrase originally incapable of exclusive appropriation, might
nevertheless have been used so long and so exclusively by one producer with reference to his article that, in
trade and to that branch of the purchasing public, the word or phrase has come to mean that the article was
his product.
Lyceum of the Philippines has not gained exclusive use of Lyceum by long passage of time. The number
alone of the private respondents suggests strongly that the use of Lyceum has not been attended with the
exclusivity essential for the applicability of the doctrine. It may be noted that one of the respondents
Western Pangasinan Lyceum used such term 17 years before the petitioner registered with the SEC.
Moreover, there may be other schools using the name but not registered with the SEC because they have
not adopted the corporate form of organization.

PHILIPS EXPORT VS. COURT OF APPEALS

(Corporate Trade Name)
A corporations right to use its corporate and trade name is a property right, a right in rem, which it may
assert and protect against the whole world.

FACTS:

Philips Export B.V. (PEBV) filed with the SEC for the cancellation of the word Philips the corporate name of
Standard Philips Corporation in view of its prior registration with the Bureau of Patents and the SEC.
However, Standard Philips refused to amend its Articles of Incorporation so PEBV filed with the SEC a
petition for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, however this was denied ruling that it can only be
done when the corporate names are identical and they have at least 2 words different. This was affirmed by
the SEC en banc and the Court of Appeals thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Standard Philips can be enjoined from using Philips in its corporate name

RULING: YES
A corporations right to use its corporate and trade name is a property right, a right in rem, which it may
assert and protect against the whole world. According to Sec. 18 of the Corporation Code, no corporate
name may be allowed if the proposed name is identical or deceptively confusingly similar to that of any
existing corporation or to any other name already protected by law or is patently deceptive, confusing or
contrary to existing law.

For the prohibition to apply, 2 requisites must be present:

(1) the complainant corporation must have acquired a prior right over the use of such corporate name
and
(2) the proposed name is either identical or deceptively or confusingly similar to that of any existing
corporation or to any other name already protected by law or patently deceptive, confusing or
contrary to existing law.
With regard to the 1st requisite, PEBV adopted the name Philips part of its name 26 years before Standard
Philips. As regards the 2nd, the test for the existence of confusing similarity is whether the similarity is such
as to mislead a person using ordinary care and discrimination. Standard Philips only contains one word,
Standard, different from that of PEBV. The 2 companies products are also the same, or cover the same
line of products. Although PEBV primarily deals with electrical products, it has also shipped to its
subsidiaries machines and parts which fall under the classification of chains, rollers, belts, bearings and
cutting saw, the goods which Standard Philips also produce. Also, among Standard Philips primary
purposes are to buy, sell trade x x x electrical wiring devices, electrical component, electrical supplies. Given
these, there is nothing to prevent Standard Philips from dealing in the same line of business of electrical
devices. The use of Philips by Standard Philips tends to show its intention to ride on the popularity and
established goodwill of PEBV.

ASIA BREWERY VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND SAN MIGUEL CORP.

(Unfair Competition)
Nobody can acquire any exclusive right to market articles supplying the simple human needs in containers or
wrappers of the general form, size and character commonly and immediately used in marketing such
articles.

FACTS:
San Miguel Corp. (SMC) filed a complaint against Asia Brewery Inc. (ABI) for infringement of trademark and
unfair competition. RTC dismissed the complaint finding that ABI has not committed trademark infringement
or unfair competition. The CA reversed the decision finding that ABI is guilty of trademark infringement and
unfair competition thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not ABI infringes SMCs trademark and as such constitutes unfair competition

HELD: NO
Infringement is determined by a test of dominancy. If the competing trademark contains the main or essential
or dominant features of another and confusion and deception is likely to result, infringement takes place. A
closer look at the trademark of both companies will show that the dominant features of each absolutely bear
no similarity to each other. SMCs dominant trademark is the name of the product, San Miguel Pale Pilsen
written in white Gothic letters with elaborate serifs at the beginning and end of the letters S and M on an
amber background while ABIs is the name Beer Pale Pilsen with the word Beer written in large amber
letters, larger than any of the letter found in SMC label.
The word pale pilsen on ABIs trademark does not constitute trademark infringement for it is a generic word
descriptive of the color of a type of beer. No one may appropriate generic or descriptive words for they
belong to the public domain.
ABI is likewise not guilty of unfair competition for unfair competition is the employment of deception or any
other means contrary to good faith by which a person shall pass off the goods manufactured by him for
those of another who has already established goodwill for his similar goods. The universal test for this is
whether the public is likely to be deceived. Actual or probable deception and confusion on the part of the
customers by reason of defendants practices must appear. However, this is unlikely to happen in the case at
bar for consumers generally order beer by brand. Also, the fact that ABI also uses amber-colored steinie
bottles cannot constitute unfair competition for ABI did not copy SMCs bottle. SMC did not invent but merely
borrowed the steinie bottle from abroad. Likewise, amber is the most effective color in preventing

transmission of light thus providing maximum protection to beer. 320 ml is likewise the standard prescribed
under Metrication Circular No. 778. The fact that it is the first to use the steinie bottle does not give SMC a
vested right to use it to the exclusion of everyone else. Nobody can acquire any exclusive right to market
articles supplying the simple human needs in containers or wrappers of the general form, size and character
commonly and immediately used in marketing such articles.
There is no confusing similarity between the competing beers therefore ABI neither infringed SMCs
trademark nor did it commit unfair competition.

Dissenting Opinion of J. Cruz:

Side-by-side comparison is not the final test of similarity because average buyers do not make minute
scrutiny of label details. The average shopper is usually in a hurry and does not inspect every product on the
shelf as if he were browsing in a library.

DEL MONTE V. SUNSHINE SAUCE

(Infringement of Trademark and Unfair Competition)
In making the comparison to determine similarity, the question is NOT whether the two articles are
distinguishable by their label when set side by side but whether the general confusion made by the article
upon the eye of the casual purchaser who is unsuspicious and off his guard, is such as to likely result in his
confounding it with the original. The court therefore should be guided by its first impression because the
imitator will always try to create enough differences to confuse the Court but enough similarity to confuse the
public.

FACTS:
Petitioner Del Monte Corporation is a foreign company organized under the laws of the United States and
not engaged in business in the Philippines. Both the Philippines and the United States are signatories to the
Convention of Paris of September 27, 1965, which grants to the nationals of the parties rights and
advantages which their own nationals enjoy for the repression of acts of infringement and unfair competition.
Petitioner Philippine Packing Corporation (Philpack) is a domestic corporation duly organized under the laws
of the Philippines. Del Monte granted Philpack the right to manufacture, distribute and sell in the Philippines
various agricultural products, including catsup, under the Del Monte trademark and logo. Del Monte
authorized Philpack to register with the Philippine Patent Office the Del Monte catsup bottle configuration, for
which it was granted Certificate of Trademark Registration No. SR-913 by the Philippine Patent Office under
the Supplemental Register. Del Monte also obtained two registration certificates for its trademark "DEL

MONTE" and its logo. Respondent Sunshine Sauce Manufacturing Industries was issued a Certificate of
Registration by the Bureau of Domestic Trade to engage in the manufacture, packing, distribution and sale of
various kinds of sauce, identified by the logo Sunshine Fruit Catsup. The product itself was contained in
various kinds of bottles, including the Del Monte bottle, which the private respondent bought from the junk
shops for recycling.
Having received reports that the private respondent was using its exclusively designed bottles and a logo
confusingly similar to Del Monte's, Philpack and Del Monte filed a complaint against the private respondent
for infringement of trademark and unfair competition.
Sunshine alleged that its logo was substantially different from the Del Monte logo and would not confuse the
buying public to the detriment of the petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was infringement of trademark and unfair competition.

RULING: YES.
Section 22 of R.A. No. 166, otherwise known as the Trademark Law, provides:
Any person who shall use, without the consent of the registrant, any reproduction, counterfeit, copy or
colorable imitation of any registered mark or tradename in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or
advertising of any goods, business or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause
confusion or mistake or to deceive purchasers or others as to the source or origin of such goods or services
or identity of such business...
Sec. 29 of the same law states as follows:
Any person who shall employ deception or any other means contrary to good faith by which he shall pass off
the goods manufactured by him or in which he deals, or his business, or services for those of the one having
established such goodwill...
To arrive at a proper resolution of this case, it is important to bear in mind the following distinctions
between infringement of trademark and unfair competition.
(1) Infringement of trademark is the unauthorized use of a trademark, whereas unfair competition is the
passing off of one's goods as those of another.
(2) In infringement of trademark fraudulent intent is unnecessary whereas in unfair competition
fraudulent intent is essential.

(3) In infringement of trademark the prior registration of the trademark is a prerequisite to the action,
whereas in unfair competition registration is not necessary.
In determining whether two trademarks are confusingly similar, the two marks in their entirety as they appear
in the respective labels must be considered in relation to the goods to which they are attached; the
discerning eye of the observer must focus not only on the predominant words but also on the other features
appearing on both labels.
The ordinary buyer does not usually make such scrutiny nor does he usually have the time to do so. The
question is NOT whether the two articles are distinguishable by their label when set side by side but whether
the general confusion made by the article upon the eye of the casual purchaser who is unsuspicious and off
his guard, is such as to likely result in his confounding it with the original.The court therefore should be
guided by its first impression because the imitator will always try to create enough differences to confuse the
Court but enough similarity to confuse the public. Here, although there are particular differences, such are
only manifest when you conduct a thorough comparison.
We also note that the respondent court failed to take into consideration several factors which should have
affected its conclusion, to wit: age, training and education of the usual purchaser, the nature and cost of the
article, whether the article is bought for immediate consumption and also the conditions under which it is
usually purchased. It has been aptly observed that the ultimate ratio in cases of grave doubt is the rule that
any doubt should be resolved against the newcomer inasmuch as the field from which he can select a
desirable trademark to indicate the origin of his product is obviously a large one. As Sunshine's label is an
infringement of the Del Monte's trademark, law and equity call for the cancellation of the private respondent's
registration and withdrawal of all its products bearing the questioned label from the market. With regard to
the use of Del Monte's bottle, the same constitutes unfair competition; hence, the respondent should be
permanently enjoined from the use of such bottles.

FRUIT OF THE LOOM V. FRUIT FOR EVE

(Infringement of Trademark)
In cases involving infringement of trademark brought before this Court it has been consistently held that
there is infringement of trademark when the use of the mark involved would be likely to cause confusion or
mistake in the mind of the public or to deceive purchasers as to the origin or source of the commodity.

FACTS:
Petitioner is the registrant of a trademark, FRUIT OF THE LOOM, in the Philippines Patent Office and was
issued two Certificates of Registration. The classes of merchandise covered by Registration Certificate No.
6227 are, among others, men's, women's and children's underwear, which includes women's panties and

which fall under class 40 in the Philippine Patent Office's classification of goods. Registration Certificate No.
6680 covers knitted, netted and textile fabrics.
Private respondent, a domestic corporation, is the registrant of a trademark FRUIT FOR EVE in the
Philippine Patent Office and was issued a Certificate of Registration No. 10160, on January 10, 1963
covering garments similar to petitioner's products like women's panties and pajamas. In 1965 petitioner filed
before the lower court, a complaint for infringement of trademark and unfair competition against the herein
private respondent. Petitioner principally alleged in the complaint that private respondent's trademark FRUIT
FOR EVE is confusingly similar to its trademark FRUIT OF THE LOOM used also on women's panties and
other textile products. Furthermore, it was also alleged therein that the color get-up and general appearance
of private respondent's hang tag consisting of a big red apple is a colorable imitation to the hang tag of
petitioner. Private respondent stated that the trademark FRUIT FOR EVE is being used on ladies' panties
and pajamas only whereas petitioner's trademark is used even on men's underwear and pajamas.
At the pre-trial on May 5, 1965, the following admissions were made:
(1) That the trademark FRUIT OF THE LOOM has been registered with the Bureau of Patents and it
does not bear the notice 'Reg. Phil. Patent Off.', and
(2) That the trademark FRUIT FOR EVE has been registered with the Bureau of Patents and it bears the
notice "Reg. Phil. Patent Off." And
(3) That at the time of its registration, plaintiff filed no opposition thereto.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the word FRUIT, being a generic word, is capable of exclusive appropriation by petitioner
2. Whether there is no confusing similarity in sound and appearance between the two trademarks in
question.

RULING: No.
In cases involving infringement of trademark brought before this Court it has been consistently held that
there is infringement of trademark when the use of the mark involved would be likely to cause confusion or
mistake in the mind of the public or to deceive purchasers as to the origin or source of the commodity.
Standing by itself, FRUIT OF THE LOOM is wholly different from FRUIT FOR EVE. WE do not agree with
petitioner that the dominant feature of both trademarks is the word FRUIT for even in the printing of the
trademark in both hang tags, the word FRUIT is not at all made dominant over the other words.

As to the design and coloring scheme of the hang tags, We believe that while there are similarities in the two
marks like the red apple at the center of each mark, We also find differences or dissimilarities which are
glaring and striking to the eye such as:
1. The shape of petitioner's hang tag is round with a base that looks like a paper rolled a few inches
in both ends; while that of private respondent is plain rectangle without any base.
2. The designs differ. Petitioner's trademark is written in almost semi-circle while that of private
respondent is written in straight line in bigger letters than petitioner's. Private respondent's tag has
only an apple in its center but that of petitioner has also clusters of grapes that surround the apple in
the center.

3. The colors of the hang tag are also very distinct from each other. Petitioner's hang tag is fight
brown while that of respondent is pink with a white colored center piece. The apples which are the
only similarities in the hang tag are differently colored. Petitioner's apple is colored dark red, while
that of private respondent is light red.

The ordinary purchaser must be thought of as having, and credited with, at least a modicum of intelligence to
be able to see the obvious differences between the two trademarks in question.

SUBIDO VS. OZAETA- Registered Land Records

FACTS:
Petitioner was the editor of the Manila Post who sought the inspection of real estates sold to aliens and
registered with the Register of Deeds (RD) who was given the authority thru DOJ Circular to examine all the
records in the respondents custody relative to the said transactions.

ISSUE:
What is the extent of the discretion of the Register of Deeds (RD) to regulate the accessibility of records
relating to registered lands in its office.

HELD:
What the law expects and requires from the RD is the exercise of an unbiased and impartial judgment by
which all persons resorting to the office, under the legal authority and conducting themselves with the
motives, reasons and objects of the person seeking access to the records. Except when it is clear that the

purpose of the inspection is unlawful, it is not the duty of the registration officers to concern themselves with
the motives, purposes, and objects of the person seeking to inspect the records. It is not their prerogative to
see that the information which the records contain is not flaunted before the public gaze.

TAMIN VS. CA- Abatement of Public Nuisance

FACTS:
Petitioner municipality represented by its mayor Real filed in the RTC a complaint for the ejectment of
respondents. It is alleged that the municipality owns a parcel of residential land located in Zamboanga del
Sur and the said parcel of land was reserved for public plaza under PD 365 and that during the mayor, the
municipality leased the area to the defendants subject to the condition that they should vacate the place in
case it is needed for public purposes and the defendants paid the rentals religiously until 1967. They refused
to vacate the said land despite the efforts of the government since money is allocated for the construction of
a municipal gymnasium within the public plaza and such construction could not continue because of the
presence of the buildings constructed by the defendants.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the municipality has a cause of action for the abatement of public nuisance under Article 694
of the Civil Code.

Held:
Yes based on the definition of a nuisance provided for in the CC which states that Art. 694. A nuisance is
any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property or anything else which: hinders or
impairs the use of the property. Article 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a
community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance,
danger or damage upon individuals may be equal.
Article 699 provides for the following remedies against public nuisance:
1. A prosecution under the penal code or any local ordinance
2. civil action

3. abatement without judicial proceedings In the present case, the municipality chose to file a civil
action for the recovery of possession of the parcel of land occupied by the PR. Under the Local
Government Code, the Sangguniang Bayan has to first pass an ordinance before summarily abate a
public nuisance.

Considering the facts in the complaint is true then the writ of possession and writ of demolition would have
been justified. A writ of demolition would have been sufficient to eject the private respondent.

HIDALGO ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. BALANDAN, et al.

(Attractive Nuisance Doctrine)
Attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial (e.g. water tanks) as well
as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere water and its
location.

FACTS:
Guillermo Balandan and his wife is claiming damages in the sum of P2,000 for the death of their son, Mario.
Petitioner was the owner of an Ice plant, who had in their premises 2 tanks filled of water, 9 feet deep. The
factory was fenced but Ingress and egress was easily made because the gates were always open and there
was no guard assigned in the said gate. Also the tanks didnt have any barricade or fence. One day when
Mario was playing with his friend, they saw the tank inside the factory and began playing and swimming
inside it. While bathing, Mario sank to the bottom of the tank, only to be fished out later, already as a
cadaver, having died of asphyxia secondary to drowning. The lower decided in the favor of the parents
saying that the petitioner is liable for damages due to the doctrine of attractive nuisance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of attractive nuisance is applicable in this case?

RULING: NO.
The doctrine of attractive nuisance states that One who maintains on his premises dangerous
instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise
ordinary care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender
years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises. American

Jurisprudence shows us that the attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water,
artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the mere
water and its location. In the case bar, the tanks themselves cannot fall under such doctrine thus the
petitioners cannot be held liable for Marios death.

ILOILO COLD STORAGE CO. vs. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL- Nuisance

City Council cannot, by a mere resolution or motion, declare any particular thing a nuisance which has not
theretofore been pronounced to be such by law, or so adjudged by judicial determination.

FACTS:
Plaintiff is the owner of an ice and cold storage plant. Nearby residents made complaints regarding the
smoke that the plant emits saying that it was very injurious to their health and comfort. The defendant made
investigations and later on passed a resolution which demands that the smokestacks of the said factory be
elevated or else the factory operations will be closed or suspended. Plaintiff opposed by filing for injunction.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the resolution alone issued by the municipal council is sufficient to label and abate the
supposed nuisance in this case?

RULING: NO.
There are two kinds of nuisances: nuisances per se and per accidens. The former are recognized as
nuisances under any and all circumstances. The latter are such only because of the special circumstances
and conditions surrounding them. The former may be abated even by private individuals however the latter is
different; it needs a determination of the facts which is a judicial function.
The question of nuisance can conclusively be decided, for all legal uses, by the established courts of law or
equity alone, and that the resolution of officers, or of boards organized by force of municipal charters,
cannot, to any degree, control such decision. City Council cannot, by a mere resolution or motion, declare
any particular thing a nuisance which has not theretofore been pronounced to be such by law, or so
adjudged by judicial determination.
In the present case it is certain that the ice factory of the plaintiff is not a nuisance per se. It is a legitimate
industry, beneficial to the people and conducive to their health and comfort. The resolution is obviously not
enough to abate the property of the plaintiff.

VELASCO vs. MANILA ELECTRIC CO.- Nuisance

Noise may constitute a nuisance but it must be of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort
and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities.

FACTS:
Velasco bought three (3) adjoining lots. He sold two (2) of these to Meralco and maintained the last one as
his residence. Meralco constructed on their lots a sub-station at a distance of 10-20 meters away from
appellants house. The company also built a concrete wall at the sides along the streets but put up only an
interlink wire fence (previously a sawali wall) on the boundary with appellant. An unceasing sound emanates
from the substation, caused by transformers. Such, appellent contends, constitute a nuisance which has
worsened his health condition and has lowered the value of his property. Several witnesses came forth but
their testimonies were vague and imprecise. Resort was made to a sound level meter. The audible sound
from different areas in Velasos property was measured in terms of decibels. It was found that the sound
exceeded the average intensity levels of residences.

ISSUE:
Can there be a nuisance caused by noise or sound?

HELD:
Yes. Several American decisions are cited showing that noise is an actionable nuisance. In fact, Kentucky v.
Anderson dealt with noise emanating from electrical machinery and appliances. The determining factor,
however, is not just intensity or volume. It must be of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort
and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities. However, appellants testimony is too plainly biased. Nor
are the witnesses testimonies revealing on account of different perceptions. Consequently, sound level
meters were used. As stated above, the sound exceeds average residential decibels. Also, the testimonies of
appellants physicians (which were more reliable since they actually treated him, unlike the appellees) point
to the noise as having caused appellant loss of sleep, irritation and tension weakening his constitution.
Notable lastly is the fact that in the Kentucky case, where the nuisance was ordered abated, the average
reading was 44 decibels while in the instant, the readings include 52, 54, and 55. The decision goes on to
discuss the proper award of damages. But Meralco was ordered either to transfer the facilities or reduce the
produced sound to around.

SITCHON, ET AL. v. AQUINO- Public Nuisance

The duties vested in the district health officer in case of nuisances may be placed upon other officers as may
be designated by special provision of law.

FACTS :
This decision stems from six (6) different suits. All of the petitioners implead Aquino (the City Engineer of
Manila) as respondent so that he may be enjoined from causing the demolition of their respective houses
situated in different areas along public streets in Manila inasmuch as these constitute public nuisances. All of
the petitioners occupied the subject parcels of land initially entirely without consent. However, all of them
subsequently paid concession fees or damages for the use of the land with the agreement that such
payment and consent shall be without prejudice to an order to vacate. The time came when the City
Engineer demanded that petitioners vacate the occupied streets. Unheeded, he threatened to demolish the
houses. Petitioners contend that by virtue of arts. 700 and 702, the power to remove public nuisances is
vested in the District Health Officer, not in the City Engineer.

ISSUES:
Is there a public nuisance? Does the City Engineer have authority to cause the abatement of the nuisance?

HELD:
There is a public nuisance. This case falls on art. 694 par. 4,; classifying as a nuisance the obstruction of
free passage of any public highway or street. It is public because it affects a community or neighborhood.
The constructions in fact constitute nuisances per se, obstructing at all times the streets. As such, the
summary removal of these may be authorized by statute or ordinance.
Aquino, as City Engineer, is vested with authority to effect the abatement of the nuisances through
demolition. By virtue of the Revised Charter of Manila, such duty, among others, was placed upon him. Arts.
700 and 702 must yield to this provision not only because it is later law but also because of the principle that
special provisions prevail over general ones. Moreover, an ordinance authorized the action sought to be
taken by respondent.

LA VISTA ASSOCIATION, INC vs. CA- Easement of Right of Way

Like any other contractual stipulation, a voluntary easement cannot be extinguished except by voluntary
recession of the contract establishing the servitude or renunciation by the owner of the dominant lots.

FACTS:
The controversy in this case is regarding the right of way in Manyan road. The road is a 15 meter wide road
abutting Katipunan Avenue on the west, traverses the edges of La Vista Subdivision on the north and of the
Ateneo de Manila University and Maryknoll College on the south. The said road was originally owned by the
Tuasons sold a portion of their land to Philippine Building Corporation. Included in such sale was half or 7.5
meters width of the Mangyan road. The said corporation assigned its rights, with the consent of the tuasons,
to AdMU through a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Mortgage. Ateneo later on sold to Maryknoll the
western portion of the land. Tuason developed their land which is now known as La Vista. On January, 1976,
Ateneo and La Vista acknowledged the voluntary easement or a Mutual right of way wherein the parties
would allow the other to use their half portion of the Manyan road (La Vista to use AdMUs 7.5 meters of the
mangyan road and also the other way around.) Ateneo auctioned off the property wherein Solid Homes Inc.,
the developer of Loyola Grand Villas, was the highest bidder.
ADMU transferred not only the property, but also the right to negotiate the easement on the road. However,
La Vista did not want to recognize the easement thus they block the road using 6 cylindrical concrete and
some guards over the entrance of the road blocking the entrance of the residents of Loyola Grand Villas.
Solid Homes Inc. filed for injunction and La vista in turn filed a third party complaint against AdMU. Some of
the arguments of the petitioner were that Loyola residents had adequate outlet to a public highway using
other roads and also that AdMU has not yet finalized the negotiation of the easement.

ISSUES:
Whether or not there is an easement of right of way?

RULING: YES.
There was a voluntary easement of right of way which was acknowledged on January 1976 by the Tuasons
and Admu (the easement was established by PBC and the Tuasons but I dont think I can find the details
regarding it in the case I just saw the one regarding acknowledgement between admu and the Tuasons.)
Being such, the 4 requisites for a compulsory easement need not be met. And like any other contractual
stipulation, the same cannot be extinguished except by voluntary recession of the contract establishing the
servitude or renunciation by the owner of the dominant lots. In the case at bar, all the predecessors-ininterest of both parties recognized the existence of such easement and there was no agreement yet to
revoke the same. The free ingress and egress along Mangyan Road created by the voluntary agreement is
thus demandable.

The Court also emphasized that they are not creating an easement but merely declaring one (there no such
thing as a judicial easement)

TRIAS VS. ARANETA- Easement

Sellers of land may validly impose reasonable easements and restrictions as conditions for contracts of
sales; the same may not be overturned by courts merely on the ground that it impacts dominical rights.

FACTS:
JM Tuason and Co. owned a piece of land that was part of a subdivision. Thru broker Araneta Inc (of
Araneta Coliseum fame), this civic-minded company sold the land to Mr Lopez with the condition that said lot
should never be used to erect a factory. This imposition was annotated to the TCT.
A series of transfers and conveyances later, the lot ended up in the hands of the gorgeous Ms. Rafael Trias.
She was dismayed with the annotation that stated 5. That no factories be permitted in this section.
Ms. Trias felt that the annotation impaired her dominical rights and therefore illegal and existed as mere
surplusage since existing zoning regulations already prevented the erection of factories in the vicinity.
Worse, the annotation possibly hindered her plans to obtain a loan. She accordingly raised the issue to the
court and received relief.
Later on, Gregorio Araneta moved for reconsideration stating that the imposition resulted from a valid sales
transaction between her predecessors in interest. He alleged that the court held no authority to overrule such
valid easement and impaired the right to contract.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the imposition was valid.

HELD:
The imposition was valid. The prohibition is an easement validly imposed under art 594 which provides that
every owner of a piece of land may establish easements he deems suitable xxx and not in contravention to
the law, public policy and public order

The court ruled that the easement existed to safeguard the peace and quiet of neighboring residents. The
intention is noble and the objectives benign. In the absence of a clash with public policy, the easement may
not be eroded.
The contention of surplusage is also immaterial. Zoning regulations may be repealed anytime, allowing the
erection of factories. With the annotation, at the very least, the original intent to bar factories remains
binding.

VALISNO V. ADRIANO- Doctrine of Apparent Sign

Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a
parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the conveyance.
The purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor's land cannot be defeated
even if the water is supplied by a third person.

FACTS:
Plaintiff is the absolute owner and actual possessor of a land in Nueva Ecija, with TCT No. NT-16281. He
bought the land from the respondents sister, Honorata Adriano Francisco. The land which is planted with
watermelon, peanuts, corn, tobacco, and other vegetables adjoins that of the respondent Adriano on the
bank of the Pampanga River. Both parcels of land had been inherited by Honorata and Felipe from their
father. At the time of the sale of the land to Valisno, the land was irrigated by water from the Pampanga River
through a canal about seventy (70) meters long, traversing the Respondent's land.
In 1959, Respondent levelled a portion of the irrigation canal so that Plaintiff was deprived of the irrigation
water and prevented from cultivating his 57-hectare land.
Plaintiff filed in the Bureau of Public Works and Communications a complaint for deprivation of water rights.
A decision was rendered ordering Adriano to reconstruct the irrigation canal. Instead of restoring the
irrigation canal, the appellee asked for a reinvestigation of the case by the Bureau of Public Works and
Communications. A reinvestigation was granted.
In the meantime, Plaintiff rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own expense because his need for water to irrigate
his watermelon fields was urgent.

Later, he filed a complaint for damages in the RTC claiming that he suffered damages when he failed to plant
his fields that yearfor lack of irrigation water, and when he reconstructed the canal.
Meanwhile, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications reversed the Bureau's decision by issuing a
final resolution dismissing Valisno's complaint. The Secretary held that Eladio Adriano's water rights which
had been granted in 1923 ceased to be enjoyed by him in 1936 or 1937, when his irrigation canal collapsed.
His non-use of the water right since then for a period of more than five years extinguished the grant by
operation of law, hence the water rights did not form part of his hereditary estate which his heirs partitioned
among themselves.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Plaintiff has acquired the easement of water over Respondents land.

RULING: Yes.
The existence of the irrigation canal on Respondents land for the passage of water from the Pampanga
River to Honorata's land prior to and at the time of the sale of Honorata's land to the plaintiff was equivalent
to a title for the vendee of the land to continue using it as provided in Article 624 of the Civil Code (Doctrine
of Apparent Sign):
Article 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established or maintained
by the owner of both shall be considered, should either of them be alienated, as a title in order that he
easement may continue actively and passively, unless at the time, the ownership of the two estates is
divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid
should be removed before the execution of the deed.
The deed of sale in favor of Plaintiff included the "conveyance and transfer of the water rights and
improvements" appurtenant to Honorata's property. According to the Plaintiff, the water right was the primary
consideration for his purchase of Honorata's property, for without it the property would be unproductive.

Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a
parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the conveyance.
The purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor's land cannot be defeated
even if the water is supplied by a third person. The fact that an easement by grant may also have qualified
as an easement of necessity does detract from its permanency as property right, which survives the
determination of the necessity.

As an easement of waters in favor of the appellant has been established, he is entitled to enjoy it free from
obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference, such as the appellee's act of leveling the irrigation canal to
deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River.

PURUGGANAN V. PAREDES, 69 SCRA 69- Easement of Drainage

In an easement of receiving rainwater, the distances prescribed in the decree of registration should not
correspond to the width and length of the roof of the house but on the distance of the rainwater falling inside
the land of the servient estate.

FACTS:
Purugganan is the owner of a piece of residential lot adjacent to and bounded on the north by the lot of
Paredes. The lot of Purugganan is subject to an easement of drainage in favor of Paredes annotated in the
Decree of registration, which read in part:
XXX the applicant agrees to respect an easement or servitude over a portion of the lots No. 1 and 2 which
is EIGHT and ONE HALF (8-1/2) meters in lengthand the width is ONE (1) meter, in order that the
rainwater coming from the roofing of a house to be constructed by the oppositor over the ruins of her brick
wallshall fall into the land of the applicant.
Paredes constructed a new house, the roof was 2-1/2 meters longer than the length allowed in the Decree of
Registration, and has an outer roofing (eaves) of 1.20 meters, protruding over the lot of Purugganan, which
is .20 meters wider than that allowed, and the rainwater from the GI roofing falls about 3 meters inside lots 1
and 2 of Purugganan.
Purugganan filed a case prohibiting Paredes from proceeding with the construction of the roof, which
exceeds the allowed dimensions. Trial court, in a summary proceeding decided in favor of Purugganan. CA
affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of drainage refers to the measure of the roofing?

HELD: No.
Paredes have made a mistake in applying the distances prescribed in the decree of registration to the
roofing of their house. They failed to comprehend the meaning of the phrase servidumbre de vertiente de
los tejados constituted on the land of Purugganan. Translated, it means the easement of receiving water
falling from the roof which is an encumbrance imposed on the land of Purugganan because the
encumbrance is not the roof itself but the rain water falling inside the property of Purugganan. The report

submitted by the court-appointed commissioner clearly shows that Paredes exceeded the dimension allowed
in the decree of registration.

CORTES vs. YU-TIBO- Easement of Light and View

FACTS:
Easement disputed here is the easement of light and view. Plaintiffs wife has certain windows on her
property which open on the adjacent lot. It has been established that the plaintiffs hasnt done any formal act
prohibiting the owner of the house of the adjacent house prohibiting them to make any improvements.
Plaintiff claims that period of prescription started when those windows were made and acknowledge by the
owner of the adjacent lot. Defendant however claims that there should be a formal act prohibiting them from
doing a certain act to trigger the prescriptive period.

ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiffs have acquired the easement through prescription?

RULING: NO.
GENERAL RULE: No part owner can, without the consent of the other, make in a party wall a window or
opening of any kind (Art. 580)
The very fact of making such opening in such a wall may be the basis for acquisition of a prescriptive title
without the necessity of any active opposition because it always presupposes the express or implied consent
of the owner of the wall, which in time, implies a voluntary waiver of the right to oppose.

EXCEPTION: When the windows are not opened on the neighbor's side, there is need of a prohibition from
exercising that neighbor's right to build on his land or cover the closed window on the party wall.
The period of prescription starts to run from such prohibition if the neighbor consents to it.
Note: The law refers to all kinds of windows, even regulation windows. According to article 528, windows
with "similar projections" include sheds.

The exception applies in this case because

1)

what is concerned is a party wall;

2)

there was no prohibition on Yu-Tibo to build anything that would cover the Cortes' window (YuTibo wanted to raise his roof which would in effect cover 1/2 of the window).

VDA. DE BALTAZAR V. COURT OF APPEALS- Easement of Right of Way

For someone to be entitled of an easement of right of way, 4 requisites must be present: (1) the estate must
be surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway (2) after payment of
the proper indemnity (3) the isolation is not due to the propietors own acts and (4) the right of way claimed is
at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and in so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance
from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

FACTS:
Daniel Panganiban is the owner of Lot No. 1027. It is bounded on the north by Sta. Ana River, on the south
by the land of vda. de Baltazar and on the west by lot 1028 and on the east by Lot 1025. Directly in front of
1026, 1028, and 1025 is the Braulio St.
Panganiban filed a complaint against the Baltazars for the establishment of a permanent and perpetual
easement of right of way for him to have access to the provincial road. The RTC dismissed the complaint for
it found 2 other passageways. The CA reversed the decision for it found that there was a strip of land used
by Panganiban and his grandfather as a right of way for 30 years until it was closed and that the 2 other
passageways were only temporary and was granted to Panganiban when the right of way was closed. Thus
the case at bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Panganiban is entitled to an easement of right of way

RULING: YES
It has been held that for someone to be entitled of an easement of right of way, 4 requisites must be present.
(1) the estate must be surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway
(2) after payment of the proper indemnity
(3) the isolation is not due to the propietors own acts and
(4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and in so far as consistent with
this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

Panganiban has all 4 requisites. With regard to the 1st requisite, his land is bounded on all sides by
immovables, the lands of Baltazar, Legaspi and Calimon and by the river. The 2nd requisite is settled by a
remand to the lower court for the determination of the proper indemnity. As regards the 3rd requisite, it was
found that Panganiban bought the land from the Baltazars therefore its isolation was not due to his own acts.
And with regard to the 4th requisite, the passage claimed is the shortest distance from his lot to Braulio
Street. Panganiban was established all 4 requisites therefore is entitled to the easement.

ENCARNACION V. COURT OF APPEALS- Easement of Right of Way

An easement of right of way exists as a matter of law when a private property has no access to a public road
and the needs of such property determines the width of the easement which requires payment of indemnity
which consists of the value of the land and the amount of the damages caused.

FACTS:
Tomas Encarnacion is the owner of the dominant estate which is bounded on the north by the servient
estates of Eusebio de Sagun and Mamerto Masigno, on the south by a dried river and the Taal Lake. The
servient estate is bounded on the north by the National Highway.
Prior to 1960, persons going to the national highway would just cross the servient estate at no particular
point. In 1960, Sagun and Masigno enclosed their lands with a fence but provided a roadpath 25 meters long
and about 1 meter in width. At this time, Encarnacion started his plant nursery business on his land. When
his business flourished, it became more difficult to transfer the plants and garden soil through the use of a
pushcart so Encarnacion bought an owner-type jeep for transporting the plants. However, the jeep could not
pass through the roadpath so he approached Sagun and Masigno asking them if they would sell to him 1
meters of their property to add to the existing roadpath but the 2 refused the offer.
Encarnacion then instituted an action before the RTC to seek the issuance of a writ of easement of a right of
way over an additional width of at least 2 meters. The RTC dismissed the complaint for there is another
outlet, which is through the dried river bed. This was affirmed by the CA thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Encarnacion is entitled to an widening of an already existing easement of right-of-way

RULING: YES
Encarnacion has sufficiently established his claim. Generally, a right of way may be demanded:
(1) when there is absolutely no access to a public highway, and

(2) when, even if there is one, it is difficult or dangerous to use or is grossly insufficient.
In the case at bar, although there is a dried river bed, t it traversed by a semi-concrete bridge and there is no
egress or ingress from the highway. For the jeep to reach the level of the highway, it must literally jump 4-5
meters up. And during rainy season, it is impassable due to the floods. When a private property has no
access to a public road, it has the right of easement over adjacent servient estates as a matter of law. With
the non-availability of the dried river bed as an alternative route, the servient estates should accommodate
the needs of the dominant estate. Art. 651 provides that the width of the easement of right of way shall be
that which is sufficient for the needs of the dominant estate To grant the additional easement of right of
way of 1 meters, Encarnacion must indemnify Sagun and Masigno the value of the land occupied plus
amount of the damages caused until his offer to buy the land is considered.

ABELLANA, SR. V. CA- Easement by Prescription

Subdivision roads open to public use "when deemed necessary by the proper authorities" simply allow
persons other than the residents of the subdivision, to use the roads therein when they are inside the
subdivision but do not give outsiders a right to open the subdivision walls so they can enter the subdivision
from the back.

FACTS:
The petitioners who live on a parcel of land abutting the northwestern side of the Nonoc Homes Subdivision,
sued to establish an easement of right of way over a subdivision road which, according to the petitioners,
used to be a mere footpath which they and their ancestors had been using since time immemorial, and that,
hence, they had acquired, through prescription, an easement of right of way therein. The construction of a
wall by the respondents around the subdivision deprived the petitioners of the use of the subdivision road
which gives the subdivision residents access to the public highway. They asked that the high concrete walls
enclosing the subdivision and cutting of their access to the subdivision road be removed and that the road be
opened to them.
The private respondents denied that there was a pre-existing footpath in the place before it was developed
into a subdivision. They alleged furthermore that the Nonoc Subdivision roads are not the shortest way to a
public road for there is a more direct route from the petitioners' land to the public highway.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not an easement has arisen by prescription

2. Whether or not the pathway has become a public street

RULING:
1) No. Petitioners' assumption that an easement of right of way is continuous and apparent and may be
acquired by prescription under Article 620 of the Civil Code, is erroneous. The use of a footpath or road may
be apparent but it is not a continuous easement because its use is at intervals and depends upon the acts of
man. It can be exercised only if a man passes or puts his feet over somebody else's land. Hence, a right of
way is not acquirable by prescription.

2) No. Petitioners cannot invoke Section 29 of P.D. 957 which provides:

Sec. 29. Right of Way to Public Road. The owner or developer of a subdivision without access to any
existing public road or street must secure a right of way to a public road or street and such right of way must
be developed and maintained according to the requirement of the government authorities concerned.
a. Because the above provision applies to the owner or developer of a subdivision (which petitioners are not)
without access to a public highway.
b. And the petitioners' allegation that the footpaths which were converted to subdivision roads have acquired
the status of public streets, is not well taken. The municipal ordinances which declared subdivision roads
open to public use "when deemed necessary by the proper authorities" simply allow persons other than the
residents of the Nonoc Homes Subdivision, to use the roads therein when they are inside the subdivision but
those ordinances do not give outsiders a right to open the subdivision walls so they can enter the subdivision
from the back. The closure of the dead ends of road lots 1 and 3 is a valid exercise of proprietary rights. It is
of judicial notice that most, if not all, subdivisions are enclosed and fenced with only one or few points that
are used as ingress to and egress from the subdivisions.

RAMOS V. GATCHALIAN, 154 SCRA 703- Easement Right of Way

Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to justify a grant of right of way. Real necessity
must be shown.

FACTS:

Ramos is the owner of a house and lot in Paraaque. Respondents Asprec own Lot 4135. Gatchalian
Avenue is alongside Lot 4135. Respondent Gatchalian Realty was granted the road right of way and
drainage along Lot 4135 to service the Gatchalian and Asprec subdivision, by the respondent Asprecs.

Ramos alleged that, Gatchalian Realty, Inc. built a 7-8, feet high concrete wall right infront of his premises,
blocking his entrance/exit to Gatchalian Road, the nearest, most convenient and adequate entrance/exit to
the public road. or highway, Sucat Road but now known as Dr. A. Santos Avenue, Paraaque; that this
house and lot is only about 100 meters from Sucat, Road passing thru Gatchalian Avenue. Ramos also
alleged that due to Gatchalian's construction,he was constrained to use as his "temporary" way the adjoining
lots belonging to different persons. Said way is allegedly "bumpy and impassable especially during rainy
seasons because of flood waters, mud and tall 'talahib' grasses thereon." Moreover, according to Ramos, the
road right of way which the private respondents referred to as the petitioner's alternative way to Sucat Road
is not an existing road but has remained a proposed road as indicated in the subdivision plan of the Sobrina
Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision.

RTC and CA both denied Ramos' complaint.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a right of way must be granted based on allegation of inconvenience?

HELD:
No. The petitioner's position is not impressed with merit. We find no reason to disturb the appellate court's
finding of fact that the petitioner failed to prove the non-existence of an adequate outlet to the Sucat Road
except through the Gatchalian Avenue. As borne out by the records of the case, there is a road right of way
provided by the Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision indicated as Lot 4133-G-12 in its subdivision plan
for the buyers of its lots. The fact that said lot is still undeveloped and causes inconvenience to the petitioner
when he uses it to reach the public highway does not bring him within the ambit of the legal requisite. We
agree with the appellate court's observation that the petitioner should have, first and foremost, demanded
from the Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision the improvement and maintenance of Lot 4133-G-12 as his
road right of way because it was from said subdivision that he acquired his lot and not either from the
Gatchalian Realty or the respondents Asprec. To allow the petitioner access to Sucat Road through
Gatchalian Avenue inspite of a road right of way provided by the petitioner's subdivision for its buyers simply
because Gatchalian Avenue allows petitioner a much greater ease in going to and coming from the main
thoroughfare is to completely ignore what jurisprudence has consistently maintained through the years
regarding an easement of a right of way, that "mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to
serve as its basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial,
necessity for it."

STA. MARIA V. CA|FAJARDO, 285 SCRA 351

(Compulsory Servitude of Right of Way)
Requirements of compulsory servitude of right of way: 1) surrounded by immovables and no adequate outlet
to a public highway; 2) payment of indemnity; 3) isolation is not due to the owner of the dominant estate; 4)
least prejudicial (and shortest if possible)

FACTS:
Plaintiff spouses Arsenio and Roslynn Fajardo are the registered owners of a piece of land, Lot No. 124, in
Bulacan.
Plaintiff's aforesaid Lot 124 is surrounded by Lot 1, a fishpond, on the northeast portion thereof; by Lot 126,
owned by Florentino Cruz, on the southeast portion; by Lot 6-a and a portion of Lot 6-b owned respectively
by Spouses Cesar and Raquel Sta. Maria and Florcerfida Sta. Maria, on the southwest; and by Lot 122,
owned by the Jacinto family, on the northwest.
On February 17, 1992, Fajardo filed a complaint against defendants Sta. Maria for the establishment of an
easement of right of way. Plaintiffs alleged that their lot, Lot 124, is surrounded by properties belonging to
other persons, including those of the defendants; that since plaintiffs have no adequate outlet to the
provincial road, an easement of a right of way passing through either of the alternative defendants'
properties which are directly abutting the provincial road would be plaintiffs' only convenient, direct and
shortest access to and from the provincial road; that plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest have been passing
through the properties of defendants in going to and from their lot; that defendants' mother even promised
plaintiffs' predecessors-in-interest to grant the latter an easement of right of way as she acknowledged the
absence of an access from their property to the road; and that alternative defendants, despite plaintiffs'
request for a right of way and referral of the dispute to the barangay officials, refused to grant them an
easement. Thus, plaintiffs prayed that an easement of right of way on the lots of defendants be established
in their favor. They also prayed for damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.
RTC and CA both found for Fajardo and granted the easement of right of way. On appeal, the Sta. Maria's
allege that Fajardo failed to prove that it was not their own actions which caused their lot to be enclosed or
cut-off from the road.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiffs failed to prove the third requisite or that the isolation was not caused by the
plaintiffs themselves?

HELD:

The plaintiffs sufficiently proved that they did not by themselves cause the isolation.
As to the third requisite, we explicitly pointed out; thus: "Neither have the private respondents been able to
show that the isolation of their property was not due to their personal or their predecessors-in-interest's own
acts." In the instant case, the Court of Appeals have found the existence of the requisites. The petitioners,
however, insist that private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have, through their own acts of
constructing concrete fences at the back and on the right side of the property, isolated their property from the
public highway. The contention does not impress because even without the fences private respondents'
property remains landlocked by neighboring estates belonging to different owners.
Again, for an estate to be entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of way under the Civil Code, to wit:
1. the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
2. there is payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1);
3. the isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.); and
4. the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest (Art. 650).

NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION VS. CA- Easement and Just Compensation

When a land, originally public land is awarded to a provate individual, a legal easement may be constituted
and thus no just compensation is required. It would be otherwise if the land were originally private property,
in which case, just compensation must be paid for the taking of a part thereof for public use as an easement
of a right of way.

FACTS:
A free patent over three (3) hectares of land, situated in the province of Cagayan was issued in the name of
Vicente Manglapus, and registered under OCT No. P-24814. The land was granted subject to the following
proviso expressly stated in the title:
"... it shall not be subject to any encumbrance whatsoever in favor of any corporation, association or
partnership except with the consent of the grantee and the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and solely for educational, religious or charitable purposes or for a right of way; and
subject finally to all conditions and public easements and servitudes recognized and prescribed by law

especially those mentioned in sections 109, 110, 111, 112, 113 and 114 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as
amended..."
Subsequently, respondent Manglapus acquired the lot from Vicente Manglapus by absolute sale.
Sometime in 1982, NIA was to construct canals in Amulung, Cagayan and Alcala, Cagayan. NIA then
entered a portion of Manglapus' land and made diggings and fillings thereon. Manglapus filed a complaint for
damages against NIA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the NIA should pay Manglapus just compensation for the taking of a portion of his property
for use as easement of a right of way.

RULING: No.
The transfer certificate of title contains such a reservation. It states that title to the land shall be:
". . . subject to the provisions of said Land Registration Act and the Public Land Act, as well as those of
Mining Laws, if the land is mineral, and subject, further to such conditions contained in the original title as
may be subsisting."
Under the Original Certificate of Title, there was a reservation and condition that the land is subject to "to all
conditions and public easements and servitudes recognized and prescribed by law especially those
mentioned in Sections 109, 110, 111, 112, 113 and 114, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended." This
reservation, unlike the other provisos imposed on the grant, was not limited by any time period and thus is a
subsisting condition.
Section 112, Commonwealth Act No. 141, provides that lands granted by patent,
"shall further be subject to a right of way sot exceeding twenty meters in width for public highways,
railroads,irrigation ditches, aqueducts, telegraphs and telephone lines, and similar works..."
We note that the canal NIA constructed was only eleven (11) meters in width. This is well within the limit
provided by law. Manglapus has therefore no cause to complain.
Article 619 of the Civil Code provides that, "Easements are established either by law or by the will of the
owners. The former are called legal and the latter voluntary easements." In the present case, we find and
declare that a legal easement of a right-of-way exists in favor of the government.
The land was originally public land, and awarded to respondent Manglapus by free patent. The ruling would
be otherwise if the land were originally private property, in which case, just compensation must be paid for
the taking of a part thereof for public use as an easement of a right of way.

QUIMEN V. CA- Easement

LEAST DAMAGE > SHORTEST DISTANCE
When the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the
one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere
stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least
damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest.

FACTS:
Anastacia Quimen, together with her 3 brothers and sister, inherited a piece of property in Bulacan. They
agreed to subdivide the property equally among themselves. The shares of Anastacia and 3 other siblings
were next to the municipal road. Anastacias was at the extreme left of the road while the lots on the right
were sold by her brothers to Catalina Santos. A portion of the lots behind Anastacias were sold by her (as
her brothers adminstratix) brother to Yolanda.
Yolanda was hesitant to buy the back property at first because it d no access to the public road. Anastacia
prevailed upon her by assuring her that she would give her a right of way on her adjoining property (which
was in front) for p200 per square meter.
Yolonda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her passageway to the public highway a portion
of anastacias property. But when yolanda finally offered to pay for the use of the pathway anastacia refused
to accept the payment. In fact she was thereafter barred by Anastacia from passing through her property.
After a few years, Yolanda purchased another lot from the Quimens (a brother), located directly behind the
property of her parents who provided her a pathway gratis et amore between their house, extending about
19m from the lot of Yolanda behind the sari-sari store of one brother, and Anastacias perimeter fence.
In 1987, Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for a right of way through Anastacias property.
The proposed right of way was at the extreme right of Anastacias property facing the public highway,
starting from the back of the sari-sari store and extending inward by 1m to her property and turning left for
about 5m to avoid the store in order to reach the municipal road. The way was unobstructed except for an
avocado tree standing in the middle.

The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action, explaining that the right of way through
the brothers property was a straight path and to allow a detour by cutting through Anastacias property
would no longer make the path straight. They held that it was more practical to extend the existing pathway
to the public road by removing that portion of the store blocking the path as that was the shortest route to the
public road and the least prejudicial to the parties concerned than passing through Anastacias property.
CA reversed and held that Yolanda was entitled to a right of way on Anastacias property. The court,
however, did not award damages to her and held that Anastacia was not in bad faith when she resisted the
claim.
Anastacia went to the SC alleging that her lot should be considered as a servient estate despite the fact that
it does not abut or adjoin the property of private respondent. She denies ever promising Yolonda a right of
way.
Anastacia also argues that when Yolanda purchased the second lot, the easement of right of way she
provided was ipso jure extinguished as a result of the merger of ownership of the dominant and the servient
estates in one person so that there was no longer any compelling reason to provide private respondent with
a right of way as there are other surrounding lots suitable for the purpose.
She also strongly maintains that the proposed right of way is not the shortest access to the public road
because of the detour and that, moreover, she is likely to suffer the most damage as she derives a net
income of P600.00 per year from the sale of the fruits of her avocado tree, and considering that an avocado
has an average life span of seventy (70) years, she expects a substantial earning from it.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not there was a valid grant of an easement
2) Whether or not the right of way proposed by Yolonda is the least onerous/least prejudicial to the
parties

HELD: YES to both

1) A right of way in particular is a privilege constituted by covenant or granted by law to a person or class of
persons to pass over anothers property when his tenement is surrounded by realties belonging to others
without an adequate outlet to the public highway. The owner of the dominant estate can demand a right of
way through the servient estate provided he indemnifies the owner thereof for the beneficial use of his
property.

The conditions for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are:

(a) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a public
highway;
(b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity;
(c) the isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant estate; and,
(d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.

These elements were clearly present. The evidence clearly shows that the property of private respondent is
hemmed in by the estates of other persons including that of petitioner; that she offered to pay P200.00 per
square meter for her right of way as agreed between her and petitioner; that she did not cause the isolation
of her property; that the right of way is the least prejudicial to the servient estate. These facts are confirmed
in the ocular inspection report of the clerk of court, more so that the trial court itself declared that [t]he said
properties of Antonio Quimen which were purchased by plaintiff Yolanda Quimen Oliveros were totally
isolated from the public highway and there appears an imperative need for an easement of right of way to
the public highway.
2) Article 650 of the NCC explicitly states that the easement of right of way shall be established at the point
least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance
although this is a matter of judicial appreciation. When the easement may be established on any of several
tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least
damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a
single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the
shortest.

TCs findings:
> Yolandas property was situated at the back of her fathers property and held that there existed an available
space of about 19m long which could conveniently serve as a right of way between the boundary line and
the house of Yolanda s father
> The vacant space ended at the left back of the store which was made of strong materials
> Which explained why Yolanda requested a detour to the lot of Anastacia and cut an opening of one (1)
meter wide and five (5) meters long to serve as her right of way to the public highway.

CAs finding:
> The proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is 1m wide and 5m long at the extreme right of Anastacias
property will cause the least prejudice and/or damage as compared to the suggested passage through the
property of Yolanda s father which would mean destroying the sari-sari store made of strong materials.
Absent any showing that these findings and conclusion are devoid of factual support in the records, or are so
glaringly erroneous, the SC accepts and adopts them. As between a right of way that would demolish a store
of strong materials to provide egress to a public highway, and another right of way which although longer will
only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative should be preferred.

FRANCISCO V. IAC- Easement of Way

An owner cannot, as respondent has done, by his own act isolate his property from a public highway and
then claim an easement of way through an adjacent estate. Isolation must not be due to his own acts.

FACTS:
Ramos' Lot 860-A used to be a part of Lot 860 of the Malinta Estate owned by several co-owners.
On December 3,1947, the co-owners of Lot 860 (Cornelia and Frisca Dila) executed a deed by which an
undivided 1/3 portion of the land was donated to a niece, Epifania Dila, and another undivided 1/3 portion to
the children of a deceased sister, Anacleta Dila, and the remaining portion, also an undivided third, was
declared to pertain exclusively to and would be retained by Cornelia Dila. A partition was then executed.

The former co-owners overlooked the fact that, by reason of the subdivision, Epifania Dilas lot came to
include the entire frontage of what used to be Lot 860 along Parada Road, and thus effectively isolated from
said road the other lots, i.e., of Cornelia Dila, and of the children of Anacleta Dila.
Despite that, Cornelia sold the lot to some buyers who subsequently sold them to Ramos.
Ramos asked for a right of way through Franciscos land but negotiations failed. Francisco's proposal for an
exchange of land at the rate of 1 sq.m from him to three 3 sq.m from Ramos, as was supposedly the custom
in the locality, was unacceptable to Ramos.

Later that year, Ramos succeeded was able to obtain a 3m wide passageway through Dilas lot. Yet in
August, 1973, he inexplicably put up a 10ft high concrete wall on his lot, thereby closing the very right of way

granted to him across Lot 860-B. [It seems that what he wished was to have a right of passage precisely
through Francisco's land, considering this to be more convenient to him, and he did not bother to keep quiet
about his determination to bring suit, if necessary, to get what he wanted. Francisco learned of Ramos'
intention and reacted by replacing the barbed-wire fence on his lot along Parada Road with a stone wall.
Shortly thereafter, Francisco filed a case against him asserting his right to a legal easement.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ramos was entitled to an easement of right of way through the land belonging to Francisco

HELD: NO
The law makes it amply clear that an owner cannot, as respondent has done, by his own act isolate his
property from a public highway and then claim an easement of way through an adjacent estate. The third of
the cited requisites: that the claimant of a right of way has not himself procured the isolation of his property
had not been met indeed the respondent had actually brought about the contrary condition and thereby
vitiated his claim to such an easement. It will not do to assert that use of the passageway through Lot 860-B
was difficult or inconvenient, the evidence being to the contrary and that it was wide enough to be
traversable by even a truck, and also because it has been held that mere inconvenience attending the use of
an existing right of way does not justify a claim for a similar easement in an alternative location.

FLORO v. LLENADO- Legal Easement

A legal easement cannot arise merely for the convenience of the dominant estate. The owner must prove
that the easement is absolutely necessary and least restrictive on the servient estate.

FACTS:
Mr Floro owned the Floro Park Subdivision situated in Bulacan. The subdivision has its own access roads
from the MacArthur Highway through road lot 4. Another fellow, Llenado, owned the Llenado Homes
Subdivision. He obtained the same from Mr. de Castro, when it was known as the Emmanuel Homes
Subdivision, Llenado Homes was bounded on the south by the Palanas Creek, 5 which separates it from the
Floro Park Subdivision. To the west sat the ricelands belonging to Marcial Ipapo. The controversy brewed
since Llenado Homes did not have any passage to the MacArthur Highway. However, a proposed access
road passing the abandoned riceland of Marcial Ipapo has been specifically provided in the subdivision plan
of the former Emmanuel Homes Subdivision. This plan was approved by the HLURB.

Because the access road through the Ipapo Riceland did not exist yet, the Llenados sought, and were
granted, oral permission by the Floros to use Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park . At this point, remember
that the agreement was merely provisional as the parties were still drafting a contract.
Later, Floro discovered grave damage to the lots in question from the passage of heavy machinery. He then
barricaded Road Lot 5 with a pile of rocks, wooden posts and adobe stones. He essentially implied Llenados
to keep out off property.
Llenado pursued an easement claim with the RTC. The RTC denied the request. On appeal by LLenado,
and ordered that Mr. Floro remove the barricades. Mr. Floro went to the SC

ISSUE:
Whether or not the requirements for legal easement existed to allow Llenado to claim the same against Mr.
Floro.

HELD: NO.
As in the earlier case, the court held that to be entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way, the
preconditions provided under Arts. 649 and 650 of the Civil Code must be established. These include:
that the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway;
(2) that proper indemnity has been paid; (3) that the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the
dominant estate; (4) that the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, in
so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be
the shortest.
For this case, it is apparent that the elements have not been met. The original subdivision development plan
presented by Llenado indicates an existing and prior agreement with Ms. Ipapo to create a right of way
through the abandoned Ipapo ricefield. Ipapo had long agreed to these terms but Llenado apparently
thought it too much work and cost to develop such road. It was easier for him to create an easement via the
Floro property.
The court ruled time and again that one may not claim a legal easement merely out of convenience.
Convenience motivated Llenando to abandon the Ipapo access road development and pursue an access
road through the Floro estate. He was stacking the cards in his favor to the unnecessary detriment of his
neighbor. The court refused to countenance his behavior.

COSTABELLA CORP. VS. CAEasement Right of Way

The convenience of the dominant estate is not the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way but rather,
it should satisfy all four requisites (emphasis on 1st requisite- it should be merely for convenience but it must
be due to the fact that the dominant estate does not have an adequate outlet to a public highway.

FACTS:
Petitioners owned a lot wherein they started constructing their beach hotel. Before such construction, the
private respondent, in going to and from their respective properties and the provincial road, passed through
a passageway which traversed the petitioners property. As a result of the construction, this passageway,
including the alternative route, was obstructed. Private respondent filed for injunction plus damages. In the
same complaint the private respondents also alleged that the petitioner had constructed a dike on the beach
fronting the latters property without the necessary permit, obstructing the passage of the residents and local
fishermen, and trapping debris of flotsam on the beach. The private respondent also claim that the have
acquired the right of way through prescription. They prayed for the re-opening of the ancient road right of
way (what they called the supposed easement in this case) and the destruction of the dike. Petitioner
answered by saying that their predecessor in interests act of allowing them to pass was gratuitous and in
fact, they were just tolerating the use of the private respondents. CA ruled in favor of the private respondents.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not easement of right and way can be acquired through prescription?
2) Whether or not the private respondents had acquired an easement of right of way in the form of a
passageway, on the petitioners property?

RULING:

1) NO. Easement of right of way is discontinuous thus it cannot be subject to acquisitive prescription.

2) NO. one may validly claim an easement of right of way when he has proven the: (1) the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has
been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way
claimed is at point least prejudicial to the servient estate. The private respondent failed to prove that there is
no adequate outlet from their respective properties to a public highway; in fact the lower court confirmed that
there is another outlet for the private respondents to the main road (yet they ruled in favor of the private
respondents). Apparently, the CA lost sight of the fact that the convenience of the dominant estate was never
a gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. There must be a real necessity and not mere convenience
for the dominant estate to acquire such easement. Also, the private respondents made no mention of their
intention to indemnify the petitioners. The SC also clarified that least prejudicial prevails over shortest
distance (so shortest distance isnt necessarily the best choice.)

VILLANUEVA VS. VELASCOLegal Easement

A legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted for public use or for private interest and becomes a
continuing property right unless its removal is provided for in a title of conveyance or the sign of the
easement is removed before the execution of the conveyance; Essential requisites for an easement to be
compulsory are: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of
the dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to
the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest.

FACTS:
Petitioner Bryan Villanueva bought a parcel of land in QC from Pacific Banking Corporation which it acquired
from the spouses Maximo and Justina Gabriel. When he bought it, there was a small house on its
southeastern portion. It occupies one meter of two meter wide easement of right of way the Gabriel spouses

granted to Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of the private respondents, in a contract of easement of right

of way. Amongst others, the contract provides that the easements purpose is to have an outlet to Tandang
Sora which is the nearest public road and the least burdensome (Espinolass property being the dominant
estate and Gabriel spousess as the servient estate.) It was also provided in the contract that the easement
shall be binding to the successors, assigns without prejudice in cases of sale of subject property that will
warrant the circumstances.

The private respondents were able to acquire a writ of demolition on the house obstructing the easement
against the Spouses Gabriel. The petitioner filed a third party claim with prayer to quash the writ saying that
he was not made a party to the civil case and that the writ of demolition should not prosper since the
easement which is meant to protect was not annotated in the petitioners title.
CA ruled in favor of the private respondents saying that the easement exists even though it was not
annotated in the torrens title because servitudes are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or
passively belong. And that Villanueva is bound by the contact of easement, not only as a voluntary
easement but as a legal easement.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement on the property binds petitioner?

RULING:
YES. A legal easement is mandated by law, and continues to exists unless its removal is provided for in a
title of conveyance or the sign of the easement is removed before the execution of the conveyance
conformably with Art 647 in accordance with Article 617 of the Civil Code.

Essential requisites for an easement to be compulsory are: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the
isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; (4) the right of way claimed is at point
least prejudicial to the servient estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, where the
distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
The existence of the easement has been established by the lower courts and the same has become
conclusive to the SC. The small house occupying one meter of the two-meter wide easement obstructs the
entry of private respondents cement mixer and motor vehicle (no mention of what kind.) Accordingly, the
petitioner has to demolish the house to make way for the easement.

ALCANTARA V. RETA, 372 SCRA

364 - Personal Easement
Construction of a house on the lot of another to facilitate the utilization of usufruct may constitute as personal
easement pursuant to Article 614.

FACTS:
Edilberto Alcantara et. al. filed with the RTC, Davao City a complaint against Cornelio B. Reta, Jr. for the
exercise of the right of first refusal under Presidential Decree No. 1517, injunction with preliminary injunction,
attorney's fees and nullity of amicable settlement.

Alcantara et. al. claimed that they were tenants or lessees of the land; that the land has been converted by
Reta into a commercial center; and that Reta is threatening to eject them from the land. They assert that they
have the right of first refusal to purchase the land in accordance with Section 3(g) of Presidential Decree No.
1517 since they are legitimate tenants or lessees thereof.

They also claimed that the amicable settlement executed between Reta and Ricardo Roble was void ab initio
for being violative of Presidential Decree No. 1517.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners have the right of first refusal under Presidential Decree No. 1517.

HELD:

No right of first refusal. The area involved has not been proclaimed an Urban Land Reform Zone (ULRZ). In
fact, Alcantara et. al. filed a petition with the National Housing Authority requesting that the land they were
occupying be declared as an ULRZ. On May 27, 1986, the request was referred to Mr. Jose L. Atienza,
General Manager, National Housing Authority, for appropriate action. The request was further referred to
acting mayor Zafiro Respicio, Davao City, as per 2nd Indorsement dated July 1, 1986. Clearly, the request to
have the land proclaimed as an ULRZ would not be necessary if the property was an ULRZ.

Presidential Decree No. 1517, otherwise known as "The Urban Land Reform Act," pertains to areas
proclaimed as Urban Land Reform Zones.11 Consequently, petitioners cannot claim any right under the said
law since the land involved is not an ULRZ.

To be able to qualify and avail oneself of the rights and privileges granted by the said decree, one must be:
(1) a legitimate tenant of the land for ten (10) years or more; (2) must have built his home on the land by
contract; and, (3) has resided continuously for the last ten (10) years. Obviously, those who do not fall within
the said category cannot be considered "legitimate tenants" and, therefore, not entitled to the right of first
refusal to purchase the property should the owner of the land decide to sell the same at a reasonable price
within a reasonable time.

Respondent Reta allowed petitioner Ricardo Roble to use sixty-two (62) coconut trees for P186 from where
he gathered tuba. This arrangement would show that it is a usufruct and not a lease. Usufruct gives a right to
enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the title
constituting it or the law otherwise provides.

Petitioner Roble was allowed to construct his house on the land because it would facilitate his gathering of
tuba. This would be in the nature of a personal easement under Article 614 of the Civil Code.
Whether the amicable settlement is valid or not, the conclusion would still be the same since the agreement
was one of usufruct and not of lease. Thus, petitioner Roble is not a legitimate tenant as defined by
Presidential Decree No. 1517.

TAEDO v BERNADExtinguishment of Easement

An easement continues by operation of law. Alienation of the D and S estates to different persons is not a
ground for extinguishment of easements absent a statement extinguishing it.

FACTS:
Antonio Cardenas (resp) is the original owner of 2 parcels of land (7501-A and 7501-B). He constructed an
apartment bldg in Lot A and in Lot B he constructed an apartment, house, bodega and a septic tank for
common use of the occupants of the two lots.

Cardenas sold Lot A and mortgaged Lot B to Eduardo Taedo (pet). He also agreed that should be decide to
sell Lot B he would sell it to Taedo. However, Cardenas sold Lot B to Spouses Sim (resp). Sim blocked the
sewage pipe connecting the building on Lot A to the septic tank. He also asked Tanedo to remove that
portion of his building encroaching Lot B.

Taedo filed an action for legal redemption and damages against resps. Cardenas admitted that he had
agreed to sell the lot to pet and claimed by way of cross claim against spouses Sim that the Deed of Sale he
had executed was only intended as an equitable mortgage. RTC dismissed the complaint and the cross
claim.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the right to continue to use the septic tank ceased upon the subdivision of the land and its
subsequent sale to different owners.

RULING: NO.

The alienation of the dominant and servient estates to different persons is not one of the grounds for the
extinguishment of an easement. On the contrary, use of the easement is continued by operation of law as
provided in Art 624 because no abolishment or extinguishment was provided in the deed of absolute sale.
Nor did Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe and septic tanks before he sold the lots. Accordingly, the
spouses Sim cannot impair, in any manner, the use of the servitude.

JAVELLANA V. IAC- Positive

Easement
When a positive easement is constituted, the servient owner is prevented from impairing the use of such by
the dominant estate.

FACTS:
Marsal & Co., Inc., and Marcelino Florete, Sr. is the present owner of the land adjoining the Iloilo River up to
the adjacent lot where the L. Borres Elem. School is located. There existed a main canal from the Iloilo River
which passes through the Marsal property and thru a canal that traverses the school property going towards
Lot 2344. Marsal & Co. closed the dike entrance and later on demolished the portions of the main dike
connecting the main canal to the canal running thru the school grounds. This closure caused flooding in the
premises of the school and its vicinity because the canal serves as outlet of rain or flood water that empties
into the river. This prompted the school and barangay officials to complain to higher authorities about the
closure of the canal. When Florete was about to bury a pipe in lieu of an open canal, he was prevented from
doing so by the district supervisor, Javellana, thus he instituted a complaint for recovery of damages for
allegedly denying his access to the use of the canal to his property.

The RTC ruled in favor of Javellana thus Florete appealed to the IAC which reversed the decision thus the
case at bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an easement was established in favor of the school property

RULING: YES
A positive easement of water-right-of-way was constituted on the property of Florete as the servient estate in
favor of the L. Borres Elementary School and the nearby lands as dominant estates since it has been in
continuous use for no less than 15 years by the school fishpond as well as by the nearby adjacent lands.

As a positive easement, Florete had no right to terminate the use of the canal without violating Art. 629 of
the CC which provides that The owner of the servient estate cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the
use of the servitude. Nevertheless if by reason of the place originally assigned or of the manner established
for the use of the easement, the same should become very inconvenient to the owner of the servient estate,
or should prevent him from making any important works, repairs or improvements thereon, it may be
charged at his expense, provided he offers another place or manner equally convenient and in such a way
that no injury is caused thereby to the owner of the dominant estate or to those who may have a right to the
use of the easement.

When Florete closed the entrance of the canal and demolished portions of the main dike it impaired the use
of the servitude by the dominant estates.

Additional Facts:
> One witness almost drowned
> One witness saved a woman, who while picking shells fell into the canal
> 2 witnesses took a bath in the canal, 1 when he was still a child, the other when he was still single
> Canal is used by residents for salt-making using plastic bags, which is in competition with Marsal & Co. in
the production of salt
> the canal is a source of salt water, it is fresh and clean since the tide changes from the Iloilo River while
the fishpond is stagnant and polluted
> before the closure of the dikes, there were no floods in the vicinity
> tube to be buried: 10-inch rubber tube
> canal:
o for the 1st 100 meters = 3 meters wide
o 200 meters = 2 meters
> depth of canal:
o high tide or rainy season = main canal = meter; canal that traverses school = 2 meters

o ordinary days = no water

> Florete only caused the canal to be deeper

VALDERRAMA V. THE NORTH

NEGROS SUGAR CO., INC.Easement Right of Way
What is prohibited by Art. 543 is that in extending the line or repairing or using the same, a larger area of
land is occupied or excavations or materials deposited are outside the area occupied not by causing wagons
to pass just because of a change of ownership of the objects being transported.

FACTS:
Several hacienda owners in Manapla, Occidental Negros, entered into a milling contract with Miguel Osorio
wherein the latter would build a sugar central of a minimum capacity of 300 tons for the milling and grinding
of all the sugar cane to be grown by the hacienda owners who in turn would furnish the central with all the
cane they might produce in their estates for 30 years from the execution of the contract. Later on, Osorios
rights and interests were acquired by the North Negros Sugar Co., Inc.
2 years after, the current petitioners, Catalino Valderrama, Emilio Rodriguez, Santos Urra et. al, made other
milling contracts identical to the first one with the North Negros Sugar, Co., Inc. The hacienda owners,
however, could not furnish the central sufficient cane for milling as required by its capacity, so the North
Negros made other milling contracts with the various hacienda owners of Cadiz, Occidental Negros. This
prompted Valderrama et. al to each file a complaint against North Negros.

The CFI entered 1 single judgment for all of them, ruling in Valderrama et. als favor finding that North
Negros had no right to pass through the lands of the hacienda owners for the transportation of sugar cane
not grown from their lands. Thus the appeal to the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of way established was restricted to transporting only sugar cane from the
hacienda owners lands

HELD: NO
(the SC also made 1 judgment for all the 3 cases)
The contract entered into by each of the hacienda owners contained a clause that granted the North Negros
an easement of way 7 meters wide for the period of 50 years upon their properties for the construction of a
railroad. The owners allege ambiguity since it could permit the transportation of sugar cane which they did
not produce which is contrary to their intent but the SC held that it is clear that the easement was
established for the benefit of all producers and of the corporation as it is the intent of the milling contract.

Since the easement is a voluntary, apparent, continuous easement of way in favor of the corporation, it is
contrary to the nature of the contract that it is only limited to canes produced by the servient estates since it
is a well settled rule that things serve their owner by reason of ownership and not by reason of easement.
The owners also cannot limit its use for there is nothing in the contract prohibiting the central from obtaining
other sources.

Transporting cane from Cadiz also does not make it more burdensome since what is prohibited in Art. 543 of
the CC is that in extending the road or in repairing it, it should occupy a greater area or deposit excavations
outside the granted 7 meters. This does not happen in this case when the North Negros transports sugar
cane from Cadiz, crossing the servient estates, since it continues to occupy the same area and the
encumbrance is still the same regardless of the number of times it passes through the estates.

Also the period of the easement is longer than the period of the milling contracts, so even if the owners no
longer desire to furnish the central canes for milling, the North Negros still has the right to the easement for
the remaining period so the contention that it should be limited to the canes produced by the owners has no
basis.

GARGANTOS V. CA- Easement

FACTS:
Sanz was the previous owner of a land which he subdivided into several lots. One lot was sold to Tengtio,
whol sold to Uy Veza. Another lot with a house constituted thereon was sold to Tan Yanon. A third portion
with a warehouse was sold to Gargantos. The problem arose when latter asked from the Municipality for a
permit to demolish the warehouse in order to construct a higher one. Yan Yung opposed for it would block
his window and impair his right of loght and view.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an easement was established

RULING:
Yes. Again, Art. 624 provides that when two adjoining estates were formerly owned by one person who
introduced improvements on both such that the wall of the house contructed on the first estate extends to the
wall of the warehouse on the second estate; and at the time of the sale of the first estate, there existed on
the aforementioned wall of the house, doors, windows which serve as passages for light and view, there
being no provision in the deed of sale that the easement of light and view will not be established, the
apparent sign of easement between the two estates is established as a title.

inShare2

AMOR v. FLORENTINO- Easement

FACTS:
Maria Florentino owned a house and a camarin (warehouse). By a will, she transferred the house to Jose
Florentino and the warehouse to Maria Florentino. Maria sold the warehouse to Amor. Amor then
demolished the old warehouse in order to build a new 2-storey structure. The problem is it will shut off the
light and air that come in through the window of the adjacent house owned by Jose. Hence the latter files for
prohibition claiming there is a negative easement prohibiting Amor from constructing any structure at any
height that would block the window. Amor counters that there is no easement. Moreover, since the death of
testator was before the Civil Code took effect, the rules on easement do not apply.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there is an easement prohibiting Amor from doing said construction.
2. Whether or not the Civil Code may be applied

RULING:
1. Yes. Easement are established by law or by will of the owners or by title. Under Art. 624, there is title by
the doctrine of apparent sign. When the estate is subsequently owned by two different persons and the
service (it cannot be an easement before the transfer) is not revoked in the title nor removed, an easement
is established.
The Cortez case cannot be invoked by Amor because it involved acquisition by prescription. Art. 624 is
acquisition by title.

2. Amor failed to prove that the death of the testator occurred before the effectivity of the Old Civil Code. The
facts show that it happened after the effectivity of the said code so the law on easement is already
applicable. In any case, even if we assume Amors supposition, the law on easement was already integrated
into the Spanish Law and in fact, had been established by Jurisprudence.
Therefore, Amor is prohibitied from constructing the warehouse above the level of the window.

DISSENTING OPINION OF OZAETA.

1) The Majority opinio committed a travesty on justice when it ignored the evidence produced by Amor that
the testators death occurred before the effectivity of the Code.

2) Hence, the law on easement will not apply. Moreover, the Spanish Law and the Partidas provided for only
three ways of acquiring easements: 1) contract 2) testament 3) prescription. There was no provision similar
to the doctrine of apparent sign.

3) There is no doctrine established by the Spanish Tribunal regarding the doctrine.

4) In this modern age of flourescent lights and air conditioning devices, the easement of light and view would
be obsolete and deterrent to economic progress especially when in the cities, buildings are side to side with
each other.

RONQUILLO vs. ROCO- Easement

of Right of Way
Easements of right of way may not be acquired by prescription because it is not a continuous easement.

FACTS:
Petitioners parcel of land was connected to the Naga Market Place and Igualdad St. by an easement of a
right of way through the land of the Respondents, which they have been using for more than 20 years. On
May 1953, however, respondents built a chapel right in the middle of the road, blocking their usual path to

the marketplace. One year after, by means of force, intimidation, and threats, the owners (respondents) of
the land where the easement was situated, planted wooden posts and fenced with barbed wires the road,
closing their right of way from their house to Igualdad St. and Naga public market.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of a right of way may be acquired by prescription?

HELD: No.
Art. 620 of the CC provides that only continuous and apparent easements may be acquired by prescription.
The easement of a right of way cannot be considered continuous because its use is at intervals and is
dependent on the acts of man.

Minority Opinion (including the ponente):

Easements of right of way may already be acquired by prescription, at least since the introduction into this
jurisdiction of the special law on prescription through the Old Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190. Said law,
particularly, Section 41 thereof, makes no distinction as to the real rights which are subject to prescription,
and there would appear to be no valid reason, at least to the writer of this opinion, why the continued use of
a path or a road or right of way by the party, specially by the public, for ten years or more, not by mere
tolerance of the owner of the land, but through adverse use of it, cannot give said party a vested right to
such right of way through prescription.

The uninterrupted and continuous enjoyment of a right of way necessary to constitute adverse possession
does not require the use thereof every day for the statutory period, but simply the exercise of the right more
or less frequently according to the nature of the use. (17 Am. Jur. 972)
"It is submitted that under Act No. 190, even discontinuous servitudes can be acquired by prescription,
provided it can be shown that the servitude was actual, open, public, continuous, under a claim of title
exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants'."

ABELLANA vs. CA- Easements of

Right of Way
Easements of right of way may not be acquired by prescription because it is not a continuous easement.

FACTS:
Petitioners are owners of a parcel of land on the NW side of Nonoc Subdivision, Cebu. They sued to
establish an easement of a right of way over a subdivision road, which they claim theyve acquired through
prescription since their ancestors have been using these since time immemorial.

They pray that the concrete wall surrounding the village be taken down to allow easy access to the public
highway.

RTC found for the petitioners. CA reversed, averring that road lots in subdivisions are private property and
may only be used as a public highway once acquired by the government through donation, purchase or
expropriation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the easement of a right of way may be acquired by prescription?

HELD:
No. Art. 620 of the Civil Code provides that only continuous and apparent easements may be acquired by
prescription. The easement of a right of way cannot be considered continuous because its use is at intervals
and is dependent on the acts of man.

CORTES vs. YU-TIBO- Negative

Easement
A Notarial prohibition is required to start the running of prescription in a negative easement.

FACTS:
Easement disputed here is the easement of light and view. Plaintiffs wife has certain windows on her
property which open on the adjacent lot. It has been established that the plaintiffs hasnt done any formal act
prohibiting the owner of the house of the adjacent house prohibiting them to make any improvements.
Plaintiff claims that period of prescription started when those windows were made and acknowledge by the
owner of the adjacent lot. Defendant however claims that there should be a formal act prohibiting them from
doing a certain act to trigger the prescriptive period.

ISSUE:
Whether or not plaintiffs have acquired the easement through prescription?

RULING: NO.
The Court clarified that mere act of opening one owns window is an act of dominion not of easement. The
easement here is the (possible) prohibition of creating any improvements on the property of the defendants
(negative easement) that may impede or limit the use of the window. Thus, plaintiff is totally wrong in saying
that prescription for the easement starts to kick in when the window was made and acknowledge by the
adjacent owner. In fact, what is needed in this situation is a formal act through a notarial prohibition so that
prescriptive period will start. The fact that the defendant has not covered the windows of the apellant/ plaintiff

does not necessarily imply the recognition of the acquisitive prescription of the alleged easement as this
might just be a result of a mere tolerance on the part of the defendant.

Plaintiffs asked for a rehearing but was again denied! Plaintiff mentions about their windows and watersheds
to be apparent easements, or just projitiendi and jus spillitiendi. The court says that the plaintiffs are
obviously confused between the right exercised by owners and the rights provided in easements.

CID vs. JAVIER- Notarial Prohibition

Notarial prohibition is required to start the running of prescription. Also Registration of the Immovable without
the registration of the easement extinguishes the easement.

FACTS:
The easement in dispute here is an easement of light and view, which is a negative easement. The
respondents Javier, et al are the owners of the building standing on their lot with windows overlooking the
adjacent lot. Respondents have claimed that they had acquired by prescription an enforceable easement of
light and view arising from a verbal prohibition to obstruct such view and light. The lower courts have ruled in
their favor.

Note: easement of light and view is continuous and apparent so it is subject to prescription.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the respondents Irene P. Javier, et al., owners of a building standing on their lot with windows
overlooking the adjacent lot, had acquired by prescription an enforceable easement of light and view arising
from a verbal prohibition to obstruct such view and light, alleged to have been made upon petitioners
predecessor-in-interest as owner of the adjoining lot, both of which lots being covered by Torrens titles.

RULING: NO.
Art538s requirement is a formal act and not just any verbal or written act. Formal act contemplated in
art538 in the OLD Civil Code pertains to an instrument acknowledged before a notary public. Prescription for
a negative easement only begins when there is a notarial prohibition by the dominant estate. Respondents
could have not acquired the easement by prescription because they have not fulfilled this requirement. Even
assuming they have acquired it, the easement no longer exists because the properties were registered under
the Torrens system without any annotation or registration of the said easement.

SOLID MANILA CORP. vs. BIO

HONG TRADING CO.- Easement
and Servitudes
Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenement of which they form part, and even if they are possessed
of a separate juridical existence, they cannot be alienated from the tenement or mortgaged separately.

Note: In a personal servitude, there is no "owner of a dominant tenement" to speak of, and the easement
pertains to persons without a dominant estate, in this case, the public at large. (Merger, which presupposes
ownership, is not possible.)

FACTS:
Solid Manila Corp. is the owner of a parcel of land located in Ermita. The same lies in the vicinity of another
parcel registered under Bio Hong Trading whose title came from a prior owner. In the deed of sale between
Bio Hong and the vendor, 900 sqm of the lot was reserved as an easement of way.
The construction of the private alley was annotated on Bio Hongs title stating among other things "(6) That

the alley shall remain open at all times, and no obstructions whatsoever shall be placed thereon; and (7) that
the owner of the lot on which the alley has been constructed shall allow the public to use the same, and
allow the City to lay pipes for sewer and drainage purposes, and shall not act (sic) for any indemnity for the
use thereof

The petitioner claims that ever since, it (along with other residents of neighboring estates) made use of the
above private alley and maintained and contributed to its upkeep, until sometime in 1983, when, and over its
protests, the private respondent constructed steel gates that precluded unhampered use.
On December 6, 1984, the petitioner commenced suit for injunction against the private respondent, to have
the gates removed and to allow full access to the easement.

The trial court ordered Bi Hong to open the gates but the latter argued that the easement has been
extinguished by merger in the same person of the dominant and servient estates upon the purchase of the
property from its former owner.

CA reversed holding that an easement is a mere limitation on ownership and that it does not impair the
private respondent's title, and that since the private respondent had acquired title to the property, "merger"
brought about an extinguishment of the easement.

Thus, Solid went to the SC alleging that the very deed of sale executed between the Bio Hong and the
previous owner of the property "excluded" the alley in question, and that in any event, the intent of the
parties was to retain the "alley" as an easement notwithstanding the sale.

[While the case was pending, Bio Hong asked the RTC to cancel the annotation in question, which it granted
subject to the final outcome of the prior case.]

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not easements may be alienated (sold) from the tenement or mortgaged separately
2) Whether or not the easement had been extinguished by merger.

HELD: NO to both

1) The sale included the alley. The court rejected Solids contention that the alley was not included in the
sale. It was included but there was a limitation on its use-the easement. As a mere right of way, it cannot be
separated from the tenement and maintain an independent existence. (Art. 617)
Even though Bio Hong acquired ownership over the property including the disputed alley as a result of
the conveyance, it did not acquire the right to close that alley or otherwise put up obstructions thereon and
thus prevent the public from using it, because as a servitude, the alley is supposed to be open to the public.

2) No genuine merger took place as a consequence of the sale in favor of the private respondent
corporation. According to the Civil Code, a merger exists when ownership of the dominant and servient
estates is consolidated in the same person. Merger requires full ownership of both estates.
Note that The servitude in question is a personal servitude (established for the benefit of a community, or of
one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong). In a personal servitude, there is
therefore no "owner of a dominant tenement" to speak of, and the easement pertains to persons without a
dominant estate, in this case, the public at large. Thus, merger could not have been possible.

RELOVA v. LAVAREZ- Easement

and Servitude
The enjoyment of the plaintiff of an easement for the maintenance of an irrigation aqueduct and a dam on
the lands of defendant for a period of more than 20 years confers title thereto upon the plaintiff by virtue of
prescription and burdens the lands of the defendants with a corresponding servitude.

FACTS:
The plaintiff is the owner of a tract of rice land which is cultivated with the aid of water brought from a river
through an aqueduct which passes over the land of the defendants. This was by virtue of an easement the
use of which had been with the plaintiff for more than thirty years. On the land of the defendants there was a
dam with a small gate or aperture in its face which was used to control the flow of the water in the aqueduct,
by permitting a greater or less quantity to escape in a drainage ditch, also on the land of the defendants.

One of the defendants completely destroyed the dam and let all the water escape by the drainage ditch, so
that none flowed on the land of the plaintiff. At the time when the dam was destroyed the plaintiff had some
five cavanes of land prepared to plant rice, but because of the escape of the water resulting from the
destruction of the dam he was unable to raise his crop. Defendants claim that the plaintiff is not the owner of
any lands watered by the aqueduct of the class known as padagat (rice lands planted in May). It was also
alleged that the plaintiff suffered no damage by the destruction of the dam, because all the lands of plaintiff
which are cultivated with the aid of water from the aqueduct are of the class known as binanbang (rice lands
planted in August or September), and the destruction of the dam in May and the consequent failure of water
in the aqueduct at that period did not, and could not, damage the plaintiff or interfere with the proper
cultivation of his lands.

Lastly, defendants say that that the evidence on record does not establish the existence of the servitude in
the lands of the defendants in favor of the lands of the plaintiff landowner for the maintenance of the
aqueduct and dam in question.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a valid servitude between the parties.

HELD:
Save for the issue on the existence of the servitude, all other allegations of defendants were outrightly
disregarded as they were clearly unmeritorious in light of the findings of fact. However, the Court ruled that
there was a valid easement in light of the fact that the aqueduct and the dam had been in existence for more
than 30 years, during which time the plaintif had exercised its use. It was alleged that no benefit was granted
to the plaintiff since his (plaintiff's) land is situated higher than defendants' land. Moreover, even if defendants
had the right to open the gates of the dam to prevent destructive overflow upon their land, this does not give
them the right to stop the flow of water altogether.

BALURAN V. NAVARRO - Usufruct

The manner of terminating the right of usufruct may be stipulated by the parties such as in this case, the
happening of a resolutory condition.

FACTS:
Baluran and Paraiso (ancestor of Obedencio) entered into a contract which they called barter, but in fact
stipulated that they would only transfer the material possession of their respective properties to each other.
Thus, Baluran will be allowed to construct a residential house on the land of Paraiso while Paraiso is entitled
to reap the fruits of the riceland of Baluran. The contract prohibited them from alienating the properties of the
other and contained a stipulation that should the heirs of Paraiso desire to re-possess the residential lot,
Baluran is obliged to return the lot. Indeed, years after, Obedencio (grandchild of Paraiso) acquired the
ownership of the residential lot from his mother and demanded that Baluran, who was in possession, vacate.

Baluran now counters that the barter already transferred ownership.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the contract was a barter or usufruct

RULING:
IT IS USUFRUCT. First, the contract is what the law defines it to be and not what the parties call it. It is very
clear that what the parties exchanged was not ownership, but merely material possession or the right to
enjoy the thing.

Now, because it is usufruct, the law allows the parties to stipulate the conditions including the manner of its
extinguishment. In this case, it was subject to a resolutory condition which is in case the heir of Paraiso (a
third party) desires to repossess the property. Upon the happening of the condition, the contract is
extinguished.

Therefore, Baluran must return the land to Obedencia. But since Art. 579 allows the usufructuary to remove
improvements he made, Baluran may remove the house he constructed.
One last point. At the time of this case, the Obedencias were also in possession of the riceland of Baluran.
Although it was not proper to decide the issue of possession in this case, the Court nevertheless decided on
the matter and order the Obedencias to vacate the property inasmuch as there was an extinguishment of a
reciprocal obligations and rights.

VDA DE ALBAR v. CARANDANG,

106 PHIL 855- Usufruct
The reparation or indemnity given in exchange for the destruction of the building is the substitute for the
building itself. The indemnity is the capital which belongs to the naked owner while the interest on the capital
is the fruits which belong to the usufructuary.

Notes:
The Civil Code contemplates a situation where the owner pays for the construction of a new building.
However, the twist in this case was that the naked owner did not have to construct a new one because the
Chinaman had one built at his own expense. This is the reason why the court had a difficult time
ascertaining who had the right to the indemnity given by the government for the destruction of the building
due to the war.

Majority Opinion: The reparation should be treated as fruits. Usufructuary should get 6% of the reparation
(from the time it was actually received to the tend of the life of the usufruct) because it was not used to
construct a new building. Otherwise, the naked owner is enriched twice first from the reparation and
second from the fruits if payment of rent stops when the building is constructed. Thus, the new building
should be considered as the capital, and the reparation as fruits. The naked owner should share the
reparation with the usufructuary to prevent unjust enrichment.

Ponentes Opinion: The reparation should be treated as capital (NCC). Only the interest on the reparation up

to the date that the new building was constructed time should be given to the usufructuary, not the interest
until the end of the usufruct. The reparation itself which is considered as the capital (which rightfully belongs
to the naked owner) intended to replace the old building. The intention was fulfilled when the Chinaman
constructed a new one. It was not the naked owners fault that he need not use the reparation to construct a
new building. The owner is not doubly compensated because it was not his fault.

Dissenting opinion: There is double benefit in either case. In the first, the usufructuary will be receiving
interest on the reparation and rent from the building. In the second, the naked owner receives value for the
building and the construction of a building at no expense to him.

Payment of interest should continue during the life of the usufruct (not just 6%) because the war damage is
the equivalent to the building. The construction of the new building does not relieve the owners of the land
used in the war damage payment from continuing the payment of interest. If they had used it to construct the
building, they would have been freed from paying interest but they did not.

*********************************

FACTS:
Doa Rosario Fabie y Grey was the owner of the lot in the City of Manila with a building and improvements,
and by a will left by her upon her death which was duly probated she devised the naked ownership of the
whole property to Rosario Grey Vda. de Albar, et al. but its usufruct to Josefa Fabie for life.

During liberation, as a consequence of the fire that gutted the building in many portions of Manila, the
building on the Ongpin lot was burned, leaving only the walls and other improvements that were not
destroyed by the fire.

One Au Pit, a Chinaman, offered to lease the property for a period of five years, at the same time agreeing to
construct on the lot a new building provided the naked owners as well as the usufructuary sign the
agreement of the lease. As the usufructuary maintains that she has the exclusive right to cede the property
by lease and to receive the full rental value by virtue of her right to usufruct while on the other hand the
naked owners maintain that the right of usufruct was extinguished when the building was destroyed, the right
of the usufructory being limited to the legal interest on the value of the lot and the materials, in order that the
agreement of lease may be affected, the parties agreed on a temporary compromise whereby the naked
owners would receive P100.00, or 20% of the monthly rental of P500.00 and the usufructuary the balance of

80% or P400.00 of said monthly rental. It was likewise stipulated in the agreement that the title to the
building to be constructed would accrue to the land upon it completion as an integral part of the lot covered
by the transfer certificate of title issued in the name of the naked owners but subject to the right of usufruct of
Josefa Fabie. The parties expressly reserved the right to litigate their respective claims after the termination
of the contract of lease to determine which of said claims was legally correct.

By reason of the destruction of the building on the Ongpin property, the United States War Damage
Commission approved the claim that was presented for the damage caused to the property, paid to and
received by the naked owners. In the meantime, the usufructuary paid the real estate taxes due on the
property at Ongpin for the years 1945 to 1952.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the usufruct included the building and the land? W/N the usufructuary (FABIE) or naked
owner (VDA DE ALBAR) should undertake the reconstruction? W/N the usufructuary should pay the real
estate taxes?

HELD:
The usufruct for life extended to the land and the building. From the above, it is clear that when the
deceased constituted the life usufruct on the rentals "fincas situadas" in Ongpin and Sto. Cristo streets, she
meant to impose the encumbrance both the building and the land on which it is erected for indeed the
building cannot exist without the land. And as this Court well said, "The land, being an indispensable part of
the rented premises cannot be considered as having no rental value whatsoever." Moreover, in the Spanish
language, the term "fincas" has a broad scope; it includes not only building but land as well. (Diccionario
Ingles-Espaol, por Martines Amador) Since only the building was destroyed and the usufruct is constituted
not only on the building but on the land as well, then the usufruct is not deemed extinguished by the
destruction of the building for under the law usufruct is extinguished only by the total loss of the thing subject
of the encumbrance (Article 603, old Civil Code).
FABIE, the usufructuary has the discretion to reconstruct the building. Of course, this is addressed to the
wisdom and discretion of the usufructuary who, to all intents and purposes is deemed as the administrator of
the property. This has been clarified in the case of Fabie vs. Gutierrez David, 75 Phil., 536, which was
litigated between the same parties and wherein the scope of the same provision of the will has been the
subject of interpretation.

The usufructuary should pay the taxes. We find, however, merit in the contention that the real estate taxes

paid by respondent in her capacity as usufractuary for several years previous to the present litigation should
be paid by her, as she did, instead of by petitioners not only because she bound herself to pay such taxes in
a formal agreement approved by the court in Civil Case No. 1569 of the Court of First Instance of Manila
(Fabie vs. Gutierrez David, supra). In the case, which involved the same parties and the same properties
subject to usufruct, the parties submitted an amicable agreement which was approved by the court wherein
the usufructuary, herein respondent, bound herself to pay all the real estate taxes, special assessment and
insurance premiums, and make all the necessary repairs on each of the properties covered by the usufruct
and in accordance with said agreement, respondent paid all the taxes for the years 1945 to 1954.

GABOYA V. CUI- Usufruct

FACTS:
Don Mariano sold his 2 lots to two of his children. Later on, he and his children became co-owners of the
property. Don Mariano executed a deed authorizing the children to apply for a loan w/ mortgage with a
stipulation reserving his right to the fruits of the land. The children then constructed a building on the land
and collected rent from the lessee thereof. Much later, when Don Mariano died, his estate was claiming the
fruits of the building.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Don Mariano had a right to fruits of the building?

RULING: NO.
The deed expressly reserved only to his right to the fruits of the land. He only owned the rent for the portion
of land occupied by the building; thus, the estate could only claim the rent on that piece of land and not on

the entire parcel of land. The children are entitled to the rents of the building. (A usufruct on the land may be
separate from the building.

There should be no rescission of the contract coz the exact amount of rent due and owing to the Don
Marianos estate is still unliquidated and undetermined. The trial court has the discretion to grant the debtor
(children) a period within which to pay the rental income from the portion of land owned by the building
because the same has not yet been determined. Article 1191 of the Civil Code grants the right to rescind but
subject to the period that the court will grant.

Moreover, on the issue of co-ownership, the court held that a co-owner cannot simultaneously be a
usufructuary of the same land owned.

inShare1

CHUA KAI V. KAPUNAN, 104 PHIL

110- Possession of Chattels
Possession of chattels in GF is equivalent to title until ordered by the proper court to restore the thing to the
owner who was unlawfully deprived thereof. The presumptive owner is entitled to the enjoyment and holding
of the thing.

FACTS:
Soto purchased from Youngstown Hardware 700 galvanized iron sheets and round iron bars. He issued as
payment a check drawn against Security Bank. Soto then sold the sheets, some of them to Chua Hai.
Meanwhile, the check issued for payment was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. This prompted the
hardware store to file a case of estafa against Soto and prayed for the return of the sheets. This was
opposed by Chua on the part of the sheets he purchased. Notwithstanding this opposition, the court ordered
for its return.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Chua has the right to retain possession?

HELD: Yes.
To deprive Chua, who was in good faith, of the possession of the sheets, may it be temporarily or
permanently, is in violation of the rule laid down in Article 559. Possession of chattels in good faith is
equivalent to title, until ordered by the proper court to restore the thing to the owner who was illegally
derpived thereof. Until such decree is issued, the possessor as presumptive owner is entitled to the
enjoyment and holding of the thing. Further, the hardware store or Ong was not unlawfully deprived of the
sheets. There was a

LEDESMA v. CA- Perfected

Unconditional Contract of Sale
FACTS:
Citiwide sold 2 cars to a certain Jojo Consunji evidenced by 2 invoices. Upon delivery of the cars, Jojo paid
with a Managers Check (PhP101,000.00). When Citiwide deposited the check, it was dishonored for being
tampered. Amount was changed from 101.00 to 101,000.00.

Citiwide reported the crime to the Phil. Constabulary where he found that Consunji was actually Armando
Suarez, a professional criminal.

One car was found abandoned, while the other was discovered to be in the possession of Jaime Ledesma,

who claims to have purchased the car in good faith from the registered owner, evidenced by the LTO
Registration.

RTC ordered the car to remain in the possession of Ledesma.

CA overruled RTC, stating that Citiwide was unlawfully deprived of property through false pretenses
amounting to fraud.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the owner was unlawfully deprived of the property?

HELD:
No. There was a perfected unconditional contract of sale. Failure to pay by Suarez through the subsequent
dishonor of the check did not render the contract of sale void. Ownership was already transferred by the
delivery of the cars to Suarez.

EDCA PUBLISHING v. SANTOS

Possession of movable property acquired in GF is equivalent to title. There is no need to produce a receipt.

FACTS:
EDCA Publishing sold 406 books to a certain Professor Jose Cruz who ordered these by telephone, which
was agreed to be payable on delivery. The books were subsequently delivered to him with the corresponding
invoice, and he paid with a personal check.

Cruz then sold the 120 of the books to Leonor Santos who asked for verification, and was then showed the
invoice for the books.

EDCA became suspicious when Cruz ordered another set of books even before his check cleared. Upon
investigation, EDCA found that he wasnt the person he claimed to be (Dean in DLSU). EDCA had the police
capture Cruz, as well as seize the books from Santos. Santos demanded the return of the books.
RTC granted the writ of preliminary attachment.
Subsequent dishonor of a check, which did not render the contract of sale void does not amount to unlawful
deprivation of property. (There was a perfected contract of sale so the proper remedy is specific
performance)

ISSUE:
Whether or not the owner was unlawfully deprived of the property?

HELD: No.
Santos was a good faith buyer after taking steps to verify the identity of the seller. When she was showed the
invoice, she reasonably believed that he was a legitimate seller.

With regard to unlawful deprivation, EDCA was not unlawfully deprived of the property by mere failure of
consideration. There was already a perfected contract of sale. Proof was even substantiated when EDCA
gave the invoice as proof of payment upon delivery of the books. This did not amount to unlawful taking,
because by the delivery of EDCA to Cruz, ownership of the books already transferred to him.

DIZON V. SUNTAY- Pledge of

Immovable
An owner of a movable unlawfully pledged by another is not estopped from recovering possession. Where
the owner delivered the diamond ring solely for sale on commission but the seller instead pawned it without
authority, the owner is not stopped form pursuing an action against the pawnshop.

FACTS:
Lourdes Suntay is the owner of a 3-carat diamond ring valued at P5,500. She and Clarita Sison entered into
a transaction wherein the ring would be sold on commission. Clarita received the ring and issued a receipt.
After some time, Lourdes made demands for the return of the ring but the latter refused to comply. When
Lourdes insisted on the return, Clarita gave her the pawnshop ticket which is the receipt of the pledge and
she found out that 3 days after the ring was received by Clarita, it was pledged by Melia Sison, the niece of
Claritas husband in connivance with Clarita with the pawnshop of Dominador Dizon for P2,600. Lourdes
then filed an estafa case. She then asked Dominador Dizon for the return of the ring pledged but refused to
return the ring thus the case filed by Lourdes.

The CFI issued a writ of replevin so Lourdes was able to have possession of the ring during the pendency of
the case. The CFI also ruled in her favor which was affirmed by the CA on appeal. Thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:
W/N the CA erred in ruling that Lourdes has a right to possession of the ring

HELD: NO
It reiterated the ruling in de Garcia v. CA, that the controlling provision is Art. 559 of the CC which states that
the possession ofmovable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has

lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the
same. If the possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in
good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.

Lourdes, being unlawfully deprived of her ring thus she has a right to recover it from the current possessor.
Dizon is engaged in a business where presumably ordinary prudence would require him to inquire whether
or not an individual who is offering the jewelry by pledge is entitled to do so. The principle of estoppel cannot
help him at all. Since there was no precaution availed of, perhaps because of the difficulty of resisting
opportunity for profit, he only has himself to blame and should be the last to complain if the right of the true
owner of the jewelry should be recognized.

Other issues raised:

Principle of estoppel = has its roots in equity, moral right and natural justice.
> For estoppel to exist, there must be a declaration, act or omission by the party who is sought to be bound.

> A party should not be permitted to go against his own acts to the prejudice of another.
Concurring opinion by J. Teehankee:

> Interpretation of the unlawfully deprived in Art. 559 of the CC. It is understood to include all cases where
there has been no valid transmission of ownership. If our legislature intended interpretation to be that of the
French Code, it certainly would have adopted and used a narrower term than the broad language of Art. 559
(formerly 464) and the accepted meaning in accordance with our jurisprudence.

DE GARCIA V. COURT OF
APPEALS/ GUEVARA- Buying Lost
or Stolen Goods
(Art 559) One who has lost or has been unlawfully deprived of any movable may recover the same from the
possessor except when the owner has been unlawfully deprived of it and it has been obtained by the latter in
good faith at a public sale wherein the former needs to reimburse the latter of the price paid.

:. THE ONLY EXCEPTION is acquisition in good faith of the possession at a public sale.

FACTS:
Mrs. Guevara owned a pretty diamond ring with white gold mounting, 2.05 diamond-solitaire, and 4 brills.
Sometime in February 1952, the ring was stolen from her house. Luckily, on October 1953 (barely a year
after), she found it at a restaurant, La Bulakena, on the finger of the restaurant owner, Consuelo De Garcia.

Guevara asked De Garcia where she bought it and explained to her how she had lost it. When the ring was
handed to her by De Garcia, it fitted her perfectly. The next time around, she brought her husband and
Rebullida, the person whom she bought the ring from, to verify the identity of the ring. Rebullida examined
the ring with the aid of high power lens and his 30 years of experience. He concluded that it was the very
ring that he had sold to the Guevaras. After that, Guevara sent a written request for the ring, but De Garcia
did not deliver it. When the sheriff tries to serve a writ of seizure, De Garica likewise refused to deliver the
ring.

According to De Garcia, she bought the ring from her kumare who got it from another Miss who in turn got it
from the owner, a certain Aling Petring. Aling Petring however, was nowhere to be found. She boarded three
months at the first buyers house but left a week after her landlady bought the ring. The first buyer did not
even know Aling Petrings last name nor her forwarding address.
De Garcia claims to be a holder in good faith and for value. She says her possession is equivalent to title.

[Note: There was a discrepancy as to the weight of the ring at the time it was purchased and at the time it
was found, but this was because De Guevara substituted the diamond-solitaire with a heavier stone.]
The lower court both ruled in favor of the buyer and CA reversed in favor of the owner, Guevara. Hence, the
present petition.

ISSUE: Who has a better right?

RULING: Guevara (owner)
Article Article 559 again, applies. Remember that the article establishes two exceptions to the general rule of
irrevindicability: when the owner (1) has lost the thing, or (2) has been unlawfully deprived thereof. In these
cases, the possessor cannot retain the thing as against the owner, who may recover it without paying any
indemnity. THE ONLY EXCEPTION is acquisition in good faith of the possession at a public sale.

There is no merit in the contention that De Garcias possession is in good faith, equivalent to title, sufficed to
defeat the owners claim. Possession in good faith does not really amount to title for the reason that there is
a period for acquisitive prescription for movable through uninterrupted possession of 4 years.

The title of the possessor in good faith is not that of ownership, but is merely a presumptive title sufficient to
serve as a basis for acquisitive prescription. This, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully
deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of the same.
Besides, De Garcias title, if any, was weak. Her source, Aling Petring, was dubious. She did not make a
comment when Rebullida examined the ring nor did she answer Guevaras letter asserting ownership of it.
Her testimony was weak!

Other facts
1. Subject matter = 1 diamond ring 18 cts. white gold mounting, with 1 2.05 cts. diamond-solitaire, and 4
brills 0.10 cts. total weight.
2. Mr. Rebullidas experience in the jewelry business = 30 years
3. Mrs. Garcia = owner of La Bulakea restaurant
4. Weight of the diamonds:
5. substituted diamond = 2.57 cts.
6. lost diamond (guevaras) = 2.05 cts

7. Ruling of the CA = return the ring or pay P1,000 and costs, P1,000 (attys fees) & P1,000 as exemplary
damages

AZNAR v. YAPDIANGCO- Stolen

Goods
True owner has a better right than a buyer in good faith to possession of a stolen good.

FACTS:
Teodoro Santos advertised the sale of his FORD FAIRLANE 500 in a newspaper. On L. De Dios went to the
house of Teodoro and talked to his son Ireneo Santos and said that his uncle Vicente Marella is interested in
buying the said car.

The next day, Ireneo went to the house of Marella and they agreed to the price of P14,700 on the
understanding that it will be paid after the car has been registered in the latters name.
A deed of sale was executed and the registration was changed to the name of Marella. Ireneo went to
Marella to get the payment and deliver the car who informed him that he is P2,000 short of the money and
that they need to go to his sister to get it. Ireneo, together with De Dios and an unidentified man went to a
house.

Once inside, De Dios asked Ireneo to wait in the sale. After waiting in vain, he went down and discovered
that the car was gone.

Marella was able to sell the car to plaintiff-appellant Jose Aznar and while attending to registration, the car
was seized by Phil. Constabulary due to the report of the incident.

ISSUE:
Between the two parties, who has the better right?

HELD:
Teodoro Santos has the better right. Marella did not have any title to the property under litigation because
the same was never delivered to him. He may have the contract but he never acquired valid title. Although
the keys to the car may have been given to the unidentified companion, it may be done only because that
companion took them to the place where the sister of Marella was supposed to live. The car was evidently
stolen and that the buyer did not acquire any valid title thereto.

CRUZ v. PAHATI
The common law principle that the one who has made the happening of fraud possible through misplaced
confidence must suffer the consequence cannot be applied since there is an express provision covering the
case. Article 559, a statutory provision, prevails over a common law principle.

FACTS:
Jesusito Belizo is a second hand car dealer who sold an automobile (not indicated what type) to plaintiff
Jose Cruz. After a year, Belizo offered to sell the sell the same car to a certain buyer. Plaintiff agreed and
since the certificate of registration was missing, Cruz made a letter addressed to the Motor Section of the
Bureau of Public Works for the issuance of a new certificate.

Cruz gave the letter to Belizo to be submitted to the said office and he gave the car as well on the latters
pretext that he was going to show it to a prospective buyer. The letter was falsified, making it appear that a
deed of sale was executed in favor of Belizo, who then got a certificate of registration on his name.

Belizo was able to sell the car to respondent Bulahan who later sold it to Pahati, but the sale was cancelled
so the car went back to Bulahan.

ISSUE:
Between two innocent and parties in good faith, who has a better right over the property?

HELD:
Cruz, the original owner has the better right for it cannot be disputed that plaintiff had been illegally deprived
through ingenious schemes by Belizo and that Art 559 and 1505 are applicable in this situation.

1. Art 559 clearly indicates that the one who has lost any movable or has been lawfully deprived thereof, may
recover it from the person in possession of the same and the only defense is if the other party has acquired
it in good faith and at a public sale.

2. Art 1505 clearly says that in cases where a sale is made not by owner and was made without authority,
the buyer acquires no better right than that of the seller unless the owner is estopped.
Moreover, if Bulahan had been more diligent, he could have seen that the letter had an erased portion which
couldve aroused his suspicion and made him conscious on making inquiries which he failed to do.
The contention of Bulahanan re common law principle that the one who has made the happening of fraud
possible through misplaced confidence must suffer the consequence cannot be applied since there is an
express provision covering the case.

CALAGAN V. CFI OF DAVAOUseful Expense

The HOUSE which private respondent constructed is a useful expense, defined as that which increases the
value or augments the income of the property, as contrasted to a necessary expense which is incurred for
the preservation of the thing.

FACTS:
Calagan and his wife Takura was granted a homestead application over a parcel of land. Takura died and
was survived by her husband and their children. On August 8, 1961, Mangulon and his daughter, Paula sold
a portion of 9,230 square meters of their homestead to private respondent, Petra Sandoval in consideration
of the sum of P2,340.00. Petitioners title to the land was borrowed by private respondent so that the latter
could have the sale annotated thereon.

She was given the title so that the sale could be annotated. Thereafter, Calagan offered to repurchase the
land but Sandoval didn't agreed. She continuously refused and was only willing to comply if Calagan would
reimburse the value of the house constructed on the parcel of land. This prompted petitioners to file an
action for reconveyance, on which the trial court ruled in their favor, given that they pay for the value of the
house built on good faith by Sandoval.

CFI ordered the Heirs of Calagan to pay Sandoval the the value of the house constructed in good faith. The
heirs argue that only necessary expenses are subject to reimbursement. House constructed on a coconut
land is not necessary. It is only useful.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs must reimburse Sandoval for the house

HELD:
Under Article 1616, the vendor a retro cannot avail himself of the right of repurchase without returning to the
vendee the price of the sale, the expenses of the contract and other legitimate payments, and the necessary
and useful expenses made on the thing sold.

[There can be no question but that the house which private respondent constructed is a useful expense,
defined as that which increases the value or augments the income of the property, as contrasted to a
necessary expense which is incurred for the preservation of the thing.]

However, Article 1616 should be read with Article 456 and 457.

Applying Article 547, the homesteader desiring to repurchase should be given the option to require the
vendee a retro to remove the useful improvements on the land subject of the sale a retro, which option is not
granted the vendor a retro under Article 1616. Under the latter Article, the vendor a retro must pay for the
useful improvements introduced by the vendee a retro, otherwise, the latter may retain possession of the
property until reimbursement is made.

To allow a vendee a retro of a homestead, however, the right of retention until payment of useful expenses is
made by the redemptioner would be to render nugatory the right of repurchase granted by law to a
homesteader because all a vendee a retro can do to prevent repurchase is to build something on the
homestead beyond the capacity to pay of the homesteader who seeks to repurchase. Such a situation
should not be allowed to pass.

It is obvious that the heirs of Calagan are not exercising the option to refund the amount of the expenses
incurred by private respondent for the house that the latter built as provided for in Article 546.
[Note that Sandoval, as the vendee a retro, may remove her house since this can be done without damage
to the principal thing - land]

In other words, since the heirs didn't exercise the option to refund the amount of the expenses incurred by
Sandoval for the house he built, and not to pay the increase in value acquired by the land by reason of such
expenses Sandoval may remove her house since this can be done without damage. The heirs should not,
as opined by the trial Court, be made to refund the value of that house to Sandoval.

AZARCON V. EUSEBIO- Owner of

Crops Pending Harvest
A person who is in possession and who is being ordered to leave a parcel of land while products thereon are
pending harvest, has the right to a part of the net harvest.

FACTS:
Victor Eusebio et al. had a dispute over the possession of a certain parcel of public land in the year 1954.
Eusebio had filed a lease application for a parcel of containing an area of about 349 hectares. A portion
thereof was occupied by. Azarcon and his companions, under a homestead application. The conflict between
the lessee and the homesteaders was investigated by the Director of Lands and again by the Secretary of
Agriculture and natural Resources.

Before the dispute could be settled, Eusebio filed a complaint in the CFI of Nueva Ecija, alleging that he had
acquired a big parcel of land, 349 hectares in area, by lease from the Bureau of Lands (lease application No.
V-79) and that while he was in possession thereof, defendants occupied a portion. He prayed that
defendants be ordered to vacate the six hectares occupied by them and pay damages.
Azarcon answered the complaint alleging that he is in actual possession of a portion of 24 hectares since
1941 by virtue of a homestead application. He contends that the lease application of Euseboo was
subsequent to his homestead application. He had occupied the land since 1941 with interruption during the
war and again in 1950 up to the time of the filing of the action. He prayed that the action be dismissed.
The trial court found for Eusebio. Pending the CA case, a writ of execution was issued. In spite of the receipt
by the Aznar of the notice of the writ of execution of which commanded defendants "to forthwith remove from
said premises and that plaintiff have restitution of the same," defendants-appellants nevertheless entered the
land to gather palay which was then pending harvest.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Aznar acted in bad faith

HELD:
While the court order of October 3, 1955 ordered the defendant-appellant to move out from the premises, it
did not prohibit them from gathering the crop then existing thereon. Under the law a person who is in
possession and who is being ordered to leave a parcel of land while products thereon are pending harvest,
has the right to a part of the net harvest, as expressly provided by Article 545 of the Civil Code.

ART. 545. If at the time the good faith ceases, there should be any natural or industrial fruits, the possessor
shall have a right to a part of the expenses of cultivation, and to a part of the net harvest, both in proportion
to the time of the possession.

As the order of execution did not expressly prohibit the defendants-appellants from gathering the pending
fruits, which fruits were the result of their possession and cultivation of the land, it cannot be said that the
defendants-appellants committed an act which is clear violation of the courts' order. Besides, the
defendants-appellants had presented, after receipt of the order of execution, a motion to set aside the said
order of execution, and this motion to stay execution was granted. Defendants furthermore presented a bond
in accordance with the order of the court and had it approved by the CFI. It was perhaps in expectation of
this resolution of the court setting aside the order of execution that defendants-appellants may have felt
justified in entering the land and harvesting the fruits existing thereon.

Again the order of the court setting aside its order to stay execution was issued in the belief that the
defendants-appellants had not presented before the CFI of Nueva Ecija and which said court actually
approved). Their act in harvesting the pending fruits was not only justified by law but was not expressly
prohibited by the court's order, and was even ratified when the court ordered the suspension of the
execution.

FRANCEL REALTY v. CA | SYCIP,

252 SCRA 127- P.D. 957
Where an action for unlawful detainer is based on P.D. 957 (defective construction), HLURD, not the MTC,
has jurisdiction.

FACTS:
Francel alleged that it had executed a Contract to Sell to Sycip a property in Cavite, for P451,000.00. The
Contract to Sell provides that in case of default in the payment of two or more installments, the whole
obligation will become due and demandable and the seller will then be entitled to rescind the contract and
take possession of the property; the buyer will vacate the premises without the necessity of any court action
and the downpayment will be treated as earnest money or as rental for the use of the premises. Francel
alleged that Sycip failed to pay the monthly amortization of P9,303.00 since October 30, 1990 despite
demands to update his payments and to vacate the premises, the latest of which was the demand made in
the letter dated September 26, 1992, so Francel filed in the MTC an action for unlawful detainer and award
for costs and damages.

Sycip, on the other hand filed a motion o dismiss the case on the ground that he stopped paying because
the townhouse sold to him was of defective construction; that in fact a case for unsound real estate business
practice is pending in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).

MTC granted the dismissal on the ground that it had no jurisdiction and that the case was cognizable by the
HLURB. RTC affirmed. CA reversed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not MTC had jurisdiction?

HELD: No.
Petitioner's complaint is for unlawful detainer. While generally speaking such action falls within the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC, the determination of the ground for ejectment requires a consideration
of the rights of a buyer on installment basis of real property. Indeed private respondent claims that he has a
right under P.D. No. 957, 23 to stop paying monthly amortizations after giving due notice to the owner or
developer of his decision to do so because of petitioner's alleged failure to develop the subdivision or
condominium project according to the approved plans and within the time for complying with the same. The
case thus involves a determination of the rights and obligations of parties in a sale of real estate under P.D.
No. 957, Private respondent has in fact filed a complaint against petitioner for unsound real estate business
practice with the HLURB.

This is, therefore, not a simple case for unlawful detainer arising from the failure of the lessee to pay the
rents, comply with the conditions of a lease agreement or vacate the premises after the expiration of the
lease. Since the determinative question is exclusively cognizable by the HLURB, the question of the right of
petitioner must be determined by the agency.

As to the counterclaim, Pursuant to Rule 6, 8 a party may file a counterclaim only if the court has
jurisdiction to entertain the claim. Otherwise the counterclaim cannot be filed.

PENAS v. CA | CALAYCAY, 233

SCRA 744- Unlawful Detainer
Unlawful detainer: 1 year prescription should be counted from the LAST letter of demand to vacate.

FACTS:
Spouses Penas leased to Calaycay a certain property in Quezon City. The original written contract was on a
month to month basis and for P110.00 per month. The price was continuously increased until it reached
P2000.00 per month.

In a letter of January 18, 1990, Penas notified Calaycay that effective March 1990, they were terminating the
written month to month lease contract as they were no longer interested to renew the same and demanded
from the latter to vacate the premises in question on or before February 28, 1990. In the same letter, Penas
opted to allow the defendant to continue occupying the leased premises provided he will agree to execute a
new lease contract for a period of one (1) year at an increased monthly rental P2500.00, plus two (2) months
deposit and, further, gave the Calaycay up to February 28, 1990 to decide, otherwise judicial action for
unlawful detainer shall ensue. Penas later finally reduced the monthly rental to P2000.00.

Calaycay did not vacate but instead consigned the monthly rents in a bank.
On August 10, 1992, Penas sent another letter to the defendant to vacate and demanded back rentals,
which Calaycay failed to satisfy.

On September 25, 1992, Penas filed an action for unlawful detainer. MTC dismissed the case for being filed
more than 1 year after the unlawful occupation. RTC and CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the case for unlawful detainer was filed in time?

HELD: Yes.
The established rule that the one (1) year period provided for in section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
within which a complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed should be counted from the LAST letter of
demand to vacate, the reason being that the lessor has the right to waive his right of action based on
previous demands and let the lessee remain meanwhile in the premises.

The notice giving the lessee the alternative either to pay the increased rental or otherwise vacate the land is
not the demand contemplated by the Rules of Court in unlawful detainer cases. When after such notice, the
lessee elects to stay, he thereby merely assumes the new rental and cannot be ejected until he defaults in
said obligation and necessary demand is first made.

The demand was made on 10 August 1992, followed by the action for unlawful detainer on 25 September
1992. Hence it was filed within 1 year from the beginning of the unlawful possession.

LIM KIEH TONG V. CA- Forcible

Entry and Unlawful Detainer
Any person deprived of possession of any land or building may file an action for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer against the person unlawfully depriving or withholding possession from him. This relief is not only
available to landlord, lessor but to lessee and tenant as well within one year from such unlawful deprivation
or withholding of possession.

FACTS:
Private Respondent and his family resided in room of a building owned by Petitioner until the former
transferred to their new residence. However, Respondent retained possession of the room to keep his
important belongings. At one point, when Respondent wanted to go to his room, he found that his key was
no longer compatible with the doors lock, that is, the lock was changed. He asked from Petitioner the new
key but having failed, he filed a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction plus damages with the MTC.
Petitioner countered that since the action is one for specific performance, the action should have been filed
with the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the action is one for specific performance or forcible entry and detainer.

RULING:

The suit is actually one for forcible entry and detainer. Respondent remained in possession of the property
but Petitioner prevented him from enjoying his right by depriving him of the right of egress and ingress
through the door of the building and the room. Any person deprived of possession of any land or building
may file an action for forcible entry and detainer against the person unlawfully depriving or withholding
possession from him. This relief is not only avaible to landlord, lessor but to lessee and tenant as well within
one year from such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession.

JAVIER V. VERIDIANO II- Action

for Determination of Ownership
A final judgment on forcible entry or unlawful detainer is NOT a bar against to an action for determination of
ownership. A judgment rendered in a case for recovery of possession is conclusive only as to possession,
not ownership. It is not a bar against an action for determination of ownership.

FACTS:
Petitioner bought a land on a subdivision by filing a Miscellaneous Sales Application. Pending the approval
of the sale, Ben Babol entered a portion adjacent to the land being bought by Petitioner. Petitioner claims
that the occupied land by Babol is part of his land so he filed a forcible entry case. However, the trial court
found Petitioner wrong and so sustained the possession of Babol. Later on, Babol would sell this portion to
private Respondent. In the meantime, the application was approved and a TCT was delivered to Petitioner.
This motivated the Petitioner to demand the land again, this time from Respondent, and this time on the
basis of ownership. He filed a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession. Respondent
countered that the first case on forcible entry constituted res judicata against the second complaint.

ISSUE:
W/N the first case on forcible entry was res judicata against the second case on quieting of title

RULING:
No! Once again, for res judicata to arise, four requisites must concur: Final judgment, Court with competent
jurisdiction, judgment based on merits, identity of parties and cause of action.
The Court said that in the two cases, there were identity of parties because Respondent, having acquired
the contested land by sale and tradition, is a successor in interest.

However, there was no identity of the causes of action. In forcible entry, the only issue is prior possession
and not ownership. In accion reivindicatoria, the issue is the ownership. The Court held that the second case
was actually an accion reivindicatoria as Petitioner set up title for herself, prayed that Respondent to be
ejected and that she be declared the owner. Thus a final judgment on forcible entry or detainer is NOT a bar
against to an action for determination of ownership.

Guidelines on how to detect fake titles

1. Check if the initials, signatures, technical description, annotation and other component elements
appearing on the front and at the back of the original are exactly the same as that appearing on the owners
duplicate copy of the title. Any variance is a ground for suspicion;
2. Judicial Forms for titles are considered accountable forms. A serial number is assigned to each judicial
form. The serial number to be used for the original copy is printer in rd and the serial number for the
duplicate copy is in black. The LRA distributes the judicial forms with serial number in consecutive order to
the various Registries of Deeds. Any certificate of title bearing a serial number which is not among the ones
delivered to a particular registry is of doubtful authenticity;
3. A number is assigned to each judicial form. It is indicated on the upper left-hand corner of the form.
Example: Judicial Form No. 109 is used for the original copy of the TCT which emanated from a decree of
registration and Judicial Form No. 109-D is used for the title is not the proper form as indicated by the
Judicial Form number, this should be investigated;
Immediately below the Judicial Form number is the year the form was printed or revised. If, for instance, the
judicial form on which the title was prepared bears a date previous to the time when such form was printed
or revised, then this is a ground for suspicion;
4. The owners duplicate copy of the title contains the words Owners Duplicate Certificate on the left side
margin of the judicial form. On the lower left corner of the form is affixed a red seal. The seal should not blot
or stain when wet;

5. The last two digits of the title number should correspond with the page number of the registration book
indicated on the upper right corner of the title. Any variance should be investigated;
6. A reconstituted transfer certificate of title is identified by the letters RT preceding the title
number, while the reconstituted original certificate of title carries the letter RO before the title
number;
7. The Central Bank judicial form is printed on security paper which contains security features. The paper
is 50% cotton and 50% chemical wood pulp with artificially colored silk fibers. It has a NALTDRA or LRA
watermark which can be seen if held against the light. Patently fake titles are usually printed in forms made
of cartolina or some other material of inferior quality.
8. Check if the Register of Deeds who signed the title was the incumbent register of deeds at the time the
title was issued;
9. Check the entry of a related transaction in the Primary Entry Book to be certain that the title was issued
on the basis of a duly registered document;
10. Check the Enumeration Book or logbook which contains information on the personnel assigned to
prepare the title on a certain date and the serial number of the judicial form used;
11. Check the Releasing Book if there was a title of such number that was released by the registry on that
certain date;
12. Of necessary, trace the history of the title to determine the genuineness of its source. This may entail
going back to the mother title, the derivative titles and relevant documents.
13. If necessary, trace the history of the title to determine the genuineness of its source. This may entail
going back to the mother title, the derivative titles and relevant documents.
For more information, inquiries and the directory of LRA offices, please visit the LRA website or contact and
visit the nearest LRA office in your area.
Source: Land Registration Authority (LRA) Philippine Guidelines on How to Detect Fake Titles

WONG V. CARPIO
Possession in good faith ceases once defects in title are made known to the possessor by extraneous
evidence or by suit for recovery by the owner; interruption takes place upon service of summons.

FACTS:
Mr. Giger sold to Plaintiff Mr. Mercado a piece of property for the price of P3,500 under the terms of a pacto
de retro.

Mr.Mercado paid land taxes and planted coconut trees but failed to erect signs of occupancy, nor did he
establish a hut. He spent much of his time away at his place of business where he ran a store. He visited the
land occasionally only to make copra. Other than this, the place resembled a ghost town.
Mr Wong happened to chance upon the land, and finding no one occupying the same, purchased the
property from Mr. Giger. Thereupon, he obtained a TCT, established a hut, populated the place with laborers
and fenced the property.

Mr. Mercado returned to the property and was dismayed to find his land occupied. He had the incident
blottered and filed for forcible entry against Mr. Wong. He also demanded rentals. Unfortunately, the MTC
ruled in favor of Mr. Wong, stating that the latter was in open, actual, prior and continuous possession. On
appeal, the CFI reversed and ruled for Mr. Mercado stating that he had taken possession of the property
much earlier and that Mr. Wong is the actual intruder. Mr. Wong took the case to the CA which ruled against
him.
(interesting note: Wong says Mercado was a mere laborer who was tolerated to gather fruits. How thick
faced is that?)

ISSUE:
Whether or not Mercado was the real owner

HELD:Yes.
Art. 135 provides that possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right,
or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities for acquiring
such right."

The law and jurisprudence indicate that the execution of a sale thru a public instrument shall be equivalent to
the delivery of the thing, unless there is stipulation to the contrary . But theres a catch. Even if there exists
the execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the
purchased thing when such tenancy and enjoyment is opposed by another. In this case, delivery has not
been effected.

It is crystal clear that possession passed from William Giger to Mercado by virtue of the first sale. This being
the case, , the later sale in favor of thick-faced Wong failed to pass the possession of the property because
there is an impediment the possession exercised by respondent Mercado.
Possession cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in the cases of copossession.
Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there
are two possessions, the one longer in possession, if the dates of possession are the same, the one who
presents a title; and if these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending
determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings (Art. 538, Civil Code).
Furthermore, Wong cannot claim good faith to deny Mercado due rentals. The moment he received the
complaint of forcible entry and summons, he should have been aware of defects in his title. He owes rentals
from that point onwards.

SEMIRA v. CA- Forcible Entry

When the issue of possession cannot be decided independently of the question of ownership in an action for
forcible entry, any pronouncement made affecting ownership is merely provisional and does not bar an
action between the same parties involving title to the land.

FACTS :
Ms. Gutierez sold to Respondent Buenaventura An an 822sqm lot specifically designated by boundaries.
Respondent then proceeded to occupy said lot within the boundaries.
Mr. Buenaventura got lucky with money and expanded. He subsequently purchased an adjacent lot with the
size of 8,606 and another of 11,000 sqm. Not much later on, he then sold the original 822sqm lot to his
nephew, Mr. Ramirez. The Deed indicated the same boundaries designated in the original sale from Gutierez
to Buenaventura. Mr. Ramirez proceeded to occupy the lot according to the boundaries stated.

Seven years passed and Mr. Ramirez sold the 822 sqm lot to Mr. Semira according to the stated boundaries
for a lump sum of P20,000. At this point, Mr Semira discovered that the actual size delimited by the
boundaries was not 822sqm, but rather, 2200sqm. What a bonanza! Mr. Semira gleefully entered the lot
according to its stated boundaries and built a rice mill.
Someone wasnt pleased. Mr. Buenaventura, who occupied the adjacent lots, didnt look to kindly upon the
encroachment. He filed forcible entry, claiming that Mr. Semira forcibly occupied an additional 1,377 sqm. He
asserts that Mr. Semira purchased an 822sqm lot, not a 2200sqm lot. The case went to court and during the
pendancy of proceedings, Mr. Buenaventura obtained an OCT for the two lots surrounding that of Mr.
Semira.

The MTC dismissed the forcible entry case against Mr Semira, stating that it had no jurisdiction to try cases
on the issue of ownership. The RTC reversed and ruled for Buenaventura. CA affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Mr. Semira rightfully owned 2200sqm of land designated by boundaries and not the 822sqm
erroneously stated on the Deed. (this is a boundary vs area quandary)

HELD:
Mr. Semira is entitled to 2200sqm designated by the boundary.

It is clear that the original 822sqm lot was once owned by respondent Buenaventura; and that he sold
same to his nephew, Cipriano Ramirez, in 1972 for the lump sum of P2,500.00. The "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng
Lupa" incorporated both the estimated area and the definite boundaries of the land; and, that private

respondent's nephew in turn sold the lot to petitioner in 1979 with the very same boundaries mentioned in
the deed of sale executed in his favor by his uncle Buenaventura An.
Petitioner Semira claims that owns the entire 2,200 square meters since it is the size of the lot he purchased
as established boundaries. On the other hand, respondent Buenaventura insists that he only sold 822.5
square meters, therefore, his nephew Ramirez could not have transferred a bigger area to petitioner.

The SC sustained Mr. Semira as well as the MCTCs decision. When land is sold for a lump sum and not on
a per unit of measure or number, the boundaries of the land stated in the contract determine the effects and
scope of the sale, not the area thereof. Hence, the Vendor Ramirez is obligated to deliver all the land
included within the boundaries, regardless of whether the real area should be greater or smaller than that
recited in the deed. The court stressed the point especially when the area is described in the vernacular as
"humigit kumulang," that is, more or less.

WILMON AUTO SUPPLY CORP. v

CA-Possession de
Jure, Possession de Facto
It has also been decided in a long line of cases that cases wherein ownership (possession de jure) is the
issue does not a bar or suspend ejectment cases (which tackles possession de facto.)

FACTS:
Petitioners were lessees of a commercial building and bodegas owned in common by Lucy A. Solinap, Fr.
Jerry R. Locsin, Lourdes C Locsin, Manuel C. Locsin and Ester L. Jarantilla. In their lease contract, there
was a reservation of right clause stating that the lessor reserves the rights to sell, mortgage, hypothecate
or encumber the property so long as it requires the purchase or mortgage creditors to respect the terms of
the lease contract; provided further that lessee shall be duly informed about lessors plan to sell the property

(herein referred to as leasehold rights). After the expiration of the lease contract, the lessors sold the
property to respondent Star Group Resources and Development Inc.
Thereafter, the respondent filed against the petitioner, who stayed despite the expiration of their lease
contract, for unlawful detainer. The lessees refused to concede and even impugned the right of the
respondent to eject them. Petitioners filed a case in the RTC to enforce their leasehold and pre-emptive
rights, which include the declaration of the sale null and void, their right of redemption, and to recover their
two-month deposits against the respondent in the dispute premises. Subsequently they filed a motion to
dismiss the ejectment case because of the case they filed with RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an action of unlawful detainer filed in the MTC against a lessee grounded on the expiration of
the latters lease should be suspended by an action filed in the RTC by the defendant lesse on the claim that
he is entitled to a right of preemption of the premises in question and wishes to have said right judicially
enforced?

RULING:
NO. An ejectment suit cannot be suspended by an action filed in the RTC based on tenants claim that his
right of preemption was violated. The underlying reasons for the this were that the actions in the RTC did not
involve physical or de facto possession, and on not a few occasions, that the case in the RTC was merely a
ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding, or that the issues presented in the former could quite
as easily be set up as defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved
It has also been decided in a long line of cases that cases wherein ownership (possession de jure) is the
issue does not a bar or suspend ejectment cases (which tackles possession de facto.)
The Court however stressed that when in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, the defendant raises
the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership. The MTC nevertheless have the undoubted competence to resolve the
issue of ownership x x only to determine the issue of possession

VDA. DE BORROMEO v.
POGOY- Forcible entry and
unlawful detainer
Special Civil Actions; Forcible entry and unlawful detainer prescribes in one year counted from demand to
vacate the premises

FACTS:
Petitioner seeks to stop respondent Judge Pogoy from taking cognizance of an ejectment suit for failure of
the plaintiff to refer the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation.

Deceased Vito Borromeo was the original owner of the building which was leased to herein petitioner Petra
Vda. De Borromeo for P500 per month payable within the first five days of the month. On August 28, 1982,
Atty Ricardo Reyes, administrator of the estate, served upon petitioner a letter demanding that she pay the
overde rentals corresponding to the period from March to September (1982), and thereafter vacate the
premises. Petitioner failed to do so, thus the respondent instituted an ejectment case against the former.
Petitioner moved to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. She points out that the parties are from the same cities
and as such they must refer the dispute to the barangay Court or Lupon before going through the judicial
courts. Respondents defense was that it was danger of prescribing under the statute of limitations. The
motion was dismissed thus this case.

ISSUES:
Whether or not it was indeed in danger of prescribing?
Whether or not going through Lupon was necessary?

RULING: NO to both.

The defense of Atty Reyes regarding the statute of limitations is unacceptable because the case was filed on
September 16, 1982, less than a month before the letter of demand was served. Forcible entry and detainer
prescribes in one year counted from demand to vacate the premises and the law only required 60 days upon
which the parties should try to reconcile in Lupon; Respondent had more than 9 months left even if
reconciliation failed.

However, PD No. 1508, wherein it is required to go through Lupon first before going to courts only applies to
individuals. In this case, Ricardo reyes is a mere nominal party who is suing in behalf of the Intestate
Estate of Vito Borromeo thus it is inapplicable to them.

EQUATORIAL V. MAYFAIR- Sale of

Land
While execution of a public instrument of sale is recognized by law as equivalent to the delivery of the thing
sold, such constructive or symbolic delivery is merely presumptive. It is nullified by the failure of the vendee
to take actual possession of the land sold.

FACTS:
Carmelo & Bauermann, Inc. owned a land, together with two 2-storey buildings at Claro M. Recto Avenue,
Manila, and covered by TCT No. 18529.

On June 1, 1967, Carmelo entered into a Contract of Lease with Mayfair Theater Inc. fpr 20 years. The lease
covered a portion of the second floor and mezzanine of a two-storey building with about 1,610 square
meters of floor area, which respondent used as Maxim Theater.

Two years later, on March 31, 1969, Mayfair entered into a second Lease with Carmelo for another portion of
the latters property this time, a part of the second floor of the two-storey building, and two store spaces on

the ground floor. In that space, Mayfair put up another movie house known as Miramar Theater. The
Contract of Lease was likewise for a period of 20 years.

Both leases contained a clause giving Mayfair a right of first refusal to purchase the subject properties.
Sadly, on July 30, 1978 - within the 20-year-lease term -- the subject properties were sold by Carmelo to
Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. for eleven million smackers, without their first being offered to Mayfair.

As a result of the sale of the subject properties to Equatorial, Mayfair filed a Complaint before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila for the recission of the Deed of Absolute Sale between Carmelo and Equatorial, specific
performance, and damages. RTC decided for Carmelo and Equatorial. Tsk tsk.
CA reversed and ruled for Mayfair. The SC denied a petition questioning the CA decision. What happened is
that the contract did get rescinded, Equatorial got its money back and asserted that Mayfair have the right to
purchase the lots for 11 million bucks.

Decision became final and executory, so Mayfair deposited with the clerk the 11M (less 847grand
withholding) payment for the properties (Carmelo somehow disappeared).
Meanwhile, on Sept 18, 1997, barely five months after Mayfair submitted its Motion for Execution, Equatorial
demanded from Mayfair backrentals and reasonable compensation for the Mayfairs continued use of the
subject premises after its lease contracts expired. Remember that Mayfair was still occupying the premises
during all this hullabaloo.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Equatorial was the owner of the subject property and could thus enjoy the fruits and rentals.

HELD:NO.
Nor right of ownership was transferred from Carmelo to Equatorial since there was failure to deliver the
property to the buyer. Compound this with the fact that the sale was even rescinded.

The court went on to assert that rent is a civil fruit that belonged to the owner of the property producing it by
right of accession. Hence, the rentals that fell due from the time of the perfection of the sale to petitioner until
its rescission by final judgment should belong to the owner of the property during that period.

We remember from SALES that in a contract of sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to
transfer ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing and the other to pay therefor a price certain in
money or its equivalent.

Ownership of the thing sold is a real right, which the buyer acquires only upon delivery of the thing to him in
any of the ways specified in articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the
possession is transferred from the vendor to the vendee. This right is transferred, not by contract alone, but
by tradition or delivery. There is delivery if and when the thing sold is placed in the control and possession
of the vendee.

While execution of a public instrument of sale is recognized by law as equivalent to the delivery of the thing
sold, such constructive or symbolic delivery is merely presumptive. It is nullified by the failure of the vendee
to take actual possession of the land sold.

For property to be delivered, we need two things. Delivery of property or title, and transfer of control or
custody to the buyer.

Possession was never acquired by the petitioner. It therefore had no rights to rent.

SAN MIGUEL V. CA- Conclusive

Evidence of Possession
To convert public into private land by means of open, continuous and exclusive possession, it is necessary to
provide strong evidence beyond mere tax declarations and tax receipts. Corroboration of the facts by
witnesses will help. (CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE)

FACTS:

On December 23, 1975, petitioner SMC purchased from Silverio Perez a 14,531 sqm lot of land located in
Batangas, in consideration for about a hundred grand. (Mr. Perez allegedly held the land for 30 years,
converting the said land from public alienable land to private land. Its on this ground that SMC claims it can
validly purchase said land from Perez).

On February 21,1977, SMC claimed ownership in fee simple. It filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Batangas an application for its registration under the Land Registration Act.

The Solicitor General opposed the application for registration contending that SMC's claim of ownership in
fee simple on the basis of a Spanish title or grant could no longer be availed of by the applicant as the sixmonth period from February 16, 1976 prescribed by Presidential Decree No. 892 had elapsed; that the
parcel of land in question is part of the public domain, and that SMC, being a private corporation, is
disqualified under Section 11, Article XIV of the Constitution from holding alienable lands of the public
domain.

During initial hearing on October 12, 197 7, the Court, upon motion of SMC and there being no opposition to
the application except that of the SolGen, issued an order of general default. SMC was allowed to submit
evidence to establish jurisdictional facts.

On December 12, 1977, the RTC adjudicated the property in favor of SMC.

The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA reversed the decision of the lower court and
declared the parcel of land involved as public domain.

SMC contested that the Court of Appeals' failed to hold that "prescription is a mode of acquiring title or
ownership of land and that the title thus acquired is registrable.

ISSUE:
Whether or not SMC validly acquired the land from Perez

HELD: NO.
The land is still public domain. Perez, the Seller, failed to proved that he acquired the land by prescription.

What is key here is whether the evidence presented by the petitioner is sufficient to warrant a ruling that
SMC and its predecessor-in-interest had a registrable right over the Lot.
Open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for 30 years transforms public land into
private land without the need of judicial or other sanction. Such open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
occupation of the disputed properties for more than 30 years must, however, be conclusively established.
This proof is necessary to avoid the erroneous validation of crazy claims of possession over the property in
dispute.

In this case, SMC's claim that its predecessor-in-interest had open, exclusive and undisputed possession of
said Lot for more than thirty years is anchored on certain documentary and testimonial evidence. Its
documentary evidence consist of tax declaration and tax receipts
Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or right of possession over a piece
of land. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership. Tax declarations only become strong evidence of
ownership of land acquired by prescription, a mode of acquisition of ownership relied upon by petitioner in
this case, when accompanied by proof of actual possession.
None are present. The land is still public land.

DBP V. CA- Good Faith and

Redemption
A mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith.

FACTS:
Spouses Piedas are registered owners of a parcel of land in Capiz, which they mortgaged to DBP to secure
the loan (P20,000) they obtained from the latter. Piedas eventually defaulted, prompting DBP to extrajudicially foreclose and take possession of such property. The Ministry of Justice, then, opined through its
Opinion No. 92 (78) that lands covered by P.D. No. 27, to which the subject property was included, may not

be the object of foreclosure proceedings. The Piedas, then, sought to redeem such property (with P10,000
as downpayment) but was denied as the land was allegedly tenanted. They then sought the cancellation of
the title and specific performance, stating that DBP acted in bad faith when it took possession of the property
andcaused the consolidation of its title in spite of the fact that the 5-year redemption period expressly stated
in the Sheriffs Certificate of Sale had not yet lapsed and that their offer to redeem was within the redemption
period.

ISSUE:
Whether or not DBP acted in bad faith when it took possession of the property

RULING: NO.
DBPs act of consolidating its title and taking possession of the property after the expiration of the
redemption period was in accordance with Sec. 6 of Act No. 3135, which states that if no redemption of a
foreclosed property is made within one year, the purchaser (DBP) is entitled as a matter of right to
consolidate and to possess the property. In addition to this, it was in consonance with Sec. 4 of the mortgage
contract between DBP and the Piedas where they agreed the appointment of DBP as receiver to take
charge and to hold possession of the mortgaged property in case of foreclosure. In fact, without DBPs act of
consolidating its title, the Piedas would not be able to assert their right to repurchase the property within 5
years, which would begin to run after the expiration of the one-year period. Thus, its acts cannot be tainted
with bad faith nor did it impair Piedas right to repurchase.

It may also be argued that P.D. No. 27 was already in effect when DBP foreclosed the property. However, the
legal propriety of the foreclosure of the land was questioned only after Opinion No. 92 (78) was issued,
which happened almost 2 months after DBP consolidated its title to the property. By law and jurisprudence, a
mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may properly be the basis of good faith.

Art. 526 of NCC states that a possessor in good faith is one who is not aware that there exists in his title or
mode of acquisition any flaw, which invalidates it. Moreover, Art. 527 of NCC provides good faith is always
presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of the possessor rests the burden of proof. Thus,
it is incumbent on the Piedas to prove that DBP was aware of the flaw in its title (nullity of the foreclosure),
but this they failed to do.

STATE INVESTMENT V. CAMortgage

A mortgagee who has foreclosed property is not considered in good faith when such mortgagee has or is
expected to have knowledge of any defect in the title; a prior buyer in good faith, although merely under a
contract to sell, is preferred over a mortgagee since if the original owner delivered title, he would not
anymore be able to mortgage the thing.

FACTS:
A contrcat to sell was executed between spouses Canuto and Oreta, and Solid Homes. The sale involved a
parcel of land (511 sq. m.). Upon signing of the contract, Oreta made payment with the agreement that the
balance shall be paid in installments. Meanwhile. Solid Homes executed several mortgages in favor of State
Investment over its subdivided parcels of land, including the subject of land of the mentioned contract to sell.
Such mortgage was foreclosed upon failure of Solid to comply with its obligations. Thereafter, Solid through
a MOA, negotiated for the deferment of consolidation of ownership over the foreclosed properties. It further
committed itself to redeem the properties.
Spouses Canuto after a few years filed a complaint before the HLURB against Solid and State for failure on
the part of Solid to execute the necessary absolute deed of sale as well as to deliver title to property subject
of the contract to sell despite full payment. Solid alleged that its obligations under the contract have become
so difficult for performance. Solid , in effect, asked to be partially released from its obligations by delivering
another parcel of land in substitution to the subject of the sale. State, on the other hand averred that unless
Solid pays the redemtion price, it has a right to hold on to the foreclosed properties. However, HLURB
ordered State to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of complainants and deliver the title to the land. Solid
was then ordered to pay State the portion of the loan which corresponds to the value of the lot. this judgment
was sutained by the Board of Commissioners, Office of the President, and Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

(1) W/N spuses Oreta's unregistered rights are superior over State's registered mortgage over the property
(2) W/N State has the right to rely on the face of the Torrens title

HELD:
(1) State's registered mortgage right over the property is inferior to that of respondents' unregistered right.
The unrecorded sale is preferred for the reason that if the original owner (Solid) had parted with the
ownership of the thing sold, he would no longer have the free disposal of it and would not be able to
mortgage it. Registration of the mortgage is not important since it is understood to be without prejudice to
the rights of third persons.

(2) As a general rule, where there is nothing in the title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership thereof,
the purchaser is not required to explore further. An exception to this is when the mortgagee or purchaser has
knowledge of a defect or lack of title on the part of the vendor or that he was aware of sufficient facts to
induce a reasonably prudent man to inquire furher. In this case, petitioner knows full well that Solid is
engaged in selling subdivision lots. Therefore, as founded on jurisprudence, it should have taken necessary
precautions to ascertain any flaw. Moreover, the uniform practice of financing institutions is to investigate,
examine, and assess real property offered as security. State is therefore not a mortgagee in good faith.

inShare1

PO LAM V. CA- Notice of Lis

Pendens
A buyer cannot be considered in bad faith when the notice of lis pendens was already being ordered
cancelled at the time of purchase.

FACTS:

This is a ruling on the motion for reconsideration filed by the Po Lam spouses.
The case stems from a controversy regarding two lots situated in Legazpi, Albay, which the spouses
purchased from Lim Kok Chiong. The lots were the subject of litigation between Lim and his brother Felix.
The latter sought an action to annul the sale by Lim to Legazpi Avenue Hardware because it was alleged
that Lim included his brothers share in the lot. During the pendency of the case, Felix sought the annotation
of notice of lis pendence on the TCTs of the 2 lots. The trial court found that Lim was the absolute owner of
the lots and upheld the sale, also, the court ordered the cancellation of notice of lis pendence on the titles.
One of the notices was cancelled but the other was not acted upon. Felix appealed, however the CA
maintained the ruling of the trial court and ordered the cancellation of the other TCT.

Subsequently, Legazpi Avenue Hardware sold the lots to the spouses Po Lam, which they later leased to
Jose Lee. Felix then impleaded the spoused Po Lam in the continuing civil case between him and his
brother. After the expiration of his lease, Jose Lee refused to pay Po Lam and instead said he would deposit
the payment to Felix. The Po Lam spouses filed an action with the trial court in Legazpi, which declared
them the lawful owners of the lots. The RTC and CA sustained, but the SC through Justice Purisima
reversed stating that the Po Lam spouses were vendees in bad faith because they knew of the notice of lis
pendence annotated on the TCTs.

Hence this motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are buyers in good faith

HELD:
Yes. In granting the motion for reconsideration, Justice Melo wrote that even though there was notice of lis
pendence on one of the titles, there was already a previous ruling by the trial court and later the CA, which
upheld the validity of the sale between Lim and Legazpi Avenue Hardware, and ordering the cancellation of
the TCTs. In the order of cancellation, it was recalled that Felix never moved for reinstatement of the notices.
Petitioner spouses cannot be considered in bad faith because there was an existing order of cancellation
annotated on the TCT. Such a view, which the SC former held, was erroneous and defied the purpose of the
doctrine of lis pendence. The doctrine is based on public policy and necessity.

CHUA-BURCE V. CA (possession
by a bank teller is possession of the
bank itself; mere custodian)
FACTS:
Ramon Rocamora, manager of Metrobank, requested FructuosoPenaflor, Assistant Cashier, to conduct a
physical bundle count of cash inside the vault, which should total to P4 million. They found out that there was
a shortage of P150,000. After 4 investigations conducted by the bank and NBI, the reports concluded that
Cristeta Chua-Burce, Cash Custodian, was primary responsible for the shortage. Unable to explain the
shortage, the services of the accused was terminated.

Chua-Burce, together with her husband Antonio Burce, were charged with the crime of estafa. A civil case
was also instituted. The accused prayed for suspension of criminal case due to a prejudicial question. It was
first granted but denied by the CA. The CRIMINAL and CIVIL cases continued.

The CRIMINAL CASE ruled that she was guilty of estafa. CIVIL CASE also found her liable for the shortage
of P150,000. She appealed both rulings to the CA but the court affirmed the two TC rulings.
Hence this case.

ISSUE:
(1) W/N there was a valid trial
(2) W/N the elements of estafa were proven beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:
(1) Yes, there was a valid trial.
The accused allege that the public prosecutor did not intervene with the case (violation of Sec 5 RULE 110 )
and did not present evidence for the criminal case (no evidence for the accused to be convicted).
But the fact showed that the public prosecutor actively participated with the criminal case. And both parties,
during the pre-trial, agreed to adopt their respective evidences in the CIVIL CASE to the CRIMINAL CASE.
The agreement was reduced into writing, inconformity with the Rules of Court. Being bound by the pre-trial
agreement, it is now too late in the day to challenge its contents.

(2) No, the crime of estafa was not proven.

The elements of Estafa, ART. 315 (1) (b), are the following:
a) The personal property is received in trust, on commission, for administration, or any other circumstances,
with the duty return.
b) There is a conversion/diversion of such property or denial that he received it.
c) Such conversion/diversion is to the injury of another
d) There is demand for such property

The 1st element is absent. The 1st element gives the tranferee both material and juridical possession of the
personal property. Juridical possession means the transferee has a right over the thing which he may even
set up against the owner.The possession of the accused of the money had no juridical possession. Being a
cash custodian, her possession is akin to that of a bank teller. And possession of a bank teller is possession
of the bank. she was a mere custodian.

*She should have been charged with qualified theft, but double jeopardy is already in play.
*Difference between an agent and teller. TELLER payment to the teller is a payment to the bank, he is a
mere custodian. AGENT he can assert his independent, autonomous right to retain money, even against
the owner.

LASAM V. DIRECTOR OF LANDSPossession

Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of
ground before it can be said that he is in possession, however, possession is not gained by mere nominal
CLAIM.

FACTS:
Lasam files a case in Court for the registration of a parcel of land, containing an area of around 24,000,000
hectares. He presents Exhibit L as proof of his possession over the land. Exhibit L is a certified copy of an
application. This application states that Lasams predecessor in interest, Domingo Narag, has owned the
land since time immemorial. However, the property described in Exhibit L is 15,000,000 hectares only and
the property sought to be registered is 24,000,000 hectares.
Furthermore, the document, mentions a fifth parcel of land which is the same parcel described in another
Exhibit K. Apparently, the surveyor of the land delineated the property based on what the possessor at that
time pointed out to him; he based his study mostly on hearsay. According to the applicant, before his
occupation of the land, only about 2 hectares were cultivated. But then, they justified this by invoking the
doctrine of constructive possession (That a person in possession of the land does not have to have his feet
on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession).

Thus, the Director of Lands opposed the registration on the ground that
a) it is not supported by any title fit for registration and
b) that the land sought to be registered is public land.

ISSUE:
Is the applicant entitled to registration because of the required possession during the time prescribed by
law? Is he entitled to the 24,000,000 hectares of land considering that the area possessed is only 2
hectares?

HELD:
First, the Court ruled that Exhibit L cannot be a valid application because the identity o the land was not
clearly established.

Second, although there is proof that Lasam might have possessed a portion of the parcel land, the proof is
lacking in certainty as to the portion occupied and the extent thereof. Although the counsel invokes the
doctrine of constructive possession, the said application is subject to certain qualifications, and this court
was careful to observe that among these qualifications is one particularly relating to the size of the tract in
controversy with reference to the portion of land actually in possession of the claimant. While, therefore,
possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of
ground before it can be said that he is in possession, possession is not gained by mere nominal CLAIM. The
mere planting of a sign or a symbol of possession cannot justify a Magellan-like claim of dominion over an
immense tract of territory.

SOMODIO VS. COURT OF

APPEALSAccion interdictal
Accion interdictal (forcible entry and unlawful detainer) are not remedies to obtain ownership of a certain
property rather they are remedies to determine who has a better right to possess the property subject of
dispute.

Note: What is important in ejectment cases is the issue of who is entitled to the physical or material
possession of a property and not the question of ownership.

FACTS:
Jose Ortigas executed an instrument designated as a Transfer of Rights, conveying to Wilfredo Mangubat,
the possession of a residential lot located at General Santos City. Nicanor Somodio, petitioner, contributed
one-half of the purchase price. Mabugat then executed an Affidavit of Trust expressly recognizing the right of
Somodio over undivided portion of the lot.

Somodio and Mabugat partitioned the property into two portions, with the former taking the western part.
After the partition, Somodio took possession of his portion and planted thereon ipil-ipil trees, coconut trees,
and other fruit bearing trees.

He also began construction of a structure with a dimension of 22 by 18 feet on his lot. Due to his work, he
was transferred to Kidapawan, North Cotabato, and left the unfinished structure to the care of his uncle.
Somodio allowed Ayco, respondent to transfer his hut to petitioners lot.

Somodio demanded Ayco to vacate the premises but to no avail. He then filed an action for unlawful detainer
with damages before the MTC. Another respondent, Purisima entered the land and constructed a house
thereon. Somodio then filed a complaint for forcible entry against the latter.

The MTC rendered a decision in favor of Somodio finding that Purisima built a house almost on the spot
where Somodios unfinished house stood through stealth and strategy. The MTC also held that Somodio
was the actual possessor of the lot in question.

The RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC. CA on the other hand, dismissed petition of Somodio and held
that the latter did not clearly and conclusively established physical, prior possession over the lot.

ISSUE:
Who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property? (only issue in ejectment cases)

RULING:
Anyone who can prove prior possession de facto (physical possession) may recover such possession even
from the owner himself. This is true regardless of the character of a partys possession provided he has in
his favor priority of time entitling him to stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a
better right by either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
Accrdg. to Art. 531 of NCC, possession is acquired by material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a
right. Somodio then enjoyed priority of possession because Purisima entered the lot only in 1983 which is
later than Somodios possession fo the property.

In addition, Somodios possession over the property is not synonymous with his right of ownership over the
same. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title to an estate. The
MTC and RTCs decision are deemed reinstated.

RAMOS VS. DIRECTOR OF

LANDS- Adverse Possession
The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land under the claim of ownership
of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another.

FACTS:
Restituo Romero gained possession of a considerable tract of land located in Nueva Ecija. He took
advantage of the Royal Decree to obtain a possessory information title to the land and was registered as
such.

Parcel No. 1 included within the limits of the possessory information title of Romero was sold to Cornelio
Ramos, herein petitioner.

Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered.

Director of Lands opposed on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a good title from the Spanish
government.

Director of Forestry also opposed on the ground that the first parcel of land is forest land.
It has been seen however that the predecessor in interest to the petitioner at least held this tract of land
under color of title.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the instrument giving color of title
sufficient to give title to the entire tract of land?

HELD:
The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land under the claim of ownership
of all is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder is not in the adverse possession of another.

The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith and he has open, peaceable, and notorious possession
of a portion of the property, sufficient to apprise the community and the world that the land was for his
enjoyment.

Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of
ground before it can be said that he is in possession.
Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements of the law on supposition that the premises
consisted of agricultural public land.

On the issue of forest land, Forest reserves of public land can be established as provided by law. When the
claim of the citizen and the claim of the government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the
Government desires to demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit
to the court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes.

In this case, the mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry,
unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant.
Petitioner and appellant has proved a title to the entire tract of land for which he asked for registration.
Registration in the name of the petitioner is hereby granted.

HEIRS OF SORIANO V. CA and

SPOUSES ABALOS
A person may be declared the owner of a property but he may not be entitled to possession.The exercise of
the rights of ownership is subject to limitations that may be imposed by law. Although declared to be the
lawful owner, such owner cannot automatically evict the physical possessor of the land unless it has been
determined that no rights of the possessor will be violated by such eviction.

FACTS:
A piece of land located in Lingayen, Pangasinan is the disputed property in this case. Said land was
originally owned by one Adriano Soriano, subsequently it was leased for a period of 15 years to the Spouses
David and Consuelo with RAMON SORIANO, son of Adriano and herein petitioner, acting as
caretaker/tenant of the property during the duration of the lease. Upon the death of Adriano the lot he owned
was divided into TWO and given to his heirs. One of the lots inherited was sold to the Spouses ABALOS,
here. The other lot was also bought by the Spouses Abalos although not completely (only of the lot). The
lots in question were subsequently registered in the name of the Spouses Abalos. The courts later declared
them to be the undisputed owners thereof. Soriano questions their ownership of the land and so filed cases
against the spouses. Currently Soriano is still in possession of the land claiming rights of Security of Tenure
as a tenant of the land.

ISSUE:

May a winning party in a land registration case effectively eject the possessor thereof?

RULING/RATIO:
No. Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Possession is the holding of a thing or the
enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without
right. A judgment of ownership does not necessarily include possession as a necessary incident. Such
declaration pertains only to OWNERSHIP and does not automatically include possession. This is especially
true in the case at bar wherein petitioner is occupying the land allegedly in the concept of an agricultural
tenant. The court says allegedly due to the fact that there is still a pending case in the DARAB (Department
of Agrarian Reform and Adjudication Board) on the issue. The issue of ownership of the subject land has
been laid to rest by final judgment; however the right of possession is yet to be resolved. The Tenancy Act,
which protects the rights of agricultural tenants, may limit the exercise of rights by the lawful owners. The
exercise of the rights of ownership yields to the exercise of the rights of an agricultural tenant. Since the
rights of Soriano to possess the land are still pending litigation in the DARAB he is protected from
dispossession of the land until final judgment of said court unless Sorianos occupancy is found by the court
to be unlawful.

inShare

CORONEL v. CONSTANTINO- Sale

of an Undivided Interest of a
Property
Sale of an undivided interest of a property only binds the co-owner only up to the portion of his/her interest;
consequently he/she can only transfer ownership over the same to other parties.

FACTS:
The disputed property was originally owned by Honoria Aguinaldo. One half was inherited by Emilia Coronel
together with her sons Benjamin, Catalino and Cerefino, all surnamed Coronel. The other half was inherited
by Florentino Constantino and Aurea Buensuceso. Emilia sold her share of the lot to Jess C Santos and
Priscilla Bernardo as evidenced by the KASULATAN NG BILIHANG PATULUYAN. Santos and Bernardo
then sold it to the respondents. Petitioners built several constructions and improvements on the disputed lot.
Respondents then filed a complaint for declaration of ownership, quieting of title and damages with prayer
for writ of mandatory and/or prohibitory injunction with the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale was valid? If yes, up to what extent?

RULING:
YES, only up to share of the land inherited by Emilia and her sons. Emilia signed only in her behalf and
not in representation of her three children thus the sale is only binding to her share. The subject property
was co-owned, pro-indiviso by petitioner Emilia together with her petitioner sons. No proof was presented to
show that the co-ownership that existed among the heirs of Ceferino and Catalino and herein petitioners as
never been terminated. No evidence was presented to show that the three brothers were aware of the sale
made by their mother. Since there was no partition made, Emilia is deemed to have sold only her share of
the lot which is thereof. Consequently SC declared respondents as owner of undivided portion of the
original lot which they inherited plus share (of their ) of petitioner Emilia Coronel.

AGUILAR v. CA- Co-ownership

Any of the Co-owners may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot object to
such demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally according to their respective
interests.

FACTS:
Petitioner Vergilio and respondent Senen bought a house and lot in Paraaque where their father could
spend and enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood. They initially agreed that Vergilio will get
2/3 and Senen will get 1/3; but later they agreed on equal shares. Senen was left in the said lot to take care
of their father since Vergilios family was in Cebu. After their fathers death petitioner demanded from private
respondent that the latter vacate the house and that the property be sold and proceeds thereof divided
among them but the latter refused. Petitioner then filed to compel the sale of the property. The chunk of the
issue tackled by the courts was regarding the pre-trial. Respondent filed a motion to cancel Pre-trial since
the counsel had to accompany his wife in Dumaguete City where she would be a principal sponsor in a
wedding. CFI denied the motion; and the pre-trial proceeded on the scheduled date. The respondents did
not appear thus they were declared in default. The trial went on ex parte without the respondent and held
that the property should be sold to a third party and that the proceeds be distributed to the parties; in
addition respondent was made to pay rent from the time the action was filed. Respondents appealed this
and the decision was reversed by the CA saying that the TC erred in declaring respondents in default; the
case was then remanded to the trial court. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
A) W/N CA erred (1) in holding that the motion of respondent through counsel to cancel the pre-trial was
dilatory in character and (2) in remanding the case to the trial court for pre-trial and trial?
ISSUE RELEVANT TO PROPERTY:
B) W/N trial court was correct with regards to the sale and rent?

RULING:
A) YES, CA erred in granting the respondents motion and remanding the case. The law is clear that the
appearance of parties at the pretrial is mandatory. A party who fails to appear at a pre-trial conference may
be non-suited or considered as in default. It is the discretion of the court to grant the motion if it sees that the
reason for the cancelation of the same would be reasonable. SC found that the reason for the cancelation of
the pre-trial was insufficient and that the trial court was not in grave abuse of discretion when they denied it.

B) YES, with a few modification. Petitioner and respondents are co-owners of subject house and lot in equal
shares; either one of them may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot object
to such demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally according to their respective
interests.
BASIS: Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the coownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar
as his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states that whenever the thing is
essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify
the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed.

SC held that of the proceeds should go to the petitioner and the remainder to the respondent (1,200
each.) Also rent was awarded 1,200 pesos per month with legal interest from the time the trial court ordered
the respondent to vacate, for the use and enjoyment of the other half of the property.
BASIS: When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court granted the
petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the right to
enjoy the possession jointly also ceased.

HEIRS OF SEGUNDA
MANINGDING V. CA | Heirs of
BUAZON- Acquisitive Prescription
While prescription among co-owners cannot take place when the acts of ownership exercised are vague and
uncertain, such prescription arises and produces all its effects when the acts of ownership do not evince any
doubt as to the ouster of the rights of the other co-owners.

FACTS:

This case involved 2 parcels of land: a riceland and sugarland in Pangasinan. The heirs of Segunda claim
that they own the disputed lands together with the Buazons.

The Buazons aver that:

1. Their father, Roque Buazon, acquired the land by virtue of a deed of donation propter nuptias.
2. Segunda Maningding, Maria Maningding, Juan Maningding and Roque Bauzon co-owned the lands as
heirs of Ramon Roque. Roque Buazon allegedly repudiated the co-ownership of the sugarland in 1965 and
repudiated it to himself and later on, Juan and Maria Maningding renounced and quitclaimed their shares
in the Riceland in favor of R. Buazon.
3. Subsequently, Roque Bauzon transferred the riceland to his son Luis Bauzon and the sugarland to his
daughter Eriberta Bauzon (the respondents in this case), both transactions being evidenced by deeds of
sale.

On 31 July 1979 Segunda Maningding died. Her heirs allegedly discovered the transfers made by Roque
Bauzon in favor of his children only in 1986. Consequently, the heirs sought the partition of the properties as
well as the accounting of the produce but were unsuccessful.

The trial court awarded both parcels to Segunda Maningding and Roque Bauzon as co-owners in equal
shares after finding that Juan Maningding and Maria Maningding had already executed an Affidavit of
Quitclaim and Renunciation. It rejected the deed of donation for failure to prove its due execution and
authenticity and nullified the deed of sale by Roque Buazon to his children. It concluded that Roque Bauzon
could not have validly conveyed both parcels as one-half (1/2) of each parcel rightfully belonged to Segunda
Maningding and her heirs.

The CA reversed the ruling, declaring the donation and sales valid. Later on, the court reversed itself by
declaring the donation void for failure to comply with the necessary requirements. However, it ruled that the
properties belonged to Roque Bauzon by virtue of acquisitive prescription.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Roque Bauzon acquired ownership over the subject properties by acquisitive prescription

RULING:

Yes. While prescription among co-owners cannot take place when the acts of ownership exercised are
vague and uncertain, such prescription arises and produces all its effects when the acts of ownership do not
evince any doubt as to the ouster of the rights of the other co-owners.

In the instant case, Roque Bauzon possessed the subject parcels of land in the concept of owner by virtue
of the donation propter nuptias. The possession was public as it was Roque Bauzon who personally tilled
and cultivated the lots. The acts of reaping the benefits of ownership were manifest and visible to all. These
acts were made more pronounced and public considering that the parcels of land are located in a
municipality wherein ownership and possession are particularly and normally known to the community.
Roque peacefully possessed the properties as he was never ousted therefrom nor prevented from enjoying
their fruits. His possession was uninterrupted and in good faith because of his well-founded belief that the
donation propter nuptias was properly executed and the grantors were legally allowed to convey their
respective shares in his favor. He likewise appropriated to himself the whole produce of the parcels of land to
the exclusion of all others.

As disclosed by the records, Roque Bauzon and his heirs possessed the property from 1948 to 1986 to the
exclusion of petitioners who were never given their shares of the fruits of the properties, for which reason
they demanded an accounting of the produce and the conveyance to them of their shares. Unfortunately
they slept on their rights and allowed almost thirty-six (36) years to lapse before attempting to assert their
right. Perforce, they must suffer the consequence of their inaction.

Note: The donation propter nuptias was effected as early as 21 April 1926. It was only in 1986 when the
heirs of Segunda Maningding demanded partition of the properties and conveyance of the produce. Sixty
(60) years have already elapsed. Even granting that Roque Bauzon possessed the properties only upon the
death of his father in 1948, more than thirty (30) years have already passed. In either case, acquisitive
prescription has already set in in favor of Roque Bauzon.

MARIATEGUI V. CA - Prescription
of an Action for Partition
Prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the
co-owner. Petitioners registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did not operate as a valid
repudiation of co-ownership, especially since there was fraud involved.

FACTS:
Lupo Mariateguie died without a will on June 15, 1953. During his lifetime, Lupo contracted 3 marriages. He
had 8 children all in all: 4 with his first wife, Eusebia; 1 daughter with his second wife, Flaviana; and 3 with
his third wife, Felipe.

Lupo left four properties which he acquired while he was still unmarried. On December 2, 1967, Lupos
descendants by his 1st and 2nd marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they
adjudicated one of the lots unto themselves. An OCT was issued in the names of these heirs. Subsequently,
this lot was subdivided into two, for which separate TCTs were issued to the respective parties.

Lupos children with the third wife, who were claiming continuous enjoyment and possession of the land,
protested. They went to court saying that when the court adjudicated one of the four lots to their co-heirs,
they were deprived of their respective shares in the lot. They prayed for the partition of the entire estate (all 4
lots) and the annulment of the deed of extrajudicial partition.
The defendants (other heirs) filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and
prescription. The trial court dismissed the case while the CA declared that all the heirs were entitled to equal
shares in the estate. CA directed the heirs who had acquired TCTs to execute deeds of reconveyance in
favor of the heirs with the third wife.

ISSUE:
Whether or not prescription barred private respondents right to demand partition of the estate
[The court established that the heirs had successional rights as their father had, during his lifetime,

repeatedly acknowledged them as his children; that they enjoyed that status since birth legitimate children
& heirs indeed]

RULING:
No. Prescription does not run against private respondents wrt the filing of the action for partition so long as
the heirs/co-owners for whose benefit the prescription is invoked have not expressly or impliedly repudiated
the co-ownership.

The registration was not a valid act of repudiation because it was not clearly made known to the other heirs.
For prescription to run, the act of repudiation is subject to certain conditions:

1. a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership

2. such act is clearly made known to the other co-owners
3. the evidence is clear and conclusive
4. OCEN possession of the property

Assuming that it was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription had not yet set in when the
respondents filed the action for partition. The reason is because there was fraud involved in obtaining
registration. Earlier the respondent heirs were assured by the petitioner-heirs no to worry about their share in
their inheritance; their existence as co-owners was recognized and in fact, they constructed a house on the
registered lot without objection from the petitioner-heirs. In as much as petitioners registered the properties
in their names in fraud of their co-heirs, prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from the time
respondents discovered the fraud. In this case, respondents immediately commenced an action two months
after they learned of the fraud.

ADILLE V. CA- Notice of

Repudiation
Registration is not equivalent to notice of repudiation when it is done to defraud the others. Torrens title
cannot be used as shield for fraud.

FACTS:
There was a woman who had two husband. With the first husband, she produced the Petitioner. The second
husband, the Respondents. Meanwhile, this woman owned a land and sold the same to a third person with
right of repurchase. However, when the woman died, it was Petitioner who by himself repurchased the land
and later on he executed an affidavit of sole ownership and registered the land unto himself alone.
Eventually, the other heirs (Respondent) learned of the registration so they filed an action to cancel the title.

Now Petitioner claims prescription almost on similar grounds with the previous case, i.e. the registration
constituted constructive notice to the other heirs, if not to the world.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioner is correct.

RULING:
NO! First of all, the redemption by Petitioner benefited all so that the ownership did not transfer to him alone.
The other heirs only need to reimburse him.

As to the notice, the registration by Petitioner cannot be considered as notice of the repudiation because
they were done in bad faith to deprive the other co-heirs. In fact, they were done clandestinely. One of the
co-heir in fact was in possession of the land and yet he was not informed of the pending registration nor

ousted by Petitioner. Hence, should there have been any notice, it would be during litigation when the heirs
finally learned of the registration. In that case, there is no prescription yet.

DELIMA V. CA- Repudiation of Coownership

Cancellation of old title and issuance of new one constituted an open and clear repudiation of the trust or coownership which would start the running of prescription.

FACTS:
This case is another story of sibling war over a Friar Land Estate inherited from their parent who had
acquired said land from the Government. When the parents died, Respondent Galileo allegedly paid the
remaining balance of the purchase price, and the estate tax. Later on, he executed an affidavit declaring
himself as sole owner and acquired TCT over it. 10 years after the TCT was issued, the other heirs instituted
this action for reconveyance claiming their part as co-owners.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the other heirs are still entitled to the land or are they barred by prescription.

RULING:

The other heirs are barred by prescription. How did this happen? Galileo was able to prove the 4
requirements: (1) clear and convincing evidence of repudiation (2) made known to the other owners (3)
adverse possession and open repudiation (4) for over 10 years.

What is important in this case is that the Court ruled that registration of the land would be sufficient
compliance with the notice requirement above.

TAN V. CA , CHINABANK, 172

SCRA 660
Consolidation of ownership by mortgagee after expiration of redemption period terminates co-ownership. A
co-owner who redeems a property with her own funds after such consolidation becomes the sole owner
thereof.

FACTS:
Tan Tiong Tick, married to Tan Ong Hun was the registered owner of a parcel of land and its improvements
in Binondo Manila. They had six children George Laurel, Teodora, Rosa, Rosita, Mauro Umali, and D. Annie
Tan.

The land was mortgaged to China Bank to secure payment for several obligations. Tan Tiong Tick and Tan
Ong Hun died without paying their obligations.

China Bank foreclosed on the mortgage. Two weeks before the redemption period expired, China Bank and
the Heirs of Tan Tiong Tick entered into a settlement. It provided that the heirs were given right to
repurchase even after the redemption period but before August 3, 1973.

The heirs failed to redeem before the legal redemption period so China Bank consolidated its ownership and

was issued a new TCT. However, D. Annie Tan exercised the right to repurchase pursuant to the settlement
using her personal funds. But the title to the land was registered in the name of all the heirs.

D. Annie Tan filed an action to reconvey the property to her and damages. RTC ruled that the property was
co-owned by the heirs. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not co-ownership among the heirs was dissolved by the foreclosure and consolidation of title by
the bank after the redemption period has expired?

HELD:
Yes. Since the lot and its improvement were mortgaged by the deceased parents, there can be no question
that a co-ownership existed among the heirs during the period given by law to redeem the foreclosed
property. Redemption by one during this period would have inured to the benefit of all.
The records show, however, that when the petitioner purchased the disputed property on August 30, 1974,
any co-ownership among the brothers and sisters no longer existed. The period to redeem had expired more
than one year earlier, on July 6, 1973. The respondent China Bank consolidated its ownership and a new
title was issued in the bank's name. When the heirs allowed the one year redemption period to expire without
redeeming their parents' former property and permitted the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a
new title, the co-ownership was extinguished.
Since D. Annie Tan used her personal fund to repurchase the property, she is the lawful sole owner. The
respondent China Banking Corporation is ordered to execute the deed of sale over the disputed property in
favor of the petitioner alone.

MARIANO V. CA | GOSIENGFIAO,
222 SCRA 736- Redemption by a
Co-owner
Redemption of the whole property by a co-owner within the redemption period does not terminate the coownership and does not vest in him sole ownership.

FACTS:
Francisco Gosiengfaio is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Tuguegarao. In his lifetime, he
mortgaged the land to Rural Bank of Tuguegarao to secure payment of a loan. Francisco died in without
paying the debt. His intestate heirs were: his wife Antonia and children Amparo, Carlos, Severo, Grace,
Emma, Ester, Francisco, Jr., Norma, Lina, and Jacinto.

The bank foreclosed on the mortgage but before the redemption period expired, Antonia, Emma, Lina,
Norma, Lina, Carlos and Severo executed a deed of assignment of the right of redemption in favor of
Amparo. Amparo later on sold the land to Spouses Mariano.

Grace Gosengfiao, and the other heirs excuded in the deed of assignment filed a complaint for recovery and
legal redemption with damages against spouses Mariano.

RTC decided in favor of spouses Mariano. CA for Grace Gosiengfia, et. al.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a co-owner who redeems the whole property with her own personal funds becomes the sole
owner of said property and terminates the existing state of co-ownership?

HELD:
No. Admittedly, as the property in question was mortgaged by the decedent, a co-ownership existed among
the heirs during the period given by law to redeem the foreclosed property. Redemption of the whole
property by a co-owner does not vest in him sole ownership over said property but will inure to the benefit of
all co-owners. In other words, it will not end to the existing state of co-ownership. Redemption is not a mode
of terminating a co-ownership.

Respondents have not lost their right to redeem, for in the absence of a written notification of the sale by the
vendors, the 30-day period has not even begun to run.

VILLANUEVA v. FLORENDO- Third

Party
The third party contemplated in Art. 1620 refers to those who are not heirs in succession, either
contemplated by will or by law to succeed the deceased.

FACTS:
Spouses Villanueva and Garcia, parents of the petitioners, were owners of a land in Cagayan. Garcia died
intestate, leaving her husband and children as sole and only legitimate heirs.
The spouse, without having the land partitioned, sold the western portion of the lot to the wife of one of his
children. Upon learning of the sale, the petitioners signified their intention to redeem the lot, but respondent
refused, stating that as wife of one of the legal heirs, redemption will not lie against her. RTC found in favor
of respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent is a third party against whom redemption can be exercised against,
pursuant to Art. 1620?

HELD:
Within the meaning of Art. 1620, the term "third person" or "stranger" refers to all persons who are not heirs
in succession, and by heirs are meant only those who are called either by will or the law to succeed the
deceased and who actually succeeds. In short, a third person is any one who is not a co-owner.
Respondent seller Villanueva, as co-owner and before partition, has the right to freely sell and dispose of his
undivided interest or his Ideal share but not a divided part and one with boundaries as what was done in the
case at bar.

DISSENT (Aquino): The third person term contemplated in Art. 1620, basing on the Spanish origin of the
Code, means stranger, and not merely one who is not an heir by succession.

In fact, the redemption should not run against the respondent for the reason that the land that respondent
bought formed part of the conjugal property, of which her husband, who is a legitimate heir, also owns.
Therefore, the land never transferred to the ownership or possession of third parties.

CRUZ v LEIS- Redemption and Coownership

Redemption by a co-owner doesn't terminate the co-ownership nor give her title to the whole property
subject of the co-ownership

FACTS:

Leis and Isidro married each other in 1923. Isidro subsequently acquired from the Department of Agriculture
and Natural Resources a parcel of land, which was titled in her name, with the description that she was a
widow. Leis only passed away in 1973 without executing a will.

Isidro then secured a loan from Cruz (PhP 15,000, with 5% interest) secured by a mortgage on the land from
DANR, but failed to pay on due date. Isidro executed 2 contracts in favor of Cruz: an Deed of Absolute Sale
and a Contract indicating a pacto de retro sale. Isidro still failed to repurchase the property within 1 year, so
she consolidated the ownership of the land in favor of Cruz.

When Isidro died, Cruz demanded her heirs to vacate the premises. The heirs then filed a complaint with the
RTC averring that the land was conjugal property having been purchased during their marriage. The RTC
found in favor of the heirs. The case was appealed to the CA, but the CA merely affirmed the ruling because
Cruz failed to get a judicial order to have the land consolidated in his name after failure of Isidro to comply
with the requirements of the right to repurchase (Art. 1607).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the land in question is conjugal property, and therefore subject to the rules on co-ownership?

HELD:
Although the land was purchased during the marriage, upon Leis death, the conjugal property regime
ceased, and gave Isidro an equal portion of Leis half of the property to be divided among his legitimes. Coownership of the land then began.

However, upon failure of Isidro the heirs to exercise the right to repurchase, the ownership of the land
transferred to Cruz. Despite the TCT being void for non-compliance with 1607, the ownership did not transfer
back to the heirs, for compliance with 1607 is merely for purposes of registering the title in the Torrens
System.

PAULMITAN V. CA- Co-ownership

of Property
When a co-owner sells the entire property without consent from the other co-owners, only his pro indiviso
share on the property is transferred to the buyer.

FACTS:
The dispute covers 2 lots, Lot 757 and Lot 1091, which were owned by Agatona Paulmitan. She had 2
children, Pascual and Donato. Pascuals (7) children (Alicio, Elena, Abelino, Adelina, Anita, Baking, Anito)
are the respondents and Donato and his daughter and son-in-law are petitioners.

Donato executed an Affidavit of Declaration of Heirship, adjudicating to himself Lot 757 claiming that he is
the sole surviving heir thus the OCT of Agatona was cancelled and a TCT was issued in his name. He
executed a deed of sale of Lot 1091 in favor of his daughter, Juliana. For non-payment of taxes, the lot was
forfeited and sole at a public to the Provincial Govt of Negros Occidental, however, Juliana was able to
redeem the property. Upon learning these, the children of Pascual filed w/ the CFI a complaint against
petitioners to partition the land plus damages. Petitioners defense was that the action has already
prescribed for it was filed more than 11 years after the issuance of the TCT and that Juliana has acquired
exclusive ownership thru the Deed of Sale and by redeeming the said property.

The CFI dismissed the complaint and became final and executory. With respect to Lot 1091, the court
decided in favor of respondents. They are entitled to of Lot 1091, pro indiviso. The redemption did not in
anyway prejudice their rights. The land was ordered to be partitioned and the petitioners were ordered to pay
the respondents their share of the fruits and the respondents to pay their share in the redemption of the land.
The CA affirmed the decision thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not Pascuals children and Donato and Juliana were co-owners of their mothers lot
(2) Whether or not Juliana acquired full ownership by redeeming the property

HELD:
(1) YES: When Agatona died, her estate was still unpartitioned. Art. 1078 states that Where there are 2 or
more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject
to the payment of debts of the deceased. Since Pascual and Donato were still alive when she died, they are
co-owners of the estate. When Pascual died, his children succeeded him in the co-ownership of the
property.

When Donato sold to his daughter the lot, he was only a co-owner of the same thus he can only sell his
undivided portion of the property. Art. 493 states that each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part
and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of
the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred making the buyer (Juliana) a co-owner.

(2) NO: When she redeemed the property, it did not end the co-ownership. The right of repurchase may be
exercised by a co-owner w/ respect to his/her share alone as stated in Art. 1612. But she may compel them
to reimburse her for half of the repurchase price for a co-owner has the right to compel other co-owners to
contribute to the expenses for the preservation of the thing and to taxes.

ADLAWAN V. ADLAWAN- Coownership & Ejectment

A co-owner by virtue of Art. 487 is allowed to bring an action without necessity of including all the co-owners
as plaintiffs for it is presumed to be for the benefit of all BUT if the action of the plaintiff alone, the action
should be dismissed.

FACTS:
A house and lot (lot 7226) was registered in the name of Dominador Adlawan, the father of (petitioner)
Arnelito Adlawan. He is the acknowledged illegitimate child of Dominador who is claiming that he is the sole
heir. He then adjudicated to himself the said house and lot to himself and out of generosity allowed the
siblings of his father to occupy the property provided that they vacate when asked. Time came when he
demanded that they vacate and when they refused he filed an ejectment suit against them.

His aunt and uncle on the other hand, Narcisa (70) and Emeterio (59) denied his allegations claiming that
the said lot was registered in their parents name and they had been living in the said house and lot since
birth. The only reason why the said house and lot was transferred in Dominadors name was when their
parents were in need of money for renovating their house, their parents were not qualified to obtain a loan
and since Dominador was the only one who had a college education, they executed a simulated deed of sale
in favor of Dominador.

The MTC dismissed the complaint holding that Arnelitos filiation and the settlement of the estate are
conditions precedent for the accrual of the suit. And since Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana,
her legal heirs are entitled to their share in the lot. The RTC ordered Narcisa and Emeterio to turn over the
possession of the lot to Arnelito. It also granted the motion of execution which was opposed by the nephew
and nieces of Graciana who claim that they have a share in the lot.

The CA reinstated the decision of the MTC holding that Arnelito and the heirs of Graciana are co-heirs thus
he cannot eject them from the property via unlawful detainer. Thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Arnelito can validly maintain the ejectment suit

HELD:
NO. The theory of succession invoked by Arnelito would prove that he is not the sole heir of Dominador.
Since he was survived was his wife, upon his death, Arnelito and Graciana became co-owners of the lot.
Upon her death, her share passed on to her relatives by consanguinity thus making them co-owners as well.

Petitioner contends that Art. 487 allows him to file the instant petition. (Art. 487. Any one of the co-owners
may bring an action in ejectment.) It is true that a co-owner may bring such an action w/o necessity of joining
all the co-owners as plaintiffs because it is presumed to be instituted for the benefit of all BUT if the action is
for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, the action should be dismissed.
Since petitioner brought the suit in his name and for his benefit alone and his repudiation of the ownership of
the other heirs, the instant petition should be dismissed.

SERING v. PLAZO- Action for

Ejectment
Anyone of the co-owners of an immovable may bring an action in ejectment.

FACTS:
Sering won an ejectment suit against Spouses Plazo and Suan. On appeal with the CFI, respondents
learned that Sering is not the sole owner of the property and they moved to implead the other co-owners
because they think that they are indispensable parties to the case. Court granted and ordered Sering to
amend complaint.
Due to the failure of the petitioner to amend the complaint, the case was dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether the other co-owners are indispensable to the ejecment case

HELD:

No, according to Art 478 Anyone of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment (whether the action is
forcible entry or unlawful detainer). The matter to be determined is the prior physical possession of the
plaintiff which was correctly alleged.

SI v. CA- Right of Redemption

After physical division of a lot the community ownership is terminated and right of redemption is no longer
available.

FACTS:
Spouses Armada transferred their property to the names of their three sons namely, Crisotomo, Jose and
Severo. Crisostomo through Cresencia (atty-in-fact) executed a deed of sale in favor Anita Si.
Spouses Jose Armada (other brother) filed a complaint to annul the sale on the ground that there was no
written notice of such sale whereas the deed stated that the co-owners are not interested in buying the
land. Further, there was misrepresentation on the citizenship of Cresencia is a Filipino citizen.
Petitioners claimed that there was really no co-ownership since the parents executed three deeds of sale
assigning specific properties to the brothers. Since there is no-ownership it follows that there is no right to
redemption. Petitioners pointed out that it was only because the brothers failed to submit a subdivision plan
which is the reason why there is only one certificate of title.
Lower court dismissed the petition. CA reversed and said that co-ownership still exists and that the land was
undivided. Petitioners filed a motion for new trial on the basis that there was annotation at the back of the
original TCT due to the sale in favor of the brothers. CA denied because the reglementary period had lapsed
and the decision has become final and executory.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents are co-owners and that they are entitled to right of redemption based on
Art 1623 of NCC.

RULING:
1. Trial court was correct in finding that the parents already partitioned the property which was registered
with the RD. Every portion conveyed and transferred was definitely described and segregated with
corresponding technical description. After this division co-ownership already ceased. Hence, there is no right
to redemption available to the respondents.

2. There was an actual notice of the impending sale and Jode even acknowledged such when he told his
brother Crisostomo in a letter Well you are the king of yourselves, and you can sell your share of Leveriza.
Written notice is no longer necessary when there is actual notice.

NAKPIL & SONS v. CA

To be exempt from liability due to an act of God, the engineer/architect/contractor must not have been
negligent in the construction of the building.

FACTS:
Private respondents Philippine Bar Association (PBA) a non-profit organization formed under the
corporation law decided to put up a building in Intramuros, Manila. Hired to plan the specifications of the
building were Juan Nakpil & Sons, while United Construction was hired to construct it. The proposal was
approved by the Board of Directors and signed by the President, Ramon Ozaeta. The building was
completed in 1966.

In 1968, there was an unusually strong earthquake which caused the building heavy damage, which led the
building to tilt forward, leading the tenants to vacate the premises. United Construction took remedial
measures to sustain the building.

PBA filed a suit for damages against United Construction, but United Construction subsequently filed a suit
against Nakpil and Sons, alleging defects in the plans and specifications.

Technical Issues in the case were referred to Mr. Hizon, as a court appointed Commissioner. PBA moved for
the demolition of the building, but was opposed. PBA eventually paid for the demolition after the building
suffered more damages in 1970 due to previous earthquakes. The Commissioner found that there were
deviations in the specifications and plans, as well as defects in the construction of the building.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an act of God (fortuitous event) exempts from liability parties who would otherwise be due to
negligence?

HELD:
Art. 1723 dictates that the engineer/architect and contractor are liable for damages should the building
collapse within 15 years from completion.

Art. 1174 of the NCC, however, states that no person shall be responsible for events, which could not be
foreseen. But to be exempt from liability due to an act of God, the ff must occur:

1) cause of breach must be independent of the will of the debtor

2) event must be unforeseeable or unavoidable
3) event must be such that it would render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation
4) debtor must be free from any participation or aggravation of the industry to the creditor.

In the case at bar, although the damage was ultimately caused by the earthquake which was an act of God,
the defects in the construction, as well as the deviations in the specifications and plans aggravated the
damage, and lessened the preventive measures that the building would otherwise have had.

BENITO vs. SAQUITAN-RUIZ

If a person claiming to be the owner of a wrongfully registered parcel of land is in actual possession, then his
right to seek reconveyance does not prescribe.

FACTS:
Petitioners Horacio and Felisa Benito, originally, bought the land from Francisco Morales and instituted
ejectment proceedings against all of the other squatters in the land. Respondent, Agapita Saquitan-Ruiz
bought a portion of the land from petitioner on a promise to contribute Php 6000 for the ejectment
proceedings which will serve as the consideration for the sale. On 17 April 1979, a Deed of Absolute Sale
was issued in favor of respondent, however, he failed to pay his obligation of Php 6000. Thus, the petitioner
never caused the issuance of the certificate of title despite demands of the respondent for such issuance.
Instead, petitioner subdivided the lot where respondents land was located into five while the latter continued
to possess such land. Petitioners, then borrowed Php75,000 from a certain Basilia Dela Cruz, who later
sued them for collection. For failure to pay the borrowed money, a writ of execution was issued by the RTC
and the disputed petitioners land was sold to Dela Cruz at a public auction, in which the latter was the
highest bidder. On 25 March 1996, the assailed Certificate of Title was issued to Dela Cruz but it was only
on 27 May 1999 that the Certificate of Final Deed of Sale was issued. On 1 April 1999, respondent filed the
case for specific performance with declaration of nullity of titles and damages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners action to quiet title had already prescribed?

RULING: No.
The respondent is in possession of the disputed property. If a person claiming to be the owner of a
wrongfully registered parcel of land is in actual possession, the right to seek reconveyance does not
prescribe. A petition for the quieting of title, although essentially an action for reconveyance, should not be
dismissed on the ground of prescription, if it is alleged that the plaintiff is in possession of the property.
Furthermor

e, the action was seasonably filed since Dela Cruzs right to its conveyance and possession was subject to
the 12-month redemption perion provided under section 33 of rule 39 of the Rules of court. In this case, only
a month had passed.

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST

CO. V ALEJO
A cloud on a title is defined as a semblance of title which appears in some legal form but which is in fact
unfounded. Where a title was previously held null and void already, an action to quiet title is not the proper
remedy because the TCT (as basis of the right) is not, on its face or otherwise, valid in the first place.

FACTS:
Spouses Raul and Cristina Acampado obtained loans from Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company in the
amounts of 5k and 2k. As security for the payment, Spouses Acampados executed in favor of the bank a
Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land registered in their names. Subsequently a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of the TCT of the spouses was filed by Sy Tan Se in the RTC of Valenzuela.
Despite being the mortgagee of the real property, the bank was not made a party to the said civil
case(complaint for declaration of nullity of TCT.) They werent notified as well.

The spouses defaulted in the payment of their loan and extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings were initiated.
The bank submitted the highest and winning bid. A certificate of sale was issued in their favor.
When they were about to get their TCT from the Register of Deeds, petitioner was informed of the existence
of the decision in the aforementioned civil case (complaint for declaration of nullity of TCT) declaring the
Spouses Acampadoss TCT null and void.

The bank filed with the CA a petition for the annulment of the RTC Decision. The CA dismissed their petition
and ruled that the bank should have filed a petition for relief from judgment or an action for quieting of title.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a petition for annulment of judgment is the proper remedy available to the bank
2. Whether or not the judgment of the trial court (declaring the Spouses Acampados TCT null and void)
should be declared null and void

HELD Both Yes

1. Petition for annulment of judgment was the proper remedy available to the bank. It precisely alleged that
Sy Tan Se purposely concealed the case by excluding petitioner as a defendant to the civil case even if he
was an indispensable party. This deprived the bank of its duly registered property right without due process
of the law. The allegation of extrinsic fraud may be the basis for annulling a judgment.

Petition for relief (what the CA recommended) was not available to the bank since it was never a party to the
civil case.

An action for quieting of the title was also not available to the bank. An action for quieting of title is filed only
when there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein. A cloud on a title is defined as a
semblance of title which appears in some legal form but which is in fact unfounded. The subject judgment
cannot be considered as a cloud on petitioners title or interest over the real property covered by TCT, which
does not even have a semblance of being a title.

It would not be proper to consider the subject judgment as a cloud that would warrant the filing of an action
to quiet title because to do so would require the court hearing the action to modife or interfere with the
judgment of another co-equal court. Well-entrenched in our jurisdiction is the doctrine that our court has no
power to do so, as that action may lead to confusion and seriously hinder the administration of justice.
Clearly, an action for quieting of title is not an appropriate remedy in this case.

Bank cant also intervene to a case that he has no knowledge of.

2. The judgment of the trial court should also be declared null and void because the bank, which is an
indispensable party, was not impleaded in the civil case.

The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actuations of the court null and void, for want
of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.

ROBLES v. CA- Action for quieting

of title | Free patent
FACTS
Petitioners (all surnamed Robles) trace their ownership of a parcel of land (9,985 sq m.) to Leon and Silvino,
their grandfather and father, respectively. Upon Silvinos death in 1942, said petitioners inherited the property
and started cultivation thereof. Hilario Robles, private respondent and half-brother of the petitioners, was
entrusted with the payment of land taxes due on the property. In 1962, Hilario caused both the cancellation
of the tax declaration covering the property and its transfer to Ballane (his father-in-law). Ballane mortgaged
the property and, for some reason, the tax declaration thereon was subsequently named to Hilario. The latter
then mortgaged the property to private respondent Rural Bank of Cardona. The mortgage was foreclosed
and said bank acquired by public bidding the property which was then sold by it to the spouses Santos.
Petitioners learned of the mortgage only in 1987. Subsequently, the action was filed, impleading also as
parties-defendant the Director of Lands and the District Land Officer sue to an issuance of a free patent in
favour of spouses Santos. Trial court ruled in favour of petitioners, declaring null the patent, declaring the
heirs of Silvino absolute owners of the subject land. CA reversed on the ground that petitioners no longer
had title to the property.

ISSUES
(1) whether petitioners have the appropriate title essential to an action for quieting of title (relevant issue) and
whether title claimed by respondents is valid
(2) whether REM between Hilario and RBC is valid
(3) whether issuance of free patent is valid

HELD
(1) Petitioners have valid title by virtue of their continued and open occupation and possession as owners of
the subject property.
In this case, the cloud on petitioners title emanate from the apparent validity of the free patent issued and
the tax declarations and other evidence in favour of respondents ultimately leading to the transfer of the
property to spouses Santos. WRT title of the spouses Santos, such is deemed invalid/inoperative insofar as
it is rooted in the title and appropriation of Hilario. Hilario could not have prejudiced the rights of his co-heirs
as co-owners of the real estate. He must have first repudiated the ownership clearly and evidently. CA failed
to consider the irregularities in the transactions involving the property. No instrument/deed of conveyance
was presented to show any transaction between petitioners and Ballane or even Hilario.

(2) Mortgage was only valid insofar as Hilarios undivided interest is concerned there being co-ownership
between the heirs. Court also delved into gross negligence which amounted to bad faith on part of bank by
not exercising due diligence in verifying the ownership of the land considering such was unregistered.
Free patent was also not valid, the land in question having been converted ipso jure to private land by virtue
of the adverse possession in the concept of owners since.

(3) 1916 by the petitioners. Issuance of patents covering private lands is out of the jurisdiction of the Director
of Lands or Bureau of Lands.

Hence, the sale of the property in favour of the spouses Santos WRT the share of Hiario was valid but the
patent issued was null.

GAPACAN V. OMIPET, 387 SCRA

383
Issues of property rights can be determined in an action to quiet title.

FACTS:
Paicat Gapacan is the primitive possessor of an unregistered land in Mt. Province, divided into 3 parcels of
riceland and another planted to camote and declared by him for taxation purposes. He had two children
Maria and Antonio. Antonio left for a long while to try his luck in the mines Benguet. Maria remained, took
care of their father and eventually took over the cultivation of the land.

Antonio Gapacan returned to and executed an Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property showing that the
property had been transferred to him by his sister Maria Gapacan-Omipet (Omipet) making him in effect the
legal owner of the property in question. Since then, Antonio Gapacans family (Gapacans) had been
occupying and cultivating the property.

Sometime in 1992, Omipet hired laborers to clear and cultivate portions of the disputed property. Gapacans
prohibited them Gapacans and ordered the defendants to vacate the land and restore possession to
plaintiffs.

Omipet then filed an action to quiet title in RTC and that she be declared the lawful owner. RTC adjudged
that Gapacans have right of possession over the land. On appeal CA, declared that the land is common
property of both Omipet and Gapacans and ordered its partition.
Both parties appealed. Gapacans alleged that CA cannot declare that the land is common property since it
deviates from the cause of action in the trial court. Omipets appeal is mostly factual.

ISSUE: Whether or not property rights can be decided in an

action to quiet title?
HELD: Yes.
Art. 476 of the Civil Code provides that an action to quiet title may be brought when there exists a cloud on
the title to a real property or any interest therein. In the case of Bautista v. Exconde, we held that the
property owner whose property rights were being disturbed may ask a competent court for a proper
determination of the respective rights of the party-claimants, not only to place things in their proper place,
that is, to require the one who has no right to refrain from acts injurious to the peaceful enjoyment of the

property not only of the rightful owner but also for the benefit of both with the view of dissipating any cloud of
doubt over the property. It goes without saying therefore that the appellate court in resolving the present
controversy is well within its authority to adjudicate on the respective rights of the parties, that is, to pass
upon the ownership of the property; hence to declare the same as common property.

As to Omipets appeal, SC merely affirmed the findings of the trial court that she did not present sufficient
evidence to overcome Gapacans better right to possession. SC ultimately ruled that CA was correct in its
determination that the land in dispute is common property and should be partitioned.

OBLEA V. CA|ESTEBAN, 244

SCRA 101
FACTS:
The lot in issue was originally registered in the names of Manuel Melencio, Pura Melencio, Wilfredo Wico
and Mariabelle Wico. But was subsequently re-registered in the name of Ramon Melencio (son of deceased
Manuel Melencio), Pura Melencio and the Wicos via a deed of sale.

On 6 June 1958 subject lot was bought by private respondent Juan S. Esteban from Mauricio Ramos who
claimed to have acquired the property from Ursula Melencio, the alleged administratrix of the estate of
Manuel and Pura Melencio.

Meanwhile, petitioner Romeo V. Oblea leased a building located on the subject lot from a certain Marius
Esteban, an alleged son of private respondent Juan S. Esteban. Oblea eventually bought from Marius the lot
on which the building stood. As a consequence, on 4 July 1991 Juan Esteban filed an ejectment suit against
petitioner Oblea.

MTC decided for Juan Esteban and ordered Oblea to vacate and pay arrears. On appeal, RTC affirmed
MTC.

On 3 June 1993, the registered owners (Ramon Melencio, Pura Melencio and Wilfredo Wico and Mariabelle
Wico) sold the disputed lot to petitioner Oblea. Afterwards, Oblea together with the registered owners filed
before the RTC an action for quieting of title against Juan Esteban. They contended that the deeds of sale
executed by Mauricio Ramos in favor of Juan Esteban and by Ursula Melencio in favor of Mauricio Ramos
were a nullity.

Meanwhile, the ejectment case was appealed thrice to the CA but all were denied.

In the appeal to the SC, Oblea asserts that the subsequent sale to him by the registered owners is a
supervening event that gave him a better right of possession and ownership. Hence the judgment of eviction
can no longer be enforced.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a subsequent action to quiet title in the RTC divests the MTC of its jurisdiction over an
ejectment case?

HELD:
No.The sole issue in an action for unlawful detainer is physical or material possession, i.e., possession de
facto and not possession de jure. The pendency of an action for quieting of title before the RTC does not
divest the MTC of its jurisdiction to proceed with the ejectment case over the same property. The subsequent
acquisition of ownership by petitioners is not a supervening event that will bar the execution of the judgment
in said unlawful detainer case, the fact remaining that when judgment was rendered by the MTC in the
ejectment case, petitioner Oblea was a mere possessor of the subject lot.
Similarly, the fact that petitioners instituted a separate action for quieting of title is not a valid reason for
defeating the execution of the summary remedy of ejectment. On the contrary., it bolsters the conclusion that
the eviction case did not deal with the issue of ownership which was precisely the subject matter of the
action for quieting of title before the RTC. With the finality of the decision in the ejectment case, execution in
favor of the prevailing party has become a matter of right; its implementation mandatory. It cannot be
avoided.

VDA. DE AVILES v. CA
An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be brought for the purpose of settling a boundary dispute.

FACTS:
Eduardo Aviles, the predecessor of the petitioners is the bother of defendant Camilo. They inherited their
lands from their parents and have agreed to subdivide the same amongst themselves. The area alloted (sic)
to Eduardo Aviles is 16,111 square meters more or less, to Anastacio Aviles is 16,214 square meters more
or less, while the area alloted to defendant Camilo Aviles is 14,470 square meters more or less.

Defendants land composed of the riceland portion of his land is 13,290 square meters, the fishpond portion
is 500 square meters and the residential portion is 680 square meters, or a total of 14,470 square meters.

The Petitioners claim that they are the owners of the fish pond which they claim is within their area.
Defendant Camilo Aviles asserted a color of title over the northern portion of the property with an area of
approximately 1,200 square meters by constructing a bamboo fence (thereon) and moving the earthen dikes,
thereby molesting and disturbing the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs over said portion.

Petitioners say that the fences were created to unduly encroach to their property but the defendant said that
he merely reconstructed the same.

Petitioners brought an action to quiet title but were denied thus this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioners filed the right action

RULING:
No, Petitioners filed the wrong action. This is obviously a boundary dispute and as such the action must fail.

Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is, in truth
and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may
be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon a title to real property or any interest
therein.

Petitioners fail to point out any any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding that could been a
cloud to their title. In fact, both plaintiffs and defendant admitted the existence of the agreement of partition
dated June 8, 1957 and in accordance therewith, a fixed area was allotted to them and that the only
controversy is whether these lands were properly measured.

A special civil action for quieting of title is not the proper remedy for settling a boundary dispute, and that
petitioners should have instituted an ejectment suit instead. An action for forcible entry, whenever warranted
by the period prescribed in Rule 70, or for recovery of possession de facto, also within the prescribed period,
may be availed of by the petitioners, in which proceeding the boundary dispute may be fully threshed out.

GALLAR v. HUSAIN
If the action is brought by the one who is in possession of the land, the action is imprescriptible; otherwise, it
could prescribe.

FACTS:

Husains in this case are the heirs of Teodoro Husain. Teodoro Husain sold the land under dispute for 30
pesos to Serapio Chichirita with the right to repurchase within 6 years. Teodoro transferred his right to his
sister, Graciana Husain. Graciana paid the redemption price and later sold the land to Elias Gallar for a
cattle. Possession of the land, together with the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title of Teodoro Husain,
was delivered on the same occasion to Gallar, who since then has been in possession of the land. A couple
of years after, Gallar filed this suit in the Court of Instance of Iloilo on October 10, 1960 to compel
Hermenegilda and Bonifacio Husain, as heirs of Teodoro Husain, to execute a deed of conveyance in his
favor so that he could get a transfer certificate of title. He also asked for damages. The Husains countered
by saying that Graciana already paid the redemption price thus their father had already reacquired
ownership over the same. They also claim that the action of Elias has already PRESCRIBED.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not ownership was transferred to Gallar?
2) Whether or not the action has already prescribed?

RULING:
1) YES, ownership has been transferred to Gallar. The right of repurchase may be exercised only by the
vendor in whom the right is recognized by contract or by any person to whom the right may have been
transferred. Graciana Husain must, therefore, be deemed to have acquired the land in her own right, subject
only to Teodoro Husain's right of redemption. As the new owner she had a perfect right to dispose of the
land as she in fact did when she exchanged it for a cattle with Gallar.

2) NO, the action is imprescriptible. This action is not for specific performance; all it seeks is to quiet title, to
remove the cloud cast on appellee's ownership as a result of appellant's refusal to recognize the sale made
by their predecessor. And, as plaintiff-appellee is in possession of the land, the action is imprescriptible.
Appellant's argument that the action has prescribed would be correct if they were in possession as the action
to quiet title would then be an action for recovery of real property which must be brought within the statutory
period of limitation governing such actions.

PINGOL V. COURT OF APPEALS

A vendee in an oral contract to convey land who had made part payment thereof, entered upon the land and
had made valuable improvements thereon is entitled to bring suit to clear his title against the vendor who
had refused to transfer the title to him. It is not necessary that the vendee should have an absolute title, an
equitable title being sufficient to clothe him with personality to bring an action to quiet title.

FACTS:
In 1969, Pingol, the owner of a lot (Lot No. 3223) in Caloocan City, executed a DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE
OF ONE-HALF OF AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF [his] PARCEL OF LAND in favor of Donasco (private
respondent), payable in 6 years.

In 1984, Donasco died and was only able to pay P8,369 plus P2,000 downpayment, leaving a balance of
P10,161. The heirs of Donasco remained in possession of such lot and offered to settle the balance with
Pingol. However, Pingol refused to accept the offer and demanded a larger amount. Thus, the heirs of
Donasco filed an action for specific performance (with Prayer for Writ of Prelim. Injunction, because Pingol
were encroaching upon Donascos lot). Pingol averred that the sale and transfer of title was conditional upon
the full payment of Donasco (contract to sell, not contract of sale). With Donascos breach of the contract in
1976 and death in 1984, the sale was deemed cancelled, and the heirs continuous occupancy was only
being tolerated by Pingol.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Pingol can refuse to transfer title to Donasco
(2) Whether or not Donasco has the right to quiet title

RULING:
(1) No. The contract between Pingol and Donasco is a contract of sale and not a contract to sell. The acts of
the parties, contemporaneous and subsequent to the contract, clearly show that the parties intended an
absolute deed of sale; the ownership of the lot was transferred to the Donasco upon its actual (upon

Donascos possession and construction of the house) and constructive delivery (upon execution of the
contract). The delivery of the lot divested Pingol of his ownership and he cannot recover the title unless the
contract is resolved or rescinded under Art. 1592 of NCC. It states that the vendee may pay even after the
expiration of the period stipulated as long as no demand for rescission has been made upon him either
judicially or by notarial act. Pingol neither did so. Hence, Donasco has equitable title over the property.

(2) Although the complaint filed by the Donascos was an action for specific performance, it was actually an
action to quiet title. A cloud has been cast on the title, since despite the fact that the title had been
transferred to them by the execution of the deed of sale and the delivery of the object of the contract, Pingol
adamantly refused to accept the payment by Donascos and insisted that they no longer had the obligation to
transfer the title.

Donasco, who had made partial payments and improvements upon the property, is entitled to bring suit to
clear his title against Pingol who refused to transfer title to him. It is not necessary that Donasco should have
an absolute title, an equitable title being sufficient to clothe him with personality to bring an action to quiet
title.

Prescription cannot also be invoked against the Donascos because an action to quiet title to property in
ONEs POSSESSION is imprescriptible.

TITONG v. CA
For one to file an action to quiet title to a parcel of land, the requisites in Art 476 of the NCC must be
complied with meaning there should be an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance setting forth the cloud or
doubt over the title. Otherwise, the action to be filed can either be ejectment, forcible entry, unlawful detainer,
accion reivindicatoria or accion publiciana.

FACTS:

A 20,592 square meter parcel of land located at Barrio Titiong, Masbate is the subject property being
disputed in this case. The property is being claimed by 2 contestants, however legal title over the property
can only be given to one of them.

The case originated from an action for quieting of title filed by petitioner Mario Titong. The RTC of Masbate
decided in favor of private respondents, Vicente Laurio and Angeles Laurio as the true and lawful owners of
the disputed land. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Titong asserts that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel of land with an area of 3.2800 hectares and
declared for taxation purposes. He claims that on three separate occasions, private resps, with their hired
laborers, forcibly entered a portion of the land containing an approximate area of 2 hectares and began
plowing the same under pretext of ownership. On the other hand, private resps denied the claim and said
that the subject land formed part of the 5.5 hectare agricultural land which they had purchased from their
predecessor-in-interest, Pablo Espinosa.

Titong identified Espinosa as the his adjoining owner asserting that no controversy had sprouted between
them for 20 years until the latter sold lot 3749 to V. Laurio. The boundary between the land sold to Espinosa
and what remained of Titongs property was the old Bugsayon river. When Titong employed Lerit as his
tenant, he instructed the latter to change the course of the old river and direct the flow of water to the lowland
at the southern portion of Titongs property, thus converting the old river into a Riceland.

Private resps, on the other hand, denied claim of Titongs, saying that the area and boundaries of disputed
land remained unaltered during the series of conveyances prior to its coming into his hands. Accdg to him,
Titong first declared land for taxation purposes which showed that the land had an area of 5.5 hectares and
was bounded on the north by the B. River; on the east by property under ownership by Zaragoza, and on the
west by property owned by De la Cruz. He also alleges that Titong sold property to Verano. The latter
reacquired the property pursuant to mutual agreement to repurchase the same.
However, the property remained in Titongs hands only for 4 days because he sold it to Espinosa. It then
became a part of the estate of Espinosas wife, late Segundina Espinosa. Later on, her heirs executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Simultaneous Sale whereby the 5.5 hectares was sold to Laurio for
5,000 pesos. In all these conveyances, the area and boundaries of the property remained exactly the same
as those appearing in the name of Titongs.

The court found out that 2 surveys were made of the property. First survey was made by Titong, while the
second was the relocation survey ordered by the lower court. Because of which, certain discrepancies
surfaced. Contrary to Titongs allegation, he was actually claiming 5.9789 hectares, the total areas of lot nos
3918, 3918-A and 3606. The lot 3479 pertaining to Espinosas was left with only an area of 4.1841 hectares
instead of the 5.5 hectares sold by Titong to him.

Apprised of the discrepancy, private resps filed a protest before Bureau of Lands against 1st survey, and
filing a case for alteration of boundaries before the MTC, proceedings of which were suspended because of
instant case.

Private resps. Avers that Titong is one of the four heirs of his mother, Leonida Zaragoza. In the Extrajudicial
Settlement with Sale of Estate of late Zaragoza, the heirs adjudicated unto themselves the 3.6 hectares
property of the deceased. The property was bounded by the north by Verano, on the east by Bernardo
Titong, on the south by the Bugsayon River and on the west by Benigno Titong.
Instead of reflecting only .9000 hectares as his rightful share in the extrajud settlement, Titongs share
bloated to 2.4 hectares. It then appeared to Laurio that Titong encroached upon his property and declared it
as part of his inheritance.

The boundaries were likewise altered so that it was bounded on the north by Verano, on the east by B.
Titong, on the south by Espinosa and on the west by Adolfo Titong. Laurio also denied that Titong diverted
course of the B. river after he had repurchased the land from Verano because land was immediately sold to
Espinosa thereafter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Titong is the rightful owner of the subject property

RULING: NO
The remedy for quieting of title may be availed of under the circumstances mentioned in Art 476 of the NCC
wherein it says that action to quiet title may be made as a remedial or preventive measure. Under 476, a
claimant must show that there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which casts a
cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon owners title to or interest in real property. The ground for filing a
complaint for quieting title must be instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding.
In the case at bar, Titong failed to allege that there was an instrument, claim etc be clouded over his
property. Through his allegations, what Titong imagined as clouds cast on his title were Laurios alleged acts
of physical intrusion into his purported property. The grounds mentioned are for action for forcible entry and
not quieting title.

In addition, the case was considered to be a boundary dispute. The RTC and CA correctly held that when
Titong sold the 5.5 hectare land to Espinosa, his rights and possession ceased and were transferred to
Laurio upon its sale to the latter.

Thus, it is now a contract of sale wherein it is a contract transferring dominion and other real rights in the
thing sold. Titong also cannot rely on the claim of prescription as ordinary acquisitive prescription requires
possession in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.

VICENTE SAPTO VS. FABIANA

Actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible.

FACTS:
The subject property was originally owned by Sapto (this Sapto was a Moro, so only one name) and located
in Alambre, Toril, Davao City. He died, leaving three sons Samuel, Constancio, and Ramon. The latter
predeceased his brothers, leaving no heirs. Samuel and Constancio executed a deed of sale for a portion of
said property in favour of Fabiana in consideration of P240.00. The sale was approved by the governor of
Davao but was never registered. The property was transferred to Fabiana and from then on he enjoyed
possession from 1931 until the case was filed.

Constancio died with no issue, leaving Samuel as sole administrator of the property. Upon the latters death,
his widow and two children filed the present action for recovery of the parcel of land sold by their
predecessors to defendant. The CFI held that although the sale between the Sapto brothers and Fabiana
was never registered, it was binding valid and binding upon the parties and the vendors heirs. The CFI also
ordered the petitioners to execute the necessary deed of conveyance in favour of the defendant.

Hence this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CFIs order of conveyance in favour of Fabiana was valid.

HELD:
The SC first affirmed the validity of the sale between the Sapto brothers and Fabiana, ruling, that even
though it was never registered the sale was valid, binding, and effective upon the heirs of the vendor.
According to the court, actual notice of the sale served as registration. Futher, that the transfer and
possession of the property was a clear indication of the validity of the sale.

Regarding the issue on the validity of the order of conveyance, the SC ruled that it was valid. In assailing the
order, the Sapto heirs claimed that the CFI cannot order the conveyance because the defendants cause of
action had already prescribed.

The SC ruled however, that the action for conveyance was actually one to quiet title. In ruling so, the SC
cited American jurisprudence and Art. 480 of the New Civil Code, which states, that actions to quiet title to
property in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible.
The judgement is affirmed, cost against appellants.

AGUIRRE V. PHENANG
In specification, if both parties are in good faith, the principal owner may acquire such property, provided that
he pay reimbursements made by the laborer for his expenses. Without reimbursements, there is an unjust
enrichment in favor of the petitioner.

FACTS:
Spouses Aldaba sold to Jesus Aguirre a circular bolted steel tank for Php900, which was not physically
possessed by petitioner due to prevention by the municipality where the tank was located. The spouses sold
again the same tank to Zosimo Gabriel for the same price, who sold it to Leonora and Company for
Php2,500, who made an improvement (investment and expenses) thereto worth Php11,299 and sold it
Nassco (National Shipyards and Steel Corporation) for Php14,500. Aguirre filed a case against the spouses
and L&C where it was held that he is the absolute owner. While the above case was pending, L&C filed a
case against Nassco for its non-payment, with petitioner as intervenor. It was held that petitioner must

reimburse L&C Php11,299 or upon failure to deliver, Nassco must pay petitioner Php900 and L&C
Php14500.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner may acquire such property without reimbursements.

RULING:
Since there was alteration of such tank, Specification took place. The court found that L&C was in good faith
when it made the improvements over the property. Since both parties are in good faith, the principal owner
may acquire such property, provided that pays reimbursements made by the laborer for his expenses.
Without reimbursements, there is an unjust enrichment in favor of the petitioner.

SIARI VALLEY ESTATE INC. V.

FILEMON LUCASAN
If the commingling of 2 things is made in bad faith, the one responsible for it will lose his share.

FACTS:
Siari Valley Inc. brought action to recover 200 heads of cattle that were driven from its lands to that of
Lucasans. Lucasan however argued that although there was commixtion of cattle, Siari already retrieved its
animals. The CFI of Zamboanga decided in favor of Siari thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Lucasan was in bad faith thus should lose his share in the commixtion

HELD: YES
Although there was no actual evidence that all 823 missing animals were taken by Lucasan or his men, on 2
occasions however, his men drove away 30 heads of cattle. It is not erroneous to believe that the others
must have also been driven away applying by analogy the principle that one who stole a part of the stolen
money must have taken also the larger sum lost by the offended party.

Art. 382 (now Art. 473) of the CC states that if the commingling of 2 things is made in bad faith, the one
responsible for it will lose his share thus since Lucasan is in bad faith, he should lose his share in the
commixtion.

> The SC ordered Lucasan to deliver the 321 heads that had been entrusted to his care to Siari; pay
damages for the 400 heads he sold since 1946; ordered to allow Siari to round up all the buffaloes that may
be found on its cattle ranch

SANTOS v. BERNABE
If two things of identical or dissimilar nature are mixed and the owners of the things are in good faith, OR if
the mixture occurs accidentally and cannot be separated without injury, each owner shall acquire a right in
the mixture proportionate to the part belonging to him, according to the value of the things mixed or
comingled.

FACTS:

Santos deposited 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay in the warehouse of Bernabe. At the same time,
Tiongson also deposited 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay. The share of Tiongson and Santos were mixed
together and cannot be separated.

Later on and for some unknown reason, Tiongson files a case against Bernabe to recover the 1,026 cavans
and 9 kilos of palay deposited in Bernabes warehouse. So Tiongson files for a petition for a writ of
attachment and the Court granted it. Bernabes properties were attached, including only 924 cavans of rice
and 31 kilos of palay. These were sold at a public auction and the proceeds were delivered to Tiongson.

Santos tried to intervene in the attachment of the palay but then the sheriff had already proceeded with the
attachment, so Santos files a complaint. He says that Tiongson cannot claim the 924 cavans of palay; he
says that by asking for the attachment of the properties, Tiongson is claiming that the cavans of rice all
belonged to Bernabe and not to him.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Tiongson can claim the 924 cavans of rice as his own.

HELD:
No, both Tiongson and Santos must divide the cavans and palay proportionately.

The cavans belonging to Santos, having been mixed with those belonging to Tiongson, the following rule
prescribed is Article 381 of the Civil Code: If, by will of one of their owners, two things of identical or
dissimilar nature are mixed, or if the mixture occurs accidentally, if in the latter case, the things cannot be
separated without injury, each owner shall acquire a right in the mixture proportionate to the part belonging
to him, according to the value of the things mixed or comingled.

The number of kilos in a cavan not having been determined, the Court took the proportion only of the 924
cavans of palay which were attached andsold, therby giving Santos, who deposited 778 cavans, 398.49 and
Tiongson, who deposited 1,026 cavans, 525.51, or the value thereof at the rate of 3Php per cavan.

JAGUALING V. CA | EDUAVE, 194

SCRA 607
FACTS:
Eduave claims that she inherited a parcel of land from her parents, which later increased in size due to
erosion caused by typhoon Ineng. In 1973 Jagualing asked her permission to plant corn and bananas
provided that they prevent squatters to come to the area.

The land was the subject of a reconveyance case between Janita Eduave vs. Heirs of Antonio Factura which
was the subject of judgment by compromise in view of the amicable settlement of the parties. In the
amicable settlement the heirs of Antonio Factura (Jagualing), ceded a portion of the land with an area of
1,289 square meters more or less to Eduave.

Later, Jagualing denied the claim of ownership of Eduave, and asserted that they are the real owners of the
land in litigation containing an area of 18,000 square meters more or less. According to them, they acquired
the land by acquisitive prescription since they have occupied the land since 1969. They presented tax
declarations and photos of actual occupation to prove claim of prescription.

Eduave filed an action to quiet title and/or remove a cloud over the property in question against Jagualing.
RTC dismissed the complaint for failure of Eduave to establish by preponderance of evidence their claim of
ownership over the land in litigation and that the land is a delta thus is part of public domain not susceptible
of appropriation.

The CA found that the island was formed by the branching off of the river and subsequent thereto the
accumulation of alluvial deposits. Basing its ruling on Articles 463 and 465 of the Civil Code the Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, declared private respondents as the lawful and true owners
of the land subject of this case and ordered petitioners to vacate the premises and deliver possession of the
land to private respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Jagualing acquired the island thru prescription?

HELD: No.
From the evidence thus submitted, CA had sufficient basis for the finding that the property of Eduave actually
existed and was identified prior to the branching off or division of the river. The CA, therefore, properly
applied Article 463 of the Civil Code which allows the ownership over a portion of land separated or isolated
by river movement to be retained by the owner thereof prior to such separation or isolation. The parcel of
land in question is part of an island that formed in a non-navigable and non-flotable river; from a small mass
of eroded or segregated outcrop of land, it increased to its present size due to the gradual and successive
accumulation of alluvial deposits. In this regard the CA also did not err in applying Article 465 of the Civil
Code. Under this provision, the island belongs to the owner of the land along the nearer margin as sole
owner thereof; or more accurately, because the island is longer than the property of private respondents,
they are deemed ipso jure to be the owners of that portion which corresponds to the length of their property
along the margin of the river.

It is well-settled that lands formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner. This preferential right is, under
Article 465, also granted the owners of the land located in the margin nearest the formed island for the
reason that they are in the best position to cultivate and attend to the exploitation of the same. In fact, no
specific act of possession over the accretion is required. If, however, the riparian owner fails to assert his
claim thereof, the same may yield to the adverse possession of third parties, as indeed even accretion to
land titled under the torrens system must itself still be registered.
However, Jagualing failed to prove adverse possession of the land for the required period and their
possession cannot be considered in good faith since by their admission they have recognized Eduaves
ownership over the land. Thus the land still belongs to Eduave.

Islands formed by accretion belong to the riparian owner nearest to its margin. However such accretion may
be lost to third parties thru prescription.

BAES V. COURT OF APPEALS

The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial accretions nor to accretions to lands that adjoin
canals or esteros or artificial drainage systems. If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the
damage to or loss of his property due to natural causes, there is all the more reason to compensate him
when the change in the course of the river is effected through artificial means.

FACTS:
In 1962, the Government dug up a canal on a private estate in order to streamline the Tripa de Gallina creek
(in other words, there was a mand-made change of river course). Said private estate was acquired by
petitioner Baes, and was subdivided in to three lots. It was lot 2958-C which was totally occupied by the
canal so the Government in exchange granted him a lot near but not contiguous to C. The old river bed was
filled up by soil from Lot C. Petitioner now claims ownership over the old river bed on the basis of Article 461
which says that abandoned river beds belong to the riparian owners whose land is occupied by the new
course of water.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 461 applies

RULING: YES!
If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the damage to or loss of his property due to natural
causes, there is all the more reason to compensate him when the change in the course of the river is
effected through artificial means. The loss to the petitioners of the land covered by the canal was the result
of a deliberate act on the part of the government when it sought to improve the flow of the Tripa de Gallina
creek. It was therefore obligated to compensate the Baeses for their loss.

We find, however, that the petitioners have already been so compensated. Felix Baes was given Lot 3271-A
in exchange for the affected Lot 2958-B through the Deed of Exchange of Real Property dated June 20,
1970. This was a fair exchange because the two lots were of the same area and value and the agreement
was freely entered into by the parties.

RONQUILLO V. COURT OF
APPEALS
FACTS:
Del Rosario owns a registered land adjacent to Estero Calubcub which is already dried up due to the
dumping of garbage by the sorrounding neighborhood and not by any natural causes. Defendant now
occupies said dried up land until Del Rosario, claiming ownership over the same, required him to vacate on
the basis of Article 370 of the Civil Code which provides that riparian owner owns the dried up river bed
abandoned by natural changes.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 370 applies

RULING: No.
The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial accretions nor to accretions to lands that adjoin
canals or esteros or artificial drainage systems. Considering our earlier finding that the dried-up portion of
Estero Calubcub was actually caused by the active intervention of man, it follows that Article 370 does not
apply to the case at bar and, hence, the Del Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian
owners.

The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of the land of the public
domain which cannot be subject to acquisition by private ownership.

REYNANTE v. CA
FACTS:
More than 50 years ago, Reynante was taken as tenant by the late Don Cosme Carlos over a fishpond in
Meycauayan, Bulacan. Reynante subsequently built a nipa hut where he and his family lived and took care
of the nipa palms which they planted on lots 1 and 2, which was located between the fishpond and Liputan
River. Reynantes family sold the nipa palms, and appropriated the fruits as his own, without interference or
complaint from Don Carlos.

Upon Don Carlos death, his heirs convinced Reynante to sign an affidavit, relinquishing his rights as a
caretaker of the fishpond. Reynante, however, continued to live in the nipa hut he had built, and he still took
care of the nipa palms, which he continued to sell.

This lead the heirs to file a complaint for forcible entry with preliminary injunction against Reynante in the
MTC. The MTC found for Reynante, but the heirs appealed to the RTC, where the decision was reversed.
The CA merely affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not accretion automatically becomes registered land just because the adjoining lot is registered
in the Torrens System?

HELD:
While it is true that alluvial deposits shall belong to the owner of the lot adjoining such accretion, it does not
automatically bestow an imprescriptibility. If the owners of said land have not registered this with the proper
entity, said land will be subject to acquisition by prescription, which was what occurred in this case.

Since the affidavits prove that Reynante has been in possession of these lands for more than 50 years, the
SC rightly held that the land belongs to him.

GRANDE v. CA
FACTS:
The Grandes are owners of a parcel of land in Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased mother, Patricia
Angui, who likewise, inherited it from her parents. In the early 1930s, the Grandes decided to have their land
surveyed for registration purposes. The land was described to have Cagayan River as the northeastern
boundary, as stated in the title.
By 1958, a gradual accretion took place due to the action of the current of the river, and an alluvial deposit of
almost 20,000 sq.m. was added to the registered area. The Grandes filed an action for quieting of title
against the Calalungs, stating that they were in peaceful and continuous possession of the land created by
the alluvial deposit until 1948, when the Calalungs allegedly trespassed into their property. The Calalungs,
however, stated that they were the rightful owners since prior to 1933.

The CFI found for the Grandes and ordered the Calalungs to vacate the premises and pay for damages.
Upon appeal to the CA, however, the decision was reversed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the alluvium deposited land automatically belongs to the riparian owners?

HELD:

Art. 457 dictates that alluvium deposits on land belong to the owners of the adjacent land. However, this
does not ipso jure become theirs merely believing that said land have become imprescriptible. The land of
the Grandes only specifies a specific portion, of which the alluvial deposits are not included, and are thus,
subject to acquisition by prescription. Since the Calalungs proved that they have been in possession of the
land since 1934 via two credible witnesses, as opposed to the Grandes single witness who claims that the
Calalungs only entered the land in 1948, the Calalungs have been held to have acquired the land created by
the alluvial deposits by prescription. This is because the possession took place in 1934, when the law to be
followed was Act 190, and not the New Civil Code, which only took effect in 1950.

REPUBLIC V. CA
Land near the sea that is submerged in water because of rainfall is not considered foreshore land, hence it
can be registered.

FACTS:
Benedicto del Rio purchased from Ms. Pili a lot with size of 17,311 sqm in Laguna, about 20 meters from the
shore of Laguna de Bay. He registered the property and declared it for tax purposes since 1918 . Actual tax
payments began 1948. The man died and his son Santos acquired part of the land after partition amongst
the heirs. He filed for registration but the same was opposed by the Director of Lands and Private
Oppositors.

Director OF Lands alleged that a portion of the land stays submerged in water for 4 to 5 months, therefore it
forms part of public domain.

Two Private oppositors also blocked registration because they wanted the land for themselves (they built
duckhouses with the toleration of Santos, but violated the terms of agreement by also building residences).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the land can be registered

HELD:YES.
The Law of waters govern. According to such law, the natural bed of lakes, ponds or pools pertains to that
covered by waters at their highest ordinary time of the year for most of the year. The Laguna Bay is a lake
and the part around it covered with water up to 5 months a year results not from tidal action but from
thunderstorms. The law defines foreshore land as that area between high and low water alternately revealed
and hidden by the tide. Hence, the disputed land is not foreshore. It is registrable. The Director of Lands
argues from the wrong premises. And as to the private oppositors who entered into possession based on
mere PERMISSION and as ungrateful tenants WHO DID NOT EVEN PAY RENT REGULARLY, their petition
had been denied. Such possession cannot ripen into ownership. Only possession acquired and enjoyed in
the concept of owners can serve as the basis for title acquired via prescription.

HEIRS OF NAVARRO V. IAC

Accretion along an area adjacent to the sea is public domain, even if the accretion results from rivers
emptying into the sea. It cannot be registered.

FACTS:
Sinforoso Pascual sits in the midst of a land registration case. The story begins on 1946 upon his desire to
register land on the northern section of his existing property. His current registered property is bounded on
the east by Talisay River, on the West by Bulacan River and on the North by the Manila bay. Both rivers flow
towards the Manila Bay. Because of constantly flowing water, extra land of about 17hectares (thats about
the size of Disney Park!) formed in the northern most section of the property. It is this property he sought to
register.

The RTC denied the registration claiming this to be foreshore land and part of public domain (remember,
accretion formedby the sea is public dominion). His Motion for Reconsideration likewise burned. In 1960, he

attempted registry again, claiming that the Talisay and Bulacan rivers deposited more silt resulting on
accretion. He claimed this land as riprarian owner. The Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and the Fiscal
opposed.

Then a new party surfaced. Mr Emiliano Navarro jumped into the fray opposing the same application, stating
the he leased part of the property sought to be registered. He sought to protect his fishpond that rested on
the same property. Sinforoso was not amused and filed ejectment against Mr. Navarro, claiming that Navarro
used stealth force and strategy to occupy a portion of his land. Pascual lost the case against Navarro so he
appealed. During the appeal, his original land registration case was consolidated and tried jointly. (alas
Pascual died) The heirs of Pascual took over the case.
On 1975, the court decided that the property was foreshore land and therefore part of public domain. The
RTC dismissed the complaint of Pascual for ejectment against Navarro and also denied his land registration
request. Pascuals heirs appealed and the RTC was reversed by the IAC. The Apellate court granted petition
for registration! The reason? The accretion was caused by the two rivers, not manila bay. Hence it wasnt
foreshore land. (BUT the confusion lies in the fact that the accretion formed adjacent to Manila Bay which
is sea!) Aggrieved, the Director of Forestry moved for reconsideration (Government insists it is foreshore and
hence, public domain). The Apellate court denied all motions of the Director and the Government.

The matter went to the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accretion taking place on property adjacent to the sea can be registered under the
Torrens system.

HELD:
It cannot be registered. This is land of Public domain. Pascual claimed ownership under Article 457 of the
Civil Code saying that the disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the Talisay
and Bulacan Rivers Art 457: Accretion as a mode of acquiring property and requires the concurrence of the
following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be
the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where the accretion takes place is
adjacent to the bank of the river.

Unfortunately, Pasucal and Heirs claim of ownership based on Art 457 is misplaced. If theres any land to be
claimed, it should be land ADJACENT to the rivers Talisay and Bulacan. The law is clear on this. Accretion of
land along the river bank may be registered. This is not the case of accretion of land on the property
adjacent to Manila Bay.

Furthermore, Manila Bay is a sea. Accretion on a sea bank is foreshore land and the applicable law is not Art
457 but Art 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. This law, while old, holds that accretion along sea shore
cannot be registered as it remains public domain unless abandoned by government for public use and
declared as private property capable of alienation.

Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as follows:

Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of
the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for
purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coast-guard service, the
Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as
increment thereof.

The IAC decision granting registration was reversed and set aside. Registration cannot be allowed.

REPUBLIC VS. CA
Alluvium must be the exclusive work of nature. It has 3 requirements: 1) that the deposit be gradual and
imperceptible; 2) through the current of the river; and 3) the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent
to the river bank. Deposits made by human intervention are excluded.

FACTS:
The respondents (Tancincos) were registered owners of a parcel of land in Bulacan, bordering on the
Maycauayan and Bocaue Rivers. They filed an application for the registration of three lots adjacent to their

fishpond, but because of the recommendation of the Commissioner, they only pushed for the registration of
two. The RTC and CA granted the petition despite the opposition of the Bureau of Lands.

The respondents based their claim on accretions to their fishponds. They presented a lone witness (their
overseer). The Bureau of Lands argue that the lands in dispute are not accretions. They assert that what
actually happened was that the respondents simply transferred their dikes simply further down the river bed
of the Meycauayan River. Thus, if there was any accretion to speak of, it was man-made.

Respondents counter that the their evidence shows that accretion happened without human intervention and
that the transfer of the dikes occurred only after.

ISSUE:
Whether accretion took place

RULING: No
Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. There is not evidence that the addition to said property was
made gradually through the effects of the currents of the two rivers. The lands in question total almost 4
hectares of land, which are highly doubtful to have been caused by accretion. The lone witness testified that
she observed an increase in the area in 1939, but the lots in question were not included in the survey of their
adjacent property conducted in 1940. They were also not included in the Cadastral Survey of the entire
Municipality of Maycauayan between the years 1958-1960. If the overseer was indeed telling the truth, the
accretion was sudden, not gradual. When the respondents transferred their dikes towards the river beds, the
dikes were meant for reclamation purposes and not to protect their property from the destructive force of the
waters of the river. The lots in question were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan River and are therefore
classified as public property.

Registration denied, decisions appealed are reversed. Note: The lands sought were not even dry land. The
entire area was under one to two meters of water.

BINALAY VS. MANALO

A sudden and forceful action like that of flooding is not the alluvial process contemplated in Art. 457. The
accumulation of the soil deposits must be slow and hardly imperceptible in order for the riparian owner to
acquire ownership thereof. Also, the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of the
rivers (or the sea coast).

FACTS
Manalo acquired 2 lots which were originally owned by Judge Taccad from 2 different people (the latters
daughter and from an earlier purchaser). These lots were later consolidated into Lot 307, a total of 10.45
hectares. The lot was beside the Cagayan River, which, due to flooding, would place a portion of the land
underwater during the rainy season (September to December). On sunny days, however, the land would be
dried up for the entire dry season (January to August). When a survey of the land was conducted on a rainy
month, a portion of the land that Manalo bought was then underwater and was thus left unsurveyed and
excluded from Lot 307.

The big picture is this: Cagayan River running from south to north, forks at a certain point to form two
braches (western and eastern) and then unites at the other end, further north, to form a narrower strip of
land. The eastern branch of the river cuts through Lot 307, and is flooded during the rainy season. The
unsurveyed portion, on the other hand, is the bed of the eastern branch. Note that the fork exists only during
the rainy season while the island/elongated strip of land formed in the middle of the forks becomes dry and
perfect for cultivation when the Cagayan river is at its ordinary depth. The strip of land in the middle of the
fork totaled 22.7 hectares and was labeled Lot 821-822. Lot 821 is directly opposite Lot 307 and is separated
by the eastern branch of the rivers fork.

Manalo claims that Lot 821 belongs to him by way of accretion to the submerged portion of the land to which
it is adjacent. Petitioners (Binalay, et al) who possess the Lot 821, on the other hand, insist that they own it.
They occupy the other edges of the lot along the river bank (i.e. the fertile portions on which they plant
tobacco and other agricultural products) and also cultivate the western strip during the summer.

Manalo filed 2 cases for forcible entry which were both dismissed. Later on, he filed a complaint for quieting
of title, possession, and damages against petitioner. The trial court and the CA ruled in favor of Manalo,
saying that Lot 821 and Lot 307 cannot be considered separate and distinct from each other. They reasoned
that when the land dries up for the most part of the year, the two are connected. [Note: The CA applied the
ruling in Govt of the Phil Islands vs. Colegio de San Jose, which was actually inappropriate because the
subject matter in this case was a lake so that the definition of a bed was different.]

ISSUE:
Whether or not Manalo owns Lot 821 by way of accretion

RULING: No.
The disputed property is not an accretion. It is the action of the heavy rains that cause the highest ordinary
level of waters of the Cagayan River during the rainy season. The depressed portion is a river bed and is
thus considered property of public domain.
The SC observed the following:
a) The pictures identified by Manalo during his direct examination depict the depressed portion as a river
bed. The dried up portion had dike-like slopes (around 8m) on both sides connecting it to Lot 307 and Lot
821 that are vertical and very prominent.
b) The eastern bed already existed even before Manalo bought the land. It was called Rio Muerte de
Cagayan.
c) Manalo could not have acquire ownership of the land because article 420 of the civil code states that
rivers are property of public dominion. The word river includes the running waters, the bed, and the banks.
[The seller never actually owned that part of the land since it was public property]
d) The submerged area (22.72 ha) is twice the area of the land he actually bought. It is difficult to suppose
that such a sizable area could have been brought about by accretion.
More importantly, the requisites of accretion in article 457 were not satisfied. These are: 1) that the
deposition of the soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; 2) that it be the result of the action of the
waters of the river (or sea); and 3) the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of the
rivers (or the sea coast). The accretion shouldve been attached to Lot 307 for Manalo to acquire its
ownership. BUT, the claimed accretion lies on the bank of the river; not adjacent to Lot 307 but directly
opposite it across the river. Aside from that, the dike-like slopes which were very steep may only be formed
by a sudden and forceful action like flooding. The steep slopes could not have been formed by the river in a
slow and gradual manner.

AGUSTIN V. IAC
FACTS:
Private respondents, Maria Melad and Pablo Binuyag are among those who are occupying the western bank
of the Cagayan River while on the eastern bank is owned by petitioner Eulogio Agustin. From 1919 to 1968,
the Cagayan river has eroded the lands on the eastern bank including Agustins Lot depositing alluvium on
the land possessed by Pablo Binuyag. In 1968, after a typhoon which caused a big flood, the Cagayan River
changed its course and returned it to its 1919 bed and it cut through the lands of respondents whose lands
were transferred on the eastern side. To cultivate the lands they had to cross the river. When they were
cultivating said lands, (they were planting corn) Agustin accompanied by the mayor and some policemen
claimed the land and drove them away. So Melad and Binuyag filed separate complaints for recovery of their
lots and its accretions. The Trial Court held ordered Agustin et. al to vacate the lands and return them to
respondents. On appeal, the IAC affirmed in toto the judgment thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents own the accretion and such ownership is not affected by the sudden and
abrupt change in the course of the Cagayan River when it reverted to its old bed

HELD: YES
Art. 457 states that the owner of the lands adjoining river banks own the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects of the currents of the waters. Accretion benefits a riparian owner provided that these
elements are present: 1) deposit be gradual and imperceptible 2) it resulted from the effects of the current of
the water and 3) the land is adjacent to the river bank. When the River moved from 1919 to 1968, there was
alluvium deposited and it was gradual and imperceptible.

Accretion benefits the riparian owner because these lands are exposed to floods and other damage due to
the destructive force of the waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to encumbrances and various
kinds of easements, it is only just that such risks or dangers should in some way be compensated by the
right of accretion. Also, respondents ownership over said lots was not removed when due to the sudden and
abrupt change in the course of the river; their accretions were transferred to the other side. Art. 459 states
when the current of a river x x x segregates from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and transfers

it to another estate, the owner of segregated portion retains ownership provided he removes the same w/in 2
years. And Art. 463 states that whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving a piece of
land or part thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains ownership. He also retains it if a portion of land is
separated from the estate by the current.

VIAJAR v. CA
It is a well settled rule that registration under the Torrens System does not protect the riparian owner against
the diminution of the area of his registered land through gradual changes in the course of an adjoining
stream or river.

FACTS:
Private respondents Spouses Ladrido are owners of Lot 7511 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan Iloilo.
Petitioners are owners of the Lot 7340, which they bought from the Te. Viajar had lot 7340 relocated and
found out that the property was in the possession of Ladrido. She demanded the return but the latter
refused. She instituted a civil action for recovery of possession and damages. She also impleaded Te as
defedant for the reason that if Ladrido is going to be favored then the sale was to be annulled and plaintiff
must be reimbursed. During the trial it was proven that during the cadastral survey in 1926, the two lots were
separated by the Suague River and that a part of the land of Lot 7340 and the old river bed were in the
possession of the defendants and that the plaintiffs have never been in actual physical possession.

CFI ruled in favor of the defendants which the CA confirmed. There was a mention in the case that the issue
from which the decision of the CFI was not the issue appealed in the CA so the affirmation made by the CA
should be void.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the change in the course of the Suague River was gradual or sudden
2) Whether or not the plaintiffs are protected by the Torrens System (in relation to the dimunition of the area
of their land because the plaintiffs are contending that Art 457 must be interpreted as applicable only to
unregistered lands)

RULING:
It was established in the trial that for a period of 40 years the Suague river overflowed its banks yearly and
the property of the defendant gradually received deposits of soil from the effects of the current of the river.

It is a well settled rule that registration under the Torrens System does not protect the riparian owner against
the dimunition of the area of his registered land through gradual changes in the course of an adjoining
stream or river. Accretions which the banks of the river may gradually receive from the effect of the current
become the property of the owners of the banks.

MWSS V. CA, CITY OF DAGUPAN,

143 SCRA 623
FACTS:
The City of Dagupan (CITY) filed a complaint against the former National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority (NAWASA), now the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), for recovery of the
ownership and possession of the Dagupan Waterworks System. NAWASA interposed as one of its special
defenses R.A. 1383 which vested upon it the ownership, possession and control of all waterworks systems
throughout the Philippines and as one of its counterclaims the reimbursement of the expenses it had
incurred for necessary and useful improvements amounting to P255,000.00. Judgment was rendered by the
trial court in favor of the CITY on the basis of a stipulation of facts. The trial court found NAWASA to be a
possessor in bad faith and hence not entitled to the reimbursement claimed by it.

ISSUE:
Whether or not MWSS has the right to remove all the useful improvements introduced by NAWASA to the
Dagupan Waterworks System, notwithstanding the fact that NAWASA was found to be a possessor in bad
faith?

HELD: No.
Article 449 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that "he who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on
the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity." As a builder in bad faith,
NAWASA lost whatever useful improvements it had made without right to indemnity. Moreover, under Article
546 of said code, only a possessor in good faith shall be refunded for useful expenses with the right of
retention until reimbursed; and under Article 547 thereof, only a possessor in good faith may remove useful
improvements if this can be done without damage to the principal thing and if the person who recovers the
possession does not exercise the option of reimbursing the useful expenses. The right given a possessor in
bad faith is to remove improvements applies only to improvements for pure luxury or mere pleasure,
provided the thing suffers no injury thereby and the lawful possessor does not prefer to retain them by paying
the value they have at the time he enters into possession (Article 549).

IGNAO V. IAC

When co-ownership is terminated by division of land, Art 448 applies to parties in good faith. The party
whose land is encroached upon has the sole right to choose whether to sell his land encroached or to
appropriate that which encroaches his land.

FACTS:
The case involves Petitioner Florencio Ignao and his Uncles Juan and Isidro Ignao as Respondents. Both
Petitioner and Respondents co-owned land with 534 sqm (about the size of an Olympic swimming pool.) in
Cavite. The parties had a falling out (maybe the uncles had bad breath) and so attempted to partition the
land, with 133 going to the uncles and 266 going to Petitioner. The attempt failed. Later, Petitioner
discovered that the two houses of Respondent uncles encroached his land. Juan ate 42 sqm and Isidro ate
59 sqm for the grand total of 101 sqm. He complained.

The RTC said that uncles built in good faith therefore that exempts them from damages. Art 448 therefore
applies But things didnt go to well for the Petitioner. The RTC said that if Petitioner opted to appropriate the
sections of the encroaching houses, the Uncles will be left with worthless hovels. Hence, RTC ordered
Petitioner to just sell his land which was encroached. No Good! cried Petitioner and he appealed to the
IAC. He lost again. Petitioner trooped to the SC for vindication

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Petitioner has the right to choose whether to appropriate the house encroaching his land
or to sell his land.
2. Whether or not the courts and respondents can rob Petitioner of the options provided for under Art 448.

HELD:
Petitioner has the right whether to appropriate the houses or to sell his land! The ruling of the RTC and IAC
contravened the explicit provisions of Art 448 which granted him the explicit right to choose. The law is clear
when it bestows choice upon the aggrieved land owner and not upon the builders or the courts.

DEL CAMPO V. ABESIA

When land is co-owned by two parties, but the co-ownership is terminated, Article 448 governs in case real
property (like a house) encroaches the land of another. This is provided that good faith exists.

FACTS:
The case involves two friendly parties who are co-owners of a corner lot at Flores and Cavan Streets in
Cebu City. Plaintiff owns 2/3 of the lot and Defendant owns 1/3 of the same. The total size of the lot is 45
square meters (which is about the size of a typical Starbux caf)

Later on, the two parties decided to divide the co-owned property into two lots. 30 square meters went to the
plaintiffs and 15 square meters went to the defendants. From the sketch plan, both parties discovered that
the house of the defendants occupied a portion of the plaintiffs adjacent lot, eating 5 sqm of it. The parties
then requested the trial court to adjudicate who should take possession of the encroached 5 sqm.

The trial court ruled that Art 448 does not apply. The owner of the land on which anything has been built,
sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting,
after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted
to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot
be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case, he
shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after
proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court
shall fix the terms thereof. Since art 448 does not apply, the Plaintiff cannot be obliged to pay for the portion
of defendants house that entered into the 30 sqm lot, AND Defendant cannot be obliged to pay for the price
of the 5 sqm their house occupied. Why? The RTC believed the rules of co-ownership should govern, and
not that of accession.

RTC then assigned the full 30sqm to Plaintiff and ordered Defendants to demolish the 5sqm part of their
house encroaching the 30sqm lot of the Plaintiffs. Defendants where aghast at having to axe the family
home, hence they appealed.

CA affirmed the decision. So we have the SC coming to the rescue.

ISSUE:
w/n the rules of accession applies (and not coownership) on property that used to be co-owned, but was
subdivided.

HELD:
The rule of accession applies because co-ownership was terminated upon the partitioning of the lot. Art 448
therefore governs. The house of Defendant overlapped that of Plaintiff, but this was built on good faith.
Hence, the plaintiffs have the right to choose one of two options

> Appropriate the 5sqm portion of the house of Defendants after indemnifying the Defendants; or
> Obliging the Defendants to pay a portion of the land on which their home rested. ( or they can rent it)

GEMINIANO v. CA
Lessor in good faith and Builders in Good faith are not synonymous. Article 1678 may apply to the formers
case and Art 448 may apply to the latters case. If a person knew that his stay would likely end or that he
knew somehow that he is not the owner of the land then he is not a BPS in good faith.

FACTS:
The lot in question was originally owned by the mother of the petitioner. Petitioner sold their unfinished
bungalow to the respondents for P6,000, with a promise to sell the lot to the latter. The property was later
leased to the respondents for 7 years starting November 1978 for P40 a month as evidenced by their written
lease contract. The respondents built their house and introduced some improvements in the lot. In 1985
petitioners mother refused receiving monthly rentals. It turned out that the lot in question was subject to
litigation which resulted to its acquisition by Maria Lee which was sold to Salcedo, who further sold to
Dionisio spouses. The property eventually came back to the petitioner when the Dinisio spouses executed a
Deed of Quitclaim over the said property in favor of the petitioners. As such, the lot was registered in the
latters names. (petitioners never lost possession of the land because Lee and company never issued a writ
of possession against them).

In 1993, petitioners wrote a letter to respondents demanding them to vacate the premises and when the
latter refused, petitioners filed in court. Respondents claim that they should be entitled to buy the land
because of the promise of the petitioners to sell them the land and because they were builders in Good faith.
The courts now are deciding which one to use: Art. 448 regarding builders and land owners in good faith or
Art. 1678 regarding lessee in good faith who can be reimbursed half of the expenses of the improvements if
the LO chooses to appropriate them and that such lessee have the right to retain in the premises until fully
reimbursed.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the respondents were builders in Good faith?
2) Whether Art 448 or 1678 should be applied?

RULING:
1) No, they were not builders in good faith. The respondents knew that their stay would end after the lease
contract expires. They cant bank on the promise, which was not in writing, of the petitioners that the latter
will sell the land to them. According to 1403, an agreement for the sale of real property or an interest therein
is unenforceable, unless some note or memorandum thereof be produced. Other than the alleged promise
by petitioner, respondents had no other evidence to prove their claim.

2) They are mere lessees in good faith; therefore Art 1678 may apply if the lessor chooses to appropriate the
improvements. But since the petitioners refused to exercise that option, the private respondents cant compel
them to reimburse the one-half value of the house and improvements. Neither can they retain the premises
until reimbursement is made. The private respondents sole right then is to remove the improvements without
causing any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.

BALLATAN v. CA
-Land Owner in Good faith, Builder in Good faith scenario -The right to choose between appropriating the
improvement or selling the land on which the improvement of the builder, planter or sower stands, is given to
the owner.
-If the option chooses is to sell the lot, the price must be fixed at the prevailing market value at the time of
payment.

FACTS:
Eden Ballatan, together with other petitioners, is living in and registered owners of Lot No. 24. Respondent
Winston Go is living in and registered owners of Lot No. 25 and 26. And Li Ching Yao is living in and the
registered owner of Lot. 27. The Lots are adjacent to each other.

When Ballatan constructed her house in her lot, she noticed that the concrete fence and side pathway of the
adjoining house of respondent Winston Go encroached on the entire length of the eastern side of her

property. She was informed by her contractor of this discrepancy, who then told respondent Go of the same.
Respondent, however, claims that his house was built within the parameters of his fathers lot; and that this
lot was surveyed by engineer Jose Quedding, the authorized surveyor of Araneta Institute of Agriculture
(AIA). Petitioner called the attention of AIA on the matter and so the latter authorized another survey of the
land by Engineer Quedding. The latter then did the survey twice which led to the conclusion that Lots Nos
25, 26 (owned by respondent Go) and 27 (owned by Li Ching Yao) moved westward to the eastern boundary
of Lot 24 (owned by petitioner Ballatan.) (it was later on discovered by the courts that Go encroached 42
square meters from the property of Ballatan and Yao encroached 37 square meters on Gos property, all of
which were in GOOD FAITH) Ballatan made written demands to the respondent to dismantle and move their
improvements and since the latter wasnt answering the petitioner filed accion publiciana in court. Gos filed
their Answer with Third-Party Complaint impleading as third party defendants respondents Li Ching Yao,
the AIA and Engineer Quedding.

RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner ordering respondent Go to demolish their improvements and pay
damages to Petitioner but dismissing the third-party complaint. CA affirmed the dismissal of the third partycomplaint as to AIA but reinstated the the complaint against Yao and the Engineer. CA also affirmed the
demolition and damages awarded to petitioner and added that Yao should also pay respondent for his
encroachment of respondent Gos property. Jose Quedding was also ordered to pay attorneys fees for his
negligence which caused all this fuzz.

ISSUE: What is the proper remedy in this situation (everyone

was in good faith)?
RULING:
Art 448 is the proper remedy (Lower Courts are wrong in awarding the damages). It was established in the
case that the parties had no knowledge of the encroachment until Ballatan noticed it there all of them were
builders in Good faith. In that scenario they have two options. 1st option is that the land owner will buy the
improvements and the 2nd option is to oblige the builders to buy the land given that the value of the land is
not considerably more than the buildings or tree; other wise the owner may remove the improvements
thereon.

The builder, planter or sower, however, is not obliged to purchase the land if its value is considerably more
than the building, planting or sowing. In such case, the builder, planter or sower must pay rent to the owner
of the land. If the parties cannot come to terms over the conditions of the lease, the court must fix the terms

thereof. The right to choose between appropriating the improvement or selling the land on which the
improvement of the builder, planter or sower stands, is given to the owner. If the option chooses is to sell the
lot, the price must be fixed at the prevailing market value at the time of payment.

Petitioner was given by SC 30 days to decide on what to do or which right to exercise. Likewise, Go was also
given time to do the regarding Yaos encroachment. Engineer Quedding was still asked to pay attorneys
fees.

DEPRA v. DUMLAO
FACTS:
Dumlao is the owner of a parcel of land in Iloilo, while Depra owns the lot adjoining his. Dumlao built his
house on his own land, but the kitchen encroached about 34 sq.m on Depras property. Upon finding this,
Depras mom ordered Dumlao to move back from his encroachment, then subsequently filed an action for
unlawful detainer against Dumlao.

The lower court found that Dumlao was a builder in good faith, and ordered him to pay rent (PhP5.00/month)
forced lease between the parties. Depra refused to accept the rentals so Dumlao deposited this with the
MTC. Neither party appealed judgment so this became final and executory.

1 year later, though, Depra filed an complaint for Quieting of Title. Dumlao contested this, stating that the suit
is barred by res judicata. But Depra averred that the lower court did not have jurisdiction to rule on
encumbrances of real property only the CFI has jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not res judicata would apply to the case at bar?

2. Whether or not the land owner can be compelled to accept rent payments by the court (with both LO and
BPS being in good faith)?

HELD:
In the first issue, res judicata would not apply should the first case be one for ejectment and the other for
quieting of title. Article 448 of the Civil Code provides that the land owner has 2 options to buy the building
or to sell/rent his land. This is so because the rights of the owner of the land is older, and by the principle of
accession, he also has a right to the accessories.

The Court remanded the case to the RTC to determine the fair price of the land, the expenses incurred by
the BPS (Dumlao), the increase in value of the land, and whether the value of the land is considerably more
than the value of the kitchen built on it. The RTC shall then give Depra 15 days to exercise such option.

SARMIENTO v. AGANA
FACTS:
Before Ernesto Valentino and Rebecca Lorenzo wed, Rebeccas mother offered a lot in Paranaque that they
could build their house on. In 1967, they finally built their home which cost about PhP8,000-10,000, thinking
that someday, the lot would be transferred to them in their name. It turns out, though, that the lot was owned
by the Spouses Santos who , in turn, sold the same to Leonila Sarmiento in 1974. A year later, Sarmiento
ordered the Valentinos to vacate their lot, then eventually filed and Ejection Suit against them.

The lower court ruled in Sarmientos favor and ordered her to pay 20,000 as the value of the house. But the
case was then elevated to the CFI of Pasay (w/ Agana as Judge), and pursuant to Art.448 of the CC (March
1979), the Court ordered Sarmiento to exercise the option in 60 days to pay Ernesto 40,000 as the value of

the house or to let them purchase the land for 25,000. Sarmiento was not able to exercise this option, and
the CFI allowed Ernesto to deposit the 25,000 purchase price with the Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the land owner is compelled to exercise either option: to buy the building or to sell the land?

HELD:
Ernesto and his wife (BPS) were clearly in good faith as they believed that Rebeccas mother has the
capacity to eventually transfer the title of the land to them. In line with this, Sarmiento (LO) was required to
exercise only 2 options: To purchase the house or to sell the land to them, in this case, based on the value
decided by the courts. Since Sarmiento failed to exercise the option within the allotted period, and based on
Art. 448, the LO is compelled by law to exercise either option. Not choosing either is a violation of the law.

MANOTOK REALTY INC v.

TECSON
FACTS
In a complaint filed by the petitioner for recovery of possession against defendants, CFI ruled declaring
respondent Nilo Madlangawa a builder in good faith. CA affirmed and SC dismissed for lack of merit.

Petitioner filed with the trial court motion for the approval of the petitioner's exercise of option and for
satisfaction of judgment(that is final and executory) which was dismissed. Hence this petition for mandamus.
However, since there is a pending case (Manotok v. NHA) involving the expropriation of the land in question

it is better to suspend the current case til after the outcome of the expropriation proceedings is done.
Moreover, a fire engulfed the Tambunting estate covering the disputed area of the land.The expropriation
case was not granted and the law that provided for such was declared unconstitutional.

Due to the fire, petitioner is contending that the execution of the decision must now involve the delivery of
possession.

ISSUE
Whether or not there should be a delivery of possession by the respondent to the petitioner

RULING
When the decision of the trial court became final and executory, it becomes incumbent upon the respondent
judge to issue the necessary writ for the execution of the same. Since the improvements have been gutted
by fire, and therefore, the basis for private respondent's right to retain the premises has already been
extinguished without the fault of the petitioner, there is no other recourse for the private respondent but to
vacate the premises and deliver the same to the petitioner.

TECHNOGAS PHIL. v. CA
FACTS
Petitioner bought a lot together with the building and improvements including the wall which encroached that
of the defendant. Upon learning of such encroachment, petitioner offered to buy the land but defendant
refused.
After 2 years, through an agreement, petitioner agreed to demolish the wall (but the case did not state what
happened to this agreement, my assumption is that it did not happen due to conflicts that arose after)

Defendant dug a canal along the wall which caused a portion of it to collapse. Petitioner filed a supplemental
complaint re the action and a separate criminal action of malicious mischief (which the wife was convicted of)

RTC decided for the petitioners and the CA reversed. Note that respondent wants to have the wall
demolished.

ISSUES:
A. Whether or not petitioner is a builder in bad faith because it is 'presumed to know the metes and bounds
of his property.'
B. Whether or not amicable settlement was a proper remedy
C. Whether or not respondent can opt to demolish the structure without exercising the option to sell the land
to the petitioner and the latter cannot do buy the same

RULING: Petition was granted.

Good faith or Bad Faith No such doctrinal statement that supports that the knowledge of metes and
bounds of a land due to the Torrens system would amount to bad faith if there was encroachment on the
land of another.

A. When the petitioner purchased the lot, the wall was already built. Even the respondent did not knew about
the encroachment until he has hired a surveyor.

B. Where one derives title to the property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while
holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former. And possession in good faith does
not lose this character except when the possessor is aware of this impropriety.

C. The encroachment was very narrow which can be considered as a mere error. Remedy the petitioner,
despite being a purchaser of the original builder, can compel the landowner to either buy the property or sell
the piece of land because:

1. He was really unaware of the encroachment basing on the fact presented by both sides.
2. When the petitioner bought the land, he has stepped into the rights of the original owner (hence, the
right to compel the LO to buy or sell is also transferred)

Estoppel Petitioner is not considered in estoppel only because it has previously agreed to demolish a part
of the wall. Rather, it was to be negotiated by the parties concern. In the meantime, petitioner has to pay the
rent for the property occupied by its building only up to the date when respondent serves notice of their
option. Case remanded back to the trial court for determination of the value of the land and the number of
days to allot for the respondent to choose an option.

BENITEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Both pairs of spouses, Sps. Benitez and Macapagal bought parcels of land wherein the latter found that the
Sps. Benitez encroached on a portion of their land. The Sps. Macapagal filed an action to recover
possession of said portion and after which a compromise was reached wherein the Sps. Macapagal would
sell the encroached portion to the Benitez. The Sps. Macapagal bought another lot adjacent to that of the
Sps. Benitez and found that the Sps. Benitezs house encroached a portion of their lot [again]. After refusing
to vacate despite verbal and written demands, the Sps. Macapagal filed an action for ejectment against the
Sps. Benitez [within 1 year from the last demand]. The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) decided in favor of
Sps. Macapagal. On appeal the RTC and the CA affirmed in toto said decision. Thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not an action for ejectment is the proper remedy to recover possession of the encroached
portion
(2) Whether or not Sps. Benitez can be made to pay rent
(3) Whether or not the option to sell exclusively belongs to the owner

HELD:

(1) YES, Sec. 1 Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court allows any person unlawfully deprived of possession
by FISTS or after expiration of right to hold possession within 1 year from unlawful deprivation to bring an
action to recover possession. Forcible entry requires prior physical possession but unlawful detainer does
not require prior physical possession. Actual or physical possession is not always necessary. And
possession is not only acquired through material occupation but also when a thing is subject to the action of
ones will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right, through execution of
deed of sale. [since it is a proper remedy, the MeTC has jurisdiction to hear the matter]
(2) YES, The rent to be paid arises from the loss of the use and occupation of the property and is technically
damages. Therefore since petitioners benefited from the occupation of the property it is only just that they be
made to pay damages in the form of rent.
(3) YES, Art. 448 of the CC mandates that the option to sell the land on which another in good faith builds,
plants or sown on, belongs to the owner. The reason for this is because the owners right is older and by
principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing.

PEDRO P. PECSON v. COURT OF

APPEALS, SPS. NUGUID
FACTS:
Pedro Pecson was the owner of a commercial lot on which he built a 4-door-2-storey apartment building. He
failed to pay realty taxes amounting to P12k so the lot was sold at public auction to Mamerto Nepomuceno
who later on sold it to the Sps. Nuguid.

Pecson challenged the validity of the auction before the RTC but was dismissed but the RTC held that the
apartment bldg was not subject of the litigation. On appeal, the CA appealed in toto the decision of the RTC
that the apartment bldg was not included in the auction sale.

After an entry of judgment was made, the Sps. Nuguid filed a motion with the RTC for a motion for delivery
of possession of the lot and the apartment bldg citing Art. 546 of the CC. The RTC issued an order declaring
that the owner of the lot and apartment bldg were the Sps. Nuguid and to pay the construction cost of the

apartment before a writ of possession would be issued and to pay rent to the spouses. Pecson moved for
reconsideration but the Trial court did not act on it, instead it issued a writ of possession. The CA affirmed in
part the decision declaring the cost of construction can be offset from the amount of rents to be collected
and that since Sps. Nuguid opted to appropriate the improvement, Pecson is entitled to be reimbursed the
cost of construction at the time it was built in 1965 which is at P53k and the right the retain the improvement
until full indemnity is paid.

Thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Art. 448 and 546 applies in the case at bar

HELD: YES
> With regard to Art. 448, the provision on indemnity may be applied in analogy. Whoever is the owner of the
land may appropriate whatever has been built, planted or sown after paying indemnity. However, it does not
apply when the owner of the land is also the builder of the works on his own land who later on loses
ownership by sale or donation.

> Art. 546 refers to the necessary and useful expenses which shall be refunded to the possessor in good
faith with right of retention. However, it does not state how to determine the value of the useful improvement.
The respondents [court and private respondents alike] espouses as sufficient reimbursement the cost of
construction in 1965, however, this is contrary to previous rulings which declares that the value to the
reimbursed should be the present market value of said improvements so as not to unjustly enrich either of
the parties. [the trial court erred in ordering Pecson to pay rent since the Sps. Nuguid has yet to pay the
indemnity therefore Pecson has the right to retain the improvements and the income thereof. The case was
remanded to the trial court for determination of the current market value of the apartment bldg and ordered
the Sps to pay Pecson otherwise it shall be restored to Pecson until payment of indemnity.]

DOMINICA CUTANDA v. HEIRS OF

ROBERTO CUTANDA
FACTS:
Roberto Cutanda owned 2 parcels of land in Bohol, and upon his death, his children became owners of said
land by inheritance. They left Bohol and established residence in Leyte. In 1988, they returned to Bohol
hoping to work on the land that was left to them. However, they discovered that these lands were already in
the possession of their relativesheirs of their uncles and aunts.

Petitioners averred that the land in question is actually owned by their late uncle, Anastacio Cutanda, who
died without children, and left the lands to his siblings, one of which was Roberto Cutanda.
Furthermore, they claim rightful ownership of the land as they have been in open, contiguous, adverse, and
uninterrupted possession of these for about 55 years.

The trials court found for the Petitioners. However, the CA reversed the RTCs decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the rights of the heirs of Roberto Cutanda have already prescribed, thus, giving rightful
ownership to the Petitioners?

HELD:
The action brought by the respondents to the court was one of accion publiciana to recover the right to
possession and to be declared rightful owners of the land. Since the complaint actually put in issue the
ownership of the land, it should thus be treated properly as an accion reinvindicatoria.

Nevertheless, both have already prescribed as these rights are extinguished if not brought within 10 years
from dispossession. Therefore, the petitioners have indeed acquired possession and ownership of the land
in question by prescription, as the respondents failed to bring this action only 55 years later.

HEIRS OF JUAN OCLARIT v. CA

FACTS:
Juan Oclarit purchased an unregistered land in Bohol for P100 from Macalos. This particular land did not
have specified boundaries, as it was only indicated that the borders were a brook, lands of Gales, and
another of Baja. He subsequently purchased 5 more unregistered parcels of land from Gales, one of which
was an irrigated rice and coconut lands, which is now the subject of the action.

Balasabas apparently entered the land about 15 years later and replaces the J.O. labels on top of the trees
with F.G. (Felipa Gales, his mother). The heirs of Oclarit then filed an action for the quieting of the title
and damages against Balasabas, averring that Oclarit exercised dominion and ownership openly, peacefully,
adversely and uninterrupted. The deceased even planted coconut trees and other crops on the land, enjoyed
their fruits and even paid realty tax on the land.

RTC initially found for Balasabas after having a Commissioner survey the lands and discovered the
discrepancy between the boundaries indicated in the Deed of Sales and the one written on the tax
declarations. The CA, however, reversed the decision, and ruled that Oclarit is the rightful owner of the land.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the lands claimed by Balasabas are actually foreign and alien to the lands claimed by
Oclarit, making these lands actually his property?

HELD:

While it is true that tax declarations are not strong proof to claim ones property as his, it will stand in court
should these tax declarations be coupled with ones exercise of ownership, such as those proven by Oclarits
heirs.

Furthermore, although what defines a piece of land is not the area mentioned in its descriptions, but the
boundaries laid down, in cases such as this one, where the boundaries are unclear, the actual size of the
land gains importance.

HEIRS OF VENCILAO V. CA
One may not acquire property by prescription when that property is titled to another under the Torrens
System. It does not even matter whether occupation by the adverse claimant was open, notorious and
continuous. As long as the TCT is in someone elses name, the property belongs to person who holds the
TCT

FACTS:
On Feb 12, 1990, the heirs of Vencilao filed a complaint to quiet the title and recover a piece of land against
spouses Gepalgo.

Said heirs asserted that they acquired the land from their father who was in open, peaceful and notorious
enjoyment of the same. They presented tax declarations to prove said ownership
On the other hand, the Gepalgo spouses denied the claim and for proof as registered owners, presented
TCT No. 16042 which they acquired on public auction from the PNB.

RTC ruled in favor of Vencilao because the latter had been in possession, cultivation and enjoyment for more
than 30 years- long before a title was ever issued to the Gepalgos.

Upon appeal, the CA reversed and awared the property to Gepalgos because the latter were buyers in good

faith and holders in due course. Furthermore, they held a Torrens Title. That was the gold standard of
ownership for registered land.

Naturally, the heirs of Vencilao trooped to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Gepalgos had better right to the land.

HELD:
No.The RTC erroneously found for the petitioners. True, the Vencilaos enjoyed the property for more than 30
years. However, prescription does not run against registered land. No one may acquire by prescription or
adverse possession land that is titled and registered even if occupation is adverse, open and notorious. A
Certificate of Title is absolute and unbeatable evidence of ownership in favor of the person whose name
appears upon it. It binds the whole world.

HEIRS OF FABELA V. CA
In an action for reconveyance, there is presumption that the current possessor or holder of the property is
the rightful owner. To overwhelm this presumption, the averse claimant must prove ownership based on the
strength of his claim and not the weakness of the defense. He accomplishes the same by presenting
convincing evidence of just title as well as the incontrovertible identity of the property he seeks.

FACTS
In 1985 The Heirs of Fabela filed a case for reconveyance of property, as well as damages against the heirs
of Neri. This pertains to so-called lot 868 in Misamis Oriental.

Apparently the subject lot belonged to grandfather Fabela back in 1924. It then became the subject of
litigation between Grandpa Fabela and Grandpa Neri in connection with a Visayan agreement called
Escritura Transaccion which entrusted said lot of Fabela to Neri as vendee a retro for 14 years. After 14
years, he was bound to restore said property back to Fabella. Neri never did and so the battle began.
Decades later the Heirs of Fabela decided they wanted this lot returned. They were grossly ignored by the
heirs of Neri, hence the Fabela clan took the case to the RTC.

In 1986, the RTC ruled in favor of the heirs of Fabela on two grounds:

1. The heirs of Neri failed to answer the complaint and thus were declared in default
2. The Escrittura Transaccion indicated that Neri Sr was merely a trustee and should have returned said
property long ago.

The Heirs of Neri didnt take the loss well and appealed to the CA. The CA examined the records and found
that the RTC erred because in an action to recover, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his title and not
on the weakness of the defendant. It is well accepted that the possessor of the property has the presumption
of title in his favor; therefore any person who claims he has a better right to property must prove he has
better title than the defendant and he must properly prove the identity of the property. Apparently the RTC
based its decision on the Escrittura Transaction, but the original records of such document were never found
or located! Worse, it was never presented to the RTC! Plaintiff Heirs of Fabella relied on the Escrittura as the
primary claim to lot 868. For all we know, it could have been a figment of their imagination.

The lack of evidence compelled the CA to reverse the RTC decision and restore the contested property to
Neri.

The Heirs of Fabella contested the CA reversal and raised the issue to the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Heirs of Fabela provided substantial evidence of ownership over the contested property.

HELD:

No. Despite the default of the Heirs of Neri, the allegations of the Heirs of Fabella rested on shaky ground.
The latter failed to establish their case on preponderance of evidence.

In an action for recovery of ownership, the person who claims he has a better right to property must prove
not only his ownership of property, but also the identity of the land by describing the location,a area, and
boundaries thereof. In the case at hand, petitioners based their claim of ownership on the 1924 Escritura de
Transaccion, the original copy of which was never presented in the trial court. That was the only piece of
evidence that could establish petitioners ownership and the identity of the subject lot.
The RTC committed travesty by guessing the appropriate boundaries of the lot that came under litigation.

Ultimately the SC affirmed the reversal of the CA on the reason that the Heirs of Fabela failed to substantiate
their claim on the merits of his title.

CAISIP v PEOPLE
FACTS:
Spouses Gloria Cabalag and Marcelino Guevarra are people who cultivated a parcel of land known as Lot
105-A of Hacienda Palico situated in sitio Bote-bote, barrio Tampisao, Nasugbu, Batangas. The overseer of
the hacienda is petitioner Felix Casipi and the owner of the same is Roxas y Cia. The latter acquired a court
ruling against the spouses Gloria and Marcelino for forcible entry which orders them to vacate the premises
within 20 days. The order was carried out June 6, 1959 (so they had until June 26 to vacate it.) On June 17,
Gloria was seen by Felix Caisip harvesting their crops in Lot 105-A. The Latter bade her to stop what she
was doing and to leave the premises. When Gloria refused, Caisip called for Sgt. Rjales and Cpl. Villadelrey
to help him shoo her away. Gloria stuck to her attitude and still refused to stop and leave so the two police
officers, by means of force, stopped her and dragged her away (they also tried to threaten her by drawing
their guns :). As a result, the clothes of Gloria got torn. One of Glorias neighbours caught sight of the event
and asked the officers to release her. Gloria was later turned over to the police on duty for interrogation.

A case filed against the petitioners, Caisip and the officers, for Grave Coercion (Petitioners also filed grave
coercion and unjust vexation against Gloria after 8 days maybe just to get back at her- just in case sir asks.)

One of their defenses was ART. 429 (including the doctrine of self help.) The petitioners were found guilty by
the lower court thus this appeal.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not Art. 429 can be used as a defense? [More relevant issue to property:]
2) Whether or not the petitioners liable for Grave Coercion? [Main Issue-this case is really a criminal case]

RULING:
1. NO, Art 429 cannot be used as a defense of the petitioner to justify their action.
The order to vacate was until June 26 (or 20 days from the execution of the decision.) On June 17, the
spouses REMAINED in possession of the said lot. At the very least the owner of the hacienda is just a copossessor of the land, thus the spouses still had rights over it.

Although the spouses were ordered to vacate the land, it doesnt necessarily mean that they dont have
rights to the land (they still have right to necessary expenses they used to till the land)
What petitioner did was not repel or prevent in actual or threatened x x x physical invasion or usurpation.
They EXPELLED Gloria from a property which they were still in possession of. (more detailed enumeration
of reason in page 23)

2. YES, they are guilty! Caisip is guilty of grave coercion as a co-conspirator, apart from being a principal by
induction
> By trying to stop her the first time showed that he intended to stop her
> By calling the police and not stopping them when they were already dragging Gloria and threatening her by
drawing their guns.

Aggravating circumstances: abuse of superior strength and disregard of sex were appreciated in the case of
Caisip and an additional aggravating: taking advantage of position as a members of the local police force
were appreciated on the two police officers case

GERMAN MANAGEMENT &

SERVICES, INC. V COURT OF
APPEALS
FACTS:
Spouses Jose are residents of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are owners of the land situated in sitio
Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal (the land being disputed in the case at bar.) The spouses Jose
executed a special power of attorney authorizing petitioner German Management Services to develop their
property. They have already acquired the proper permits to do so but they discovered that the land was
occupied by the respondent with 20 other farmers (members of the Concerned of Farmers Association.)
These farmers have occupied the land for the last twelve to fifteen years prior to the issuance of the permits
and they already have their crops all over the property. In short, they are in actual possession of the land.

Petitioners tried to forcibly drive the farmers away and; demolish and bulldoze their crops and property. The
respondents filed in CFI because they were deprived of their property without due process of law by
trespassing, demolishing and bulldozing their crops and property situated in the land. CFI and RTC denied it
but CA reversed the decision. Petitioners tried to appeal the decision in CA but were denied thus this appeal

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible entry case against petitioner?

RULING:
YES, they are entitled to file a forcible entry case! Since private respondents were in actual possession of
the property at the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a right to
commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of possession.

Private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against petitioner because
ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title to
an estate. Title is not involved, only actual possession. It is undisputed that private respondents were in
possession of the property and not the petitioners nor the spouses Jose. Although the petitioners have a
valid claim over ownership this does not in any way justify their act of forcible entry. It must be stated that
regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not
be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover
such possession even against the owner himself.Whatever may be the character of his possession, if he has
in his favor priority in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully
ejected by a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. The doctrine of self
help, which the petitioners were using to justify their actions, are not applicable in the case because it can
only be exercised at the time of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar (in fact
they are the ones who are threatening to remove the respondents with the use of force.) Article 536 basically
tells us that the owner or a person who has a better right over the land must resort to judicial means to
recover the property from another person who possesses the land.

When possession has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of
property. As clearly stated in Article 536- In no case may possession be acquired through force or
intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or
right to deprive another of the holding of a thing must invoke the aid of the competent court, if holder should
refuse to deliver the thing.

VENCILAO V. VANO
FACTS
Three consolidated cases are resolved, given that there are same parties and parcels of land in question.

1) In the first case, the heirs of the late Juan Reyes filed an application for registration of the subject parcel
of land, which resulted in an OCT. After the heirs tried to take possession of the property, a reconveyance of
property was filed against them by Vencila et al., asserting that:

a. They have acquired the land by purchase or inheritance and in OCEN possession for 30 years
b. The parcels of land that they own were by mistake part of Juan Reyes estate

2) The second case involved the death of the administratix of the estate of the owners/heirs of the land. After
her death, a TCT was issued in the name of Pedro Luspo, and another was issued in the name of several
persons. A writ of possession was issued by the trial court against petitioners.

3) The third case involved one of the registered owners of the land who filed a petition for complaint against
the occupants who refused to vacate the land and sign the Sheriffs return.

The heirs of Juan Reyes moved to dismiss the case of reconveyance stating that the other parties had no
cause of action and that they were barred by prior judgement already.

The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, then set aside the same order, and then reversed itself
partially (some cases were dismissed, some were not -- since there were several petitioners). The parties
whose cases were dismissed appealed to the SC.

These petitioners contend that they were not claimants-oppositors nor defeated oppositors in the said land
registration case, as their names dont appear in the amended application for registration. They argue that
they have occupied the parcels of land for more than 30 years which began long before the application for
registration and that even after registration, they continued to possess the land.

ISSUE/S:
1) Whether or not res judicata is applicable in an action for reconveyance
2) Whether or not the writ of possession may be issued against them considering that the petitioners were
not the defeated parties in the registration case

RULING

1. No. Res judicata applies to all cases and proceedings, including land registration and cadastral
proceedings. A final judgment is conclusive even in subsequent cases involving the same parties and their
successors-in-interest as long as the ff. requisites are present:

a. The former judgment must be final

b. Rendered by a court having jurisdiction on the subj matter and of the parties (CFI Bohol had jurisdiction)
c. The judgment was based on the merits
d. There is identity of parties, subj matter, and cause of action between the first and second actions (Land
registration and action for reconveyance)
2. Yes. A writ of possession may be issued not only against a person who has been defeated in a
registration case but also against anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof
during the land registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree.
Note: In a registration case, the judgment confirming the title of the applicant and ordering its registration in
his name necessarily carries with it the right of ownership (right to possess-may be obtained through writ of
possession).

On the issue of contempt, the court ruled that the occupants were not guilty. Contempt only applies when
after the sheriff dispossess or eject the occupants, they enter/attempt to enter the property. It was the
sheriffs and not the petitioners fault that there was delivery of possession was unsuccessful.

LUCERO V. LOOT
FACTS:
Julio Lucero filed was granted a writ of possession of property (based on a final decree in a land registration
proceeding). Although the other party (all surnamed Loot) filed a motion to quash the writ, this was granted
by CFI Iloilos Judge Fernan on September 21, 1959.

The Loots opposed the decision on the ground that there were defects in the reconstitution of the records

and that the motion was not under oath. The court dismissed these as trivial arguments. Two motions for
reconsideration were also denied. The writ of possession prayed for was issued in favour of Lucero.

The Loots were stubborn as hell. They then went straight to the Supreme Court for an appeal for certiorari.
The Loots desperately tried to assert

ISSUE: Whether or not the order granting the writ of

possession was in accordance with law
RULING: Yes.
The order granting the writ of possession was based on a decision promulgated on a land registration case
in 1938, which became a final decree on October 29, 1941.
After the final decree, the issuance of the writ of possession was only a ministerial duty of the court if no writ
has been issued to the registered owner yet. The final decree, in effect, immediately empowered the court to
enforce the order/judgment/decree. This automatic process is to avoid further delay and inconvenience to a
successful land registration litigant if he were compelled to commence another action to secure possession.

Furthermore, there is no period of prescription as to the issuance of a writ of possession.

The writ may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in a registration case, but also
against anyone adversely occupying the land or any portion of the land. Even fraud shall not be a bar to the
issuance of the writ of possession, which necessarily implied the delivery of possession of the land.

As to the questions of fact raised by the Loots, the SC can do nothing. These must be raised at the CA of
appeals; otherwise, the parties contesting the facts are deemed to have waived the opportunity to question
the correctness of the findings.

CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY

LANDLESS RESIDENTS ASSOC.
V. CA
FACTS:
Land in question is a public land. Bureau of Lands granted authority to COCLAI to survey the land for
purposes of subdivision into residential lots. NHA, on the other hand, filed an expropriation proceeding to
acquire the same lot. The President of the Philippines issued a proclamation granting NHA to develop,
administer and dispose said land. So, NHA demolished the structures built by COCLAI. MTCC granted
forcible entry decision against NHA & RTC affirmed. While case was pending, the President of the
Philippines issued a Special Patent covering the land in question, thereby granting title to NHA. COCLAI
moved for the execution of forcible entry while NHA wants to quiet the title and an application for a writ of
preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:
Who has the better right?

HELD:
NHA has a better right.
An injunction may only be restored by a litigant for the preservation or protection of his rights. CA was
justified in ruling that NHA was entitled to writ of injunction since it has a title on the lot and the proclamation
granted the authority to dispose the land. On the other hand, petitioners only basis is lawful entry and
possession. Petitioners became squatters with no legal right over the land they are occupying.

IDOLOR v CA (351 SCRA 402)

FACTS:
Teresita Idolor executed in favor of private respondent Gumersindo De Guzman a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage with right of extra-judicial foreclosure upon failure to redeem the mortgage.

Upon the failure of the petitioner to settle her mortgage, respondents went to the Barangay which resulted
into a Kasunduang Pag-aayos which noted that the petitioner shall pay within 90 days and her failure
would warrant the foreclosure of the property with the right to repurchase within one year without interest.

Petitioner failed to comply with her undertaking; thus respondent Gumersindo De Guzman filed an extra
judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. The property was sold in a public auction to respondent
Gumersindo and the Certificate of Sale was registered.

After more than a year, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 220, a complaint
for annulment of Sheriffs Certificate of Sale with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction.Trial court subsequently issued the TRO and the writ.

CA anulled the writ

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Petitioner has proprietary rights to the writ of preliminary injunction
2. Whether or not the Kasunduan was a form of novation

HELD:

Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. Before an injunction
can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present:

1. there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected;

2. the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right.

Petitioner had one year redemption period from the registration of the sheriffs sale to redeem the property
but she failed to exercise this right. Hence, the right no longer exists.

There was no novation that was brought by the Kasunduan, since it is essentially the same agreement as
the first, only that the conditions were changed a little. Novation requires the extinguishment of the
obligation, here the original obligation was not extinguished.

PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE

AUTHORITY (PEZA) V.
FERNANDEZ
FACTS:
Lot 4673 was registered in the names of Florentina Rapaya, Victorino Cuizon among others covered by an
OCT. Sometime thereafter, Jorgea Igot-Soro o et al executed an Extra-judicial Partition claiming to be the
only surviving heirs of the registered owners, through which they were issued a TCT.

Said lot was among the object of an expropriation proceeding before the RTC. Said RTC approved the

compromise Agreement b/w the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) and Igot-Soroo et al wherein
EPZA would pay a certain amount in exchange for the subject property.

EPZA acquired title to said land by virtue of the RTC decision and was issued a corresponding TCT.
The Heirs of the Florentina Rapaya and Juan Cuizon filed a complaint to nullify several documents including
the TCT issued to EPZA for they were excluded from the extrajudicial settlement of the estate.
EPZA filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription and was denied thus elevated the case to the
CA wherein the CA ruled that the heirs of Igot-Soroo defrauded the other heirs by falsely representing that
they were the only heirs enabling them to appropriate the land in favor of EPZA. This method of acquiring
property created a constructive trust in favor of the defrauded party and grants them the right to vindicate
regardless of the lapse of time. Thus, the case at bar.

ISSUE/S:
1) Whether or not private respondents claim over the expropriated land has prescribed
2) Whether or not reconveyance lies against expropriated property

HELD:
1) YES. As provided in the Rules of Court, persons unduly deprived of their lawful participation in a
settlement may assert their claim only w/in the 2-year period after the settlement and distribution of the
estate. However, this prescriptive period will not apply to those who had not been notified of the settlement.

The Private respondents are deemed to have been notified of the extrajudicial settlement since it was
registered and annotated on the certificate of title over the lot.

The only exception to this rule is when the title still remains in the hands of the heirs who have fraudulently
caused the partition of the said property. In the case at bar, the title has already passed to an innocent
purchaser for value, the govt through EPZA.

Their remedies of action for reconveyance resulting from fraud, and action for reconveyance based on an
implied constructive trust has already prescribed as well the former having prescribed 4 years from the
discovery and the latter prescribing 10 years from the alleged fraudulent registration.

2) NO. Reconveyance is a remedy for those whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered
in anothers name. However, this cannot be availed once the property has passed to an innocent purchaser
for value. Since the property has already passed to the govt in an expropriation proceeding, EPZA is entitled
to enjoy the security afforded innocent 3rd persons and their title to the property must be preserved.

However, the private respondents are not w/o remedy. They can sue for damages their co-heirs.

DE LA CRUZ V. COURT OF
APPEALS
A positive act of the govt is needed to reclassify land and until such reclassification, property
remains part of the forest reserve incapable of alienation and cannot be acquired by prescription.

FACTS:
In 1973, the subject lot, a 407 sq. m. residential lot was the subject of an application under the Land
Registration Act by the Ramos bros. Eugenio de la Cruz [petitioner] opposed. After trial, the application was
dismissed on the ground that the land was not yet reclassified and remains part of the forest reserve. The
Ramos bros. pursued the reclassification of the land and were subsequently awarded ownership of it.
Cristina Villanueva, the private respondent, subsequently purchased the same lot from the brothers. Upon
learning of the said sale, petitioner filed a complaint for reconveyance claiming ownership of the said land
having possessed and occupied it openly, publicly, notoriously and adversely against the whole world and in
the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. His complaint was dismissed. The CA affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court thus the case at bar.

ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioner is vested with a better right over the residential lot to which he possessed and
devoted time, effort and resources

HELD: NO
Petitioner possessed and occupied the land after it was declared by the Govt as part of the forest zone.
Forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation, and possession thereof, however
long, cannot convert them into private property.
A positive act by the government is needed to declassify land and to convert it to alienable or disposable
land. And until such declassification, there is no disposable land to speak of.

SARMIENTO V. CA|CRUZ, 250

SCRA 108
FACTS:
Generosa Cruz owned a parcel of land in Bataan. The adjacent land belongs to the Nuguids but is being
used and occupied by Eufemia Sarmiento for several years now. It was found out by the Geodetic Engineer
that Sarmientos fence is encroaching Cruzs land for about 71 meters. Cruz requested Sarmiento to remove
the fence, but the latter refused so Cruz filed a complaint for ejectment in the Municipal Trial Court.

MTC decided for Cruz. Sarmiento appealed in the RTC, assailing the jurisdiction of the MTC. RTC decided
for Sarmiento and held that the MTC had no jurisdiction to hear the case. CA reversed RTC and reinstated
the MTC decision.

Issue:
Whether or not the court of origin (MTC) had jurisdiction over the ejectment case? (Apparently, Cruz failed to
state details on how the encroachment was done.)

Held:
No. To give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the land, it is
necessary that the complaint should embody such statement of facts as brings the party clearly within the
class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as the proceedings are summary in nature. The
complaint must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence.

The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts
constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as when it does not state how entry was effected or how
and when dispossession started, as in the case at bar, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or
an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.

CALUB V. CA
Replevin cannot be issued to recover a property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and
considered in the custody of the law. A replevin case against the State, without its consent, cannot
prosper.

FACTS:
Petitioner from DENR apprehended two vehicles carrying illegally sourced lumber and thereafter confiscated
them. The owners of the vehicles filed an action for replevin to recover the vehicles. They won in the trial
court on the ground that petitioner did not act in accordance with the law. So petitioner appeals on the
ground that the replevin in this case is a suit against the State and is therefore valid.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not a replevin may be instituted for recovery of property under custodia legis.
2) Whether or not replevin in this case is a suit against the State

RULING:
1) No! Replevin cannot be issued to recover a property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and
considered in the custody of the law.
2) Yes! This suit is not valid because the State may not be sued without its consent or when the public official
acted in bad faith in the discharge of his duties. It has been established that the DENR acted within its
authority. Hence, its action is the action of the State

CHIAO LIONG TAN V. COURT OF

APPEALS
Replevin is possessory in character and determines nothing more than the right of possession.
However, when the title to the property is distinctly put in issue by the defendants plea and by
reason of the policy to settle in one action all the conflicting claims of the parties to the possession
of the property in controversy, the question of ownership may be resolved in the same proceeding.

FACTS:
Petitioner claims to be the owner of a motor vehicle, Isuzu Elf van, relying on the Certificate of Registration in
his name. He claims that he sent his brother to look and purchase a car which the latter did. However, the
brother is claiming ownership on the van.

The brothers contention is that the purchase money was from the loan he acquired from a friend-lender. He
asked petitioner to purchase the van and gave him the downpayment (P5,000). This is the reason why the
car is registered in petitioners name. However, the balance (P133,000) was paid by respondent himself. The
friend-lender and an Isuzu Motors employee corroborated the claim of the respondent.

Petitioner files action of replevin. He lost in the lower courts. He appeals to overturn the order of replevin by
proving ownership

ISSUE:

W/N ownership may be decided in a proceeding for replevin.

RULING:
YES. (still in this case, the petitioner lost because the SC affirmed the findings of the lower court)
1) A certificate of registration creates a strong presumption of ownership. But such is rebuttable by
competent proof.
2) In this case, it is undeniable that an IMPLIED TRUST has been created in the name of petitioner (The
court was able to conclude this because it affirmed the allegations of respondent).
3) Replevin is possessory in character and determines nothing more than the right of possession. However,
when the title to the property is distinctly put in issue by the defendants plea and by reason of the policy to
settle in one action all the conflicting claims of the parties to the possession of the property in controversy,
the question of ownership may be resolved in the same proceeding. In this case, the ownership was
established through evidence and testimonies presented by defendant.
4) Also, replevin is sufficiently flexible to authorize a settlement of all equities between the parties, arising
from or growing out of the main controversy. Hence, the winning party may in the same court procure relief
for the return of the property.

DACANAY v. ASISTIO, JR.

FACTS:
This is a petition for mandamus to the non-action of the city registered being a public road intended for public
use is considered part of the public domain and therefore outside the commerce of man. After hearing the
parties, on 11 October 1914 the trial court issued an order dismissing the petitioner's application for
registration of title. Hence, the instant petition for review.

The Supreme Court set aside the order of the lower court, and the ordered said court to proceed with the
hearing of the petitioner's application for registration of title.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale is valid

RULING: Yes it is.

1. City is empowered to close city road or street and withdraw the same from public use. Section 31 of the
Revised Charter of Cebu City (Legislative Powers) provides that any provision of law and executive order to
the contrary notwithstanding, the City Council shall have the following legislative powers xxx to close any city
road, street or alley, boulevard, avenue, park or square. Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may
be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully
used or conveyed." It is undoubtedly clear that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city road or street.

2. Discretion of the city council cannot ordinarily be interfered with by the court. The city council is the
authority competent to determine whether or not a certain property is still necessary for public use. The
power to vacate a street or alley is discretionary, and the discretion will not ordinarily be controlled or
interfered with by the courts, absent a plain case of abuse or fraud or collusion. Faithfulness to the public
trust will he presumed. So the fact that some private interests may be served incidentally will not invalidate
the vacation ordinance.

3. Street withdrawn from public use becomes patrimonial property; Subsequent sale valid. When a portion of
the city street was withdrawn from public use, such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which
can be the object of an ordinary contract. As expressly provided by Article 422 of the Civil Code, "property of
public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the
patrimonial property of the State."

Further, the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu, in very clear and unequivocal terms, states that "property
thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property
belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed." Thus, the withdrawal of the property in question
from public use and its subsequent sale to the petitioner is valid.

DACANAY v. ASISTIO, JR.

FACTS
This is a petition for mandamus to the non-action of the city government of Caloocan in accordance with the
decision of the RTC to evict the occupants of a flea market located in the streets of Caloocan.

January 5, 1979 Metropolitan Manila Commission enacted an ordinance allowing the use of streets for the
purpose of flea markets subject to several conditions.
1987 Mayor Martinez caused the demolition of the flea markets and the stallowners filed a case against
such action.
RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the streets in questions (Heros del '96, Gozon and Gonzales)
are of public dominion, hence outside the commerce of man.
After the decision came out, there was a change in the city administration and current mayor (Asistio) did not
pursue the action of the previous mayor and left the flea markets in the streets as is.
Dacanay, being a resident of Heroes del '96 filed a petition for mandamus to remove the stalls in their street

ISSUE
May public streets be leased or licensed to market stallholders by virtue of a city ordinance or resolution of
Metropolitan Manila Commission?

HELD: NO

1. A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man. Being outside the
commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other contract

2. The vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve such as for
traveling

3. Any executive order or city resolution cannot change the nature of the public street because it is going to
be contrary to the general law

VILLANUEVA v. CASTAEDA, JR.

FACTS
Petitioners are owners of stalls in a talipapa located in a land owned by the municipal government. They
were ed to lease the said land through a municipal council resolution in 1961.

The municipal government demolished the the stalls and subsequently issued a new resolution revoking the
right previously granted to the vendor. Said resolution indicated that the said area will be a parking space for
the town plaza.

Petitioners brought an action against the municipal government alleging that they have the right to use the
said lang because the resolution allowing them to use the area constitutes a contract between them
(vendors) and the municipal government.

CFI dismissed the petition and ordered the petitioners to be evicted from the area. But such eviction was not
enforced and the number of stall owners even grew.

After a few years, the municipal again resolved to demolish the stalls

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the resolution in 1961 conferred contractual rights to the stall owners making them lawful
lessees of the land

2. Whether or not the said area are dedicated for public use
HELD:
1. There was no dispute that the land occupied by the petitioners was previously used as a town plaza and
being such it is considered as beyond the commerce of man and cannot be the subject of lease or any
contractual undertaking. The petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises.

2. The proliferation of the stalls caused several repercussions to the area such as
> the makeshift and flammable materials has made the area susceptible of fire endangering public safety
> said stalls have obstructed the way going to the real public market
> the filthy conditions of the stalls has aggravated health and sanitation problems
> the area has contributed to the obstruction of the flow of traffic

3. Assuming that there was a valid contract (and that the land is not for public use), the petitioners must yield
to the police power exercised by the municipal government. It is a well settled rule that any valid contract
may be cancelled if it causes danger to the public.

VILLARICO V. COURT OF
APPEALS 309 SCRA 193
FACTS

Sps. Teofilo and Maxima Villarico, filed an application for confirmation of the title over a parcel of land which
they allege they bought from Teofilos father. Said application was opposed by the Director of Forestry
contending that the said land forms part of the public domain as it is within the unclassified area in
Meycauayan and is not available for private appropriation. The TC dismissed the case since the property
forms part of the public domain therefore the certificate of title is void. The CA affirmed the findings of the
Trial Court, thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the property still forms part of the public domain

HELD: YES
> The SC held that both the TC and the appellate court correctly adjudged the area to be within the
unclassified forest zone therefore incapable of private appropriation.
> There has been no showing that a declassification has been made declaring the said lands as disposable
or alienable and the spouses have not showed evidence to lead to the court to rule otherwise.
> Thus, if the land in question still forms part of the public forest, then possession thereof, however long,
cannot convert it into private property as it is beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to
register under the Torrens System.

LANZAR V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

FACTS:
Petitioner Ramon Lanzar filed an application for registration of title to a parcel of land, alleging that he is the
owner in fee simple of the lad in question and asking that the title thereto be registered in his name. The
Director of Lands filed an opposition on the ground that the land is a foreshore which forms a part of public
domain. RTC decided in favor of Lanzar holding that the property in question has been possessed by the
applicant publicly, continuously and adversely for more that 30 years. CA reversed, holding that the land,
being an accretion formed by the action of sea, is property of public domain and not susceptible of
appropriation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the title to the land may be registered on the basis of adverse possession for over 30 years?

HELD:
No. The shores and lands reclaimed from the sea, while they continue to be devoted to public uses and no
grant whatever has been made of any portion of them to private persons, remain part of the public domain
and are of public uses, and, until they are converted to patrimonial property of the State, such lands, thrown
up by the action of the sea, and the shores adjacent thereto, are not susceptible of prescription, inasmuch
as, being dedicated to the public uses, they are not subject of commerce among men, in accordance with
the provisions of article 1936 of the civil code.

REPUBLIC V. CA
FACTS:
Respondent Morato filed a free patent application on a parcel of land, which was approved and issued an
original certificate of title. Both the free patent and title specifically mandate that the land shall not be
alienated nor encumbered within 5 years from the date of the issuance of the patent. The District Land
Officer, acting upon reports that Morato had encumbered the land and upon finding that the subject land is
submerged in water during high tide and low tide, filed a complaint for cancellation of the title and reversion
of the parcel of land to the public domain. RTC dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not respondent violated the free patent condition prohibiting encumbering the land within the
5-year period?

2. Whether or not the land is of public domain?

HELD
1. Yes. Public Land Act Sec. 18 provides thatlands acquired under free patent or homestead provisions
shall not be subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of approval of the application and for a term
of 5 years from and after the date of issuance of the patent or grantThe contracts of lease and mortgage
executed by Morato constitute an encumbrance as contemplated by section 18 of the Public Land Act
because such contracts impair the use of the property.

2. Yes. Based from the facts, the land is clearly foreshore as it is subject to the ebb and flow of the tide.
When the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property became foreshore land
and passed to the realm of the public domain. In Government v. Cabangis, the Court annulled the
registration of land subject of cadastral proceedings when the parcel subsequently became foreshore land.
In another case, the Court voided the registration decree of a trial court and held that said court had no
jurisdiction to award foreshore land to any private person or entity. The subject land in this case, being
foreshore land should therefor be returned to the public domain.

CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATE

AUTHORITY
FACTS:
From the time of Marcos until Estrada, portions of Manila Bay were being reclaimed. A law was passed
creating the Public Estate Authority which was granted with the power to transfer reclaimed lands. Now in
this case, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a private corporation. Under the Joint
Venture Agreement between AMARI and PEA, several hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom
Islands and several portions of submerged areas of Manila Bay were going to be transferred to AMARI .

ISSUE:
Whether or not the stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands, reclaimed or to be
reclaimed, violate the Constitution

RULING: YES!
Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain Section 3 of the Constitution: Alienable lands of the public domain
shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands
of the public domain except by lease The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom
Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain.
PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to
private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine
citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. Clearly, the
Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Under Article 1409 of
the Civil Code, contracts whose object or purpose is contrary to law, or whose object is outside the
commerce of men, are inexistent and void from the beginning. The Court must perform its duty to defend
and uphold the Constitution, and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.

INVOLUNTARY INSOLVENCY OF
PAUL STROCHECKER V.
RAMIREZ (GR 18700, 26
September 1922)

FACTS:
The half-interest in the business (Antigua Botica Ramirez) was mortgaged with Fidelity & Surety Co. on 10
March 1919, and registered in due time in the registry of property, while another mortgage was made with
Ildefonso Ramirez on 22 September 1919 and registered also in the registry. Raised in the lower court, the
trial court declared the mortgage of Fidelity & Surety Co. entitled to preference over that of Ildefonso
Ramirez and another mortgage by Concepcion Ayala. Ayala did not appeal, but Ramirez did.

ISSUE:
Whether or not half-interest over a business is a movable property

RULING: Yes.
1. Interest in business may be subject of mortgage With regard to the nature of the property mortgaged
which is one-half interest in the business, such interest is a personal property capable of appropriation and
not included in the enumeration of real properties in articles 335 of the Civil Code, and may be the subject of
mortgage. All personal property may be mortgaged. (Sec. 7, Act 1508.)

2. Description of mortgage property sufficient The description contained in the document is sufficient. The
law (sec. 7, Act 1508) requires only a description of the mortgaged property shall be such as to enable the
parties to the mortgage, or any other person, after reasonable inquiry and investigation, to identify the same.
In the case at bar, his half interest in the drug business known as Antigua Botica Ramirez, located at Calle
Real Nos. 123 and 125, District of Intramuros, Manila Philippine Islands" is sufficient.
3. Article 1922 (1-3) of the Civil Code applicable only to mortgage property in possession Numbers 1, 2, and
3 of the article 1922 of the Civil Code are not applicable as neither the debtor, nor himself, is in possession
of the property mortgaged, which is, and since the registration of the mortgage has been, legally in
possession of the surety company
4. Stipulation about personal property not a mortgage upon property - In no way can the mortgage executed
be given effect as of the date of the sale of the store in question; as there was a mere stipulation about
personal security during said date, but not a mortgage upon property, and much less upon the property in
question.

US V. TAMBUNTING
FACTS:
The Manila Gas Company installed equipment for the transmission of gas in a house at Evangelista. After
the original subscriber left, the apparatus was sealed and the services discontinued.

Later Mr Tambunting moved in. He was a cheapskate and spliced the tubing to leech free gas for household
use. Alas, the crime was discovered by the gas company. The prosecutor filed charges and hailed Mr.
Tambunting to court

ISSUE:
Whether or not gas can be the subject of larceny.

HELD:
Yes. Gas is a substance which lends itself to felonious appropriation. It is a valuable merchandise that can
be bought and sold like other personal property, susceptible of being siphoned from a larger mass and
transported from place to place. Articles 517 and 518 sets parameters for the theft of gas and it is a valid
ordinance.

US V. CARLOS
FACTS:

Mr Carlos stole about 2273 kilowatts of electricity worth 909 pesos from Meralco. The court issued warrant
for arrest. Mr. Carlos demurred and refused to enter a plea. He claimed that what he did failed to constitute
an offense. His counsel further asserted that the crime of larceny applied only to tangibles, chattels and
objects that can be taken into possession and spirited away.

Deliberation quickly followed at the court which subsequently sentenced him to over a year in jail. Mr. Carlos
contested saying that electrical energy cant be stolen (how can one steal an incorporeal thing?). He filed an
appeal on such grounds and the court of first instance affirmed the decision. The case reached the supreme
court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not larceny can be committed against an intangible such as electricity.

HELD:
Yes, larceny of incorporeal objects is possible. The right of ownership of electrical current was secured by
Art 517 and 518 of the Penal Code which applies to gas.

Analogically, electricity can be considered as gas which can be stolen. However, the true test of what
constitutes the proper subject of larceny is not whether the subject is corporeal or incorporeal, but whether is
is capable of appropriation by another other than the owner. It is a valuable article of merchandise, a force of
nature brought under the control of science. Mr. Carlos secretly and with intent to deprive the company of its
rightful property, used jumper cables to appropriate the same for his own use. This constitutes larceny.

PHILIPPINE REFINING COMPANY

V. JARQUE
FACTS:
Plaintiff Philippine Refining Co. and defendant Jarque executed three mortgages on the motor vessels
Pandan and Zargazo. The documents were recorded as transfer and encumbrances of the vessels for the
port of Cebu and each was denominated a chattel mortgage.

The first two mortgages did not have an affidavit of good faith. A fourth mortgage was executed by Jarque
and Ramon Aboitiz over motorship Zaragoza and was entered in the Chattel Mortgage Registry on May 12,
1932, within the period of 30 days prior to the foreclosure/institution of the insolvency proceedings.

Jose Curaminas filed with the CFI of Cebu a petition praying that Francisco Jarque be declared an insolvent
debtor. This was granted and Jarques properties were then assigned to Curaminas.

A problem arose when Judge Jose Hontiveros declined to order the foreclosure of the mortgages, and
instead, ruled that they were defective because they did not have affidavits of good faith.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the mortgages of the vessels are governed by the Chattel Mortgage Law
2. Whether or not an affidavit of good faith is needed to enforce achattel mortgage on a vessel

RULING:
Yes. Personal property includes vessels. They are subject to the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law.
The Chattel Mortgage Law says that a good chattel mortgage includes an affidavit of good faith. The
absence of such affidavit makes mortgage unenforceable against creditors and subsequent encumbrances.
The judge was correct.

Note: A mortgage on a vessel is generally like other chattel mortgages. The only difference between a
chattel mortgage of a vessel and a chattel mortgage of other personalty is that the first must be noted in the
registry of the register of deeds.

RUBISO AND GELITO V. RIVERA

FACTS:
Gelito & Co. was owned by Bonifacio Gelito and Chinaman Sy Qui. One of the properties of the company
was a pilot ship/merchant vessel called Valentina, whose ownership is at question here.
A series of sales had taken place:
1. First, Gelito had sold is 2/3 share to Chinaman Sy Qui.
2. When Sy Qui acquired full ownership of the company, he sold Valentina to Florentino Rivera for
P2,500 on January 4, 1915. The sale was registered in the Bureau of Customs over two months later
on March 17, 1915.
3. Shorty after the sale to Rivera, a suit was brought against Sy Qui to enforce payment of a certain
sum of money. Valentina was placed at a public auction and was purchased by Sy Quis creditor,
Fausto Rubiso. He bought the vessel for P55.45. The sale was registered in the Office of the
Collector of Customs on January 27, 1915 and in the commercial registry on March 14, 1925.

The first buyer, Florentino Rivera, contends that he had lost the ship when it got stranded somewhere in
Batangas. He claims that Rubiso took possession of the vessel without his knowledge or consent. Rivera

seeks to be indemnified for the profits he could have collected from the vessels voyages had Rivera not
taken it. But, does he have the right to the vessel?

ISSUE:
Who is the rightful owner of the merchant vessel--Rivera or Rubiso?

RULING:
Rubiso. It is true that the sale to Rivera had taken place prior to the public auction where Rubiso bought the
vessel, but the same was entered in the customs registry only on March 17, 1915. Rubiso, however, had
acted more swiftly by registering the property much earlier in the Office of the Collector Customs and in the
commercial registry in the same month. Although the sale to Rivera had taken place first, the registration
made by Rubiso was made earlier.

Rubiso did the smart thing by registering the property at the commercial registry. Pursuant to Article 573 of
the Code of Commerce, the acquisition of a vessel must be registered at the commercial registry in order to
bind third parties. Such registration is necessary and indispensible in order that the purchasers rights may
be maintained against a claim filed by third persons.

With respect to the rights of two purchasers, whichever of them first registered his acquisition of the vessel is
the one entitled to enjoy the protection of the law. By first registration, he becomes the absolute owner of the
boat and is freed from all encumbrances and claims by strangers.

SIBAL v. VALDEZ
For the purpose of attachment and execution, and for the purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law,
"ungathered products" have the nature of personal property.

FACTS:
(this case has a lot of confusing facts, just read the original if this digest fails to compress everything) The
Deputy Sheriff of the Province of Tarlac, by virtue of a writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga, attached and sold to the defendant Emiliano J. Valdez the sugar cane planted by the plaintiff
and his tenants on seven parcels of land. Included also in those attached were real properties wherein
8mout of the 11 parcels of land, house and camarin which was first acquired by Macondray & Co and then
later on bought by Valdez in an auction. First Cause for petitioner: That Within one year from the date of the
attachment and sale the plaintiff offered to redeem said sugar cane and tendered to the defendant Valdez
the amount sufficient to cover the price paid by the latter, the interest thereon and any assessments or taxes
which he may have paid thereon after the purchase, and the interest corresponding thereto and that Valdez
refused to accept the money and to return the sugar cane to the plaintiff. Second Cause for petitioner: That
Valdez was trying to harvest palay from four out of seven parcels of land. Petitioner filed for preliminary
injunction to stop defendant from 1) distributing the lands 2) harvesting and selling the sugar canes, and 3)
harvesting and selling the palay. The writ was issued which prevented defendant from planting and
harvesting the lands. Defendant later appealed claiming that he was the owner of many of the alleged land
thus he also owns the crops of it. The court awarded the defendant 9,439.08 because the petitioner unduly
denied the defendant to plant in his land thus preventing him to profit thereto.

ISSUE:
Whether the sugar cane is personal o real property? (The relevance of the issue is with regards to the sugar
cane of the Petitioner which came from the land that now belongs to the defendant)

RULING:
It is contended that sugar cane comes under the classification of real property as "ungathered products" in
paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code. Said paragraph 2 of article 334 enumerates as real property the
following: Trees, plants, and ungathered products, while they are annexed to the land or form an integral part
of any immovable property." That article, however, has received in recent years an interpretation by the
Tribunal Supremo de Espaa, which holds that, under certain conditions, growing crops may be considered
as personal property.

In some cases "standing crops" may be considered and dealt with as personal property. In the case of
Lumber Co. vs. Sheriff and Tax Collector (106 La., 418) the Supreme Court said: "True, by article 465 of the
Civil Code it is provided that 'standing crops and the fruits of trees not gathered and trees before they are cut
down . . . are considered as part of the land to which they are attached, but the immovability provided for is
only one in abstracto and without reference to rights on or to the crop acquired by others than the owners of
the property to which the crop is attached. . . . The existence of a right on the growing crop is a mobilization
by anticipation, a gathering as it were in advance, rendering the crop movable quoad the right acquired
therein. Our jurisprudence recognizes the possible mobilization of the growing crop."
For the purpose of attachment and execution, and for the purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law,
"ungathered products" have the nature of personal property. SC lowered the award for damages to the
defendant to 8,900.80 by acknowledging the fact that some of the sugar canes were owned by the petitioner
and by reducing the calculated expected yield or profit that defendant would have made if petitioner did not
judicially prevent him from planting and harvesting his lands.

PIANSAY v. DAVID
As it may be true that the parties who agreed to attach the house in a chattel mortgage may be
bound thereto under the doctrine of estoppel, the same does not bind third persons.

FACTS:
Conrado S. David received a loan of P3,000 with interest at 12% per annum from Claudia B. Vda. de Uy
Kim, one of the plaintiffs, and to secure the payment of the same, Conrado S. David executed a chattel
mortgage on a house situated at 1259 Sande Street, Tondo, Manila. The mortgage was foreclosed and was
sold to Kim to satisfy the debt. 2 years later after the foreclosure, the house was sold by Kim to Marcos
Magubat. The latter then filed to collect the loan from David and to declare the sale issued by Kim in favour
of Piansay null and void. (It appears that Kim sold the house to two people, namely Piansay and Magubat)
The trial court approved of the collection of the loan from David but dismissed the complaint regarding the
questioned sale between Kim and Piansay, declaring the latter as rightful owner of the house and awarding
damages to him. CA reversed the decision making David the rightful owner and ing him and his co-

defendant, Mangubat, to levy the house. Now Petitioners are trying to release the said property from the
aforementioned levy by claiming that Piansay is the rightful owner of the house.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the sale between Kim and Piansay was valid?

RULING:
Since it is a rule in our law that buildings and constructions are regarded as mere accesories to the land
(following the Roman maxim omne quod solo inaedificatur solo credit) it is logical that said accessories
should partaked of the nature of the principal thing, which is the land forming, as they do, but a single object
(res) with it in contemplation of law. A mortgage creditor who purchases real properties at an extra-judicial
foreclosure sale thereof by virtue of a chattel mortgage constituted in his favor, which mortgage has been
declared null and void with respect to said real properties acquires no right thereto by virtue of said sale
Thus, Mrs. Uy Kim had no right to foreclose the alleged chattel mortgage constituted in her favor, because it
was in reality a mere contract of an unsecured loan. It follows that the Sheriff was not authorized to sell the
house as a result of the foreclosure of such chattel mortgage. And as Mrs. Uy Kim could not have acquired
the house when the Sheriff sold it at public auction, she could not, in the same token, it validly to Salvador
Piansay. Conceding that the contract of sale between Mrs. Uy Kim and Salvador Piansay was of no effect,
we cannot nevertheless set it aside upon instance of Mangubat because, as the court below opined, he is
not a party thereto nor has he any interest in the subject matter therein, as it was never sold or mortgaged to
him At any rate, regardless of the validity of a contract constituting a chattel mortgage on a house, as
between the parties to said contract, the same cannot and does not bind third persons, who are not parties
to the aforementioned contract or their privies. As a consequence, the sale of the house in question in the
proceedings for the extrajudicial foreclosure of said chattel mortgage, is null and void insofar as defendant
Mangubat is concerned, and did not confer upon Mrs. Uy Kim, as buyer in said sale, any dominical right in
and to said house, so that she could not have transmitted to her assignee, plaintiff Piansay any such right as
against defendant Mangubat. In short plaintiffs have no cause of action against the defendants herein.

MANILA ELECTRIC CO. V.

CENTRAL BOARD
FACTS
This is about the imposition of realty tax on two oil storage tanks installed by Manila Electric on land which it
leased from Caltex. The tanks, as alleged, merely sit on its foundation. City board alleges that the area
where the two tanks are located is enclosed with earthen dikes with electric steel poles on top.

ISSUE
Whether the tanks are realty or personalty.

HELD
For purposes of taxation, the term "real property" may include things which should generally be regarded as
personal property. The other Manila Electric case is not in point since in that case the steel towers were
regarded as poles and under its franchise, Meralco's poles were exempt from taxation. Moreover, the steel
towers were not attached to any land, or building. They were removable from their metal frames. Although
the two tanks here were not embedded in the land, they were installed with some degree of permanence.
Moreover, they are useful and necessary to the industry.

CALTEX V. CENTRAL BOARD

FACTS

This case is concerned with tax on machinery and equipment installed by Caltex in its gas stations located
on leased land. The machines were loaned by Caltex to gas station operators under a lease agreement. It
was stipulated in the contract that the operators, upon demand, shall return to Caltex the machines and
equipment in good condition. The city assessor characterized said machines as taxable realty.

ISSUE
Whether said machines and equipments are realty property and thus subject to realty tax.

HELD
Said equipment and machinery, as appurtenances to the gas station building owned by Caltex and which are
necessary o the operation of the gas station and are thus taxable as realty. This ruling is different from the
one in Davao Saw Mill since here, the machinery were permanently affixed by Caltex to its gas stations. The
tenement was owned by Caltex. Differentiate this also from the Manila Electric Case where the materials
were only attached by bolts and could be moved from place to place.

MAKATI LEASING AND FINANCE

CORP. V. WEAREVER TEXTILE
MILLS, INC.
Parties to a contract may by agreement treat as personal property that which by nature is a real
property, as long as no interest of 3rd party would be prejudiced.

FACTS:

To obtain financial accommodations from Makati Leasing, Wearever Textile discounted and assigned several
receivables under a Receivable Purchase Agreement with Makati Leasing. To secure the collection of
receivables, it executed a chattel mortgage over several raw materials and a machinery Artos Aero Dryer
Stentering Range (Dryer).

Wearever defaulted thus the properties mortgaged were extrajudicially foreclosed. The sheriff, after the
restraining order was lifted, was able to enter the premises of Wearever and removed the drive motor of the
Dryer. The CA reversed the order of the CFI, ordering the return of the drive motor since it cannot be the
subject of a replevin suit being an immovable bolted to the ground. Thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:
Whether the dryer is an immovable property

HELD: NO
The SC relied on its ruling in Tumalad v. Vicencio, that if a house of strong materials can be the subject of a
Chattel Mortgage as long as the parties to the contract agree and no innocent 3rd party will be prejudiced
then moreso that a machinery may treated as a movable since it is movable by nature and becomes
immobilized only by destination. And treating it as a chattel by way of a Chattel Mortgage, Wearever is
estopped from claiming otherwise.

TUMALAD V. VICENCIO
Although a building is an immovable; the parties to a contract may by agreement treat as personal
property that which by nature is a real property however they are estopped from subsequently
claiming otherwise.

FACTS:
Alberta Vicencio and Emiliano Simeon received a loan of P4, 800 from Gavino and Generosa Tumalad. To
guaranty said loan, Vicencio executed a chattel mortgage in favor of Tumalad over their house of strong
materials which stood on a land which was rented from the Madrigal & Company, Inc. When Vicencio
defaulted in paying, the house was extrajudicially foreclosed, pursuant to their contract. It was sold to
Tumalad and they instituted a Civil case in the Municipal Court of Manila to have Vicencio vacate the house
and pay rent.

The MTC decided in favor of Tumalad ordering Vicencio to vacate the house and pay rent until they have
completely vacated the house. Vicencio is questioning the legality of the chattel mortgage on the ground that
1) the signature on it was obtained thru fraud and 2) the mortgage is a house of strong materials which is an
immovable therefore can only be the subject of a REM. On appeal, the CFI found in favor of Tumalad, and
since the Vicencio failed to deposit the rent ordered, it issued a writ of execution, however the house was
already demolished pursuant to an order of the court in an ejectment suit against Vicencio for non-payment
of rentals. Thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the chattel mortgage is void since its subject is an immovable

HELD:
NO.
Although a building is by itself an immovable property, parties to a contract may treat as personal property
that which by nature would be real property and it would be valid and good only insofar as the contracting
parties are concerned. By principle of estoppel, the owner declaring his house to be a chattel may no longer
subsequently claim otherwise.

When Vicencio executed the Chattel Mortgage, it specifically provides that the mortgagor cedes, sells and
transfers by way of Chattel mortgage. They intended to treat it as chattel therefore are now estopped from
claiming otherwise. Also the house stood on rented land which was held in previous jurisprudence to be
personalty since it was placed on the land by one who had only temporary right over the property thus it
does not become immobilized by attachment.

[Vicencio though was not made to pay rent since the action was instituted during the period of redemption
therefore Vicencio still had a right to remain in possession of the property]

NAVARRO v. PINEDA
With regard to third persons who are not parties to the contract, a house is still considered as an
immovable property.

FACTS:
Pineda and his mother secured a loan from Navarro. In line with this, they executed a REM over the land
owned by his mother, and a Chattel Mortgage over the residential house. They defaulted on the payment of
the loan, but they were able to ask for an extension. However, they still defaulted, which caused Navarro to
file for a foreclosure of the mortgages.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the house should be considered as a movable or immovable property?

HELD:
The stipulation of the parties still govern. Thus, with regard to a building erected on a lot belonging to
another, this may be the subject matter of a chattel mortgage if the parties so stipulate. However, with regard
to third persons who are not parties to the contract, the house is still considered as an immovable property.

PRUDENTIAL BANK v. PANIS

An Real Estate Mortgage can be constituted on the building erected on the land belonging to
another.

FACTS:
Spouses Magcale secured a loan with Prudential Bank. To further secure said loan, the spouses executed
a Real Estate Mortgageover the residential building, with a right to occupy the lot. The Real Estate
Mortgage also included information about the Sales Patent applied for by the spouses for the lot to which
the building stood. The spouses got another loan, which was secured by another Real Estate
Mortgage over the same properties.

The Sec. of Agriculture issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent over the lot which was then mortgaged to the
bank in favor of the Macales.

The spouses defaulted on both loans. Thus, the Real Estate Mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed, and
sold in a public auction.

The RTC held that the Real Estate Mortgage was null and void.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a Real Estate Mortgage can be constituted on the building erected on a lot belonging to
another?

HELD:

Yes.
The fact that the spouses executed the Real Estate Mortgage over the building before executing the
second Real Estate Mortgageover the land proved that the spouses intended for the building to be an
immovable separate and distinct from the land on which it is built.

PUNZALAN V. LACSAMANA
Buildings are always treated as immovable or real property under the Code even if it was dealt
with separately from the land upon which it stood

FACTS:
Some land belonging to Antonio Punzalan was foreclosed by the Philippine National Bank Tarlac, Branch in
failure of the former to pay the mortgaged fee amounting to P10 grand Since PNB was the highest bidder,
the land went to PNB.

Sometime 1974, while the property was still in the possession of Punzalan, Punzalan constructed a
warehouse on the said land by virtue of the permit secured from the Municipal Mayor of Bamban, Tarlac.
Subsequently, in 1978, a contract of sale was entered into by PNB and Remedios Vda. De Lacsamana,
whom in lieu of the said sale secured a title over the property involving the warehouse allegedly owned and
constructed by the plaintiff.

Punzalan filed a suit for annulment of the Deed of Sale with damages against PNB and Lacsamana before
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 31, impugning the validity of the sale of the building, requesting
the same to be declared null and void and that damages in the total sum of P23, 200 more or less be
awarded to him.

Respondent Lacsamana in his answer averred the affirmative defense of lack of cause of action contending
that she was a purchaser for value, while, PNB filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue,
invoking that the building was a real property under Article 415 of the Civil Code, and therefore, Section 4 (a)
of the Rules of Court should apply.

Punzalan filed a Motion for Reconsideration asserting that the action he filed is limited to the annulment of
sale and that, it does not involved ownership of or title to property but denied by the court for lack of merit. A
motion for pre-trial was also set by Punzalan but was also denied by the court invoking that the case was
already dismissed.

Hence, a petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioner.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the judgment rendered by the court is proper.

HELD:
While it is true that the petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of the title or possession of the property
in question, his action for annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely intertwined with the issue
of ownership of the building, which, under the law, is considered immovable property, the recovery of which
is petitioners primary objective. The prevalent doctrine is that an action for the annulment or rescission of a
sale of real property does not operate to efface the objective and nature of the case, which is to recover said
property. It is a real action. Respondent Court did not err in dismissing the case on the ground of improper
venue under Section 12 Rule 4 which was timely raised under Section 1 Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.

Personal Observation: The venue was improperly laid by the petitioner in the case at bar. Such ground was
sufficient to render dismissal of the case, as the same is one of the grounds provided for under Rule 16 (c) of
the Rules of Court.

The Denial of Motion to Dismiss rendered by the court in the instant case is appealable. If such denial
constitute grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court , Punzalan may file either Prohibition or
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

STANDARD OIL COMPANY V

JARAMILLO
The Power of the Registry of Deeds is Ministerial, and The absolute criterion to determine between real and
personal property is NOT supplied by the civil code. Parties may agree what to treat as personal property
and what to treat as real property.

FACTS
On November 27, 1922, Gervasia de la Rosa was the lessee of a parcel of land situated in the City of Manila
and owner of the house of really tough materials built thereon. She executed that fine day a document in the
form of a chattel mortgage, purporting to convey to Standard Oil Company of New York (by way of
mortgage) both the leasehold interest in said lot and the building.

After said document had been duly acknowledged and delivered, Standard Oil presented it to Joaquin
Jaramillo, as register of deeds of the City of Manila, for the purpose of having the same recorded in the book
of record of chattel mortgages. Upon examination of the instrument, Jaramillo opined that it was not chattel
mortgage, for the reason that the interest therein mortgaged did not appear to be personal property, within
the meaning of the Chattel Mortgage Law, and registration was refused on this ground only.

Later this confusion was brought to the Supreme Court upon demurrer by Joaquin Jaramillo, register of
deeds of the City of Manila, to an original petition of the Standard Oil Company of New York, demanding a
mandamus to compel the respondent to record in the proper register a document purporting to be a chattel
mortgage executed in the City of Manila by Gervasia de la Rosa, Vda. de Vera, in favor of the Standard Oil
Company of New York.

The Supreme Court overruled the demurrer, and ordered that unless Jaramillo interposes a sufficient answer
to the petition for mandamus by Standard Oil within 5 days of notification, the writ would be issued as
prayed, but without costs.

ISSUE:

w/n the Registry of Deeds can determine the nature of property to be registered.
w/n the Registry of Deeds has powers beyond Ministerial discretion.

RESOLUTION:
1.Jaramillo, register of deeds, does not have judicial or quasi-judicial power to determine nature of document
registered as chattel mortgage Section 198 of the Administrative Code, originally of Section 15 of the Chattel
Mortgage Law (Act 1508 as amended by Act 2496), does not confer upon the register of deeds any authority
whatever in respect to the "qualification," as the term is used in Spanish law, of chattel mortgages. His duties
in respect to such instruments are ministerial only. The efficacy of the act of recording a chattel mortgage
consists in the fact that it operates as constructive notice of the existence of the contract, and the legal
effects of the contract must be discovered in the instrument itself in relation with the fact of notice.

2.Article 334 and 335 of the Civil Code does not supply absolute criterion on distinction between real and
personal property for purpose of the application of the Chattel Mortgage Law Article 334 and 335 of the Civil
Code supply no absolute criterion for discriminating between real property and personal property for
purposes of the application of the Chattel Mortgage Law. Those articles state rules which, considered as a
general doctrine, are law in this jurisdiction; but it must not be forgotten that under given conditions property
may have character different from that imputed to it in said articles. It is undeniable that the parties to a
contract may be agreement treat as personal property that which by nature would be real property; and it is
a familiar phenomenon to see things classed as real property for purposes of taxation which on general
principle might be considered personal property. Other situations are constantly arising, and from time to
time are presented to the Supreme Court, in which the proper classification of one thing or another as real or
personal property may be said to be doubtful.]

BICERRA V. TENEZA
FACTS:
The Bicerras are supposedly the owners of the house (PhP 20,000) built on a lot owned by them in

Lagangilang, Abra; which the Tenezas forcibly demolished in January 1957, claiming to be the owners
thereof. The materials of the house were placed in the custody of the barrio lieutenant. The Bicerras filed a
complaint claiming actual damages of P200, moral and consequential damages amounting to P600, and the
costs. The CFI Abra dismissed the complaint claiming that the action was within the exclusive (original)
jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court of Lagangilang, Abra.

The Supreme Court affirmed the order appealed. Having been admitted in forma pauperis, no costs were
adjudged.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the house is immovable property even if it is on the land of another

RULING:
Yes.

House is immovable property even if situated on land belonging to a different owner; Exception, when
demolished.

A house is classified as immovable property by reason of its adherence to the soil on which it is built (Article
415, paragraph 1, Civil Code). This classification holds true regardless of the fact that the house may be
situated on land belonging to a different owner. But once the house is demolished, as in this case, it ceases
to exist as such and hence its character as an immovable likewise ceases.

ASSOCIATED INS. & SURETY

CO., INC. v. IYA, et al.
A building is an immovable property irrespective of where or not said structure and the land on
which it is adhered to belong to the same owner.

FACTS:
Adriano Valino and Lucia A. Valino owns a house of strong materials. Filed a bond fr 11k subscribed by the
Associated Insurance and Surety Co., Inc. and as counter-guaranty therefr, the spouses Valino executed an
alleged chattel mortgage on the aforementioned house in favor of the surety company.
The parcel of land on which the house is erected was still registered in the name of the Philippine Realty
Corporation but was able to obtained the same from them after full payment of the purchase price. Valinos
acquired another loan from Iya for 12k, executing an REM over the lot and house. However they werent able
to pay off their other loan so the chattel mortgage was foreclosed. The surety company was awarded the
land as the highest bidder in the auction. The surety company later on discovered that the land was subject
to a REM. The surety company then requested that the house and lot be excluded from the REM. Iya, in her
answer, said that she had a real right over the property and that the chattel mortgage on which the
foreclosure was based should be declared null and void for non-compliance with the form required by law.
CA ed only the foreclosure of the REM only up to the land and they awarded the structure to the surety
company saying that the house is a personal property and may be subject to chattel mortgage.

ISSUE:
Which of the mortgages should have preference?

RULING:
Lopez v Orosa was used as a precedent here saying that the buildings an immovable itself, separate and
distinct from the land. A building is an immovable property irrespective of where or not said structure and the
land on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner.

Only personal property is subject to a chattel mortgage and since the structure in this case is an immovable,
it cannot subject to a chattel mortgage. Therefore the chattel mortgage and the sale on which it was based
should be declared null and void.

Iya was given the superior right not only to the land but also to the structure to foreclose them in an auction.

LOPEZ v OROSA, JR., PLAZA

THEATRE, INC.
The Building is an immovable by itself, separate and distinct from the land from which it is attached.

FACTS:
Orosa invited Lopez to invest with him in building a theatre. Lopez supplied wood for the construction of the
said theatre. The materials totaled 62k but Orosa was only able to pay 20k thus leaving a balance of almost
42k. Later on respondents acquired a bank loan of 30k, wherein Luzon Surety Company as their surety and
the land and buildings as mortgages. Petitioner sued to collect the unpaid materials and was able to get a
judgment against the respondents making them jointly liable to pay the remaining amount. Also, he was able
to obtain a materialmans lien on the building of the theatre. The stocks amounting to 42k shall be sold in
public auction in case the respondents default. Petitioner wasnt happy because he also wanted a lien on the
land, urging that the judgment lien should include it since the building and the land are inseparable.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the building and the land are inseperable and W/N petitioner can obtain a lien on the land as
well?

RULING:

NO to both! The contention that the lien executed in favor of the furnisher of the materials used for the
construction, repair or refection of a building is also extended to land on which the construction was made is
without merit, because while it is true that generally, real estate connotes the land and the building
constructed thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of the building, separate and distinct from the land in the
enumeration (in the CC) of what may constitute real properties could mean only one thing- that a building is
by itself an immovable property.

The preference to unregistered lien is only with respect to the real estate upon which the refection or work
was made. The materialmans lien could be charged only to the building for which the credit was made or
which received the benefit of refection.

ADVANTAGES OF THE TORRENS

SYSTEM
1. Substituted security for insecurity
2. Reduced the cost of conveyance from pounds to shillings, and the time occupied from months to days
3. It has exchanged brevity and clearness for obscurity and verbiage
4. It has so simplified ordinary dealings that he who has mastered the 3 Rs can transact his own
conveyancing
5. It affords protection against fraud
6. It has restored to their just value many estates, held under good holding titles, but depreciated in
consequence of some blur or technical defect, and has barred the reoccurrence of any similar faults

NOCEDA V. CA
313 SCRA 504
FACTS:
Directo together with her nephew and another, extrajudicially partitioned the land donated to them. On the
same date, she donated in favor of Noceda a part of her land. On her share of the land, she fenced it and
constructed three huts therein. On a later date, Noceda removed the fence, entered the premises and used
the three lots. Despite demands for him to vacate, he refused to do so, prompting Directo to file a case
against him and revoke the donation made by her.

HELD:
The acts of Noceda are acts of usurpation which is an offense against the property of Directo and
considered an act of ingratitude of a donee against a donor. The law doesnt require conviction of the donee,
it is enough that his offense is proved in the action for revocation.

EDUARTE V. CA
253 SCRA 391
FACTS:
Pedro executed a deed of donation in favor of Helen. Amazingly, another deed showed up wherein he
conveyed the whole property to the same. He donated a portion of his land to a Christian church and then
sold another to Eduarte. Pedro claimed that the signature on the second deed was a forgery and he sought
to revoke the first donation.

HELD:
All crimes which offend the donor show ingratitude and are causes for revocation.

AUSTRIA-MAGAT V. CA
375 SCRA 556
FACTS:
Comerciante had 5 children. She then bought a residential house and lot which she donated to her children.
The deed contained an acceptance and irrevocability clause. Thereafter she executed a deed of absolute
sale in favor of Apolinaria.

HELD:
The act of selling the subject property to petitioner herein cannot be considered as a valid act of revocation
of the deed of donation for the reason that a formal case to revoke must be filed in court.

PARKS V. PROVINCE OF TARLAC

49 PHIL 142
FACTS:
Cider and Hill donated parcels of land in favor of the Municipality of Tarlac, under certain conditions. Without
revoking donation, they sold the land to Parks. The Municipality then conveyed the property to the Province.
Parks filed an action to recover property.

HELD:
The characteristic of a condition precedent is that the acquisition of a right isnt effected while said condition
is not complied with or isnt deemed complied with. Meanwhile, nothing is acquired and there is only
expectancy of right. Consequently, when a condition is imposed, the compliance of which cannot be effected
except when the right is deemed acquired, such condition cannot be a condition precedent.

CENTRAL PHIL. UNIVERSITY V.

CA
246 SCRA 511
FACTS:

When Don Ramon was still part of the board of trustees of the school, he donated a lot on the condition that
a medical school will be constructed therein. The heirs sought to annul the donation on the ground that the
school wanted to exchange the land with another owned by NHA.

HELD:
If there has been no compliance with the resolutory condition, the donation may now be revoked and all
rights which have been acquired under it shall be deemed lost and extinguished.

DE LUNA V. ABRIGO
181 SCRA 150
FACTS:
De Luna donated property for the construction of buildings for a school. Since the conditions were not met,
the donation was revoked but was later on revived, setting conditions for the construction of nursery,
kindergarten and chapel.

HELD:
When it involves onerous donations, the rules applicable will be that on contracts and prescription and not
those on the rules on donation.

ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP

OF MANILA V. CA
198 SCRA 300
FACTS:
The spouses donated property to the archbishop with the condition that no disposition shall be made within
100 years.

HELD:
There is no need for prescription to be applied in cases where there is stipulation for automatic reversion.
Nonetheless, the stipulation is against public policy and thus, is void.

CRUZ V. COURT OF APPEALS

140 SCRA 245
FACTS:
Cruz donated an apartment and lot in favor of her nieces. She was a childless widow. Thereafter, she
adopted a minor and sought to annul the donation.

HELD:
The donation may not be revoked or reduced if there is no adequate allegation that the legitime would be
impaired and if there has been no inventory submitted.

GENATO V. LORENZO
23 SCRA 618
FACTS:
This involved the transfer of shares of Simona Genato in favor of one of her sons.

HELD:
For there to be a valid donation, the delivery and acceptance must be simultaneously made.

Checklist For A Valid Donation

1. Is the donation gratuitous?
a. If it is onerous, then the law on contracts will apply.
2. Is the donation inter vivos?
a. If it is mortis causa, then the law on succession shouldapply.
3. Does the parties have the capacity to give or receive donations?
a. Take into consideration those prohibited donations as against public policy, unworthiness and
incapacity given by Articles 1027 and 1032
4. Perfection of the donation
5. Are there any grounds for reduction or revocation?
a. For reduction, there are three grounds
b. For revocation, there are four grounds

Notes in Donation

1. Donation is hard to sustain given the many requirements and conditions that have to be met.
2. Donation is both an act and a contract
3. There should be consideration given to the differences between a donation inter vivos and donation mortis
causa
4. Take note that there are different applicable rules when it comes to Civil Law and Taxation. The same
question may be asked regarding donation but there can be different answers depending on the law being
applied, on whether it is civil law or tax law.

VOID, INEFFECTIVE OR
UNPERFECTED DONATIONS
1. Those not perfected in accordance with the forms and solemnities of the law
2. Those made with property outside the commerce of man
3. Those made with future property except those provided in marriage settlements
4. Those made to persons specially disqualified
5. By reason of possible undue influence

Revocation Vs. Reduction Of

Donations
REVOCATION

REDUCTION

This is total regardless whether the

legitime has been impaired or not

This is as a rule, only partial and

applies only when the legitime has
been impaired. Thus, the legitime

As a rule, for the benefit of the

donor

As a rule, for the benefit of the heirs

of the donor

must always be preserved.

As a rule, for the benefit of the heirs
of the donor, since their legitimes
are supposed to be preserved

GROUNDS FOR
REVOCATION:

GROUNDS FOR
REDUCTION:

Fulfillment of resolutory conditions

or charges

BAR

Ingratitude
BAR/Birth, Adoption, Reappearance

Inofficiousness
If insufficient property is left for the
support of the donor and his
relatives

REVOCATION AND REDUCTION

OF DONATIONS
Art. 760. Every donation inter vivos, made by a person having no children or descendants, legitimate or
legitimated by subsequent marriage, or illegitimate, may be revoked or reduced as provided in the next
article, by the happening of any of these events:
(1) If the donor, after the donation, should have legitimate or legitimated or illegitimate children, even though
they be posthumous;
(2) If the child of the donor, whom the latter believed to be dead when he made the donation, should turn out
to be living;
(3) If the donor subsequently adopt a minor child. (644a)

TWO KINDS OF INOFFICIOUS DONATIONS

1. Those referred to in Articles 760 and 761

2. Those referred to in Articles 771 and 752

REASON WHY REDUCTION OR REVOCATION IS ALLOWED

> The law presumes that had the donor known he would have a child or that the child he thought was dead
was really alive, he wouldnt have made the donations, because then his only child would have been the
object of his affection and generosity

ADOPTION
1. Adoption must have judicial approval
2. The adoption must be that of a minor child
3. It will be observed that this adoption is practically one way of allowing the donor to revoke the donation
inter vivos at his own will. To allow an adoption of a sui juris as a ground of revocation may give rise to
adoption fro ulterior purposes

APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE 760

1. Donations propter nuptias
2. Onerous donations
3. Mortis causa
Art. 761. In the cases referred to in the preceding article, the donation shall be revoked or reduced
insofar as it exceeds the portion that may be freely disposed of by will, taking into account the whole
estate of the donor at the time of the birth, appearance or adoption of a child. (n)

VALUE OF THE HEREDITARY ESTATE

> The value at the birth, appearance, or adoption plus the value of the donation

RULE WHEN DONATION CAN BE COVERED BY THE FREE

DISPOSAL
> Insofar as the free disposal is concerned, the donation will remain valid up to that extent
Art. 762. Upon the revocation or reduction of the donation by the birth, appearance or adoption of a
child, the property affected shall be returned or its value if the donee has sold the same.

If the property is mortgaged, the donor may redeem the mortgage, by paying the amount
guaranteed, with a right to recover the same from the donee.
When the property cannot be returned, it shall be estimated at what it was worth at the time of the
donation. (645a)

WHAT THE DONEE MUST DO IF THE DONATION IS

REDUCED
1. If the property is still with him, return the property
2. If the property has been sold, give the value to the donor
3. If the property has been mortgaged, the donor may pay off the debt, but he can recover reimbursement
from the donee
4. If the property cannot be returned, return its value
Art. 763. The action for revocation or reduction on the grounds set forth in article 760 shall prescribe after
four years from the birth of the first child, or from his legitimation, recognition or adoption, or from the judicial
declaration of filiation, or from the time information was received regarding the existence of the child believed
dead. This action cannot be renounced, and is transmitted, upon the death of the donor, to his legitimate and
illegitimate children and
descendants. (646a)

PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION FOR REVOCATION OR

REDUCTION
1. If the donation was made when there was no child, it is the birth of the first child that counts, and not the
birth of subsequent children.
2. First child refers to the first legitimate child
3. Mere birth of a natural child is not a ground, it is the recognition that is the ground of reduction

RULE IN CASE OF LEGITIMATED CHILDREN

> Counted from time of legitimation

EFFECT IF REASON DISAPPEARS

> The donation should remain valid

PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD
> Four years
Art. 764. The donation shall be revoked at the instance of the donor, when the donee fails to comply
with any of the conditions which the former imposed upon the latter. In this case, the property
donated shall be returned to the donor, the alienations made by the donee and the mortgages
imposed
thereon by him being void, with the limitations established, with regard to third persons, by the
Mortgage Law and the Land Registration Laws.
This action shall prescribe after four years from the noncompliance with the condition, may be
transmitted to the heirs of the donor, and may be exercised against the donee's heirs. (647a)

FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH CONDITIONS

> Conditions must be understood to mean the charges and burdens imposed
> When the donee fails to comply with any of the conditions imposed by the donor, it is the donor who has
the right to impugn the validity of the transaction affecting the donated property

NECESSITY OF COURT ACTION

> The donor may not revoke a donation by his own unilateral act, even if the donee should have broken any
of the conditions imposed by the donation
> A court action is essential, if the donee refuses to return the property voluntarily

PERIOD FOR FULFILLMENT OF CONDITIONS

1. If there is a period given, said period is controlling, unless extended by the donor
2. If there is no period, the courts may fix a reasonable term

EFFECT ON PROPERTY DONATED

1. If still with the donee, he must return the same to the donor
2. If sold, donated, or mortgaged, the alienation or encumbrance will be considered void, unless the grantee
be an innocent third party who has received or registered his own right

PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD

> Four years from the non-compliance of the condition

TRANSMISSIBILITY OF THE RIGHT TO REVOKE

> The heirs are expressly granted the right to revoke if the donor is already dead and that the prescriptive
period has not yet lapsed

WHEN COURT ACTION IS NOT ESSENTIAL

> Court action is essential for revocation, unless the donee willingly surrenders the property or his value
> It is the party prejudiced who should bring the suit

MAY REVOCATION BE DONE AT THE INSTANCE OF THE

DONORS HEIRS?
> Yes, because one right of a creditor is to exercise the rights that couldve been exercised by the debtor

ACTION TO REVOKE MAY BE WAIVED

> The action to revoke is waivable by the donor or his successors-ininterest
Art. 765. The donation may also be revoked at the instance of the donor, by reason of ingratitude in the
following cases:
(1) If the donee should commit some offense against the person, the honor or the property of the donor, or of
his wife or children under his parental authority;
(2) If the donee imputes to the donor any criminal offense, or any act involving moral turpitude, even though
he should prove it, unless the crime or the act has been committed against the donee himself, his wife or
children under his authority;
(3) If he unduly refuses him support when the donee is legally or morally bound to give support to the donor.
(648a)

REASON FOR THE LAW ON GROUNDS OF INGRATITUDE

> One who has been the object of generosity must not turn ungrateful
> Gratitude is both a moral and legal duty

ACTS OF INGRATITUDE COVERED

1. Purely personal
2. Exclusive

Art. 766. Although the donation is revoked on account of ingratitude, nevertheless, the alienations
and mortgages effected before the notation of the complaint for revocation in the Registry of
Property shall subsist. Later ones shall be void. (649)
Art. 767. In the case referred to in the first paragraph of the preceding article, the donor shall have a
right to demand from the donee the value of property alienated which he cannot recover from third
persons, or the sum for which the same has been mortgaged. The value of said property shall be
fixed as of the time of the donation. (650)

RULE WHEN THIRD PERSONS HAVE THE PROPERTY, OR

WHEN IT HAS BEEN MORTGAGED
1. Recovery cannot be had from third persons because they are innocent
2. Or when the property has been mortgage

RULE WHEN DONEE IS INSOLVENT

> Rule is that the donor shall have the same rights as of a creditor of an insolvent debtor
Art. 768. When the donation is revoked for any of the causes stated in Article 760, or by reason of
ingratitude, or when it is reduced because it is inofficious, the donee shall not return the fruits except from
the filing of the complaint. If the revocation is based upon noncompliance with any of the conditions imposed
in the donation, the donee shall return not only the property but also the fruits thereof which he may have
received after having failed to fulfill the condition. (651)

RETURN OF THE FRUITS

1. The fruits accruing from the time the action is filed must be returned if the ground is
a. Birth-adoption-reappearance (BAR)
b. Inofficiousness of the donation because the legitime is impaired
c. ingratitude
2. The fruits received after failure to fulfill the condition
3. In case of money, it should be paid with the legal rate of interest

Art. 769. The action granted to the donor by reason of ingratitude cannot be renounced in advance. This
action prescribes within one year, to be counted from the time the donor had knowledge of the fact and it
was possible for him to bring the action. (652)

NO RENUNCIATION IN ADVANCE OF ACTION TO REVOKE

BECAUSE OF INGRATITUDE
> The right to revoke because of ingratitude cannot be renounced in advance

FORM OF RENUNCIATION
> When it can be done in the proper case, renunciation may be done either expressly or impliedly since the
law requires no formality under this article

PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD
> Within one year
> Period must be counted from
> The donor knew of the fact or cause of ingratitude
> Provided that it was possible for him to bring the action
Art. 770. This action shall not be transmitted to the heirs of the donor, if the latter did not institute the same,
although he could have done so, and even if he should die before the expiration of one year. Neither can this
action be brought against the heir of the donee, unless upon the latter's death the complaint has been filed.
(653)

GENERALLY, NO TRANSMISSIBILITY OF RIGHT

Art. 771. Donations which in accordance with the provisions of Article 752, are inofficious, bearing in mind
the estimated net value of the donor's property at the time of his death, shall be reduced with regard to the
excess; but this reduction shall not prevent the donations from taking effect during the life of the donor, nor
shall it bar the donee from appropriating the fruits. For the reduction of donations the provisions of this
Chapter and of Articles 911 and 912 of this Code shall govern. (654)

RULES RE INOFFICIOUS DONATIONS

1. Value of the estate at the time of donors death
2. Inofficious donations may not only be reduced but they may be completely cancelled

3. Since the inofficiousness of the donation cannot be determined till after the donors death, it follows that in
the meantime, the donation is valid and ownership is transmitted to the donee during the donors lifetime

SOME IMPLICATIONS FROM THE TRANSFER OF

OWNERSHIP
1. The donee gets the fruits while the donor is still alive
2. The donee can take advantage of natural and artificial incorporations or attachments
3. The donee bears the loss in case of destruction or deterioration

PREFERENCE OF DONATIONS
> Donations inter vivos are preferred over devisees or legatees
Art. 772. Only those who at the time of the donor's death have a right to the legitime and their heirs and
successors in interest may ask for the reduction or inofficious donations. Those referred to in the preceding
paragraph cannot renounce their right during the lifetime of the donor, either by express declaration,
or by consenting to the donation. The donees, devisees and legatees, who are not entitled to the legitime
and the creditors of the deceased can neither ask for the reduction nor avail themselves thereof. (655a)

PERSONS WHO CAN ASK FOR THE REDUCTION OF

INOFFICIOUS DONATIONS
1. The compulsory heirs of the donor
2. Heirs and successors-in-interest of the compulsory heirs

PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD
> Action must be brought within 5 years from the time of donors death

COLLATION
> If the donee happens to be a compulsory heir, he must collate or bring back the value of the property
donated, for its value is considered already an advance of his legitime or inheritance
Art. 773. If, there being two or more donations, the disposable portion is not sufficient to cover all of them,
those of the more recent date shall be suppressed or reduced with regard to the excess. (656)

PREFERENCE GIVEN TO EARLIER DONATIONS

> It is essential that in cases there is need to reduce, the subsequent ones must first be reduced
> If the donations be constituted at the same time, then there will be proportionate reductions on both

EFFECT OF DONATIONS AND

LIMITATIONS THEREON
Art. 750. The donations may comprehend all the present property of the donor, or part thereof, provided he
reserves, in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of himself, and of all relatives who,
at the time of the acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled to be supported by the donor. Without such
reservation, the donation shall be reduced in petition of any person affected. (634a)

REASON FOR THE LAW ON DONATIONS WITHOUT THE

NEEDED RESERVATION
> This article is important because the claims of the donors own family shouldnt be disregarded

STATUS OF THE DONATION

> An excessive donation under this article is not void, but merely reducable to the extent support of the
relatives is unimpaired
> The party prejudiced can ask the court for the reduction

SUPPOSE HE MADE THE RESERVATION BUT THIS

DOESNT APPEAR IN THE DEED OF DONATION, IS THE
DONATION ALL RIGHT?

> Yes, for the law doesnt state that the deed of donation must expressly say that a reservation has been
made
> That indeed there was a reservation can be proved by evidence aliunde

DONATIONS NOT INCLUDED UNDER THIS ARTICLE

> The onerous donation
> Donation mortis causa
> Donations propter nuptias

MEANING OF PRESENT PROPERTY

> Present property is that the donor can dispose of at the time of donation

PAYMENT OF EXISTING CREDITORS

> Aside from the reservation as to support, the donor must also reserve enough of his property to pay off his
debts contracted before the donation, otherwise, there is presumption that the donation was made to
defraud creditors
Art. 751. Donations cannot comprehend future property. By future property is understood anything
which the donor cannot dispose of at the time of the donation. (635)

FUTURE PROPERTY
> Anything which the donor cannot dispose of at the time of the donation
> Future inheritance cannot be the object of the donation, but present or accrued inheritance may be even if
the properties have not yet been delivered, for in succession, the rights of inheritance are transmitted from
the very moment of death

REASON FOR THE ARTICLE WHICH GENERALLY

PROHIBITS THE DONATION OF FUTURE PROPERTY
> One cannot give away that which doesnt have nemo dat quod non habet
Art. 752. The provisions of Article 750 notwithstanding, no person may give or receive, by way of donation,
more than he may give or receive by will.
The donation shall be inofficious in all that it may exceed this limitation. (636)

LIMITATION ON THE GIVER

> A person may not give by donation more than what he can give by will
> And a person may not receive by way of donation more than what the giver may give by virtue of a will

TO WHOM LIMITATION APPLIES

> The limitation naturally applies to persons only who have compulsory heirs at the time of the formers
death

PRESCRIPTION PERIOD
> The action to revoke or reduce the inofficious donations must be brought by the donors compulsory heirs,
within 5 years after the donors death
Art. 753. When a donation is made to several persons jointly, it is understood to be in equal shares,
and there shall be no right of accretion among them, unless the donor has otherwise provided. The
preceding paragraph shall not be applicable to donations made to the husband and wife jointly,
between whom there shall be a right of accretion, if the contrary has not been provided by the
donor. (637)

GENERALLY NO ACCRETION INSTANCES WHEN

ACCRETION IS PROPER
1. In case of predecease
2. In case of incapacity
3. In case of refusal or repudiation

DONATION TO WIFE OF ANOTHER

> Note that in case of a donation is made by a friend to the wife of another, the husband of the latter has to
consent, otherwise the donation is not valid

> The exception is when the donor is the ascendant, parent-inlaw, or collateral relative within the 4th degree of the wife
Art. 754. The donee is subrogated to all the rights and actions which in case of eviction would
pertain to the donor. The latter, on the other hand, is not obliged to warrant the things donated, save

when the donation is onerous, in which case the donor shall be liable for eviction to the concurrence
of the burden. The donor shall also be liable for eviction or hidden defects in case of bad faith on his
part. (638a)

SUBROGATION OF DONEE EVICTION, DEFINED.

> Eviction shall take place whenever by final judgment based on a right prior to the sale or an act imputable
to the vendor/donor, the vendee/donee is deprived the whole or of a part of the thing purchased/donated

MEANING OF HIDDEN DEFECTS

> Those which are not patent upon a physical examination of the object donated

WHEN WARRANTY EXISTS

1. If the donor is in bad faith
2. If donation is onerous
3. If warranty is expressly made
4. If donation is propter nuptias unless the contrary is stipulated
Art. 755. The right to dispose of some of the things donated, or of some amount which shall be a charge
thereon, may be reserved by the donor; but if he should die without having made use of this right, the
property or amount reserved shall belong to the donee. (639)

DONATIONS WITH RESERVATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO

DISPOSE
Art. 756. The ownership of property may also be donated to one person and the usufruct to another or
others, provided all the donees are living at the time of the donation. (640a)

DONATION OF NAKED OWNERSHIP AND USUFRUCT

> When one person receives the usufruct, it is understood that the other donee receives only the naked, and
the not the full
ownership

FORM

> The usufruct of real property, being real property by itself should be donated in the form prescribed for real
properties
> The naked ownership and usufruct of personal properties are personal properties themselves, so only the
formalities for the donation of personal property would be required
Art. 757. Reversion may be validly established in favor of only the donor for any case and circumstances, but
not in favor of other persons unless they are all living at the time of the donation.
Any reversion stipulated by the donor in favor of a third person in violation of what is provided in the
preceding paragraph shall be void, but shall not nullify the donation. (614a)

CONVENTIONAL REVERSION
Art. 758. When the donation imposes upon the donee the obligation to pay the debts of the donor, if the
clause does not contain any declaration to the contrary, the former is understood to be liable to pay only the
debts which appear to have been previously contracted. In no case shall the donee be responsible for the
debts exceeding the value of the property donated, unless a contrary intention clearly appears. (642a)

STIPULATION THAT DONEE SHOULD PAY DEBTS OF THE

DONOR
1. Pay only for prior debts contracted after the donation had been made, unless there is stipulation to this
effect
2. Pay only for debts up to the value of the property donated
Art. 759. There being no stipulation regarding the payment of debts, the donee shall be responsible therefor
only when the donation has been made in fraud of creditors. The donation is always presumed to be in fraud
of creditors, when at the time thereof the donor did not reserve sufficient property to pay his debts prior to
the donation. (643)

RULES WHEN THERE IS NO SUCH STIPULATION

> General rule is that the donee is not required to pay
> Exception is when the donation is made in fraud of creditors

PRESUMPTION
> The law establishes a presumption when the donation is apparently in fraud of creditors, namely failure to
reserve sufficient property to pay previous debts

CAGAOAN V. CAGAOAN
43 PHIL 554
FACTS:
Gregorio Cagaoan donated four parcels of land first in favor of Eugenio. He was able to take possession but
he wasnt able to register. On a later date, another donation was effected, this time in favor of Felix. Felix this
time was able to register.

HELD:
Felix has a better right over the property donated. This follows the rules on double sales.

REPUBLIC V. GUZMAN
325 SCRA 90
FACTS:
David was a natural-born American citizen. His dad is a naturalized American citizen. When his dad died,
properties were left in favor of him and his mother. Thereafter, a quitclaim was executed by the mother,
conveying to him all of her shares in the property. David claims that the properties were donated by his
mother to him.

HELD:
By the language of the quitclaims, the intention was a waiver of her rights, title and interest over the lands in
favor of David and not a donation. That a donation was far from the mothers mind. The deeds of quitclaim
were in the nature of public instruments but they didnt effect a donation. They lack the essential element of
acceptance to make the donation valid.

DANGUILAN V. IAC
168 SCRA 22
FACTS:
Apolinia sought the recovery of a farm lot and house from Danguilan. She averred that she acquired the
property through sale. Danguilan on the other hand, contends that the property is his by virtue of a donation.

HELD:
The donation being of real property, it is void for not complying with the requirements given by law. Donation
of real property should be in a public instrument. In this case, it wasnt.

LAGAZO V. CA
287 SCRA 18
FACTS:

Catalina was the grantee of the Monserrat estate. She had to leave for Canada to become a permanent
resident therein and she appointed Espanol to be her attorney-in-fact to fix the requirements needed. Failing
to accomplish what he ought to do, Catalina appointed Lagazo as her new attorney-in-fact. The grant was
subsequently given and later, the land was donated to Lagazo. Lagazo then sought to remove Cabanlit from
the property. The latter claims ownership over the land by virtue of a deed of sale executed in favor of him by
Espanol.

HELD:
The donation is simple and pure. There is no showing of any acceptance from Lagazo and thus, there has
been no perfected donation.

QUIJADA V. CA
299 SCRA 645
FACTS:
A parcel of land was donated for the construction of a school. The donation is subject to a resolutory
condition. The school wasnt constructed. The land was subsequently sold to Montejar. The donors sought to
remove Montejar from the premises.

HELD:
It has been held that when a person donates land to another on the condition that the latter would build upon
the land a school, the condition imposed is a resolutory one and not suspensive.

GESTOPA V. CA
342 SCRA 105
FACTS:
Spouses Gestopa previously issued a deed of donation mortis cause in favor of Mercedes but subsequently,
they issued another deed, now inter vivos, still in favor of Mercedes. Mercedes now seeks the donated
property but the Gestopas claimed that she isnt entitled to such, the donation being mortis causa.

HELD:
The existence of an acceptance clause in the deed shows that the donation is of inter vivos. There is no
acceptance needed when it comes to donations mortis causa.

REYES V. MASQUEDA
187 SCRA 661
FACTS:
Dr. Pascual died without issue and left his properties to his sister and latters children as heirs. In the
inventory of his estate, Ursula sought to exclude those properties that were donated to her by her brother
during his lifetime. On one of the properties donated to her, she sold the same to Reyes. It was found out
however that after the donation to her was made, it was donated subsequent to a minor.

HELD:
The donation in favor of Ursula is of inter vivos and thus, it is valid and should be upheld. Given such, as
there was no reason to revoke the donation in her favor, the later donation to a minor is null and void.

ALEJANDRO V. GERALDEZ
78 SCRA 245
FACTS:
Spouses Diaz executed deeds of donation in favor of Andrea and Angel. After the spouses died, Andrea
sued Angel for the partition of the lots, and that the donations effected before were invalid for not complying
with formalities of a will.

HELD:
The contracts show that the donation was in the nature of inter vivosthe acceptance clause, warranty
clause, and reservation clause all lead to this conclusion.

MAGLASANG V. HEIRS OF
CABATINGAN
383 SCRA 6
FACTS:
Conchita issued deeds of donation in favor of petitioners conveying parcels of land, houses, and other
properties. After her death, respondents sought the annulment of the deeds, claiming to be not in conformity
with formalities of a will, being donations mortis causa.

HELD:
If a donation is of mortis causa, it should conform with formalities of a will for it to be valid. Otherwise, it shall
be void.

DAVID V. SISON
76 PHIL 118
FACTS:
Petitioners claim 5% of original inventoried estate. In this claim, there is contention with respect on whether
donation was inter vivos or mortis causa. The deed of donation was effected by David after adopting
grandnieces.

HELD:
The donation is of mortis causa because the conditions set in are of the nature that will not take effect till the
death of the donor.

SICAD V. CA
294 SCRA 183
FACTS:

Aurora executed a deed entitled donation inter vivos in favor of her grandchildren. There was reservation of
right of disposition in her favor and the property may not be disposed of after 10 years from her death.
Thereafter, the title were registered in the donees name yet the owners duplicate is with Aurora. Thereafter,
the grandchildren sold the land to Sicad and Aurora sought to reinstate TCT in her name.

HELD:
If there is reservation of disposition with donor, then the donation is of mortis causa and not inter vivos. A
document is what the law defines it to be and not what the parties call it.

HOWARD V. PADILLA
96 PHIL 983
FACTS:
Two petitions for review of a decision which declares that the donation in question is by nature inter vivos,
and not mortis causa, and as such is valid and irrevocable.

HELD:
The donation is of mortis causa and since it is not in conformity with the formalities of a will, is null and void.

JUTIC V. CA
153 SCRA 269
FACTS:
Arsenio was the owner of two agricultural lands. During his lifetime, he executed an affidavit in favor of
Melquiades, his brother, for one of the lots. The affidavit expressed his intention to bequeath to the latter the
land. Despite this, Arsenio mortgaged the property, applied for a homestead patentall in his right as an
owner.

HELD:
Again, like the previous case, an intent to donate is not enough to effect a valid donation. There are
formalities that needs to be complied with.

ALDABA V. CA
27 SCRA 263
FACTS:
Belen was a prominent and rich woman. When she died, she left as heirs her husband and daughter. Before
her death, she allowed Dr. Aldaba and his daughter to live in one of her houses. Now that she is dead, the
surviving heirs wanted the doctor and his daughter out of the house. They refused to do so, claiming a valid
donation in their favor, evidenced supposedly of a letter by Belen allowing them to stay further in the house.

HELD:

Intent to donate is not enough to effect a valid donation.

DONATION
NATURE OF DONATIONS
Art. 725. Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously of a thing or right in favor of
another, who accepts it. (618a)

DONATION AS AN ACT AND AS A CONTRACT

> Although the article says it is an act, it cannot be denied that a donation is really a contract
> It itself is a mode of acquiring ownership and doesnt ordinarily require delivery before ownership may be
transferred

ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF A TRUE DONATION

INTER VIVOS
1. The necessary form
2. Consent or acceptance by donee during donors lifetime
3. Irrevocability
4. Intent to benefit the donee
5. Resultant decrease in the assets or patrimony of donor
Art. 726. When a person gives to another a thing or right on account of the latter's merits or of the
services rendered by him to the donor, provided they do not constitute a demandable debt, or when
the gift imposes upon the donee a burden which is less than the value of the thing given, there is
also a donation. (619)

CLASSIFICATION OF DONATIONS
1. From viewpoint of motive, purpose or cause
a. Simplethe cause is pure liberality
b. Renumeratorydue to past services rendered or future services or charges and burdens
c. Onerousburdens and charges equal to the value of the thing donated

d. Modalconsideration is less than the value of the thing donated

2. Time of taking effect
a. Inter vivos
b. Mortis causa
Art. 727. Illegal or impossible conditions in simple and remuneratory donations shall be considered as not
imposed. (n)
Art. 728. Donations which are to take effect upon the death of the donor partake of the nature of
testamentary provisions, and shall be governed by the rules established in the Title on Succession.
(620)

DONATIONS FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF EFFECTIVITY

DISTINCTION BETWEEN DONATION INTER VIVOS AND
MORTIS CAUSA
INTER VIVOS

Takes effect during lifetime of donor Must

follow the formalities of donations

MORTIS CAUSA

Takes effect after the death of the donor

Must follow the formalities of wills and codicils

Can be revoked anytime and for any reason while

the donor is still alive

The right of disposition is completely

transferred to the donee

In case the legitime is impaired, donations mortis

causa are reduced ahead of donations inter vivos,
the latter being preferred

Acceptance by donee must be during

lifetime of donor

The right of disposition isnt transferred to the donee

while the donor is still alive

Acceptance by donee mortis causa can be only be

done upon donors death

Cannot be revoked except for grounds

provided for by law
In case of impairment of the legitime,
donations inter vivos are preferred to
donations mortis causa

DONATION IN PRAESENTI TO BE DELIVERED IN FUTURO

> Considered as a donation inter vivos and all the characteristics referred to above are applicable to it in
relation to a donation inter vivos
Art. 729. When the donor intends that the donation shall take effect during the lifetime of the donor,
though the property shall not be delivered till after the donor's death, this shall be a donation inter
vivos. The fruits of the property from the time of the acceptance of the donation, shall pertain to the
donee, unless the donor provides otherwise. (n)
Art. 730. The fixing of an event or the imposition of a suspensive condition, which may take place
beyond the natural expectation of life of the donor, does not destroy the nature of the act as a
donation inter vivos, unless a contrary intention appears. (n)

SUSPENSIVE CONDITION WHICH MAY BE FULFILLED

BEYOND THE LIFETIME OF THE DONOR
> Reason for the lawretroactive effect of the fulfillment of the suspensive condition
Art. 731. When a person donates something, subject to the resolutory condition of the donor's
survival, there is a donation inter vivos. (n)

DONATION SUBJECT TO THE RESOLUTORY CONDITION

OF THE DONORS SURVIVAL
Art. 732. Donations which are to take effect inter vivos shall be governed by the general provisions
on contracts and obligations in all that is not determined in this Title. (621)

SUPPLETORY EFFECT OF RULES ON CONTRACTS

Art. 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts and
remuneratory donations by the provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which exceeds
the value of the burden imposed. (622)
Art. 734. The donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the
donee. (623)

PERFECTION OF THE DONATION

> Donation is perfected not from the time of acceptance but from the time of knowledge of the donor that the
donee has accepted

PERSONS WHO MAY GIVE OR RECEIVE A DONATION

Art. 735. All persons who may contract and dispose of their property may make a donation. (624)

WHO MAY DONATE; SIMULTANEOUS CAPACITIES

> It is not enough that a person be capacitated to contract, he must also have the capacity to dispose
Art. 736. Guardians and trustees cannot donate the property entrusted to them. (n)
REASON FOR THE RULE: they can only do acts of administration and not of ownership.
Art. 737. The donor's capacity shall be determined as of the time of the making of the donation. (n)

DETERMINATION OF CAPACITY
> Capacity of both donor and donee is determined at the time of perfection of the donation
Art. 738. All those who are not specially disqualified by law therefor may accept donations. (625)

WHEN IS A PERSON CONSIDERED SPECIALLY

DISQUALIFIED BY LAW
> Specially disqualified doesnt refer to those incapacitated to contract like minors and those of unsound
mind but to people such as those mentioned in article 739, etc.
Art. 739. The following donations shall be void:
(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the
donation;
(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in consideration thereof;
(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descedants and ascendants, by reason of his office.
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of
the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of
evidence in the same action. (n)

DONATIONS THAT ARE VOID BECAUSE OF MORAL

CONSIDERATIONS

1. The first kindthose made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the
donation
a. The adultery or concubinage need not be proved in a criminal action. The guilt may be proved by
preponderance of evidence.
b. If the donation was made after the adultery or concubinage, then it is valid except if the consideration
thereof is the commission of the act
c. If the perpetrators are merely sweethearts but dont have any sexual intercourse with one another, then
this prohibition is not applicable. Remember the elements of adultery and concubinage.
2. The second kindthose made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in
consideration thereof
a. There must be a criminal convictionmere preponderance of evidence showing guilt is not sufficient
b. It doesnt matter whether the donation was made before or after the commission of the offense
3. The third kindthose made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants by reason of his
office
a. Purposeto prevent bribery

REASON WHY THE DONATION ARE VOID

> Void by reason of public policy
Art. 740. Incapacity to succeed by will shall be applicable to donations inter vivos. (n)
Art. 1027. The following are incapable of succeeding:
(1) The priest who heard the confession of the testator during his last illness, or the minister of the
gospel who extended spiritual aid to him during the same period;
(2) The relatives of such priest or minister of the gospel within the fourth degree, the church, order,
chapter, community, organization, or institution to which such priest or minister may belong;
(3) A guardian with respect to testamentary dispositions given by a ward in his favor before the final
accounts of the guardianship have been approved, even if the testator should die after the approval
thereof; nevertheless, any provision made by the ward in favor of the guardian when the latter is his
ascendant, descendant, brother, sister, or spouse, shall be valid;
(4) Any attesting witness to the execution of a will, the spouse, parents, or children, or any one
claiming under such witness, spouse, parents, or children;
(5) Any physician, surgeon, nurse, health officer or druggist who took care of the testator during his
last illness;
(6) Individuals, associations and corporations not permitted by law to inherit. (745, 752, 753, 754a)
Art. 1032. The following are incapable of succeeding by reason of unworthiness:
(1) Parents who have abandoned their children or induced their daughters to lead a corrupt or
immoral life, or attempted against their virtue;
(2) Any person who has been convicted of an attempt against the life of the testator, his or her

spouse, descendants, or ascendants;

(3) Any person who has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment
for six years or more, if the accusation has been found groundless;
(4) Any heir of full age who, having knowledge of the violent death of the testator, should fail to
report it to an officer of the law within a month, unless the authorities have already taken action; this
prohibition shall not apply to cases wherein, according to law, there is no obligation to make an
accusation;
(5) Any person convicted of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator;
(6) Any person who by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence should cause the testator to
make a will or to change one already made;
(7) Any person who by the same means prevents another from making a will, or from revoking one
already made, or who supplants, conceals, or alters the latter's will;
(8) Any person who falsifies or forges a supposed will of the decedent. (756, 673, 674a)
Art. 741. Minors and others who cannot enter into a contract may become donees but acceptance shall be
done through their parents or legal representatives. (626a)

MINORS MAY BE DONEES MAY MINORS ACCEPT BY

THEMSELVES?
It depends.
1. If the donation is simpleyes because after all is for the benefit of the child. The exception is when a
written acceptance is required. In this case, the parents or legal representative must intervene.
2. If the donation is onerous or conditionalbecause there is some burden is imposed on the child. The
parent and the legal representative must intervene.
Art. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by those persons who
would legally represent them if they were already born. (627)

REQUISITES FOR THE ARTICLE TO APPLY

1. The child be born alive later
2. Or that the child after being born alive, should live for at least 24 hours
Art. 743. Donations made to incapacitated persons shall be void, though simulated under the guise of
another contract or through a person who is interposed. (628)

DISGUISED DONATIONS TO INCAPACITATED PERSONS

MEANING OF INCAPACITATED

> Refers to those who are not allowed to become donees

Art. 744. Donations of the same thing to two or more different donees shall be governed by the provisions
concerning the sale of the same thing to two or more different persons. (n)

DONATION OF THE SAME OBJECT TO TWO OR MORE

DIFFERENT DONEES; CROSS-REFERENCE TO ARTICLE
1544
Art. 745. The donee must accept the donation personally, or through an authorized person with a special
power for the purpose, or with a general and sufficient power; otherwise, the donation shall be void. (630)

FORMALITIES FOR ACCEPTANCE

> The formalities for acceptance if any must also be present, otherwise the donation is void

THRU WHOM ACCEPTANCE MAY BE MADE

> This article speaks of two kinds of authorized personsone with special power and another, one with a
general and sufficient power
Art. 746. Acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the donor and of the donee. (n)

APPLICABILITY OF THE ARTICLE ON WHEN ACCEPTANCE

IS TO BE MADE
> The rule enunciated herein is applicable to donations inter vivos as well as donations which are onerous
> In the case of onerous donations, without unconditional acceptance, there will be no meeting of minds and
thus, no perfection of contract
Art. 747. Persons who accept donations in representation of others who may not do so by themselves, shall
be obliged to make the notification and notation of which Article 749 speaks. (631)

ADDITIONAL DUTY OF THOSE WHO ACCEPT FOR

OTHERS

1. It is understood that the persons referred to here are duly authorized to do the acceptance
2. Notification and notation in the proper cases, are essential for the perfection of the donation
Art. 748. The donation of a movable may be made orally or in writing. An oral donation requires the
simultaneous delivery of the thing or of the document representing the right donated. If the value of the
personal property donated exceeds five thousand pesos, the donation and the acceptance shall be made in
writing, otherwise, the donation shall be void. (632a)
Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document,
specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy. The
acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not
take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor. If the acceptance is made in a separate
instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both
instruments. (633)
*CONSTANCIA AUTHENTICA

PEARL AND DEAN V. SMI

409 SCRA 231
FACTS:
Pearl and Dean had their light box designs copyrighted but does this extend to the actual light boxes?
In this case, Pearl and Dean supplied the light boxes to different branches of SM. Thereafter, it was found
out that a different supplier took over, using the same design of the light boxes. This prompted the petitioner
to file an action against SMI.

HELD:
Being a mere statutory grant, the rights are limited to what the statute confers. It can cover only the works
falling under the statutory enumeration or description. A copyright would only cover the drawing or technical
description but will not extend to the actual product. The actual product should be covered by a patent to be
protected.

A patent infringement to be sustained necessarily entails that a patent is secured and has been issued. No
right to the invention arises alone from the issuance of a patent.

ASIA BREWERY V. COURT OF

APPEALS
224 SCRA 437
FACTS:
SMC filed a case against petitioner for infringement of trademark. It alleged that the bottles used by Asia
Brewery were confusingly similar to those used by SMC in the packaging of its beer. The trial court held in
favor of Asia Brewery but was reversed in the appellate court.

HELD:
Using the holistic test, wherein all circumstances were given consideration, there was no infringement
committed by petitioner. There are two tests available for colorable imitation. One is the dominancy test. If
the form, marks, contents, words of other special arrangement or general appearance of the two marks or
devices are such as would likely mislead persons in the ordinary course of purchasing the genuine article,
then the similarity is such as would entitle the opposer to equitable protection.
Under the holistic test, on the other hand, the opposing trademarks are compared in their entirety to
determine confusing similarity.

LYCEUM OF THE PHILS. V. CA

219 SCRA 610
FACTS:
1. Petitioner had sometime commenced before in the SEC a complaint against Lyceum of Baguio, to require
it to change its corporate name and to adopt another name not similar or identical with that of petitioner. SEC
decided in favor of petitioner. Lyceum of Baguio filed petition for certiorari but was denied for
lack of merit.
2. Armed with the resolution of the Court, petitioner instituted before the SEC to compel private respondents,
which are also educational institutions, to delete word Lyceum from their corporate names and permanently
to enjoin them from using such as part of their respective names.
3. Hearing officer sustained the claim of petitioner and held that the word Lyceum was capable of
appropriation and that petitioner had acquired an enforceable right to the use of that word.
4. In an appeal, the decision was reversed by the SEC En Banc. They held that the word Lyceum to have
become identified with petitioner as to render use thereof of other institutions as productive of consfusion
about the identity of the schools concerned in the mind of the general public.
5. Petitioner went to appeal with the CA but the latter just affirmed the decision of the SEC En Banc.

HELD:
Under the corporation code, no corporate name may be allowed by the SEC if the proposed name is
identical or deceptively or confusingly similar to that of any existing corporation or to any other name already
protected by law or is patently deceptive, confusing or contrary to existing laws. The policy behind this
provision is to avoid fraud upon the public, which would have the occasion to deal with the entity concerned,
the evasion of legal obligations and duties, and the reduction of difficulties of administration and supervision
over corporations.
The corporate names of private respondents are not identical or deceptively or confusingly similar to that of
petitioners. Confusion and deception has been precluded by the appending of geographic names to the
word Lyceum. Furthermore, the word Lyceum has become associated in time with schools and other
institutions providing public lectures, concerts, and public discussions. Thus, it generally refers to a school or
an institution of learning.

Petitioner claims that the word has acquired a secondary meaning in relation to petitioner with the result that
the word, although originally generic, has become appropriable by petitioner to the exclusion of other
institutions.
The doctrine of secondary meaning is a principle used in trademark law but has been extended to corporate
names since the right to use a corporate name to the exclusion of others is based upon the same principle,
which underlies the right to use a particular trademark or tradename. Under this doctrine, a word or phrase
originally incapable of exclusive appropriation with reference to an article in the market, because
geographical or otherwise descriptive might nevertheless have been used for so long and so exclusively by
one producer with reference to this article that, in that trade and to that group of purchasing public, the word
or phrase has come to mean that the article was his produce. The doctrine cannot be made to apply where
the evidence didn't prove that the business has continued for so long a time that it has become of
consequence and acquired good will of considerable value such that its articles and produce have acquired
a well known reputation, and confusion will result by the use of the disputed name.
Petitioner didn't present evidence, which provided that the word Lyceum acquired secondary meaning. The
petitioner failed to adduce evidence that it had exclusive use of the word. Even if petitioner used the word for
a long period of time, it hadnt acquired any secondary meaning in its favor because the appellant failed to
prove that it had been using the same word all by itself to the exclusion of others

PHILIPS EXPERT V. CA
206 SCRA 457
FACTS:
Petitioner filed an action against private respondent for the use of the latter of a corporate name confusingly
similar with petitioners.

HELD:

Under the corporation code, no corporate name may be allowed by the SEC if the proposed name is
identical or deceptively or confusingly similar to that of any existing corporation or to any other name already
protected by law or is patently deceptive, confusing or contrary to existing laws. The policy behind this
provision is to avoid fraud upon the public, which would have the occasion to deal with the entity concerned,
the evasion of legal obligations and duties, and the reduction of difficulties of administration and supervision
over corporations.
The corporate names of private respondents are identical or deceptively or confusingly similar to that of
petitioners.

DEL MONTE CORPORATION V.

CA
181 SCRA 410
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a case for trademark infringement and unfair competition against Sunshine Sauce. The latter
for a time used the bottles of Del Monte in packaging their own catsup sauce. It also used bottles which were
similar to those of petitioner.

HELD:
There is a distinction between infringment of trademark and unfair competition:
1. Infringement is the unauthorized use of a trademark while unfair competition is the passing off of ones
goods as that of another
2. In infringement, fraudulent intent is unnecessary while it is otherwise for unfair competition
3. In infringement, prior registration of the trademark is needed whereas in unfair competition, registration is
not necessary.

In assessing the two trademarks, side-by-side comparison is not the final test of similarity because average
buyers dont make minute scrutiny of
label details.
Also, in testing if there has been prior registration, registration in the supplemental register isnt what the law
contemplates.

FRUIT OF THE LOOM V. CA

133 SCRA 405
FACTS:
1. Petitioner is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Rhode Island, USA. It
is the registrant of the trademark FRUIT OF THE LOOM in the Philippine Patent Office and was issued two
Certificates of Registration, one of which was in 1957 and the other in 1958.
2. Private Respondent, a domestic corporation, is the registrant of the trademark FRUIT FOR EVE in the
Philippine Patent Office.
3. Both are involved in the merchandise of garments.
4. Petitioner filed a complaint for infringement of trademark and unfair competition against private
respondent, alleging that:
a. The latters trademark is confusingly similar to the formers, both trademarks being used in womens
panties and other textile products.
b. That the hang tags used by private respondent is a colorable imitation of those of the petitioner.
5. Private respondent alleged that there was no confusing similarity between the trademarks.
6. At the pre-trial, the following admissions were made:

a. That the registered trademark Fruit for Eve bears the notice Reg. Phil. Pat. Off. while that of Fruit of the
Loom does not.
b. That at the time of its registration, the plaintiff filed no opposition thereto.
7. The lower court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner, permanently enjoining private respondent
from using the trademark Fruit for Eve.
8. Both parties appealed to the former Court of Appeals:
a. Petitioner questioned the lower courts failure to award damages in its favor.
b. Private respondent sought the reversal of the lower courts decision.
9. The former Court of Appeals rendered a decision reversing the lower courts decision and dismissing the
petitioners complaint. The petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.

HELD:
In cases involving infringement of trademark brought before this Court, it has been consistently held that
there is infringement of trademark when the use of the mark involved would be likely to cause confusion or
mistake in the mind of the public or to deceive purchasers as to the origin or source of the commodity. The
discerning eye of the observer must focus not only on the predominant words but also on the other features
appearing in both labels in order that he may draw his conclusion where one is confusingly similar to the
other. The similarities of the competing trademarks in this case are completely lost in the substantial
differences in the design and general appearance of their respective hang tags. We have examined the two
trademarks as they appear in the hang tags submitted by the parties and We are impressed more by the
dissimilarities than by the similarities appearing therein. We hold that the trademarks Fruit of the Loom and
Fruit for Eve do not resemble each other as to confuse or deceive an ordinary purchaser. The ordinary
purchaser must be thought of as having, and credited with, at least a modicum of intelligence to be able to
see the obvious differences between the two trademarks in question.

SUBIDO V. OZAETA
80 PHIL 383
FACTS:
Petitioner was the editor of the Manila Post, who sought the inspection of real estates sold to aliens and
registered with the RD. He was denied to do so which prompted him to file a petition for mandamus.

HELD:
Except when it is clear that the purpose of the inspection is unlawful, it is not the duty of the registration
officers to concern themselves with the motives, purposes, and objects of the person seeking to inspect the
records. It is not their prerogative to see that the information which the records contain is not flaunted before
the public gaze.

HIDALGO ENTERPRISES V.
BALANDAN
91 PHIL 488
FACTS:

Hidalgo Enterprises was the owner of an ice plant factory. They kept on their premises 2 uncovered water
tanks, which were unguarded. On a relevant date, children entered the factory premises and swam in one of
the water tanks. One of them drowned and sank in the tank. The factory is now being held for damages.

HELD:
A swimming pool or water tank isnt an attractive nuisance for while it is attractive, it cannot be a nuisance
being merely an imitation of a work of nature. Hence, if small children are drowned in an attractive water tank
of another, the owner is not liable even if there be no guards in the premises.

ILOILO COLD STORAGE V.

MUNICIPAL COUNCIL
24 PHIL 471
FACTS:
An ice factory was constructed in the premises. Not long after, there had been numerous complaints
regarding the health hazards that the factory brings to the areas residents. There was then an order for the
factory to raise its smokestacks, otherwise, it will be ordered to close down.

HELD:
If no compelling necessity requires the summary abatement of a nuisance, the municipal authorities under
their power to declare and abate nuisances, dont have the right to compel the abatement of a particular
thing or act as a nuisance without reasonable notice to the person alleged to be maintaining or doing the
same of the time and place of hearing before a tribunal authority to decide whether the thing is a nuisance or
not.

VELASCO V. MANILA ELECTRIC

40 SCRA 342
FACTS:
Velasco was the owner of 3 adjoining lots. He then sold two of these to Meralco who later constructed a
substation. It was only separated from the house of petitioner by a wire fence.

HELD:
General rule is that everyone is bound to bear the habitual or customary inconveniences that result from the
proximity of others, and so long as this level is not surpassed, he may not complain against them. But if the
prejudice exceeds the inconveniences that such proximity habitually brings, the neighbor who causes such
disturbance is held responsible for the resulting damage, being guilty of causing nuisance.
The test is whether the rights of property, of health or of comfort are so injuriously affected by the noise in
question that the sufferer is subjected to a loss which goes beyond the reasonable limit imposed upon him
by the condition of living, or of holding property, in a particular locality in fact devoted to uses which involve
the emission of noise although ordinary care is taken to confine it within reasonable bounds.

SITCHON V. AQUINO
98 PHIL 720
FACTS:
Petitioners constructed houses on a public road. They were made to pay concession fees and were issued
receipts for the same. Thereafter, they were being ordered by the city engineer to vacate. Failure to obey,
there was an order for demolition.

HELD:
Houses constructed without governmental authority, on public streets and roads, obstruct at all times the free
use of the public of said places and accordingly, constitute nuisance per se aside from being public
nuisances.

OCCUPATION
Art. 713. Things appropriable by nature which are without an owner, such as animals that are the
object of hunting and fishing, hidden treasure and abandoned movables, are acquired by
occupation. (610)

OCCUPATION DEFINED

Acquisition of ownership by seizing corporeal things that have no owner, made with the intention of
acquiring them according to legal rules

ESSENTIAL REQUISITES FOR OCCUPATION

1. There must be seizure or apprehension
2. The property seized must be corporeal personal property
3. The property seized must be susceptible of appropriation
4. There must be intent to appropriate
5. The requisites or conditions of the law must be complied with

SOME KINDS OF PROPERTY ACQUIRABLE BY

OCCUPATION
1. Those without an owner
2. Hidden treasure
3. Abandoned movables

WHEN THING IS CONSIDERED ABANDONED

1. The expectation to recover is gonespec recuperandi
2. The intention to return or have it returned has been given up by the owneranimo revertendi
Art. 714. The ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by occupation. (n)

REASON FOR THE RULE

When the land is without owner, it pertains to the State
Art. 715. The right to hunt and to fish is regulated by special laws. (611)
Art. 716. The owner of a swarm of bees shall have a right to pursue them to another's land, indemnifying the
possessor of the latter for the damage. If the owner has not pursued the swarm, or ceases to do so within
two consecutive days, the possessor of the land may occupy or retain the same. The owner of domesticated
animals may also claim them within twenty days to be counted from their occupation by another person. This
period having expired, they
shall pertain to him who has caught and kept them. (612a)

KINDS OF ANIMALS

1. Wild
2. Domestic
3. Domesticated

ACQUISITION OF DOMESTICATED AND DOMESTIC

ANIMALS
1. Domesticated animals may be acquired by occupation unless a claim has been made on them20 days
2. Domestic animals cannot be acquired by occupation unless there is an abandonment
Art. 717. Pigeons and fish which from their respective breeding places pass to another pertaining to
a different owner shall belong to the latter, provided they have not been enticed by some article of
fraud. (613a)
Art. 718. He who by chance discovers hidden treasure in another's property shall have the right
granted him in article 438 of this Code. (614)
Art. 719. Whoever finds a movable, which is not treasure, must return it to its previous possessor. If
the latter is unknown, the finder shall immediately deposit it with the mayor of the city or
municipality where the finding has taken place. The finding shall be publicly announced by the
mayor for two
consecutive weeks in the way he deems best. If the movable cannot be kept without deterioration, or
without expenses which considerably diminish its value, it shall be sold at public auction eight days
after the publication. Six months from the publication having elapsed without the owner having
appeared, the thing found, or its value, shall be awarded to the finder. The finder and the owner shall
be obliged, as the case may be, to reimburse the expenses. (615a)
Art. 720. If the owner should appear in time, he shall be obliged to pay, as a reward to the finder, onetenth of the sum or of the price of the thing found. (616a)

DIFFERENT MODES OF
ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP
PRELIMINARY PROVISION
Art. 712. Ownership is acquired by occupation and by intellectual creation.
Ownership and other real rights over property are acquired and transmitted by law, by donation, by estate
and intestate succession, and in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition. They may also be acquired
by means of prescription. (609a)

MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP

1. Occupation
2. Law
3. Donation
4. Tradition
5. Intellectual creation
6. Prescription
7. Succession

CLASSIFICATION OF REAL RIGHTS IN THE CIVIL CODE

1. When there is full control and enjoyment
a. Ownership
b. Possession
2. When there is partial control and enjoyment
a. Naked ownership
b. Usufruct
c. Easements
d. Lease of real property if it exceeds one year or if it is registered
3. Real rights of security or guaranty
a. Mortgage
b. Pledge
c. Antichresis

d. Retention
e. Chattel mortgage
4. Of acquisition
a. Pre-emption
b. redemption

REGISTRY OF PROPERTY
Art. 708. The Registry of Property has for its object the inscription or annotation of acts and
contracts relating to the ownership and other rights over immovable property. (605)
Art. 709. The titles of ownership, or of other rights over immovable property, which are not duly
inscribed or annotated in the Registry of Property shall not prejudice third persons. (606)
Art. 710. The books in the Registry of Property shall be public for those who have a known interest
in ascertaining the status of the immovables or real rights annotated or inscribed therein. (607)

PUBLIC NATURE OF BOOKS

It may embrace every person as long as it is clear that the purpose of the examination isnt unlawful
or arises from sheer and idle curiousity

MINISTERIAL FUNCTION OF THE REGISTER OF DEEDS

It is ministerial to comply with the decision of the court to issue a title and register a property in the
name of a certain person, especially when the decision had attained finality

Art. 711. For determining what titles are subject to inscription or annotation, as well as the form,
effects, and cancellation of inscriptions and annotations, the manner of keeping the books in the
Registry, and the value of the entries contained in said books, the provisions of the Mortgage Law,
the Land Registration Act, and other special laws shall govern. (608a)

NUISANCE
Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or
anything else which:
(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of
water; or
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.
Art. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or
neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger
or damage upon individuals may be unequal. A private nuisance is one that is not included in the
foregoing definition.

NUISANCE PER SE

Always a nuisance

NUISANCE PER ACCIDENS

A nuisance only because of the location or other circumstances

PUBLIC NUISANCE

Affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of persons

PRIVATE NUISANCE

That which is not public

ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE

An attractive nuisance is a dangerous instrumentality or appliance which is likely to attract children at

play

Doctrine: One who maintains on his estate or premises an attractive nuisance without exercising due
care to prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years
who is injured thereby even if the child is technically a trespasser in the premises

Basis of liability: the attractiveness is an invitation to children

A swimming pool or water tank isnt an attractive nuisance for while it is attractive, it cannot be a
nuisance being merely an imitation of a work of nature. Hence, if small children are drowned in an
attractive water tank of another, the owner is not liable even if there be no guards in the premises.

Art. 696. Every successive owner or possessor of property who fails or refuses to abate a nuisance
in that property started by a former owner or possessor is liable therefor in the same manner as the
one who created it.

WHEN SUCCESSOR TO THE PROPERTY MAY BE HELD

LIABLE

The successor to be held liable must knowingly fail or refuse to abate the nuisance

RULE IF LESSOR CREATED OR CONTINUES THE

NUISANCE

He cannot escape liability

Art. 697. The abatement of a nuisance does not preclude the right of any person injured to recover
damages for its past existence.
Art. 698. Lapse of time cannot legalize any nuisance, whether public or private.
Art. 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are:
(1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance: or
(2) A civil action; or
(3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.

Art. 700. The district health officer shall take care that one or all of the remedies against a public
nuisance are availed of.
Art. 701. If a civil action is brought by reason of the maintenance of a public nuisance, such action
shall be commenced by the city or municipal mayor.
Art. 702. The district health officer shall determine whether or not abatement, without judicial
proceedings, is the best remedy against a public nuisance.
Art. 703. A private person may file an action on account of a public nuisance, if it is specially
injurious to himself.
Art. 704. Any private person may abate a public nuisance which is specially injurious to him by
removing, or if necessary, by destroying the thing which
constitutes the same, without committing a breach of the peace, or doing unnecessary injury. But it is
necessary:
(1) That demand be first made upon the owner or possessor of the property to abate the nuisance;
(2) That such demand has been rejected;
(3) That the abatement be approved by the district health officer and executed with the assistance of
the local police; and
(4) That the value of the destruction does not exceed three thousand pesos.
Art. 705. The remedies against a private nuisance are:
(1) A civil action; or
(2) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
Art. 706. Any person injured by a private nuisance may abate it by removing, or if necessary, by
destroying the thing which constitutes the nuisance, without committing a breach of the peace or
doing unnecessary injury. However, it is indispensable that the procedure for extrajudicial
abatement of a public nuisance by a private person be followed.
Art. 707. A private person or a public official extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall be liable for
damages:
(1) If he causes unnecessary injury; or
(2) If an alleged nuisance is later declared by the courts to be not a real nuisance.

LA VISTA ASSOCIATION V. CA
278 SCRA 498
FACTS:
This is the case pertaining to the battle of big boys over the usage of Mangyan Road.

HELD:
A legal easement is that which is constituted by law for public use and interest. A voluntary easement is
constituted simply by will or agreement of the parties.

TRIAS V. ARANETA
15 SCRA 241
FACTS:
Trias sought the cancellation on her certificate of title an annotation prohibiting the construction of factories
on her land. This was opposed by Araneta, claiming that the condition was inserted by virtue of an
agreement between it and Trias predecessor-in-interest.

HELD:
It is proper for the opposition because if the condition is erased, a purchaser who gets the certificate of title
without the annotation will get hold of the lot free from the encumbrance and might build a factory there. The

existence of a zoning ordinance is of no relevance. The ordinance may be repealed at any time and if so
repealed, the prohibition wouldnt be enforceable.

VALISNO V. ADRIANO
161 SCRA 398
FACTS:
Adriano siblings previously owned two parcels of land. On the land of Honorata was an existing irrigation
which passes through the land of Felipe, whose property adjoins the river. When Valisno bought the
property, he cultivated therein different fruits and crops. Felipe then enclosed the irrigation providing water to
the land of Valisno, causing the latter prejudice.

HELD:
Water rights appurtenant to a parcel of land pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically
mentioned in the conveyance.

PURUGGANAN V. PAREDES
69 SCRA 69
FACTS:
Paredes had his property at the north of Purugganans. He constructed a roof which is 2.5 meters wider than
what is allowed him, which caused the rainwater to fall 3 meters wider that what has been established in the
degree of registration.

HELD:
In a drainage or easement of receiving water falling from roofs, this encumbrance relates to water falling
from roof of dominant estate on servient estate.

CORTES V. YU-TIBO
2 PHIL 24
FACTS:
Cortes sought to enforce easement of light and view against Yu-tibo, claiming to have opened the windows
in their house for around 59 years.

HELD:

An easement of light and view is a negative easement. A notarial prohibition is needed to commence
prescriptive period. An easement of light and view is only positive in relation to party walls and apparent
signs of easement.

VOLUNTARY EASEMENTS
Art. 688. Every owner of a tenement or piece of land may establish thereon the easements which he
may deem suitable, and in the manner and form which he may deem best, provided he does not
contravene the laws, public policy or public order. (594)

KINDS OF VOLUNTARY EASEMENTS THAT MAY BE

ESTABLISHED

The easements established may be real or personal

RIGHT PERTAINS TO OWNER

Only the owner or someone else, in the name of and with the authority of the owner, may establish a
voluntary real easement on his estate, for this is an act of ownership

WHO ACTS FOR THE DOMINANT ESTATE?

The person to act for the dominant estate must be the owner or somebody else, in the name and with the
authority of the owner

OWNER WITH A RESOLUTORY OR ANNULABLE TITLE

If a person is an owner with a resolutory title or an annullable title, he can create an easement over
the property but is deemed extinguished upon resolution or annulment of the title

Art. 689. The owner of a tenement or piece of land, the usufruct of which belongs to another, may impose
thereon, without the consent of the usufructuary, any servitudes which will not injure the right of usufruct.
(595)

RIGHT OF NAKED OWNER TO IMPOSE EASEMENTS

The naked owner must respect the rights of the usufructuary

Art. 690. Whenever the naked ownership of a tenement or piece of land belongs to one person and the
beneficial ownership to another, no perpetual voluntary easement may be established thereon without the
consent of both owners. (596)

RULES WHEN USUFRUCT EXISTS

1. The beneficial owner may be himself create a temporary easement compatible with the extent of his
beneficial dominion
2. If the easement is perpetual both the naked and beneficial owners must consent
Art. 691. In order to impose an easement on an undivided tenement, or piece of land, the consent of all the
co-owners shall be required.
The consent given by some only, must be held in abeyance until the last one of all the co-owners shall have
expressed his conformity. But the consent given by one of the co-owners separately from the others shall
bind the grantor and his successors not to prevent the exercise of the right granted. (597a)

CREATION OF AN EASEMENT BY THE CO-OWNERS IN A

COOWNERSHIP

Unanimous consent is needed for creation of an easement is an act of ownership

Once a consent has been given, it cannot be revoked

Art. 692. The title and, in a proper case, the possession of an easement acquired by prescription shall
determine the rights of the dominant estate and the obligations of the servient estate. In default thereof, the
easement shall be governed by such provisions of this Title as are applicable thereto. (598)

GOVERNING RULES FOR VOLUNTARY EASEMENTS

1. If created by title, the title governs. The CC is suppletory.
2. If created by prescription, the form and manner it is acquired governs. The CC is suppletory.

3. If created by prescription in a proper case, the way the easement has been possessed, that is, the
manner and form of possession.
Art. 693. If the owner of the servient estate should have bound himself, upon the establishment of the
easement, to bear the cost of the work required for the use and preservation thereof, he may free himself
from this obligation by renouncing his property to the owner of the dominant estate. (599)

RULE TO APPLY WHEN SERVIENT ESTATE HAS BOUND

ITSELF TO PAY FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THE
EASEMENT

In the contract or title, the servient owner may have or may not have bound himself to pay for the
maintenance of the easement
Article only applies when he has bound himself

LATERAL AND SUBJACENT

SUPPORT
Sec. 684. No proprietor shall make such excavations upon his land as to deprive any adjacent land or
building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support.

THE EASEMENT OF LATERAL AND SUBJACENT SUPPORT

ISNT A TRUE EASEMENT: EXAMPLES
1. Of lateral supportwhile a person may excavate on his own land, he cannot do so if by such action,
adjacent buildings would collapse or adjacent lands crumble
2. Of subjacent supportA owns a parcel of land with a house, but underneath the soil is being used by B in
connection with a tunnel

LATERAL DISTINGUISHED FROM SUBJACENT

The support is lateral when both the land being supported and the supporting land are on the same
plane, when the supported is above the supporting land, the support is subjacent

Art. 685. Any stipulation or testamentary provision allowing excavations that cause danger to an adjacent
land or building shall be void.

RULE ON DANGEROUS EXCAVATIONS

A person is protected even against his own folly, in the interest of public safety

Art. 686. The legal easement of lateral and subjacent support is not only for buildings standing at the time
the excavations are made but also for constructions that may be erected.
Art. 687. Any proprietor intending to make any excavation contemplated in the three preceding articles shall
notify all owners of adjacent lands.

NOTIFICATION RE INTENDED EXCAVATIONS

1. Notice isnt required if there is actual knowledge of the excavation. Otherwise, notice is mandatory.
2. Even if there be notice, the excavation should deprive the other owners of lateral or subjacent support.
This is true even if the others consent or even if the excavation is carried out skillfully.
3. Notice is required to enable adjoining owners to take proper precautions.

EASEMENT AGAINST NUISANCE

Art. 682. Every building or piece of land is subject to the easement which prohibits the proprietor or
possessor from committing nuisance through noise, jarring, offensive odor, smoke, heat, dust,
water, glare and other causes.

REASON FOR PROHIBITING A NUISANCE

A nuisance is that which, among others, annoys or offends the senses and it should therefore be
prohibited

WHO IS THE SERVIENT IN AN EASEMENT AGAINST

NUISANCE?

The proprietor or possessor of the building or piece of land who commits the nuisance through noise,
jarring, offensive odor, is servient in an easement against nuisance

WHO IS DOMINANT IN AN EASEMENT AGAINST

NUISANCE?

The general public or anyone injured by the nuisance

PERHAPS, NOT A TRUE EASEMENT

While a true easement prohibits the owner from that which he could lawfully do were it not for the
existence of the easement, a nuisance is something that is done or allowed unlawfully, whether or
not a person has made a notarial prohibition

Art. 683. Subject to zoning, health, police and other laws and regulations, factories and shops may
be maintained provided the least possible annoyance is caused to the neighborhood.

LATERAL AND SUBJACENT SUPPORT

Sec. 684. No proprietor shall make such excavations upon his land as to deprive any adjacent land or
building of sufficient lateral or subjacent support.

THE EASEMENT OF LATERAL AND SUBJACENT SUPPORT

ISNT A TRUE EASEMENT
EXAMPLES
1. Of lateral supportwhile a person may excavate on his own land, he cannot do so if by such action,
adjacent buildings would collapse or adjacent lands crumble
2. Of subjacent supportA owns a parcel of land with a house, but underneath the soil is being used by B in
connection with a tunnel

LATERAL DISTINGUISHED FROM SUBJACENT

The support is lateral when both the land being supported and the supporting land are on the same plane,
when the supported is above the supporting land, the support is subjacent
Art. 685. Any stipulation or testamentary provision allowing excavations that cause danger to an adjacent
land or building shall be void.

RULE ON DANGEROUS EXCAVATIONS

A person is protected even against his own folly, in the interest of public safety
Art. 686. The legal easement of lateral and subjacent support is not only for buildings standing at the
time the excavations are made
but also for constructions that may be erected.
Art. 687. Any proprietor intending to make any excavation contemplated in the three preceding
articles shall notify all owners of adjacent lands.

NOTIFICATION RE INTENDED EXCAVATIONS

1. Notice isnt required if there is actual knowledge of the excavation. Otherwise, notice is mandatory.
2. Even if there be notice, the excavation should deprive the other owners of lateral or subjacent support.
This is true even if the others consent or even if the excavation is carried out skillfully.
3. Notice is required to enable adjoining owners to take proper precautions.

INTERMEDIATE DISTANCES AND

WORKS FOR CERTAIN
CONSTRUCTIONS AND
PLANTINGS
Art. 677. No constructions can be built or plantings made near fortified places or fortresses without
compliance with the conditions required in special laws, ordinances, and regulations relating
thereto. (589)
Art. 678. No person shall build any aqueduct, well, sewer, furnace, forge, chimney, stable, depository
of corrosive substances, machinery, or factory which by reason of its nature or products is
dangerous or noxious, without observing the distances prescribed by the regulations and customs
of the place, and without making the necessary protective works, subject, in regard to the manner
thereof, to the conditions prescribed by such regulations. These prohibitions cannot be altered or
renounced by stipulation on the part of the adjoining proprietors.
In the absence of regulations, such precautions shall be taken as may be considered necessary, in
order to avoid any damage to the neighboring lands or tenements. (590a)

NO WAIVER ALLOWED

By reason of public safety

Art. 679. No trees shall be planted near a tenement or piece of land belonging to another except at
the distance authorized by the ordinances or customs of the place, and, in the absence thereof, at a
distance of at least two meters from the dividing line of the estates if tall trees are planted and at a
distance of at least fifty centimeters if shrubs or small trees are planted. Every landowner shall have
the right to demand that trees hereafter planted at a shorter distance from his land or tenement be
uprooted.
The provisions of this article also apply to trees which have grown spontaneously. (591a)

RULES WITH RESPECT TO THE PLANTING OF TREES

1. Tall trees2 meters from boundary line to center of tree

2. Small trees or shrubs50 centimeters from boundary line to center of tree or shrub

REMEDY FOR VIOLATION

Demand uprooting of the tree or shrub

Art. 680. If the branches of any tree should extend over a neighboring estate, tenement, garden or
yard, the owner of the latter shall have the right to demand that they be cut off insofar as they may
spread over his property, and, if it be the roots of a neighboring tree which should penetrate into the
land of another, the latter may cut them off himself within his property. (592)

RULES REGARDING INTRUSIONS OR EXTENSIONS OF

BRANCHES
AND ROOTS
1. Branchesadjacent owner has the right to demand that they be cut off
2. Rootshe may cut them off himself

PRESCRIPTION
1. Of the right to demand the cutting off the branchesthis doesnt prescribe if tolerated by invaded owner
2. Of the right to cut off the rootsthis is imprescriptible unless a notarial prohibition is made

RIGHT OF THE OWNER OF THE TREE

The owner of the tree even if the branches and roots have invaded the adjacent land can cut down the tree
himself for he owns the trees
Art. 681. Fruits naturally falling upon adjacent land belong to the owner of said land. (n)

RULES AS TO FRUITS
1. If the fruits still hang on the tree, they are still owned by the tree owner
2. It is only after they have naturally fallen that they belong to the owner of the invaded land

ALMENDRAS V. CA
GR 110067, MARCH 13, 1997
FACTS:
Almendras property was surrounded by different properties owned by different peopleon the north was
Pang Engs, east was Yaps, west was Opones, and south was Bongos. Yap and Pang Eng both enclosed
their properties against Almendras. She filed for an easement of right of way. Bongo then enclosed his
property and this was followed soon after by Opone.

HELD:
Where there are several estates surrounding the dominant estate, and the easement may be established on
any of them, the one where the way is shortest and will cause less damage should be chosen.

DIONISIO V. ORTIZ
204 SCRA 745
FACTS:
Petitioners were owners of contiguous lots. Adjacent to it were the lots of private respondents. Through an
agreement, they were granted a right of way over Howmart Road, transverring through the properties of
private respondents. Petitioner then decided to partition his lot into 2, which led to the construction of a new

gate. This gate opened directly to the property of one of the private respondent. Later, a steel barricade was
constructed to block the gate.

HELD:
Easement is not compulsory if the isolation was due to the proprietors own acts.

EASEMENT OF PARTY WALL

Art. 658. The easement of party wall shall be governed by the provisions of this Title, by the local
ordinances and customs insofar as they do not conflict with the same, and by the rules of co
ownership.
(571a)

PARTY WALL DEFINED

Wall at the dividing line of estates

Co-ownership governs the wall, hence, the party wall is necessarily a common wall

Art. 659. The existence of an easement of party wall is presumed, unless there is a title, or exterior
sign, or proof to the contrary:
(1) In dividing walls of adjoining buildings up to the point of common elevation;
(2) In dividing walls of gardens or yards situated in cities, towns, or in rural communities;
(3) In fences, walls and live hedges dividing rural lands. (572)

HOW PRESUMPTION THAT A WALL IS A

PARTY WALL MAY BE REBUTTED
1. Title to the contrary
2. Exterior signs to the contrary
3. Proof to the contrary

CONFLICT BETWEEN A TITLE AND AN

EXTERIOR SIGN

A title conferring ownership in one owner prevails over a mere exterior sign

Art. 660. It is understood that there is an exterior sign, contrary to the easement of party wall:
(1) Whenever in the dividing wall of buildings there is a window or opening;
(2) Whenever the dividing wall is, on one side, straight and plumb on all its facement, and on the other, it has
similar
conditions on the upper part, but the lower part slants or projects outward;
(3) Whenever the entire wall is built within the boundaries of one of the estates;
(4) Whenever the dividing wall bears the burden of the binding beams, floors and roof frame of one of the
buildings, but not those of the others;
(5) Whenever the dividing wall between courtyards, gardens, and tenements is constructed in such a way
that the coping sheds the water upon only one of the estates;
(6) Whenever the dividing wall, being built of masonry, has stepping stones, which at certain intervals project
from the surface on one side only, but not on the other;
(7) Whenever lands inclosed by fences or live hedges adjoin others which are not inclosed. In all these
cases, the ownership of the walls, fences or hedges shall be deemed to belong exclusively to the owner of
the property or tenement which has in its favor the presumption based on any one of these signs. (573)

EXTERIOR SIGNS NEGATIVING THE

EXISTENCE OF A PARTY WALL

This article enumerates by illustration exterior signs rebutting the presumption of there being an
easement of a party wall

CONFLICTING EXTERIOR SIGNS

If one owner has signs in his favor, and some against him, they generally cancel each other, unless it
can be shown from the purpose of the wall that it had been made for the exclusive benefit of one

Art. 661. Ditches or drains opened between two estates are also presumed as common to both, if
there is no title or sign showing the contrary.
There is a sign contrary to the part-ownership whenever the earth or dirt removed to open the ditch
or to clean it is only on one side thereof, in which case the ownership of the ditch shall belong
exclusively to the owner of the land having this exterior sign in its favor. (574)

PARTY DITCHES OR DRAINS

The presumption of party wall applies to ditches and drains opened between two estates

REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION
Art. 662. The cost of repairs and construction of party walls and the maintenance of fences, live hedges,
ditches, and drains owned in common, shall be borne by all the owners of the lands or tenements having the
party wall in their favor, in proportion to the right of each.
Nevertheless, any owner may exempt himself from contributing to this charge by renouncing his partownership, except when the party wall supports a building belonging to him. (575)

REPAIRS ON AND CONSTRUCTION OF

PARTY WALL WHEN RENUNCIATION
CAN BE MADE
1. The repair had already been contracted for and made
2. He still uses the wall

REQUISITES FOR THE RENUNCIATION

OF THE SHARE
1. Must be total or complete
2. Must be made voluntarily and with full knowledge of the facts
3. Must be made before the expenses are incurred
4. Made with the implied condition that the other owner should make or pay for the repairs
5. Must be of both the share in the wall and share in the land, for the wall cannot be used without the land
Art. 663. If the owner of a building, supported by a party wall desires to demolish the building, he may also
renounce his part ownership of the wall, but the cost of all repairs and work necessary to prevent any
damage which the demolition may cause to the party wall, on this occasion only, shall be borne by him.
(576)

DEMOLITION OF A BUILDING
SUPPORTED BY THE PARTY WALL

Indemnification must be made for damages

Art. 664. Every owner may increase the height of the party wall, doing at his own expense and paying for
any damage which may be caused by the work, even though such damage be temporary. The expenses of
maintaining the wall in the part newly raised or deepened at its foundation shall also be paid for by him; and,
in addition, the indemnity for the increased expenses which may be necessary for the preservation of the
party wall by reason of the greater height or depth which has been given it.

If the party wall cannot bear the increased height, the owner desiring to raise it shall be obliged to
reconstruct it at his own expense and, if for this purpose it be necessary to make it thicker, he shall give the
space required from his own land. (577)

INCREASING THE HEIGHT OF THE

PARTY WALL
1. Must do so at his own expense
2. Must pay the necessary damages caused, even if the damage be temporary
3. Must bear the costs of maintenance of the portion added
4. Must pay for the increased cost of preservation
5. Must reconstruct if original wall cannot bear the increased height
6. Must give the additional space necessary if wall is to be thickened

EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP OF THE

ADDITIONS
Art. 665. The other owners who have not contributed in giving increased height, depth or thickness to the
wall may, nevertheless, acquire the right of part-ownership therein, by paying proportionally the value of the
work at the time of the acquisition and of the land used for its increased thickness. (578a)

HOW THE OTHER OWNERS MAY

ACQUIRE PART-OWNERSHIP IN THE
ADDITIONS

The value of the additions at the time of acquisition by the others should be paid

Art. 666. Every part-owner of a party wall may use it in proportion to the right he may have in the coownership, without interfering with the common and respective uses by the other co-owners. (579a)

EASEMENT OF LIGHT AND VIEW

Art. 667. No part-owner may, without the consent of the others, open through the party wall any
window or aperture of any kind. (580)

PROVISION PERTAINS TO
PROHIBITION TO MAKE AN OPENING
THROUGH THE PARTY WALL
Art. 668. The period of prescription for the acquisition of an easement of light and view shall be
counted:
(1) From the time of the opening of the window, if it is through a party wall; or
(2) From the time of the formal prohibition upon the proprietor of the adjoining land or tenement, if the
window is through a wall on the dominant estate. (n)

WHEN EASEMENT OF LIGHT AND VIEW

IS POSITIVE AND WHEN NEGATIVE
1. Positiveif the window is through a party wall. Therefore the period of prescription commences from the
time the window is opened.
a. The mere opening of the window doesnt create the easement; it is only when after a sufficient lapse of
time
the window still remains open, the easement of light and view is created
2. Negativeif the window is through ones own wall, that is, through a wall of the dominant estate
Art. 669. When the distances in Article 670 are not observed, the owner of a wall which is not party wall,
adjoining a tenement or piece of land belonging to another, can make in it openings to admit light at the

height of the ceiling joints or immediately under the ceiling, and of the size of thirty centimeters square, and,
in every case, with an iron grating imbedded in the wall and with a wire screen.
Nevertheless, the owner of the tenement or property adjoining the wall in which the openings are made can
close them should he acquire part-ownership thereof, if there be no stipulation to the contrary.
He can also obstruct them by constructing a building on his land or by raising a wall thereon contiguous to
that having such openings, unless an easement of light has been acquired. (581a)

RESTRICTED WINDOWS

The openings or windows referred to in this article are for light, not view, hence, the conditions or
restrictions set for them

THE RESTRICTIONS THEMSELVES

1. Maximum size is 30 cm. square
2. There must be an iron grating imbedded in the wall
3. There must be a wire screen
4. The opening must be at the height of the ceiling joists or immediately under the ceiling

SANCTIONS IN CASE OF VIOLATIONS

1. He can obstruct the light
a. By constructing a higher building on his own land
b. Or by raising a blocking wall
2. If the wall becomes a party wall he can close the window, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary
Art. 670. No windows, apertures, balconies, or other similar projections which afford a direct view
upon or towards an adjoining land or tenement can be made, without leaving a distance of two
meters between the wall in which they are made and such contiguous property.
Neither can side or oblique views upon or towards such conterminous property be had, unless there
be a distance of sixty centimeters.
The nonobservance of these distances does not give rise to prescription. (582a)

Art. 671. The distance referred to in the preceding article shall be measured in cases of direct views
from the outer line of the wall when the openings do not project, from the outer line of the latter
when they do, and in cases of oblique view from the dividing line between the two properties. (583)

RULES FOR REGULAR WINDOWS

1. Articles 670 and 671 deal with regular, full windows
2. Regular windows can be opened provided that the proper distances are followed

THE PROPER DISTANCES

1. For windows having direct views, observe at least 2 meters distance between the wall having the windows
and the boundary line
2. For windows having side or oblique views, observe a distance of at least 50 centimeters between the
boundary line and nearest edge of the window

BUILDING RIGHT ON THE BOUNDARY

LINE

It is permissible to build even up to the boundary line provided that no regular windows are opened

WHAT IS MEANT BY THE NONOBSERVANCE OF THESE DISTANCES

DOESNT GIVE RISE TO
PRESCRIPTION?

The mere non-observance of these distances doesnt give rise to prescription because this being a
negative easement, a notarial prohibition is still required before the period of prescription will
commence to run

RULE AS TO TERRACES

Article 670 also applies to terraces if there are railings but not if there are no railings

Art. 672. The provisions of Article 670 are not applicable to buildings separated by a public way or
alley, which is not less than three meters wide, subject to special regulations and local ordinances.
(584a)

RULE WHEN THE BUILDINGS ARE

SEPARATED BY A PUBLIC WAY OR
ALLEY

When buildings are separated by a public way or alley, there should be a minimum distance of 3
meters

Art. 673. Whenever by any title a right has been acquired to have direct views, balconies or
belvederes overlooking an adjoining property, the owner of the servient estate cannot build thereon
at less than a distance of three meters to be measured in the manner provided in Article 671. Any
stipulation permitting distances less than those prescribed in Article 670 is void. (585a)

RULE WHEN A RIGHT HAS BEEN

ACQUIRED TO HAVE DIRECT VIEWS

This provision speaks of a true easement

DRAINAGE OF BUILDINGS
Art. 674. The owner of a building shall be obliged to construct its roof or covering in such manner
that the rain water shall fall on his own land or on a street or public place, and not on the land of his
neighbor, even though the adjacent land may belong to two or more persons, one of whom is the
owner of the roof. Even if it should fall on his own land, the owner shall be obliged to collect the
water in such a way as not to cause damage to the adjacent land or tenement. (586a)

RESTRICTIONS WITH RESPECT TO

THE EASEMENT OF DRAINAGE OF
BUILDINGS

A person who should let rain water fall on his own land and not on the adjacent land, even if he be a
co-owner of the latter

Rain water must be collected

Art. 675. The owner of a tenement or a piece of land, subject to the easement of receiving water
falling from roofs, may build in such manner as to receive the water upon his own roof or give it
another outlet in accordance with local ordinances or customs, and in such a way as not to cause
any nuisance or damage whatever to the dominant estate. (587)

RULE WHEN A TENEMENT OR LAND IS

SUBJECT TO THE EASEMENT OF
RECEIVING WATER FALLING FROM
THE ROOFS
Art. 676. Whenever the yard or court of a house is surrounded by other houses, and it is not possible
to give an outlet through the house itself to the rain water collected thereon, the establishment of an

easement of drainage can be demanded, giving an outlet to the water at the point of the contiguous
lands or tenements where its egress may be easiest, and establishing a conduit for the drainage in
such manner as to cause the least damage to the servient estate, after payment of the property
indemnity. (583)

OUTLET OF RAIN WATER THROUGH

SURROUNDING HOUSES:
CONDITIONS
1. Because of enclosure, there is no adequate outlet for rain water
2. The outlet must be at the point of easiest egress
3. Least possible damage
4. Payment of proper indemnity

ENCARNACION V. CA
195 SCRA 74
FACTS:
Encarnacions property was behind the property of De Sagun. It was the latters property which was fronting
the public road. Not long after, Encarnacion engaged in the plant nursing business which flourished. His
jeepney couldnt pass through the pathway. He offered to pay for the widening but was denied.

HELD:
It is the needs of the dominant estate which ultimately determines the width of the passage and these needs
may vary from time to time.

VDA. DE BALTAZAR V. CA
245 SCRA 333
FACTS:
Panganibans property was surrounded by Baltazars in front, and Calimons and Legazpis on the left and
right, respectively. It was Baltazars property which fronts the national road. Panganiban sought the right of
way through Baltazars. It was discovered that he was allowed access through Legazpi and Calimons
property when Baltazar closed his property.

HELD:
Requisites that has to be complied with before the grant of a compulsory easement of right of way
1. The property is surrounded by estate of others and there is no adequate outlet to a public highway
2. It must be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and insofar as consistent with this
rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest
3. There must be payment of the proper indemnity
4. The isolation should not be due to the proprietors own acts

STA. MARIA V. CA
285 SCRA 163
FACTS:
Fajardos property was surrounding by different properties owned by different people. On the northwest was
Jacintos, the northeast was a fishpond, on southwest was Cruzs and on the southeast was Sta. Marias. It
was through Sta. Marias property that there could be a less prejudicial right of way. Fajardo filed for an
easement of right of way.

HELD:
Where there are several estates surrounding the dominant estate, and the easement may be established on
any of them, the one where the way is shortest and will cause less damage should be chosen.

NATIONAL IRRIGATION
AUTHORITY V. CA
340 SCRA 661
FACTS:
Ramos was the owner of a parcel of land which he bought from a subdivision. Abutting his property were two
road lots, one was the proposed access road of the subdivision and the other was owned by a different
entity. A wall was constructed on the other constructed road lot, preventing Ramos from passing through the
road.

HELD:
To justify an easement, real necessity must be shown.

ABELLANA V. CA
208 SCRA 316
FACTS:
Manglapus was the grantee of a free patent. In the free patent issued to him, there was a provision granting
the government reservation for public easements and servitudes. After he was given the patent, the NIA

entered
into his premises and started constructing canals.

HELD:
Where the land was originally public land, and awarded by free patent with a reservation for a legal
easement of a right of way in favor of the government, just compensation need not be paid for the taking of
the part thereof for public use as an easement of right of way.

CRISTOBAL V. CA
291 SCRA 122
FACTS:
Cristobal owned a house and lot in Visayas Avenue Extension. Ledesma on the other hand was the owner of
the adjoining subdivision, which included the disputed lots 1 and 2. Lots 1 and 2 were originally a part of the
private road. Upon the making of Visayas Avenue as a public road, Ledesma petitioned the exclusion of the
two disputed lots from the road. He was granted to do so. Upon the sale of the lots to a third person, it was
discovered that there were squatters on the land and that it was being used as a passageway by petitioners.
This prompted the new owner to enclose the lot.

HELD:
The essential requisites for the compulsory right of way are as follows
1. The property is surrounded by estate of others and there is no adequate outlet to a public highway
2. It must be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and insofar as consistent with this
rule, where the distancefrom the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest
3. There must be payment of the proper indemnity
4. The isolation should not be due to the proprietors own acts In consideration of the above, mere
convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis for setting up the compulsory
right of way.

FLORO V. LLENADO
244 SCRA 713
FACTS:
Floro was the owner of a subdivision. Here comes Llenado who bought the adjoining subdivision lot, which
was formerly Emmanuel Homes. A creek separates the property of Llenado from Floro. On the west side of
Llenados property was a rice land. On the subdivision plan of Llenados property, there was a plan to
construct an access road to McArthur Highway but no construction was made. With the two subdivisions, it
was Floros which only had an access road. Floro allowed usage of his access road pending negotiations but
later on closed the property.

HELD:
The essential requisites are the following
1. The property is surrounded by estate of others and there is no adequate outlet to a public highway
2. It must be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and insofar as consistent with this
rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest
3. There must be payment of the proper indemnity
4. The isolation should not be due to the proprietors own acts Burden of proving the existence of the
prerequisites to validly claim a compulsory right of way lies on the owner of the dominant estate. And it
should be noted that mere convenience of the dominant estate is not what is contemplated by the law in
establishing a right of way.

MORTGAGE, FORECLOSURE AND REDEMPTION

Larry P. Ignacio
REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE
A real estate mortgage is a contract in which
the debtor guarantees to the creditor the fulfillment of a principal obligation,
subjecting for the faithful compliance therewith a real property in case of nonfulfillment of said obligation at the time stipulated (Manresa). It is a lien on

specific or identified immovable property. It directly and immediately subjects the

property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the
fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted. It creates a real
right enforceable against the whole world (DBP v. NLRC, 183 SCRA 328
[1990]). Foreclosure of mortgage
Foreclosure of mortgage is the process by which a property covered may be
subjected to sale to pay demand for which mortgages stand as security (Pacific
Commercial Co. v. Alvarez, 38 OG 758). Foreclosure is the necessary consequence
of non-payment of mortgage indebtedness. The mortgage can be foreclosed only
when the debt remains unpaid at the time it is due (Producers Bank v. CA, GR No.
111584, 17 Sept. 2001; Govt of the PI v. Espejo, 57 Phil 496) or in case of default
in the payment of obligation (PNB v. CA, GR No. 126908, 16 Jan. 2003; Chinabank
v. CA, 265 SCRA 327 [1996])
Demand is essential for default. Demand, however, is necessary for default to
exist and which gives the right to collect debt and foreclose the mortgage. The
maturity dates in the promissory notes or the acceleration clause ([i]n case of
non-payment of this note or any portion of it on demand, when due, on account of
this note, the entire obligation shall become due and demandable. . .) therein
stated only indicate when payment can be demanded. It is the refusal to pay after
demand that gives the creditor a cause of action against the debtor (DBP v.
Licuanan, GR No. 150097, 26 February 2007). Default commences upon judicial or
extrajudicial demand (UCPB vs. Beluso, G.R. No. 159912, August 17,
2007).Demand, however, is not necessary where the law or the obligations
expressly declare it unnecessary (Premiere Devt. Bank v. Central Surety &
Insurance Company, Inc., 579 SCRA 359, 13 February 2009).
Mora solvendi or debtors default is defined as a delay in the fulfillment of an
obligation, by reason of a cause imputable to the debtor. There are three requisites
necessary for a finding of default. First, the obligation is demandable and
liquidated; second, the debtor delays performance; third, the creditor judicially or
extrajudicially requires the debtors performance (Selegna Management & Devt.
Corp. v. UCPB, GR No. 165662, 03 May 2006).
Prohibition against Pactum Commissorium.
A stipulation in a deed of mortgage which states that upon failure of the
mortgagor to pay the debt within the agreed period, the land covered by the
mortgage shall become property of the mortgagee or the transaction shall become
a sale and the consideration shall be considered as payment of the price of the

land is pactum commissorium and is null and void (Reyes v. Nebreja, 98 Phil 639
[1956]). Such stipulation is void since it enables the mortgagee to acquire
ownership of the mortgaged property without need of foreclosure (Olea v. CA, 247
SCRA 274 [1995]); it is a nullity being contrary to the provisions of Article 2088 of
the Civil Code (Lumayag v. Heirs of Jacinto Nemeno, 526 SCRA 315 [2007]).
Two modes of foreclosure of real estate mortgage.
Foreclosure of real estate mortgage is either done extra-judicially or
judicially. The provisions of Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure govern
judicial foreclosure. The extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage, on the
other hand, is carried out in the procedure governed by the provisions of Act
3135, as amended, otherwise known as An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property
Under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real Estate Mortgages.

EXTRA-JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE OF REAL ESTATE

MORTGAGE UNDER ACT 3135, AS AMENDED &
REDEMPTION
Essential requirements under Act 3135
Under Act 3135, as amended and settled jurisprudence, the following
essential requirements must be met:
1.
There must be a special power of attorney inserted in or attached to the
real estate mortgage authorizing the sale pursuant to the provisions of Act, 3135,
as amended (Section 1; Paguyo v. Gatbunton, 523 SCRA 156 [2007]). 2.
The
sale must be made within the province where the property or any part thereof is
located, unless otherwise stipulated (Section 2; Supena v. de la Rosa, 267 SCRA
1). 3.
There must be a notice of sale to be posted in three public places of the
municipality or city where the property is situated. If the property is worth more
than P400.00, the notice shall also be published once a week for three consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the city or municipality (Section
3). 4.
The sale shall be made at public auction between the hours of nine in
the morning and four in the afternoon, and shall be under the direction of the
sheriff of the province, the justice or auxiliary justice of the peace (now municipal
judge) of the municipality in which such sale shall be made, or a notary public of
said municipality (Section 4). Procedure of extrajudicial foreclosure under Act
3135
In Administrative Matter No. 99-10-05-0 (as further amended on 07 August
2001), the Supreme Court prescribed the following procedures in the extra-judicial
foreclosure of mortgage:

1. All applications for extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage whether under the

direction of the sheriff or a notary public, pursuant to Act 3135, as amended, shall
be filed with the Executive Judge, through the Clerk of Court who is also the ExOfficio Sheriff. 2. Upon receipt of an application for extra-judicial foreclosure of
mortgage, it shall be the duty of the Clerk of Court to: a) receive and docket said
application and to stamp thereon the corresponding file number, date and time of
filing; b) collect the filing fees therefore pursuant to Rule 141, Section 7(c) as
amended by A.M. No. 00-2-01-SC, and issue the corresponding official
receipt; c) examine, in case of real estate mortgage foreclosure, whether the
applicant has complied with all the requirements before the public auction is
conducted under the direction of the sheriff or a notary public, pursuant to Sec. 4
of Act 3135, as amended; d) sign and issue the certificate of sale, subject to the
approval of the Executive Judge, or in his absence, the Vice-Executive Judge. No
certificate of sale shall be issued in favor of the highest bidder until all fees
provided in the aforementioned sections and in Rule 141, Section 9(1) as amended
by A.M. 00-2-01-SC, shall have been paid; Provided, that in no case shall the
amount payable under Rule 141, Section 9(1), as amended, exceed
P100,000.00; e) after the certificate of sale has been issued to the highest bidder,
keep the complete records, while awaiting any redemption within a period of one
(1) year from date of registration of the certificate of sale with the Register of
Deed concerned, after which, the records shall be archived. Notwithstanding the
foregoing provision, juridical persons whose property is sold pursuant to an
extrajudicial foreclosure, shall have the right to redeem the property until, but not
after, the registration of the certificate of foreclosure sale which in no case shall be
more than three (3) months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier, as provided in
Section 47 of Republic Act No. 8791 (as amended, Res. of August 7, 2001) Where
the application concerns the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgages of real estates
and/or chattels in different locations covering one indebtedness, only one filing fee
corresponding to such indebtedness shall be collected. The collecting Clerk of
Court shall, apart from the official receipt of the fees, issue a certificate of
payment indicating the amount of indebtedness, the filing fees collected, the
mortgages sought to be foreclosed, the real estates and/or chattels mortgaged
and their respective locations, which certificate shall serve the purpose of having
the application docketed with the Clerks of Court of the places where the other
properties are located and of allowing the extrajudicial foreclosures to proceed
thereat. 3. The notices of auction sale in extrajudicial foreclosure for publication by
the sheriff or by a notary public shall be published in a newspaper of general
circulation pursuant to Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1079, dated January 2,
1977, and non-compliance therewith shall constitute a violation of Section 6
thereof. 4. The Executive Judge shall, with the assistance of the Clerk of Court,
raffle applications for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage under the direction of
the sheriff among all sheriffs, including those assigned to the Office of the Clerk of
Court and Sheriffs IV assigned in the branches. 5. The name/s of the bidder/s

shall be reported by the sheriff or notary public who conducted the sale to the
Clerk of Court before the issuance of the certificate of sale. Time when to conduct
auction sale.
Issue: Whether a sale a public auction, to be valid, must be
conducted the whole day from 9:00 a.m. until 4:00 p.m. of the scheduled auction
day. Section 4 of Act 3135 provides that the sale must take place between the
hours of nine in the morning and four in the afternoon.
The word
between ordinarily means in time interval that separates. Thus, between the
hours of nine in the morning and four in the afternoon merely provides a time
frame within which an auction sale may be conducted. Therefore, a sale at public
auction held within the intervening period provided by law (i.e., at any time from
9:00 a.m. until 4:00 p.m.) is valid, without regard to the duration or length of time
it took the auctioneer to conduct the proceedings (PNB v. Cabatingan, 557 SCRA
426 [2008]). Act 3135 regulates the extrajudicial sale of mortgaged real properties
by prescribing a procedure which effectively safeguards the rights of both debtor
and creditor (ibid.). Notice and publication requirements.
1. Notice and publication under PD 1079 and Act 3135, as amended.
Section 1 of PD 1079, as amended provides:
All notices of auction sales in extra-judicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage under Act 3135, as amended x x x required by law to be published in a
newspaper of general circulation in particular provinces and/or cities shall be
published in newspapers or publications published, edited and circulated in the
same city and/or province where the requirement of general circulation
applies: Provided, That the province or city where the publications principal office
is located shall be considered the place where it is edited and published x x x.
Section 3 of Act 3135, as amended, reads:
Notice shall be given by posting notices of the sale for not less than twenty
days in at least three public places of the municipality or city where the property is
situated, and if such property is worth more than four hundred pesos, such notice
shall also be published once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the municipality or city.
A reading of the above provisions gives us the impression that the
publication of extra-judicial sales under Act, 3135, if the property is worth more
than four hundred pesos, shall be in a newspaper of general circulation in the city
or municipality where the property lies. Hence, if the property in question is
located in Quezon City, it logically follows that the auction sale of said property
should be published in a newspaper of general circulation that is edited and
published in Quezon City.
However, such application and/or interpretation are too narrow and very
limited that it virtually defeats the purpose and intention of the law. If this is the

case, the leading dailies, like the Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI) (with head office in
Makati City) and Manila Bulletin (with head office in Manila), which enjoys a wide
circulation nationwide, cannot publish notice of extra-judicial sales of properties
located in Quezon City simply because it is outside their place of
publication.
What is important is that the newspaper is of general circulation
in the place where the property/ies to be foreclosed is/are located.
In a line
of cases, the Highest Court declared that publication of the extra-judicial sale in a
newspaper of general circulation is more than sufficient compliance with the
notice-posting requirement of the law (Fortune Motors v. Metrobank, 265 SCRA
72; Cristobal v. CA, 328 SCRA 256; Concepcion v. CA, 274 SCRA 614; Bohanan v.
CA, 256 SCRA 355; Olizon v. CA, 236 SCRA 148; Gravina v. CA 220 SCRA
178). PD 1079 and Act 3135 do not require that the newspaper which publishes
judicial notices should be a daily newspaper (Fortune Motors, 265 SCRA 72).
In Olizon at 156, it was ruled that:
x x x the publication of the notice of sale in the newspaper of general
circulation alone is more than sufficient compliance with the notice-posting
requirement of the law. By such publication, a reasonably wide publicity had been
effected such that those interested might attend the public sale, and the purpose
of the law had thereby subserved. The object of a notice of sale is to inform
the public of the nature and condition of the property to be sold, and
inform of the time, place and terms of the sale. Notices are given for the
purpose of securing bidders and to prevent a sacrifice of the property. If these
objects are attained, immaterial errors and mistakes will not affect the sufficiency
of the notice; x x x (emphases supplied)
An extra-judicial foreclosure sale is an action in rem and thus requires only
notice by publication and posting to bind the parties in the foreclosed property. No
personal notice is necessary (Langkaan Realty Devt., supra; Bohanan v. CA,
supra; Fortune Motors, 265 SCRA 72).
A certificate of posting is not required, much less considered indispensable,
for the validity of a foreclosure sale under Act 3135 it is significant only in the
matter of providing compliance with the required posting of notice (Bohanan v.
CA, 256 SCRA 355; Olizon v. CA, 256 SCRA 355; Cristobal v. CA, 328 SCRA 256
[2000]; DBP v. CA, GR No. 125838, 10 June 2003). The failure to post a notice is
not per se a ground for invalidating the sale provided that the notice thereof is
duly published in a newspaper of general circulation (DBP v. Aguirre, GR No.
144877, 07 September 2001).
However, the failure to publish the notice of auction sale as required by the
statute constitutes a jurisdictional defect which invalidates the sale (DBP v.
Aguirre, GR No. 144877, 07 Sept. 2001).

The affidavit of publication executed by the publisher, business/advertising

manager that a newspaper is a newspaper of general circulation constitutes prima
facie evidence of compliance with the requisite publication (Bonnevie v. CA, 125
SCRA 122 [1983]; Sadang v. GSIS, 18 SCRA 491).
A single act of posting the notice of auction sale satisfies the requirements of
law. The burden of proving that the posting requirement was not complied with is
shifted to the one who alleges non-compliance (Bonnevie v. CA, 125 SCRA 122
[1983]).
2. The purpose of notice and publication.
The object of a notice of sale is to inform the public of the nature and
condition of the property to be sold, and inform of the time, place and terms of the
sale. Notices are given for the purpose of securing bidders and to prevent a
sacrifice of the property (Olizon v. CA, 236 SCRA 148). Publication, therefore, is
required to give the foreclosure sale a reasonably wide publicity such that those
interested might attend the public sale (Ouano v. CA, 129279, 04 March 2003).
3. The notice and publication requirement are mandatory and failure to comply is a
jurisdictional defect that vitiates the foreclosure auction sale.
Non-compliance with the notice and publication requirement in Act 3135, as
amended is a jurisdictional defect that vitiates the auction sale (Tambunting v. CA,
167 SCRA 16).
The rule is that statutory provisions governing publication of notice of
mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with, and that even slight
deviation therefrom will invalidate the notice and render the sale at least voidable.
x x x It has been held that failure to advertise a mortgage foreclosure sale in
compliance with statutory requirements constitute a jurisdictional defect
invalidating the sale and that a substantial error or omission in a notice of sale will
render the notice insufficient and vitiate the sale. (Tambunting v. CA, 167 SCRA
16).
Statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure
sales must be strictly complied with and slight deviations therefrom will invalidate
the notice and render the sale at the very least voidable (PNB v. Nepomuceno
Productions, Inc., GR No. 139479, 27 December 2002; Ouano v. CA, GR No.
129279, 04 March 2003; Lucena v. CA, 313 SCRA47, [1999]).

The failure to publish the notice of auction sale as required by the statute
constitutes a jurisdictional defect which invalidates the sale (DBP v. Aguirre, GR
No. 144877, 07 September 2001).
The right of a bank to foreclose a mortgage upon the mortgagors failure to
pay his obligation must be exercised according to its clear mandate and every
requirement of the law must be complied with, lest the valid exercise of the right
end. The valid exercise of the right ends when the right disappears, and it
disappears when it is abused especially to the prejudice of others (PNB v.
Nepomuceno, supra.).
4. The parties have no right to waive the notice and publication requirements.
There is no estoppel in case of an agreement to dispense with the notice and
publication requirements.
The parties have absolutely no right to waive the posting and publication
requirements (PNB v. Nepomuceno Productions, Inc., GR No. 139479, 27
December 2002; Ouano v. CA, GR No. 129279, 04 March 2003). Foreclosure
auction sale is imbued with public policy considerations and any waiver on the
notice and publication requirements would be inconsistent with the intent and
letter of Act 3135, as amended (PNB v. Nepomuceno, supra.).
To request postponement of the sale is one thing; to request it without need
of compliance with the statutory requirements is another. Therefore, a party is not
estopped from questioning the validity of the foreclosure sale for non-compliance
with Act 3135 (PNB v. Nepomuceno, supra.).
Publication, therefore, is required to give the foreclosure sale a reasonably
wide publicity such that those interested might attend the public sale. To allow the
parties to waive this jurisdictional requirement would result in converting into a
private sale what ought to be a public auction (Ouano v. CA, GR No. 129279, 04
March 2003).
In the case of DPB v. CA, GR No. 125838, 10 June 2003, the Supreme Court
clarified that:
The form of the notice of extrajudicial sale is now prescribed in Circular No.
7-2002 issued by the Office of the Court Administrator on 22 January
2002. Section 4(a) of Circular No. 7-2002 provides that: x x x The last paragraph
of the prescribed notice of sale allows the holding of a rescheduled auction sale
without reposting or republication of the notice. However, the rescheduled auction

sale will only be valid if the rescheduled date of auction is clearly specified in the
prior notice of sale. The absence of this information in the prior notice of sale will
render the rescheduled auction sale void for lack of reposting or republication. If
the notice of auction sale contains this particular information, whether or not the
parties agreed to such rescheduled date, there is no more need for the reposting
or republication of the notice of the rescheduled auction sale.
5. Personal notice to the mortgagor is REQUIRED if it is stipulated.
There being no contractual stipulation therefore, personal notice is not
necessary and what governs is the general rule in Section 3 of Act 3135, as
amended, which directs the posting of notices of the sale in at least three (3)
public places of the municipality where the property is situated, and the
publication therefore in a newspaper of general circulation in said municipality
(PNB v. International Corporate Bank, 199 SCRA 508).
Act 3135 only requires (1) the posting of notices of sale in three public
places, and (2) the publication of the same in a newspaper of general
circulation. Personal notice to the mortgagor is not necessary. Nevertheless, the
parties to the mortgage contract are not precluded from exacting additional
requirement (Metrobank v. Wong, GR No. 120859, 26 June 2001; Concepcion v.
CA, 274 SCRA 614). Thus, while publication of the foreclosure proceedings in the
newspaper of general circulation was complied with, personal notice is still
required when the same was mutually agreed upon by the parties as additional
condition of the mortgage contract. Failure to comply with such stipulation is fatal
(Community Savings & Loan Association, Inc. v. CA, 153 SCRA 564; Grand Farms
Inc. v. CA, 193 SCRA 748; Concepcion v. CA, GR No. 122079, 27 June 1997).
The rule is that statutory provisions governing publication of
mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with, and that even
slight deviation therefrom will invalidate the notice and render the sale at
least voidable. x x x Where required by the statute or by the terms of the
foreclosure decree, public notice of the place and time of the mortgage foreclosure
sale must be given, a statute requiring it being held applicable to
subsequent sales as well as to the first advertised sale of the property. It
has been held that failure to advertise a mortgage foreclosure sale in compliance
with statutory requirements constitutes a jurisdictional defect invalidating the sale
and that a substantial error or omission in a notice of sale will render the notice
insufficient and vitiates the sale (Tambunting v. CA, 167 SCRA 16, 23 [1988]
citing Jalandoni v. Ledesma, 64 Phil 1058 & 59 CJS 1314, emphases supplied).

The failure to publish the notice of auction sale as required by the statute
constitutes a jurisdictional defect which invalidates the sale (DBP v. Aguirre, GR
No. 144877, 07 September 2001).
The Act only requires (1) the posting of notices of sale in three public
places, and (2) the publication of the same in a newspaper of general circulation.
Personal notice to the mortgagor is not necessary. Nevertheless, the parties to the
mortgage contract are not precluded from exacting additional requirements. In
this case, petitioner and respondent in entering into a contract of real estate
mortgage, agree inter alia:
all correspondence relative to this mortgage, including demand letters, summonses, subpoenas,
or notifications of any judicial or extrajudicial action shall be sent to the MORTGAGOR at 40-42
Aldeguer St., Iloilo City, or at the address that may hereafter be given in writing by the
MORTGAGOR to the MORTGAGEE.

Precisely, the purpose of the foregoing stipulation is to apprise respondent of

any action which petitioner might take on the subject property, thus according him
the opportunity to safeguard his rights. When petitioner failed to send the notice of
foreclosure sale to respondent, he committed a contractual breach sufficient to
render the foreclosure sale on November 23, 1981 null and void. (Metrobank v.
Wong, 359 SCRA 608 [2001])
The OLIZON CASE is an exception:
Obviously, as correctly pointed out by respondent, what prompted the Court to
dispense with the posting requirement is the unusual nature of the attendant
facts and the peculiarity of the confluent circumstances involved in Olizon. It
bears stressing that in the said case, the extrajudicial-judicial foreclosure sale
sought to be annulled was conducted more than 15 years ago, thus, even on the
equitable ground of laches, the Olizons action for annulment of foreclosure
proceedings and certificate of sale was bound to fail. An extrajudicial foreclosure
sale is an action in rem and thus requires only notice of publication and posting to
bind the parties in the foreclosed property. (Langkaan Realty Devt. v. UCPB, GR
No. 139437, 08 December 2000; Olizon v. CA, 2236 SCRA 148; Bohanan v. CA,
256 SCRA 355). No personal notice is necessary to the mortgagor (Bonnevie v.
CA, 125 SCRA 122; Fortune Motors v. Metrobank, 265 SCRA 72) unless stipulated
upon by the parties (PNB v. International Corporate Bank, 199 SCRA 508;
Community and Savings Loan Association, Inc. v. CA, 153 SCRA 564; Grand
Farms Inc. v. CA, 193 SCRA 748). Publication of the extrajudicial sale in a
newspaper of general circulation is more than sufficient compliance with the
notice-posting requirement of the law (Cristobal v. CA, 328 SCRA 256; Gravina v.
CA, 220 SCRA 178; Concepcion v. CA, 274 SCRA 614; Olizon v. CA, 236 SCRA
148). The notice and publication requirement are mandatory and failure to comply
is a jurisdictional defect that vitiates the foreclosure auction sale (Tambunting v.

CA, 167 SCRA 16). The parties have absolutely no right to waive the posting and
publication requirements. Foreclosure auction sale is imbued with public policy
considerations and any waiver on the notice and publication requirements would
be inconsistent with the intent and letter of Act 3135, as amended (PNB v.
Nepomuceno, GR No. 1139479, 27 December 2002). Publication is therefore
required to give the foreclosure sale a reasonably wide publicity such that those
interested might attend the public sale. To allow the parties to waive this
jurisdictional requirement would result in converting into a private sale what ought
to be public auction (Ouano v. CA, GR No. 129279, 04 March 2003). Notices are
given for the purpose of securing bidders and to prevent a sacrifice of the property
(Olizon v. CA, 236 SCRA 148). REDEMPTIONRedemption period After the issuance
of the certificate of sale to the highest bidder, this shall be registered with the
Register of Deeds where the property is located. At this point, the remaining right
of the mortgagor/debtor is to redeem the property. Theperiod to redeem property
sold extrajudicially following the foreclosure of mortgage is one (1) year from the
registration of the sheriffs certificate of foreclosure sale (Bernardez v. Reyes, 201
SCRA 648; Section 6, Act 3135, as amended). Incase the mortgagor is a juridical
person Section 47, RA 8791, the General Banking Law of
2000 provides: Notwithstanding Act 3135, juridical persons x x x shall have the
right to redeem the property in accordance with this provision until, but not after,
the registration of the certificate of foreclosure sale with the applicable Register of
Deeds which in no case shall be more than three (3) months after the foreclosure,
whichever is earlier. Redemption period not suspended by TRO or a separate
civil case. The period to redeem was not suspended by the institution of a separate
civil case for annulment of mortgage, foreclosure, etc. (Sumerariz v. DBP, 21
SCRA 1374; Unionbank v. CA, GR No. 134068, 25 June 2001) and NEITHER is it
suspended by the issuance of a TRO by the courts (Peoples Financing Corp. v. CA,
192 SCRA 34). Redemption price
In case of redemption, a written notice of redemption must be served on the
officer who made the sale and a duplicate filed with the applicable Register of
Deeds (Rosales v. Yboa, 120 SCRA 869; Section 28[par. 3], Rule 39, Rules of
Court). The redemption price shall be: the purchase price with one percent (1%)
per month interest; assessment or taxes paid with 1% per month interest (Section
28, Rule 39). When the mortgagee is a bank or a banking or credit institution, the
redemption price is that which is stipulated in the mortgage document or the
outstanding obligation of the mortgage plus interest and expenses (Unionbank v.
CA, GR No. 134068, 25 June 2001; Ponce de Leon v. RFC, 36 SCRA 289; Sy v. CA,
172 SCRA 125). The redemption amount includes the assessment of taxes paid by
the purchaser and the interest on the auction price that should be computed from
the date of the registration of the certificate of sale (Sps. Estanislao, Jr. v. CA, GR
No. 143687, 31 July 2001).
Effect of failure to redeem.

If no redemption is made within the prescribed period, the buyer at

foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased (Joven v.
CA, 212 SCRA 700; PNB v. Adil, 118 SCRA 110). The purchaser then has the
absolute right to a writ of possession that is the final process to carry out or
consummate the extrajudicial foreclosure. Henceforth, the mortgagor/debtor loses
his right over the property (Bernardez v. Reyes, 201 SCRA 648; Section 6, Act
3135, as amended). Consolidation of title likewise becomes a matter of right on
the part of the auction buyer, and the issuance of a certificate of title in favor of
the purchaser becomes ministerial upon the Register of Deeds (Unionbank v. CA,
GR No. 133366, 05 August 1999).
Redemption vs. repurchase
The right to redeem (a foreclosed property)
becomes functus oficio on the date of its expiry, and its exercise after the period is
not really one of redemption but of repurchase. Distinction must be made because
redemption is by force of law; the purchaser at public auction is bound to accept
redemption. Repurchase however of a foreclosed property, after redemption
period, imposes no such obligation. After expiry, the purchaser may or may not
resell the property but no law will compel him to do so. And, he is not bound by
the bid price; it is entirely within his discretion to set a higher price, for after all,
the property already belongs to him as owner (Prudencio v. CA, 431 SCRA 566).

JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE

UNDER RULE 68, RULES OF COURT
Judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage is governed by the provisions of
Rule 68 of the Rules of Court. It is like any ordinary civil action filed in court that
shall be proven by preponderance of evidence.
Procedure
1. Preparation and filing of complaint which shall set forth the following

allegations (Sec. 1, Rule 68):

a) Date and due execution of the mortgage and its assignments, if any;
b) Names and residences of the mortgagor and mortgagee;
c) Description of the mortgaged property/ies;
d) Documentary evidence/s of the obligation/s secured by the mortgage and
the unpaid obligation;

e) Names and residences of all persons having or claiming an interest in the

mortgaged property/ies.
1. The trial court shall render a judgment based on the facts proven and shall

ascertain the amount due based on the mortgage debt or obligation,

including interests, charges and costs. The court shall then direct the
defendant to pay said amount within a period of not less than ninety (90)
days nor more than one-hundred twenty (120) days (Sec. 2, Rule 68).
1. In the event of failure to pay as directed within 90 to 120 days, the

mortgage realty/ies shall be sold at an auction sale, the proceeds of which

shall be applied to the mortgage debt, pursuant to Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court (Sec. 3, Rule 68).
3.1. Before the sale of the real property/ies, notice must be given:
a) By posting for 20-days in three (3) public places. If the assessed value
is more than P50,000.00, by publishing a copy of the notice once a week
for two (2) consecutive weeks in one newspaper selected by raffle (Sec.
15c, Rule 39).
b) Written notice to the judgment obligor at least three (3) days
before the sale (Sec. 15d, Rule 39).
3.2. The highest bidder shall be issued a certificate of sale (Sec. 25, Rule
39).
1. Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the trial court will issue an order

of confirmation of the sale (Rural Bank of Oroquieta v. CA, 101 SCRA 5

[1980]).
4.1. The final order of confirmation shall be registered with the Registry of
Deeds (Sec. 7, Rule 68).
a) If no right of redemption exists, the certificate of title in the name of
the mortgagor shall be cancelled and a new one issued in the name of
the purchaser.

b) Where a right of redemption exists, the certificate of title of the

mortgagor shall not be cancelled. Instead, the certificate of sale and
order of confirmation shall be registered with a memorandum of the right
redemption. If the property is not redeemed a final deed of sale shall be
executed by the sheriff in favor of the purchaser which shall be registered
in the Register of Deeds, whereupon the title of the mortgagor shall be
cancelled and a new one issued in the name of the purchaser.
1. If the proceeds of the auction sale of the property are not sufficient, the trial

court, upon motion, shall render a deficiency judgment against the

defendant (Sec. 6, Rule 68).
Equity of Redemption
Equity of redemption is the right of the mortgagor to redeem the mortgaged
property after his default in the performance of the conditions of the mortgage but
before the sale of the property or the confirmation of the sale after judicial
foreclosure thereof (International Services, Inc. v. IAC, 142 SCRA 467 [1986]).
This is the right of the defendant mortgagor to extinguish the mortgage and retain
ownership of the property by paying the secured debt within a 90-day period after
the judgment becomes final or after the foreclosure sale but prior to its
confirmation (GSIS v. CFI, 175 SCRA 19 [1989]).
No right of redemption in judicial foreclosure.
There is no right of redemption from a judicial foreclosure of mortgage,
except foreclosure of mortgage by banks or banking institutions (GSIS v. CFI, 175
SCRA 19 [1989]; Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. v. CA, 339 SCRA 534 [2000]).
Equity of redemption vs. right of redemption.
The Supreme Court already ruled on the distinction between the equity of
redemption and the right of redemption as follows:
The equity of redemption is, to be sure, different from and should not be
confused with the right of redemption. The right of redemption in relation to a
mortgage understood in the sense of a prerogative to re-acquire mortgaged
property after registration of the foreclosure sale exists only in the case of
the extrajudicialforeclosure of the mortgage. No such right is recognized in
a judicial foreclosure except only where the mortgagee is the Philippine National
Bank or a bank or banking institution. Where a mortgage is foreclosed
extrajudicially, Act 3135 grants to the mortgagor the right of redemption within

one (1) year from the registration of the sheriffs certificate of foreclosure
sale. Where the foreclosure is judicially effected, however, no equivalent right of
redemption exists. The law declares that a judicial foreclosure sale, when
confirmed by an order of the court, x x shall operate to divest the rights of all the
parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser, subject to such
rights of redemption a may be allowed by law. Such rights exceptionally allowed
by law (i.e. even after confirmation by an order of the court) are those granted by
the charter of the Philippine National Bank (Acts No. 2747 and 2938), and the
General Banking Act (R.A. 337). These laws confer on the mortgagor, his
successors in interest or any judgment creditor of the mortgagor, the right to
redeem the property sold on foreclosure after confirmation by the court of the
foreclosure sale which may be exercised within a period of one (1) year, counted
from the date of registration of the certificate of sale in the Registry Property. But,
to repeat, no such right of redemption exists in case of judicial foreclosure of a
mortgage if the mortgagee is not the PNB or a bank or banking institution. In such
a case, the foreclosure sale, when confirmed by an order of the court. x x shall
operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights
in the purchaser. There then exists only what is known as the equity of
redemption. This is simply the right of the defendant mortgagor to extinguish the
mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt within
the 90-day period after the judgment becomes final, in accordance with Rule 68,
or even after judgment becomes final, in accordance with Rule 68, or even after
the foreclosure sale but prior to its confirmation. Section 2, Rule 68 provides that
xx If upon the trial xx the court shall find the facts set forth in the complaint to
be true, it shall ascertain the amount due to the plaintiff upon the mortgage debt
or obligation, including interest and costs, and shall render judgment for the sum
so found due and order the same to be paid into court within a period of not less
than ninety (90) days from the date of the service of such order, and that in
default of such payment the property be sold to realize the mortgage debt and
costs. This is the mortgagors equity (not right) of redemption which, as above
stated, may be exercised by him even beyond the 90-day period from the date of
service of the order, and even after the foreclosure sale itself, provided it be
before the order of confirmation of the sale. After such order of confirmation, no
redemption can be effected any longer. (Italics supplied, Huerta Alba Resort, Inc.
v. CA, 339 SCRA 534 [2000] citing Limpin v. IAC, 166 SCRA 87) Deficiency
judgment
It refers to judgment for any unpaid balance of the obligation,
which remains after foreclosure of mortgage, judicial or extrajudicial, which a
creditor may secure from the court (Phil. Bank of Commerce v. de Vera, 6 SCRA
1026 [1962]). In extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, where the proceeds of the
sale are insufficient to pay the debt, the mortgagee has the right to recover the
deficiency from the debtor (Prudential Bank v. Martinez, 189 SCRA 612 [1990]. In
a foreclosure, the deficiency is determined by simple arithmetical computation
immediately after foreclosure (United Planters Sugar Milling Co., Inc. (UPSUMCO)

v. CA, 527 SCRA 336 [2007]). Extrajudicial foreclosure (EJF) vs. judicial
foreclosure (JF)
1. On the governing law. EJF is governed by the provisions of Act 3135, as

amended, while JF is by the provisions of Rule 68 of the Rules of Court.

1. On the publication requirement. In EJF, the auction sale shall be published

once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general

circulation. In JF, the publication shall only be for two (2) consecutive weeks.
1. On the notice requirement. Personal notice to the mortgagor is not required

in EJF as a rule, UNLESS stipulated upon. In JF, written notice to the

judgment obligor at least three (3) days before the auction sale is required.
1. On redemption. There is a right of redemption in EJF, which is one year from

registration of the certificate of sale. If the mortgagor is a juridical person

the redemption period is until, but not after, the registration of the certificate
of foreclosure sale with the applicable Register of Deed which in no case
shall be more than three (3) months after the foreclosure, whichever is
earlier. In JF, there is no right of redemption but only equity of redemption,
unless the mortgagee is a bank or banking institution. In the latter instance,
the redemption period shall be one (1) year from the date of registration of
the certificate of sale.
CHATTEL MORTGAGE
Chattel mortgage is a security for the performance of obligation effected by
the recording of the personal property mortgaged in the chattel mortgage register
(Art. 2140, Civil Code; Northern Motors, Inc. v. Coquia, 66 SCRA 415 [1975]).
Only personal property may be the object of a chattel mortgage (Sec. 2, Act No.
1508). While the subject of a chattel mortgage is personal property, the parties
thereto may by agreement treat as personal property that which by nature would
be real property, such as a building, as the subject of a chattel mortgage, and the
owner thereof may be estopped from subsequently claiming otherwise (Tumalad
v. Vicencio, 41 SCRA 143 [1971]). Such agreement, however, is valid only as
between the contracting parties (Evangelista v. Alto Surety, 103 Phil 401).
Affidavit of good faith.

Section 5 of Act No. 1508 requires the following form of an affidavit of good
faith to be appended to the chattel mortgage:
We severally swear that the foregoing mortgage is made for the purpose of
securing the obligation specified in the conditions thereof, and for no other
purpose, and that the same is a just and valid obligation, and one not entered into
for the purpose of fraud
The absence of such affidavit vitiates a mortgage as against creditors and
subsequent encumbrances (Phil. Refining Co. v. Jarque, 61 Phil 229; Giberson v.
Jureideni Bros., 44 Phil 216; Benedicto de Tarrosa v. Yap Tico & Co., 46 Phil 753)
but may, however, be valid as between the parties (Lilius & Lilius v. Manila
Railroad Co., 62 Phil 56).
Foreclosure of chattel mortgage.
It appears that a chattel mortgage may only be foreclosed extrajudicially
pursuant to Section 14 of Act No. 1508 with the deletion of Section 8, Rule 68 of
the former rule on judicial foreclosure of chattel mortgage.
In Section 14 of Act No. 1508, it is a condition precedent before foreclosure
that the conditions of the chattel mortgage be broken and at least 30-days already
elapsed.
Procedure
Section 14 of Act No. 1508, provides the following procedure in the
extrajudicial foreclosure of chattel mortgage
1. Posting of the notice of auction sale at least 10 days before auction,
indicating time, place and purpose of sale, at two or more public places in
the municipality where the mortgagor resides, or where the property is
situated.

1. Notification of the mortgagor or his assigns, of the time and place of sale, at

least 10-days previous to the sale, either in writing if a resident of the

municipality, or by registered mail if a resident outside of the municipality.
1. Auction sale of the mortgaged property by a public officer at a public place in

the municipality where the mortgagor resides, or where the property is

situated.
1. The officer making the sale shall, within 30-days thereafter, make in writing

a return of his doings and file the same in the office of the register of deeds
where the mortgage is recorded, and the register of deeds shall record the
same. The return shall particularly describe the articles sold, and state the
amount received for each article, and shall operate as a discharge of the lien
thereon created by the mortgage.
1. The proceeds of the sale shall be applied in the following order:

a) Costs and expenses of keeping the sale;

b) Payment of the demand or obligation secured by such mortgage;
c) Residue shall be paid to persons holding subsequent mortgages in their
order;
d) Balance, if any, shall be paid to the mortgagor or persons holding him
on demand.
Deficiency judgment in chattel mortgage.
If in an extrajudicial foreclosure of chattel mortgage a deficiency exists, an
independent civil action may be instituted for recovery of said deficiency, the
chattel mortgage being given only as security and not as payment for debt in case
of failure of payment (Bicol Savings & Loan Assn. v. Guinhawa, 188 SCRA 642
[1990]; Superlines v. ICC, GR No. 150673, 28 Feb. 2003).
Note however, that in a contract of sale of personal property where the price
is payable in installments and in the event of foreclosure of the chattel mortgage
should the vendee fail to pay two or more installments, the vendor shall have no
further action against the purchaser to recover any unpaid balance of the price.
Any agreement to the contrary shall be void (Art. 1484, Civil Code; Recto

Law). Please note that this is applicable in cases of sale of personal property on
installment.
Distinction: real estate mortgage (REM) vs. chattel mortgage (CM)
1. Properties covered: REM is constituted on immovables/real properties. Only

movables/personal properties may be the object of a chattel mortgage

1. Modes of foreclosure: There are two modes of foreclosure in a REM

extrajudicial under Act No. 3135, as amended or judicial under Rule 68 of

the Rules of Court. In a CM, only extrajudicial foreclosure under Sec. 14 of
Act No. 1508 is now available.
1. On redemption: There is NO right of redemption in CM. In REM, there is right

of redemption in case of extrajudicial foreclosure, and when the mortgagee

is a bank or banking institution in case of judicial foreclosure. In CM, the
purchaser at an auction sale becomes the owner of the property.

VILLANUEVA V. VELASCO
346 SCRA 99
FACTS:
Spouses Gabriel were the previous owners of a house which encroached on the easement of right of way of
Sebastian and Lotilla. By virtue of this, a case was filed against the spouses. Thereafter, the house was sold
to Villanueva. The trial court and appellate court held in favor of Sebastian and Lotilla and ordered the
demolition of the house. This was questioned
by Villanueva on claims that he acquired the property under a clean title and that he wasnt a party to the
previous case.

HELD:
A legal easement is one mandated by law, constituted for public use and for private interest and becomes a
continuous property right.

The following are the essential requisites for a compulsory right

of way
1. The property is surrounded by estate of others and there is no adequate outlet to a
public highway
2. It must be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and insofar
as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest
3. There must be payment of the proper indemnity
4. The isolation should not be due to the proprietors own acts

LEGAL EASEMENTS
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Art. 634. Easements imposed by law have for their object either public use or the interest of private
persons. (549)

LEGAL EASEMENTS DEFINED

> They are the easements imposed by the law, and which have for their object either public use or
the interest of private persons

DIFFERENT LEGAL EASEMENTS

1. Easements relating to waters
2. Right of way
3. Light and view
4. Party wall

5. Drainage of building
6. Intermediate distances
7. Easement against nuisance
8. Lateral and subjacent support
Art. 635. All matters concerning easements established for public or communal use shall be
governed by the special laws and regulations relating thereto, and, in the absence thereof, by the
provisions of this Title. (550)
Art. 636. Easements established by law in the interest of private persons or for private use shall be
governed by the provisions of this Title, without prejudice to the provisions of general or local laws
and ordinances for the general welfare. These easements may be modified by agreement of the
interested parties, whenever the law does not prohibit it or no injury is suffered by a third person.
(551a)

HOW LEGAL EASEMENTS FOR PRIVATE INTERESTS ARE GOVERNED

1. Agreement of the interested parties
2. In default the above, of general or local laws and ordinances for the general welfare
3. In default of the above, the Civil Code

EASEMENTS RELATING TO WATERS

Art. 637. Lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention
of man descend from the higher estates, as well as the stones or earth which they carry with them.
The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede this easement; neither can
the owner of the higher estate make works which will increase the burden. (552)

ENUMERATION OF LEGAL EASEMENT RELATING TO WATERS

1. Natural drainage of lands
2. Natural drainage of buildings
3. Easement on riparian banks for navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage
4. Easement of a dam
5. Easement for drawing water or for watering animals
6. Easement of aqueduct
7. Easement for the construction of a stop luck or sluice

WHAT LOWER ESTATES ARE OBLIGED TO RECEIVE

1. Water which naturally and without the intervention of man descends from the higher estates
2. The stones and earth carried by the waters

DUTIES OF THE SERVIENT ESTATE

> The owner cannot construct works that would impede the easement

DUTIES OF THE DOMINANT ESTATE

1. He cannot make works which will increase the burden
2. But he may construct works preventing erosion
3. If the descending waters are the result of artificial development or proceed from industrial establishments
recently set up, or are the overflow from irrigation dams, the owner of the lower estate shall be entitled to
compensation for his loss or damage

CONTRACT MAY EXTINGUISH LEGAL EASEMENT THERE IS NO NEED FOR

INDEMNITY AS LONG AS THERE IS COMPLIANCE WITH CONDITIONS
Art. 638. The banks of rivers and streams, even in case they are of private ownership, are subject
throughout their entire length and within a zone of three meters along their margins, to the easement of
public use in the general interest of navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage.
Estates adjoining the banks of navigable or floatable rivers are, furthermore, subject to the easement of
towpath for the exclusive service of river navigation and floatage. If it be necessary for such purpose to
occupy lands of private ownership, the proper indemnity shall first be paid. (553a)

EASEMENT ALONG RIPARIAN BANKS RIVER BANK, DEFINED

> A bank is a lateral strip of shore washed by the water during high tides but which cannot be said to be
flooded or inundated

THE EASEMENTS ALLOWED

1. On banks of rivers; a public easement for
a. Navigation
b. Floatage
c. Fishing
d. Salvage
2. On banks of navigable or floatable riversalso the easement of tow path

PAYMENT OF INDEMNITY
1. If the land be of public ownershipno indemnity
2. If the land be of private ownershipindemnity

WIDTH OF ZONE BURDENED

1. Three meters along the river margins, for navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage
2. Tow path2 meters if for animals and 1 meter if for pedestrians
Art. 639. Whenever for the diversion or taking of water from a river or brook, or for the use of any
other continuous or discontinuous stream, it should be necessary to build a dam, and the person
who is to construct it is not the owner of the banks, or lands which must support it, he may establish
the easement of abutment of a dam, after payment of the proper indemnity. (554)

EASEMENT CONCERNING A DAM

Art. 640. Compulsory easements for drawing water or for watering animals can be imposed only for
reasons of public use in favor of a town or village, after payment of the proper indemnity. (555)

EASEMENTS FOR DRAWING WATER OR FOR WATERING ANIMALS

1. They can be imposed only for reasons of public use
2. They must be in favor of a town or village
3. Proper indemnity must be paid
Art. 641. Easements for drawing water and for watering animals carry with them the obligation of the owners
of the servient estates to passage to persons and animals to the place where such easements are to be
used, and the indemnity shall include this service. (556)

EASEMENTS COVERED
> Easements for drawing water and watering animals but there is also an accessory easement combined
with easement of right of way

REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCH AN EASEMENT TO EXIST

1. It must be for public use
2. It must be in favor of a town or village
3. The right must be sought not by one individual but by the town or village, through its legal representative
4. The right of way should have a maximum width of 10 meters, which cannot be altered by the owners of

the servient estates although the direction of the path may indeed be changed, provided that the use of the
easement is not prejudiced
Art. 642. Any person who may wish to use upon his own estate any water of which he can dispose shall
have the right to make it flow through the intervening estates, with the obligation to indemnify their owners,
as well as the owners of the lower estates upon which the waters may filter or descend. (557)

EASEMENT OF AQUEDUCT
> The right to make water flow through intervening estates in order that one may make use of said waters

RIGHT TO ACQUIRE THE EASEMENT OF AQUEDUCT

4 REQUISITES FOR THE LEGAL EASEMENT OF AQUEDUCT
1. That he can dispose of the water
2. That it is sufficient for the use for which it is intended;
3. That the proposed right of way is the most convenient and the least onerous to third persons;
4. To indemnify the owner of the servient estate in the manner determined by the laws and regulations.
Art. 643. One desiring to make use of the right granted in the preceding article is obliged:
(1) To prove that he can dispose of the water and that it is sufficient for the use for which it is
intended;
(2) To show that the proposed right of way is the most convenient and the least onerous to third
persons;
(3) To indemnify the owner of the servient estate in the manner determined by the laws and
regulations. (558)
Art. 644. The easement of aqueduct for private interest cannot be imposed on buildings, courtyards,
annexes, or outhouses, or on orchards or gardens already existing. (559)
Art. 645. The easement of aqueduct does not prevent the owner of the servient estate from closing
or fencing it, or from building over the aqueduct in such manner as not to cause the latter any
damage, or render necessary repairs and cleanings impossible. (560)
Art. 646. For legal purposes, the easement of aqueduct shall be considered as continuous and
apparent, even though the flow of the water may not be continuous, or its use depends upon the
needs of the dominant estate, or upon a schedule of alternate days or hours. (561)
Art. 647. One who for the purpose of irrigating or improving his estate, has to construct a stop lock
or sluice gate in the bed of the stream from which the water is to be taken, may demand that the
owners of the banks permit its construction, after payment of damages, including those caused by
the new easement to such owners and to the other irrigators. (562)

CONSTRUCTION OF A STOP LOCK OR SLUICE GATE

1. Purpose must be for irrigation or improvement
2. The construction must be on the estate of another
3. Damages must be paid
4. Third persons shouldnt be prejudiced
Art. 648. The establishment, extent, form and conditions of the servitudes of waters, to which this section
refers, shall be governed by the special laws relating thereto insofar as no provision therefor is made in this
Code. (563a)

PROVISIONS THAT GOVERN EASEMENTS RELATING TO WATERS

> Civil code provisions on easement of waters prevail over special laws
> In case of conflict between special laws and the new CC, the latter prevails

EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY

Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is
surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet to a public
highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper
indemnity.
Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous for all the needs of
the dominant estate, establishing a permanent passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land
occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate.
In case the right of way is limited to the necessary passage for the cultivation of the estate surrounded by
others and for the gathering of its crops through the servient estate without a permanent way, the indemnity
shall consist in the payment of the damage caused by such encumbrance. This easement is not compulsory
if the isolation of the immovable is due to the proprietor's own acts. (564a)

EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY DEFINED

> Easement or privilege by which one person in a particular class of persons is allowed to pass over another
land, usually through one particular path or line

REQUISITES FOR THE EASEMENT

1. The property is surrounded by estate of others and there is no adequate outlet to a public highway
2. It must be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and insofar as consistent with this
rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest

3. There must be payment of the proper indemnity

4. The isolation should not be due to the proprietors own acts

PROPER INDEMNITY
1. If the passage is permanent, pay the value of the land occupied by the path plus damages
2. If temporary, pay for the damages caused

CLASSIFICATION OF RIGHT OF WAY

1. Private
2. public
Art. 650. The easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant
estate to a public highway may be the shortest. (565)
N.B: Adequacy to dominant estate
Art. 651. The width of the easement of right of way shall be that which is sufficient for the needs of
the dominant estate, and may accordingly be changed from time to time. (566a)

WIDTH OF PATH
> The width may be modified from time to time depending on the reasonable needs of the dominant estate
Art. 652. Whenever a piece of land acquired by sale, exchange or partition, is surrounded by other estates of
the vendor, exchanger, or co-owner, he shall be obliged to grant a right of way without indemnity.
In case of a simple donation, the donor shall be indemnified by the donee for the establishment of the right
of way. (567a)

RULE IF LAND OF VENDOR IS ISOLATED FROM THE HIGHWAY

> Indemnity included in the purchase pricethe buyer is the owner of the dominant estate
Art. 653. In the case of the preceding article, if it is the land of the grantor that becomes isolated, he may
demand a right of way after paying a indemnity. However, the donor shall not be liable for indemnity. (n)

RULES IF GRANTOR OR GRANTEES LAND IS ENCLOSED

1. If the enclosing estate is that of the grantor, the grantee doesnt pay indemnity for the easement
2. If the enclosed estate is that of the grantor, the grantor must pay indemnity
Art. 654. If the right of way is permanent, the necessary repairs shall be made by the owner of the
dominant estate. A proportionate share of the taxes shall be reimbursed by said owner to the
proprietor of the servient estate. (n)

OWNERSHIP OF, REPAIRS AND TAXES ON, THE PATH

1. Even though permanent, the path belongs to the servient estate, and he pays all the taxes
2. But the dominant estate
a. Should pay for repairs
b. Should pay proportionate share of taxes to the servient estate
Art. 655. If the right of way granted to a surrounded estate ceases to be necessary because its owner has
joined it to another abutting on a public road, the owner of the servient estate MAY DEMAND that the
easement be extinguished, returning what he may have received by way of indemnity. The interest on the
indemnity shall be deemed to be in payment of rent for the use of the easement. The same rule shall be
applied in case a new road is opened giving access to the isolated estate. In both cases, the public highway
must substantially meet the needs of the dominant estate in order that the easement may be extinguished.
(568a)

CAUSES FOR EXTINGUISHMENT OF THE EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY

1. Opening of a new road
2. Joining the dominant estate to another

EXTINGUISHMENT NOT AUTOMATIC

> The extinguishment is not automatic
> The law says that the servient estate may demand
> It follows that if he chooses not to demand, the easement remains and he has no duty to refund the
indemnity

NON-APPLICABILITY OF THE ARTICLE TO A VOLUNTARY EASEMENT NO

RETURN OF INDEMNITY IN CASE OF TEMPORARY EASEMENT
Art. 656. If it be indispensable for the construction, repair, improvement, alteration or beautification
of a building, to carry materials through the estate of another, or to raise therein scaffolding or other

objects necessary for the work, the owner of such estate shall be obliged to permit the act, after
receiving payment of the proper indemnity for the damage caused him. (569a)

TEMPORARY EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY

1. The easement here is necessarily only temporary, nonetheless proper indemnity must be given
2. Indispensable is not to be construed literally
3. The owner can make use of Article 656
Art. 657. Easements of the right of way for the passage of livestock known as animal path, animal
trail or any other, and those for watering places, resting places and animal folds, shall be governed
by the ordinances and regulations relating thereto, and, in the absence thereof, by the usages and
customs of the place. Without prejudice to rights legally acquired, the animal path shall not exceed
in any case the width of 75 meters, and the animal trail that of 37 meters and 50 centimeters.
Whenever it is necessary to establish a compulsory easement of the right of way or for a watering
place for animals, the provisions of this Section and those of Articles 640 and 641 shall be observed.
In this case the width shall not exceed 10 meters. (570a)

EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY FOR THE PASSAGE OF LIVESTOCK: WIDTH

1. Animal path75 meters
2. Animal trail37 meters and 50 centimeters
3. Cattle10 meters

COSTABELLA CORP. V. CA- Legal

Easement, Right of Way
193 SCRA 333
FACTS:
Petitioner was the owner of a beachfront property, it later constructed a beach resort thereto. The private
respondents on the other hand were the owners of the adjoining properties. Prior to the construction of the
resort, the property was being used as passageway in going to the provincial road and city proper. Upon the
construction of the first phase, pathway was closed but they were given an alternate route.

HELD:
The following are the requirements for the compulsory easement of right of way
1. The property is surrounded by estate of others and there is no dequate outlet to a public highway
2. It must be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient state and insofar as consistent with this
rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest
3. There must be payment of the proper indemnity
4. The isolation should not be due to the proprietors own acts he private respondents failed to show
compliance with the
abovementioned requirements.

JAVELLANA V. IAC
172 SCRA 280
FACTS:
Marsall owned a parcel of land adjoining a river and elementary school. Before owning the land, there
existed already a main canal, transversing the property from the river up to the area of the school. Javellana
together with others closed the canal and destroyed the dam, leading to damages caused to those benefiting
from the canal.

HELD:
It is violative against the owner of a dominant estate to have closed the canals and destroyed the dam which
supplies water to the dominant estate.

BENEDICTO V. CA
25 SCRA 145
FACTS:
Hendrick was the owner of a property which half of it was sold to Recto. An easement of way was annotated
in the certificates of title. Subsequently, the remaining half of the property was sold to Herras who then
closed and walled the part of land serving as easement of way.

HELD:
The easement is perpetual in character and was annotated in all the certificates of title. Absence of anything
that would show mutual agreement to extinguish the easement, the easement persists.

ALCANTARA V. RITA
372 SCRA 364
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a case for alleged violations of their right of first refusal under PD1517, claiming to be urban
lessees or tenants. The complaint was dismissed from the finding that they are not lessees.

HELD:
Where a person is allowed to construct his house on the land of another to facilitate gathering of fruits, this
would be in the nature of a personal easement.

ALDERAMA V. NORTH NEGROS

SUGAR CENTRAL
48 PHIL 492
FACTS:
Case regarding the milling contracts and use of the railroad in going to the sugar central

HELD:
1. In a contract establishing an easement of way in favor of a sugar company for the construction of a
railroad for the transportation of sugar cane from the servient estates to the mill, it is contrary to the nature of
the contract to pretend that only sugar cane grown in the servient estates can be transported on said
railroad, because it is a well-settled rule that things serve their owner by reason of ownership and not by
easement. That an easement being established in favor of the sugar company, the owners of the servient
estates cannot limit its use to the transportation of their cane, there being no express stipulation to that
effect.
2. An easement of way is not more burdensome by causing to pass hereon wagons carrying goods
pertaining to persons who arent winners of the servient estates and at all time the person entitled o the
easement may please, for in such case the easement continues to be the same.

RELOVA V. LAVAREZ
9 PHIL 149
FACTS:
Plaintiff is an owner of a rice land being irrigated through an aqueduct. A dam existed in the land of
defendant which controls the water in the aqueduct. When plaintiff was preparing to plant, the defendant
destroyed the dam causing damage to plaintiff.

HELD:
The enjoyment of the plaintiff of an easement for the maintenance of an irrigation aqueduct and a dam on
the lands of defendant for a period of more than 20 years confers title thereto upon the plaintiff by virtue of
prescription and burdens the lands of the defendants with a corresponding servitude.

EASEMENTS OR SERVITUDES
EASEMENTS IN GENERAL
EASEMENT DEFINED
Encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of a community or one or more persons or for
the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner

DIFFERENT KINDS OF EASEMENTS

Art. 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit
of another immovable belonging to a different owner.
The immovable in favor of which the easement is established is called the dominant estate; that
which is subject thereto, the servient estate. (530)

REAL EASEMENT DEFINED

An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the benefit of another
immovable belonging to a different owner.
Art. 614. Servitudes may also be established for the benefit of a community, or of one or more
persons to whom the encumbered estate does not belong. (531)

CHARACTERISTICS OF EASEMENT
1. A real rightaction in rem is possible against the possessor of the servient estate
2. Imposable only on anothers property
3. It is a jus in re alienareal right that may be alienated although the naked ownership is maintained
4. It is a limitation or encumbrance on the servient estate for anothers benefit
a. It is essential that there be benefit
b. It is not essential that the benefit be exercised
c. It is not essential for the benefit to be very great
d. The benefit shouldnt be so great as to completely absorb or impair the usefulness of the servient
estate, for then, this would not be merely an encumbrance but the cancellation of the rights of the servient
estate
e. The benefit or utility goes to the dominant estate
f. The exercise is naturally restricted by the needs of the dominant estate or of its owner
g. Easements being an abnormal restriction on the ownership are not presumed but may be imposed by
law
5. There is inherence
6. It is indivisible
7. It is intransmissible
8. It is perpetual

NO EASEMENT ON PERSONAL
PROPERTY
There can be no easement on personal property; only on immovables
Art. 615. Easements may be continuous or discontinuous, apparent or nonapparent. Continuous
easements are those the use of which is or may be incessant, without the intervention of any act of
man. Discontinuous easements are those which are used at intervals and depend upon the acts of
man. Apparent easements are those which are made known and are continually kept in view by
external signs that reveal the use and enjoyment of the same. Nonapparent easements are those
which show no external indication of their existence. (532)
Art. 616. Easements are also positive or negative. A positive easement is one which imposes upon
the owner of the servient estate the obligation of allowing something to be done or of doing it
himself, and a negative easement, that which prohibits the owner of the servient estate from doing
something which he could lawfully do if the easement did not exist. (533)

CLASSIFICATION OF EASEMENTS
1. According to party given the benefit
a. Real easementfor the benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner
b. Personal easementfor the benefit of one or more persons or of a community
2. According to the manner they are exercised
a. Continuous easements
b. Discontinuous easements
3. According to whether or not their existence is indicated
a. Apparent easement
b. Non-apparent easement
4. According to the purpose of the easement or the nature of the limitation
a. Positive easement
b. Negative easement
Art. 617. Easements are inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively belong. (534)

INSEPARABILITY OF EASEMENTS
Independently of the immovable to which they are attached, easements dont exist

CONSEQUENCES OF INSEPARABILITY
1. Easements cannot be sold or donated or mortgaged independently of the real property to which they may
be attached
2. Registration of the dominant estate under Torrens system without the registration of the voluntary
easements in its favor doesnt extinguish the easements but the registration of the servient estate without the
registration of the easements burdening it extinguishes the voluntary easements.
a. Noteactual knowledge of third persons is equivalent to registration in that if they have actual knowledge
of the
existence of the easement, they are bound by the same, even though no registration has been made

PROVISION OF THE LAND

REGISTRATION LAW
Easements shall continue to subsist and shall be held to pass with the title of ownership until rescinded or
extinguished by virtue of the registration of the servient estate or in any other manner Art. 618. Easements
are indivisible. If the servient estate is divided between two or more persons, the easement is not modified,
and each of them must bear it on the part which corresponds to him. If it is the dominant estate that is
divided between two or more persons, each of them may use the easement in its entirety, without changing
the place of its use, or making it more burdensome in any other way. (535)

INDIVISIBILITY OF EASEMENTS
Partition or division of an estate doesnt divide the easement, which continues to be complete in that each
of the dominant estates can exercise the whole easement over each of the servient estate but only on the
part corresponding to each of them
Art. 619. Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owners. The former are called
legal and the latter voluntary easements. (536)

JUDICIAL EASEMENTS
When the court says that an easement exists, it is not creating one; it merely declares the existence of an
easement created either by law or by the parties or testator

MODES OF ACQUIRING EASEMENTS

Art. 620. Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by virtue of a title or by
prescription of ten years. (537a)

HOW EASEMENTS ARE ACQUIRED

1. If continuous and apparent
a. By title

b. By prescriptionten years
2. If discontinuous and apparentonly by title
3. If continuous and non-apparentonly by title
4. If discontinuous and non-apparentonly by title

MEANING OF TITLE
1. Title here doesnt necessarily mean document
2. It means a juridical act or law sufficient to create the encumbrance
Art. 621. In order to acquire by prescription the easements referred to in the preceding article, the time of
possession shall be computed thus: in positive easements, from the day on which the owner of the dominant
estate, or the person who may have made use of the easement, commenced to exercise it upon the servient
estate; and in negative easements, from the day on which the owner of the dominant estate forbade, by an
instrument acknowledged before a notary public, the owner of the servient estate, from executing an act
which would be lawful without the easement. (538a)

APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE OF
EASEMENTS ACQUIRABLE BY
PRESCRIPTION: RULES
1. If the easement is positive, begin counting the period from the day the dominant estate began to exercise
it
2. If the easement is negative, begin counting from the time of notarial prohibition was made on the servient
estate
3. The notarial prohibition should be given by the owner of the dominant estate
Art. 622. Continuous nonapparent easements, and discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, may be
acquired only by virtue of a title. (539)

EASEMENTS THAT MAY BE ACQUIRED

ONLY BY TITLE
1. Continuous non-apparent easements
2. Discontinuous apparent easements
3. Discontinuous non-apparent easements

EASEMENT OF AQUEDUCT
The easement of aqueduct is considered continuous and apparent and may therefore be acquired by
prescription
Art. 623. The absence of a document or proof showing the origin of an easement which cannot be
acquired by prescription may be cured by a deed of recognition by the owner of the servient estate
or by a final judgment. (540a)

APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE
1. Continuous non-apparent
2. Discontinuous easements

HOW PROOF MAY BE GIVEN OF THE

EXISTENCE OF THE EASEMENTS
1. By deed of recognition by the servient owner
2. Final judgment
Art. 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established or maintained by
the owner of both, shall be considered, should either of them be alienated, as a title in order that the
easement may continue actively and passively, unless, at the time the ownership of the two estates is
divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid
should be removed before the execution of the deed. This provision shall also apply in case of the division of
a thing owned in common by two or more persons. (541a)

APPARENT SIGNS OF EASEMENT THAT

APPARENTLY EXISTS
1. Originally no true easement exists here because there is only one owner
2. The article speaks of apparent visible easements
3. Outward indication
4. It is not essential that there be apparent sign between the two estates; it is important that there is an
apparent sign that the easement exists between the two estates
N.B: Immaterial period of counting prescription.

RULES
1. Before the alienation, there is no true easement
2. After alienation
a. There arises an easement if the sign continues to remain there unless there is a contrary agreement
b. There is no easement if the sign is removed or if there is an agreement to this effect

APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE
1. Whether only one or both estates is alienated
2. Even if there be only one estate but there are two portions thereof, as long as later on there is a division of
the ownership of the said portion
3. Even in the case of division of common property, though this is not an alienation

WHEN ARTICLE DOESNT APPLY

Doesnt apply in case both estates or both portions are alienated to the same owner, for then there would
be no true easement unless there is a further alienation, this time, to different owners
Art. 625. Upon the establishment of an easement, all the rights necessary for its use are considered
granted. (542)

GRANT OF NECESSARY RIGHTS FOR

THE USE OF THE EASEMENT
1. Unless the necessary rights are also granted, the right to the easement itself is rendered nugatory
2. Necessary rights include repair, maintenance, accessory easements, such as the right of way if the
easement is for the
drawing of water
3. Termination of the principal easement necessarily ends all the secondary or accessory easements
Art. 626. The owner of the dominant estate cannot use the easement except for the benefit of the immovable
originally
contemplated. Neither can he exercise the easement in any other manner than that previously established.
(n)

USE OF THE EASEMENT FOR BENEFIT OF THE

IMMOVABLE ORIGINALLY CONTEMPLATED RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS OF THE OWNERS OF THE DOMINANT AND
SERVIENT ESTATES
Art. 627. The owner of the dominant estate may make, at his own expense, on the servient state any
works necessary for the use and preservation of the servitude, but without altering it or rendering it
more burdensome. For this purpose he shall notify the owner of the servient estate, and shall
choose the most convenient time and manner so as to cause the least inconvenience to the owner of
the servient estate. (543a)
Art. 628. Should there be several dominant estates, the owners of all of them shall be obliged to
contribute to the expenses referred to in the preceding article, in proportion to the benefits which
each may derive from the work. Any one who does not wish to contribute may exempt himself by
renouncing the easement for the benefit of the others.
If the owner of the servient estate should make use of the easement in any manner whatsoever, he
shall also be obliged to contribute to the expenses in the proportion stated, saving an agreement to
the contrary. (544)
Art. 629. The owner of the servient estate cannot impair, in any manner whatsoever, the use of the
servitude. Nevertheless, if by reason of the place originally assigned, or of the manner established
for the use of the easement, the same should become very inconvenient to the owner of the servient

estate, or should prevent him from making any important works, repairs or improvements thereon, it
may be changed at his expense, provided he offers another place or manner equally convenient and
in such a way that no injury is caused thereby to the owner of the dominant estate or to those who
may have a right to the use of the easement. (545)
Art. 630. The owner of the servient estate retains the ownership of the portion on which the
easement is established, and may use the same in such a manner as not to affect the exercise of the
easement. (n)

RIGHTS OF THE DOMINANT ESTATE

1. To exercise the easement and all necessary rights for its use including accessory easement
2. To make on the servient estate all works necessary the use and preservation of the servitude but
a. This must be at his own expense
b. He must notify the servient owner
c. Select convenient time and manner
d. He must not alter the easement nor render it more burdensome
3. To ask for mandatory injunction to prevent impairment or obstruction in the exercise of the easement as
when the owner of the servient estate obstructs the right of way by building a wall or fence
4. To renounce totally the easement if he desires exemption ffrom contribution to expenses

OBLIGATIONS OF THE DOMINANT

ESTATE
1. He cannot alter the easement
2. He cannot make it more burdensome
a. Thus he cannot use the easement except for movable originally contemplated
b. In the easement of right of way, he cannot increase the agreed width of the path nor deposit soil or
materials
outside of the boundaries agreed upon
3. If there be several dominant estates, each must contribute to necessary repairs and expenses in
proportion to the benefits received by each estate

RIGHTS OF THE SERVIENT ESTATE

1. To retain ownership and possession of the portion of his land affected by the easement
2. To make use of the easement, unless deprived by stipulation provided that the exercise of the easement
isnt adversely affected and provided further that he contributes to the expenses in proportion to the benefits
received, unless there is contrary stipulation
3. To change the location of a very inconvenient easement provided that an equally convenient substitute is
made, without injury to the dominant estate

OBLIGATIONS OF THE SERVIENT

ESTATE
1. He cannot impair the use of the easement
2. He must contribute to the expenses in case he uses the easement, unless there is contrary stipulation
3. In case of impairment, to restore conditions to the status quo at his expense plus damages
4. To pay for the damages incurred for the changes of location or form of the easement

MODES OF EXTINGUISHMENT OF
EASEMENTS
Art. 631. Easements are extinguished:
(1) By merger in the same person of the ownership of the dominant and servient estates;
(2) By nonuser for ten years; with respect to discontinuous easements, this period shall be
computed from the day on which they ceased to be used; and, with respect to continuous
easements, from the day on which an act contrary to the same took place;
(3) When either or both of the estates fall into such condition that the easement cannot be used; but
it shall revive if the subsequent condition of the estates or either of them should again permit its
use, unless when the use becomes possible, sufficient time for prescription has elapsed, in
accordance with the provisions of the preceding number;
(4) By the expiration of the term or the fulfillment of the condition, if the easement is temporary or
conditional;
(5) By the renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate;
(6) By the redemption agreed upon between the owners of the dominant and servient estates. (546a)

Art. 632. The form or manner of using the easement may prescribe as the easement itself, and in the
same way. (547a)

PRESCRIPTION RE VOLUNTARY
EASEMENTS
1. The easement may itself prescribe
2. The form or manner of using may also prescribe in the same manner as the easement itself

PRESCRIPTION LEGAL EASEMENTS

1. Some legal easements dont prescribe
2. But some legal easement do prescribe, as in the case of the servitude of natural drainage
Art. 633. If the dominant estate belongs to several persons in common, the use of the easement by
any one of them prevents prescription with respect to the others. (548)

EFFECT ON PRESCRIPTION OF USE BY

ONE CO-OWNER OF THE DOMINANT
ESTATE
The use benefits the other co-owners, hence, there will be no prescription even with respect to their own
shares

REASON FOR THIS ARTICLE

The easement is indivisible

USUFRUCT
USUFRUCT IN GENERAL
Art. 562. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its
form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides. (467)

CONCEPT AND DEFINITION OF

USUFRUCT
Right to enjoy the property of another, with the obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the
title containing it or the law provides otherwise
Formula: jus utendi and jus fruendi equals usufruct; jus disponendi equals naked ownership

CHARACTERISTICS OR ELEMENTS OF
USUFRUCT
1. Essential characteristics
a. It is a real right
b. It is of temporary nature or duration
c. Its purpose is to enjoy the benefits and derive the advantages from the object as a consequence of normal
use or exploitation
2. Natural characteristicsobligation of conserving and preserving the form and substance of the thing
3. Accidental characteristicsthose which may be present or absent depending upon the stipulation of the
parties

OBJECT OF USUFRUCT
1. May be real or personal property
2. May be sterile or productive
3. May be created over a right
Art. 563. Usufruct is constituted by law, by the will of private persons expressed in acts inter vivos or
in a last will and estament, and by prescription. (468)

CLASSIFICATION OF USUFRUCT AS TO
ORIGIN
1. Legalcreated by law
2. Voluntary or conventional
a. Created by the will of the parties inter vivos
b. Created mortis causa
3. Mixed
Art. 564. Usufruct may be constituted on the whole or a part of the fruits of the thing, in favor of one
more persons, simultaneously or successively, and in every case from or to a certain day, purely or
conditionally. It may also be constituted on a right, provided it is not strictly personal or
intransmissible. (469)

CLASSIFICATION OF USUFRUCT
ACCORDING TO QUANTITY OR EXTENT
1. As to fruitstotal or partial
2. As to objectuniversal or particular

CLASSIFICATION OF USUFRUCT AS TO
THE NUMBER OF PERSONS ENJOYING
THE RIGHT
1. Simple
2. Multiple
a. Simultaneous
b. Successive
Art. 565. The rights and obligations of the usufructuary shall be those provided in the title
constituting the usufruct; in default of such title, or in case it is deficient, the provisions contained in
the two following Chapters shall be observed. (470)

RULES GOVERNING A USUFRUCT

1. The agreement of the parties or the title giving the usufruct
2. In case of deficiency, apply the Civil Code

RIGHTS OF THE USUFRUCTUARY

Art. 566. The usufructuary shall be entitled to all the natural, industrial and civil fruits of the property in
usufruct. With respect to hidden treasure which may be found on the land or tenement, he shall be
considered a stranger. (471)

SHARE OF USUFRUCTUARY
REGARDING HIDDEN TREASURE
This means that the usufructuary, not being the landowner, is not entitled as owner, but is entitled as finder
to of the treasure as a rule, unless there is a contrary agreementif he is really the finder
If somebody else is the finder, the usufructuary gets nothing

Art. 567. Natural or industrial fruits growing at the time the usufruct begins, belong to the
usufructuary. Those growing at the time the usufruct terminates, belong to the owner.
In the preceding cases, the usufructuary, at the beginning of the usufruct, has no obligation to
refund to the owner any expenses incurred; but the owner shall be obliged to reimburse at the
termination of the usufruct, from the proceeds of the growing fruits, the ordinary expenses of
cultivation, for seed, and other similar expenses incurred by the usufructuary.
The provisions of this article shall not prejudice the rights of third persons, acquired either at the
beginning or at the termination of he usufruct. (472)

PENDING NATURAL OR INDUSTRIAL

FRUITS RULES
1. FRUITS PENDING AT THE BEGINNING OF USUFRUCT
a. Belong to the usufructuary
b. No necessity of refunding owner for expenses incurred
c. But without prejudice to the right of third persons
2. FRUITS PENDING AT THE TERMINATION OF USUFRUCT
a. Belong to the owner
b. But the owner must reimburse the usufructuary for ordinary cultivation expenses and for the seeds and
similar expenses, from the proceeds of the fruits
c. Also, rights of third persons shouldnt be prejudiced
Art. 568. If the usufructuary has leased the lands or tenements given in usufruct, and the usufruct
should expire before the termination of the lease, he or his heirs and successors shall receive only
the proportionate share of the rent that must be paid by the lessee. (473)

RULE WHEN USUFRUCTUARY LEASES

PROPERTY TO ANOTHER
As a rule, the lease executed by the usufructuary should terminate at the end of the usufruct or earlier
Except in case of leases of rural lands, because in said case, if usufruct ends earlier than the lease, the
lease continues for the remainder of the agricultural year

Art. 569. Civil fruits are deemed to accrue daily, and belong to the usufructuary in proportion to the
time the usufruct may last. (474)
Art. 570. Whenever a usufruct is constituted on the right to receive a rent or periodical pension,
whether in money or in fruits, or in the interest on bonds or securities payable to bearer, each
payment due shall be considered as the proceeds or fruits of such right. Whenever it consists in the
enjoyment of benefits accruing from a participation in any industrial or commercial enterprise, the
date of the distribution of which is not fixed, such benefits shall have the same character.
In either case they shall be distributed as civil fruits, and shall be applied in the manner prescribed
in the preceding article. (475)

RULE AS TO CERTAIN RIGHTSRENT,

PENSION, BENEFITS, ETC.
The things referred to in Article 570 are considered civil fruits and shall be deemed to accrue
proportionately to the naked owner and usufructuary, for the time the usufruct lasts
Art. 571. The usufructuary shall have the right to enjoy any increase which the thing in usufruct may
acquire through ccession, the servitudes established in its favor, and, in general, all the benefits
inherent therein. (479)

INCREASES IN THE THING HELD IN

USUFRUCT
1. Accessions
2. Servitudes and easements
3. All benefits inherent in the property

REASON
1. Entire jus fruendi and
2. Entire jus utendi
Art. 572. The usufructuary may personally enjoy the thing in usufruct, lease it to another, or alienate
his right of usufruct, even by a gratuitous title; but all the contracts he may enter into as such

usufructuary shall terminate upon the expiration of the usufruct, saving leases of rural lands, which
shall be considered as subsisting during the agricultural year. (480)

RIGHTS WITH REFERENCE TO THE

THING ITSELF
1. He may personally enjoy the thing
2. He may lease the thing to another

RIGHTS WITH REFERENCE TO THE

USUFRUCTUARY RIGHT ITSELF
1. He may alienate the usufructuary right
2. He may pledge or mortgage the usufructuary right but he cannot pledge or mortgage the thing itself
because he doesnt own the thing

AMPIL QUESTION: CAN

USUFRUCTUARY EXTEND A
CONTRACT AND NOT BE
COTERMINOUS WITH THE USUFRUCT?
Art. 573. Whenever the usufruct includes things which, without being consumed, gradually
deteriorate through wear and tear, the usufructuary shall have the right to make use thereof in
accordance with the purpose for which they are intended, and shall not be obliged to return them at
the termination of the usufruct except in their condition at that time; but he shall be obliged to
indemnify the owner for any deterioration they may have suffered by reason of his fraud or
negligence. (481)

ABNORMAL USUFRUCT ON THINGS

THAT DETERIORATE
It is true that all things deteriorate but there are some things that deteriorate much faster than others

EFFECT OF DETERIORATION ON THE USUFRUCTUARYS

LIABILITY:
IF THESE FAST DETERIORATING THINGS
Deteriorate because of normal use, the usufructuary is not responsible
Deteriorate because of an event or act that endangers their preservation, then even though there was no
fault or negligence or fraud on the part of the usufructuary, he is still required to make the necessary or
ordinary expenses
Deteriorate because of fraud or negligence, the usufructuary is responsible
Art. 574. Whenever the usufruct includes things which cannot be used without being consumed, the
usufructuary shall have the right to make use of them under the obligation of paying their appraised
value at the termination of the usufruct, if they were appraised when delivered. In case they were not
appraised, he shall have the right to return at the same quantity and quality, or pay their current
price at the time the usufruct ceases. (482)

ABNORMAL USUFRUCT ON
CONSUMABLE
THINGS/QUASIUSUFRUCT
The form and substance is not really preserved
Another instance of abnormal usufruct

RULES FOR THIS QUASI-USUFRUCT

1. The usufructuary can use them
2. But at the end of the usufruct, he must
a. Pay the appraised value
b. Or if there was no appraisal, return the same kind, quality, or quantity OR pay the price current at the
termination of the usufruct
Art. 575. The usufructuary of fruit-bearing trees and shrubs may make use of the dead trunks, and
even of those cut off or uprooted by accident, under the obligation to replace them with new plants.
(483a)
Art. 576. If in consequence of a calamity or extraordinary event, the trees or shrubs shall have
disappeared in such considerable number that it would not be possible or it would be too
burdensome to replace them, the usufructuary may leave the dead, fallen or uprooted trunks at the
disposal of the owner, and demand that the latter remove them and clear the land. (484a)
Art. 577. The usufructuary of woodland may enjoy all the benefits which it may produce according to
its nature. If the woodland is a copse or consists of timber for building, the usufructuary may do
such ordinary cutting or felling as the owner as in the habit of doing, and in default of this, he may
do so in accordance with the custom of the place, as to the manner, amount and season.
In any case the felling or cutting of trees shall be made in such manner as not to prejudice the
preservation of the land. n nurseries, the usufructuary may make the necessary thinnings in order
that the remaining trees may properly grow. ith the exception of the provisions of the preceding
paragraphs, the usufructuary cannot cut down trees unless it be to restore or improve some of the
things in usufruct, and in such case shall first inform the owner of the necessity for the work. (485)
Art. 578. The usufructuary of an action to recover real property or a real right, or any movable
property, has the right to bring the action and to oblige the owner thereof to give him the authority
for this purpose and to furnish him whatever proof he may have. If in consequence of the
enforcement of the action he acquires the thing claimed, the usufruct shall be limited to the fruits,
the dominion remaining with the owner. (486)

USUFRUCT OF AN ACTION TO
RECOVER THROUGH THE COURTS
This special usufruct deals with the right to recover by court action
1. Real property
2. Personal property
3. Real right over personal property or real property

WHAT THE USUFRUCTUARY CAN

DEMAND
1. Authority to bring the action
2. Proofs needed for a recovery

EFFECT OF JUDGMENT
1. Its naked ownership belongs to the owner
2. Its usufruct belongs to him
Art. 579. The usufructuary may make on the property held in usufruct such useful improvements or
expenses for mere pleasure as he may deem proper, provided he does not alter its form or substance; but
he shall have no right to be indemnified therefor. He may, however, remove such improvements, should it be
possible to do so without damage to the property. (487)

USEFUL AND LUXURIOUS

IMPROVEMENTS
The usufructuary has the right to the following
1. Useful improvements
2. Luxurious improvements
But

1. He must not alter the form or substance of the property held in usufruct
2. He is not entitled to a refund but he may
a. Either remove the improvements if no substantial damage to the property in usufruct is caused
b. Or set off the improvements against damages for which he may be liable
Art. 580. The usufructuary may set off the improvements he may have made on the property against
any damage to the same. (488)

RIGHT TO SET-OFF IMPROVEMENTS

RULES
1. If damage exceeds the value of the improvements, usufructuary is still liable for the difference
2. If the value of the improvements exceeds the damage, the difference doesnt go to the usufructuary but
accrues instead in the absence of contrary stipulation in favor of the naked owner, otherwise, it is as if the
usufructuary would be entitled to a partial refund is case

REQUISITES BEFORE A SET-OFF CAN

BE MADE
1. The damage must have been caused by the usufructuary
2. The improvements must have augmented the value of the property
Art. 581. The owner of property the usufruct of which is held by another, may alienate it, but he
cannot alter its form or substance, or do anything thereon which may be prejudicial to the
usufructuary. (489)

ALIENATION BY NAKED OWNER

Since the jus disponendi and the title reside with the naked owner, he retains the right to alienate the
property but
o He cannot alter its form and substance
o Or do anything prejudicial to the usufructuary

A BUYER MUST RESPECT THE

USUFRUCT IN CASE IT IS REGISTERED
OR KNOWN TO HIM RULE IN CASE OF
SUCCESSION
If the naked owner bequeathes or devises to another through a will, the legatee or devisee must respect
the usufruct

DOUBLE SALE BY NAKED OWNER

The naked owner is ordinarily not allowed to sell the usufruct to another after having sold it first to the
usufructuary but if he does so, the rules on double sales applies

OTHER RIGHTS OF THE NAKED

OWNER
Aside from the right of the naked owner to alienate the property, he may also
a. Construct any works
b. And make any improvements
c. Or make planting thereon if rural but always, such acts must not cause
i. Decrease in the value of the usufruct
ii. Or prejudice the right of the usufructuary
Art. 582. The usufructuary of a part of a thing held in common shall exercise all the rights pertaining
to the owner thereof with respect to the administration and the collection of fruits or interest. Should
the co-ownership cease by reason of the division of the thing held in common, the usufruct of the
part allotted to the co-owner shall belong to the usufructuary. (490)

USUFRUCTUARY OF A PART OF
COMMON PROPERTY
A co-owner may give the usufruct of his share to another, even without the consent of the others, unless
personal considerations are present
The usufructuary in such a case takes the owners place as to the administration and collection of fruits
and interest

EFFECT OF PARTITION
1. If there be a partition, the usufructuary continues to have the usufruct of the part allotted to the co-owner
concerned
2. If the co-owners make a partition, without the instruction of the usufructuary, this is all right, and the
partition binds said
usufructuary
N.B
1. The usufructuary can use entire propertyno co-owner owns or has a stake over a specific portion
2. When usufructuary buys property, there would be extinguishment of usufruct since there would be a
merger or confusion of rights

OBLIGATIONS OF THE
USUFRUCTUARY
Art. 583. The usufructuary, before entering upon the enjoyment of the property, is obliged:
(1) To make, after notice to the owner or his legitimate representative, an inventory of all the property, which
shall contain
an appraisal of the movables and a description of the condition of the immovables;
(2) To give security, binding himself to fulfill the obligations imposed upon him in accordance with this
Chapter. (491)

OBLIGATION RE: INVENTORY AND THE

SECURITY
They are not necessary before the right to the usufruct begins
They are merely necessary before physical possession and enjoyment of property can be had, thus if the
usufructuary fails to give security the usufruct still begins but the naked owner will have the rights granted
him under Article 586
There could be usufruct without physical possession

REQUIREMENTS FOR MAKING OF THE

INVENTORY
1. The owner must be previously notified
2. The condition of the immovables must be described
3. The movables must be appraised
4. As a rule, no form is required except where there are real properties
5. Expenses are to be borne by the usufructuary
6. Effect of not making inventorysame as when the security isnt given
7. When inventory not required
a. When no one will be injured thereby provided that the naked owner consents
b. In case of waiver by the naked owner or the law or where
there is stipulation in contract or will

THE GIVING OF SECURITY:

EXEMPTIONS
1. When no one will be injured thereby
2. When there is waiver by the naked owner or there is stipulation in a will or contract
3. When the usufructuary is the donor of the property
4. Where there is parental usufruct
5. When there is caucion juratoria, which takes place of the bond, and is made by taking an oath to fulfill
properly the duties of a usufructuary but this is available only under conditions prescribed

Art. 584. The provisions of No. 2 of the preceding article shall not apply to the donor who has
reserved the usufruct of the property donated, or to the parents who are usufructuaries of their
children's property, except when the parents contract a second marriage. (492a)
Art. 585. The usufructuary, whatever may be the title of the usufruct, may be excused from the
obligation of making an nventory or of giving security, when no one will be injured thereby. (493)

EFFECT IF NO ONE WILL BE INJURED

The exemption being dependent on the naked owner
In case the naked owner refuses to make the exemption, appeal may be made to the courts and the judge
should consider all the circumstances in deciding whether or not to give the grant
Art. 586. Should the usufructuary fail to give security in the cases in which he is bound to give it, the
owner may demand that the immovables be placed under administration, that the movables be sold,
that the public bonds, instruments of credit payable to order or to bearer be converted into
registered certificates or deposited in a bank or public institution, and that the capital or sums in
cash and the proceeds of the sale of the movable property be invested in safe securities.
The interest on the proceeds of the sale of the movables and that on public securities and bonds,
and the proceeds of the property placed under administration, shall belong to the usufructuary.
Furthermore, the owner may, if he so prefers, until the usufructuary gives security or is excused
from so doing, retain in his possession the property in usufruct as administrator, subject to the
obligation to deliver to the usufructuary the net proceeds thereof, after deducting the sums which
may be agreed upon or judicially allowed him for such administration. (494)

EFFECT OF FAILURE TO GIVE

SECURITY ON THE RIGHTS OF THE
NAKED OWNER
1. He may deliver the property to the usufructuary
2. Or the naked owner may choose retention of the property as administrator
3. Or the naked owner may demand receivership or administration of the real property, sale of movable,
conversion or deposit of credit instruments, etc.

ON THE RIGHTS OF THE

USUFRUCTUARY
1. The usufructuary cannot possess the property until he gives the security
2. The usufructuary cannot administer the property hence he cannot a lease thereon
3. The usufructuary cannot collect credits that have matured, nor invest them unless the Court or naked
owner consents
4. But the usufructuary can alienate his right to the usufruct

RETENTION OF PROPERTY BY NAKED

OWNER
Although the owner may demand the sale of movables, still he may want to retain some of them for their
artistic worth or sentimental value, in which case, he may demand their delivery to him provided he gives
security for the payment of legal interest on their appraised value
Art. 587. If the usufructuary who has not given security claims, by virtue of a promise under oath, the
delivery of the furniture necessary for his use, and that he and his family be allowed to live in a house
included in the usufruct, the court may grant this petition, after due consideration of the facts of the case.
The same rule shall be observed with respect to implements, tools and other movable property necessary
for an industry or vocation in which he is engaged. If the owner does not wish that certain articles be sold
because of their artistic worth or because they have a sentimental value, he
may demand their delivery to him upon his giving security for the payment of the legal interest on their
appraised value. (495)

CAUCION JURATORIA
Promise under oath
Sworn duty to take good care of the property and return the same at the end of the usufruct

RESTRICTION ON USUFRUCTUARY
He cannot alienate or lease the property for this means he doesnt need them

Art. 588. After the security has been given by the usufructuary, he shall have a right to all the
proceeds and benefits from the day on which, in accordance with the title constituting the usufruct,
he should have commenced to receive them. (496)

RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF THE

SECURITY GIVEN
Art. 589. The usufructuary shall take care of the things given in usufruct as a good father of a family. (497)

DUTY OF USUFRUCTUARY TO TAKE

CARE OF PROPERTY
1. Usufruct is not terminated or extinguished by bad use
2. The usufructuary is required to make ordinary repairs in the exercise of prudent care and to notify the
owner of urgency of extraordinary repairs and of any acts which may prove detrimental to ownership
Art. 590. A usufructuary who alienates or leases his right of usufruct shall answer for any damage which the
things in usufruct may suffer through the fault or negligence of the person who
substitutes him. (498)

LIABILITY OF USUFRUCTUARY FOR

ACTS OF THE SUBSTITUTE
The usufructuary is made liable for the acts of the substitute
Therefore, the substitute is liable to the usufructuary while the usufructuary becomes liable to the owner
Even when there is sub-usufructuary, it is still the usufructuary who answers to the naked owner
Art. 591. If the usufruct be constituted on a flock or herd of livestock, the usufructuary shall be
obliged to replace with the young thereof the animals that die each year from natural causes, or are
lost due to the rapacity of beasts of prey. If the animals on which the usufruct is constituted should
all perish, without the fault of the usufructuary, on account of some contagious disease or any other
uncommon event, the usufructuary shall fulfill his obligation by delivering to the owner the remains
which may have been saved from the misfortune. Should the herd or flock perish in part, also by

accident and
without the fault of the usufructuary, the usufruct shall continue on the part saved. Should the
usufruct be on sterile animals, it shall be considered, with respect to its effects, as though
constituted on fungible things. (499a)
Art. 592. The usufructuary is obliged to make the ordinary repairs needed by the thing given in
usufruct. By ordinary repairs are understood such as are required by the wear and tear due to the
natural use of the thing and are indispensable for its preservation. Should the usufructuary fail to
make them after demand by the owner, the latter may make them at the expense of the usufructuary.
(500)

DUTY TO MAKE ORDINARY REPAIRS

1. They are required by normal or natural use
2. They are needed for preservation
3. They must have occurred during the usufruct
4. They must have happened with or without the fault of the usufructuary

CAN USUFRUCTUARY EXEMPT

HIMSELF FROM THE DUTY TO MAKE
OR PAY FOR THE NECESSARY
REPAIRS BY RENOUNCING THE
USUFRUCT?
If he had no fault, yes, but he must surrender the fruits received
If he was at fault, no

REMEDY IF USUFRUCTUARY DOESNT

MAKE THE NECESSARY REPAIRS
If naked owner had demanded the repair, and the usufructuary still fails to do so, the owner may make
them at the expense of the usufructuary
Art. 593. Extraordinary repairs shall be at the expense of the owner. The usufructuary is obliged to notify the
owner when the need for such repairs is urgent. (501)

IT IS THE DUTY OF THE NAKED

OWNER TO MAKE EXTRAORDINARY
REPAIRS
Art. 594. If the owner should make the extraordinary repairs, he shall have a right to demand of the
usufructuary the legal interest on the amount expended for the time that the usufruct lasts. Should
he not make them when they are indispensable for the preservation of the thing, the usufructuary
may make them; but he shall have a right to demand of the owner, at the termination of the usufruct,
the increase in value which the immovable may have acquired by reason of the repairs. (502a)

KINDS OF EXTRAORDINARY REPAIRS

1. Those caused by natural use but not needed for preservation
2. Those caused by abnormal or exceptional circumstances and needed for preservation
3. Those caused by abnormal or exceptional circumstances but are not needed for preservation
Art. 595. The owner may construct any works and make any improvements of which the immovable
in usufruct is susceptible, or make new plantings thereon if it be rural, provided that such acts do
not cause a diminution in the value of the usufruct or prejudice the right of the usufructuary. (503)

CONSTRUCTIONS, IMPROVEMENTS,
AND PLANTINGS BY THE NAKED
OWNER
Provided that the value of the usufruct is not diminished OR the right of the usufructuary is not prejudiced
Art. 596. The payment of annual charges and taxes and of those considered as a lien on the fruits, shall be
at the expense of the usufructuary for all the time that the usufruct lasts. (504)

WHAT CHARGES OR TAXES THE

USUFRUCTUARY MUST PAY
The annual charges on the fruits
The annual taxes on the fruits
Annual taxes on the land
Art. 597. The taxes which, during the usufruct, may be imposed directly on the capital, shall be at the
expense of the owner. If the latter has paid them, the usufructuary shall pay him the proper interest on the
sums which may have been paid in that character; and, if the said sums have been advanced by the
usufructuary, he shall recover the amount thereof at the termination of the usufruct. (505)

TAXES WHICH ARE IMPOSED

DIRECTLY ON THE CAPITAL
1. If paid by the naked owner, he can demand legal interest on the sum paid
2. If advanced by the usufructuary
a. Should be reimbursed the amount paid but without the legal interest
b. Is entitled to retention until paid
Art. 598. If the usufruct be constituted on the whole of a patrimony, and if at the time of its
constitution the owner has debts, the provisions of Articles 758 and 759 relating to donations shall
be applied, both with respect to the maintenance of the usufruct and to the obligation of the

usufructuary to pay such debts. The same rule shall be applied in case the owner is obliged, at the
time the usufruct is constituted, to make periodical payments, even if there should be no known
capital. (506)

WHEN USUFRUCTUARY HAS TO PAY

FOR THE DEBTS OF THE NAKED
OWNER
Art. 599. The usufructuary may claim any matured credits which form a part of the usufruct if he has given or
gives the proper security. If he has been excused from giving security or has been able to give it, or if that
given is not sufficient, he shall need the authorization of the owner, or of the court in default thereof, to
collect such credits. The usufructuary who has given security may use the capital he has collected in any
manner he may deem proper. The usufructuary who has not given security shall invest the said capital at
interest upon agreement with the owner; in default of such agreement, with
judicial authorization; and, in every case, with security sufficient to preserve the integrity of the capital in
usufruct. (507)

RULES ON USUFRUCT OF A MATURED

CREDIT
1. If usufructuary hasnt given security, or when he is exempted or where was only a caucion juratoria,
collection and investment can be done only with the approval of the court or of the naked owner
2. If usufructuary has given security, collection and investments can be done without the approval of the
court or of the nsked owner
Art. 600. The usufructuary of a mortgaged immovable shall not be obliged to pay the debt for the security of
which the mortgage was constituted. Should the immovable be attached or sold judicially for the payment of
the debt, the owner shall be liable to the usufructuary for whatever the latter may lose by reason thereof.
(509)

USUFRUCT OF MORTGAGED
IMMOVABLE
Art. 601. The usufructuary shall be obliged to notify the owner of any act of a third person, of which he may
have knowledge, that may be prejudicial to the rights of ownership, and he shall be liable should he not do
so, for damages, as if they had been caused through his own fault. (511)

WHEN NOTIFICATION BY THE

USUFRUCTUARY IS REQUIRED
1. If a third party commits acts prejudicial to the rights of the ownership
2. If urgent repairs are needed
3. If an inventory is to be made

EFFECT OF NON-NOTIFICATION
1. The usufructuary is liable for damages, as if they had been caused through his own fault.
2. The usufructuary cannot even make the extraordinary repairs needed
3. The inventory can go on but the naked owner may later point out discrepancies and omissions in the
inventory
Art. 602. The expenses, costs and liabilities in suits brought with regard to the usufruct shall be
borne by the usufructuary. (512)

EXTINGUISHMENT OF USUFRUCT
Art. 603. Usufruct is extinguished:
(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearly appears;
(2) By the expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or by the fulfillment of any resolutory
condition provided in the title creating the usufruct;
(3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person;
(4) By renunciation of the usufructuary;
(5) By the total loss of the thing in usufruct;

(6) By the termination of the right of the person constituting the usufruct;
(7) By prescription. (513a)

DEATH OF THE USUFRUCTUARY ENDS

THE USUFRUCT.
EXCEPTIONS:
1. In the case of multiple usufructs
2. In case there is period fixed based on the number of years that would elapse before a person would reach
a certain age
3. In case the contrary intention clearly appears
Art. 604. If the thing given in usufruct should be lost only in part, the right shall continue on the
remaining part. (514)

EFFECT OF PARTIAL LOSS

Art. 605. Usufruct cannot be constituted in favor of a town, corporation, or association for more than
fifty years. If it has been constituted, and before the expiration of such period the town is
abandoned, or the corporation or association is dissolved, the usufruct shall be extinguished by
reason thereof. (515a)
Art. 606. A usufruct granted for the time that may elapse before a third person attains a certain age,
shall subsist for the number of years specified, even if the third person should die before the period
expires, unless such usufruct has been expressly granted only in consideration of the existence of
such person. (516)

USUFRUCT FOR THE TIME THAT MAY

ELAPSE BEFORE A THIRD PERSON
REACHES A CERTAIN AGE
Art. 607. If the usufruct is constituted on immovable property of which a building forms part, and the latter
should be destroyed in any manner whatsoever, the usufructuary shall have a right to make use of the land

and the materials.

The same rule shall be applied if the usufruct is constituted on a building only and the same should be
destroyed. But in such a case, if the owner should wish to construct another building, he shall have a right to
occupy the land and to make use of the materials, being obliged to pay to the usufructuary, during the
continuance of the usufruct, the interest upon the sum equivalent to the value of the land and of the
materials. (517)

USUFRUCT ON A BUILDING AND/OR

LAND CONCERNED THIS ARTICLE
DISTINGUISHES BETWEEN:
1. A usufruct constituted both on the building and on the land
2. And a usufruct constituted only on the building

RULES
1. Usufruct on both the building and land but the building is destroyed in any manner whatsoever before the
expiration of the period of the usufruct
a. The usufruct on the building is ended, but the usufruct on the land continues
b. Therefore the usufructuary is still entitled to the use of the land and the use of whatever materials of the
house
remain
c. Therefore, also, if the naked owner wants to rebuild but the usufructuary refuses, it is the usufructuary
who prevails for the use of the land is still his for the remainder of the period
2. Usufruct on the building alone
a. The usufruct on the building ends, but the usufructuary can still make use of whatever materials on the
house remain
b. Also, the usufructuary is entitled to the use of the land
c. But precisely because there was no usufruct on the land, the naked owner has preferential right to its use
Art. 608. If the usufructuary shares with the owner the insurance of the tenement given in usufruct,
the former shall, in case of loss, continue in the enjoyment of the new building, should one be
constructed, or shall receive the interest on the insurance indemnity if the owner does not wish to
rebuild. Should the usufructuary have refused to contribute to the insurance, the owner insuring the
tenement alone, the latter shall receive the full amount of the insurance indemnity in case of loss,
saving always the right granted to the usufructuary in the preceding article. (518a)

PAYMENT OF INSURANCE ON THE

TENEMENT HELD IN USUFRUCT
This article distinguishes between a case where both the usufructuary and the naked owner share in the
payment of the insurance premium, and a case where it is only the naked owner who pays because the
usufructuary refused

RULES:
1. If the naked owner and the usufructuary share in the premiumsand the property is destroyed
a. If the owner constructs a new building, the usufruct continues on the new building
b. If the owner doesnt construct a new building or rebuild, the naked owner gets the insurance indemnity but
should
pay the interest thereon to the usufructuary
2. If the naked owner pays alone for the insurance and the usufructuary has refused to share
a. The naked owner gets the whole indemnity
b. If usufruct was on the building and the land, the usufruct continues on the land and the materials
c. If usufruct was on the building alone the naked owner may rebuild, with or without the approval of the
usufructuary, but he must pay interest on the value of the land and the old materials that may have been
used
3. If the naked owner alone paid for the insurance but there is failure or omission
a. The effect is the same as if there was sharing but the usufructuary must reimburse the naked owner his
share of the insurance premium
4. If the usufructuary alone pays the insurance premium
a. The insurance indemnity goes to the usufructuary alone, with no obligation on his part to share the
indemnity with, nor give legal interest thereon to, the naked owner
b. The usufruct no doubt continues on the land for the remaining period of the usufruct
c. The usufructuary has no obligation to construct an new building or to rebuild
Art. 609. Should the thing in usufruct be expropriated for public use, the owner shall be obliged either to
replace it with another thing of the same value and of similar conditions, or to pay the usufructuary the legal
interest on the amount of the indemnity for the whole period of the usufruct. If the owner chooses the latter
alternative, he shall give security for the payment of the interest. (519)

RULES IN CASE OF EXPROPRIATION

1. If naked owner alone was given the indemnity, he has the option
a. To replace with equivalent thing
b. Or to pay to the usufructuary the legal interest on the usufruct
2. If both the naked owner and the usufructuary were separately given indemnity, each owns the indemnity
given to him, the usufruct is totally extinguished
3. If usufructuary alone was given the indemnity, he must give it to the naked owner and compel the latter to
return either the interest or to replace the property
Art. 610. A usufruct is not extinguished by bad use of the thing in usufruct; but if the abuse should
cause considerable injury to the owner, the latter may demand that the thing be delivered to him,
binding himself to pay annually to the usufructuary the net proceeds of the same, after deducting
the expenses and the compensation which may be allowed him for its administration. (520)

EFFECT OF BAD USE ON THE

PROPERTY HELD IN USUFRUCT
1. Bad usewhich doesnt cause considerable injury to the naked owner
2. Bad usewhich causes considerable injury to the naked owner
a. Usufruct continues but naked owner can demand delivery to and administration by him but he will be
obliged to pay
net proceeds to usufructuary
Art. 611. A usufruct constituted in favor of several persons living at the time of its constitution shall
not be extinguished until death of the last survivor. (521)

RULES IN CASE OF MULTIPLE

USUFRUCT
1. If constituted simultaneously, it is evident that all the usufructuaries must be alive at the time of
constitution. Here, it is
the death of the last survivor which, among other cases, terminates the usufruct
2. If constituted successively, Article 611 also applies

a. If the successive usufructs were constituted by virtue of the donation, all the donees-usufructuaries must
be living
at the time of the constitution-donation of the usufruct
b. If the successive usufructs were constituted by virtue of a last will, there should only be two successive
usufructuaries, and both must have been alive at the time of the testators death
Art. 612. Upon the termination of the usufruct, the thing in usufruct shall be delivered to the owner, without
prejudice to the right of retention pertaining to the usufructuary or his heirs for taxes and extraordinary
expenses which should be reimbursed. After the delivery has been made, the security or mortgage shall be
cancelled. (522a)

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS AT THE

TERMINATION OF THE USUFRUCT
1. On the part of the usufructuary
a. Must return the property to the naked owner
b. To retain the property till he is reimbursed for taxes on the capital and indispensable extraordinary repairs
and
expenses
c. To remove removable improvements or set them off against damages he has caused
2. On the part of the naked owner
a. Must cancel the security or mortgage
b. Must in case of rural leases, respect leases made by the usufructuary till the end of the agricultural year
c. Make reimbursements to the usufructuary in the proper cases

GABOYA V. CUI
38 SCRA 85
FACTS:
Don Mariano sold his three lots prodiviso to his three children. One of his children, due to lack of funds,
wasnt able to purchase part of the land. This reverted back to the father. As part of the sale, the father
reserved for himself the usufruct of the property. He co-owned the land with his children then. A building was
then constructed in a portion of the land, wherein rentals was given to the father. Thereafter, the two children
who were co-owners obtained a loan, secured by a mortgage, with authority of the father, to construct a
commercial building. The father alleges that since he has usufruct over the land, he has usufruct or share in
the rentals earned through the constructed building.

HELD:
The reserved right of vendor on a parcel of land doesnt include rentals from the buildings subsequently
constructed on the vacant lots, but that it did entitle the usufructuary to a reasonable rental for the portion of
the land being occupied by the building.

VDA. DE ALBAR V.
CARANGDANG
106 PHIL 855
FACTS:
Dona Rosario Fabie was the owner of a parcel of land with a building constructed thereon. Upon her death,
she bequeathed the naked ownership to Rosario Grey while the usufruct to Josefa. Thereafter, a fire broke
out and the building constructed on the land was destroyed. Then a Chinaman offered to lease the property
and Josefa nows demand a share in the rentals given by the lessor.

HELD:
A life usufruct constituted on the rentals of the building located on a certain place includes the rentals on
both the building and on the land on which it is erected, because the building cannot exist without the land.
Hence, the usufruct isnt extinguished by the destruction of the building, for under the law, usufruct is
extinguished only by the total loss of the thing subject of the encumbrance.

DE GARCIA V. CA
37 SCRA 160
FACTS:
Guevarra was the owner of a ladys diamond ring with white gold mounting, solitaire 2-karat diamond as well
as 4 brills. It was stolen from her house. On a relevant date, while she was talking to Garcia, an owner of a
restaurant, she recognized the ring on the latters finger and asked how she acquired the same. Garcia
averred that she bought it from her comadre. Guevarra made Garcia know that the ring was stolen from her
place days before. It was ascertained the ring was indeed Guevarras but despite written demands, Garcia
refused to return the ring.

HELD:
One who has lost or has been unlawfully deprived of a movable may recover the same from the person in
possession of the same and the only defense the latter may have is if he has acquired it in good faith at a
public sale in which case the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefore.
Guevarra who was unlawfully deprived of the ring
was entitled to recover it from de Garcia who was found in possession of the same. The only exception
provided by law is when the possessor acquired the property through a public sale, in which case, the owner
cannot recover without reimbursement.

DIZON V. SUNTAY
47 SCRA 160
FACTS:
Suntay was the owner of a diamond ring. On a relevant date, she and Sison entered into a transaction
wherein Sison would sell the diamond ring on a commission basis. Both parties knew each other for a long
time and that there was already a prior transaction between the two wherein Sison sold on commission
another piece of jewelry owned by Suntay. As days
passed with no return of Sison, Suntay made demands. The ring could not be returned since it was pledged
to Dizons pawnshop, without the consent of Suntay. Suntay insisted on the return of her ring and Sison then
gave her the pawnshop ticket. Upon knowledge of the pledge, she filed a case of estafa against Sison as
well as sent a written demand to Dizon for the return of the ring. Dizon refused to do so.

HELD:
One who has lost or has been unlawfully deprived of a movable may recover the same from the person in
possession of the same and the only defense the latter may have is if he has acquired it in good faith at a
public sale in which case the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefore.
Suntay who was unlawfully deprived of the ring
was entitled to recover it from Dizon who was found in possession of the same. In the present case, not only
has the ownership and the origin of the ring misappropriated been unquestionably proven but also that Sison
has fraudulently and in bad faith, disposed of and pledged them contrary to agreement, with no ownership,
and to the prejudice of Suntay, who was thereby illegally deprived of said jewels. The owner has the right to
recover. He is not estopped when his property has been unlawfully pledged by another.

EDCA PUBLISHING AND

DISTRIBUTING CORP. V. SANTOS
184 SCRA 614
FACTS:
On a relevant date, one person who identified himself as Professor Jose Cruz placed an order through
telephone with Edca Publishing. He ordered 400+ books and issued a personal check as payment. Then he
sold some of the books to Santos who, after verifying the sellers ownership from the invoice shown, paid
Cruz. Meanwhile, Edca being suspicious over the
second order placed by Cruz verified with De La Salle College where he had claimed to be dean and was
informed that no such person was under its employ. It was also found out that there was no account with the
bank against which he had drawn his check. It was later found out that his real name was Tomas de la Pena.
Edca reported this to the police and through an entrapment, de la Pena was captured. On the same date,
Edca sought the assistance of the police in recovery of the books bought from it. They forced their way
inside Santos store and seized the books without any warrant.

HELD:
First, the contention of petitioner that Santos has not established ownership over the disputed books
because they have not even shown the receipt evidencing the purchase, is without merit. The possession of
movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to title. Second, Santos acquired the books in good
faith as found by the lower courts. She first ascertained the ownership and relied on the invoice shown to her
by de la Pena. Santos was in the business of buying and
selling books and often deal with hard-up sellers who urgently have to part with their books at reduced
prices. Third, and on the real issue, on whether Edca had been unlawfully deprived of the books, Edca
argued that the impostor acquired no title to the books because of the lack of funds in the check issued and
want of consideration. This is without merit. Nonpayment of purchase price only gives rise to the right to
demand payment or rescission of the contract. Actual delivery was made to the impostor and thus,
ownership was acquired by him. Non-payment was a matter privy to him and Edca and
doesn't involve Santos who later acquired the books.

LEDESMA V. CA
213 SCRA 195
FACTS:
Two motor vehiclesHonda Gemini and Holden Premiere Modelwere purchased from Citiwide Motors by
a person who identified himself as Jojo Consunji. He bought the vehicles purportedly for his father. Upon
delivery to him of the vehicles, he paid a managers check drawn against PCIB. The check though was
dishonored by the bank on the ground that the checks value has been materially altered. This was reported
to the police authorities and it was found out that the person misrepresenting himself was actually Suarez
who had a long line of criminal cases against him for his modus operandi. The Holden car was recovered
after being abandoned somewhere in Quezon City. The Honda on the other hand, was discovered to be sold
to Ledesma. Ledesma averred he purchased the vehicle in good faith from one Neyra, as evidenced by his
certificate of registration. Citiwide Motors was able to recover.

HELD:
There was a perfected unconditional contract of sale between Citiwide Motors and Suarez. The subsequent
dishonor of the check merely amounted to failure of consideration which doesn't render a contract of sale
void, but merely allows the prejudiced party to sue for specific performance or rescission of the sale. This
being the case, Citiwide motors wasn't unlawfully deprived of the property. It is thus not entitled to the return
of the vehicle from Ledesma who bought the property in good faith and for consideration.

CHUA KAI V. KAPUNAN

104 PHIL 110
FACTS:
Soto purchased from Youngstown Hardware 700 galvanized iron sheets and round iron bars. He issued as
payment a check drawn against Security Bank. Soto then sold the sheets, some of them to Chua Hai.
Meanwhile, the check issued for payment was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. This prompted the
hardware store to file a case of estafa against Soto and prayed for the return of the sheets. This was
opposed by Chua on the part of the sheets he purchased. Notwithstanding this opposition, the court ordered
for its return.

HELD:
To deprive Chua, who was in good faith, of the possession of the sheets, may it be temporarily or
permanently, is in violation of the rule laid down in Article 559. Possession of chattels in good faith is
equivalent to title, until ordered by the proper court to restore the thing to the owner who was illegally
derpived thereof. Until such decree is issued, the possessor as presumptive owner is entitled to the
enjoyment and holding of the thing. Further, the hardware store or Ong was not unlawfully deprived of the
sheets. There was a perfected contract of sale between it and Soto. There was delivery, by virtue of which,
Soto was able to acquire title over the sheets and bars. The failure of the buyer to pay the purchase price
doesn't automatically revest ownership to the seller until the contract of sale has been first rescinded or
resolved. Hence, until the contract between Soto and Ong has been set aside by the competent court, the
validity of Chuas possession cannot be disputed and his right to possession thereof should be respected.

AZNAR V.YAPDIANGCO
13 SCRA 486
FACTS:
Theodoro Santos advertised in the newspapers the sale of his Ford Fairlane 500. After the advertisement, a
certain de Dios, claiming to be the nephew of Marella, went to the residence of Santos and expressing his
uncles intent to purchase the car. Since Santos wasn't around, it was Irineo who talked with de Dios. On
being informed, Santos advised his son to see
Marella, which the son did. Marella expressed his intention to purchase the car. A deed of sale was prepared
and Irineo was instructed by his father not to part with the deed and the car without receiving the purchase
price from Marella. When irineo and de Dios arrived at the residence of Marella, the latter averred that his
money was short and had to borrow from his sister. He then instructed de Dios and Irineo to go the
supposed house of the sister to obtain the money with an unidentified person. He also asked Irineo to leave
the deed to have his lawyer see it. Relying on the good faith of Marella, Irineo did as requested. Upon
arriving at the house of Marellas supposed to be sister, de Dios and the unidentified person then
disappeared together with the car. This prompted Santos to report the incident to the authorities. Thereafter,
Marella was able to sell the land to Aznar. And while in possession of the car, police authorities confiscated
the same. This prompted Aznar to file an action for replevin.

HELD:
Marella never had title to the car as the car wasn't ever delivered to him. While there was a deed of sale in
his favor, he was only able to obtain possession of the car since he stole it from Santos. The applicable law
is Article 559. The rule is to the effect that if the owner has lost a thing, or if he has been unlawfully deprived
of it, he has a right to recover it, not only from its finder, thief or robber, but also from third persons who may
have acquired it in good faith from such finder, thief or
robber. The said article establishes 2 exceptions to the general rule of irrevindicabiltyto wit, the owner has
lost the thing or has been unlawfully deprived thereof. In these cases, the possessor cannot retain the thing
as against the owner who may recover it without paying any indemnity, except when the possessor acquired
it in a public sale. Furthermore, the common law principle that where one of two innocent persons must
suffer a fraud perpetrated by another, the law imposes the loss upon the party who, by his misplaced
confidence, has enable the fraud to be committed, cannot be applied in this case, which is covered by an
express provision of law.

CRUZ V. PAHATI
98 PHIL 788
FACTS:
The car in dispute was originally owned by Northern Motors and was subsequently purchased by a
Chinaman. This Chinaman then sold it to Belizo, who in turn sold the same to Cruz. Belizo was a secondhand car dealer. He offered to Cruz that he would sell the car to a prospective buyer and since the car
registration was missing, Cruz issued an authorization letter to Belizo to obtain another certificate, at the
insinuation of the latter. The car was also turned over to Belizo. The letter was then falsified by Belizo and
converted into an absolute deed of sale. Because of this, he was able to secure a car registration in his
name and was later able to sell the car to Balahan who then sold the car to Pahati. This prompted Cruz to
file an action for replevin.

HELD:
One who has lost or has been unlawfully deprived of a movable may recover the same from the person in
possession of the same and the only defense the latter may have is if he has acquired it in good faith at a
public sale in which case the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefore. This
is supplemented by the provision stating that
where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner thereof, and who doesn't sell them under authority
or with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had, unless
the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the sellers authority to sell. Cruz has a
better right to the car in question than Bulahan or Pahati. He has the right to recover the car as he was

unlawfully deprived of it due to the ingenious scheme employed by Belizo. This is the case even if Bulahan
or Pahati acted in good faith.

AZARCON V. EUSEBIO
105 PHIL 569
FACTS:
Eusebio filed for a lease application over a parcel of land, Azarcon occupied a portion thereof under a
homestead application. This caused a dispute between the two. While their dispute was pending, Eusebio
filed a case against Eusebio alleging that he acquired the parcel of land by lease from the Director of Lands
and that Azarcon had been occupying a portion thereof. He prayed for Azarcon to vacate the premises.
Azarcon on the other hand, alleged that he had been occupying the land by virtue of a homestead
application prior to the lease application of Eusebio, with interruptions during the war and until the time of
filing of the action. The trial court ruled in favor of Eusebio and while pending appeal, a writ of execution was
issued ordering Azarcon to leave the premises without expressly ordering Azarcon to desist from gathering
pending fruits. Azarcon moved for the setting aside of the order and posted bond as he was required by the
court. The court eventually set aside the order but reinstated it under the wrong premise that Azarcon failed
to post the required bond. Despite the reinstatement of the order, Azarcon continued to gather the pending
fruits on the land.

HELD:
Evidence showed that despite the writ of execution ordering Azarcon to remove from the premises and let
Eusebio to have restitution of the same, Azarcon continued to enter the premises and gather the palay,
which was then pending harvest. It is found out that the palay had been planted and cultivated by Azarcon
who had been in possession of the land. The court
didn't prohibit Azarcon in its order from gathering the crops then existing thereon. Under the law, a person
who is in possession and who is being ordered to leave a parcel of land while products thereon are pending

harvest, has the right to a part of the net harvest. As the order didn't expressly prohibited Azarcon to gather
pending fruits, there has been no violation of the courts order. This is even bolstered by the fact that the writ
of execution has been set aside and Azarcon posted the required bond as required by the court. If the order
was then reinstated it was because of the wrong premise that the bond wasn't posted by Azarcon as
required.

CALAGAN V. CFI OF DAVAO

95 SCRA 498
FACTS:
Calagan and his wife Takura was granted a homestead application over a parcel of land. Takura died and
was survived by her husband and their children. On a relevant date, Calagan sold a portion of the
homestead to Sandoval. She was given the title so that the sale could be annotated. Thereafter, Calagan
offered to repurchase the land but Sandoval didn't agreed. She continuously refused and was only willing to
comply if Calagan would reimburse the value of the house constructed on the parcel of land. This prompted
petitioners to file an action for reconveyance, on which the trial court ruled in their favor, given that they pay
for the value of the house built on good faith by Sandoval.

HELD:
Since petitioners didn't exercise the option to refund the amount of the expenses incurred by private
respondent for the house that the latter has built, and not to pay the increase in value acquired by the land
by reason of such expenses. Sandoval may remove her house since this can be done without damage.
Petitioners should not be made to refund the value of the
house since this would thwart the policy laid down in CA141.

WONG V. CARPIO
203 SCRA 118
FACTS:
Giger sold a parcel of land through a pacto de recto sale to Mercado. Mercado only began to harvest the
coconut fruits but he never placed anyone over the land to watch it. Neither did he reside in the land nor was
there any hut constructed thereon to show possession. Thereafter, Wong inspected the land to see if
whether there was anyone claiming the land.
After finding there was none, he bought the land from Giger. He placed workers on the land, constructed a
farmhouse, and fenced the boundaries. He couldn't register the sale due to some technicalities.

HELD:
Possession is acquired through the material occupation of the thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact
that it is subject of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities acquiring such rights and that the
execution of the public instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the thing unless there is stipulation to the
contrary. If however, notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the
enjoyment and tenancy of the thing and make use of it herself, because such enjoyment and tenancy are
opposed by another, then delivery has not been effected. Possession was passed to Mercado by virtue of
the first pacto de recto sale. There was an impediment in passing possession to Wong by virtue of the later
sale and this was the possession exercised by Mercado. Further, the action for forcible entry was called for.
The act of entering the property and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the
exertion of force over the property and this is all that is necessary. Furthermore, there should be payment of
rentals from the time the
presumption of good faith ceased or the receipt of summons by Wong. Possession in good faith ceases from
the moment defects in the title are made known to the possessors.

JAVIER V. VERIDIANO
237 SCRA 565
FACTS:
Javier filed a miscellaneous sales application over a parcel of land. Thereafter, she instituted an action for
forcible entry against Ben Babol, alleging that she was forcibly dispossessed of the parcel of land. Her
complaint was dismissing, followed the finding of the Bureau of Lands that the disputed portion of land is
outside the lot owned by Javier. Later, the sales application has been granted. Babol had already sold the
land to somebody else. Petitioner demanded the return of the land to her and
after 4 years since the dismissal of her earlier complaint, she files an action for quieting of title and recovery
of possession against Babol and Rosete. The latter moved for the dismissal of the case based on res
judicata.

HELD:
A judgment in a forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue than possession and declares only
who has the right of possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an action for determination of who has
right or title of ownership.

PENAS V. CA
233 SCRA 744
FACTS:
Penas leased the disputed property in favor of Calaycay. An extrajudicial settlement was executed by the
heirs of Penas after his death. As time went on, the lease continued with increased rentals. On a relevant
date, a letter was sent to Calaycay from petitioner Penas, relaying the intent to terminate the lease contract
and the offer of drafting a new lease contract with a higher rental fee. Calaycay failed to abide with the
demands. He continued though to occupy the premises and deposited rentals to the bank in trust of
petitioner Penas. Another letter was sent but to no avail. This prompted the petitioner to file an action for
unlawful detainer. The complaint was dismissed in the lower court.

HELD:
A complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed should it be counted from the last demand letter to vacate, the
reason being that the lessor has the right to waive his right of action based on previous demands and let the
lessee remain meanwhile in the premises.

FRANCEL REALTY
CORPORATION V. CA
252 SCRA 127
FACTS:
Petitioner executed a contract to sell in favor of Sycip. It was stipulated that in case of failure to pay 2 or
more installment payments, the whole obligation shall be due and demandable and the seller has the right to
rescind the contract. The buyer would also have to vacate the premises without need of any court action.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a case for unlawful detainer for the alleged failure of Sycip to pay monthly
amortizations. Demand letters of petitioner against Sycip were to no avail as the latter refused to vacate.
Sycip alleged that it had to stop paying monthly amortizations or rentals as the petitioner failed to develop
the subdivision project, part of their stipulation. The complaint was ultimately dismissed, the court then
holding that it had no jurisdiction over the case.

HELD:
Where a complaint for unlawful detainer arises from the failure of the buyer on installment basis of real
property to pay based on a right to stop paying monthly amortizations based on PD 957, the determinative
question is exclusively cognizable by the HLURB.

EFFECTS OF POSSESSION
Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be disturbed
therein he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the means established by the laws
and the Rules of Court. A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry may within
ten days from the filing of the complaint present a motion to secure from the competent court, in the
action for forcible entry, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession.
The court shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof. (446a)

RIGHTS TO BE RESPECTED IN
POSSESSIONGENERAL NATURE
1. Right of a person to be respected in his possession
2. Protection in said right or restoration to said possession thru legal means
3. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction

SPECIFIC RIGHT TO BE RESPECTED IN

POSSESSION
1. Reasons for protection of possession
a. Possession is very similar to ownership and as a matter of fact modifies ownership
b. Possession almost invariably gives rise to the presumption that the possessor is the owner
2. Every possessor is protectedwhether concept of owner or holder

LEGAL MEANS FOR RESTORATION TO

POSSESSION
1. To prevent spoliation or a disregard of public order
2. To prevent deprivation of property without due process
3. To prevent a person from taking the law into his own hands

WRIT OF PRELIMINARY MANDATORY

INJUNCTION
1. Injunction cannot substitute for the other, actions to recover possession. The possessor in the meantime
has in his favor, the presumption of rightful possession, at least, till the case is finally
decided
2. Requisites for the issuance
a. In forcible entry casesfile within 10 days from the time of the complaint
b. In unlawful detainer caseswithin 10 days from the time appeal is perfected only if
i. The lessees appeal is frivolous or dilatory
ii. The lessors appeal is prima facie meritorious
Art. 540. Only the possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of owner can serve as a title for
acquiring dominion. (447)

POSSESSION IN THE CONCEPT OF

OWNER
If a person possesses in the concept of ownerhe may eventually become the owner by prescription
Thus, a possessor merely in the concept of holder cannot acquire property by acquisitive prescription
one cannot recognize the right of another and at the same time claim adverse possession.

POSSESSION IN THE CONCEPT OF

HOLDER
1. Lessees
2. Trustees
3. Antichrectic creditors
4. Agents
5. Depositaries
6. Co-owners
Art. 541. A possessor in the concept of owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with
a just title and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it. (448a)

PRESUMPTION THAT POSSESSOR

HAS JUST TITLE
1. One must be in possessionactual or constructive
2. The possession must be in the concept of owner

THE KINDS OF TITLE

1. True and valid title (titulo verdadero y valido)there was a mode of transferring ownership and the grantor
was the owner
2. Colorable title (titulo Colorado)that title, although there was a mode of transferring ownership, still
something is wrong since the grantor is not the owner
3. Putative titlewhere although the person believes himself to be the owner, he is nonetheless is not,
because there was no mode of acquiring ownership
Art. 542. The possession of real property presumes that of the movables therein, so long as it is not shown
or proved that they should be excluded. (449)

PRESUMPTION OF POSSESSION OF
MOVABLES FOUND IN AN IMMOVABLE
APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE
1. Whether the possessor be in good faith or bad faith
2. Whether the possessor be in one owns name or in anothers
3. Whether the possessor be in concept of owner or holder
Art. 543. Each one of the participants of a thing possessed in common shall be deemed to have exclusively
possessed the part which may be allotted to him upon the division thereof, for the entire period during which
the co-possession lasted. Interruption in the possession of the whole or a part of a thing possessed in
common shall be to the prejudice of all the possessors. However, in case of civil interruption, the Rules of
Court shall apply. (450a)

EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION BY A
PREVIOUS CO-OWNER SHALL BE
DEEMED
It gives a right and not just a mere presumption

RULES TO APPLY FOR CIVIL

INTERRUPTION
Civil interruption is produced by judicial summons to the possessor
Judicial summons shall be deemed not to have been issued and shall not give rise to interruption
o If it should be void for lack of legal solemnities
o If the plaintiff should desist from the complaint or should allow the proceedings to lapse
o If the possessor should be absolved from the complaint

Art. 544. A possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits received before the possession is legally
interrupted. Natural and industrial fruits are considered received from the time they are gathered or
severed. Civil fruits are deemed to accrue daily and belong to the possessor in good faith in that
proportion. (451)

RIGHTS OF A POSSESSOR IN GOOD

FAITH TO FRUITS ALREADY RECEIVED
Art. 545. If at the time the good faith ceases, there should be any natural or industrial fruits, the
possessor shall have a right to a part of the expenses of cultivation, and to a part of the net harvest,
both in proportion to the time of the possession. The charges shall be divided on the same basis by
the two possessors. The owner of the thing may, should he so desire, give the possessor in good
faith the right to finish the cultivation and gathering of the growing fruits, as an indemnity for his
part of the expenses of cultivation and the net proceeds; the possessor in good faith who for any
reason whatever should refuse to accept this concession, shall lose the right to be indemnified in
any other manner. (452a)
Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good
faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor. Useful expenses shall be refunded
only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated
him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the
increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof. (453a)
Art. 547. If the useful improvements can be removed without damage to the principal thing, the
possessor in good faith may remove them, unless the person who recovers the possession
exercises the option under paragraph 2 of the preceding article. (n)
Art. 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the possessor in good
faith; but he may remove the ornaments with which he has embellished the principal thing if it
suffers no injury thereby, and if his successor in the possession does not prefer to refund the
amount expended. (454)
Art. 549. The possessor in bad faith shall reimburse the fruits received and those which the
legitimate possessor could have received, and shall have a right only to the expenses mentioned in
paragraph 1 of Article 546 and in Article 443. The expenses incurred in improvements for pure luxury
or mere pleasure shall
not be refunded to the possessor in bad faith, but he may remove the objects for which such
expenses have been incurred, provided that the thing suffers no injury thereby, and that the lawful

possessor does not prefer to retain them by paying the value they may have at the time he enters
into possession. (445a)
Art. 550. The costs of litigation over the property shall be borne by every possessor. (n)
Art. 551. Improvements caused by nature or time shall always insure to the benefit of the person who
has succeeded in recovering possession. (456)
Art. 552. A possessor in good faith shall not be liable for the deterioration or loss of the thing
possessed, except in cases in which it is proved that he has acted with fraudulent intent or
negligence, after the judicial summons. A possessor in bad faith shall be liable for deterioration or
loss in every case, even if caused by a fortuitous event. (457a)
Art. 553. One who recovers possession shall not be obliged to pay for improvements which have
ceased to exist at the time he takes possession of the thing. (458)

IMPROVEMENTS WHICH CEASE TO

EXIST
Art. 554. A present possessor who shows his possession at some previous time, is presumed to
have held possession also during the intermediate period, in the absence of proof to the contrary.
(459)

PRESUMPTION OF POSSESSION
DURING INTERVENING PERIOD
Art. 555. A possessor may lose his possession:
(1) By the abandonment of the thing;
(2) By an assignment made to another either by onerous or gratuitous title;
(3) By the destruction or total loss of the thing, or because it goes out of commerce;
(4) By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of Article 537, if the new possession has
lasted longer than one year. But the real right of possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten
years. (460a)

ABANDONMENT
1. Possessor in the concept of owner
2. The abandoner must have the capacity to renounce or to alienate
3. There must be physical relinquishment of the thing or object
4. There must be no more spes recuperandi/expectation to recover or animus revertendi/intent to return or
get back
N.B: Abandonment which converts the thing into res nulliusownership of which may ordinarily be obtained
by occupationdoesnt apply to land. Ownership of land cannot be obtained through occupation.

ASSIGNMENT
1. Complete transmission of ownership rights to another person
2. At no time did the thing not have a possessor
3. Both possession de facto and de jure are lost and no action will allow recovery

POSSESSION OF ANOTHER
1. If person isnt in possession for more than 1 year, he loses his possession de facto
2. If a person loses possession for more than 10 years, he loses possession de jure or the real right of a
possessor
Art. 556. The possession of movables is not deemed lost so long as they remain under the control of
the possessor, even though for the time being he may not know their whereabouts. (461)

WHEN POSSESSION OF MOVABLES IS

NOT LOST OR NOT LOST
If the possessor has no idea at all about the whereabouts of the movable, possession is lost
BUT not when he more or less knows its general location, though he may not know its precise or definite
location
Art. 557. The possession of immovables and of real rights is not deemed lost, or transferred for
purposes of prescription to the prejudice of third persons, except in accordance with the provisions

of the Mortgage Law and the Land Registration laws. (462a)

LOSS OF IMMOVABLES WITH RESPECT

TO THIRD PERSONS
Art. 558. Acts relating to possession, executed or agreed to by one who possesses a thing belonging
to another as a mere holder to enjoy or keep it, in any character, do not bind or prejudice the owner,
unless he gave said holder express authority to do such acts, or ratifies them subsequently. (463)

ACTS OF MERE HOLDER

Art. 559. The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless,
one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in
possession of the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good
faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor. (464a)

WHEN POSSESSION OF MOVABLE IS

EQUIVALENT TO TITLE
1. In bad faithis never equivalent to title
2. In good faith
a. D is entitled to titleas a general rule
b. Is not equivalent to tile when the owner has lost or has been unlawfully deprived of it, unless the
possessor had acquired in good faith at a public sale

SUMMARY OF RECOVERY OR NONRECOVERY POSSESSION

1. Owner may recover without reimbursement
a. From possessor in bad faith
b. From possessor in good faithif owner has lost or has been unlawfully deprived
2. Owner may recover but should reimburse
a. If the possessor acquired the object in good faith at a public sale or auction
3. Owner cannot recover, even if he offers to reimburse
a. If the possessor acquired it in good faith and for value by purchase from a merchants store, fairs, or
markets in
accordance with the Code of Commerce
b. If owner by his own conduct precluded form denying the sellers authority to sell
c. If possessor had obtained the goods because he was an innocent purchaser for value and holder of a
negotiable
document of title
Art. 560. Wild animals are possessed only while they are under one's control; domesticated or tamed
animals are considered domestic or tame if they retain the habit of returning to the premises of the
possessor. (465)

THREE KINDS OF ANIMALS

1. Wild animalswhich live naturally independent of man
2. Domesticatedwild by nature but recognizes the authority of man
3. Domesticborn and reared ordinarily under the control of and care of man

POSSESSION OF WILD ANIMALS

Ones possession of wild animals is lost when they are under anothers control or under no ones control

DOMESTICATED OR TAMED ANIMALS

The possessor doesnt lose possession of themas long as habitulally they return to the possessors
premises
Impliedly, possession of them is lost if the aforementioned habit has ceased
Art. 561. One who recovers, according to law, possession unjustly lost, shall be deemed for all
purposes which may redound to his benefit, to have enjoyed it without interruption. (466)

LAWFUL RECOVERY OF POSSESSION

THAT HAD BEEN UNJUSTLY LOST
Applies to both possessors in good faith and bad faith, but only if beneficial to them
Thus, a possessor in good faith for the purpose of prescription may make use of this article

VDA. DE BORROMEO V. POGOY

126 SCRA 217
FACTS:
The intestate estate of Borromeo is the owner of a building, which was being rented out to petitioner. On a
relevant date, private respondent sent a letter to petitioner for the payment of overdue rentals as well as to
vacate the premises thereafter. The petitioner failed to pay. With less than a year from the demand letter,
private respondent instituted action
against petitioner for unlawful detainer. Private respondent moves for the dismissal of the case for want of

jurisdiction as she asserts that conciliation proceedings should have first been instituted with the Lupon
Barangay.

HELD:
Even though the private respondent should have submitted the complaint before the Lupon, the petition
should still be dismissed. The Lupon only refers to individualssingle human being contrasted with a social
group or institution. It only applies to natural persons. In the case at bar, private respondent is only a nominal
party in behalf of the intestate estate. The real party in interest is the intestate estate and thus, doesn't fall
within the ambits of the provision requiring submission of the case to conciliation proceedings with the
Lupon.

SEMIRA V. CA
230 SCRA 577
FACTS:
Gutierrez was the owner of a parcel of land. This parcel was sold to Buenaventura An. He entered the
premises based on the boundaries stated in the deed of sale. He then bought two additional parcels of land.
On a relevant date, he sold the first parcel to his nephew who also entered the premises based on the
boundaries stated in the deed. The deed also stated the same boundaries and area of the lot, which was
larger in actuality. This nephew then sold the land to petitioner. The deed this time reflected a different area,
the actual area of the land. The land was found to be larger than what was stated in the previous documents.
Semira entered then the premises based on the boundaries and began construction of a rice mill.
Buenaventura then filed an action for forcible entry against Semira, alleging that latter illegally encroached
on the other parcel of land previously bought by the former and that the land that was supposed to be
occupied by the latter was smaller than the land he was actually occupying.

HELD:
In the case at bar, the issue of possession cannot be decided independently of the question of ownership.
Private respondent claimed constructive possession of the parcel of land he alleged to be encroached by
Semira. Likewise, Semira based his occupancy of the land by virtue of the Ramirezs sale of the land to him.
The question of prior possession may
only be resolved in answering the question of who is the real owner of the disputed portion. Where land is
sold for a lump sum and not so much per unit of measure, the boundaries of the land stated in the contract
determines the effects
and scope of the sale, not the area thereof. The vendor is thus obligated to deliver the land included within
the boundaries regardless of whether the land is greater or lesser than the area stipulated in the sale.

PO LAM V. CA
347 SCRA 86
FACTS:
Lim Kim Chiong and LAHCO entered into a contract of sale. Later, the former instituted an action for the
annulment of the sale and the reconveyance of the property. Pending this action, LAHCO was able to sell the
property to Po Lam who leased then the property to Felix Lim. The latter thereafter after the proceedings
have ended for the annulment of the sale, deposited the rentals in court in favor of Lim.

HELD:
A buyer cannot be considered as being aware of the flaw which invalidates his acquisition of the thing where
the alleged flaw, the notice of lis pendens, was already ordered cancelled at the time of purchase.

STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE V.

CA
254 SCRA 368
FACTS:
Spouses Canuto and Solid Homes entered into a contract to sell. Solid then mortgaged the property in favor
of petitioner and upon his failure to pay the loan, the property was foreclosed. Here now comes the spouses
who filed a complaint with the HLURB for failure of Solid to execute an absolute deed of sale.

HELD:
An unregistered mortgage is of no moment since it is understood to be without prejudice to the better right of
third parties.

EQUATORIAL REALTY
DEVELOPMENT V. MAYFAIR
THEATRE
370 SCRA 56
FACTS:
Follow-up case of the popular Equatorial case in OBLICON and SALES.

HELD:
1. Rent is a civil fruit that belongs to the owner of the property producing it by right of accession.
2. Ownership of the thing sold is a real right, which the buyer acquires only upon the delivery to him in any of
the ways specified by law or in any other manner signifying an agreement that the possession is transferred
from the vendor to the vendee. While the execution of a public instrument of sale is recognized by law as
equivalent to delivery of the thing sold, such constructive or symbolic delivery, being merely presumptive, is
deemed negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold.

SOMODIO V. CA
235 SCRA 307
FACTS:
Somodio paid of the purchase price for a parcel of land. He started to construct a house but was left
unfinished when he was employed in a far away area. He allowed Ayco to occupy the land but when he tried
to demand Ayco to vacate the premises, the latter refused to do so.

HELD:
Possession in the eyes of the law doesnt mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of
ground before it can be said he is in possession.

LASAM V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

65 PHIL 367
FACTS:
Lasam sought the registration of over 100 hectares of land. This was opposed by many, one by the Director
of Lands, alleging that Lasam had no appropriate title to the land to support claim as well as the land is
public land.

HELD:
While possession in the eyes of law doesnt mean that a man has to have his two feet on every square feet
of ground before it can be said that he is in possession but possession is not gained by a mere nominal
claim. The mere planting of a sign or symbol of possession cannot justify a Magellan like claim of dominion
over an immense tract of territory. Possession as a
means of acquiring ownership is not mere fiction.

HEIRS OF SORIANO V. CA
363 SCRA 87
FACTS:
A subsequent owner of a parcel of land was successful in registering the land. Prior to this registration,
Soriano was already occupying the subject land as sub-lessee for around 15 years. May a successful
registrant oust validly one whose security of tenure rights is pending with the DARAB?

HELD:
1. Ownership and possession are distinct legal concepts. There is ownership when a thing pertaining to one
person is consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, among which
are the right to enjoy the thing owned and the right to exclude other persons from possession thereof. On the
other hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or enjoyment of a right. Possession may be in the
concept of owner or concept of holder.
2. A judgment in a land registration case cannot be effectively used to oust the possessor of the land, whose
security of tenure rights are being determined by the DARAB.

RAMOS V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

39 PHIL 175
FACTS:
Ramos was a holder of a possession information title which he later conveyed to Romero. Romero applied
for the registration of the land.

HELD:
The possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land under claim of ownership, under a claim of
ownership of all, is a constructive possession of all, if the remainder isnt under the adverse possession of
another.

POSSESSION
Art. 523. Possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. (430a)

VIEWPOINTS OF POSSESSION
1. Right to possession or jus possidendipossession de facto; incident of ownership
2. Right of possession or jus possessionspossession de jure; independent of ownership

DEGREES OF POSSESSION
1. Mere holding or having without any right whatsoever grammatical degree
2. Possession with juridical titlejuridical possession
3. Possession with just title but not from the real ownerreal possessory right
4. Possession with title of dominium, with a just title from the owner

REQUISITES OR ELEMENTS OF
POSSESSION
1. There must be holding or control of a thing or right
2. There must be a deliberate intention to possess or animus possidendi
3. The possession must be by virtue of ones own right

CLASSES OF POSSESSION
1. In ones own name or in that of another
2. In the concept of owner or concept of holder
3. In good faith or in bad faith

OWNERSHIP IS DIFFERENT FROM

POSSESSION
A person may be declared the owner but he may not be entitled to possession
A judgment for ownership doesn't necessarily include possession as a necessary incident
Art. 524. Possession may be exercised in one's own name or in that of another. (413a)

POSSESSION IN ANOTHERS NAME

1. Voluntaryagent possesses for his principal
2. Involuntaryas when a mother possesses for a child in a maternal womb
3. Unauthorizedwill become principals possession only after there has been ratification without prejudice
to the effects of
negotiorum gestio
Art. 525. The possession of things or rights may be had in one of two concepts: either in the concept
of owner, or in that of the holder of the thing or right to keep or enjoy it, the ownership pertaining to
another person. (432)

CONCEPT OF OWNER
Other people believe through my actions, that I am the owner of the property
Considered in the opinion of others as owner
Regardless of good faith or bad faith
Contrary to concept of holder wherein I recognize another to be the owner of the property
Art. 526. He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there exists in his title or
mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who
possesses in any case contrary to the foregoing. Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law
may be the basis of good faith. (433a)

MISTAKE ON A DOUBTFUL QUESTION

OF LAW
It is true that ignorance of the law excuses no one but error in the application of the law, in the legal
solutions arising from such application, and the interpretation of doubtful doctrine can still make a person a
transgressor, possessor, violator in good faith
Art. 527. Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who allegesbad faith on the part of a
possessor rests the burden of proof.(434)
Art. 528. Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in the case and from
the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing
improperly or wrongfully. (435a)
WHEN IS POSSESSION IN GOOD FAITH CONVERTED TO POSSESSION IN BAD FAITH?
1. From the moment facts exist showing the possessors knowledge of the flaw, from that time he should be
considered as a possessor in bad faith
2. It doesn't matter whether the facts were caused by him or by some other person

WHEN BAD FAITH BEGINS

Judicial summons
Even before such time as when a letter is received from the true owner asking the possessor to stop
Art. 529. It is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same character in which it
was acquired, until the contrary is proved. (436)

PRESUMPTIONS REGARDING
POSSESSION
1. Good faith
2. Continuity of the character of good faith
3. Non-interruption of possession

4. Presumption of just title

5. Non-interruption of possession of property unjustly lost but legally recovered
6. Possession during intervening period
7. Possession of movables with real property
8. Exclusive possession of common property
Art. 530. Only things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated may be the object of
possession. (437)

ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION
Art. 531. Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by
the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities
established for acquiring such right. (438a)

HOW IS POSSESSION ACQUIRED?

1. By material occupation
2. By subjection to our will
3. By constructive possession or proper acts and legal formalities
a. Constititom possessorium exists when a person who possessed property as an owner now possesses
it in
some other capacity other than owner
b. Traditio brevi manu is the opposite of constitutom possessorium
c. Traditio longa manu is delivery by consent or mere ointing
d. Traditio symbolica

ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR

POSSESSION
1. The corpus
2. The animus

CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF
LAND
If an entire parcel is possessed under claim of ownership, there is constructive possession of the entire
parcel unless a portion thereof is adversely possessed by another
Art. 532. Possession may be acquired by the same person who is to enjoy it, by his legal
representative, by his agent, or by any person without any power whatever: but in the last case, the
possession shall not be considered as acquired until the person in whose name the act of
possession was executed has ratified the same, without prejudice to the juridical consequences of
negotiorum gestio in a proper case. (439a)

NEGOTIORUM GESTIO
Whoever voluntarily takes charge of the agency or management of the business or property of another,
without any power from the latter, is obliged to continue the same until the termination of the affair and its
incidents, or to require the person concerned to substitute him, if the owner is in a position to do so. This
juridical relation does not arise in either of these instances:
1. When the property or business is not neglected or abandoned;
2. If in fact the manager has been tacitly authorized by the owner.
In the first case, the provisions of Articles 1317, 1403, No. 1, and 1404 regarding unauthorized contracts
shall govern.
In the second case, the rules on agency in Title X of this Book shall be applicable. (1888a)
Art. 533. The possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without
interruption and from the moment of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted.
One who validly renounces an inheritance is deemed never to have possessed the same. (440)

TIMES OF ACQUISITION OF
POSSESSION
1. If heir acceptsfrom the moment of death since there is no interruption
2. If heir refuseshe is deemed never to have possessed the same

Art. 534. On who succeeds by hereditary title shall not suffer the consequences of the wrongful possession
of the decedent, if it is not shown that he was aware of the flaws affecting it; but the effects of possession in
good faith shall not benefit him except from the date of the death of the decedent. (442)

EFFECTS OF ACQUISITION OF
POSSESSION THROUGH SUCCESSION
If the father was in bad faith, it doesn't mean that the son is also in bad faith
Art. 535. Minors and incapacitated persons may acquire the possession of things; but they need the
assistance of their legal representatives in order to exercise the rights which from the possession
arise in their favor. (443)

NATURE OF THEIR POSSESSION

Possession by them is allowed only in those matters where they have capacity to act and not possession
where juridical acts are imperative
Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a
possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a right to deprive another
of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to
deliver the thing. (441a)

POSSESSION MAY NOT BE ACQUIRED

THROUGH THE FOLLOWING
1. Force and intimidation
2. By mere tolerance
3. Clandestine and secret possession
Art. 537. Acts merely tolerated, and those executed clandestinely and without the knowledge of the
possessor of a thing, or by violence, do not affect possession. (444)

Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities
except in the cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the
present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessors, the one longer in possession; if
the dates of the possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if all these conditions are
equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or
ownership through proper proceedings. (445)
Art. 1120. Possession is interrupted for the purposes of prescription, naturally or civilly. (1943)
Art. 1121. Possession is naturally interrupted when through any cause it should cease for more than
one year.
The old possession is not revived if a new possession should be exercised by the same adverse
claimant. (1944a)
Art. 1122. If the natural interruption is for only one year or less, the time elapsed shall be counted in
favor of the prescription. (n)
Art. 1123. Civil interruption is produced by judicial summons to the possessor. (1945a)
IT IS POSSIBLE FOR CURRENT POSSESSOR TO ADD TIME TO POSSESSION OF PREDECESSOR IF
there is privity between them. This procedure is called TACKING.

AGUILAR V. CA
227 SCRA 472
FACTS:
Brothers Virgilio and Senen bought in co-ownership a house where their father would stay. It was first agreed
upon that Virgilio would have 2/3 and Senen 1/3 but in the written agreement, they had a 50-50 share. Upon
the death of the father, Virgilio asked Senen to vacate the house and they should sell the same. Senen didn't
want to leave. Virgilio filed for
partition.

HELD:
No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership and that each co-owner may demand at any
time the partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned.

CORONEL V. CONSTANTINO
397 SCRA 128
FACTS:
The property was originally owned by Aguinaldo. She died and was survived by Coronel and Constantino.
Constantino and his wife sought to be declared the owners of the land by virtue of the sale to them of the
land of Santos who obtained beforehand the land from Coronel.

HELD:
The sale of the subject property made by Emilia in favor of Santos is limited to the portion which may be
allotted to her upon the termination of co-ownership over the subject property with her children.

DELIMA V. CA
201 SCRA 641
FACTS:
Lino bought a lot from the friar lands. He died and was survived by his brothers and sisters. Galileo was the
caretaker of the property. He was able to execute an affidavit adjudicating to himself the parcel of land and

was able to secure the issuance of a TCT in his name. This prompted the heirs of his siblings to file for
reconveyance.

HELD:
When the co-owner of the property executed a deed of partition and on the strength thereof, obtained a
cancellation of the title in the name of their predecessor and the issuance of a new title in his name as
owner, the statute of limitations started to run for the purposes of the action instituted by the latter seeking a
declaration of the existence of the co-ownership and
their rights thereafter. The issuance of a new title constituted a clear act of repudiation of the trust and coownership.

TAN V. CA
172 SCRA 660
FACTS:
Tan owned a parcel of land. During his lifetime, he obtained a loan secured by a REM over the land. Upon
his death, he was survived by his wife and children. The loan was unpaid and thus, the REM was foreclosed.
Wife and kids sought the annulment of the REM. An amicable settlement was then entered into between the
bank and the family. The redemption would be
extended into 1 year more. Anne redeemed from bank but the latter issued the title back to the co-heirs.

HELD:
Co-ownership expired when the heirs allowed the one-year redemption period to expire without redeeming
their parents property and permitted the issuance of the new title and consolidation of ownership. There was

no co-ownership anymore when Annie redeemed the property. It was in all accounts, to be considered as a
sale.

ADLAWAN V. ADLAWAN
JANUARY 20, 2006
FACTS:
Arnelito was an illegitimate child of respondents brother. He filed a case for unlawful detainer against
respondents for he is allegedly the sole heir of the house and lot. The respondents on the other hand
contended that subject property was the ancestral home co-owned by them with the petitioners father.

HELD:
Any of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment for the benefit of all the co-owners. Nonetheless, the
action should be dismissed if the suit is for the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to
the possession of the property.

PALMITUAN V. CA
215 SCRA 866
FACTS:
Agatona was the owner of a parcel of land. She had two childrenPascual and Donato. Pascual died but
left heirs. Donato then adjudicated to himself the land. He later conveyed the land to his daughter. Another
lot was consequently sold in a public auction due to non-payment of taxes and it was Donatos daughter who
was able to redeem.

HELD:
Even if a co-owner sells the whole property, the sale will affect only his own share and not the share of the
other co-owners who didn't consent to the sale. Since this is the case, a co-owner is entitled to sell his
undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the others is not null
and void.

CRUZ V. LEIS
327 SCRA 570
FACTS:
Spouses Leis obtained a loan from spouses Cruz, secured by a REM over a parcel of land. The loan was
unpaid and the REM foreclosed. The heirs of the mortgagors sought to annul the sale that was held of the
property, alleging the property to be conjugal and subject to co-ownership.

HELD:
Redemption by a co-owner doesn't terminate the co-ownership nor give her title to the whole property
subject of the co-ownership.

CONDOMINIUM ACT
SECTION 2. A Condominium is an interest in real property consisting of a separate interests in a unit in a
residential, industrial or commercial building or in an industrial estate and an undivided interests in common,
directly and indirectly, in the land, or the appurtenant interest of their respective units in the common areas.
SECTION 3. As used in this Act, unless the context otherwise requires:
a) "Condominium" means a condominium as defined in the next preceding section.
b) "Unit" means a part of the condominium project intended for any type of independent use or ownership,
including one or more rooms or spaces located in one or more floors (or parts of floors) in a building or
buildings and such accessories as may be appended thereto; provided, that in the case of an industrial

estate wherein the condominium project consists of

several buildings, plants and factories may, by themselves, be considered separately as individual units as
herein defined."
c) "Project" means the entire parcel of real property divided or to be divided in condominiums, including all
structures thereon.
d) "Industrial Estate or Estate" means a certain tract of land which is subdivided and developed primarily for
industrial purposes and which usually includes provisions for basic infrastructure facilities and common
services such as roads, water, electricity, drainage and waste disposal system.
e) "Common areas" means the entire project except all units separately granted or held or reserved.
f) "To divide" real property means to divide the ownership thereof or other interests therein by conveying one
or more condominium therein but less than the whole thereof.
SECTION 4. The provisions of this Act shall apply to property divided or to be divided into condominium only
if there shall be recorded in the Register of Deeds of the province or city in which the property lies, and duly
annotated in the corresponding certificate of title of the land, if the latter had been patented or registered
under either the Land Registration or Cadastral Acts, an enabling or master deed which shall contain,
among others, the following:
a) Description of the land on which the building or buildings and improvements are to be located;
b) Description of the building or buildings, stating the number of storeys and basement, the number of units
and their accessories, if any;
c) Description of the common areas and facilities;
d) A statement of the exact nature of the interest acquired or to be acquired by the purchased in the separate
units and the common areas of the condominium projects. Where title to or to appurtenant interests in the
common areas is to be held by a condominium corporation, a statement to this effect shall be included;
e) A certificate of the registered owner of the property, if he is other than those executing the master deed,
as well as of all registered holders of any lien or encumbrances on the property, that they consent to the
registration of the deed;
f) The following plans shall be appended to the deed as integral parts thereof:
1. A survey plan of the land included in the project, unless a survey plan of the same property had previously
been filed in said office;
2. A diagrammatic floor plan of the building or buildings each unit, its relative location and approximate
dimensions.
g) Any reasonable restriction not contrary to law, morals, or public policy regarding the right of any
condominium owner to alienate or dispose off his condominium.
h) The enabling or master deed may be amended or revoked upon registration of an instrument executed by
a simple majority of the registered owners of the property: Provided. That in a condominium project
exclusively for either residential or commercial use, simple majority shall be on a per unit of ownership basis
and that in the case of mixed use, simple majority shall be on a floor area of ownership basis: Provided,
further, That prior notifications to all registered owners shall be submitted to the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board and the city/municipal engineer for approval before it can be registered. Until registration
of a revocation, the provisions of this Act shall continue to apply to such property.

SECTION 5. Any transfer or conveyance of a unit or an apartment, office or store or other space therein,
shall include the transfer or conveyance of the undivided interest in the common areas or in a proper case,
the membership or share holdings in the condominium corporation: provided, however. That where the
common areas in the condominium project are
held by the owners of separate units as co-owners hereof, no condominium unit therein shall be conveyed or
transferred to persons other than Filipino citizens or corporation at least 60% of the capital stock of which
belong to Filipino citizens, except in cases of hereditary succession. Where the common areas in a
condominium project are held by a corporation, no
transfer or conveyance of a unit shall be valid if the concomitant transfer of the appurtenant membership or
stockholding in the corporation will cause the alien interest in such corporation to exceed the limits imposed
by existing laws.
SECTION 6. Unless otherwise expressly provided in the enabling or master deed or the declaration of
restrictions, the incidents of a condominium grant are as follows:
a) the boundary of the unit granted are the interior surfaces of the perimeter walls, floors, ceiling, windows
and doors thereof: provided, that in the case of an industrial estate condominium projects, wherein whole
buildings, plants or factories may be considered as unit defined under section 3 (b) hereof, the boundary of a
unit shall include the outer surfaces
of the perimeter walls of said buildings, plants or factories. The following are not part of the unit: bearing
walls, columns, floors, roofs, foundations, and other common structural elements of the buildings; lobbies,
stairways, hall ways and other areas of common use, elevator equipment and shafts, central heating, central
refrigeration and central air conditioning
equipment, reservoir, tanks, pumps and other central services and facilities, pipes, ducts, flues, chutes,
conduits wires and other utility installations, wherever located, except the outlets thereof when located within
the unit."
b) There shall pass with the unit, as an appurtenant thereof, an exclusive easement for the use of the air
space encompasses by the boundaries of the unit as it exists at any particular time and as the unit may
lawfully be altered or reconstructed from time to time. Such easement shall be automatically terminated in
any air space upon destruction of the units as to render it untenantable.
c) Unless otherwise provided, the common areas are held in common by he holders of units, in equal share
one for each unit.
d) A non-exclusive easement for ingress, egress and support through the common areas in appurtenant to
each unit and the common areas are subject to such easement.
e) Each condominium owner shall have the exclusive right to paint, repaint, tile, wax, paper or otherwise
refinish and decorate the inner surfaces of the walls, ceilings, floors, windows and doors hounding his own
unit: provided, that in the case of an industrial estate condominium unit, such right may be exercised over the
external surfaces of the said unit.
f) Each condominium owner shall have the exclusive right to mortgage, pledge or encumber his
condominium and to have the same appraised independently of the other condominium owner.
g) Each condominium owner has also the absolute right to sell or dispose of his condominium unless the
master deed contains a requirements that the property be first offered to the condominium owners within a
reasonable period of time before the same is offered to outside parties;

SECTION 7. Except as provided in the following section, the common areas shall remain undivided, and
there shall be no judicial partition thereof.
SECTION 8. Where several persons own condominium in a condominium project, an action may be brought
by one or more such person for partition thereof, by sale of the entire project, as if the owners of all the
condominium in such project were co-owners of the entire project in the same proportion as their interests in
the common areas; Provided, however, that a partition shall be made only upon a showing:
a) That three years after damage or destruction to the project which renders a material part thereof unfit for
its use prior thereto, the project had not been rebuilt or repaired substantially to its state prior to its damage
or destruction; or
b) That damage or destruction to the project has rendered one half or more of the units therein untenantable
and that condominium owners holding in aggregate more than 30 percent interest in the common areas are
opposed to the repair or restoration of the projects; or
c) That project has been in existence in excess of 50 years, that it is obsolete and uneconomical, and that
condominium owners holding in aggregate more than 50 percent interest in the common areas are opposed
to repair or restoration or remodeling or modernizing of the project; or
d) That the project or a material part thereof has been condemned or expropriated and that the project is no
longer viable, or that the condominium owners holding in aggregate more than 70 percent interest in the
common areas are opposed to the continuation of the condominium regime after expropriation or
condemnation of a material proportion thereof; or
e) That the condition for such partition by sale set forth in the declaration of restrictions duly registered in
accordance with the terms of this Act, have been met.

DEED OF RESTRICTIONS MAY

PROVIDE FOR THE FOLLOWING
(SECTION 9)
Restrictions shall ensure to bind all condominium owners in the project, such liens, unless otherwise,
provided, may be enforced by any condominium owner in the project or by the management body of such
project
As to management body
1. For the power thereof, including power to enforce the provisions of the declarations of restrictions;
2. For the maintenance of insurance policies insuring condominium owners against loss by the, casualty,
liability, workmen's compensation and other insurable risks and for bonding of the members of any
management body;
3. Provisions for maintenance, utility, gardening and other services benefiting the common areas for the

operations of the building, and legal, accounting and other professional and technical services;
4. For purchase of materials, supplies and the like needed by the common areas;
5. For payment of taxes and special assessment which would be a lien upon the entire project or common
areas, for discharge of my encumbrance levied against the entire project of the common areas;
6. The manner for delegation of its powers;
7. For reconstruction of any portion or portions of any damage to or destruction of the project;
8. For entry by its officers and agents into any unit when necessary in connection with the maintenance or
construction for which such body is responsible;
9. For a power of attorney to the management body to sell the entire project for the benefit of all of the
owners
thereof when partition of the project may be authorized under Section 8 of this Act, which said power shall
be binding upon all of the condominium owners regardless or whether they assume the obligations of the
restrictions or not
The manner and procedure for amending such restrictions, provided, that the vote of not less than a
majority in interest of the owners is obtained;
For independent audit of the accounts of the management body;
For reasonable assessments to meet authorized expenditures, each condominium unit to be assessed
separately for its share of such expenses in proportion (unless otherwise provided) to its owner's fractional
interest in any common areas;
For the subordination of the liens securing such assessments to other lien either generally or specifically
described;
For conditions, other than those provided for in Section 8 and 13 of this Act, upon which partition of the
project and dissolution of the condominium corporation may be made. Such right to partition or dissolution
may be conditioned upon failure of the condominium owners to rebuild within a certain period or upon
specified percentage of damage to the building, or upon a decision of an arbitration, or upon any other
reasonable condition.

CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION
(SECTION 10)
Shall be limited to the holding of the common areas; either the ownership of any other interest in real
property recognized by the law, to the management of the project, and to such other purposes as maybe
necessary, incidental or convenient to the accomplishment of said purposes
The articles of incorporation or by laws of the corporation shall not contain any provision contrary to or
inconsistent with the provision of this Act, the enabling or master deed, or the declaration of restrictions of
the project, membership in a condominium corporation regarding of whether it is stock or non-stock
corporation, shall not be transferable separately from the condominium unit of which it is an appurtenance
When a member or a stockholder ceases to own a unit in the project in which the condominium
corporation owns or holds the common area, he shall automatically cease to be a member or stockholder of

the condominium corporation.

The registration and regulation of a condominium corporation shall be vested with the Housing And Land
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and the term of the said corporation shall be coterminous with the duration
of the subdivision projects, the provision of the corporation law to the contrary notwithstanding.
Unless otherwise provided for by the declaration of restrictions, the management body, provided for
herein, may acquire and hold, for the benefit of the condominium owners, tangible personal property and
may dispose of the same by sale or otherwise, and the beneficial interest in such personal property shall be
owned by the condominium owners in the same proportion as their respective interests in the common
areas. A transfer of a condominium shall transfer to the transferee ownership of the transferor's beneficial
interest in such personal property. (Section
22)

SI V. CA
342 SCRA 653
FACTS:
Escolastica conveyed a parcel of land to her three sons. This is evidenced by three deeds of sale. One of the
sons then sold a part of the land to spouses Si. Jose and his wife then sought to annul the sale alleging the
co-ownership over the land.

HELD:
After the physical division of the lot among the co-owners, the community ownership is terminated, and the
right of preemption or redemption for each other was no longer available. There is no co-ownership when the
different portions owned by the different people are already concretely determined and separately

identifiable, even if not yet technically

described.

CO-OWNERSHIP
Art. 484. There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to
different persons. In default of contracts, or of special provisions, co-ownership shall be governed
by the provisions of this Title. (392)

CO-OWNERSHIP
State where an undivided thing or right belongs to two or more persons
Right of common dominion which 2 or more persons have over a spiritual, ideal part of a thing which is not
physically divided

SOURCES OF CO-OWNERSHIP
1. By law
2. By contract
3. By chance
4. By occupation or occupancy
5. By succession or will

CHARACTERISTICS OF CO-OWNERSHIP
There must be more than one subject or owner
There is one physical whole divioded into ideal shares
Each ideal share is definite in amount but is not physically segregated from the rest
Regarding the physical whole, each co-owner must respect each other in the common use, enjoyment, or
preservation of the physical whole
Regarding the ideal share, each co-owner holds almost absolute control over the same
It is not a juridical person
There is no mutual agency

 There is no extinguishment upon the death of any co-owner

A co-owner is in a sense a trustee for the other co-owners
Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges, shall be proportional to their
respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the contrary shall be void. The portions belonging to the
co-owners in the co-ownership shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved. (393a)

SHARES IN BENEFITS OR CHARGES

Share is proportional to the interest of each
Contrary stipulation is void
Each co-owner shares proportionately in the accretion or alluvium of the property
Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so in accordance with the
purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent
the other co-owners from using it according to their rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may be
changed by agreement, express or implied. (394a)

EACH CO-OWNER HAS THE RIGHT TO USE THE

PROPERTY FOR THE PURPOSE INTENDED
The interest of the co-ownership must be impaired or prejudiced
And the co-owners must not be prevented from using it
Art. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. (n)
Art. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners to contribute to the expenses of
preservation of the thing or right owned in common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt
himself from this obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as may be equivalent to his
share of the expenses and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the co-ownership.
(395a)

EXPENSES FOR PRESERVATION

A co-owner has a right to compel the others to share in the expenses of preservation, even if incurred
without prior
notification to them but he must notify if practicable
Covers only necessary expenses

A CO-OWNER MAY EXEMPT HIMSELF

 By renouncing so much of his undivided share as may be equivalent to the share of the expenses and
taxes
Art. 489. Repairs for preservation may be made at the will of one of the co-owners, but he must, if
practicable, first notify his co-owners of the necessity for such repairs. Expenses to improve or embellish the
thing shall be decided upon by a majority as determined in Article 492. (n)

CONSENT REQUIREMENTS
1. ACTS OF PRESERVATIONno consent requirement
2. ACTS OF ADMINISTRATIONfinancial majority
3. ACTS OF ALTERATIONall must consent
Art. 490. Whenever the different stories of a house belong to different owners, if the titles of
ownership do not specify the terms under which they should contribute to the necessary expenses
and there exists no agreement on the subject, the following rules shall be observed:
(1) The main and party walls, the roof and the other things used in common, shall be preserved at the
expense of all the
owners in proportion to the value of the story belonging to each;
(2) Each owner shall bear the cost of maintaining the floor of his story; the floor of the entrance, front door,
common yard and sanitary works common to all, shall be maintained at the expense of all the owners pro
rata;
(3) The stairs from the entrance to the first story shall be
maintained at the expense of all the owners pro rata, with the
exception of the owner of the ground floor; the stairs from the first
to the second story shall be preserved at the expense of all, except
the owner of the ground floor and the owner of the first story; and
so on successively. (396)
PERPENDICULAR OWNERSHIP
Different stories belong to different owners
Art. 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the
others, make alterations in the thing owned in common, even
though benefits for all would result therefrom. However, if the
withholding of the consent by one or more of the co-owners is
clearly prejudicial to the common interest, the courts may afford
adequate relief. (397a)
ALTERATIONS
1. Change which is more or less permanent
2. Which changes the use of the thing
3. Which prejudices the condition of the thing or its enjoyment by

others
Art. 492. For the administration and better enjoyment of the thing
owned in common, the resolutions of the majority of the co-owners
shall be binding.
There shall be no majority unless the resolution is approved by the
co-owners who represent the controlling interest in the object of
the co-ownership.
Should there be no majority, or should the resolution of the
majority be seriously prejudicial to those interested in the property
owned in common, the court, at the instance of an interested party,
shall order such measures as it may deem proper, including the
appointment of an administrator.
Whenever a part of the thing belongs exclusively to one of the coowners,
and the remainder is owned in common, the preceding
provision shall apply only to the part owned in common. (398)
NOTE: An act of administration pertains to management and useful
expenses
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part
and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may
therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may
be alloted to him in the division upon the termination of the coownership.
(399)
RIGHT WITH RESPECT TO THE IDEAL OR PROPORTIONATE SHARE
Deals nto with the right to the whole property but only with the
right to the IDEAL or metaphysical share of each co-owner
RULES REGARDING THE IDEAL SHARE
1. Each co-owner must have full ownership of his part and his share
of the fruits and benefits
2. He may alienate, assign or mortgage his ideal share but of course
without prejudice to the exercise of the others of their right of
legal redemption
3. He may even substitute another person for the enjoyment except
when personal rights are involved
4. He may exempt himself from necessary expenses and taxes by
renouncing part of his interest in the co-ownership
Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the coownership.
Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of
the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a

certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This
term may be extended by a new agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall
not exceed twenty years.
Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against
his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership. (400a)
WHEN A CO-OWNER MAY NOT SUCCESSFULLY DEMAND A
PARTITION
1. If by agreement, for a period not exceeding 10 years, partition is
prohibited
2. When partition is prohibited by the donor or testator, for a period
not exceeding 20 years
3. When partition is prohibited by law
4. When a physical partition would render the property unserviceable
but in this case, the property may be allotted to one of the coowners
5. When the legal nature of the common property doesn't allow
partition
PROHIBITION TO PARTITION BECAUSE OF AN AGREEMENT
1. Period must not extend more than 10 years
2. If it exceeds 10 years, the stipulation is valid insofar as the first
10 years is concerned
3. There can be an extension but only after the original period has
ended
4. After the first extension, there can be another, and so on
indefinitely, as long as for each extension, the period of 10 years
is not exceeded
PRESCRIPTION IN FAVOR OF A CO-OWNER AGAINST THE OTHER
CO-OWNERS
1. Clear and unequivocal act of repudiation of the co-ownership
2. Act of repudiation must be made known
3. Clear and convincing evidence
4. Other requirements of prescriptionopen, continuous, exclusive,
notorious, adverse, public possession in the concept of owner
Art. 495. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding article,
the co-owners cannot demand a physical division of the thing
owned in common, when to do so would render it unserviceable for
the use for which it is intended. But the co-ownership may be
terminated in accordance with Article 498. (401a)
Art. 496. Partition may be made by agreement between the parties
or by judicial proceedings. Partition shall be governed by the Rules
of Court insofar as they are consistent with this Code. (402)

PARTITION MAY BE MADE EXTRAJUDICIALLY OR JUDICIALLY. IF

THERE IS NO AGREEMENT, ONE CAN FILE FOR PARTITION. THE
COURT WILL ASCERTAIN THE FOLLOWING:
1. Is there co-ownership?
2. Are they the co-owners?
3. What are their respective shares?
4. What would be the allocation?
Art. 497. The creditors or assignees of the co-owners may take part
in the division of the thing owned in common and object to its
being effected without their concurrence. But they cannot impugn
any partition already executed, unless there has been fraud, or in
case it was made notwithstanding a formal opposition presented to
prevent it, without prejudice to the right of the debtor or assignor
to maintain its validity. (403)
Art. 498. Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the coowners
cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall
indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds distributed.
(404)
JURIDICAL DISSOLUTION
1. First, give the whole to one of the co-owners who will now be
required to indemnify the rest
2. If this is not agreed upon, there must be a sale
Art. 499. The partition of a thing owned in common shall not
prejudice third persons, who shall retain the rights of mortgage,
servitude or any other real rights belonging to them before thedivision was made. Personal rights pertaining
to third persons
against the co-ownership shall also remain in force,
notwithstanding the partition. (405)
Art. 500. Upon partition, there shall be a mutual accounting for
benefits received and reimbursements for expenses made.
Likewise, each co-owner shall pay for damages caused by reason of
his negligence or fraud. (n)
EFFECTS OF PARTITION
1. Mutual accounting for benefits
2. Mutual reimbursement for expenses
3. Indemnity for damages in case of negligence or fraud
4. Reciprocal warranty for defects of title or quality
5. Each former co-owner is deemed to have had exclusive possession
of his part allotted to him for the entire period during which the
co-possession lasted
Art. 501. Every co-owner shall, after partition, be liable for defects
of title and quality of the portion assigned to each of the other coowners.
(n)

Art. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of

redemption in case the shares of all the other co-owners or of any
of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is
grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable
one.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of
redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the share they
may respectively have in the thing owned in common. (1522a)
Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be
exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by
the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The
deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property,
unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given
written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining
owners. (1524a)
Art. 1647. If a lease is to be recorded in the Registry of Property,
the following persons cannot constitute the same without proper
authority: the husband with respect to the wife's paraphernal real
estate, the father or guardian as to the property of the minor or
ward, and the manager without special power. (1548a)
Art. 1648. Every lease of real estate may be recorded in the
Registry of Property. Unless a lease is recorded, it shall not be
binding upon third persons. (1549a)
Art. 1878. Special powers of attorney are necessary in the
following cases:
(1) To make such payments as are not usually considered as
acts of administration;
(2) To effect novations which put an end to obligations already
in existence at the time the agency was constituted;
(3) To compromise, to submit questions to arbitration, to
renounce the right to appeal from a judgment, to waive objections
to the venue of an action or to abandon a prescription already
acquired;
(4) To waive any obligation gratuitously;
(5) To enter into any contract by which the ownership of an
immovable is transmitted or acquired either gratuitously or for a
valuable consideration;
(6) To make gifts, except customary ones for charity or those
made to employees in the business managed by the agent;
(7) To loan or borrow money, unless the latter act be urgent
and indispensable for the preservation of the things which are
under administration;

(8) To lease any real property to another person for more than
one year;
(9) To bind the principal to render some service without
compensation;
(10) To bind the principal in a contract of partnership;
(11) To obligate the principal as a guarantor or surety;
(12) To create or convey real rights over immovable property;
(13) To accept or repudiate an inheritance;
(14) To ratify or recognize obligations contracted before the
agency;
(15) Any other act of strict dominion. (n)

GAPACAN V. OMIPET
387 SCRA 383
FACTS:
Gapacan was the primitive possessor of a parcel of land. He declared the land for taxation purposes. He had
2 children. His son tried his luck in the mines and his sister was left to take care of the father. Later, when the
son returned, he executed an affidavit of transfer of real property, allegedly thumbmarked by his sisters
husband. Since then, his family cultivated the property. When his sister tried to cultivate the land, an action
for forcible entry was filed against her.

HELD:
An action to quiet title may be brought when there exists a cloud on the title to real property or any interest
therein.

ROBLES V. CA
328 SCRA 97
FACTS:
An action for quieting of title was filed by petitioner against Santos. The subject land was inherited from their
father. Their brother was able to mortgage the land and upon failure to pay, the REM was foreclosed. They
later knew about the REM and foreclosure and subsequent sale to Santos.

HELD:
A co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of other co-owners absent any clear indication of
repudiation of co-ownership. An action to quiet title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud or
doubt or uncertainty on the title to real property.

METROPOLITAN BANK V. ALEJO

364 SCRA 812
FACTS:
There is an existing action to nullify the TCT of the spouses. During the pendency, they obtained from the
bank a loan secured by a REM over the subject land. Upon their failure to pay, the REM was foreclosed.
Upon the registration, the bank was informed of the decision to declare the TCT null and void.

HELD:
A cloud on title is a semblance of title which appears in some legal form but which is in fact unfounded. In
this case, the judgment cannot be considered as a cloud on petitioners title or interest over the real property
covered by the TCT, which doesn't even have a semblance of being a title.

SPOUSES BENITO V. SAQUITANRUIZ

394 SCRA 250
FACTS:
The spouses sold to Ruiz a parcel of land but upon repeated demands, they failed to deliver the land. It was
known that they had the land subdivided into portions to the prejudice of Ruiz. This prompted Ruiz to file a
complaint for specific performance and declaration of nullity with damages.

HELD:
If a person claiming to be the owner of a wrongfully registered parcel of land is in actual possession, the right
to seek reconveyance doesn't prescribe. A petition for quieting of title although essentially an action for
reconveyance, should not be dismissed on the ground of prescription, if it is alleged that the plaintiff is in
possession of the property.

NAKPIL AND SONS V. CA

144 SCRA 596
FACTS:

PBA commissioned petitioner to construct building. In a very strong earthquake, severe damage was
suffered by the building. PBA sued for damages. Expert witness attested that the building was constructed
and planned defectively.

HELD:
One who negligently creates a dangerous condition cannot escape liability for the natural and probable
consequences thereof, although the act of a third person, or an act of God for which he is not responsible,
intervenes to precipitate the loss. As already discussed, the destruction was not purely an act of God. Truth
to tell hundreds of ancient buildings in the vicinity were hardly affected by the earthquake. Only one thing
spells out the fatal difference; gross negligence and evident bad faith, without which the damage would not
have occurred. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED and considering the special
and environmental circumstances of this case, We deem it reasonable to render a decision imposing, as We
do hereby impose, upon the defendant and the third-party defendants (with the exception of Roman Ozaeta)
a solidary (Art. 1723, Civil Code, Supra, p. 10) indemnity in favor of the Philippine Bar Association of FIVE
MILLION (P5,000,000.00) Pesos to cover all damages (with the exception of attorney's fees) occasioned by
the loss of the building (including interest charges and lost rentals) and an additional ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P100,000.00) Pesos as and for attorney's fees, the total sum being payable upon the finality of
this decision. Upon failure to pay on such finality, twelve (12%) per cent interest per annum shall be imposed
upon afore-mentioned amounts from finality until paid. Solidary costs against the defendant and third-party
defendants (except Roman Ozaeta).

OBLEA V. CA
244 SCRA 101
FACTS:
Melencios and Wicos co-owned a parcel of land. This was allegedly bought by Esteban from a certain
Ramos, the alleged administratix of Melencio and Pura Melencios estate. Oblea was leasing then a building

on the subject lot and eventually bought it from Estebans son. Esteban then filed an ejectment case to which
he won. The registered owners then sold
the land to Oblea and they instituted an action for quieting of title against Esteban.

HELD:
An action for quieting of title before the RTC doesn't divest the MTC of its jurisdiction to hear the case
for ejectment.Further, the subsequent acquisition of ownership of the property is not a supervening event
that will bar the execution of the judgment in a case of unlawful detainer.

GALLAR V. HUSSAIN
20 SCRA 186
FACTS:
Teodoro sold to Chichirita with right to repurchase. Former failed to repuchase the property but
the same was purchased by his sister. Thereafter, Graciana transferred her rights to Gallar in exchange
of a cow.

HELD:
This action is not for specific performance but to quiet title, to remove the cloud cast on appellees
ownership as a result of appellants refusal to recognize the sale made by their predecessor.
as the plaintiff is in possession, the action is imprescriptible.

And

VDA DE AVILES V. CA
264 SCRA 473
FACTS:
Aviles was the owner of this parcel of land and was in actual possession. Carlos, with the intent of creating
a color of title over the land, constructed bamboo fences and moved the earthen dikes. This prompted the
owner to file an action for quieting of title.

HELD:
Boundary disputes are not cognizable in a special civil action to quiet title.

SAPTO V. FABIANA
103 PHIL 683
FACTS:

Sapto brothers sold to Fabiana a parcel of land. This parcel was inherited from their father. The
possession was then transferred to Fabiana and remained to possess when widow and children of
Samuel filed an action to recover the land.

HELD:
An action to quiet title doesn't prescribe when the land is in possession of the plaintiff.

TITONG V. CA
287 SCRA 102
FACTS:
Titong filed an action for quieting of title over a 20000 hectare parcel of land. The land was
adjudged in favor of respondents Lacerio.

HELD:
The ground or reason for filing a complaint for quieting of title must be an instrument, record, claim or
encumbrance or proceeding.

PINGOL V. CA
226 SCRA 118
FACTS:
Pingol owned a parcel of land, half of its undivided portion he sold Donasco. Later, the land was
separated from the mother lot. Donasco died, leaving a large unpaid balance for the land. The heirs
filed an action for specific performance. Pingol then was asking for a larger amount and didn't want to
accept payment of balance.

HELD:
Although the complaint filed was an action for specific performance, it was actually an action to quiet title. A
cloud has been cast on the title. Despite the fact that title has been conferred to them through the
sale, the petitioners refused to receive the tender of payment being made by them.

RUINOUS BUILDINGS AND

TREES IN DANGER OF FALLING
Art. 482. If a building, wall, column, or any other construction is in danger of falling, the owner
shall be obliged to demolish it or to execute the necessary work in order to prevent it from
falling.
If the proprietor does not comply with this obligation, the administrative authorities
may order the demolition of the structure at the expense of the owner, or take measures to
insure public safety. (389a)
Art. 483. Whenever a large tree threatens to fall in such a way as to cause damage to the land or
tenement of another or to travelers over a public or private road, the owner of the tree shall be
obliged to fell and remove it; and should he not do so, it shall be done at his expense by order of the
administrative authorities. (390a)
Art. 1723. The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications for a building
is liable for damages if within fifteen years from the completion of the structure, the same
should collapse by reason of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due to the defects in
the ground. The contractor is likewise responsible for the damages if the edifice falls, within
the same period, on account of defects in the construction or the use of materials of inferior
quality furnished by him, or due to any violation of the terms of the contract. If the engineer or
architect supervises the construction, he shall be solidarily liable with the contractor.
Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any of the cause of action by
reason of any defect mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

The action must be brought within ten years following the collapse of the building. (n)

ENUMERATION OF LIABILITIES
1. Engineer or architect
a. Liable for damages if within a PERIOD OF 15 YEARS FROM THE COMPLETION OF THE
STRUCTURE, the same should collapse by reason of a defect in those plans and specifications or due to

the defects of the ground

b. Shall be solidarily liable for defects that may arise during construction if they supervised the same
2. Contractor
a. Shall be liable for the same period on account of defects in the construction or the use of materials
of inferior
quality furnished by him, or due to violations of the terms of the contract
NOTES:
Acceptance of the building doesn't constitute a waiver of any cause of action by reason of any
defect mentioned in the preceding paragraph
Action must be brought within 10 years following the collapse of the building

SANTOS V. BERNABE
54 PHIL 19
FACTS:
Both Santos and Tiongson deposited in defendants warehouse palay with the same grade and quality.
Their palay didn't have markings to distinguish it from one another. Tiongson then filed a
complaint against defendant. A writ of attachment was then issued which included palay that was owned by
Santos.

HELD:
There are no means to distinguish the palay owned by Santos and Tiongson. This being the
case, each owner shall acquire a right in the mixture proportionate to the part belonging to him,
according to the value of the things mixed or commingled

QUIETING OF TITLE
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of
any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or
effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and
may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any interest
therein.

TWO ACTIONS ARE BEING REFERRED TO IN THESE

PROVISIONS
1.
2.

REMEDIALaction to remove cloud or to quiet title

PREVENTIVEaction to prevent a future cloud or doubt

EXISTENCE OF A CLOUD
The cloud on title exists because
1. Of an instrument or record or claim or encumberance or proceeding
2. Which is apparently valid or effective
3. But is in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceable or extinguished or barred
by extinctive prescription
4. And may be prejudicial to the title

RIGHT OF A PROPERTY OWNER TO HAVE CLOUDS

ELIMINATED
1. That their respective rights be determined
2. Not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said
immovable respect and not disturb the other
3. But also for the benefit of both
4. So that he who has a right would see every cloud of doubt over the property displaced
5. And he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use and even
to abuse the property as he deems best

REASONS FOR ALLOWING THE ACTION

1.
2.
3.

The prevention of litigation

The protection of the true title and possession
The promotion of right and justice

N.B: the nature of the action for quieting of title is an action in personam

DOES AN ACTION FOR QUIETING OF TITLE PRESCRIBE?

It depends
1. If the plaintiff is in possession of the property, the action doesn't prescribe
2. If the plaintiff is not in possession of the property, the action may prescribe. The period would be either
10 or 30 years. It may also be barred by laches.
Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property
which is the subject matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said property.

NECESSARY FOR TITLE OF PLAINTIFF

Plaintiff must have either equitable or legal ownership over the property

Art. 478. There may also be an action to quiet title or remove a cloud therefrom when the
contract, instrument or other obligation has been extinguished or has terminated, or has been
barred by extinctive prescription.

Art. 479. The plaintiff must return to the defendant all benefits he may have received from the latter,
or reimburse him for expenses that may have redounded to the plaintiff's benefit.
N.B: General rule based on equity

Art. 480. The principles of the general law on the quieting of title are hereby adopted insofar as
they are not in conflict with this Code.
Art. 481. The procedure for the quieting of title or the removal of a cloud therefrom shall be
governed by such rules of court as the Supreme Court shall promulgated.

RIGHT OF ACCESSION WITH

RESPECT TO MOVABLE
PROPERTY
Art. 466. Whenever two movable things belonging to different owners are, without bad faith,
united in such a way that they form a single object, the owner of the principal thing acquires
the accessory, indemnifying the former owner thereof for its value. (375)

ADJUNCTION
Process by virtue of which 2 movable things belonging to different owners are united in such a way that
they form a single object

DIFFERENT KINDS OF ADJUNCTION

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Inclusion/engraftment
Soldadura/soldering
Escritura/writing
Pintura/painting
Weaving/tejido

Art. 467. The principal thing, as between two things incorporated, is deemed to be that to which
the other has been united as an ornament, or for its use or perfection. (376)
Art. 468. If it cannot be determined by the rule given in the preceding article which of the
two things incorporated is the principal one, the thing of the greater value shall be so considered,
and as between two things of equal value, that of the greater volume.
In painting and sculpture, writings, printed matter, engraving and lithographs, the board, metal,
stone, canvas, paper or parchment shall be deemed the accessory thing. (377)

TEST TO DETERMINE WHICH IS THE PRINCIPAL AND

WHICH IS THE ACCESSORY
1.
2.
3.
4.

That to which the other has been united as an ornament, or for its use, or perfection
That of greater value
That of greater volume
That which has greater merits

SPECIAL RULE
In painting and sculpture, writings, printed matter, engraving and lithographs, the board, metal, stone,
canvas, paper or parchment shall be deemed the accessory thing. (377)

IF THE ADJUNCTION CONCERNS THREE OR MORE THINGS

Determine which really is the principal

All the rest should be considered as accessories

Art. 469. Whenever the things united can be separated without injury, their respective owners
may demand their separation.

Nevertheless, in case the thing united for the use, embellishment or perfection of the other, is
much more precious than the principal thing, the owner of the former may demand its
separation, even though the thing to which it has been incorporated may suffer some injury.
(378)

RULE WHERE THERE CAN BE SEPARATION WITHOUT INJURY

There is no real adjunction
In the second paragraph, if the accessory is much more precious than the principal, then there can be
removal although with injury
Art. 470. Whenever the owner of the accessory thing has made the incorporation in bad faith, he
shall lose the thing incorporated and shall have the obligation to indemnify the owner of the
principal thing for the damages he may have suffered.
If the one who has acted in bad faith is the owner of the principal thing, the owner of the accessory
thing shall have a right to choose between the former paying him its value or that the thing
belonging to him be separated, even though for this purpose it be necessary to destroy the
principal thing; and in both cases, furthermore, there shall be indemnity for damages.
If either one of the owners has made the incorporation with the knowledge and without the
objection of the other, their respective rights shall be determined as though both acted in good
faith. (379a)
Art. 471. Whenever the owner of the material employed without his consent has a right to an
indemnity, he may demand that this consist in the delivery of a thing equal in kind and value, and
in all other respects, to that employed, or else in the price thereof, according to expert
appraisal. (380)

HOW INDEMNITY IS PAID

Either by delivery of the thing equal in kind and value OR

Payment of price as appraised by experts
This rule is applicable if there was no consent of the owner

Art. 472. If by the will of their owners two things of the same or different kinds are mixed, or if the
mixture occurs by chance, and in the latter case the things are not separable without injury,
each owner shall acquire a right proportional to the part belonging to him, bearing in mind
the value of the things mixed or confused. (381)

Art. 473. If by the will of only one owner, but in good faith, two things of the same or
different kinds are mixed or confused, the rights of the owners shall be determined by the
provisions of the preceding article.
If the one who caused the mixture or confusion acted in bad faith, he shall lose the thing
belonging to him thus mixed or confused, besides being obliged to pay indemnity for the
damages caused to the owner of the other thing with which his own was mixed. (382)
Art. 474. One who in good faith employs the material of another in whole or in part in order to make a
thing of a different kind, shall appropriate the thing thus transformed as his own, indemnifying
the owner of the material for its value.
If the material is more precious than the transformed thing or is of more value, its owner may, at his
option, appropriate the new thing to himself, after first paying indemnity for the value of the work, or
demand indemnity for the material.
If in the making of the thing bad faith intervened, the owner of the material shall have the right to
appropriate the work to himself without paying anything to the maker, or to demand of the latter
that he indemnify him for the value of the material and the damages he may have suffered.
However, the owner of the material cannot appropriate the work in case the value of the
latter, for artistic or scientific reasons, is considerably more than
that of the material. (383a)
Art. 475. In the preceding articles, sentimental value shall be duly appreciated. (n)

VIAJAR V. CA
168 SCRA 405
FACTS:

Spouses Ladrido were owners of a registered land. Spouses Teh were also owners of a registered land.
The latter sold the land to Viajar. During a relocation survey, it was found out that the land was being
occupied by Ladrido. It was found out also that the 2 parcels of land were separated by the riverone
portion was being possessed by the defendant together with the old river bed.

HELD:
Registration under the Torrens system doesn't protect the riparian owner against the dimunition of
the area of his registered land through gradual changes in the course of an adjoining stream.

AGUSTIN V. IAC
187 SCRA 218

FACTS:
Cagayan River separates Solana on the west and Tuguegarao on the east. Agustin was the owner of the
eastern lot while the western lot was owned by the private respondent. Through the years, the Cagayan river
eroded the eastern portion depositing the alluvion to the western portion. After a big flood, the river cut
through the lot of private respondent, whose lands were transferred to the eastern lot. The private
respondent tried to cultivate but they were stopped by the men of Agustin.

HELD:
Accretion belongs to the riparian owners upon whose lands the alluvial deposits were made.

BINALAY V. MANALO
195 SCRA 374
FACTS:
Judge Taccad owned a parcel of landon the west, bordering on the Cagayan River, on the east, the
national road. The western portion would occasionally go under the waters and reappear during the
dry season. Manalo purchased the land. A relocation survey was conducted during the rainy season, so
the survey didn't cover the submerged land. The sketch would show that the river branches through the
west and east, leaving a strip of land. The land was then surveyed into two 2 lots. One of these is being
claimed by Manalo through accretion.

HELD:

According to the Law of Waters, the natural bed or channel of a creek or river is the ground covered by its
waters during the highest floods.
This being the case, the subject land couldn't have been sold to Manalo, being part of the public
domain.

REPUBLIC V. CA
131 SCRA 532
FACTS:
Subject land was 20 meters away from the shores of Laguna de Bay. It was owned by Benedicto del
Rio. After his death, it was acquired by Santos del Rio. Private oppositors sought permission
and obtained the same to construct duck houses. They violated agreement by constructing residential
houses. Santos then sought to register the land which was opposed. The oppositors was able to
obtain sales application on the land. The director of Lands alleged that since a portion of the land is
submerged in water 4 to 5 months, then it forms part of the public domain.

HELD:
According to the Law of Waters, the natural bed or basin of lakes, ponds, or pools is the covered by their
waters when at their highest ordinary depthregular, common, natural, which occurs almost or most of
the time during the year.
Laguna de Bay is a lake and that part around it which becomes covered with water 4 to 5 months a
year, not due to tidal action, but due to rains cannot be considered as part of the bed or basin of Laguna de
Bay nor as a foreshore land. Property not being so, the land is registrable.

HEIRS OF NAVARRO V. IAC

268 SCRA 74
FACTS:
Pascual filed an application for lease of a foreshore land. Such was denied. Navarro then sought
approval for fishpond application which was consequently approved. Pascual then later sought
registration of land, he claims to be from accretion. His application was denied for land sought to be
registered is public domain.

HELD:
Accretion through the action of the sea forms part of the public domain.

GRANDE V. CA
5 SCRA 524
FACTS:
Petitioners were the registered owners of a parcel of land with the Cagayan River at the NE boundary.
Petitioners instituted then an action for quieting of title against respondents over the alluvium in the NE
boundary.

HELD:
The alluvium is not automatically registered.

REYNANTE V. CA
207 SCRA 794
FACTS:
Petitioner was the tenant over a fishpond. During his tenancy, he constructed a nipa hut and took
care of the sasahan. This parcel of land was located between the fishpond and Meycauyan river. After the
death of the original landlord, heirs made petitioner sign an agreement surrendering the fishpond for
consideration. when he was being asked to leave consequently, he refused to do so.

HELD:
Failure to register the acquired alluvial deposit subjects it to ownership by acquisitive prescription.

RONQUILLO V. CA
195 SCRA 433
FACTS:
Plaintiff owned a titled lot adjacent to a dried up land of Estero Calubcub. Roldan occupied the titled lot.
After a relocation survey, it was found out that petitioner was occupying a portion of land and the
dried up land of Estero Calubcub.

HELD:

The rules on alluviun don't apply to man-made or artificial accretions, nor to accretions to lands that
adjoin canals or esteros or artificial drainage systems.

BAES V. CA
224 SCRA 562
FACTS:
A parcel of land was dug by the government for the construction of a canal to streamline the river. Baes
eventually bought the land, which was subdivided into 3 parcels. The middle parcel covered the
canal. The government gave him another equivalent parcel as compensation. After resurvey, it was
discovered that there were errors. New TCTs were issued to represent the enlargements. Government
opposed as the lots were allegedly unlawfully enlarged. Baes averred that he should own dried up land
as the creek was discovered to the canal in his property.

HELD:
If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the damage to or loss of his property due to natural
causes, all the more reason to compensate him when the change in the course of river is effected
through artificial means.

BALLATAN V. CA
304 SCRA 34
FACTS:
Petitioner constructed a house and found out that Go was encroaching on her land. A relocation survey
was then conducted and it was found out that her total land area was decreased while the land of Yao
increased.

HELD:
Where a person had no knowledge that he encroached on his neighbors lot, he is deemed a
builder in good faith until the time the latter is informed of his encroachment upon the latters property.

GEMINIANO V. CA
259 SCRA 344
FACTS:
Petitioners mom owned a parcel of land. A bungalow was constructed on a portion of it. She sold the land
to Nicholas, promising that she would also sell the land wherein the bungalow was constructed on. The
mother then leased the land, including the house.
Nicholas then introduced improvements. The
lease was terminated and not renewed.

HELD:
While the right to let property is an incident to the title and possession, a person may be a lessor and occupy
the position of landlord to his tenant although he is not the owner of the premises let.
The private respondents may not be considered as builders or possessors in good faith. They knew that
their possession is only within the life of the lease. Consequently, they are not entitled to any indemnity.

SPOUSES DEL CAMPO V. OBESIA

160 SCRA 379
FACTS:

An action of partition was filed by the plaintiffs. Together with the defendants, they were owners
pro-indiviso of a parcel of land. In the survey conducted by the trial court it was found that the
defendants house encroached on the lot of plaintiff.

HELD:
When a co-ownership is terminated by the partition and it was found that the house of defendants
overlaps a portion of land of plaintiffs, which defendants built in good faith, Article 448 can still be
applied.

MWSS V. CA
143 SCRA 623
FACTS:
The Dagupan City filed a case against petitioner for the recovery of ownership and possession
of the Dagupan Waterworks System. MWSS contended that through a law, it was vested ownership
over all waterworks systems.

HELD:
Possessor in bad faith is not entitled to the removal of useful improvements.

ACCESSION NATURAL
Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. (336)

FORMS OF ACCESSION NATURAL

1.
2.
3.
4.

Alluvium
Avulsion
Change of course of rivers
Formation of islands

ALLUVIUM
The soil deposited or added to the lands adjoining the banks of rivers, and gradually received
as an effect of the current of the waters

ACCRETION

Process by which the soil is deposited

A broader term than alluvium

REQUISITES OF ALLUVIUM
1.
2.
a.
3.
4.

The deposit should be gradual and imperceptible

Cause is the current of river
Cannot be done artificially or man-made causes
That the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of river
The owner of the adjacent lot will own the increase

REASONS WHY ALLUVIUM IS GRANTED THE RIPARIAN OWNER

1. To compensate him for the loss he may suffer
2. To compensate him because the property is subject to encumbrances and legal easements
3. The interests of agriculture require that the soil be given to the person who is in the best position
to cultivate the same
4. Since after all, it cannot be said with certainty from whom the soil came

ACCRETION ON THE BANK OF A LAKE AND ON THE BANK OF AN

ISLAND FORMED IN A NON-NAVIGABLE RIVER

Belong to the owners of the estate to which they have been added

ACCRETION ON A SEA BANK

Still belongs to the public domain

EFFECT OF PUBLIC SERVICE CONSTRUCTIONS OR EASEMENTS ON

RIVER BANKS
Public service constructionthe owner of the land is no longer the riparian owner and the government
which will own the accretion
Easement for the benefit of navigation, floatage, fishing or salvageright still subsists because
in easements, the owner of the serviant estate doesn't lose his ownership over the portion
occupied
NOTE:
1. Loss of alluvium not affected by registration under the Land Registration Act
2. Registered land is not protected from the process of accretion

THE ALLUVIAL DEPOSIT ISNT AUTOMATICALLY REGISTERED UNDER

THE TORRENS SYSTEM

The alluvial deposit may still be lost through acquisitive prescription

Remember the source of ownership is law

Art. 458. The owners of estates adjoining ponds or lagoons do not acquire the land left dry by the
natural decrease of the waters, or lose that inundated by them in extraordinary floods. (367)

POND
A body of stagnant water without an outlet, larger than a puddle and smaller than a lake, or a like body
of water with a small outlet

LAGOON
A small lake, ordinarily of fresh water, and not very deep, fed by floods, the hollow bed of which is
bounded by the elevations of the land

LAKE
A body of water formed by the depressions of the earth, ordinarily fresh water, coming from rivers,
brooks, or springs, and connected with the sea by them
Art. 459. Whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent segregates from an estate on its bank
a known portion of land and transfers it to another estate, the owner of the land to which the
segregated portion belonged retains the ownership of it, provided that he removes the same within
two years. (368a)

AVULSION
The process whereby the current of a river, creek, or torrent segregates from an estate on its
bank a known portion of land and transfers it to another estate
The removal of a considerable quantity of earth upon or annexation to the land of
another, suddenly, and by the perceptible action of the water

REQUISITES OF AVULSION
1. Sudden and violent
2. Land is identifiable and known
3. Owner of the land where the land was detached retains ownershipsubject to remove land
within 2 years
N.B: it doesn't matter if it adds or lands on top. It also doesn't matter if there were trees attached to the
detached land.

RIVER
A natural stream of water, of greater volume than a creek or rivulet flowing, in a more or less
permanent bed or channel, between defined banks or walls with a current which may either be
continuous in one direction or affected by the ebb and flow of the tide

CREEK

A small stream less than a river

TORRENT

Violent, rushing or turbulent stream

Art. 460. Trees uprooted and carried away by the current of the waters belong to the owner
of the land upon which they may be cast, if the owners do not claim them within six
months. If such owners claim them, they shall pay the expenses incurred in gathering them or
putting them in a safe place. (369a)
NOTE: The six-month period given in Article 460 should be considered only a condition precedent.
The recovery period must be made within the period for prescription.
Art. 461. River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the
waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in
proportion to the area lost. However, the owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall have the
right to acquire the same by paying the value thereof, which value shall not exceed the
value of the area occupied by the new bed. (370a)

REQUISITES FOR ARTICLE 461 TO APPLY

1. The change must be sudden in order that the old river bed may be identified
2. The changing of the course must be more or less permanent and not temporary overflooding of
anothers land
3. The change of the river bed must be a natural one caused by natural forces
4. There must be a definite abandonment by the government
5. The river must continue to exist, that is, it must not completely dry up or disappear

CHANGE IN THE COURSE OF RIVERS

1.
2.

Owner of new bed will own the old river bed

Adjacent owners has the right to acquire the old land

3. If new owners refuse to sell, their refusal would be contrary to lawthe adjacent owners have
a preemptive right over the old bed
a. In case of the government, it has the right to return the river to its former coursefollowing the Water
Code
Art. 462. Whenever a river, changing its course by natural causes, opens a new bed through a private
estate, this bed shall become of public dominion. (372a)

RULE IS NEW RIVER BED IS ON PRIVATE ESTATE

Even if the new bed is on private property the bed becomes property of public dominion, just as
the old bed had been of public dominion before the abandonment
Art. 463. Whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving a piece of land
or part thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains his ownership. He also retains it if a
portion of land is separated from the estate by the current. (374)

FORMATION OF ISLAND BY THE BRANCHING OFF OF A RIVER

1.
2.

May be isolated from the rest

Or may be separated from the rest

THREE PARTS OF A RIVER

1.
2.
3.

Water
River bed
River bank

Art. 464. Islands which may be formed on the seas within the jurisdiction of the Philippines, on
lakes, and on navigable or floatable rivers belong to the State. (371a)
Art. 465. Islands which through successive accumulation of alluvial deposits are formed in non-navigable
and non-floatable rivers, belong to the owners of the margins or banks nearest to each of them, or

to the owners of both margins if the island is in the middle of the river, in which case it shall be divided
longitudinally in halves. If a single island thus formed be more distant from one margin than from the
other, the owner of the nearer margin shall
be the sole owner thereof. (373a)

OWNERSHIP OF ISLANDS
1.
a.
b.
2.
3.
a.
b.

If formed on the sea

Within the territorial waters or maritime zone or jurisdiction of the PhilippinesSTATE
Outside the jurisdictionthe first country to occupy effectively
If formed on lakes, navigable or floatable riversSTATE
If formed on non-navigable or non-floatable rivers
If nearer in margin to one bank, owner of nearer margin is sole owner
If equidistant, the island shall be divided longitudinally in halves

NAVIGABLE OR FLOATABLE RIVER

If useful for floatage and commerce, whether the tides affect the water or not

RULE TO FOLLOW IF A NEW ISLAND IS FORMED BETWEEN THE

OLDER ISLAND AND THE BANK
The owner of the older island is the riparian owner and if the new island is nearer in margin the older
island, the owner of the older island should be considered also the owner of the new island.

DEPRA V. DUMLAO
136 SCRA 475
FACTS:

Dumlao owned a land adjacent to Depra. Upon his construction of a house, it encroached on the land of
Depra. An unlawful detainer case was filed against him. A case to quiet title was also instituted

wherein Depra was held to be the owner of the land.

HELD:
Res judicata doesn't apply wherein the first case was for ejectment and the other was for quieting of title.

MANOTOK REALITY V. TECSON

164 SCRA 587
FACTS:

Private respondent in an earlier dispute was held to be a builder in good faith and the petitioner was
adjudged to reimburse with PR having right of retention. He filed a motion to exercise option but was
opposed since the property were burned during a fire.

HELD:
An issuance of a writ of execution is proper even if private respondent was adjudged to a builder in good
faith or peculiar circumstances supervened. The option belongs to the landowner to begin with.

SARMIENTO V. AGANA
129 SCRA 122
FACTS:

Mother-in-law offered a lot for the construction of house by the spouses. Here comes Sarmiento,
alleging himself to be the owner of the land. The trial court ordered Sarmiento to exercise option and there
was failure to do so. The spouses then consigned the amount in court.

HELD:
The landowner cannot refuse both to appropriate or sell the land, and to compel the builder to
remove it from the land on which it is located. He is entitled to such demolition only when after having
chosen to sell the land, the other party fails to pay for the same.

SPOUSES BENITEZ V. CA
266 SCRA 242
FACTS:
Macapagal filed an action against petitioners for recovery of an encroached portion of lot they purchased.
Thereafter, they bought another lot adjacent to Macapagal. Upon a relocation survey, they discovered
part of it was being encroached by petitioners. Despite demands, the petitioners refused to vacate.

HELD:
Prior possession is not always a condition sine que non in ejectment.

TECHNOGAS PHIL. V. CA
268 SCRA 5
FACTS:
Technogas owned property with buildings and walls. Uy bought an adjacent property. There was
an agreement for Technogas to demolish the wall. Uy filed a complained but the case was
dismissed. This prompted him to dig a hole along the wall, which led to the partial collapse of the
wall. A case for malicious mischief was filed against Uy.

HELD:
1. Unless one is versed in the science of surveying, no one can determine the precise extent or
location of the property by merely examining his proper title.
2. The supervening awareness of the encroachment by petitioner doesn't militate against its right
to claim the status of builder in good faith.
3. Bad faith isnt imputable to a registered owner of a land when a part of his building encroaches upon a
builders land.

SPOUSES LUIS CRUZ V. SPOUSES ALEJANDRO

FERNANDO SR.
FACTS:
Spouses Cruz were the occupants of a front portion of a property. An accion publiciana was filed
against them by spouses Fernando, alleging that they are the rightful owners thereof and asking that
the Cruz spouses vacate the land and pay reasonable rent for the use thereof. The RTC ruled in
favor of the spouses Fernando.

HELD:
The absence of any formal deed of conveyance is a strong indication that the parties didnt intend immediate
transfer of ownership.
Petitioners dont have a superior right of ownership or possession to speak of. Their occupation of the
property was merely through the tolerance of the owners. Evidence on record shows that petitioners
and their predecessors were able to live and build their house on the property through the permission
and kindness of the previous owner. They have no title or at the very least, a contract of lease over the
property. Based as it is was on mere tolerance, petitioners possession could neither ripen into
ownership nor operate to bar any action by respondents to recover absolute possession thereof. A
person who occupies the land of another at the latters forebearance or permission without any contract
between them is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand.

ACCESSION DISCRETA
(RIGHT OF ACCESSION WITH RESPECT TO WHAT IS
PRODUCED BY PROPERTY)
Art. 441. To the owner belongs:
(1) The natural fruits;
(2) The industrial fruits;
(3) The civil fruits. (354)
Art. 442. Natural fruits are the spontaneous products of the soil, and the young and other

products of animals.
Industrial fruits are those produced by lands of any kind through cultivation or labor. Civil
fruits are the rents of buildings, the price of leases of lands and other property and the
amount of perpetual or life annuities or other similar income. (355a)

TECHNICAL MEANING OF FRUITS

The term natural, civil and industrial fruits as defined by the Code are highly technical, therefore,
when they are found in a final judgment, there can be no doubt as to their meaning

NATURAL FRUITS

The spontaneous products of the soil

The young and other products of animals

INDUSTRIAL FRUITS

Those produced by lands of any kind through cultivation or labor

YOUNG OF ANIMALS
The offspring of animals belong to the owner of the motherapplicable when the male and
female belong to different owners
This follows the maxim of pratus sequitor ventremthe offspring follows the dam or mother
Art. 443. He who receives the fruits has the obligation to pay the expenses made by a third
person in their production, gathering, and preservation. (356)

CHARACTERISTIC OF THE EXPENSES REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 443

They must have been used for production, gathering, or preservation, not for the improvement
of the property
They must have been necessary and not luxurious or excessive
Art. 444. Only such as are manifest or born are considered as natural or industrial fruits.
With respect to animals, it is sufficient that they are in the womb of the mother, although unborn.
(357)

RULES FOR CIVIL FRUITS AS DISTINGUISHED FROM NATURAL AND

INDUSTRIAL FRUITS
1. Civil fruits accrue daily and are therefore considered in the category of personal property; natural
and industrial fruits, while still growing, are real property
2. Civil fruits can be prorated while natural and industrial fruits cannot ordinarily

RIGHT OF ACCESSION WITH RESPECT TO REAL PROPERTY

(ACCESSION INDUSTRIAL)
Art. 445. Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another and the improvements or
repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the land, subject to the provisions of the
following articles. (358)
Art. 446. All works, sowing, and planting are presumed made by the owner and at his expense,
unless the contrary is proved. (359)
Art. 447. The owner of the land who makes thereon, personally or through another, plantings,
constructions or works with the materials of another, shall pay their value; and, if he acted in
bad
faith, he shall also be obliged to the reparation of damages. The owner of the materials shall
have the right to remove them only in case he can do so without injury to the work
constructed, or without the plantings, constructions or works being destroyed. However, if the
landowner acted in bad faith, the owner of the materials may remove them in any event,
with a right to be indemnified for damages. (360a)
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall
have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the
indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the
price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be
obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such
case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if
the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building
or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the
terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix
the terms thereof. (361a)
Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built,
planted or sown without right to indemnity. (362)

Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith
may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order
to replace things in their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or
sowed; or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower
the proper rent. (363a)
Art. 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the landowner is entitled to damages from the
builder, planter or sower. (n)
Art. 452. The builder, planter or sower in bad faith is entitled to reimbursement for the
necessary expenses of preservation of the land. (n)
Art. 453. If there was bad faith, not only on the part of the person who built, planted or sowed on the
land of another, but also on the part of the owner of such land, the rights of one and the other shall
be the same as though both had acted in good faith.
It is understood that there is bad faith on the part of the landowner whenever the act was done
with his knowledge and without opposition on his part. (354a)
Art. 454. When the landowner acted in bad faith and the builder, planter or sower proceeded in
good faith, the provisions of article 447 shall apply. (n)
Art. 455. If the materials, plants or seeds belong to a third person who has not acted in bad faith, the
owner of the land shall answer subsidiarily for their value and only in the event that the one who
made use of them has no property with which to pay.
This provision shall not apply if the owner makes use of the right granted by article 450. If the
owner of the materials, plants or seeds has been paid by the builder, planter or sower, the latter
may demand from the landowner the value of the materials and labor. (365a)
Art. 456. In the cases regulated in the preceding articles, good faith does not necessarily
exclude negligence, which gives right to damages under article 2176. (n)

DOMINICA CUTANDA V. HEIRS OF ROBERTO CUTANDA

335 SCRA 418

FACTS:
PR brought an action for recovery of possession of parcels of land they alleged to have been owned
by their grandfather and later on inherited by his children. They intended to work personally on the
lands but was
frustrated as it was being occupied by the petitioners. PR then prayed that they be declared owners of
1/5 of the subject real properties and that petitioners be ordered to return to them said properties. Trial
court held that the petitioners owned the land through prescription.

HELD:
Private respondents action is barred by prescription. An accion publiciana to recover the right to possession
and to be declared owners of the subject lands. Their complaint surely put in issue the ownership of the
lands. It may thus be properly treated as an accion reivindicatoria. These two remedies must be
availed of within 10 years from dispossession.

HEIRS OF JUAN OCLARIT V. COURT OF APPEALS

233 SCRA 239

FACTS:
Oclarit has purchased a parcel of land on which there was no permanent landmarks or boundaries. The
property was just described in the deed of sale. He then again purchased parcels of land, again
without no clear boundaries or landmarks. Thereafter, petitioners instituted action against Balasabas for
quieting of title. Having no permanent or clear boundaries and failing to work on an area planted to
palay, the private respondent climbed coconut trees and placed markings. The petitioners moved for the
quieting of title for worries on confusion on property.

HELD:
Although it is true that what defines a piece of land is not the areamentioned but the boundaries
therein laid down, in controversial cases where there appears to be an overlapping of boundaries, the
actual size of the property gains importance.

PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY V. FERNANDEZ

358 SCRA 489
FACTS:
The subject parcel of land was subject of an expropriation proceeding entered into by EPZA and the
newly registered owners of the land. Private respondents sought the nullity of the documents executed
as he alleged
that he was excluded from the extrajudicial partition of the estate, originally owned by their
predecessors. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint as it was allegedly barred by prescription.
This was denied by the trial court and the CA.

HELD:
An action for reconveyance resulting from fraud prescribes 4 years from the discovery of the fraud;
such discovery is deemed to have taken place upon the issuance of the certificate of title over the property.
Registration of real property is considered constructive notice to all persons, and thus, a four-year period
shall be counted therefrom. The action for reconveyance based on fraud has already prescribed.
Even an action for reconveyance based on an implied constructive trust would have already
prescribed. The imprescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on implied trust applies only
when the plaintiff is in
possession of the property. However, private respondents are not in possession of the disputed
property. In fact, they dont even claim to be in possession of it, even if to so would enable them to
justify the imprescriptibility of their action.
Furthermore, reconveyance is a remedy to those whose property has been wrongfully registered in the
name of another. Such recourse however cannot be availed of once the property has passed to
an innocent

purchaser for value. For an action for reconveyance to prosper, the property should not have passed
into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.

IDOLOR V. COURT OF APPEALS

351 SCRA 399

FACTS:
Idolor issued a deed of Real Estate Mortgage with right to extrajudicial foreclosure of the property
upon failure to redeem the mortgage, in favor of De Guzman for a loan, which she secured. Upon her
failure to pay, Guzman sought the foreclosure of the Real Estate Mortgage. The property was sold
in public auction to Gumersindo. Petitioner now sought the nullity of the proceedings for alleged
irregularities. The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining those concerned from
executing a final deed of sale and consolidation of ownership.

HELD:
Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. Before an
injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present:
1.
2.

There must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected

The act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right

Hence, the existence of the right violated, is a prerequisite to the granting of an injunction. Injunction is not
designed to protect contingent or future rights.
The petitioner no longer has any proprietary right to speak of over the foreclosed property to entitle
her to the issuance of a writ of injunction.

CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY

LANDLESS RESIDENTS V.
COURT OF APPEALS
254 SCRA 220
FACTS:
The subject lot of this case was formerly classified as timberland until the time it was reclassified by
the government as public land. Petitioners were then authorized to survey land, for purposes of subdivision
into residential lots. Meanwhile, NHA initiated expropriation proceedings including the subject lot.
Petitioner intervened and said that instead of being paid through money, it preferred acquisition of any
housing area of NHA. Upon learning of the annulment of the title over the same land, the NHA sought the
suspension of the expropriation proceedings. Thereafter, the SC finally resolved by annulling the title
and declaring the subject lot to be public land. The Bureau was furnished of the decision and
according to an investigation, members of the petitioner was found settling in the land. A Presidential
proclamation was then issued reserving the entire subject land for a slum improvement project of the NHA.
This led to the rejection of the survey submitted by petitioner and the demolition of the settlement
constructed by members of the petitioner. This prompted petitioner to file a case for forcible entry on
which the trial court decided in its favor. During the pendency of the civil case, a special patent was
issued for the entire subject land. The petitioner sought the execution of decision, which was countered by a
case for quieting of title by the NHA.

HELD:
As an extraordinary remedy, injunction is calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo of
things and is generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case

can be heard. As
such, injunction is accepted as a strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy to be used
cautiously, as it affects the respective rights of the parties, and only upon full conviction on the part of
the court of its extreme
necessity.
NHA was entitled to the writ of injunction because of the pendency of an appeal for forcible entry; the
special patent issued to it by the president over the parcel of land.

LUCERO V. LOOT
25 SCRA 687
FACTS:
The trial court granted a writ of possession in favor of Lucero. This was opposed to by oppositors Loot
but the court didnt see any merit in the same. Consequently, a writ of possession was issued.

HELD:
A writ of possession may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in a
registration case but also against anyone adversely occupying the land or any portion thereof during
the land registration
proceedings. the issuance of the decree of registration is part of the registration proceedings. In
fact, it is supposed to end the said proceedings.
Consequently, any person unlawfully and
adversely occupying said lot at any time up to the issuance of the final decree, may be subject to a judicial
ejectment by means of a writ of possession and it is the duty of the registration court to issue said writ

when asked by the successful claimant.

If the writ of possession issued in a land registration implies the delivery of the possession of the land to
the successful litigant therein, a writ of demolition must, likewise issue, especially considering that the
latter writ is but a complement of the latter, which, without said writ of execution would be ineffective.

inShare

VENCILAO V. VANO
182 SCRA 492
FACTS:
Three consolidated cases are resolved, given that there are same parties and parcels of land in
question.
On the first case, it was tackled that the heirs of the late Juan Reyes filed an application for registration
of the subject parcel of land.
A reconveyance case was filed against them by petitioners on
the ground that they are true owners of thereof.
The second case involved the death of the administratix of the estate of the owner of the subject land. After
her death, a TCT was issued in the name of Pedro Luspo, and another was issued in the name of several
persons. A writ of possession was issued by the trial court against the petitioners.

HELD:
Petitioners contend that they were not claimants-oppositors nor defeated oppositors in the said land
registration case, as their names dont appear in the amended application for registration. They have
occupied the subject parcels of land for more than 30 years which began long before the application
for registration; and that even after registration, they continued to possess the land.
In a registration case, the judgment confirming the title of the applicant and ordering its registration in
his name necessarily carried with it the right of ownership. The issuance of the writ of possession is
therefore
sanctioned by existing laws in this jurisdiction and by the generally accepted principle upon which the
administration of justice rests. A writ of possession may be issued not only against the person who
has been defeated in a registration case but also against anyone unlawfully and adversely
occupying the land or any portion thereof during the land registration proceedings up to the issuance of
the final decree.

GERMAN MANAGEMENT AND

SERVICES V. COURT OF
APPEALS
177 SCRA 495
FACTS:
Spouses Jose issued a power of attorney in favor of petitioner for the development of their parcel of
land into a subdivision. Private respondents were occupying the land and petitioner advised them to

vacate but they

refused.
Thereafter, petitioner continued their development and construction. Respondents then
filed a case for forcible entry. The trial court dismissed the complaint and this was reversed by the CA.

HELD:
Notwithstanding petitioners claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to develop the subject
property, private respondents as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case against
petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process, and never
determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved.
Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniment of title it presented,
such evidence doesnt responsively address the issue of prior actual possession raised in a forcible entry
case. It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of title to the property, the party in a
peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who
can prove prior possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatver may be
the character of his prior possession, if he has in favor priority in time, he
has security that entitles him to remain on the property until he has been lawfully ejected by a person having
a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.

CAISIP V. PEOPLE
36 SCRA 17

FACTS:
Cabalag and her husband cultivated a parcel of land in Hacienda Palico, which was owned by Roxas
y Cia. Caisip is the overseer of the land. The land cultivated was previously tenanted by the father of
Cabalag. On a relevant date, Guevarra sought recognition as a lawful tenant from the CAR but such was
dismissed as it was held that he wasnt a tenant thereof. Thereafter, Roxas filed a case for forcible
entry against Guevarra, on which he won and the court ordered Guevarra to vacate the lot.
Meanwhile, there was an altercation between Cabalag and Caisip over the cutting of sugar cane.
She was being asked to leave by Caisip but she refused. Thereafter, she was charged with grave
coercion. When she was again seen in the Hacienda and weeding, she was forcibly dragged by
policemen and Caisip. This prompted for the filing a case for grave coercion.

HELD:
Article 429 is inapplicable to the case at bar. The complainant didnt usurp or invade said lot. She had
merely remained in possession thereof, even though the hacienda owner may have become its copossessor. Appellants didnt repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or
usurpation of the property. They expelled the complainant from a property on which she and her
husband were in possession even before the action for forcible entry was filed against them.

HEIRS OF VENCILAO, SR. V.

COURT OF APPEALS
288 SCRA 574

FACTS:
Petitioners sought the quieting of title, recovery of possession and ownership over a parcel of
land. They allege that they are the rightful owners, having inherited the land from their father.
The private respondents contend on the other hand that they are the rightful owners, getting rightful
ownership from buying the land through a public auction by PNB. The trial court held in favor of the
petitioners while the CA reversed the decision.

HELD:
1. The rule is settled that prescription doesnt run against registered landa title, once registered,
cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and notorious possession.
2. In order that an action for recovery of ownership of real property may prosper, the person who claims
that he has a better right to it must prove not only his ownership of the same but also satisfactorily
prove the identity thereof.
3. As a general rule, where the certificate of title is in the name of the vendor when the land is sold,
the vendee for value has the right to rely on what appears on the face of the title though, by way of
exception, the vendee is required to make the necessary inquiries if there is anything in the certificate of title
which indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property.
4. Identity of the land doctrine

OCLARIT V. COURT OF APPEALS

233 SCRA 239

FACTS:
Petitioners instituted an action for reconveyance against the heirs of Neri. Previously, there was an
agreement entered into by Neri with the heirs. In the said agreement, Neri was a vendee-a-retro who has
been entrusted the possession of parcel of land for 14 years. After said period, he would return
possession to the petitioners. The trial court decided in favor of petitioners. The CA reversed,
saying that petitioner failed to show preponderance of evidence to support their claim of absolute
ownership.

HELD:
In able to maintain an action for recovery of ownership, the person who claims that he has a better
right of the property must prove not only his ownership of the property claimed but also the identity thereof,
fixing the identity of the land claimed by describing the location, area and boundaries thereof.
What really defines a parcel of land isnt the area mentioned in its description but the boundaries
therein laid down, as enclosing the land and indicating its limits.

CHIAO LIONG TAN V. COURT OF

APPEALS
228 SCRA 75

FACTS:
Chiao Long Tan claims to be the owner of a 1976 Isuzu Elf van. As owner thereof, petitioner says he has
been in possession, enjoyment, and utilization of the van until his older brother, Tan Ban Yong, unlawfully
took it away from him.

Petitioner relies on the fact:

1. That the van is registered under his name.
2. He claims to have bought the vehicle from isuzu balintawak;
3. That he sent his brother to pay for the van and the receipt was issued in his name because it
was his money that was used to pay for the vehicle;
4.
5.

That he allowed his brother to use the vehicle because the latter was working for the company;
And that his brother later refused to return the vehicle and appropriated the same for himself.

Private respondent on the other hand testifies:

1. CLT Industries is the family business and it was under the name of petitioner since at the that time,
he was leaving for the US and petitioner is the only Filipino left in the Philippines
2. When the family business needed a vehicle, he asked petitioner to look for a vehicle and gave him
money as downpayment for an Isuzu Elf van
3. After a month, he paid for the van by getting a loan from a friend
4. As much as the receipt was placed in the name of petitioner, private respondent allowed the
registration under the name of petitioner
5. There was also agreement that he would use the vehicle as he paid for the same
All the abovementioned allegations of private respondent has been corroborated by witnesses.
trial court hence ruled in favor of the private respondent and the CA affirmed this decision.

The

HELD:
It is true that the judgment in a replevin suit must only resolve in whom is the right of possession. Primarily,
the action of replevin is possessory in character and determines nothing more than the right of

possession. However, when the title to the property is distinctly put in issue by the defendants plea
and by reason of this policy to settle in one action all the
conflicting claims of the parties to the possession of the property in controversy, the question of
ownership may be resolved in the same proceeding.
Furthermore, a replevin action is primarily one for the possession of personalty, yet it is sufficiently
flexible to authorize a settlement of all equities between the parties, arising or growing out of
the main
controversy. Thus, in an action for replevin where the defendant is adjudged to possession, he need
not go to another forum to procure relief for the return of the replevied property or secure judgment for the
value of the property in case the adjudged return thereof could not be had.

CALUB V. COURT OF APPEALS

331 SCRA 55
FACTS:
The Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Team of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office of the DENR apprehended two trucks carrying with it illegally sourced lumber. The
drivers failed to show
any legal documents. Thereafter, the trucks and lumber were seized. A criminal complaint was filed
against them.
The trucks were taken forcibly by the two drivers from the custody of DENR. This prompted the
department to file charges but these were dismissed. Again though, the trucks were then caught
and seized, for
carrying illegally sourced lumber once again. Subsequently, an action for replevin was filed by the private
respondents. The trial court granted the application for replevin and the CA affirmed this decision.

HELD:
Since there was a violation of the Revised Forestry Code and the seizure was in accordance with law,
the subject vehicles were validly deemed in custodia legis. It could not be subject to an action for
replevin. For it is
property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law, and not
otherwise.

BONGATO V. MALVAR
387 SCRA 327
FACTS:
Spouses Malvar filed a complaint for forcible entry against Bongato, for allegedly unlawfully entering
a parcel of land and constructed a house of light materials thereon. The trial court ordered petitioner to
vacate the lot
and thereafter issued an order insofar as to determine the location of the houses involved in the civil case is
the same with the one in the criminal case for anti-squatting. The judge made a warning that there will be
no extension granted for the submission of the survey and failure to do so would prompt the
issuance of the writ of execution. Upon failure of petitioner to submit a survey report, the judge
ordered the return of the records of the case to the court of origin for disposal.

HELD:
In forcible entry, one employs FISTS to deprive another physical possession of land or building.
Thus, plaintiff must allege and prove prior physical possession of the property in litigation until deprived
thereof by defendant. Sole question for resolution hinges on the physical or material possession of the
property. Neither a claim of juridical possession nor an averment of ownership by the defendant can
outrightly prevent the court from taking cognizance of the case.
Ejectment cases proceed
independently of any claim of ownership and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession de facto
and undue deprivation thereof.
In the present case, the lower court lacked jurisdiction in this case. First, the house of petitioner was actually
situated in the lot subject of the anti-squatting case and not on the lot of the spouses. Second, the house
has been in existence prior to the alleged date of forcible entry. Third, the respondents had
knowledge of the existence of the house long before the alleged date of entry.
Forcible entry is a quieting process, and that the restrictive time bar is prescribed to complement the
summary nature of the process. Indeed, the one-year period within which to bring an action for
forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land. However, when entry is
made through stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the time plaintiff knew about it. after
the lapse of the one-year period, the party dispossessed of a parcel of land may file either an accion
publiciana, which is a plenary action to recover the right to possession, or an accion reivindicatoria, which is
an action to recover ownership as well as possession.

DE LA CRUZ V. COURT OF
APPEALS
286 SCRA 230

FACTS:
Petitioner contracted a loan from Villanuevas parents, mortgaging the subject parcel of land as
security. Years after, the parcel of land became the subject for an application for registration by the Ramos
brothers. They insisted that they had a better claim over the land than petitioner. After trial, the case was
dismissed as the land has not been reclassified for other purposes and remained a part of the forest
reserve. Consequently, the brothers were able to secure reclassification of the land and the same was
registered in their name as owners, and they later sold the land to
Villanueva. Thereafter, petitioner came to know of the registration and filed a complaint, which was
dismissed.

HELD:
Petitioner possessed and occupied the land after it had been declared by the government as part of
the forest reserve. In fact, the land remained as part of the forest reserve until such time it was
reclassified into alienable or disposable land at the behest of the Ramoses. A positive act of the
government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest, and to convert it into alienable and
disposable land for other purposes. Until such lands have been properly declared to be available
for other purposes, there is no disposable land to speak of. Absent the fact of reclassification prior
to the possession and cultivation in good faith by petitioner, the property occupied by him remained
classified as forest or timberland, which he could not have acquired by prescription.

OWNERSHIP
OWNERSHIP IN GENERAL
Art. 427. Ownership may be exercised over things or rights. (n)

OWNERSHIP
Independent and general right of a person to control a thing particularly in his possession,
enjoyment, disposition and recovery, subject to no restrictions except those imposed by the state or
private persons, without prejudice to the provisions of the law

KINDS OF OWNERSHIP
1.
2.
3.
4.

Full ownershipall rights of an owner

Naked ownershipownership where the right to the use and the fruits have been denied
Sole ownershipownership is only vested in one person
Co-ownership

Art. 428. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those
established by law.
The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to
recover it. (348a)

7 RIGHTS OF AN OWNER UNDER ROMAN LAW

Jus possidendi -The right to possess
Jus utendi -The right to use
Jus fruendi -The right to the fruits

Jus abutendi -The right to consume

Jus disponendi -The right to dispose
Jus vindicandi -The right to recover
Jus accessiones -The right to accessories
ACTIONS TO RECOVER
1.

Replevin

2.

Accion interdictalforcible entry and unlawful detainer

3.

Accion publiciana

4.

Accion reinvidicatoria

5.

Writ of possession | writ of demolition

6.

Writ of preliminary injunction

REPLEVIN
An action or provisional remedy where the complainant prays for the recovery of the possession of
PERSONAL PROPERTY

FORCIBLE ENTRY
> Summary action to recover material or physical possession of real property when a person originally in
possession was deprived thereof by force, intimidation, strategy, threat or stealth
> Action must be brought within 1 year from the dispossession

> Issue involved is mere physical possession or possession de facto and not juridical possession nor
ownership

UNLAWFUL DETAINER
> Action that must be brought when the possession by a landlord, vendor, vendee or other person
of any land or building is being unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied

>Action must be brought within one year from last demand letter

ACCION PUBLICIANA
> Recovery of the better right to possess, and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding before the
RTC

>Must be brought within a period of 10 years otherwise the real right to possess is lost

> Issue is possession de jure

ACCION REINVIDICATORIA
> Action to recover ownership over real property

> Must be brought in the RTC

> It must be brought within 10 or 30 years as the case may be

> Issue involved is ownership and for this purpose, evidence of title or mode may be introduced

> It is permissible to file both an action for ownership and for detainer over the same land, and
between the same parties, because the issues involved are different

WRIT OF INJUNCTION
> A person deprived of his possession of real or personal property is ordinarily not allowed to avail himself of
this remedy, the reason being that the defendant in actual possession is presumed disputably to have
the better right

WRIT OF POSSESSION
> Used in connection with the Land Registration Law is an order directing the sheriff to place a
successful registrant under the Torrens system in possession of the property covered by a decree of the
Court

OWNERSHIP HAS LIMITATIONS

1.
2.
3.

Those given by the State or the laws

Those given by the owner himself
Those given by the person who gave the right to its present owner

Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any person from the
enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or
usurpation of his property. (n)

DOCTRINE OF SELF-HELP
> The right to counter force with force

> Comparable with self-defense under justifying circumstances in Criminal Law

Art. 430. Every owner may enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live
or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon.
(388)
Art. 431. The owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such manner as to injure the rights
of a third person. (n)

NO INJURY TO RIGHTS OF THIRD PERSONS

> This is one of the fundamental bases of police power and constitutes a just restriction on the right of
ownership

Art. 432. The owner of a thing has no right to prohibit the interference of another with the same,
if the interference is necessary to avert an imminent danger and the threatened
damage, compared to the damage arising to the owner from the interference, is much greater. The
owner may demand from the person benefited indemnity for the damage to him. (n)

STATE OF NECESSITY
ANALOGOUS TO THE RULE UNDER CRIMINAL LAW

Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does an act which causes damage to another
doesn't incur criminal liability provided that the following requisites are present:
1. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists
2. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it
3. That there be no other practical or less harmful means of preventing it
Art. 433. Actual possession under claim of ownership raises disputable presumption of
ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property. (n)

RULE OF EVIDENCE
REQUIREMENTS TO HAVE DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION
1.

Actual possession of the property

2.

Claim of ownership

Art. 434. In an action to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the
strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim. (n)

REQUISITES IN AN ACTION TO
RECOVER
1.
2.

Identity of the property

Strength of the plaintiffs title

Art. 435. No person shall be deprived of his property except by competent authority and for
public use and always upon payment of just compensation.
Should this requirement be not first complied with, the courts shall protect and, in a proper case,
restore the owner in his possession. (349a)

EMINENT DOMAIN V. EXPROPRIATION

- Eminent domain is the power of the state and expropriation is the proceeding
Art. 436. When any property is condemned or seized by competent authority in the interest of
health, safety or security, the owner thereof shall not be entitled to compensation, unless he can
show that such condemnation or seizure is unjustified. (n)
Art. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it, and he
can construct thereon any works or make any plantations and excavations which he may deem
proper, without detriment to servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He
cannot complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial navigation. (350a)

SURFACE RIGHT OF A LAND OWNER

Art. 438. Hidden treasure belongs to the owner of the land, building, or other property on
which it is found.
Nevertheless, when the discovery is made on the property of another, or of the State or any of
its subdivisions, and by chance, one-half thereof shall be allowed to the finder. If the finder is
a trespasser, he shall not be entitled to any share of the treasure.
If the things found be of interest to science of the arts, the State may acquire them at their just
price, which shall be divided in conformity with the rule stated. (351a)
Art. 439. By treasure is understood, for legal purposes, any hidden and unknown deposit of money,
jewelry, or other precious objects, the lawful ownership of which does not appear. (352)

RULES REGARDING HIDDEN TREASURES

1. If the treasure is not hidden, there is no 50-50 sharing
2. If the precious metals are in their raw state, it will be owned by the State by virtue of the Regalian
doctrine
3. If the owner finds the treasure in his own land, he owns the treasure
4. If finder finds it not in his own land, there is 50-50 sharing with the owner of the land
5. If the finder is hired, then compensation or salary or fixed fee will be given to him

6.

If the finder is a trespasser, then he would not receive anything

2 SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT REGARDING BY CHANCE

1.
2.

If there is deliberate search, it is not to be construed as by chance

Even if there is a deliberate search, still by chance since there is uncertainity of finding a treasure

LAUREL V. GARCIA
187 SCRA 797
FACTS:
The subject Roppongi property is one of the properties acquired by the Philippines from Japan
pursuant to a Reparations Agreement. The property is where the Philippine Embassy was once located,
before it transferred to the Nampeidai property. It was decided that the properties would be
available to sale or disposition. One of the first properties opened up for public auction was the Roppongi
property, despite numerous oppositions from different sectors.

HELD:
The Roppongi property was acquired together with the other properties through reparation
agreements. They were assigned to the government sector and that the Roppongi property was
specifically designated under the agreement to house the Philippine embassy.
It is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial.
The respondents have failed to do so.

As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be
alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and payment, in application to
the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose is not to serve the
State as the juridical person but the citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be
the object of appropriation.
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service doesnt
automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is
withdrawn from public use. A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for
private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to
withdraw it from being such.

CEBU OXYGEN AND ACETYLENE

CO. V. BERCILLES
66 SCRA 431
FACTS:
The land sought to be registered in this case was formerly a part of a street. Through a resolution,
it was declared to be an abandoned road and not part of the City development plan. Thereafter, it was sold
through a public bidding and petitioner was the highest bidder. He then sought to register said land
but his application was dismissed.

HELD:
The portion of the city street subject to petitioners application for registration of title was withdrawn
from public use. Then it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property of the
State. It is also very clear from the Charter that property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be
used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully
used or conveyed.

VILLARICO V. COURT OF
APPEALS
309 SCRA 193
FACTS:
Spouses Villarico sought for the confirmation of title over a parcel of land to which they allege that they
absolutely own the land. This was opposed to by a person who posed himself also to be the rightful owner
of the land, as well as by the Director of Forestry who said that the subject land is part of forest land and
may not be appropriated. Trial and appellate court dismissed application of petitioners.

HELD:
There has been no showing that a declassification has been made of the land in question as
disposable or alienable. And the record indeed disclosed that applicants have not introduced any

evidence which would have led the court a quo to rule otherwise.
Forest lands cannot be owned by private persons. Possession thereof, no matter how long doesnt ripen
to a registrable title. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant or title or confirmation of
an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain.

IGNACIO V. DIRECTOR OF
LANDS
108 PHIL 335
FACTS:
Ignacio filed for the registration of title over a mangrove to which he later said that he acquired right to the
mangrove through accretion.

HELD:
Land formed by the action of the sea is property of the State.
Land of the public domain is not subject to acquisitive prescription.

LANZAR V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

78 SCRA 130
FACTS:
Lanzar filed for application for registration of title over a parcel of land, to which the Director of Lands
objected to as the land in question, according to him, was part of the foreshore lands. The trial court
adjudicated the land to Lanzar as the said land wasnt necessary for public utility or
establishment of special industries.
The CA reversed the decision.

HELD:
Lands added to the shore by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the
public domain. When they are no longer washed by the water of the sea and are not necessary for
purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for coastguard services,
then the Government shall declare them to be property of the owners of the estate adjacent
thereto and as increment thereof.

CHAVEZ V. PUBLIC ESTATES

AUTHORITY
384 SCRA 152
FACTS:
President Marcos through a presidential decree created PEA, which was tasked with the
development, improvement, and acquisition, lease, and sale of all kinds of lands. The then president also
transferred to PEA the foreshore and offshore lands of Manila Bay under the Manila-Cavite Coastal
Road and Reclamation Project.
Thereafter, PEA was granted patent to the reclaimed areas of land and then, years later, PEA entered
into a JVA with AMARI for the development of the Freedom Islands. These two entered into a joint
venture in the absence of any public bidding.
Later, a privilege speech was given by Senator President Maceda denouncing the JVA as the
grandmother of all scams. An investigation was conducted and it was concluded that the lands that PEA
was conveying to AMARI were lands of the public domain; the certificates of title over the
Freedom Islands were void; and the JVA itself was illegal. This prompted Ramos to form an investigatory
committee on the legality of the JVA.
Petitioner now comes and contends that the government stands to lose billions by the conveyance
or sale of the reclaimed areas to AMARI. He also asked for the full disclosure of the renegotiations
happening between the parties.

ISSUE:
W/N stipulations in the amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of the lands, reclaimed or to be
reclaimed, violate the Constitution.

HELD:
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine,
which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public domain.
The 1987 Constitution recognizes the Regalian doctrine. It declares that all natural resources are owned
by the State and except for alienable agricultural lands of the public domain, natural resources
cannot be alienated.
The Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84 hectares of the 750 hectare
reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest of the area are still submerged areas forming part of
Manila Bay. Further, it is provided that AMARI will reimburse the actual costs in reclaiming the areas
of land and it will shoulder the other reclamation costs to be incurred.
The foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the lands of the public domain, waters and
other natural resources and consequently owned by the State. As such, foreshore and submerged areas
shall not be alienable unless they are classified as agricultural lands of the public domain. The mere
reclamation of these areas by the PEA doesnt convert these inalienable natural resources of the State
into alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. There must be a law or presidential
proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable and disposable if the law has
reserved them for some public or quasi-public use.

INVOLUNTARY INSOLVENCY OF
STROCHECKER V. RAMIREZ
44 PHIL 933
FACTS:
Three mortgages were seeking preference in the lower court. The one of Fidelity and Surety Co. alleged
that it should be given preference as the mortgage in favor of Ramirez was not valid as the subject of
the mortgage cannot be a proper subject thereof. The subject involved in the 1st mortgage is an
interest in business of a drug store.

HELD:
Such interest in the business is a personal property capable of appropriation and not included in
the enumeration of real properties in the Civil Code, and may be the subject of mortgage. All
personal property may be mortgaged.

US V. TAMBUNTING
41 PHIL 364
FACTS:
Accused and his wife were accused and later found guilty of stealing gas from the Manila Gas
Corporation. It was found out that during their occupancy of the upper portion of a house wherein
the corporation was supplying gas, the spouses made an illegal connection so that they could
benefit from the supply.

HELD:
There is nothing in the nature of gas used for illuminating purposes which renders it incapable of being
feloniously taken and carried away. It is a valuable article of merchandise bought and sold like
other personal property, susceptible of being severed from a mass or larger quantity and of being
transported from place to place.

RUBISO V. RIVERA
37 PHIL 72
FACTS:
Rubiso filed a complaint against Rivera for the recovery of a pilot boat. He alleged that he is the rightful
owner of a pilot boat, which was stranded and recovered by Rivera. The latter refused to return the said

boat as he alleged too that he was the owner thereof. It was known that the original
owners of the boat had secretly sold the pilot boat to Rivera on an earlier date than the sale in a public
auction to Rubiso. Nonetheless, material is the fact that the entry into the customs registry of the sale of the
boat was later than the recording of the sale to Rubiso.

HELD:
The requisite of registration in the registry, of the purchase of the vessel, is necessary and indispensable
in order that the purchasers rights may be maintained against a third person. Such registration is
required both by the Code of Commerce and Act 1900. It is undeniable, ergo, that Rivera doesnt have a
better right than Rubiso over the pilot boat.
Ships and vessels, whether moved by steam or by sail, partake, to a certain extent of the nature and
conditions of real property, on account of their value and importance in world commerce; and for this, the
provisions of the Code of Commerce are nearly identical with Article 1473 of the CC.

MOVABLE PROPERTY
Art. 416. The following things are deemed to be personal property:
(1) Those movables susceptible of appropriation which are not included in the preceding article;
(2) Real property which by any special provision of law is considered as personal property;
(3) Forces of nature which are brought under control by science; and
(4) In general, all things which can be transported from place to place without impairment of the real
property to which they are fixed. (335a)
Art. 417. The following are also considered as personal property:
(1) Obligations and actions which have for their object movables or demandable sums; and

(2) Shares of stock of agricultural, commercial and industrial entities, although they may have real
estate. (336a)
Art. 418. Movable property is either consumable or nonconsumable. To the first class belong those
movables which cannot be used in a manner appropriate to their nature without their being consumed;
to the second class belong all the others. (337)

CLASSIFICATION OF MOVABLE
PROPERTY
1.
2.

According to their natureconsumable or non-consummable

According the the intent of the partiesfungible or non-fungible

PROPERTY IN RELATION TO THE

PERSON TO WHOM IT BELONGS
Art. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership. (338)
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth. (339a)

PUBLIC DOMINION

Means ownership by the State in that the State has control and administration
Ownership by the public in general

THREE KINDS OF PROPERTY UNDER

PUBLIC DOMINION
1.
2.
3.

For public usemay be used by anybody

For public servicemay be used only by authorized persons
For the development of national wealthlike our natural resources

CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPERTIES
OF PUBLIC DOMINION
1. They are outside the commerce of man, and cannot be leased, donated, sold, or be the object of
any contract, except insofar as they may be the subject of repairs or improvements and other
incidental things of similar character
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

They cannot be acquired by prescription, no matter how long the possession of the properties has been
They cannot be registered under the LRA and be the subject of a Torrens title
They as well as their usufruct may not be levied upon by execution nor can they be attached
In general, they may be used by everybody
They may be either real or personal property

Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding
article, is patrimonial property. (340a)

PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY
Property that the State owns which is not devoted to public use, public service or to the development of
the national wealth
Owned by the State in its private capacity
Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form
part of the patrimonial property of the State. (341a)
Art. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided into property for public use and
patrimonial property. (343)

PROPERTIES OF POLITICAL
SUBDIVISIONS
1.
2.

Property for public use

Patrimonial property

ALIENATION OF THE PROPERTIES

Properties of a political subdivision for public use cannot be alienated as such and may not be
acquired through prescription
Properties of a political subdivision which are patrimonial in character may be alienated, and
may be acquired by others through prescription
Art. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consist of the
provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters,
promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code,
without prejudice to the provisions of special laws. (344a)
Art. 425. Property of private ownership, besides the patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities,
and municipalities, consists of all property belonging to private persons, either individually or

collectively. (345a)

PROVISIONS COMMON TO THE THREE

PRECEDING CHAPTERS
Art. 426. Whenever by provision of the law, or an individual declaration, the expression "immovable
things or property," or "movable things or property," is used, it shall be deemed to
include, respectively, the things enumerated in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2.
Whenever the word "muebles," or "furniture," is used alone, it shall not be deemed to include
money, credits, commercial securities, stocks and bonds, jewelry, scientific or artistic
collections, books, medals, arms, clothing, horses or carriages and their accessories, grains, liquids and
merchandise, or other things which do not have as their principal object the furnishing or
ornamenting of a building, except where from the context of the law, or the individual declaration,
the contrary clearly appears. (346a)

USE OF THE WORD MUEBLES

Word used synonymously with furniture

Furniture has generally for its principal object the furnishing or ornamenting of a building

CALTEX PHILS. V. CENTRAL

BOARD OF ASSESSMENT
APPEALS
114 SCRA 296
FACTS:
The City Assessor characterized the items in gas stations of petitioner as taxable realty. These items
included underground tanks, elevated tank, elevated water tanks, water tanks, gasoline pumps, computing
pumps, etc. These items are not owned by the lessor of the land wherein the
equipment are installed. Upon expiration of the lease agreement, the equipment should be returned in
good condition.

HELD:
The equipment and machinery as appurtenances to the gas station building or shed owned by Caltex and
which fixtures are necessary to the operation of the gas station, for without them the gas station would be
useless, and which have been attached and fixed permanently to the gas station site or embedded therein,
are taxable improvements and machinery within the meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real
Property Tax Code.

MANILA ELECTRIC CO. V.

CENTRAL BOARD OF
ASSESSMENT APPEALS
114 SCRA 273
FACTS:
Petitioner owns two oil storage tanks, made of steel plates wielded and assembled on the spot.
Their bottoms rest on a foundation consisted of compacted earth, sand pad as immediate layer, and
asphalt stratum as top layer. The tanks merely sit on its foundation.
The municipal treasurer of Batangas made an assessment for realty tax on the two tanks, based on the
report of the Board of Assessors. MERALCO wished to oppose this assessment as they averred that the
tanks are not real properties.

HELD:
While the two storage tanks are not embodied in the land, they may nevertheless be considered as
improvements in the land, enhancing its utility and rendering it useful to the oil industry.
For purposes of taxation, the term real property may include things, which should generally be considered
as personal property. it is familiar phenomenon to see things classified as real property for
purposes of taxation which on general principle may be considered as personal
property.

BOARD OF ASSESSMENT
APPEALS V. MANILA ELECTRIC
COMPANY
10 SCRA 68
FACTS:
City Assessor of QC declared the steel towers for real property tax under Tax Declarations. After denying
the respondents petition to cancel these declarations, an appeal was taken with the CTA which held that the
steel towers come under the exception of poles under the franchise given to MERALCO; the steel
towers are personal properties; and the City Treasurer is liable for the refund of the amount paid.

HELD:
The steel towers of an electric company dont constitute real property for the purposes of real property tax.

MINDANAO BUS COMPANY

V. CITY ASSESSOR AND
TREASURER
6 SCRA 197
FACTS:
Petitioner is engaged in a public utility business, solely engaged in transporting passengers and
cargoes by motor trucks, over its authorized lines in Mindanao. It owns a main office and branch offices. To
be found in their offices are machineries and equipment, which were assessed by the City Assessor as real
properties.

HELD:
Movable equipments to be immobilized in contemplation of law must first be essential and principal
elements of an industry or works without which such industry or works would be unable to function or
carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established. We may here distinguish
those movables, which are essential and principal elements of an industry, from those which may not be
so considered immobilized by destination because they are merely incidental, not essential and principal.
In the case at bar, the tools and equipments in question are by their nature not essential and principal
elements of petitioners business of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks. They are merely
incidentals.

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TSAI V. COURT OF APPEALS

336 SCRA 324
FACTS:
EVERTEX secured a loan from PBC, guaranteed by a real estate and chattel mortgage over a parcel of land
where the factory stands, and the chattels located therein, as included in a schedule attached to the
mortgage contract. Another loan was obtained secured by a chattel mortgage over
properties with similar descriptions listed in the first schedule. During the date of execution of the
second mortgage, EVERTEX purchased machineries and equipment.
Due to business reverses, EVERTEX filed for insolvency proceedings. It failed to pay its obligation
and thus, PBC initiated extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages. PBC was the highest bidder in the
public auctions, making it the owner of the properties. It then leased the factory premises
to Tsai. Afterwards, EVERTEX sought the annulment of the sale and conveyance of the properties to
PBC as it was allegedly a violation of the INSOLVENCY LAW.
The RTC held that the lease and sale were irregular as it involved properties not included in the
schedule of the mortgage contract.

HELD:
While it is true that the controverted properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of the contract of REM
and CM executed by the parties gives a contrary indication. In the case at bar, both the trial and
appellate courts show that the intention was to treat the machineries as movables or
personal property.
Assuming that the properties were considered immovables, nothing detracts the parties from
treating it as chattels to secure an obligation under the principle of estoppel.

DAVAO SAW MILL CO. VS.

CASTILLO
61 SCRA 709
FACTS:
Petitioner is the holder of a lumber concession. It operated a sawmill on a land, which it doesnt own. Part
of the lease agreement was a stipulation in which after the lease agreement, all buildings and improvements
would pass to the ownership of the lessor, which would not include machineries and accessories. In
connection to this, petitioner had in its sawmill machineries and other equipment wherein some were
bolted in foundations of cement.

HELD:
The machinery must be classified as personal property.
The lessee placed the machinery in the building erected on land belonging to another, with the
understanding that the machinery was not included in the improvements which would pass to the lessor on
the expiration of the lease agreement. The lessee also treated the machinery as personal
property in executing chattel mortgages in favor of third persons. The machinery was levied upon by
the sheriff as personalty pursuant to a writ of execution obtained without any protest being registered.
Furthermore, machinery only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner of the property or
plant, but not when so placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any person having temporary right, unless
such person acted as the agent of the owner.

NAVARRO V. PINEDA
9 SCRA 631
FACTS:
Pineda and his mother executed real estate and chattel mortgages in favor of Navarro, to secure a loan they
got from the latter. The REM covered a parcel of land owned by the mother while the chattel mortgage
covered a residential house. Due to the failure to pay the loan, they asked for
extensions to pay for the loan. On the second extension, Pineda executed a PROMISE wherein in case of
default in payment, he wouldnt ask for any additional extension and there would be no need for any formal
demand. In spite of this, they still failed to pay.
Navarro then filed for the foreclosure of the mortgages. The court decided in his favor.

HELD:
Where a house stands on a rented land belonging to another person, it may be the subject matter of
a chattel mortgage as personal property if so stipulated in the document of mortgage, and in an action by the
mortgagee for the foreclosure, the validity of the chattel mortgage cannot be assailed
by one of the parties to the contract of mortgage.
Furthermore, although in some instances, a house of mixed materials has been considered as a chattel
between the parties and that the validity of the contract between them, has been recognized, it has
been a constant criterion that with respect to third persons, who are not parties to the
contract, and specially in execution proceedings, the house is considered as immovable property.

MAKATI LEASING AND FINANCE

CORPORATION V. WEAREVER
TEXTILE MILLS
122 SCRA 296
FACTS:
To be able to secure financial accommodations from the petitioner, the private respondent
discounted and assigned several receivables under a Receivable Purchase Agreement.
To
secure the collection of the receivables, a chattel mortgage was executed over machinery found in the
factory of the private respondent.
As the private respondent failed to pay, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed. Nonetheless, the
sheriff was unable to seize the machinery. This prompted petitioner to file an action for replevin.
The CA reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered the return of the drive motor, after ruling that
the machinery may not be the subject of a chattel mortgage, given that it was an immovable under the
provisions of Article 415. The same was attached to the ground by means of bolts and the only way to
remove it from the plant would be to drill the ground.

HELD:
There is no logical justification to exclude the rule out that the machinery may be considered as personal
property, and subject to a chattel mortgage. If a house may be considered as personal property for
purposes of executing a chattel mortgage, what more a machinery, which is movable

by nature and becomes immobilized only by destination or purpose, may not be likewise treated as
such.

TUMALAD V. VICENCIO
41 SCRA 143
FACTS:
Vicencio and Simeon executed a chattel mortgage in favor of plaintiffs Tumalad over their house,
which was being rented by Madrigal and company. This was executed to guarantee a loan,
payable in one year with a 12% per annum interest.
The mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed upon failure to pay the loan. The house was sold at a public
auction and the plaintiffs were the highest bidder. A corresponding certificate of sale was issued.
Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed an action for ejectment against the defendants, praying that the latter vacate
the house as they were the proper owners.

HELD:
Certain deviations have been allowed from the general doctrine that buildings are immovable property
such as when through stipulation, parties may agree to treat as personal property those by their
nature would be real property. This is partly based on the principle of estoppel wherein the
principle is predicated on statements by the owner declaring his house as chattel, a conduct that may
conceivably stop him from subsequently claiming otherwise.
In the case at bar, though there be no specific statement referring to the subject house as personal property,
yet by ceding, selling or transferring a property through chattel mortgage could only have meant that
defendant conveys the house as chattel, or at least, intended to treat the same as
such, so that they should not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise.

PRUDENTIAL BANK V. PANIS

153 SCRA 390
FACTS:
Spouses Magcale secured a loan from Prudential Bank. To secure payment, they executed a real
estate mortgage over a residential building. The mortgage included also the right to occupy the lot and the
information about the sales patent applied for by the spouses for the lot to which the building stood. After
securing the first loan, the spouses secured another from the same bank. To secure payment, another
real estate mortgage was executed over the same properties.
The Secretary of Agriculture then issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent over the land which was later on
mortgaged to the bank.
The spouses then failed to pay for the loan and the REM was extrajudicially foreclosed and sold in public
auction despite opposition from the spouses. The respondent court held that the REM was null and void.

HELD:
A real estate mortgage can be constituted on the building erected on the land belonging to another.
The inclusion of building distinct and separate from the land in the Civil Code can only mean that the
building itself is an immovable property.
While it is true that a mortgage of land necessarily includes in the absence of stipulation of the
improvements thereon, buildings, still a building in itself may be mortgaged by itself apart from the land

on which it is built. Such a mortgage would still be considered as a REM for the building would
still be considered as immovable property even if dealt with separately and apart from the land.
The original mortgage on the building and right to occupancy of the land was executed before the
issuance of the sales patent and before the government was divested of title to the land. Under
the foregoing, it is evident that the mortgage executed by private respondent on his own
building was a valid mortgage.
As to the second mortgage, it was done after the sales patent was issued and thus prohibits pertinent
provisions of the Public Land Act.

PUNSALAN, JR. V. VDA. DE

LACSAMANA
121 SCRA 331
FACTS:
Punsalan was the owner of a piece of land, which he mortgaged in favor of PNB. Due to his failure to pay,
the mortgage was foreclosed and the land was sold in a public auction to which PNB was the highest
bidder.
On a relevant date, while Punsalan was still the possessor of the land, it secured a permit for the
construction of a warehouse.
A deed of sale was executed between PNB and Punsalan. This contract was amended to include the
warehouse and the improvement thereon. By virtue of these instruments, respondent Lacsamana
secured title over the property in her name.
Petitioner then sought for the annulment of the deed of sale. Among his allegations was that the bank did

not own the building and thus, it should not be included in the said deed.
Petitioners complaint was dismissed for improper venue. The trial court held that the action being
filed in actuality by petitioner is a real action involving his right over a real property.

HELD:
Warehouse claimed to be owned by petitioner is an immovable or real property. Buildings are
always immovable under the Code. A building treated separately from the land on which it is stood is
immovable property and the mere fact that the parties to a contract seem to have dealt with it
separate and apart from the land on which it stood in no wise changed its character as immovable property.

STANDARD OIL CO. OF NEW

YORK V. JARAMILLO
44 SCRA 630
FACTS:
De la Rosa was the lessee of a piece of land, on which a house she owns was built. She executed a
chattel mortgage in favor of the petitionerpurporting the leasehold interest in the land and the
ownership of house.
After such, the petitioner moved for its registration with the Register of Deeds, for the purpose of
having the same recorded in the book of record of chattel mortgages. After examination, the
respondent was in the opinion that the properties were not subjects of a chattel mortgage.

HELD:
Position taken by the respondent is untenable. His duties are mainly ministerial only in nature and
no law confers upon him any judicial or quasi-judicial power. Generally, he should accept the
qualification of the property adopted by the person who presents the instrument for
registration and should place the instrument on record, upon payment of the proper fee, leaving the effects
of registration to be determined by the court if such question should arise for legal determination.
The Civil Code supplies no absolute criterion in discriminating between real property and personal
property for purposes of the application of the Chattel Mortgage Law. The articles state general
doctrines, nonetheless, it must not be forgotten that under given conditions, property may have
character different from that imputed to it in the said articles. It is undeniable that the parties in a
contract may by agreement treat as personal property that which by nature would be real property.

LEUNG YEE V. F.L STRONG

MACHINERY CO. AND
WILLIAMSON
37 SCRA 644

FACTS:
1. First mortgage: Compania Agricola Filipina bought rice-cleaning machinery from the machinery
company and this was secured by a chattel mortgage on the machinery and the building to which it
was installed. Upon failure to pay, the chattel mortgage was foreclosed, the building and machinery
sold in public auction and bought by the machinery company.
2. Days after, the Compania Agricola Filipina executed a deed of sale over the land to which the building
stood in favor of the machinery company. This was done to cure any defects that may arise in the
machinery companys ownership of the building.
3. Second mortgage: on or about the date to which the chattel mortgage was excecuted,
Compania executed a real estate mortgage over the building in favor of Leung Yee, distinct and
separate from the land. This is to secure payment for its indebtedness for the construction of the
building. Upon failure to pay, the mortgage was foreclosed.
4. The machinery company then filed a case, demanding that it be declared the rightful owner of
the building. The trial court held that it was the machinery company which was the rightful owner
as it had its title before the building was registered prior to the date of registry of Leung Yees
certificate.

HELD:
The building in which the machinery was installed was real property, and the mere fact that the parties
seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from the land on which it stood in no wise changed the
character as real property.
It follows that neither the original registry in the chattel mortgage registry of the instrument purporting to be a
chattel mortgage of the building and the machinery installed therein, nor the annotation in the registry
of the sale of the mortgaged property, had any effect whatever so far as the building is concerned.
*LANDMARK CASE

BICERRA V. TENEZZA
6 SCRA 648
FACTS:
Bicerras were the owners of a house built on a lot owned by them and situated in the municipality
of Lagangilang. Tenezza forcibly demolished the house, asserting that they are the rightful owners of the
land. Failure to restore the house and to deliver the materials by the defendants,
plaintiffs were forced to file an action against them for damages as well as praying that the court hold them
as the proper owners of the house. The court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the house demolished is still considered an immovable property?

HELD:
A house is classified as immovable property by reason of its adherence to the soil on which it is built. The
classification holds true regardless of the fact that the house may be situated on land belonging to another
owner. But once the house is demolished, it ceases to exist as such and the hence its character as
immovable likewise ceases.

ASSOCIATED INSURANCE AND

SURETY COMPANY V. IYA, ET.
AL
103 SCRA 972
FACTS:
Spouses Valino were the owners of a house, payable on installments from Philippine Realty Corporation. To
be able to purchase on credit rice from NARIC, they filed a surety bond subscribed by petitioner and
therefor, they executed an alleged chattel mortgage on the house in favor of the surety company. The
spouses didnt own yet the land on which the house was constructed on at the time of the
undertaking. After being able to purchase the land, to be able to secure payment for
indebtedness, the spouses executed a real estate mortgage in favor of Iya.
The spouses were not able to satisfy obligation with NARIC, petitioner was compelled to pay. The
spouses werent able to pay the surety company despite demands and thus, the company foreclosed
the chattel mortgage. It later learned of the real estate mortgage over the house and lot secured
by the spouses. This prompted the company to file an action against the spouses. Also, Iya filed another

civil action against the spouses, asserting that she has a better right over the property. The trial court heard
the two cases jointly and it held that the surety company had a preferred right over the building as since
when the chattel mortgage was secured, the land wasnt owned yet by the spouses making the building
then a chattel and not a real property.

HELD:
A building certainly cannot be divested of its character of a realty by the fact that the land on which it is
constructed belongs to another. To hold it the other way, the possibility is not remote that it would
result in confusion, for to cloak the building with an uncertain status made dependent on ownership
of the land, would create a situation where apermanent fixture changes its nature or character as the
ownership of the land changes hands. In the case at bar, as personal properties may be the only subjects of
a chattel mortgage, the execution of the chattel mortgage covering said building is null and void.

LOPEZ V. OROSA AND PLAZA

THEATRE
103 SCRA 98
FACTS:
1. Lopez was engaged in business under the name Lopez-Castelo Sawmill.
2. Orosa, who lived in the same province as Lopez, one dayapproached Lopez and invited the latter to make
an investment inthe theatre business.
3. Orosa, his family and close friends apparently were forming acorporation named Plaza Theatre.

4. Lopez expressed his unwillingness to invest. Nonetheless, therewas an oral agreement between Lopez
and Orosa that Lopezwould be supplying the lumber for the construction of the theatre.The terms were the
following: one, Orosa would be personallyliable for any account that the said construction would incur;
two,payment would be by demand and not by cash on delivery.
5. Pursuant to the agreement, Lopez delivered the lumber for theconstruction. Lopez was only paid one-third
of the total cost.
6. The land on which the building has been erected was previously owned by Orosa, which was later on
purchased by the corporation.
7. Due to the incessant demands of Lopez, the corporation mortgaged its properties.
8. On an earlier relevant date, the corporation obtained a loan with Luzon Surety Company as surety and in
turn, the corporation executed a mortgage over the land and building. In the registration of the land under
Act 496, such mortgage wasnt revealed.
9. Also due to the demands of Lopez, Orosa issued a deed of assignment over his shares of stock in the
corporation.
10. As there was still an unpaid balance, Lopez filed a case against Orosa and Plaza theatre. He asked that
Orosa and Plaza theatre be held liable solidarily for the unpaid balance; and in case defendants failed to
pay, the land and building should be sold in public auction with the proceeds to be applied to the balance; or
that the shares of stock be sold in public auction. Lopez also had lis pendens be annotated in the OCT.
11. The trial court decided that there was joint liability between defendants and that the materialmans lien
was only confined tothe building.

ISSUES:
W/N the materialmens lien for the value of the materials used in the construction of the building attaches to
said structure alone and doesnt extend to the land on which the building is adhered to?

HELD:
The contention that the lien executed in favor of the furnisher of materials used for the construction and
repair of a building is also extended to land on which the building was constructed is without merit. For while
it is true that generally, real estate connotes the land and the building constructed thereon, it is obvious that
the inclusion of the building in the enumeration of what may constitute real properties could only mean one
thingthat a building is by itself an immovable property. Moreover, in the absence of
any specific provision to the contrary, a building is an immovable property irrespective of whether or not said
structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner.

Appelant invoked Article 1923 of the Spanish Civil Code, which providesWith respect to determinate real
property and real rights of the debtor, the following are preferred: xxx Credits for reflection, not entered or
recorded, and only with respect to other credits different from those mentioned in four next preceding
paragraphs. Close examination of the abovementioned provision reveals that the law gives preference to
unregistered refectionary credits only with respect to the real estate upon which the refectionary or work was
made. This being so, the inevitable conclusion must be that the lien so created attaches merely to the
immovable property for the construction or repair of which the obligation was incurred. Therefore, the lien in
favor of appellant for the unpaid value of the lumber used in the construction of the building attaches only to
said structure and to no other property of the obligors.

IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY
Art. 414. All things which are or may be the object of appropriation are considered either:
(1) Immovable or real property; or
(2) Movable or personal property. (333)

PROPERTY
As an object, is that which is, or may be appropriated
Under the CC, thing and property are used synonymouslytechnically though, thing is of
broader scope than property

IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
Art. 415. The following are immovable property:

(1) Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;
(2) Trees, plants, and growing fruits, while they are attached to the land or form an integral part of an
immovable;
(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated
therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object;
(4) Statues, reliefs, paintings or other objects for use or ornamentation, placed in buildings or on
lands by the owner of the immovable in such a manner that it reveals the intention to attach
them permanently to the tenements;
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for
an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend
directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works;
(6) Animal houses, pigeon-houses, beehives, fish ponds or breeding places of similar nature, in
case their owner has placed them or preserves them with the intention to have them
permanently attached to the land, and forming a permanent part of it; the animals in these places are
included;
(7) Fertilizer actually used on a piece of land;
(8) Mines, quarries, and slag dumps, while the matter thereof forms part of the bed, and waters either
running or stagnant;
(9) Docks and structures which, though floating, are intended by their nature and object to
remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast;
(10) Contracts for public works, and servitudes and other real rights over immovable property. (334a)

CLASSIFICATION OF REAL PROPERTY

1.
2.
3.
4.

Real property by nature

Real property by incorporation
Real property by destination or purpose
Real property by analogy

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Nature Of Docks And Structures

Floating
Article 415(9) of the New Civil Code provides that docks and structures which, though floating, are intended
by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake or coast are considered immovable
property. Thus, power barges are categorized as immovable property by destination, being the nature of
machinery and other implements intended by the owner for an industry or work which may be carried on in a
building nor on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of said industry or work. (Fels
Energy Inc. v. Province of Batangas, et al., G.R. No. 168557, February 16, 2007, Callejo, J).

Estoppel In Pais
The principle of estoppel in pais applies wherein one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or by his
own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to
believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be
prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts. (Hanopol v. Shoemart, Inc., G.R.
No. 137774, October 4, 2002, 390 SCRA 439; Phil. Realty Holdings Corp. v. Firematic Phils. Inc., G.R. No.
156251, April 27, 2007, Callejo, J).

CO-OWNERSHIP- Action
Reinvindicatoria
In Iglesia ni Cristo v. Hon. Thelma Ponferada, et al., G.R. No. 168943, October 27, 2007 (Callejo, J), only
one of co-owners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title and/or Accion Publiciana before the RTC, Quezon
City. A motion to dismiss was filed alleging that there was no showing that he was authorized to do so by the
other co-owners. He alleged that after the death of their father in 1970, they inherited the property; their
father, Enrique Santos, during his lifetime, and plaintiffs, after the death of the former, had been in actual,
continuous and peaceful possession of the property until 1994 when petitioner claimed ownership based on
TCT No. 321744 issued on September 18, 1984 and barred them from fencing their property.
Petitioners claim that it had been in actual or material possession of the property since 1984 when TCT No.
321744 was issued in its favor is belied by the allegations in the complaint that respondents had been in
actual and material possession of the property since 1961 up to the time they filed their complaint on
October 24, 2001.
Admittedly, respondents interposed the alternative reinvindicatory action against petitioner. An accion
reinvindicatoria does not necessarily presuppose that the actual and material possession of the property is
on defendant and that plaintiff seeks the recovery of such possession from defendant. It bears stressing that
an accion reinvindicatoria is a remedy seeking the recovery of ownership and includes jus possidendi, jus
utendi, and jus fruendi as well. It is an action whereby a party claims ownership over a parcel of land and
seeks recovery of its full possession. (Capacete v. Baroro, 453 Phil. 392, 402 (2003). Thus, the owner of real
property in actual and material possession thereof may file an accion reinvindicatoria against another
seeking ownership over a parcel of land including jus vindicandi, or the right to exclude defendants from the
possession thereof. In this case, respondents filed an alternative reinvindicatory action claiming ownership
over the property and the cancellation of TCT No. 321744 under the name of petitioner. In fine, they sought
to enforce their jus utendi and jus vindicandi when petitioner claimed ownership and prevented them from
fencing the property.
Since respondents were in actual or physical possession of the property when they filed their complaint
against petitioner on October 24, 2001, the prescriptive period for the reinvindicatory action had not even
commenced to run, even if petitioner was able to secure TCT No. 321744 over the property in 1984. The
reason for this is that:
x x x one who is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his
possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the
rule being, that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to

ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title, which
right can be claimed only by one who is in possession. (Vda. de Cabrera v. CA, 335 Phil. 19 (1997).

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Disturbance And Preliminary

Mandatory Injunction
Possession must not be disturbed;
preliminary mandatory injunction to issue
in case of disturbance.
In Semira Coal Corp. (now Semira Mining Corp.) v. HGL Dev. Corp., et al., G.R. No. 166854, December 6,
2006, HGL has been in possession of a pasture land for 25 years. The petitioner took possession of the said
parcel of land hence, HGL filed an action for the recovery of possession with paper for the issuance of
preliminary mandatory injunction which the RTC granted. Prior thereto, the DENR unilaterally cancelled the
permit to possess on the alleged ground of non-payment of dues. The issue raised was whether the lower
court erred in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. In upholding the lower court, the SC
Held: The lower court was correct.
Under Article 539 of the New Civil Code, a lawful possessor is entitled to be respected in his possession and
any disturbance of possession is a ground for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to
restore the possession. (Torre v. Querubin, et al., 101 Phil. 53 (1957)). The petitioners claim that the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is improper because the instant case is allegedly one
for accion publiciana deserves no consideration. It has been ruled in Torre, et al. v. Hon. J. Querubin, et al.,
that prior to the promulgation of the New Civil Code, it was deemed improper to issue a writ of preliminary
injunction where the party to be enjoined had already taken complete material possession of the property

involved. However, with the enactment of Article 539, the plaintiff is now allowed to avail of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession during the pendency of his action to
recover possession. (Mara, Inc. v. Estrella, L-40511, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 471).
A writ of mandatory injunction is granted upon showing that (a) the invasion of the right is material and
substantial; (b) the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and permanent
necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. (Pelejo v. CA, L-60800, October 18, 1982, 117 SCRA 665).
In this case, HGL had an unmistakable right over the parcel of land by virtue of the pasture lease contract as
it has been in possession for 25 years until 2009. Thus, it is entitled to protection of its possession and any
disturbance of its possession is a valid ground for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
Petitioners possession of the land was only by tolerance of HGL as it was merely allowed to use a portion of
the property so that it could gain easier access to its mining area.
The urgency and necessity for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction also cannot be denied,
considering that HGL stands to suffer material and substantial injury as a result of petitioners continuous
intrusion into the subject property. Petitioners continued occupation of the property not only results in the
deprivation of HGL of the use and possession of the subject property but likewise affects HGLs business
operations. It must be noted that petitioner occupied the property and prevented HGL from conducting its
business way back in 1999 when HGL still had the right to the use and possession of the property for
another 10 years or until 2009. At the very least, the failure of HGL to operate its cattle-grazing business is
perceived as an inability by HGL to comply with the demands of its customers and sows doubts in HGLs
capacity to continue doing business. This damage to HGLs business standing is irreparable injury because
no fair and reasonable redress can be had by HGL insofar as the damage to its goodwill and business
reputation is concerned.
Petitioner contended that the pasture lease agreement had already cancelled by the DENR. The cancellation
or unilateral act of the DENR did not automatically render the FLGLA invalid since the unilateral cancellation
is subject of a separate case which is still pending before the Regional Trial Court.

In Sumipat, et al. v. Banga, et al.,

G.R. No. 155810
In Sumipat, et al. v. Banga, et al., G.R. No. 155810, August 13, 2004, it was ruled that title to immovable
property does not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of a deed of donation until and unless it has
been accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly notified thereof. The acceptance may be made in
the very same instrument of donation. If the acceptance does not appear in the same document, it must be
made in another. Where the deed of donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the
acceptance, made in a separate instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not noted in the deed of
donation and in the separate acceptance, the donation is null and void.

PRESCRIPTION- Acquisition Of
Property By Prescription
In Intercontinental Broadcasting Corp. v. Panganiban, G.R. No. 151407, February 6, 2007, the SC had the
occasion to rule that like other causes of action, the prescriptive period for money claims is subject to
interruption, an din the absence of an equivalent Labor Code provision for determining whether the said
period may be interrupted, Article 1155 of the Civil Code may be applied, (De Guzman v. CA, 358 Phil. 397
(1998), to wit:
ART. 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the Court, when there is a
written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by
the debtor.
Thus, the prescription of an action is interrupted by (a) the filing of an action, (b) a written extrajudicial
demand by the creditor, and (c) a written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor. On this point, the Court
ruled that although the commencement of a civil action stops the running of the statute of prescription or
limitations, its dismissal or voluntary abandonment by plaintiff leaves the parties in exactly the same position
as though no action had been commenced at all. (Laureano v. CA, 381 Phil. 403 (2000).

Acquisition of property by laches.

In Sps. Aguirre v. Heirs of Lucas Villanueva, et al., G.R. No. 169898, October 27, 2006, the petitioners have
been in possession of a parcel of land for more than 26 years. They declared it for taxation purposes,
occupied it, built fences, planted trees and used the same as ingress and egress towards their cottages. The
respondent knew all these but they did not lift a finger to bar them from doing so. They waited for 16 years to
oust them. Will the action prosper? Why?
Held: No. Laches had already set it. Since they have been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the
disputed land in good faith and with a just title since 1971 until 1997, petitioners doubtlessly obtained title by
ordinary acquisitive prescription.
The action is barred by laches which is defined as the failure to assert a right for an unreasonable and
unexplained length or time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either
abandoned or declined to assert it. This equitable defense is based upon grounds of public policy, which
requires the discouragement of stale claims for the peace of society. (Vda. de Rigonan v. Derecho, G.R. No.
159571, July 15, 2005, 463 SCRA 627).

Acquisition of property by prescription.

Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring (or losing) ownership and other real rights through the lapse
of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the
concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. Acquisitive prescription is either ordinary
or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for 10
years. Without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character which
requires uninterrupted adverse possession for 30 years. (Heirs of Maningding v. CA, 342 Phil. 567 (1979)).
Thus, for ordinary acquisitive prescription to set in, possession must be for at least 10 years, in good faith
and with just title. Possession is in good faith when there is a reasonable belief that the person from whom
the thing is received has been the owner thereof and could thereby transmit his ownership. (Art. 1127, NCC).
There is just title when the adverse claimant comes into possession of the property through any of the
modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor is neither the
owner nor in a position to transmit the right. (Art. 1129, NCC).