Writ of Amparo

32. Sec. of DND et al vs. Raymund Manalo

Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging to the CAFGU on the suspicion that
they were members and supporters of the NPA. After 18 months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on August
13, 2007.
Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order to stop the
military officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. While the said case was
pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. The Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation
and omnibus motion to treat their existing petition as amparo petition.
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The CA ordered the Secretary of
National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial
investigation reports as to the Manalos custody, confirm the present places of official assignment of two military officials
involved, and produce all medical reports and records of the Manalo brothers while under military custody. The Secretary
of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the SC seeking to reverse and set aside the decision
promulgated by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not the right to freedom from fear is or can be protected by existing laws.
HELD: In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing violation of the Manalos right to
security. xxx The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security
has been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission by public officials or employees and by
private individuals or entities. xxx Understandably, since their escape, the Manalos have been under concealment and
protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty, and security. The circumstances of respondents
abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will
again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life,
actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo, the Court explained. (GR No. 180906, The Secretary of National
Defense v. Manalo, October 7, 2008)
Distinguish the production order under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo from a search warrant.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The production order under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo should not be confused with a search warrant for law
enforcement under Art. III, sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It said that the production order should be likened to the
production of documents or things under sec. 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which states that upon motion of
any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and
permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents,
papers, books of accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain
evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control. (GR No.
180906, The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, October 7, 2008)

33. Robert Reyes vs. Sec. Raul Gonzales

Facts: Reyes was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November 30, 2007. In the morning of
November 30, 2007, petitioner together with fifty others, were brought to Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings. In
the evening of the same day, the Department of Justice Panel of Prosecutors conducted inquest proceedings to ascertain
whether or not there was probable cause to hold petitioner and the others for trial on charges of Rebellion and/or Inciting
to Rebellion. On December 1, 2007, upon the request of the DILG, respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold
Departure Order No. 45 ordering respondent Commissioner of Immigration to include in the Hold Departure List of the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation the name of petitioner and 49 others relative to the aforementioned case in the
interest of national security and public safety. The RTC however dismissed the charge against him but the HDO was still
in effect. Petitioner requested that HDO should be lifted in view of the dismissal of the criminal case. Petitioner argued that
a writ of amparo should be issued against the respondents, violating the whole breadth of rights enshrined in the
Constitution, specifically, his right to travel.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners right to liberty has been violated or threatened with violation by the issuance of the
subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.
Ruling: No. The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. the restriction on petitioners right to
travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also

failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious
violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.
Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his apprehension that the DOJ may deny his
motion to lift the HDO. He has failed to show any clear threat to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ
of amparo.

33. In the matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data in favor
of Noriel Rodriguez vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
Facts: Rodriguez is petitioner in G.R. No. 191805 and respondent in G.R. No. 193160. He is a member of Alyansa Dagiti
Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP).
Rodriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its
members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. On 6 September 2009, at 5:00 p.m., Rodriguez
had just reached Barangay Tapel, Cagayan when four men forcibly took him and tortured Rodriguez to confess to being a
member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), but he remained silent. After his release, Rodriguez filed before this Court a
Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of
Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties dated 2 December 2009.The petition was filed against
former President Arroyo, et.al.. The writs were granted by the CA.
Issue: 1.Whether the interim reliefs prayed for by Rodriguez may be granted after the writs of amparo and habeas
data have already been issued in his favor. 2. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo
and habeas data cases.
Ruling: 1. Being interim reliefs, they can only be granted before a final adjudication of the case is made. In any case, it
must be underscored that the privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted, necessarily entails the protection of the
aggrieved party. Thus, since we grant petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo, there is no need to issue a temporary
protection order independently of the former. The order restricting respondents from going near Rodriguez is subsumed
under the privilege of the writ.
2. Yes. The doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether respondents are accountable for and
have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to protect
his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court from applying the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo
proceedings to ascertain responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.

In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Writ of Habeas Data in favor of Noriel H. Rodriguez vs.
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
Facts:
Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization
affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State
under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured repeatedly when he refused to confess to his membership in
the NPA. When released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with
Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties. The petition
was filed against former Pres. Arroyo, et al. The writs were granted but the CA dropped Pres Arroyo as party-respondent,
as she may not be sued in any case during her tenure of office or actual incumbency.
Issue:
Whether former Pres GMA should be dropped as respondent on the basis of presidential immunity from suit
Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data cases.
Whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances.
Whether Rodriguez has proven through substantial evidence that former President Arroyo is responsible or accountable
for his abduction.
Held: No. It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability in
amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the
enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing.

As was held in the case of Estrada v Desierto, a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts
committed during the latters tenure; that courts should look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity,
especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission also reveal that the intent of the framers is clear that presidential immunity from suit is concurrent only with
his tenure and not his term. (The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and
fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during
which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the
power of the incumbent.) Therefore, former Pres. GMA cannot use such immunity to shield herself from judicial scrutiny
that would assess whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the
abduction of Rodriguez.
Yes. As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo, command responsibility pertains to the "responsibility of commanders for
crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international
wars or domestic conflict." Although originally used for ascertaining criminal complicity, the command responsibility
doctrine has also found application in civil cases for human rights abuses. This development in the use of command
responsibility in civil proceedings shows that the application of this doctrine has been liberally extended even to cases not
criminal in nature. Thus, it is our view that command responsibility may likewise find application in proceedings seeking
the privilege of the writ of amparo.
Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether respondents are
accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial
measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court from applying the doctrine of command responsibility
in amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those accountable
individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue. In such
application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in
the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party. Such identification of the responsible and accountable
superiors may well be a preliminary determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further
investigation by the appropriate government agency.
Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the doctrine of command
responsibility may nevertheless be applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability within these foregoing definitions.
Yes.
To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must obtain:
a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime
as his subordinate;
b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and
c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the
perpetrators thereof.
The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control over the military that
qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine.
No. Rodriguez anchors his argument on a general allegation that on the basis of the "Melo Commission" and the "Alston
Report," respondents in G.R. No. 191805 already had knowledge of and information on, and should have known that a
climate of enforced disappearances had been perpetrated on members of the NPA. Without even attaching, or at the very
least, quoting these reports, Rodriguez contends that the Melo Report points to rogue military men as the perpetrators.
While the Alston Report states that there is a policy allowing enforced disappearances and pins the blame on the
President, we do not automatically impute responsibility to former President Arroyo for each and every count of forcible
disappearance. Aside from Rodriguezs general averments, there is no piece of evidence that could establish her
responsibility or accountability for his abduction. Neither was there even a clear attempt to show that she should have
known about the violation of his right to life, liberty or security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish or prevent it.

Right to Privacy
34. Marynette Gamboa vs. Malou C. Chan
Facts: Former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Admin No. 275 creating Zearosa Commission which was
formed to investigate the existence of private army groups in the country in view of eliminating and dismantling them
permanently in the future. Upon conclusion of its investigation, the Commission submitted a confidential report to the
office of the President.

Marynette Gamboa was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte. Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police
Ilocos Norte conducted surveillance operation against her and her aides and classified her as PAG coddler. Purportedly
without the benefit of data verification, PNP forwarded in the Reports enumeration of individual maintaining PAGs.
Gamboas association with PAG was published and released in the different forms of media, publicly tagging her
as a PAG coddler. Alleging that her right to privacy was violated, Gamboa filed a petition before the RTC for the issuance
of writ of habeas data to destroy the unverified reports from the PNP data base and restrain PNP from forwarding
baseless reports against her. The RTC ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the report violates her right to privacy.
However, the RTC dismissed Gamboas petition for writ of habeas data saying that Gamboa failed to establish the source
of the information.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the forwarding or information or intelligence report by the PNP to the Commission was an unlawful act that
violated petitioners right to privacy
Whether or not resort to petition for writ of habeas data was proper
HELD: Forwarding of information or intelligence report gathered by the PNP to the Commission is NOT an intrusion of
petitioners right to privacy
It is clear that the issuance of AO 275 articulates a legitimate aim which is to investigate the existence of PAGs with the
ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently. Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the
powers and functions accorded to the Commission and the PNP, the latter collected information on individuals suspected
of maintaining PAGs, monitored them and counteracted their activities. One of those individuals is herein petitioner
Gamboa.
This court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in the report listing her as a PAG
coddler came from the PNP contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to
the Commission was not unlawful act that violated or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security. The PNP
was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically created for the
purpose of investigating the existence of these notorious group. Moreover, the Commission was explicitly authorized to
deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the formers mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the
latter.
Petition for writ of habeas data is NOT PROPER
In this case, Chan and Fang admitted the existence of report, but emphasized its confidential nature. That it was
leaked to third parties and the media was regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be stressed that Gamboa
failed to establish that PNP was responsible for his unintended disclosure. In any event, there are other reliefs available to
her to address the purported damage to her reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas
data unnecessary and improper.
Gamboa failed to prove through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals made her and her
supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police surveillance. As public officials, they enjoy presumption of
regularity, which she failed to overcome. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data must be denied.