Toyota Motors Workers Association v.

NLRC
October 19, 2007 || J. Velasco
By: Rose Ann

Union intensified its strike by barricading the gates of Toyotas Bicutan and Sta.
Rosa plants. The strikers prevented workers who reported for work from
entering the plants.

FACTS:
The Union is a legitimate labor organization duly registered DOLE. It filed a
petition for certification election among the Toyota rank and file employees with
the NCMB. The certification election was conducted. Med-Arbiter Lameyra
certified the Union as the SEBA of all the Toyota rank and file
employees. Toyota challenged said Order via an appeal to the DOLE Secretary.

On March 29, 2001, Toyota filed a petition for injunction with a prayer for the
issuance of a TRO with the NLRC. It sought free ingress to and egress from its
Bicutan and Sta. Rosa manufacturing plants. NLRC issued a TRO against
the Union, ordering the removal of barricades and all forms of obstruction to
ensure free ingress to and egress from the companys premises.

In the meantime, the Union submitted its CBA proposals to Toyota, but the
latter refused to negotiate in view of its pending appeal. Thus, the Union filed a
notice of strike with the NCMB. NCMB-NCR converted the notice of strike into a
preventive mediation case on the ground that the issue of whether or not
the Union is the SEBA of all Toyota rank and file employees was still unresolved
by the DOLE Secretary.
On February 21, 2001, 135 Union officers and members failed to render the
required overtime work, and instead marched to and staged a picket in front of
the BLR office in Intramuros, Manila. More than 200 employees staged mass
actions on February 22 and 23, 2001 in front of the BLR and the DOLE offices,
to protest the partisan and anti-union stance of Toyota.
Due to the deliberate absence of a considerable number of employees
on February 22 to 23, 2001, Toyota experienced acute lack of manpower in its
manufacturing and production lines, and was unable to meet its production
goals resulting in huge losses of PhP 53,849,991.
Toyota sent individual letters to some 360 employees requiring them to explain
why they should not be dismissed for their obstinate defiance of the companys
directive to render overtime work on February 21, 2001, for their failure to
report for work on February 22 and 23, 2001, and for their participation in the
concerted actions which severely disrupted and paralyzed the plants
operations.
The Union filed with the NCMB another notice of strike for union busting
amounting to unfair labor practice.
The Union nonetheless submitted an explanation in compliance with the
notices sent by Toyota to the erring employees. The Union members explained
that their refusal to work on their scheduled work time for two consecutive days
was simply an exercise of their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and
to petition the government for redress of grievances. It further argued that the
demonstrations staged by the employees could not be classified as an illegal
strike or picket, and that Toyota had already condoned the alleged acts when it
accepted back the subject employees.

Meanwhile, Toyota filed a petition to declare the strike illegal with the NLRC
arbitration branch.
On April 10, 2001, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor
dispute and issued an Order certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC. In the
Order the DOLE Secretary gave a return to work directive and likewise
ordered Toyota to accept the returning employees under the same terms and
conditions obtaining prior to the strike or at its option, put them under payroll
reinstatement. The parties were also enjoined from committing acts that may
worsen the situation.
The Union ended the strike. The union members and officers tried to return to
work but were told that Toyota opted for payroll-reinstatement authorized by
the Order of the DOLE Secretary.
In the meantime, the Union filed an MR of the DOLE Secretarys April 10, 2001
certification Order. SOLE denied. A petition for certiorari was filed in the CA.
Meanwhile, on May 23, 2001,despite the issuance of the DOLE Secretarys
certification Order, several payroll-reinstated members of the Union staged a
protest rally in front of Toyotas Bicutan Plant bearing placards and streamers in
defiance of the April 10, 2001 Order.
Then, on May 28, 2001, around 44 Union members staged another protest
action in front of the Bicutan Plant. At the same time, some 29 payrollreinstated employees picketed in front of the Santa Rosa Plants main entrance,
and were later joined by other Union members.
On June 5, 2001, notwithstanding the certification Order, the Union filed
another notice of strike. The DOLE Secretary directed the second notice of
strike to be subsumed in the April 10, 2001 certification Order.
CA dismissed the Unions petition for certiorari assailing the DOLE Secretarys
April 10, 2001 Order.

Toyota terminated the employment of 227 employees for participation in

concerted actions in violation of its Code of Conduct and for misconduct under
Article 282 of the Labor Code.

Subsequently, the NLRC declared the strikes staged by the Union on February
21 to 23, 2001 and May 23 and 28, 2001 as illegal. Reasons:

failed to comply with the procedural requirements of a valid strike

under Art. 263 of the Labor Code.

for staging strikes after the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over
the Toyota dispute

In reaction to the dismissal of its union members and officers, the Union went
on strike on March 17, 2001. From March 28, 2001 to April 12, 2001, the

CA affirmed NLRC with a modification, however, of deleting the award of

severance compensation to the dismissed Union members.

However, in its Resolution, the CA modified its decision by reinstating

severance compensation to the dismissed employees based on social justice.
ISSUE
WON the strikes conducted were illegal strikesYES
WoN the Union Officers are liableYES
WoN the participating Union members are liableYES
WoN separation pay may be granted--NO
RATIO
The alleged protest rallies in front of the offices of BLR and DOLE
Secretary and at the Toyota plants constituted illegal strikes
February 2001 Strikes: ILLEGAL
While the facts in Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization are similar
in some respects to that of the present case, the Union fails to realize one
major difference: there was no labor dispute in Philippine Blooming Mills
Employees Organization. In the present case, there was an on-going labor
dispute arising from Toyotas refusal to recognize and negotiate with the Union,
which was the subject of the notice of strike filed by the Union on January 16,
2001.
Applying pertinent legal provisions and jurisprudence, the protest actions
undertaken by the Union officials and members on February 21 to 23, 2001 are
not valid and proper exercises of their right to assemble and ask government
for redress of their complaints, but are illegal strikes in breach of the Labor
Code.
The Unions position is weakened by the lack of permit from the City of Manila to
hold rallies. The purported reason for these protest actions was to safeguard
their rights against any abuse which the med-arbiter may commit against their
cause. However, the Union failed to advance convincing proof that the medarbiter was biased against them. What comes to the fore is that the decision
not to work for two days was designed and calculated to cripple the
manufacturing arm of Toyota. It becomes obvious that the real and ultimate
goal of the Union is to coerce Toyota to finally acknowledge the Union as the
sole bargaining agent of the company. This is not a legal and valid exercise of
the right of assembly and to demand redress of grievance.
The Union failed to comply with the following requirements for a valid
strike: (1) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended
date of strike, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (2) strike vote
approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit
concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; and
(3) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days
before the intended strike. These requirements are mandatory and the failure
of a union to comply with them renders the strike illegal. The evident intention
of the law in requiring the strike notice and the strike-vote report is to
reasonably regulate the right to strike, which is essential to the attainment of
legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law.
Moreover, the February 2001 strikes are in blatant violation of Sec. D, par. 6
of Toyotas Code of Conduct which prohibits inciting or participating in riots,
disorders, alleged strikes or concerted actions detrimental to [Toyotas]

interest. The penalty for the offense is dismissal. The Union and its members
are bound by the company rules, and the February 2001 mass actions and
deliberate refusal to render regular and overtime work on said days violated
these rules.
March-April 2001 Strikes: ILLEGAL
They were initially legal as the legal requirements were met. However, when
the Union barricaded the gates of the Bicutan and Sta. Rosa plants and blocked
the free ingress to and egress from the company premises, these strikes were
illegal because unlawful means were employed. The acts of the Union officers
and members are in palpable violation of Art. 264(e), which proscribes acts of
violence, coercion, or intimidation, or which obstruct the free ingress to and
egress from the company premises.
May 2001 Strikes: ILLEGAL
The Union asserts that the rallies held on May 23 and 28, 2001 could not be
considered strikes, as the participants were the dismissed employees who were
on payroll reinstatement. It concludes that there was no work stoppage.
SC: While it may be conceded that there was no work disruption in the
two Toyota plants, the fact still remains that the Union and its members
picketed and performed concerted actions in front of the Company
premises. This is a patent violation of the assumption of jurisdiction and
certification Order of the DOLE Secretary, which ordered the parties to cease
and desist from committing any act that might lead to the worsening of an
already deteriorated situation. While there are no work stoppages, the pickets
and concerted actions outside the plants have a demoralizing and even chilling
effect on the workers inside the plants and can be considered as veiled threats
of possible trouble to the workers when they go out of the company premises
after work and of impending disruption of operations to company officials and
even to customers in the days to come.
Union officers are liable for unlawful strikes or illegal acts during a
strike
Art. 264(a) sanctions the dismissal of a union officer who knowingly participates
in an illegal strike or who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal
acts during a lawful strike.
The Union officials were in clear breach of Art. 264(a) when they knowingly
participated in the illegal strikes held from February 21 to 23, 2001, from March
17 to April 12, 2001, and on May 23 and 28, 2001.
Members liability depends on participation in illegal acts
Art. 264(a) of the Labor Code provides that a member is liable when he
knowingly participates in an illegal act during a strike. While the provision is
silent on whether the strike is legal or illegal, we find that the same is
irrelevant. As long as the members commit illegal acts, in a legal or illegal
strike, then they can be terminated. However, an ordinary striking worker
cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike.
No precise meaning was given to the phrase illegal acts (committed in a
strike). It may encompass a number of acts that violate existing labor or
criminal laws, such as the following:

(1) Violation of Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code which provides that [n]o person
engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation
or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employers premises for lawful
purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares;
(2) Commission of crimes and other unlawful acts in carrying out the strike; and
(3) Violation of any order, prohibition, or injunction issued by the DOLE
Secretary or NLRC in connection with the assumption of
jurisdiction/certification Order under Art. 263(g) of the Labor Code.
This enumeration is not exclusive and it may cover other breaches of existing
laws.
After a scrutiny of the records, the 227 employees indeed joined the February
21, 22, and 23, 2001 rallies and refused to render overtime work or report for
work.
Anent the March 28 to April 12, 2001 strikes, evidence is ample to show
commission of illegal acts like acts of coercion or intimidation and obstructing
free ingress to or egress from the company premises. The strikers badmouthed
people coming in and shouted invectives such as bakeru at Japanese officers of
the company. The strikers even pounded the vehicles of Toyota officials. More
importantly, they prevented the ingress of Toyota employees, customers,
suppliers, and other persons who wanted to transact business with the
company. These were patent violations of Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code, and
may constitute crimes under the RPC such as threats or coercion among others.
Lastly, the strikers, though on payroll reinstatement, staged protest rallies
on May 23, 2001 and May 28, 2001 which are patent violations of the April 10,
2001 assumption of jurisdiction/certification Order issued by the SOLE, which
proscribed the commission of acts that might lead to the worsening of an
already deteriorated situation. Art. 263(g) is clear that strikers who violate the
assumption/certification Order may suffer dismissal from work.
SEPARATION PAY cannot be granted in this case
GEneral Rule: when just causes for terminating the services of an employee
under Art. 282 of the Labor Code exist, the employee is not entitled to
separation pay. The apparent reason behind the forfeiture of the right to
termination pay is that lawbreakers should not benefit from their illegal
acts. The dismissed employee, however, is entitled to whatever rights, benefits
and privileges [s/he] may have under the applicable individual or collective
bargaining agreement with the employer or voluntary employer policy or
practice or under the Labor Code and other existing laws.
One exception where separation pay is given even though an employee is
validly dismissed is when the court finds justification in applying the principle of
social justice well entrenched in the 1987 Constitution. In PLDT v. NLRC, the
Court laid down the rule that severance compensation shall be allowed only
when the cause of the dismissal is other than serious misconduct or that which
reflects adversely on the employees moral character.
Explicit in PLDT are two exceptions: serious misconduct (which is the first
ground for dismissal under Art. 282) or acts that reflect on the moral character
of the employee.

A painstaking review of case law renders obtuse the Unions claim for
separation pay. In a slew of cases, this Court refrained from awarding
separation pay or financial assistance to union officers and members who were
separated from service due to their participation in or commission of illegal acts
during strikes.

Phil Blooming Mills Employment Org (PBMEO) v PBM Co. Inc.

June 5, 1973; Makasiar, J.:
By: Paola
FACTS:
1. PBMEO is a legitimate labor union composed of the employees of PBM Co.
393 members joined the demonstration at issue.
2. On March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at
Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of
the Pasig police, to be participated in by workers in the first shift (6 AM to
2 PM), as well as those in the second (7 AM to 4 PM) and third (8 AM 5PM)
shifts. The company was informed of the proposed demonstration.
3. On March 2, 1969, PBM Co. allegedly learned of the demonstration.
4. March 3: A meeting was again held between department heads for the
union and the management was called by the company on March 3, asking
that the union panel confirm or deny the mass demonstration. It was
confirmed by the union spokesperson Pacu.
a. Pacu, informed management that the demonstration cannot be
cancelled because it has already been agreed upon and explained
that it had nothing to do with the company bec. the union had no
quarrel with the management.
b. Management informed that the demonstration is an inalienable
right granted by the constitution, but emphasized that the
demonstration should not unduly prejudice the normal operations
of the company.
c. The company suggested that the first shift from 6am-2pm should
report to work in order to avoid loss or damage to the firm.
d. They warned that those in the 1st and 2nd shift who participate
without filing for leave, and who fail to report on the day of the
demonstration shall be dismissed for violating the no strike no
lockout policy provision in the CBA tantamount to an
illegal strike.
e. The union countered that it was too late to change their plans
sinche the demonstration will be held the following morning.
5. March 4, 1969: Adviser of PBMEO, Mr. Aniston, sent PBM Co a cablegram to
Company received 9:50 AM reiterating request excuse day shift
employees joining demonstration march
6. Because preparations had been made, the union proceeded with the
demonstration (400 union members went to the protest)
7. Complaint was filed by the company to the CIR for violation of section 4(a)6, in relation to sections 13 and 14 of RA 875 (Act to Promote Industrial
Peace) and their CBA.
8. In their answer, PBMEO said that:
a. They did not violate CBA because they notified PBM Co. prior to the
demonstration
b. That the mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their
constitutional right of free speech against the abuses of Pasig
policemen.
c. That their demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it
was not directed against PBM Co.
9. CIR: PBMEO was guilty of bargaining in bad faith, and its officers
Florencio, Rufino, Marioano, Asecion, Bonifacio, Benjamin, Nicanor and
Rodulfo (petitioners here) were held directly responsible for perpetrating
the ULP, thus they were dismissed. Decision was allegedly received on
September 22, 1969.

10. An MR was filed on September 29. The company argues that under the CIR
Rules of Court, the petitioners had 5 days to file MR, and since it was filed 2
days late, the MR should be dismissed.
11. CIR on MR: dismissed for being filed beyond the reglementary period.
Decision was appealed to the SC.
ISSUES/HELD/RATIO:
W/N the Union was engaged in ULP for holding the demonstration
NO.

The court went into a lengthy discussion about rights and freedoms,
but it highlighted that in the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of
free expression and assembly occupy a preferred position as they are
essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political
institutions [] [And] that while the Bill of Rights also protects property
rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized.

Because there freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as well as

supremely precious in our society and the threat of sanctions may
deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions, they need breathing space to survive, permitting
government regulation only with narrow specificity.

Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human
rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the
passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the
power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against
the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful,
and of oligarchs - political, economic or otherwise.

In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and

of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential
to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political
institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and
the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions.

The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored

by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational relation between
the means employed by the law and its object or purpose
that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive
would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs
property rights. On the other hand, a constitutional or valid
infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion,
namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive
evil which the State has the right to prevent.

The CIR, after opining that the mass demonstration was not a
declaration of strike, concluded that by their concerted act and the
occurrence temporary stoppage of work, [sic] PBMEO is guilty of
bargaining in bad faith. HOWEVER, the CIR is incorrect
o
The demonstration was against the abusive Pasig policemen,
not against PBM Co. Thus, they were merely exercising
freedom of expression in general and of the right of assembly
and of petition of redress of grievances in particular [before
the Chief Executive, the proper government agency, against
abusive policemen]

o
o
o

As a matter of fact, it was the duty of [PBM Co] to protect its

employees from the harassment of the police officers. It was to
the interest of [PBM Co] to rally in defense of, and take up the
cudgels for its employees so that they could report to work
free from harassment.
The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or
damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 AM
to 2 PM is a plea for the preservation merely of their property
rights [] Material loss can be repaired or adequately
compensated. The debasement of the human being broken
in morale and brutalized in spirit can never be fully
evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars
remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in
anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on
bruised tissues.
To regard the demonstration against police officers, not
against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective
bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining
agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of
the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the
compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a
potent means of inhibiting speech"
According to CIR the CBA fixes the work shift of the employees
and as such it imposes a duty on part of employees to observe
working hours. This strained construction, denying right
to stage a mass demonstration against police abuses
during working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny
over the mind and life of workers.
Injunction by court of the mass demonstration would be
trenching upon freedom of expression of workers.
PBM Co claims that there was no need for all workers to
participate in the demonstration, to avoid loss or damage to th
firm. This stand fails to appreciate that the condition
sine qua non of an effective demonstration especially
by the labor union, is the complete unity of its
members as well as their total presence at the
demonstration site in order to generate maximum sympathy
for the validity of their cause but also immediate action from
the government agency concerned.
At any rate, Union notified PBM Co 2 days prior to
demonstration. There was a lack of human understanding or
compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the request of
the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to
carry out its mass demonstration

W/N PBM Co. is guilty of ULP YES.

The company is actually the one guilty of unfair labor practice.

Because refusal on the part of the company to permit all employees to
join the demonstration, and the subsequent dismissal of the 8
petitioners constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the
freedom of expression, assembly, and freedom to petition for
redress of grievances.

The Company committed an unfair labor practice as defined in

Section 4(a-1) in relation to section 3 of the Industrial Peace
Act. Sec 3 guarantees the right of employees to engage
in concerted activities for mutual aid or protection,
while 4(a-1) makes it a ULP for an employer to interfere
with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of
rights granted in Sec. 3.
Obviously, the facts show that the demonstration staged was
for their mutual aid and protection, and the company with its
threat of dismissal on the employees committed an act
interfering with the exercise of this right.
Further, the CIR failed to make any finding as to the fact
of losses actually sustained by the firm. This can only
mean that firm did not sustain damage: no evidence to show it
lost expected profits, or that penalties were exacted by
customers whose orders could not be filled that day.
The SC held that on the contrary, the company saved a sizable
amount in the form of wages for its hundreds of workers, cost
of fuel, water and electric consumption for that day [which
could amply compensate unrealized profits or damage that
day] lol

W/N dismissal of the 8 leaders valid NO.

The dismissal of the 8 leaders is also contrary to the principles of social

justice enunciated in the Constitution [promotion of social justice to
insure economic security of all people; and protection to labor]

Further, the violation of the employees constitutional right divested

the CIR of jurisdiction, and as a consequence, its judgment is null and
void and confers no rights.

Does the fact that the MR was filed 2 days late defeat the rights if the
employees NO.

The rules of procedure here were promulgated by the CIR pursuant to

legislative legislation.

According to the SC, the constitution is superior to any statute or

subordinate rules. The court highlighted that the rights involved in this
case were the rights of free expression, assembly and petition.
o
It is an accepted principle that the SC has the inherent power
to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from
its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require.
o
The suspension of the provision involved (Sec 15) is also
authorized by the CIR charter, which enjoins the CIR to act
according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the
case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms
o
These doctrines have been upheld in Kapisanan v Hamilton,
Palma v Oreta.

Even if the CIR orders were to be given effect, the dismissal or

termination of the 8 leaders is harsh for a 1 day absence in work. The
appropriate penaltyif any at all is deservedshould have
been to charge the one day absence against vacation or sick
leave.

Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention,

but a complete lack of sympathetic understanding of the plight of its
laborers who claim that they are being subjected to indignities by the
local police.

Dismissed 8 employees should be reinstated with full back pay from date of
separation from service

Biflex Phils Inc Labor Union (NAFLU) v. Filflex Industrial and Biflex
Phils. Inc.
December 19, 2006 / Carpio-Morales, J.
Digest by Cate Alegre
Summary
There was a welga ng bayan. Two labor unions, on the date such welga was
held joined in and conducted work stoppage and prevented ingress and egress
at their office. Management claimed that such work stoppage was illegal. SC
sided with management claiming what the union did was in the nature of
sympathy strike, did not follow the proper procedure in staging a strike, and
assuming arguendo that the procedural rules were followed, the act of
preventing ingress and egress was also illegal
Doctrine
Employees who have no labor dispute with their employer but who, on a day
they are scheduled to work, refuse to work and instead join a welga ng
bayan commit an illegal work stoppage. Even if petitioners joining the welga
ng bayan were considered merely as an exercise of their freedom of expression,
the exercise of such rights is not absolute. For the protection of other significant
state interests such as the "right of enterprises to reasonable returns on
investments, and to expansion and growth" enshrined in the 1987 Constitution
must also be considered. The legality of a strike is determined not only by
compliance with its legal formalities but also by the means by which it is carried
out.
FACTS:

The unions involved in this case were Biflex (Phils) Inc. Labor Union and
Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Labor Union (Petitioners), which
are affiliated with National Federation of Labor Unions (NAFLU).
o
Unions are the respective collective bargaining agents of the
employees of the corporations

Biflex (Phils.) Inc. and Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Corporation

(Respondents) are sister companies engaged in garment business.
They are situated in one big compound and have a common entrance

October 24, 1990 a welga ng bayan was staged to protest the oil
price hike. Petitioners also staged a work stoppage to join the welga
which lasted for several days.
o
October 31 - Respondents filed a petition to declare the work
stoppage illegal for failure to comply with procedural
requirements

November 13, 1990 upon resumption of operations, Petitioners

claimed that they were illegally locked out by the respondents.
o
Respondents were slighted by their no-show and as a
punishment they were barred from the company premises
o
They placed tents, tables and chairs in front of the main
gate because these were for the convenience of union
members who check everyday if they will be allowed to go
back to work (basically saying that they didnt conduct a
strike)

Respondents the work stoppage was illegal since they failed to

comply with the following: (1) filing of notice of strike; (2) securing a

strike vote, and (3) submission of a report of the strike vote to the
Department of Labor and Employment
LA strike was illegal! Respondents then terminated the employment
of petitioners union members
NLRC reversed
CA reversed NLRC and reinstated LA

ISSUE: WON the strike was illegal? YES

RATIO

Stoppage of work due to welga ng bayan is in the nature of a general

strike, an extended sympathy strike. It affects numerous employers
including those who do not have a dispute with their employees
regarding their terms and conditions of employment.
o
Even if petitioners joining the welga ng bayan were
considered merely as an exercise of their freedom of
expression, freedom of assembly or freedom to petition the
government for redress of grievances, the exercise of such
rights is not absolute.
o
The right of enterprises to reasonable returns on investments
and to expansion and growth which is enshrined in the 1987
Constitution must also be considered.

There being no showing that petitioners notified respondents of their

intention, or that they were allowed by respondents, to join the welga
ng bayan, their work stoppage is beyond legal protection.

Even assuming arguendo that in staging the strike, petitioners had

complied with legal formalities, the strike would just the same be
illegal, for by blocking the free ingress to and egress from the
company premises, they violated Article 264(e) of the Labor Code
which provides that "[n]o person engaged in picketing shall obstruct
the free ingress to or egress from the employers premises for lawful
purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares."

In fine, the legality of a strike is determined not only by compliance

with its legal formalities but also by the means by which it is carried
out. Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code provides:
. . . Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any
worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal
acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment
status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not
constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a
replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.

In Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. v. National Labor Relations

Commission,22 this Court, passing on the use of the word "may" in the
immediately quoted provision, held that "[t]he law . . . grants the
employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an
illegal strike as having lost his employment." Reinstatement of a striker
or retention of his employment, despite his participation in an illegal
strike, is a management prerogative which this Court may not
supplant.

HYATT REGENCY MANILA vs. SAMASAH-NUWHRAIN

G.R. No. 165756| June 5, 2009
Digest by Ian
DOCTRINES:

The requisites for a valid strike are: (a) a notice of strike filed with the
DOLE 30 days before the intended date thereof or 15 days in case of
ULP; (b) a strike vote approved by a majority of the total union
membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot
in a meeting called for that purpose; and (c) a notice to the DOLE of
the results of the voting at least seven (7) days before the intended
strike.The requirements are mandatory and failure of a union to comply
therewith renders the strike illegal.

A valid and legal strike must be based on "strikeable" grounds,

because if it is based on a "non strikeable" ground, it is generally
deemed an illegal strike. Corollarily, a strike grounded on ULP is illegal
if no acts constituting ULP actually exist.

As an exception, even if no such acts are committed by the employer,

if the employees believe in good faith that ULP actually exists, then the
strike held pursuant to such belief may be legal. As a general rule,
therefore, where a union believes that an employer committed ULP and
the surrounding circumstances warranted such belief in good faith, the
resulting strike may be considered legal although, subsequently, such
allegations of unfair labor practices were found to be
groundless.
Facts: Petition Company Hotel Enterprises of the Philippines (HEPI), owners of
Hyatt Regency Manila had been experiencing financial losses since 2001 due to
local and international economic slowdown aggravated by the 9/11 attack. Its
unpromising financial condition was evidenced by an audited financial report of
the SGV & Co., indicating that its suffered a gross operating loss of P16M, in
2002, a staggering decline compared to its P48M gross operating profit in 2000.
It employed various cost-cutting measures to no avail. It eventually decided to
downsize its workforce and avail the service of independent contractors for
some of the positions to save on operating expenses.
Respondent is the union of R&F employees of Hyatt. It opposed the
downsizing because based on its own study, there was no financial slump.
Despite its opposition, a list of the positions declared redundant and to be
contracted out was given by the management to the Union on March 22, 2002.
Notices of termination were, likewise, sent to 48 employees whose positions
were to be retrenched or declared as redundant. The notices were sent on April
5, 2002 and were to take effect on May 5, 2002. A notice of termination was
also submitted by the management to the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) indicating the names, positions, addresses, and salaries of
the employees to be terminated.
On April 12, 2002, the Union filed a notice of strike based on ULP. The
LA ruled that the strike was valid but the NLRC reversed the LA. On appeal to
the CA, the CA reversed the NLRC hence this petition filed by the company.
Issue: WON the hotel validly suspended the union officers for six months w/o
pay for staging an illegal strike based on the decision of the NLRC.
[One issue raised is WON the hotel validly implemented the cost-cutting
measures. This was answered by the Court in the affirmative, giving credence

to the impartial audit of SGV and that the hotel exercised its right to retrench in
good faith.]
Held: No The strike was legal. A suspension of two (2) months without pay
should have been more reasonable and just. Be it noted that the striking
workers are not entitled to receive strikeduration pay, the ULP allegation
against the employer being unfounded. But since reinstatement is no longer
feasible, the hotel having permanently ceased operations on July 2, 2007, we
hereby order the Labor Arbiter to instead make the necessary adjustments in
the computation of the separation pay to be received by the Union officers
concerned.
Ratio: See doctrine.
In the case at bar:
Procedural Requirement: In this case, respondent fully satisfied the procedural
requirements prescribed by law: a strike notice filed on April 12, 2002; a strike
vote reached on April 25, 2002; notification of the strike vote filed also on April
25, 2002; conciliation proceedings conducted on May 8, 20002; and the actual
strike on May 10, 2002.
Substantive: Here, respondent Union went on strike in the honest belief that
petitioner was committing ULP after the latter decided to downsize its
workforce contrary to the staffing/manning standards adopted by both parties
under a CBA forged only four (4) short months earlier. The belief was bolstered
when the management hired 100 contractual workers to replace the 48
terminated regular rankandfile employees who were all Union members.
Indeed, those circumstances showed prima facie that the hotel committed ULP.
Thus, even if technically there was no legal ground to stage a strike based on
ULP, since the attendant circumstances support the belief in good faith that
petitioner's retrenchment scheme was structured to weaken the bargaining
power of the Union, the strike, by exception, may be considered legal.

YSS Employees Union v. YSS Laboratories

December 4, 2009 | Chico-Nazario, J.
By: Jadd
SUMMARY:
YSS implemented a retrenchment program to avoid increasing business losses.
YSS terminated the services of 11 employees (including union members and
officers) when no one availed of early retirement. The Union staged a strike
after the NCMB supervised the strike vote. After the NCMBs conciliation
proceedings failed, the SOLE certified the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory
arbitration, and issued a return to work order. YSS refused to readmit 9 union
officers and members alleging a valid retrenchment and illegal strike. The SOLE
found for the Union and ordered their readmission, but the CA reversed the
SOLE. The SC reversed the CA, and granted the Unions Petition for Review on
Certiorari, holding that YSS should readmit all striking employees, including the
retrenched ones, because allowing the employer to decide which strikers
should be admitted back to work would strip the certification/AJO of the
necessary coercive power and violate their compulsory and executory nature.
DOCTRINE:
Employers are not allowed to determine which strikers should be covered by a
return-to-work-order because it is compulsory and executory, aimed at serving
the national interest by preserving the status quo ante and industrial peace.
FACTS:

The Union (YSS EU) is a duly-registered labor organization, and is the

SEBA of YSS rank-and-file employees.

YSS implemented a retrenchment program to avoid increasing

business losses.
o
11 employees1 were affected, and allegedly chosen in
accordance with the companys reasonable standards as
established. 4 were union officers2 while 5 were union
members3.
o
At first, they were given the option to avail of YSS early
retirement program.
o
When no one availed of early retirement, YSS exercised its
option to terminate their services based on Art. 289 (then
283).

March 19, 2001 Copies of the termination notices were served on the
DOLE.

March 20, 2001 Copies of the termination notices were served on the
employees concerned.

April 20, 2001 The Union staged a strike after the strike vote was
taken under the NCMBs supervision.

The NCMBs conciliation proceedings were unsuccessful.

May 11, 2001 SOLE certified the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory
arbitration. The RTWO (Return to Work Order) directed the employees

1 Resie Santos, Edwin Perona, Rogelio Salmorin, Joselina Victoria, Dominador Monterola, Jacqueline Tubale,
Loreto Esteves, Jetner Argamaso, Teofilo Pagaduan, Jr., Bernardita Mesias and Alexander Reig.
2 Secretary - Joselina Victoria, Auditor - Edwin Perona, Rogelio Salmorin - PRO, Teofilo Pagaduan, Jr. Board Member
3 Resie Santos, Dominador Monterola, Jacqueline Tubale, Loreto Esteves, Jetner Argamaso

to return to work within 24 hours from receipt, and directed YSS to

accept them under pre-strike terms and conditions.4
o
YSS refused to comply.

YSS Urgent MR argued that the 9 union officers and

members should be excluded due to valid
retrenchment and participating in an illegal strike.
o
The Union moved to cite YSS in contempt.
June 9, 2001 The SOLE found for the Union, ordering YSS to
immediately accept back to work the 9 retrenched employees and 9
union officers who allegedly initiated the strike, or otherwise reinstate
them in the payroll if actual reinstatement was not possible.
November 26, 2001 The CA granted YSS Petition for Certiorari, and
reversed the SOLEs orders, finding that there was a valid
retrenchment and that the strike was illegal.
August 29, 2002 The CA denied the Unions MR.
The Union goes up to the SC through a Petition for Review on
Certiorari.

ISSUES/HELD: WON the retrenched employees should be part of the return to

work order? YES
RATIO:
Yes, the retrenched employees should be part of the RTWO. YSS failed to show
that the SOLE gravely abused its discretion by issuing the orders in an
arbitrary/despotic manner. The national interest is served by preserving the
status quo ante and industrial peace pending determination of the main issues,
which is why the orders (AJO, RTWO) are compulsory and executory.
1) Character of SOLEs labor dispute powers: Plenary and broad, with
wide latitude of discretion to adopt the most expeditious and
reasonable way to resolve the issue. (Citing Telefunken
Semiconductors Employees Union v. CA (2000))
2) On the Assumption of Jurisdiction (AJO)
A) Character The assumption of jurisdiction in Art. 269(g) is the
States exercise of police power for the common good. (Citing
Phimco Industries, Inc. v. Acting Secretary of Labor Brillantes
(1999))
1. Police Power
a. Definition A government's inherent
power to enact laws to promote
society's order, safety, health, and
general welfare, within constitutional
limits.
b. Character Inherent and does not
need explicit constitutional basis.
(Citing Philtread Workers Union
(PTWU) v. Confesor (1997))

4 CONSIDERING THESE PREMISES, this Office hereby certifies the labor dispute at [YSS Laboratories] to
the [NLRC] for compulsory arbitration, pursuant to Article [269](g) of the Labor [Code], as amended.All striking
workers are hereby directed to return to work within twenty four (24) hours from receipt of this Order and for
the Company to accept them back under the same terms and conditions of employment prior to the strike.
The parties are further directed to cease and desist from committing any act which might further worsen the
situation.
Let the entire records of this case be forwarded to the NLRC for its appropriate action.

B)

3)

4)

5)

6)

7)

Purpose of granting the assumption of jurisdiction power to the

SOLE Enable the SOLE to quickly, fairly, and justly resolve
the dispute to minimize or avert damage to the national
interest by avoiding work stoppage or industrial activity lag, or
even just the threat of such. (Citing Telefunken
Semiconductors Employees Union v. CA (2000))
C) Effects upon the strike/lockout (Citing Trans-Asia Shipping
Lines, Inc.-Unlicensed Crews Employees Union-Associated
Labor Unions (Tasli-Alu) v.CA (2004)):
i. If it has not yet taken place Automatically enjoined
ii. If it has taken place Striking workers return to work,
and employer shall immediately resume operations
and readmit all workers under the same terms and
conditions prevailing before the strike/lockout.
On Compulsory Arbitration Certification
A) Purpose Quick dispute resolution, not interference with
management rights.
B) Regarding the dynamics between the SOLE and labor arbiters as
seen in Art. 269(g) The provision means for shared jurisdiction
between the SOLE and labor arbiters, subject to certain conditions.
Otherwise, the SOLE would not be able to effectively and efficiently
dispose of the primary dispute, and there might be conflicting
rulings. This interpretation of the provision breathes life into it,
rather than defeating it. (Citing International Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
v. SOLE, 1999)
On Return to Work Orders
A) Character Compulsory and executory.
B) Effect Must be obeyed until set aside. (Citing PALEA v. PAL, 1971)
C) Basis A courts exercise of its compulsory arbitration power.
On Grave Abuse of Discretion
A) Definition Capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment.
B) Effect Equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
C) Requisite So patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility. (Citing Philtread Workers Union (PTWU) v.
Confesor, (1997))
In this case: There was no grave abuse of discretion.
A) YSS failed to prove that the SOLE issued the orders in an
arbitrary/despotic manner.
B) The orders were issued to preserve the status quo ante and
industrial peace while the main issues (retrenchment validity and
strike legality) were being decided in the proper forum. This
protects the common good because a continued strike is against
the employer and employees interest.
C) YSS assertion of the retrenchments validity and the strikes
illegality as grounds for not accepting certain employees violates
the compulsory and executory character of AJOs and compulsory
arbitration certifications.
D) YSS must readmit all striking employees.
Allowing the employer to decide which strikers should be admitted
back to work would strip the certification/AJO of the necessary coercive
power.

Solid Bank Union (now First Metro Investment Corp.) v. METROBANK

September 17, 2012 | del Castillo, J.
By: Kiko del Valle
SUMMARY:
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
In October 1999, petitioner Solidbank and respondent Solidbank
Employees Union (Union) were set to renegotiate the economic provisions of
their 1997-2001 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) to cover the remaining
two years.
Negotiations commenced but seeing that an agreement was unlikely,
the Union declared a deadlock and filed a Notice of Strike. During the collective
bargaining negotiations, some Union members staged a series of mass actions.
In view of the impending actual strike, the SOLE assumed jurisdiction over the
labor dispute, pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended. The
assumption order directed the parties to cease and desist from committing any
and all acts that might exacerbate the situation.
SOLE resolved all economic and non-economic issues submitted by the parties,
as follows:
a. Directing Solidbank Corporation and Solidbank Union to conclude their
Collective Bargaining Agreement for the years 2000 and 2001, incorporating
the dispositions above set forth;
b. Dismissing the unfair labor practice charge against Solidbank Corporation;
c. Directing Solidbank to deduct or check-off from the employees lump sum
payment an amount equivalent to seven percent (7%) of their economic
benefits for the first (1st) year, inclusive of signing bonuses, and to remit or turn
over the said sum to the Unions authorized representative, subject to the
requirements of check-off;
d. Directing Solidbank to recall the show-cause memos issued to employees
who participated in the mass actions if such memos were in fact issued.
Dissatisfied with the Secretarys ruling, the Union officers and members
decided to protest the same by holding a rally infront of the Office of SOLE in
Intramuros, Manila, simultaneous with the filing of their motion for
reconsideration. an overwhelming majority of employees, including the
individual respondents, joined the mass leave and protest action at the DOLE
office while the banks provincial branches in Cebu, Iloilo, Bacolod and Naga
followed suit and boycotted regular work. The union members also picketed the
banks Head Office in Binondo and Paseo de Roxas.
Solidbanks business operations were paralyzed. The President of Solidbank,
Deogracias N. Vistan, issued a memorandum addressed to all employees calling
their absence from work and demonstration infront of the DOLE office as an
illegal act, and reminding them that they have put their jobs at risk as they will
be asked to show cause why they should not be terminated for participating in
the union-instigated concerted action. The employees work
abandonment/boycott lasted for three days.

On the third day of the concerted work boycott, Vistan issued another
memorandum. Vistan issued another memorandum, this time declaring that
the bank is prepared to take back employees who will report for work starting
the next day, provided these employees were/are not part of those who led or
instigated or coerced their co-employees into participating in this illegal act.
Out of the 712 employees who took part in the three-day work boycott, a total
of 513 returned to work and were accepted by the bank. The remaining 199
employees insisted on defying Vistans directive, which included respondents
Ernesto U. Gamier, Elena R. Condevillamar, Janice L. Arriola and Ophelia C. De
Guzman. For their failure to return to work, the said 199 employees were each
issued a show-cause memo directing them to submit a written explanation
within twenty-four (24) hours why they should not be dismissed for the illegal
strike.
The herein 129 individual respondents were among the 199 employees who
were terminated for their participation in the three-day work boycott and
protest action. On various dates in June 2000, twenty-one (21) of the individual
respondents executed Release, Waiver and Quitclaim in favor of Solidbank.
SOLE denied the motions for reconsideration filed by Solidbank and the Union.
The Monetary Board approved the request of Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company (Metrobank) to acquire the existing non-real estate assets of
Solidbank in consideration of assumption by Metrobank of the liabilities of
Solidbank, and to integrate the banking operations of Solidbank with
Metrobank. Subsequently, Solidbank was merged with First Metro Investment
Corporation, and Solidbank, the surviving corporation, was renamed the First
Metro Investment Corporation (FMIC).
Solidbank ceased banking operations. FMIC duly filed a Termination Report with
the DOLE and granted separation benefits to the banks employees.
Labor Arbiter
LA Caizares dismissed the complaints of Gamier, Condevillamar, Arriola and De
Guzman. It was held that their participation in the illegal strike violated the
SOLEs return to work order.
Respondents appealed the decision of LA Caizares.
LA Flores rendered a decision in favor of the Union declaring complainants
dismissal as illegal and unjustified.
FMIC appealed LA Flores decision.
NLRC
As to Respondents appeal, NLRC SECOND DIVISION reversed the decision of LA
Caizares, protest action staged by the banks employees before the DOLE did
not amount to a strike but rather an exercise of their right to express frustration
and dissatisfaction over the decision. Hence, it cannot be concluded that the
activity is per se illegal or violative of the assumption order considering that at
the time, both parties had pending motions for reconsideration of the
Secretarys decision. Moreover, it was found that Gamier, Condevillamar,
Arriola and De Guzman were not fully investigated on the charge that they had
instigated or actively participated in an illegal activity; neither was it shown

that the explanations submitted by them were considered by the

management. Since said employees had presented evidence of plausible and
acceptable reasons for their absence at the workplace at the time of the protest
action, their termination based on such alleged participation in the protest
action was unjustified.

that such activities constituted illegal strikes. Shrouded as demonstrations in

said case, the activities of the employees were in reality temporary stoppages
of work perpetrated through the concerted action of the employees who
deliberately failed to report for work on the convenient excuse that they will
hold a rally at the BLR and DOLE offices in Intramuros.

As to FMICs appeal, NLRC THIRD DIVISION reversed the decision of LA Flores

and ruled that the mass action held by the bank employees infront of the
Intramuros Office was not a legitimate exercise of the employees freedom of
speech and assembly. Such was a strike as defined under Article 212 (o) of
the Labor Code which does not distinguish as to whom the action of the
employees is directed against, nor the place/location where the concerted
action of the employees took place. It was stressed that the mass action of the
bank employees was an incident of a labor dispute, and hence the concerted
work abandonment was a prohibited activity.

In the case at bar, the respondents staged a strike ultimately aimed at realizing
their economic demands. Whether such pressure was directed against the
petitioners or the Secretary of Labor, or both, is of no moment. All the elements
of strike are evident in the Union-instigated mass actions.

Both decisions were appealed.

Court of Appeals
CA consolidated the petitions. CA found that it was a legitimate exercise of their
right to free expression, and not a strike proscribed when the Secretary of
Labor assumed jurisdiction.
ISSUES/HELD:
1. WON the mass demonstration was a valid exercise of the right of the workers
to freedom of expression? NO
2. WON the respondents were validly terminated? NO
3. WON the respondents are entitled to separation pay or financial assistance?
YES
RATIO:
1. Art. 212 of LC defines strike as any temporary stoppage of work by the
concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. The
term strike shall comprise not only concerted work stoppages, but also
slowdowns, mass leaves, sitdowns, attempts to damage, destroy or sabotage
plant equipment and facilities and similar activities. The fact that the
conventional term strike was not used by the striking employees to describe
their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the
situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.
The mass action held by the employees constituted an illegal strike. It must be
stressed that the concerted action of the respondents was not limited to the
protest rally infront of the DOLE Office on April 3, 2000. Respondent Unionhad
also picketed the Head Office and Paseo de Roxas Branch. About 712
employees, including those in the provincial branches, boycotted and absented
themselves from work in a concerted fashion for three continuous days that
virtually paralyzed the employers banking operations. Considering that these
mass actions stemmed from a bargaining deadlock and an order of assumption
of jurisdiction had already been issued by the Secretary of Labor to avert an
impending strike, there is no doubt that the concerted work
abandonment/boycott was the result of a labor dispute.
In TMPCWA v. NLRC, where union members held similar protest rallies in front of
the offices of BLR and DOLE Secretary and at the company plants, the SC ruled

Article 264 (a) of LC considers it a prohibited activity to declare a strike during

the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the same strike. There is
no dispute that when respondents conducted their mass actions, the
proceedings before the Secretary of Labor were still pending as both parties
filed motions for reconsideration. Clearly, respondents knowingly violated the
aforesaid provision by holding a strike in the guise of mass demonstration
simultaneous with concerted work abandonment/boycott.
2. Notwithstanding the illegality of the strike, petitioners act of indiscriminately
terminating the services of individual respondents who admitted joining the
mass actions and who have refused to comply with the offer of the
management to report back to work constitutes illegal termination.
The Labor Code protects an ordinary, rank-and-file union member who
participated in such a strike from losing his job, provided that he did not
commit anillegal act during the strike. Petitioners have not adduced substantial
proof that respondent-union members perpetrated any act of violence,
intimidation, coercion or obstruction of company premises and public
thoroughfares. It did not submit in evidence photographs, police reports,
affidavits and other available evidence.
Note however that at the dispositive portion of the SC decision, SC declared
that union officers were validly dismissed.
3. Petitioner Solidbank Corporation (now FMIC) is due to pay each of the
individual respondents separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for
every year of service. Whatever sums already received from petitioners under
any release, waiver or quitclaim shall be deducted from the total separation
pay due to each of them.

Phimco v. Pila
2010 August 11 | Brion, J.
By: Jocs Dilag
SUMMARY:
Union filed NOS, conducted a strike vote, submitted the results to NCMB and 35
days later, staged a strike. ER dismissed 10 Union officers & 36 mems for illegal
acts committed during the strike. SC held strike illegal. Even if Union complied
w/ the procedural requirements of a valid strike, the strike is illegal for the
illegal acts committed when they blocked the free ingress to and egress from
companys premises and picket attended with intimidation. Art 264/278(a)
makes a distinction on the liabilities of participating workers and Union officers
(see below). In this case, the participating Union officers and members stand to
be dismissed.
DOCTRINE: (Strikes, Lockouts, and Picketing)
While the right of employees to publicize their dispute falls within the
protection of freedom of expression and the right to peaceably assemble to air
grievances, these rights are by no means absolute. Protected picketing does
not extend to blocking ingress to and egress from the company
premises.
Pickets may not aggressively interfere with the right of peaceful ingress to and
egress from the employers shop or obstruct public thoroughfares; picketing is
not peaceful where the sidewalk or entrance to a place of business is
obstructed by picketers parading around in a circle or lying on the sidewalk.
Article 264(e) of the Labor Code tells us that picketing carried on with violence,
coercion or intimidation is unlawful. According to American jurisprudence, what
constitutes unlawful intimidation depends on the totality of the
circumstances. Force threatened is the equivalent of force exercised. There
may be unlawful intimidation without direct threats or overt acts of violence.
Words or acts which are calculated and intended to cause an ordinary person to
fear an injury to his person, business or property are equivalent to threats.
FACTS:

CBA was about to expire so Phimco, manufacturer of matches

(posporo) & PILA negotiated for its renewal, which resulted in a
deadlock on economic issues: disagreements on salary increases
and benefits.
Mar 1995: PILA filed w/ NCMB a Notice of Strike on the ground of
the bargaining deadlock.
Mar.16: Union conducted a strike vote - majority voted in favor of
strike
Mar.17: Union filed strike vote results w/ NCMB.
Apr.21: Union staged a strike.
May 3: Phimco filed w/ NLRC a petition for preliminary injunction
and TRO, to enjoin the strikers from preventing the ingress and
egress of non-striking EEs into and from the company premises.
ex-parte TRO issued, valid for 20 days
June 23: Phimco sent a letter to 36 Union members, directing them
to explain within 24 hours why they should not be dismissed for the
illegal acts they committed during the strike.

June 26: These 36 Union members were informed of their dismissal.

Union filed a complaint for ULP and illegal dismissal (Case 1).
Acting SOLE Brillantes assumed jurisdiction, and issued return-towork order for all the striking employees (except those 36
terminated) and for Phimco to re-admit them. Union ended strike on
the same day.
Phimco filed a petition to declare strike illegal w/ prayer for the
dismissal of PILA officers and members who knowingly participated
in the illegal strike (Case 2): strikers prevented ingress to and
egress, paralyzing companys operations.
Respondents filed their position paper: They complied with all the
legal requirements for staging strike, put up no barricade, and
conducted strike peacefully, in an orderly and lawful manner,
without incident.
LA (Case 2): Illegal strike; prohibited acts committed during the
strike by blocking ingress and egress of companys premises and
preventing the non-striking EEs from reporting for work.
NLRC: Set aside LA. Union conducted a peaceful moving picket.
LA (Case 1): Illegal dismissal. Reinstatement w/ backwages.
NLRC: Consolidated 2 cases. Ruled in favor of Union. Case 2: not an
illegal blockade, did not obstruct ingress and egress, moving picket
was moving. Case 1: striking EEs not given ample opportunity to
explain their side.
Without waiting for the result of MR, Phimco elevated its case to CA
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
CA: Dismissed petition (in favor of Union). Hence, present petition
for review on certiorari.

ISSUES/HELD:
WoN Unions strike was legal NO
RATIO:
In the present case, Union fully satisfied the legal procedural requirements for
staging a strike. However, despite the validity of the purpose of a strike
and compliance with the procedural requirements, a strike may still be
held illegal.

Commission of Prohibited Acts

A strike may still be held illegal where the means employed are illegal, as
provided under Art.264 (now 278) (e):
No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or
intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's
premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares.
Based on SCs examination of the evidence, it found the strike illegal. 1 While
the strike undisputedly had not been marred by actual violence and patent
intimidation, the picketing that Union undertook as part of its strike
activities effectively blocked the free ingress to and egress from
Phimcos premises, thus preventing non-striking EEs and company
vehicles from entering. In this manner, the picketers violated Art.264/278(e).
While a strike focuses on stoppage of work, picketing focuses on
publicizing the labor dispute and its incidents to inform the public of what is
happening in the company struck against.
(See doctrine) While the right of employees to publicize their dispute falls
within the protection of freedom of expression and the right to peaceably
assemble to air grievances, these rights are by no means absolute. Protected
picketing does not extend to blocking ingress to and egress from the company
premises.
As applied.
That the picket was moving, was peaceful and was not attended by
actual violence may not free it from taints of illegality if the picket
effectively blocked entry to and exit from the company premises.
Significantly, the photographs taken of the strike area, capturing the
strike in its various stages and showing how the strikers actually
conducted the picket, validated the testimonies adduced. While the
picket is moving, the movement was in circles, very close to the gates,
with the strikers in a hand-to-shoulder formation without a break in
their ranks, thus preventing non-striking workers and vehicles from coming in
and getting out. Supported by actual blocking benches and
obstructions, what the union demonstrated was a very persuasive and quietly
intimidating strategy whose chief aim was to paralyze the operations of
the company, not solely by the work stoppage of the participating
workers, but by excluding the company officials and non-striking
employees from access to and exit from the company premises. No
doubt, the strike caused the company operations considerable damage. The
blockade even went to the point of causing the build up of traffic in the
immediate vicinity of the strike area.
Intimidation (see doctrine)
Art.264/278(e) likewise provides that picketing carried on with violence,
coercion or intimidation is unlawful. The manner in which the respondent
union officers and members conducted the picket had created such an
intimidating atmosphere that non-striking employees and even company
vehicles did not dare cross the picket line, even with police intervention. 2 Those
who dared cross the picket line were stopped. The testimonies of non-striking
employees, who were prevented from gaining entry into the company
premises, and confirmed no less by two officers of the union, are on record.
Liabilities of union officers and members

As explained in Samahang Manggagawa sa Sulpicio Lines, Inc.-NAFLU v.

Sulpicio Lines, Inc., the effects of illegal strikes, outlined in Art.264/278(a),
make a distinction between participating workers and union officers. The
services of an ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere
participation in an illegal strike; proof must be adduced showing that
he or she committed illegal acts during the strike. The services of a
participating union officer, on the other hand, may be terminated, not
only when he actually commits an illegal act during a strike, but also if
he knowingly participates in an illegal strike.
In all cases, the striker must be identified. Substantial evidence, available
under the attendant circumstances, suffices to justify the imposition of the
penalty of dismissal.
In the present case, the 10 respondent Union officers stand to be dismissed
as participating union officers, while the 37 respondent Union members stand
to be dismissed for their illegal acts in the conduct of the unions strike as
Phimco was able to individually identify them thru the affidavits of coemployees (Panis and Ortiz) and Personnel Manager Cinco, and photographs.
Phimco failed to observe due process
Phimco violated the twin-notice requirements of due process under LC when it
dismissed the respondents: (1) a written notice specifying the grounds for
termination and giving the employee a reasonable opportunity to explain his
side and (2) another written notice indicating that, upon due consideration of
all circumstances, grounds have been established to justify the employer's
decision to dismiss the employee.
In the present case, it does not appear that the Union officers were specifically
informed of the charges against them and given the chance to explain and
present their side. As to the Union members, only 36 Union members were
notified of the charges against them, but they were not given an ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend themselves.
Therefore, apply Agabon ruling: Employer, despite the just cause for dismissal,
must pay the dismissed workers nominal damages (P30K) as indemnity for the
violation of the workers right to statutory due process.

STA ROSA COCA-COLA PLANT EMPLOYEES UNION, et al. V. COCA-COLA

BOTTLERS PHILS., INC.
January 24, 2007 | Callejo, Sr., J.
Prof. Sobrevias for Coca-Cola Bottlers.
SUMMARY: When the negotiation for CBA reached an impasse, the union, by virtue
of the mayors permit, conducted a picketing where union members and officers left
their works for 3 hrs and marched to and fro on the side of the highway. The
company filed a case to declare the activity as a strike and an illegal one at that.
The contention is on whether the said acts constitute a strike. The SC ruled that it
was a strike and not a mere picketing, using the definition of a strike in the LC.
DOCTRINE: Art. 212, LC defines strike as a temporary stoppage of work by the
concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. In
Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that the fact that the conventional
term strike was not used by the striking employees to describe their common
course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its
appearance, will be deemed to be controlling. The term strike encompasses not
only concerted work stoppages, but also slowdowns, mass leaves, sit-downs,
attempts to damage, destroy or sabotage plant equipment and facilities, and similar
activities. . . what is definitive of whether the action staged by petitioners is a strike
and not merely a picket is the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
situation.
FACTS:
The Sta. Rosa Coca-Cola Plant Employees Union (Union) is the SEBA of the regular
daily paid workers and the monthly paid non-commission-earning employees of the
Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (Company) in its Sta. Rosa, Laguna plant.
Upon the expiration of the CBA, the Union informed the Company of its desire to
renegotiate its terms. The CBA meetings commenced on July 26, 1999, where the
Union and the Company discussed the ground rules of the negotiations. The Union
insisted that representatives from the Alyansa ng mga Unyon sa Coca-Cola be
allowed to sit down as observers in the CBA meetings. The Union officers and
members also insisted that their wages be basedon their work shift rates. For its
part, the Company was of the view that the members of the Alyansa were not
members of the bargaining unit. The Alyansa was a mere aggregate of employees of
the Company in its various plants; and is not a registered labor organization. Thus,
an impasse ensued.
On August 30, 1999, the Union, its officers, directors and six shop stewards filed a
Notice of Strike with the NCMB. The Company filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging
that the reasons cited by the Union were not valid grounds for a strike. The Union
then filed an Amended Notice of Strike.
Meanwhile, the Union decided to participate in a mass action organized by the
Alyansa in front of the Companys premises. 106 Union members, officers and
members of the BoD, and shop stewards, individually filed applications for leave of
absence for September 21, 1999. Certain that its operations in the plant would come
to a complete stop since there were no sufficient trained contractual employees who
would take over, the Company disapproved all leave applications and notified the
applicants accordingly. A day before the mass action, some Union members wore
gears, red tag cloths stating "YES KAMI SA STRIKE" as headgears and on the
different parts of their uniform, shoulders and chests.
The Office of the Mayor issued a permit to the Union, allowing it "to conduct a mass
protest action within the perimeter of the Coca-Cola plant on September 21, 1999

from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon." Thus, the Union officers and members held a picket
along the front perimeter of the plant on September 21, 1999. All of the 14
personnel of the Engineering Section of the Company did not report for work, and 71
production personnel were also absent. As a result, only one of the three bottling
lines operated during the day shift. All the three lines were operated during the night
shift with cumulative downtime of five (5) hours due to lack of manning,
complement and skills requirement. The volume of production for the day was short
by 60,000 physical cases versus budget.
On October 13, 1999, the Company filed a Petition to Declare Strike Illegal alleging
that the mass concerted action was clearly a strike and since the Union did not
observe the requirements mandated by law, i.e., strike vote, cooling-off period and
reporting requirements, the strike was therefore illegal. The NCMB recommended
that the Notice of Strike of the Union be converted into a preventive mediation case.
After conciliation proceedings failed, the parties were required to submit their
respective position papers. LA declared the strike illegal. NLRC affirmed LA. CA
dismissed petition.
The Union answered by alleging that it was not a strike but just a valid exercise of
their right to picket, which is part of the right of free expression as guaranteed by
the Constitution.
LA: the mass leave was a strike under art. 212, LC:
1) Union itself admitted that on the said date, members and officers did not report
for work. Instead, they all assembled in front of the Sta. Rosa Plant and picketed the
premises. Very clearly, there was a concerted action here on the part of the
respondents brought about a temporary stoppage of work at two out of three
bottling lines at the Sta. Rosa Plant
2) It is evident that respondents concerted activity resulted in a temporary
stoppage of work at the Sta. Rosa Plant of the company
3) Such concerted activity by respondents was by reason of a labor dispute
The strike was illegal since there was no showing that the Union conducted a strike
vote, observed the prescribed cooling-off period, much less, submitted a strike vote
to the DOLE within the required time. Consequently, for knowingly participating in
the illegal strike, the individual petitioners were considered to have lost their
employment status.
NLRC and CA: affirmed LA.
ISSUES:
1. WON the mass action was a strike? YES
2. If in the affirmative, was it legal - NO
3. WON the individual officers and shop stewards of petitioner Union be
dismissed from their employment? YES
RATIO:
The mass action was a strike
Union: It was not a strike but a picket, a valid exercise of their constitutional right to
free expression and assembly. It was a peaceful mass protest action to dramatize
their legitimate grievances against respondent.

They did not intend to have work stoppage as they knew beforehand that
there was no bottling operation scheduled on that day.

They applied for leaves of absences.

They obtained a mayors permit and they faithfully complied with the
conditions therein.

They merely marched to and fro at the side of the highway, did not block
ingress or egress of companys premises.

Request to hold the activity for 4 hrs was reduced to 3 hrs and they all went
back to work after.

IBM-KMU in San Fernando Plant staged simultaneous walkout from work and
there the SOLE declared the walkout as a mass action and not a strike.
Coca-Cola accepted the SOLEs decision. It should likewise apply here.
SC: It was a strike and not a mere picket. The factual findings of LA that it was a
strike which was affirmed by both the NLRC and CA are conclusive to the SC.
Strike: Art. 212, LC defines strike as a temporary stoppage of work by the
concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. The fact
that the conventional term strike was not used by the striking employees to
describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of
the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling. The term
strike encompasses not only concerted work stoppages, but also slowdowns, mass
leaves, sit-downs, attempts to damage, destroy or sabotage plant equipment and
facilities, and similar activities. (Bangalisan vs CA)
Picketing: involves merely the marching to and fro at the premises of the employer,
usually accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the
facts involved in a labor dispute. As applied to a labor dispute, to picket means the
stationing of one or more persons to observe and attempt to observe. The purpose
of pickets is said to be a means of peaceable persuasion.
Labor dispute: includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions
of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment,
regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer
and employee.
ICAB, there was a labor dispute. The basic elements of a strike are present in this
case: 106 members of petitioner Union, whose respective applications for leave of
absence on September 21, 1999 were disapproved, opted not to report for work on
said date, and gathered in front of the company premises to hold a mass protest
action. Petitioners deliberately absented themselves and instead wore red ribbons,
carried placards with slogans such as: YES KAMI SA STRIKE, PROTESTA KAMI,
SAHOD, KARAPATAN NG MANGGAGAWA IPAGLABAN, CBA-WAG BABOYIN, STOP
UNION BUSTING. They marched to and fro in front of the companys premises
during working hours. Thus, petitioners engaged in a concerted activity which
already affected the companys operations. The mass concerted activity constituted
a strike. Mayors permit is not conclusive evidence that their action/activity did not
amount to a strike. The Mayors description of what activities petitioners were
allowed to conduct is inconsequential. What is definitive of whether the action
staged by petitioners is a strike and not merely a picket is the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the situation.
On the illegality of the strike
Art. 263 states the requirements for a strike to be valid 5. The said requirements are
MANDATORY. In the case at bar, the union totally ignored the requirements.
There is no showing that respondents had observed the prescribed cooling-off
period, conducted a strike vote, much less submitted a strike vote report to the
Department of Labor within the required time. . . the intention of the law in requiring
the strike notice and strike-vote report as mandatory requirements is to reasonably
regulate the right to strike which is essential to the attainment of legitimate policy

5Art. 263 of the Labor Code must be observed: (a) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the
intended date thereof, or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (b) strike vote approved by a majority of the
total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that
purpose, (c) notice given to the DOLE of the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended
strike.

objectives embodied in the law. Verily, substantial compliance with a mandatory

provision will not suffice. Strict adherence to the mandate of the law is required.
Aside from the above infirmity, the strike staged by respondents was, further, in
violation of the CBA6. The union had not referred their issues to the grievance
machinery as a prior step. Instead, they chose to go on strike right away, thereby
bypassing the required grievance procedure dictated by the CBA.
On shop stewards being considered as officers
Under Section 501(a) and (b) of the Landrum Griffin Act of 1959 7, shop stewards are
officers of the Union. Admittedly, there is no similar provision in the Labor Code of
the Philippines; nonetheless, petitioners who are shop stewards are considered
union officers:
Officers normally mean those who hold defined offices. An officer is any person
occupying a position identified as an office. An office may be provided in the
constitution of a labor union or by the union itself in its CBA with the employer.
The unions constitution and by-laws define the position of a shop steward. 8
Likewise, sec. 6, rule 19, book 5 of the Implementing rules of the LC provides the
duties of a shop steward.
Thus, a shop steward is appointed by the Union in a shop, department, or plant
serves as representative of the Union, charged with negotiating and adjustment of
grievances of employees with the supervisor of the employer.
The jurisdiction of shop stewards and the supervisors includes the determination of
the issues arising from the interpretation or even implementation of a provision of
the CBA, or from any order or memorandum, circular or assignments issued by the
appropriate authority in the establishment. In fine, they are part and parcel of the
continuous process of grievance resolution designed to preserve and maintain peace

6 SECTION 1, Art. VI -

The UNION agrees that there shall be no strike, walkout, stoppage or slowdown of
work, boycott, secondary boycott, refusal to handle any merchandise, picketing, sitdown strikes of any kind,
sympathetic or general strike, or any other interference with any of the operations of the COMPANY during the
term of this Agreement, so long as the grievance procedure for which provision is made herein is followed by
the COMPANY.
7 Sec. 501 (a) The officers, agents, shop stewards, and other representatives of a labor organization
occupy positions of trust in relation to such organization and its members as a group. It is, therefore, the duty
of each such person, taking into account the special problems and functions of a labor organization, to hold its
money and property solely for the benefit of the organization and its members and to manage, invest, and
expend the same in accordance with its constitution and bylaws and any resolutions of the governing bodies
adopted thereunder, to refrain from dealing with such organization as an adverse party in any matter
connected with his duties and from holding or acquiring any pecuniary or personal interest which conflicts with
the interest of such organization, and to account to the organization for any profit received by him in whatever
capacity in connection with transactions conducted by him or under his direction on behalf of the organization.
A general exculpatory resolution of a governing body purporting to relieve any such person of liability for
breach of the duties declared by this section shall be void as against public policy.
(b)
When any officer, agent, shop steward, or representative of any labor organization is alleged to have
violated the duties declared in subsection (a) of this section and the labor organization or its governing board
or officers refuse or fail to sue or recover damages or secure an accounting or other appropriate relief within a
reasonable time after being requested to do so by any member of the labor organization, such member may
sue such officer, agent, shop steward, or representative in any district court of the United States or in any State
court of competent jurisdiction to recover damages or secure an accounting or other appropriate relief for the
benefit of the labor organization.

8 SECTION 6. Shop Stewards. The UNION shall certify a total of eight (8) shop stewards and shall inform
management of the distribution of these stewards among the departments concerned. Shop Stewards, union
officers and members or employees shall not lose pay for attending Union-Management Labor dialogues,
investigations and grievance meetings with management.

among the employees and their employer. They occupy positions of trust and laden
with awesome responsibilities.
In this case, instead of playing the role of "peacemakers" and grievance solvers, the
petitioners-shop stewards participated in the strike. Thus, like the officers and
directors of petitioner Union who joined the strike, petitioners-shop stewards also
deserve the penalty of dismissal from their employment.

Sukhothai Cuisine and Restaurant v. CA, NLRC, Philippine Labor Alliance Council
(PLAC) Local 460 Sukhothai Restaurant Chapter, and 29 workers (6 officers of
the Union, 23 members)
17 July 2006; Austria-Martinez, J.
Digest prepared by Jethro Koon
Union, on the ground of ULP by petitioner, particularly union-busting, filed a
Notice of Strike, then conducted a Strike Vote and reported the same to the
NCMB (in short they followed the procedure). However, the issue which was the
SM of the Notice and Vote were submitted to voluntary arbitration. During the
pendency of the arbitration, petitioner terminated 2 union members which lead
to the Union conducting a wildcat strike 6 months after, re-filed a notice of
strike and without conducting a vote, then reporting the results to the NCMB,
conducted an actual strike.

9.

June 25, 1999: Notice of Strike was refilled. Protest turned into a
sit-down strike

10. June 26, 1999: Strike was converted to actual strike

11. Petitioner filed a complaint for Illegal Strike with NLRC
12. LA: Declared strike illegal, union officers and members validly
terminated

13. NLRC: Reversed LA, dismissed the complaint and ordered workers to
return to work and for Sukhothai to accept them.

Strike was illegal: no strike or lockout can be made during the pendency of the
case. Even if the ground is for union-busting, only the 15-day cool-off period
may be dispensed with and not the other requirements.
I. Facts
1.

2.

March 1998: Majority of the EEs of petitioner organized themselves

into a union which affiliated with Phil. Labor Alliance Council (PLAC) and
was designated as PLAC Local 460 Sukhothai Restaurant Chapter.
(Union)
Dec 3, 1998: The Union filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB on
ground of ULP particularly act of harassment, fault-finding, and unionbusting through coercion and interference with union affairs.

3.

Dec 10, 1998: A conciliation conference was held and both parties
agreed that there would be no termination of services of respondents
during the pendency of the case

4.

Dec 11, 1998: A Strike Vote under the supervision of NCMB

personnel was held

5.

Dec 21, 1998: Results of the Strike Vote were submitted to NCMB.

6.

Jan 21, 1998: Parties entered into a Submission Agreement

agreeing to submit the issue of ULP (which is the subject matter of the
Notice and Strike Vote) for voluntary arbitration (to prevent the strike)

7.

Mar 24, 1999: Petitioner through its president Garcia dismissed a

union member for alleged petty quarrel with a co-EE in Feb. Union
filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal.

8.

June 24, 1999: Petitioner again relieved a union member from post
(cook). Unions VP protested to Garcia the termination. Shortly
thereafter, Union staged a wildcat strike.

Dec 3 and 11s Notice and Vote referred to a dispute

submitted for arbitration, so it cannot apply to a strike
6 months later. Union failed to comply with mandatory
requisites for strike.

Petitioner is guilty of union-busting and violated their Dec

10 agreement not to terminate during pendency of arbitration.

Dec 3 and 11s Notice and Vote are applicable to the

June 24, 25, 26 strike since same issues of ULP are
involved.

II. Issues
WON strike staged by Union was illegal YES
WON private respondents are deemed to have lost their employment by
committing illegal acts during the strike YES
III. Unions arguments
1.

Filing of the Notice on Dec 3 and the Strike Vote on Dec 11, the
submission to NCMB of the results and the observation of the 15 day
cooling off period in case of ULP, all satisfy the mandatory
requirements under Art 269 of the LC and are applicable to the
June 1999 strike, as per Art 269 (f) (decision to strike valid for the
duration of the dispute)

2.

Even assuming that they cannot be applied to the June strike, since
petitioner was guilty of union-busting, union can take action
immediately

IV. Ratio
1.

Undisputed is the fact that when Union staged the strike in June 1999,
voluntary arbitration between the parties was ongoing. The
issues to be resolved there were the same issues stated in the Notice
of Strike of Dec 3, 1998.

2.

Art 270(a) second paragraph of the LC states that no strike or lockout

shall be declared after submission of the dispute to voluntary

arbitration or during pendency of cases involving the same
grounds for the strike or lockout (see LC for whole provision)

3.

The rationale for the prohibition: once jurisdiction over labor

dispute is acquired by competent authority, jurisdiction should
not be interfered with by applying the coercive processes of a
strike.

Policy of the state to promote and emphasize primacy of free

collective bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary
arbitration, mediation, and conciliation as modes of
settling labor or industrial disputes. Relations between
ERs and EEs rest on essentially voluntary basis and industrial
peace cannot be secured by compulsion of law.

immediately in case of union busting provided that strike vote is

conducted and the results submitted in every case at least 7
days before the intended strike or lockout.

5.

Even if the strike was declared as valid because the objective was
lawful, strike may be declared invalid where the means employed are
illegal

270 provides for illegal activities during the strike.

Jurisprudence have also provided for some activities that are

prohibited like shouting slanderous and scurrilous words,
unnecessary and obscene language, libelous remarks, abusive
and threatening language, formation of human cordon to block
ways, coercing others to prevent them from working,
threatening bodily harm, where EEs hijacked ERs bus,
destruction of company property, use of Molotov bombs, etc.
(See FN 31 in SCRA for more activities)

The dismissals of the 2 union members which allegedly triggered the

wildcat strike are not sufficient grounds to justify radical
recourse on part of the Union

The questions regarding their dismissal are connected to the

alleged breach of the guarantee, and other incidents of ULP
which should have been raised in the voluntary arbitration
which was commenced precisely to address said issues.
Other recourse of the Union: could also have just instituted
illegal dismissal cases, or submitted it to the grievance
machinery under their CBA, or to just terminate the
voluntary arbitration case and complete the mandatory
procedure for lawful strike.

4.

Union was aware of the fact of the pendency of the arbitration

proceedings, and thus it cannot invoke good faith as a defense.

5.

With all these considerations: Strike was ILLEGAL.

As to the second argument of the Union re: ULP so we can dispense with the
requirements.
1.

It is only the 15-day cooling off period that may be dispensed with.

2.

Art 269 (f) should be read with Sec 3, Rule XXII, Book V of the
IRR which states that in case of union-busting, 15 day cooling off
period shall not apply and union may take action immediately after
the strike vote is conducted and results are submitted to
NCMB.

3.

NCMB Primer on Strike, Picketing and Lockout also provides the same
wording.

4.

IRR clarifies Art 269(c) of the LC in that union may strike

In sum: if there is union-busting the requirements of 1) notice;

2) strike vote; 3) 7 day report period cannot be dispensed
with.

6.

For the union officers: knowingly participating in an illegal strike is

ground for dismissal; also when he commits illegal acts. For union
members: Substantial proof or evidence is that they committed illegal
acts is enough to justify imposition of penalty of dismissal.

7.

In this case, evidence on record show that the respondents (both union
officers(6) and 23 members) engaged in illegal acts during the strike

Intimidation and harassment of customers to discourage them

from patronizing petitioner, waving their arms and shouting
Nilagyan naming ng lason ang pagkain dyan!,

discredited the reputation of the establishment

Angry and unruly behavior calculated to cause commotion

affecting nearby establishments in the mall

Openly cursing and using abusive language towards the

management.

Preventing non-strikers from entering, plus deliberate blocking

their movements inside the restaurant

And even shouting Granada! causing panic among the

customers (it was the Union President Emmanuel Cayno who
shouted)

LIWAYWAY PUBLICATIONS, INC. v. PERMANENT CONCRETE WORKERS

UNION, et al
October 23, 1981 | J. Guerrero
By: Perry

compound. The business of the plaintiff has absolutely no connection

whatsoever with the cause of the strike of the union against their company,
much less with the terms, conditions or demands of the strikers. The plaintiff,
being an innocent bystander, is entitled to protection by the regular courts.

SUMMARY:
The striking union prevented the employees of the plaintiff, Liwayway
Publications from entering the bodega that the latter was leasing. Other than
the fact that the bodega of the plaintiff and the workplace of the members of
the striking union are in the same premises, there is no other connection
between the plaintiff and the striking union. Therefore, the plaintiff sought the
issuance of a permanent injunction against the striking union to prevent the
latter from preventing the former from accessing its bodega.

The SC notes that the right to picket is a phrase of the freedom of speech
guaranteed by the Constitution. However, the right is not an absolute one. The
courts are not without power to confine or localize the sphere of communication
or the demonstration to the parties to the labor dispute, and to insulate
establishments or persons with no industrial connection or having interest
totally foreign to the context of the dispute. Thus, the right may be regulated at
the instance of third parties or innocent bystanders. If the law fails to afford
said protection, men will endeavor to safeguard their rights by their own might,
take the law in their own hands, and commit acts which lead to breaches of the
law.

The SC ruled that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief. The right to strike is
necessarily subsumed in the freedom of speech guaranteed by the
Constitution. However, the exercise of the right is not without limitations. The
Courts may intervene and regulate the right to protect innocent bystanders
or those who have no industrial connection or have an interest totally foreign to
the dispute of the striking union and its company.
FACTS:
The Plaintiff is leasing the premises of the Permanent Concrete Products in Sta.
Mesa. The premises of the plaintiff is separated from the premises of the
Lessor-Corporation by a concrete wall and has its own entrance and road
leading to the national road. Moreover the distance between the two entrances
is more or less 200 meters.
On 10 September 1964, the employees of the lessor-corporation staged a strike
against the corporation. However for unknown reasons, the striking employees
prevented the truck of the plaintiff from entering the compound and
intimidated and threatened its employees with bodily harm. The plaintiff made
repeated demands to the defendants to stop their actions and allow them to
access their bodega. However, their demands were left unheeded prompting
them to bring an action with the CFI for the issuance of an injunction.
The Respondent moved to dismiss the action of the plaintiff alleging that the
CFI had no jurisdiction. They alleged that it was the Court of Industrial Relations
who had exclusive jurisdiction since this is a labor dispute involving ULP.
Moreover it alleged that the plaintiff had no cause of action as it was not the
real party in interest.
The Court denied the motion to dismiss filed by the defendants and rendered a
decision in favor of the plaintiff. It declared permanent the writ of preliminary
injunction and ordered the defendants to pay damages. The defendants bring
this matter to the SC seeking the reversal of the decision of the CFI.
ISSUE / HELD:
WON had jurisdiction over the case at bar. YES.
Corollarily, WON this case involves or has arisen out of a labor dispute. NO.
RULING:
The SC points out that the plaintiff is not in any way related to the striking
union except for the fact that it is the lessee of a bodega in the companys

MSF TIRE AND RUBBER, INC. vs. CA and PHILTREAD TIRE WORKERS
UNION
MENDOZA; August 5, 1999
SUMMARY:
During the pendency of the labor dispute between the union and Philtread,
Philtread entered into a MOA with Siam Tyre hereby its plant and equipment
would be sold to a new company, MSF Tire 80% of which would be owned by
Siam Tyre and 20% by Philtread, while the land on which the plant was located
would be sold to another company, 60% of which would be owned by Philtread
and 40% by Siam Tyre. As the union refused to desist picketing outside the
plant, MSF Tire filed a complaint for injunction asserting its status as an
innocent bystander. SC held the petitioner is not an innocent bystander
because its personality is closely linked to Philtread.
DOCTRINE:
The right may be regulated at the instance of third parties or innocent
bystanders if it appears that the inevitable result of its exercise is to create an
impression that a labor dispute with which they have no connection or interest
exists between them and the picketing union or constitute an invasion of their
rights.
Thus, an innocent bystander, who seeks to enjoin a labor strike, must satisfy
the court that aside from the grounds specified in Rule 58 of the Rules of Court,
it is entirely different from, without any connection whatsoever to, either party
to the dispute and, therefore, its interests are totally foreign to the context
thereof.
FACTS:

A labor dispute arose between Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation

(Philtread) and private respondent, Philtread Tire Workers Union (Union)

Union filed a notice of strike in the National Conciliation and Mediation

Board charging Philtread with unfair labor practices for allegedly engaging
in union-busting for violation of the provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement.

Thereafter, they picketed and assembled outside the gate of Philtreads

plant.

Philtread, on the other hand, filed a notice of lockout.

The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and
certified it for compulsory arbitration.

During the pendency of the labor dispute, Philtread entered into a

Memorandum of Agreement with Siam Tyre Public Company
Limited (Siam Tyre) whereby its plant and equipment would be
sold to a new company, herein petitioner, 80% of which would be
owned by Siam Tyre and 20% by Philtread, while the land on which
the plant was located would be sold to another company, 60% of
which would be owned by Philtread and 40% by Siam Tyre.

Petitioner then asked respondent Union to desist from picketing outside its
plant.

As the respondent Union refused petitioners request, petitioner filed a

complaint for injunction with damages before the RTC Makati.

Respondent Union moved to dismiss the complaint alleging lack of

jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

RTC denied petitioners application for injunction and dismissed the

complaint.

However, on petitioners motion, the trial court reconsidered its order and
granted an injunction.

The respondent Union filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before
the CA.

CA ruled in favor of respondent Union, hence, petitioner filed this petition

asserting that its status as an innocent bystander entitled it to a writ of
injunction.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has shown a clear legal right to the issuance
of a writ of injunction under the innocent bystander rule. (NO)
HELD: Petition denied.
In Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) v. Cloribel, this Court,
through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, stated the innocent bystander rule as follows:
The right to picket as a means of communicating the facts of a labor dispute is
a phase of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the constitution. If peacefully
carried out, it can not be curtailed even in the absence of employer-employee
relationship.
The right is, however, not an absolute one. While peaceful picketing is
entitled to protection as an exercise of free speech, we believe the
courts are not without power to confine or localize the sphere of
communication or the demonstration to the parties to the labor
dispute, including those with related interest, and to insulate
establishments or persons with no industrial connection or having
interest totally foreign to the context of the dispute.
Thus the right may be regulated at the instance of third parties or
innocent bystanders if it appears that the inevitable result of its
exercise is to create an impression that a labor dispute with which
they have no connection or interest exists between them and the
picketing union or constitute an invasion of their rights.
Thus, an innocent bystander, who seeks to enjoin a labor strike, must satisfy
the court that aside from the grounds specified in Rule 58 of the Rules of Court,
it is entirely different from, without any connection whatsoever to, either party
to the dispute and, therefore, its interests are totally foreign to the context
thereof.
In the case at bar, petitioner cannot be said not to have such connection
to the dispute.
As correctly observed by the appellate court: we find that the negotiation,
contract of sale, and the post transaction between Philtread, as vendor, and
Siam Tyre, as vendee, reveals a legal relation between them which, in the
interest of petitioner, we cannot ignore. To be sure, the transaction between
Philtread and Siam Tyre, was not a simple sale whereby Philtread ceased to
have any proprietary rights over its sold assets. On the contrary, Philtread
remains as 20% owner of private respondent and 60% owner of Sucat Land
Corporation which was likewise incorporated in accordance with the terms of
the Memorandum of Agreement with Siam Tyre, and which now owns the land
were subject plant is located. This, together with the fact that private
respondent uses the same plant or factory; similar or substantially the same
working conditions; same machinery, tools, and equipment; and manufacture
the same products as Philtread, lead us to safely conclude that private
respondents personality is so closely linked to Philtread as to bar its
entitlement to an injunctive writ.