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HN1899

ETESCO DRILLSHIP

TEST PROCEDURE
OF DP FMEA PROVING TRIAL
for
ETESCO DRILLSHIP
Report No : SHI-MRI-1899-061211-02 Rev 5.0

DOCUMENT HISToRY
Revision

Date

1.0

12/08/11

2.0

Reason for issue

Origin

Check

Appr.

First issue for review

K.J. Kim

G.I. Park

J.W. Choi

29/09/11

Issue reflected owners comments

K.J. Kim

G.I. Park

J.W. Choi

3.0

24/10/11

Issue for additional tests of newly installed UPS

K.J. Kim

G.I. Park

J.W. Choi

3.1

31/10/11

Issue for updating CAT numbering

K.J. Kim

G.I. Park

J.W. Choi

4.0

14/11/11

Issue for the result of DP FMEA proving trial.

K.J. Kim

G.I. Park

J.W. Choi

K.J. Kim

G.I. Park

J.W. Choi

The status of punch list still open.


5.0

06/12/11

Issue for the revised test results with closed all


punch items

Marine Research Institute


Samsung Heavy Industries Co., Ltd.

Office Address : 10TH Floor, Production Support Buildings, Geoje Shipyard, Samsung Heavy Industries
Phone Number : + 82 (0) 55 630 5610 FAX : + 82 (0) 55 630 6270
Email Address : risingsun.kim@samsung.com

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

INDEX
Section

Description

Page

1.

Introduction

05

2.

Check on the number of required equipments

07

Test items

09

1)

Power generation

10

2)

Power distribution

18

3)

Power management

38

4)

DP control system

47

5)

Thrusters

66

6)

Communication

75

7)

ESD and F/G system

76

77

78

to comply with DPS-3

3.

4.

The summary for results of FMEA proving


DP trials

5.

The punch list from the tests

Samsung Heavy Industries

1/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

ABBREVIATIONS
(A)
AVR

: Auto Voltage Regulator

(C)
CBU

: Capacitor Bank Unit

COS

: Console Operating System

COU

: Control Unit

CPU

: Central Processing Unit

DCS

: Drilling Control System

DCU

: Drive Control Unit

DG

: Diesel Generator

DO

: Diesel Oil

DP

: Dynamic Positioning

DPC

: Dynamic Positioning Controller

DPS

: Dynamic Positioning System

DPS

: Differential Position Sensors

: Engine Room

ECR

: Engine Control Room

FMEA

: Failure Mode Effect Analysis

FO

: Fuel Oil

FW

: Fresh Water

FS

: Field Station

HV

: High Voltage (11kV)

HiPAP

: High Precision Acoustic Positioning

HPR

: Hydroacoustic Position Reference

(D)

(E)
E/R
(F)

(H)

(I)
IALA

: International Association of Lighthouse Authorities

IAS

: Integrated Automation System

INU

: Inverter Unit

K-chief

: Kongsberg Vessel Control System

K-pos

: Kongsberg Dynamic Positioning System

K-thrust

: Kongsberg Thruster Control System

KM

: Kongsberg Maritime

LAN

: Local Area Network

LCL

: Lever Communication Link

LO

: Lubrication Oil

LSU

: Line Supply Unit

LT

: Low Temperature

LV

: Low Voltage (440V)

MGE

: Main Generator Engine

MRU

Motion Reference Unit

MSB

: Main SwitchBoard

(K)

(L)

(M)

Samsung Heavy Industries

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Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

ABBREVIATIONS
(N)
NDU

: Network Distribution Unit

(O)
OS

: Operator Station

(P)
PLC

: Programmable Logic Controller

PMS

: Power Management System

(Q)
QCV

: Quick Closing Valve

(R)
RCS

: Remote Control System

RIO

: Remote Input Output

RMS

: Riser Management System

RPM

: Revolution Per Minute

(S)
SW

: Sea Water

(T)
TEU

: Terminal Unit

(U)
UPS

: Uninterruptible Power Supply

(W)
WCU

: Water Cooling Unit

Samsung Heavy Industries

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Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

PLAN HISTORY
No

Page

Why

How

For ver. 1.0 First issue for review

For ver. 2.0 Issue for review


1.

Owners comment

The term VRS was changed to MRU.

2.

15

Owners request

3.

19

Owners comment

Test method was added to verify the load of


generator is reduce to 50% at 8% discrepancy.
The sentence, - Power source of No.4 UPS to be
auto-changed over from main supply to emcy
power supply was deleted.

4.

23

Owners comment

Some wrong UPS numbers were revised.

5.

25

Owners comment

Some wrong FS numbers were revised.

6.

63

Owners comment

Expected result 1) was revised.

For ver. 3.0 Issue for additional tests of newly installed UPS
7.

17

Owners comment

We added the following sentence in cell of Pos.


ref. system: At least one should be the different
type.

8.

17

Drawing update

UPS test in stbd 220V feeder panel was added.

9.

19

Drawing update

UPS test in cent 220V feeder panel was added.

10.

21

Drawing update

UPS test in port 220V feeder panel was added.

11.

59

Drawing update

UPS tests for DCU and RexCU in each thruster


room were added.

For ver. 3.1 Issue for updating CAT numbering


12.

27~29

Drawing update

41~43

We updated the number of CAT as reference


drawing in the DP control system FMEA test.

49, 51
53~57

For ver. 4.0 Issue for the result of DP FMEA proving trial. The status of punch list still open.
13

All

Performance of actual tests

Actual result and comment were added

For ver. 5.0 Issue for the revised results of DP FMEA proving trial with closed all punch items.
14

All

Closed all punch

Samsung Heavy Industries

We updated results with closed all punch.

4/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

1. Introduction
The Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) study for DP system of the ETESCO drillship (HN1899) has
been performed with class notation DPS-3 as specified in the ABS rule (2010) for steel vessel, 4-3-5/15
section by Samsung Marine Research Institute.
These sheets were prepared to identify the results of FMEA study by testing single failure of main items
selected and simulating the loss of one compartment for some main compartments during DP sea trial.

After trial to prove DP FMEA the conclusion and the recommendations of the tests will be updated.

1.1 The conditions for the tests


The normal conditions for DP operation during trial for the tests should be the followings:
1) One generator will at least be working in each engine room and the others will be stand-by to be
started as required (Load dependent start mode).
2) MGEs in cent engine room will be supplied with fuel oil from service tanks in both port and stbd
engine rooms.
3) Control air for cent engine room is also fed from both port and stbd sides
4) For equipments with redundancy such as FO supply pumps one is duty mode and the other stand-by.
5) All 11kV and 440V/220V bus-tie breakers will be normally open. But 11kV bus-tie breakers can be
closed on some tests.
6) The DP system will be normally operated in auto control mode and the back-up DP ready for control
transfer.
7) All thrusters will be working or at least four thrusters working depending on the situation.
8) The number of DP sensors which have to work will at least follow the specification of ABS DPS-3.
9) DGPS and HiPAP system will be together used as position reference system.
10) Printers for checking of alarms and the event logger will be set.

1.2 The basic preparation for each test


The followings will be applied during each test:
1) Each test will be performed in condition that owner, class and shipyard are all attending.
2) FMEA practitioner will manage test and shipyards technicians perform test method.
3) All tests will be reset before starting the next test.
4) If there is any discrepancy with the FMEA study in test result, it should be analyzed and a counter
measure discussed.
5) If necessary, print sheets on which the alarm lists are recorded are kept after a test.

Samsung Heavy Industries

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Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

The test order can be changed as necessary or convenient.


The sequence of the tests presented here is a proposal and may be changed should that be convenient. In
order to avoid that a test could cause damages to equipment the proposed individual failure tests should
be cleared by the yards technical experts. Alternative means to simulate the failures may be discussed.

Samsung Heavy Industries

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Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

2. Check on the number of required equipments to comply with DPS-3


This vessel is complied with ABS DPS-3 on required equipments and their number as following Table

Subsystem or Component
Power
System

ABS DPS-3

ETESCO Drillship

Generator and prime


movers

Redundant, in separate
compartments

2+2+2 in separate compartments

Main switchboard

2 with normally open bus ties


in separate compartments

3 with normally open bus ties in

Bus tie breaker

6 (2 in each MSB)

Distribution system

Redundant, through separate


compartments

1+1+1 in separate compartments

Power management

Yes

Yes (FS38, 40 and 42)

Thruster

Arrangement of thruster

Redundant in separate
compartments

6 in separate compartments

Control

Auto control; no. of


computer system

2 + 1 in alternate control
station

3+1 in alternate control station

Manual control; joystick


with auto heading

Yes

Yes (Bridge console, Port/Stbd

Single levers for each


thruster

Yes

Pos. ref. systems


(At least one should be
the different type.)

3 whereof 1 in alternate
control station

6 whereof 3 in alternate control

External
Sensor

Whereof 1in
alternate control
station

Sensors

Wind

(Port/Cent/Stbd E/R)

separate compartments

(Port/Cent/Stbd E/R)

wing joystick stations)


Yes
(K-THRUST 400-1 in W/H)

station

Whereof 1 in alternate
control station

MRU

As above

As above

Gyro
compass

As above

As above

UPS

1 + 1 separate compartment

2+1 separate compartments

Alternate control station for backup


unit

Yes

Yes (DP backup room)

Consequence analysis

Yes

Yes

Samsung Heavy Industries

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Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ABS DPS-3 : Pass

ETESCO Drillship

Fail

Witness

Comments

Signed

Date

FMEA Practitioner

SHI took complementary measures for

KiJung Kim

04/11/2011

unfinished works, which had been checked


during DP trial, and then confirmed.

Please refer to ch.5 punch lists as follows :


- A) no. 1 ~ 6 at page 78 ~ 83.
- B) no. 1 at page 85..
- C) no. 1 ~ 7 at page 90 ~ 92.

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

8/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

3. Test items

Samsung Heavy Industries

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Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

1) Power Generation
The systems for the power generation ars as followings :

Each Engine Room


1.1) MGE DO supply system
Fuel Oil System

Lub Oil System

1.2) MGE DO supply system

No test item

1.3) Sea water pump


Cooling Water System

Compressed Air System

Ventilation System

Main Generator Engine

Samsung Heavy Industries

1.4) LT fresh water cooling system

1.5) Control air system

No test item

1.6) Electric governor

10/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

1) Power Generation (Auxiliary system Fuel system)


1.1) MGE DO supply pump
Objective

To check the auto-change over function of MGE DO supply pumps in each engine room.

Method

1. Stop No.1 supply pump


2. After recovery, stop No.2 supply pump

* Repeat for each engine room

Actual result

Expected result

Stbd

Cent

Port

- Alarm
- Auto change over to No.2 supply pump
- No effect on running MGE

As expected

As expected

As expected

- Alarm
- Auto change over to No.1 supply pump
- No effect on running MGE

As expected

As expected

As expected

ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Fail

Witness

Comments

Signed

Date

FMEA Practitioner

SHI took complementary measures for

KiJung Kim

05/11/2011

recommendation about alarm description,


and then confirmed.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, C) no.8 at
page 93.

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

11/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

1) Power Generation (Auxiliary system Fuel system)


1.2) MGE DO supply system
Objective

TO check the operation of DO service tank low level alarm and the redundancy of DO
supply to cent. E/R.

Method

With one MGE running for each switchboard and bus ties open during this test.
1. Simulate low level alarm, and reinstate.
2. Close quick closing valves of DO service tank.
* Repeat for the other side engine room

Actual result

Expected result
1

- Alarm

- Alarm
- For corresponding MGEs,
MGE load will reduce as
FO pressure drops.
- The other side and cent
side MGEs runs normally

Port
As expected

As expected

As expected
FO inlet pressure low

As expected
FO inlet pressure low

No.1 & 2
MGE

As expected
Load reduced,
HV MSB frequency went
down

As expected
No effect

No.3 & 4
MGE

As expected
No effect

As expected
No effect

As expected
No effect

As expected
Load reduced,
HV MSB frequency went
down

Alarm

No.5 & 6
MGE

ABS DPS-3 : Pass


Witness

Stbd

Fail

Comments

FMEA Practitioner

Signed

Date

KiJung Kim

05/11/2011

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

12/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

1) Power Generation (Auxiliary system Cooling system)


1.3) Sea water pump
Objective

To check the auto-change over function of cooling sea water (CSW) pumps in each engine
room.

Method

1. Stop No.1 CSW pump


2. After recovery, stop No.2 CSW pump
* Repeat for each engine room

Actual result

Expected result

Stbd

Cent

Port

- Alarm
- Auto change over to No.2 CSW
pump
- No effect on the cooling system

As expected.

As expected.

As expected.

- Alarm
- Auto change over to No.1 CSW
pump
- No effect on the cooling system

As expected.

As expected.

As expected.

ABS DPS-3 : Pass


Witness

Fail

Comments

FMEA Practitioner

Signed

Date

KiJung Kim

05/11/2011

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

13/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

1) Power Generation (Auxiliary system Cooling system)


1.4) LT fresh water cooling system
Objective

To check the failure of LT fresh water cooling system (CFW pump, pneumatic 3-way
temp. control valve and FW expansion tank) in each engine room.

Method

1. Stop No.1 CFW pump and after recovery, stop No.2 CFW pump
2. Isolate and bleed off air from the valve
3. Push low level alarm button in FW expansion tank
* Repeat for other engine room

Actual result

Expected result

Stbd

Cent

Port

- Alarm and auto change over to stand-by


pump

As expected

As expected

As expected

- Valve fails to fully open or keeps the


failed position.

As expected
Valve was fully
opened.

As expected
Valve was fully
opened.

As expected
Valve was fully
opened.

- Alarm

As expected

As expected

As expected

ABS DPS-3 : Pass


Witness

Fail
Comments

FMEA Practitioner

Signed

Date

KiJung Kim

05/11/2011

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

14/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

1) Power Generation (Auxiliary system Compressed air system)


1.5) Control air system
Objective

To check the failure of control air system in port/stbd engine room.

Method

1. Isolate the control air system and drain the air.


* Reinstate and repeat for the other engine room

Actual result

Expected result
1

Stbd

- Alarm
- Corresponding temp. control valves remain in
open position.
- All dampers remain in open due to non-return
valves
- At stbd side test, no air for brake of No.4
thruster. At port side test, no air for brake of
No.5 thruster. (The brake is used for
maintenance purpose.)
- Loss of DO and LO purifiers in the ER
- Loss of emcy DO pump in the ER
- No direct effect on DP

ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Port

As expected

As expected

Fail

Witness

Comments

Signed

Date

FMEA Practitioner

SHI took complementary measures for

KiJung Kim

05/11/2011

unexpected results, which happened


during DP trial, and then confirmed by
retest.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, B) no.2
at page 85.

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

15/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

1) Power Generation (MGE Governor)


1.6) Electric Governor
Objective

To check failure of speed sensor for MGE governor and simulate load sharing when fuel
rack position of one running MGE fails to maximum position.

Method

With closed ring operation mode and each one DG running on each MSB
1. Disconnect one pick up sensor at running engine. Reinstate
2. Disconnect second pick up sensor at running engine. Reinstate
* Repeat for other engines
3. Fail the fuel rack on one engine to maximum position manually.

Actual result
Expected result

Stbd

Cent

Port

(No.1 MGE)

(No.3 MGE)

(No.5 MGE)

- Alarm
- No effect on running engine

As expected

As expected

As expected

- Alarm
- No effect on running engine

As expected

As expected

As expected

If the difference between set actuator travel and


actual actuator travel exceeds 8% of the total
actuator travel for over ten seconds the load of
the faulty engine will be reduced to maximum
50% of rated power, provided that there are
generators available for additional load on the
net. Simultaneously the standby engine
automatically started and when connected, the
faulty engine will be downloaded to 10% and
disconnected and stopped.
If 10%, the CB of the MGE will be tripped and
MGE will shut down.
Otherwise, if total load is less than one MGE
load, the faulty DG hogs load and may drive the
other DG(s) into reverse power trip. The faulty
DG may also trip on over-speed protection and
as the result the corresponding switchboard(s)
may be dead. But bus tie to open before DG
breakers to prevent two or more switchboard
blackout.

As expected

Samsung Heavy Industries

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Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ABS DPS-3 : Pass

ETESCO Drillship

Fail

Witness

Comments

Signed

Date

FMEA Practitioner

SHI took complementary measures for

KiJung

05/11/2011

unexpected results, which happened during DP

Kim

trial, and then confirmed by retest.


Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, B) no.3 at page 85.

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

17/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

2) Power Distribution
In order to verify complying with ABS DPS-3 rule, carry out a battery capacity and failure test of UPS
during DP trial as follows :

a. Power distribution

b. UPS

Samsung Heavy Industries

18/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

2) Power Distribution
2.1) Stbd MSB Room
Objective

To check the effect on the failure of stbd 220V feeder panel, LV MSB, HV MSB and the
total loss of stbd MSB room

Method

With closed ring operation mode


1. Disconnect input power cable of UPS in 220V feeder panel and check UPS capacity for
30 min.
2. Fail LV transformer feeding
3. Fail HV transformer feeding
4. Open breakers of each DC110V UPS feeding to stbd HV switchboard
5. Fail PDU-04, DC110V UPS, and FS-38,39 in stbd MSB room

Expected result

Actual result

- Alarm
- Loss of power source of UPS for stbd MGEs
- Battery discharging time > 30 minutes

As expected.

- Alarm
- Power sources of MGE local control panels and
governor control panels to be auto-changed over
after UPS battery time
- Loss of power source of No.1 DC 110V dist. board
- Power source of No.4 UPS to be auto-changed
over from main supply to emcy power supply
- No effect on DP

As expected.

- Alarm
- Loss of stbd 220V feeder panel
- Loss of FO, CSW and CFW pumps
- Loss of LO and DO purifiers
- Loss of G/S and starting air compressors
- Loss of No.2 air supply fan
- Power source of MGE LO priming and cylinder
pumps to be auto-changed over
- Emcy air driven DO pump will start
- Loss of No.4 thruster due to power loss of No.4
thruster aux. panel. Remaining 5 thrusters will keep
the position.

As expected.

Samsung Heavy Industries

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Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

- Alarm and partial black-out


- Bus-tie breakers to be open
- Breaker of running generator in stbd engine room
to be open
- Loss of stbd 440V and 220V sections
- Loss of fwd No.1 440V and 220V sections
- No.1 and 2 generators to be unusable. Remaining 4
generators will cover sufficient power to maintain
the position
- Loss of No.3 and 4 thrusters. Remaining 4 thrusters
will keep the position.

As expected.

- Alarm
- K-chief OS 36 in ECR shut down
- Loss of FS 38 and 39
- Net B error
- No effect on remaining 4 thrusters and 4 generators

As expected.

ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Fail

Witness

Comments

Signed

Date

FMEA Practitioner

SHI took complementary measures for

KiJung Kim

06/11/2011

unexpected results, which happened


during DP trial, and then confirmed by
retest.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, B) no. 4
and 5 at page 86.

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

20/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

2) Power Distribution
2.2) Cent MSB Room
Objective

To check the effect on the failure of cent 220V feeder panel, LV MSB, HV MSB and the
total loss of cent MSB room

Method

With closed ring operation mode


1. Disconnect input power cable of UPS in 220V feeder panel and check UPS capacity for
30 min.
2. Fail LV transformer feeding
3. Fail HV transformer feeding
4. Open breakers of each DC110V UPS feeding to cent HV switchboard
5. Fail aft 220V emcy dist. board, DC110V UPS, and FS-40,41 in cent MSB room

Expected result

Actual result

- Alarm
- Loss of power source of UPS for cent MGEs
- Battery discharging time > 30 minutes

As expected.

- Alarm
- Power sources of MGE local control panels and
governor control panels to be auto-changed over
after UPS battery time
- Power source of ECC to be auto-changed over
from main supply to emcy power supply
- No effect on DP

As expected.

- Alarm
- Loss of cent 220V feeder panel
- Loss of FO, CSW and CFW pumps
- Loss of LO and DO purifiers
- Loss of No.1 air supply fan
- Power source of MGE LO priming and cylinder
pumps to be auto-changed over
- Emcy air driven DO pump will start
- Loss of No.6 thruster due to power loss of No.6
thruster aux. panel. Remaining 5 thrusters will keep
the position.

As expected.

Samsung Heavy Industries

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Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

- Alarm and partial black-out


- Bus-tie breakers to be open
- Breaker of running generator in cent engine room
to be open
- Loss of cent 440V and 220V sections
- No.3 and 4 generators to be unusable. Remaining 4
generators will cover sufficient power to maintain
the position
- Loss of No.2 and 6 thrusters. Remaining 4 thrusters
will keep the position.

As expected.

- Alarm
- Loss of FS 40 and 41
- Loss of alternative power source of No. 4,5 UPS
- Loss of alternative power source of FS 38~43
- No effect on remaining 4 thrusters and 4 generators

As expected.

ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Fail

Witness

Comments

Signed

Date

FMEA Practitioner

SHI took complementary measures for

KiJung Kim

06/11/2011

unexpected results, which happened


during DP trial, and then confirmed by
retest.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, B) no.4
at page 86.

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

22/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

2) Power Distribution
2.3) Port MSB Room
Objective

To check the effect on the failure of port 220V feeder panel, LV MSB, HV MSB and the
total loss of port MSB room

Method

With closed ring operation mode


1. Disconnect input power cable of UPS in 220V feeder panel and check UPS capacity for
30 min.
2. Fail LV transformer feeding
3. Fail HV transformer feeding
4. Open breakers of each DC110V UPS feeding to port HV switchboard
5. Fail PDU-05, DC110V UPS, and FS-40,41 in port MSB room

Expected result

Actual result

- Alarm
- Loss of power source of UPS for stbd MGEs
- Battery discharging time > 30 minutes

As expected.

- Alarm
- Power sources of MGE local control panels and
governor control panels to be auto-changed over
after UPS battery time
- Loss of power source of No.3 DC 110V dist. board
- Power source of No.5 UPS to be auto-changed
over from main supply to emcy power supply
- No effect on DP

As expected.

- Alarm
- Loss of port 220V feeder panel
- Loss of FO, CSW and CFW pumps
- Loss of LO and DO purifiers
- Loss of G/S and starting air compressors
- Loss of No.1 air supply fan
- Power source of MGE LO priming and cylinder
pumps to be auto-changed over
- Emcy air driven DO pump will start
- Loss of No.5 thruster due to power loss of No.5
thruster aux. panel. Remaining 5 thrusters will keep
the position.

As expected.

Samsung Heavy Industries

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Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

- Alarm and partial black-out


- Bus-tie breakers to be open
- Breaker of running generator in port engine room
to be open
- Loss of port 440V and 220V sections
- No.5 and 6 generators to be unusable. Remaining 4
generators will cover sufficient power to maintain
the position
- Loss of No.3 and 4 thrusters. Remaining 4 thrusters
will keep the position.

As expected.

- Alarm
- Loss of FS 42 and 43
- Loss of K-Chief 35
- Net A error
- No effect on remaining 4 thrusters and 4 generators

As expected.

ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Fail

Witness

Comments

Signed

Date

FMEA Practitioner

SHI took complementary measures for

KiJung Kim

06/11/2011

unexpected results, which happened


during DP trial, and then confirmed by
retest.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, B) no. 4
and 5 at page 86.

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

24/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

2) Power Distribution
2.4) Fwd Section
Objective

To check the effect on failure of fwd 220V feeder panel, LV switchboard, and total loss of
fwd section

Method

1. Fail the LV transformer feeding to No.1 220V feeder panel


2. Fail the HV transformer feeding to No.1 LV switchboard. Reinstate
3. Fail the LV transformer feeding to No.2 220V feeder panel
4. Fail the HV transformer feeding to No.2 LV switchboard.
5. Fail the HV transformer feeding of both switchboards. (to check compartment loss)

Expected result

Actual result

- Alarm
- No. 1,3 UPS and No.1 PA UPS power auto
change to emcy feeder panel
- No effect on DP

As expected

- Alarm
- Loss of fwd No.1 220V feeder panel
- Auto change over of SW and FW pumps to
No.2 section
- No effect on DP

As expected

- Alarm
- No. 2 UPS power and No.2 PA UPS auto
change to emcy feeder panel
- No effect on DP

As expected

- Alarm
- Loss of fwd No.2 220V feeder panel
- Auto change over of SW and FW pumps to
No.1 section
- No effect on DP

As expected

Samsung Heavy Industries

25/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA


5

ETESCO Drillship

- Alarm
- Loss of fwd 220V feeder panels
- Loss of cooling system of No.1 thruster
- No. 1,2,3 UPS and No.1,2 PA UPS power
auto change to emcy feeder panel

ABS DPS-3 : Pass

As expected

Fail

Witness

Comments

Signed

Date

FMEA Practitioner

SHI took complementary measures for

KiJung Kim

06/11/2011

unexpected results, which happened


during DP trial, and then confirmed by
retest.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, C) no. 9
at page 93.

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

26/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

2) Power Distribution
2.5) Emergency Switchboard
Objective

To check the effect on failure of emergency switchboard (440V and 220V)

Method

Check the emergency generator is set in manual-mode.


1. Open 220V incoming supply breaker after blocking auto-change over alternative supply
2. After blocking auto-change over alternative supply, open 440V incoming supply breaker

Expected result

Actual result

- Alarm
- Loss of alternative power source of No.
1,2,3,4,5 UPS and No.1,2 PA UPS
- Loss of alternative power source of FS 31, FS
38~43 and FS 47
- Loss of alternative power source of thruster
No.1~6 DCU UPS
- Loss of alternative power source of ECC
- Power fail of No.2 DC 110V DB

As expected.

- Alarm
- Loss of alternative power of LO priming
pumps and cyl. Pumps in each engine
- Loss of one air supply fan in each engine
room
- Loss of stbd and port HPR hoist control unit
- Loss of emergency 220V feeder panel

As expected.

ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Fail

Witness

Comments

Signed

Date

FMEA Practitioner

SHI took complementary measures for

KiJung Kim

06/11/2011

unexpected results, which happened during


DP trial, and then confirmed by retest.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists as follows :
- B) no. 6 at page 86.
- C) no. 10 at page 93.

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

27/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

2) Power Distribution
2.6) DC 110V Distribution Board
Objective

To check the effect on failure of AVR and one DC 110V dist. board.

Method

1. Fail incoming power supply for each DC 110V dist. board.


2. Check battery discharging time (over 30 minutes)
3. Disconnect DC110V power cable to AVR for each engine.
4. Open battery breaker and all output breakers.
* Restore and repeat for other dist. board

Actual result

Expected result

Port

Cent

Stbd

- Alarm Battery charger abnormal


- No effect on DP

As expected.

As expected.

As expected.

- Battery discharging time > 30 minutes

As expected.
After 30min,
output voltage
= 115V

As expected.
After 30min,
output voltage
= 112V

As expected.
After 30min,
output voltage
= 113V

- Alarm
- Other DC 110V DB will supply power for the
AVR.

As expected.

As expected.

As expected.

- Alarm
- Other DC 110V DB will compensate
- Protective relay (SEPAM) for the
corresponding LV switchboard will trip. But
CB will be still closed

As expected.

As expected.

As expected.

ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Fail

Witness

Comments

Signed

Date

FMEA Practitioner

SHI took complementary measures for

KiJung Kim

06/11/2011

unexpected results, which happened


during DP trial, and then confirmed by
retest.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, C) no. 11
and 12 at page 93.

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

28/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

< CAT 4.5.2 / 4.8.3>


2) Power distribution
2.7) UPS 1 (NAV. INST. Room)
Objective

Test a capacity of battery and failure of the UPS 1.

Method

1. Disconnect main power(online) from UPS 1.


2. And then fail all of power source for UPS 1.
Keep a battery supply for 30 minutes.
3. And then fail the UPS 1 during DP.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1, 2) A redundancy and battery capacity tests of the UPS are carried out during CAT 4.5.2
/ 4.8.3.
Please refer to the CAT item.
3) Item 4.5 Power supplies of DPC-3, 4.6 NDU and 4.8 Position reference system are
checked from results of this test.

Expected result

Actual result

- UPS error alarm.


- UPS is supplied power from second source.

As expected

- UPS battery discharging time > 30 minutes


- No effect on DP.

As expected

- Alarm and no effect on DP.


- The NDU, reference systems and K-POS OS
for DP have redundancy.

As expected

< Lost DP equipments >

< Lost DP equipments >

MRU 1 (from DPC-3 power A)

F1

MRU 1

K-POS OS 1

F2

K-POS OS 1

K-CHIEF OS 31

F4

K-CHIEF OS 31

DPS 232-1

F5

DPS 232-1

GYRO 1

F6

GYRO 1

NETWORK PRINTER 4

F7

NETWORK PRINTER 4

ALARM PRINTER 6

F8

ALARM PRINTER 6

SVC-OS 41/HS

F9

SVC-OS 41/HS

WIND 1

F10

WIND 1

K-POS OS 8 DATA LOGGER

F11

K-POS OS 8 DATA LOGGER

HiPAP OS 6

F12

HiPAP OS 6

NDU A1

F13

NDU A1

K-THRUST OS 5

F21

K-THRUST OS 5

RMS 10

F22

RMS 10

OS 40 LOAD CALCULATOR

F23

OS 40 LOAD CALCULATOR

CONNING COMPUTER

F27

CONNING COMPUTER

INMARSAT TERMINAL

F28

INMARSAT TERMINAL

Samsung Heavy Industries

29/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ABS DPS-3 : Pass


Witness

ETESCO Drillship

Fail
Comments

FMEA Practitioner

Signed

Date

KyeongKi,

06/11/2011

Kim

The other equipments, which are not listed in above Lost DP equipments, have redundant

Remarks

power. Therefore those equipments could be working normally in spite of loss of power from
UPS 1.

Samsung Heavy Industries

30/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

< CAT 4.5.2 / 4.8.3>


2) Power distribution
2.8) UPS 2 (DP Backup Room)
Objective

Test a capacity of battery and failure of the UPS 2.

Method

1. Disconnect main power(online) from UPS 2.


2. And then fail all of power source for UPS 2.
Keep a battery supply for 30 minutes.
3. And then fail the UPS 2 during DP.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1, 2) A redundancy and battery capacity tests of the UPS are carried out during CAT 4.5.2
/ 4.8.3.
3) Item 4.5 Power supplies of DPC-3, 4.6 NDU and 4.8 Position reference system are
checked from results of this test.

Expected result

Actual result

- UPS error alarm.


- UPS is supplied power from second source.

As expected

- UPS battery discharging time > 30 minutes


- No effect on DP.

As expected

- Alarm and no effect on DP.


- Loss of all of the back-up system but main DP
system is still working.

As expected

< Lost equipments >

< Lost equipments >

DPC-1

F1

DPC-1

K-POS OS 4

F2

K-POS OS 4

HiPAP OS 7

F3

HiPAP OS 7

GYRO 3

F4

GYRO 3

WIND 3

F5

WIND 3

ALARM PRINTEWR 1

F6

ALARM PRINTEWR 1

AUTO S/W BOX(S) HPR STBD

F7

AUTO S/W BOX(S) HPR STBD

ISOLATION BOX

F8

ISOLATION BOX

MRU 3 (powered from isolation box)

F8

MRU 3

DPS 132-2

F9

DPS 132-2

DPS 232-2

F10

DPS 232-2

NDU B1/C1

F18

NDU B1/C1

NDU B2

F20

NDU B2

K-CHIEF OS 32

F25

K-CHIEF OS 32

Samsung Heavy Industries

31/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ABS DPS-3 : Pass

ETESCO Drillship

Fail

Witness

Comments

Signed

Date

FMEA Practitioner

SHI took complementary measures for

KyeongKi,

06/11/2011

unexpected results, which happened

Kim

during DP trial, and then confirmed by


retest.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists as follows :
- B) no. 7 at page 86.
- C) no. 13 at page 93.
The other equipments, which are not listed in above Lost DP equipments, have redundant

Remarks

power. Therefore those equipments could be working normally in spite of loss of power from
UPS 2.

Samsung Heavy Industries

32/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

< CAT 4.5.2 / 4.8.3>


2) Power distribution
2.9) UPS 3 (Gen. Elec. Room)
Objective

Test a capacity of battery and failure of the UPS 3.

Method

1. Disconnect main power(online) from UPS 3.


2. And then fail all of power source for UPS 3.
Keep a battery supply for 30 minutes.
3. And then fail the UPS 3 during DP.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1, 2) A redundancy and battery capacity tests of the UPS are carried out during CAT 4.5.2
/ 4.8.3.
3) Item 4.5 Power supplies of DPC-3, 4.6 NDU and 4.8 Position reference system are
checked from results of this test.

Expected result

Actual result

- UPS error alarm.


- UPS is supplied power from second source.

As expected

- UPS battery discharging time > 30 minutes


- No effect on DP.

As expected

- Alarm and no effect on DP.


- The NDU, reference systems and K-POS OS
for DP have redundancy.

As expected

< Lost equipments >

< Lost equipments >

NDU A2

F7

NDU A2

WIND 2

F16

WIND 2

NO.2 DISPLAY FOR X-BAND RADAR

F17

NO.2 DISPLAY FOR X-BAND RADAR

GYRO 2

F18

GYRO 2

MRU 2 (from DPC-3 power B)

F19

MRU 2

K-POS ALARM PRINTER 2

F21

K-POS ALARM PRINTER 2

K-POS O S 2

F22

K-POS O S 2

DPS 132-1

F23

DPS 132-1

Samsung Heavy Industries

33/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ABS DPS-3 : Pass

ETESCO Drillship

Fail

Witness

Comments

Signed

Date

FMEA Practitioner

SHI took complementary measures for

KyeongKi,

06/11/2011

unexpected results, which happened

Kim

during DP trial, and then confirmed by


retest.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, B) no. 8
at page 87.
The other equipments, which are not listed in above Lost DP equipments, have redundant

Remarks

power. Therefore those equipments could be working normally in spite of loss of power from
UPS 3.

Samsung Heavy Industries

34/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

2) Power distribution
2.10) UPS 4 (Stbd MSB Room)
Objective

Test a capacity of battery and failure of the UPS 4.

Method

1. Disconnect main power(online) from UPS 4.


2. And then fail all of power source for UPS 4.
Keep a battery supply for 30 minutes.
3. And then fail the UPS 5 during DP.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1) Item 4.7 NDU is checked from results of this test.

Expected result

Actual result

- UPS error alarm.


- UPS is supplied power from second source.

As expected

- UPS battery discharging time > 30 minutes


- No effect on DP.

As expected

- Alarm and no effect on DP.


- Network B error
- The Field Stations are powered from
redundant power, aft emcy AC220V dist.
board.

As expected

< Lost equipments >

< Lost equipments >

NDU B3/C3

F1

NDU B3/C3

K-CHIEF OS 36

F15

K-CHIEF OS 36

ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Fail

Witness

Comments

Signed

Date

FMEA Practitioner

SHI took complementary measures for

KyeongKi,

06/11/2011

unexpected results, which happened

Kim

during DP trial, and then confirmed by


retest.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, B) no. 9
at page 87.
The other equipments, which are not listed in above Lost DP equipments, have redundant

Remarks

power. Therefore those equipments could be working normally in spite of loss of power from
UPS 4.

Samsung Heavy Industries

35/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

2) Power distribution
2.11) UPS 5 (Port MSB Room)
Objective

Test a capacity of battery and failure of the UPS 5

Method

1. Disconnect main power(online) from UPS 5.


2. And then fail all of power source for UPS 5.
Keep a battery supply for 30 minutes.
3. And then fail the UPS 5 during DP.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1) Item 4.7 NDU is checked from results of this test.

Expected result

Actual result

- UPS error alarm.


- UPS is supplied power from second source.

As expected

- UPS battery discharging time > 30 minutes


- No effect on DP.

As expected

- Alarm and no effect on DP.


- Network A error
- The Field Stations are powered from
redundant power, aft emcy AC220V dist.
board.

As expected

< Lost equipments >

< Lost equipments >

K-CHIEF OS 35

F4

K-CHIEF OS 35

NDU A3

F5

NDU A3

NETWORK PRINTER 7

F6

NETWORK PRINTER 7

AUTO S/W BOX(P) HPR PORT

F7

AUTO S/W BOX(P) HPR PORT

ALARM PRINTER 8

F13

ALARM PRINTER 8

Samsung Heavy Industries

36/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ABS DPS-3 : Pass

ETESCO Drillship

Fail

Witness

Comments

Signed

Date

FMEA Practitioner

SHI took complementary measures for

KyeongKi,

06/11/2011

unexpected results, which happened

Kim

during DP trial, and then confirmed by


retest.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists as
follows :
- B) no. 9 at page 87.
- C) no. 13 at page 93.
The other equipments, which are not listed in above Lost DP equipments, have redundant

Remarks

power. Therefore those equipments could be working normally in spite of loss of power from
UPS 5.

Samsung Heavy Industries

37/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

3) Power management
The Field Stations for power management, which used to control and monitor, are classified as follows :
- IAS Field Station in ECR
- MGE Field Station
- Thruster Field Station

In order to verify complying with ABS DPS-3 rule, carry out redundant power and failure test during DP
trial as follow :

Overload Prevention by PMS


Port MSB

Port MSB

Port MSB

3.1) Overload Prevention for DG

MGE Field Station

IAS Field Station


CENT SWBD Room
FS 43

PORT SWBD Room

FS 44

FS 37

FS 38

CENT SWBD Room


FS 39

FS 40

STBD SWBD Room


FS 41

FS 42

3.3) Field Station for PORT MGE (FS37, FS38)

3.2) Field Station for IAS (FS43, FS44)

3.4) Field Station for CENT MGE (FS39, FS40)


3.5) Field Station for STBD MGE (FS41, FS42)

Thruster Field Station


AFT

FWD
FS 31

FS 32

FS 33

FS 34

FS 35

FS 36

3.6) Field Station for FWD thruster (FS31, FS32, FS33)


3.7) Field Station for AFT thruster (FS34, FS35, FS36)

Samsung Heavy Industries

38/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

3) Power management
3.1) Overload Prevention for DG
Objective

To prove DP/ PMS cut back on thruster load.

Method

For each MSB, two DGs running online.


Deselect two thrusters on DP mode, increase each thruster load to approx. 100% facing
each other.
The other thrusters on DP mode.
1. Trip one running DG by pushing MGE emcy stop or simulating MGE LO pressure low

* Reinstate and repeat for other MSB

Actual result

Expected result
1

- Alarm
- Cut back on running thrusters
to prevent partial blackout by
overloading the
remaining DG.

ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Stbd

Cent

Port

As expected

As expected

As expected

Fail

Witness

Comments

Signed

Date

FMEA Practitioner

SHI took complementary measures for

KiJung Kim

07/11/2011

unexpected results, which happened


during DP trial, and then confirmed by
retest.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, A) no. 7
at page 84.

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

39/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

3) Power management
3.2) Field Station for IAS (FS 36, FS 37)
Objective

Simulate failure of the field station for IAS.

Method

1. Fail main supply for FS and after recovery, fail second supply for FS.
2. Fail both supply for FS.

Actual result

Expected result

FS 36

FS 37

- 24VDC supply power failure alarm in the


K-CHIEF OS.
- The FS is still working normally by second
power.

As expected.

As expected.

- Station is not communicational alarm in the


K-CHIEF OS.
- The FS fails.
- Loss of data and machinery related to the FS.
- No effect on DP.

As expected.

As expected.

ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Fail

Witness

Comments

Signed

Date

FMEA Practitioner

SHI took complementary measures for

KiJung Kim

07/11/2011

unexpected results, which happened


during DP trial, and then confirmed by
retest.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, C) no. 15
at page 94.

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

40/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

3) Power management
3.3) Field Station for STBD MGE (FS 38, FS 39)
Objective

Simulate failure of the field station for stbd MGE and MSB.

Method

1. Fail main supply for one FS. And after recovery, fail second supply for one FS
2. Disconnect the following signals from DG to FS
a. Generator kW signal, b. Generator Hz signal, c. Generator breaker status
d. Generator voltage, e. Bus voltage (only for FS 39), f. Generator raise/lower signal
3. Fail both power sources for the FS.

Actual result

Expected result

FS 38

FS 39

- 24VDC supply power failure alarm in the KCHIEF OS.


- The FS is still working normally by second power.

As expected.

As expected.

a. Alarm, load share fail; no kW to DP/


IAS. The corresponding DG to be changed to manual
mode.
b. Alarm, no Hz to DP/ IAS. No effect on DG
c. Alarm. No affect on DG
(But the breaker will trip at the load of DG < 10%)
d. Alarm, synchronising disabled. No affect
on DG
e. Alarm, No affect on DG
f. DG runs in DROOP.

a. As expected

a. As expected

b. As expected
c. As expected

b. As expected
c. As expected

d. As expected

d. As expected

e. f. As expected

e. As expected
f. As expected

- Station is not communicational alarm in the KCHIEF OS.


- The FS shut down
- Loss of monitoring and control by the FS
- Available power will be kept

As expected.

As expected.

ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Fail

Witness

Comments

Signed

Date

FMEA

SHI took complementary measures for


unexpected results, which happened during DP
trial, and then confirmed by retest.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists as follows :
- A) no. 8 at page 84.
- B) no. 10 at page 87
- B) no. 11 at page 88

KiJung Kim

07/11/2011

Practitioner

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

41/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

3) Power management
3.4) Field Station for CENT MGE (FS 40, FS 41)
Objective

Simulate failure of the field station for cent MGE and MSB.

Method

1. Fail main supply for one FS.


2. Disconnect the following signals from DG to FS
a. Generator kW signal, b. Generator Hz signal, c. Generator breaker status
d. Generator voltage, e. Bus voltage (only for FS 40), f. Generator raise/lower signal
3. Fail second supply for the FS.

Actual result

Expected result

FS 40

FS 41

- 24VDC supply power failure alarm in the KCHIEF OS.


- The FS is still working normally by second power.

As expected.

As expected.

a. Alarm, load share fail; no kW to DP/


IAS. The corresponding DG to be changed to manual
mode.
b. Alarm, no Hz to DP/ IAS. No effect on DG
c. Alarm. No affect on DG
(But the breaker will trip at the load of DG < 10%)
d. Alarm, synchronising disabled. No affect
on DG
e. Alarm, No affect on DG
f. DG runs in DROOP.

a. As expected

a. As expected

b. As expected
c. As expected

b. As expected
c. As expected

d. As expected

d. As expected

e. As expected
f. As expected

e. f. As expected

- Station is not communicational alarm in the KCHIEF OS.


- The FS shut down
- Loss of monitoring and control by the FS
- Available power will be kept

As expected

As expected.

ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Fail

Witness

Comments

Signed

Date

FMEA

SHI took complementary measures for unexpected


results, which happened during DP trial, and then
confirmed by retest.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists as follows :
- A) no. 8 at page 84.
- B) no. 10 at page 87

KiJung Kim

07/11/2011

Practitioner

- B) no. 11 at page 88

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

42/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

3) Power management
3.5) Field Station for PORT MGE (FS 42, FS 43)
Objective

Simulate failure of the field station for port MGE and MSB.

Method

1. Fail main supply for one FS.


2. Disconnect the following signals from DG to FS
a. Generator kW signal, b. Generator Hz signal, c. Generator breaker status
d. Generator voltage, e. Bus voltage (only for FS 42), f. Generator raise/lower signal
3. Fail second supply for the FS.

Actual result

Expected result

FS 42

FS 43

- 24VDC supply power failure alarm in the KCHIEF OS.


- The FS is still working normally by second power.

As expected.

As expected.

a. Alarm, load share fail; no kW to DP/


IAS. The corresponding DG to be changed to manual
mode.
b. Alarm, no Hz to DP/ IAS. No effect on DG
c. Alarm. No affect on DG
(But the breaker will trip at the load of DG < 10%)
d. Alarm, synchronising disabled. No affect
on DG
e. Alarm, No affect on DG
f. DG runs in DROOP.

a. As expected

a. As expected

b. As expected
c. As expected

b. As expected
c. As expected

d. As expected

d. As expected

e. As expected
f. As expected

e. f. As expected

- Station is not communicational alarm in the KCHIEF OS.


- The FS shut down
- Loss of monitoring and control by the FS
- Available power will be kept

As expected.

As expected.

Samsung Heavy Industries

43/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ABS DPS-3 : Pass

ETESCO Drillship

Fail

Witness

Comments

Signed

Date

FMEA

SHI took complementary measures for

KiJung Kim

07/11/2011

Practitioner

unexpected results, which happened during DP


trial, and then confirmed by retest.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists as follows :
- B) no. 11 at page 88
- C) no. 14 at page 94

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

44/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

3) Power management
3.6) Field Station for FWD thruster (FS 32, FS 33, FS 34)
Objective

Test failure of the field station for FWD thrusters.


1. Power off main power of the FS.

Method

2. After recovery, power off another power source.


3. Fail both powers of the FS. (No power for the FS)

Expected result

Actual result
FS 32(CENT)

- 24VDC failure alarm in the K-CHIEF OS.


- The FS is still working normally by second
power.

As expected.

- 24VDC failure alarm in the K-CHIEF OS.


- The FS is still working normally by second
power.

As expected.

- Station is not communicational alarm in the


K-CHIEF OS.
- The FS fails.
- Loss of data and machinery related to FS.
- The related thruster is out of DP.
- No effect on DP of vessel.

As expected.

ABS DPS-3 : Pass


Witness

FS 33 (STBD)

FS 34(PORT)

Signed

Date

Moonho Son

07/11/2011

Fail
Comments

FMEA Practitioner

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

45/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

3) Power management
3.7) Field Station for AFT thruster (FS 44, FS 45, FS 46)
Objective

Test failure of the field station for AFT thruster.


1. Power off main power of the FS.

Method

2. After recovery, power off another power source.


3. Fail both powers of the FS. (No power for the FS)

Actual result

Expected result
FS 44(STBD)
1

- 24VDC failure alarm in the K-CHIEF OS.


- The FS is still working normally by second
power.

As expected.

- 24VDC failure alarm in the K-CHIEF OS.


- The FS is still working normally by second
power.

As expected.

- Station is not communicational alarm in the


K-CHIEF OS.
- The FS fails.
- Loss of data and machinery related to FS.
- The related thruster is out of DP.
- No effect on DP of vessel.

As expected.

ABS DPS-3 : Pass


Witness

FS 45(PORT)

FS 46(CENT)

Signed

Date

Moonho Son

07/11/2011

Fail
Comments

FMEA Practitioner

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

46/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

4) DP control system
From the viewpoint of control system and equipments, essential tested systems during proving trial are
summarized as follows :
- DP controller & Operation Station
- Position reference system & Environmental sensors
- Network system
- Independent Joystick System

In order to verify complying with ABS DPS-3 rule, carry out as following tests during DP trial.

a. DP FMEA tests for DP control equipments

b. Function tests for DP control


4.9) DP control accuracy
4.15) Consequence Analysis

Samsung Heavy Industries

47/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

< CAT 4.3.2>


4) DP control system
4.1) K-POS OS
Objective

Test a redundancy of the K-POS OS.

Method

1. Power off the K-POS OS 1 which is main propulsion OS.


2. After recovery, power off the K-POS OS 2 which is main propulsion OS.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1) A redundancy tests of control processors due to power loss are carried out in
Computer console test during CAT 4.3.2. Please refer to the CAT.
2) Confirm that automatic change over to other redundant OS correctly.

Expected result
1

Actual result

< K-POS OS 1 >


- DP-OS fault alarm.
- If the K-POS OS 1 is main propulsion OS,
switch over to other OS.
- No effect on DP.

As expected

< K-POS OS 2 >


- DP-OS fault alarm.
- If the K-POS OS 2 is main propulsion OS,
switch over to other OS.
- No effect on DP.

As expected

ABS DPS-3 : Pass

DP-OS 1 : Station is not communicational


alarm

DP-OS 2 : Station is not communicational


alarm

Fail

Witness

Comments

Signed

Date

FMEA Practitioner

SHI took complementary measures for

KyeongKi,

05/11/2011

unexpected results, which happened

Kim

during DP trial, and then confirmed by


retest.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, B) no. 12
at page 88.

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

48/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

< CAT 4.3.2>


4) DP control system
4.2) K-THRUST OS
Objective

Test a failure of the K-THRUST OS.

Method

1. Power off the K-THRUST OS 5 which is main propulsion OS.


------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1) A redundancy tests of control processors due to power loss are carried out in
Computer console test during CAT 4.3.2. Please refer to the CAT.
2) Confirm that automatic change over to other redundant OS correctly.

Expected result
1

Actual result

- OS fault alarm.
- If the K-THRUST OS 5 is main propulsion
OS, switch over to other K-POS OS (Hot
standby OS).
- No effect on DP.

ABS DPS-3 : Pass

As expected
TC-OS 5 : Station is not communicational
alarm

Fail

Witness

Comments

Signed

Date

FMEA Practitioner

SHI took complementary measures for

KyeongKi,

05/11/2011

unexpected results, which happened

Kim

during DP trial, and then confirmed by


retest.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, B) no. 12
at page 88.

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

49/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

< CAT 4.5.1>


4) DP control system
4.3) Control processors(RCU) in DPC-3 (Main DP controller)
Objective

Test a redundancy of the DP control processors.

Method

1. Power off a control processor, RCU A, of DPC-3 in online(Master).


2. After recovery, power off a control processor, RCU B.
3. After recovery, power off a control processor, RCU C.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1) A redundancy tests of control processors due to power loss are carried out in
Computer redundancy test (Triple System) test during CAT 4.5.1.
Please refer to the CAT.
2) Confirm that automatic change over to standby processor correctly.

Expected result
1

Actual result

< RCU A >


- DpPs ## Station is not communicational
Alarm.
- Automatic change over to standby processor.
- No effect on DP.

As expected

< RCU B >


- DpPs ## Station is not communicational
Alarm.
- Automatic change over to standby processor.
- No effect on DP.

As expected

< RCU C >


- DpPs ## Station is not communicational
Alarm.
- Automatic change over to standby processor.
- No effect on DP.

As expected

ABS DPS-3 : Pass


Witness

DpPs 01 : Station is not communicational


alarm

DpPs 11 : Station is not communicational


alarm

DpPs 21 : Station is not communicational


alarm

Fail
Comments

FMEA Practitioner

Signed

Date

KyeongKi,

05/11/2011

Kim

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

50/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

4) DP control system
4.4) I/O modules in DPC-3 (Main DP controller)
Objective

Test a failure of the I/O modules in DPC-3.

Method

1. Fail one I/O module in DPC-3.


2. After recovery, repeat one by one.

Expected result

Actual result

< Unit No. 32 >


Gyro 1, DPS 132-1, Wind 1 fail.
No effect on DP.

< Unit No. 32 >


As expected.
Gyro 1, Wind 1, DPS132-1(GPS 1) fail.

< Unit No. 33 >


Gyro 3, DPS132-2 fail.
No effect on DP.

< Unit No. 33 >


As expected.
Gyro 3, DPS132-2 (GPS 3) fail.

< Unit No. 34 >


Gyro 1, MRU 1 fail.
No effect on DP.

< Unit No. 34 >


As expected.
Gyro 1, MRU 1 fail.

< Unit No. 35 >


Gyro 3 fail.
No effect on DP.

< Unit No. 35 >


As expected.
Gyro 3 fail.

< Unit No. 62 >


Gyro 2, Wind 2, DPS232-2 fail.
No effect on DP.

< Unit No. 62 >


As expected.
Gyro 2, Wind 2, DPS232-2 (GPS 2) fail.

< Unit No. 63 >


Wind 3, DPS232-2 fail.
No effect on DP.

< Unit No. 63 >


As expected.
Wind 3, DPS232-2 (GPS 4) fail.

< Unit No. 64 >


MRU 2 fail.
No effect on DP.

< Unit No. 64 >


As expected.
MRU 2 fail.

< Unit No. 65 >


Gyro 2 , MRU 3 fails.
No effect on DP.

< Unit No. 65 >


As expected.
Gyro 2, MRU 3 fail.

ABS DPS-3 : Pass


Witness

Fail
Comments

FMEA Practitioner

Signed

Date

KyeongKi,

06/11/2011

Kim

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

51/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

4) DP control system
4.5) Power supplies of DPC-3 (Main DP controller)
Objective

Test a redundant power of DPC-3.

Method

1. Switch off main power of DPC-3 from UPS 1.


2. After recovery, switch off second power failure from UPS 3.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1) This test can be confirmed from results of test item 2.7 UPS 1 and 2.9 UPS 3.

Expected result
1

Actual result

< Power A failure >


- Power failure alarm.
- MRU 1 fails.
- DPC-3 is still working by redundant power.
- No effect on DP.

< Power A failure >


As expected

< Power B failure >


- Power failure alarm.
- MRU 2 fails.
- DPC-3 is still working by redundant power.
- No effect on DP.

< Power B failure >


As expected

ABS DPS-3 : Pass


Witness

Critical low voltage 24V power supply A


alarm

Critical low voltage 24V power supply B


alarm

Fail
Comments

FMEA Practitioner

Signed

Date

KyeongKi,

06/11/2011

Kim

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

52/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

4) DP control system
4.6) NDU (Network Distribution Unit)
Objective

Test a redundant network.

Method

1. Power off the UPS 1 for NDU A1 and check a network status.
2. After recovery, power off the UPS 2 for NDU B1/C1, B2.
3. After recovery, power off the UPS 3 for NDU A2.
4. After recovery, power off the UPS 4 for NDU B3/C3.
5. After recovery, power off the UPS 5 for NDU A3.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1) The UPS loss causes NDU failure and so a redundant network can be confirmed during
UPS failure test.
Please refer to UPS failure test related to NDU as following in this procedure:
- UPS 1 failure : NDU A1 fail (item 2.7 UPS 1)
- UPS 2 failure : NDU B1/C1, B2 fail (item 2.8 UPS 2)
- UPS 3 failure : NDU A2 fail (item 2.9 UPS 3)
- UPS 4 failure : NDU B3/C3 fail (item 2.10 UPS 4)
- UPS 5 failure : NDU A3 fail (item 2.11 UPS 5)
2) Confirm that a network error alarm is coming and a redundant network is working
normally.

Expected result

Actual result

- Error Net alarm.


- A network with NDU failure has network
error but other network is operating healthy as
redundancy.
- No effect on DP.

< NDU A1 >


As expected. Error net A alarm
< NDU A2 >
As expected. Error net A alarm
< NDU A3 >
As expected. Error net A alarm
< NDU B1/C1 >
As expected. Error net B alarm
< NDU B2 >
As expected. Error net B alarm
< NDU B3/C3 >
As expected. Error net B alarm

ABS DPS-3 : Pass


Witness

Fail
Comments

FMEA Practitioner

Signed

Date

KyeongKi,

06/11/2011

Kim

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

53/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

4) DP control system
4.7) Voting of the position reference system
Objective

Test voting performance due to degraded position reference system.

Method

Select all of the position reference systems. (DPS systems and one HiPAP system)
1. Remove the differential correction signals or reduce the satellites of DPS 132-1.
2. After recovery, repeat of DPS 232-1.
3. After recovery, repeat DPS 132-2 in backup room.
4. After recovery, repeat DPS 232-2 in backup room.
5. After recovery, raise the transducer of HiPAP 1 stbd.
6. After recovery, restore and then repeat HiPAP 2 port.

Expected result
1

Actual result

< DPS 132-1 >


- Degraded DPS 132-1 is rejected or weight
decreasing. And no effect on DP.

As expected

< DPS 232-1 >


- Degraded DPS 232-1 is rejected or weight
decreasing. And no effect on DP.

As expected

< DPS 132-2 in backup room >


- Degraded DPS 132-2 is rejected or weight
decreasing. And no effect on DP.

As expected

< DPS 232-2 in backup room >


- Degraded DPS 232-2 is rejected or weight
decreasing. And no effect on DP.

As expected

< HiPAP 1 System >


- Degraded HiPAP 1 is rejected or weight
decreasing. And no effect on DP.

As expected.

< HiPAP 2 System >


- Degraded HiPAP 2 is rejected or weight
decreasing. And no effect on DP.

As expected.

Samsung Heavy Industries

GPS 1 no diff data received alarm.

GPS 2 no diff data received alarm.

GPS 3 no diff data received alarm.

GPS 4 no diff data received alarm.

Reference high variance HPR warning.

Reference high variance HPR warning.

54/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ABS DPS-3 : Pass

ETESCO Drillship

Fail

Witness

Comments

Signed

Date

FMEA Practitioner

Kongsberg explained why keep on the standard

KyeongKi,

06/11/2011

deviation of DGPS after disconnecting all of the

Kim

differential correction signals when tested method 1


to 4 during DP trial.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, C) no.16 at page 94.

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

55/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

4) DP control system
4.8) Position reference system (DGPS, HiPAP systems)
Objective Test a redundancy of the position reference systems.
Method

Select all of the position reference systems.


(DGPS systems and one HiPAP system)
1. Power off the DPS132-1 from UPS 3.
2/3/4. After recovery, repeat other DPS from UPS 1 or 2.
5/6. After recovery, repeat HiPAP systems from UPS 1 or 2.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1) This test can be confirmed from results of test item 2.7 UPS 1, 2.8 UPS 2 and 2.9 UPS
3.

Expected result

Actual result

< DPS 132-1 >


- DGPS telegram timeout alarm.
- Other systems are working.
- No effect on DP.

As expected

< DPS 200-1 >


- DGPS telegram timeout alarm.
- Other systems are working.
- No effect on DP.

As expected

< DPS 132-2 in backup room >


- DGPS telegram timeout alarm.
- Other systems are working.
- No effect on DP.

As expected

< DPS 200-2 in backup room >


- DGPS telegram timeout alarm.
- Other systems are working.
- No effect on DP.

As expected

< HiPAP 1 PORT >


- HPR position status invalid alarm.
- Other systems are working.
- No effect on DP.

As expected

< HiPAP 2 STBD in ECR >


- HPR position status invalid alarm.
- Other systems are working.
- No effect on DP.

As expected

ABS DPS-3 : Pass


Witness

Fail
Comments

FMEA Practitioner

Signed

Date

KyeongKi,

06/11/2011

Kim

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

56/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

< CAT 4.4>


4) DP control system
4.9) DP control accuracy
Objective

Test a DP control accuracy using the HiPAP or DGPS system.

Method

1. Control a positioning alongship and athwartship using the HiPAP or DGPS system.
2. Make 15heading change at low gain.
* Repeat with other reference system.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1) DP control accuracy tests with the HiPAP or DGPS system are carried out in DP
AUTO-CONTROL TEST during CAT 4.4. Please refer to the CAT.
2) Heading control test is carried out in Heading Control during CAT 4.4.13.
Please refer to the CAT.
3) Confirm that maximum overshoot at each new position shall be less then 5m and range
of heading stability shall be within 3.

Expected result

Actual result

- Position difference is recovered at new


position.
- Maximum overshoot at new position shall be
less then 5m.

As expected

- Range of heading stability shall be within


3.

As expected

ABS DPS-3 : Pass


Witness

Fail
Comments

FMEA Practitioner

Signed

Date

KyeongKi,

05/11/2011

Kim

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

57/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

4) DP control system
4.10) MRU (Motion Reference Unit)
Objective

Test a performance due to degraded MRU.

Method

1. Make a 4difference for roll and pitch of MRU 1 which selected as in use.
2. After recovery, repeat for MRU 2 which selected as in use.
3. After recovery, repeat for MRU 3 which selected as in use in DP backup room.

Expected result

Actual result

< MRU 1 HPR comp. stbd >


- VRS 1 rejected warning and rejected in DP.
- Automatically change over to other MRU.
- No effect on DP.

As expected

< MRU 2 HPR comp. port >


- VRS 2 rejected warning and rejected in DP.
- Automatically change over to other MRU.
- No effect on DP.

As expected

< MRU 3 DP backup room >


- VRS 3 rejected warning and rejected in DP.
- Automatically change over to other MRU.
- No effect on DP.

As expected

ABS DPS-3 : Pass


Witness

Fail
Comments

FMEA Practitioner

Signed

Date

KyeongKi,

06/11/2011

Kim

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

58/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

< CAT 4.5.4>


4) DP control system
4.11) MRU redundancy
Objective

Test a redundant MRU.

Method

1. Switch off the MRU 1 which selected as in use by disconnecting terminals in DPC-2.
2. After recovery, switch off the MRU 2 which selected as in use.
3. After recovery, switch off the MRU 3 which selected as in use in CENT MSB Room.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1) MRU redundancy tests due to power loss are carried out in Environmental Sensor
redundancy test during CAT 4.5.4. Please refer to the CAT.
2) Confirm that redundant sensor and no effect to DP control.

Expected result

Actual result

< MRU 1 >


- VRS 1 not ready alarm.
- Automatic change over to other MRU.
- No effect on DP.

As expected

< MRU 2 >


- VRS 2 not ready alarm.
- Automatic change over to other MRU.
- No effect on DP.

As expected

< MRU 3 >


- VRS 3 not ready alarm.
- Automatic change over to other MRU.
- No effect on DP.

As expected

ABS DPS-3 : Pass


Witness

Fail
Comments

FMEA Practitioner

Signed

Date

KyeongKi,

05/11/2011

Kim

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

59/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

4) DP control system
4.12) Gyro compass
Objective

Test a performance due to degraded Gyro compass.

Method

1. Give a difference for alarm on Gyro 1 which selected as in use.


2. After recovery, repeat for Gyro 2 which selected as in use.
3. After recovery, repeat for Gyro 3 which selected as in use in backup room.

Expected result
1

Actual result

< Gyro 1 NAV INST Room >


- Gyro rejected alarm.
- Operator can change over to other gyro.
- No effect on DP.

As expected

< Gyro 2 NAV INST Room >


- Gyro rejected alarm.
- Operator can change over to other gyro.
- No effect on DP.

As expected

< Gyro 3 DP backup room >


- Gyro rejected alarm.
- Operator can change over to other gyro.
- No effect on DP.

As expected

ABS DPS-3 : Pass


Witness

The gyro 1 changed over automatically to other


preference gyro compass.

The gyro 2 changed over automatically to other


preference gyro compass.

The gyro 3 changed over automatically to other


preference gyro compass.

Fail
Comments

FMEA Practitioner

Signed

Date

KyeongKi,

06/11/2011

Kim

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

60/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

< CAT 4.5.5>


4) DP control system
4.13) Gyro compass redundancy
Objective

Test a redundant gyro compass.

Method

1. Switch off the Gyro 1 which selected as in use by disconnecting terminals in DPC-2.
2. After recovery, switch off the Gyro 2 which selected as in use.
3. After recovery, switch off the Gyro 3 which selected as in use.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1) Gyro compass redundancy tests due to power loss are carried out in Gyro sensor
redundancy test during CAT 4.5.5. Please refer to the CAT.
2) Confirm that redundant sensor and no effect to DP control.

Expected result

Actual result

< Gyro compass 1 >


- Gyro 1 not ready alarm.
- Automatic change over to other Gyro sensor.
- No effect on DP.

As expected

< Gyro compass 2 >


- Gyro 2 not ready alarm.
- Automatic change over to other Gyro sensor.
- No effect on DP.

As expected

< Gyro compass 3 >


- Gyro 3 not ready alarm.
- Automatic change over to other Gyro sensor.
- No effect on DP.

As expected

ABS DPS-3 : Pass


Witness

Fail
Comments

FMEA Practitioner

Signed

Date

KyeongKi,

05/11/2011

Kim

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

61/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

< CAT 4.5.4>


4) DP control system
4.14) Wind sensor redundancy
Objective

Test a redundant wind sensor.

Method

1. Switch off the wind sensor 1 unit by disconnecting terminals in DPC-2.


2. After recovery, switch off the wind sensor 2.
3. After recovery, switch off the wind sensor 3 of DP backup system.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1) Wind sensor redundancy tests due to power loss are carried out in Environmental
Sensor redundancy test during CAT 4.5.4. Please refer to the CAT.
2) Confirm that redundant sensor and no effect to DP control.

Expected result

Actual result

< Wind sensor 1 >


- Wind 1 not ready alarm.
- Automatic change over to other wind sensor.
- No effect on DP.

As expected

< Wind sensor 2 >


- Wind 2 not ready alarm.
- Automatic change over to other wind sensor.
- No effect on DP.

As expected

< Wind sensor 3 >


- Wind 3 not ready alarm.
- Automatic change over to other wind sensor.
- No effect on DP.

As expected

ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Fail

Witness

Comments

Signed

Date

FMEA Practitioner

SHI took complementary measures for

KyeongKi,

05/11/2011

incorrect wind data during DP trial, and

Kim

then confirmed by retest.


Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, B) no. 13
at page 88.

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

62/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

< CAT 4.5.6>


4) DP control system
4.15) Consequence Analysis
Objective

Test a consequence analysis performance with respect to reduced thrusters and generators.

Method

1) Consequence analysis test are carried out in On-line Consequence Analysis test
during CAT 4.5.6. Please refer to the CAT.
2) Confirm consequence analysis warnings.

Expected result
1

- Warnings for consequence analysis on


reduced thrusters and generators.

Actual result
< Test Condition >
DP Class 3
Type of failure : Bus pr. bus

< Result >


Consequence analysis drift off warning alarm

ABS DPS-3 : Pass


Witness

Fail
Comments

FMEA Practitioner

Signed

Date

KyeongKi,

05/11/2011

Kim

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

63/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

< CAT 5.1 >


4) DP control system
4.16) Change over between the DP systems
Objective

Test a change over between main and backup system.

Method

1. Change over to DP backup system from DP main system by operating the selector
switch located at the backup OS, K-POS OS 4.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1) Change over between the DP systems test are carried out in Backup Switch test
during CAT 5.1. Please refer to the CAT.
2) Confirm that normally change over from main to backup DP system.

Expected result
1

Actual result

- Change over correctly to backup system.


- The DP backup system can control a vessels
positioning.

ABS DPS-3 : Pass


Witness

As expected

Fail
Comments

FMEA Practitioner

Signed

Date

KyeongKi,

05/11/2011

Kim

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

64/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

< CAT cJoy >


4) DP control system
4.17) Independent joystick
Objective

Test a manual position control by the independent joystick.

Method

1) Tests of a manual position control by the joystick system are carried out during CAT
cJoy. Refer to CAT cJoy procedure.
2) Confirm that a positioning is controlled normally by the independent joystick system.

Expected result
1

Actual result

- The independent joystick system is operating


normally.

ABS DPS-3 : Pass


Witness

As expected

Fail
Comments

FMEA Practitioner

Signed

Date

KyeongKi,

05/11/2011

Kim

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

65/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

5) Thrusters
The thruster system is consisted of 5 sub-systems which are needed necessarily in order to operate
thruster. 5 sub-systems are as follows:
-Power system
-Hydraulic and Lubrication Oil system
-Cooling system
-Thruster drive system
-Control system.

COOLING
COOLING
SYSTEM
SYSTEM

THRUSTER
THRUSTER
DRIVE
DRIVE SYSTEM
SYSTEM

5.6) Sea water cooling system

5.2) Azimuth Signal


5.3) Speed Signal
5.7) Fresh water cooling system

2) Power distribution PART


CONTROL
CONTROL
SYSTEM
SYSTEM

THRUSTER
THRUSTER
PROPULSION
PROPULSION
MOTOR
MOTOR

Electric
Electric Line
Line
Force
Force Line
Line

5.1) Thruster control panels


5.8) Emergency stops

HYDRAULIC
HYDRAULIC and
and
LUBRICATION
LUBRICATION
OIL
OIL SYSTEM
SYSTEM
THRUSTER
THRUSTER

5.4) Azimuth hydraulic system


5.5) Lubrication oil system

Water
Water Line
Line
Oil
Oil Line
Line
Signal
Signal Line
Line

The Power system and Thruster drive system are related to supplying thruster power. The effect of these
systems can be confirmed in the power distribution part.
The Cooling system supplies cooling water to equipment related to thruster operating. It has to be
checked that the cooling water is supplied to thruster equipment. So the operation of cooling pumps is
confirmed.
The Oil system supplies oil in order to help thruster operation. The pumps and expansion tanks which are
related to oil supply are evaluated.
The Control system controls the thruster operation signals. Azimuth and speed signals for the thruster to
be operated and emergency stop signals have to be analysed.

Samsung Heavy Industries

66/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

5) Thrusters
5.1) Thruster Control Panels
To test a failure of the DCU (Drive Control Unit) power

Objective

To test a failure of the RexCU (Rexpeller Control Unit) power


*Repeat for other thrusters.
1. Fail main supply power for DCU. (After recovery, test the other power)
2. Check battery capacity inside DCU after disconnecting two supply powers for DCU.

Method

3. Fail main supply power for RexCU. (After recovery, test the other power)
4. Check battery capacity supplied from THR. AUX. panel after disconnecting two supply
powers (UPS and THR. AUX. panel) for RexCU.
*Repeat for other thrusters.

Expected result

Actual result

- DCU common alarm


- The DCU power is auto-changed to the
second power and the DCU will work normally
by second power.

As expected.

- DCU UPS alarm


- Battery discharging time > 30 minutes

As expected.

- Power failure alarm.


- The RexCU power is auto-changed to the
second power and the RexCU will work
normally by second power.

As expected.

- Alarm.
- Battery discharging time > 30 minutes

As expected.

ABS DPS-3 : Pass


Witness

Fail

Comments

Signed

Date

Moonho

07/11/

Son

2011

SHI took complementary measures for incorrect


wind data during DP trial, and then confirmed by
retest.
FMEA Practitioner

Please refer to ch.5 punch lists as follows :


- B) no. 14 at page 88.
- C) no. 17 at page 95.
- C) no. 18 at page 95.

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

67/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

5) Thrusters
5.2) Azimuth Signals
Objective

To test a failure of azimuth control signals.

Method

1. Disconnect azimuth command signal from FS to RexCU.


2. Disconnect azimuth command signal from RexCU to Hyd. pump unit.
3. Disconnect azimuth feedback signal from transmitter box to RexCU.
4. Disconnect azimuth feedback signal from transmitter box to FS.
*Repeat for other thrusters.

Expected result

Actual result

- Azimuth freezes.
- Propeller is operating.
- The thruster is in DP.
-FU major failure alarm.

As expected.

- Azimuth is actually not operating.


- Propeller is operating.
- The thruster is in DP.
- FU major failure and NFU failure alarms
- Azimuth FB mismatch warning. (Time delay)

As expected.

-Prediction error (at appx. 23deg commandfeedback differential at certain time intervals)
3

- Azimuth freezes.
- Propeller is operating.
- The thruster is in DP.
- FU major failure alarm.
- Azimuth FB mismatch warning. (Time delay)

As expected.

- Azimuth is operating.
- Propeller is operating.
- The thruster is in DP.
- FU major failure alarm.
- Prediction error (at appx. 23deg commandfeedback differential at certain time intervals)

As expected.

ABS DPS-3 : Pass


Witness

Fail
Comments

FMEA Practitioner

Signed

Date

Moonho

07/11/

Son

2011

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

68/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

5) Thrusters
5.3) Speed Signals
Objective

To test a failure of speed control signals.

Method

1. Disconnect speed command signal from FS to DCU.


2. Disconnect speed feedback signal from DCU to FS
*Repeat for other thrusters.

Expected result

Actual result

- Thruster is in DP
- Propeller is idle running.
- DCU common alarm.
-Prediction error (at appx. 30% commandfeedback differential at certain time intervals)

As expected.

- Thruster is in DP
- Propeller is operating.
- DCU common alarm.
- Feedback input signal error

As expected.

ABS DPS-3 : Pass


Witness

Fail
Comments

Signed

Date

Moonho

07/11/

Son

2011

FMEA Practitioner

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

69/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

5) Thrusters
5.4) Azimuth hydraulic System
Objective

To test failure of hydraulic steering pumps.

Method

1. Power off running duty azimuth hydraulic pump.


2. After recovery, power off auto-changed azimuth hydraulic pump.
3. Power off two azimuth hydraulic pumps.

*Repeat for other thrusters.

Expected result

Actual result

- Steering pump power failure alarm


- The stand-by pump starts.

As expected.

- Steering pump power failure alarm


- The stand-by pump starts.

As expected.

- Steering pump power failure alarm


- Not ready for DP alarm.
- The thruster is out of DP.

As expected.

ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Fail

Witness

Comments

Signed

FMEA Practitioner

SHI took complementary measures for


incorrect wind data during DP trial, and then
confirmed by retest.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, B) no. 15 at

Moonho
Son

Date

07/11/ 2011

page 89.

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

70/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

5) Thrusters
5.5) Lubrication Oil System
Objective

To check a failures of lubrication oil system.

Method

1. Power off running lubrication oil pump.


2. After recovery, power off auto-changed lubrication oil pump.
3. Power off two lubrication oil pumps.
4. Operate low level switch about the gravity tank.
(Put off the cable of the gravity tank connection box)
*Repeat for other thrusters.

Expected result

Actual result

- LO pump failure alarm


- The stand-by pump starts.
- The thruster is in DP.

As expected.

- LO pump failure alarm


- The stand-by pump starts.
- The thruster is in DP.

As expected.

- LO pump failure alarm


- Low press alarm.
- The thruster is in DP.

As expected.

- Gravity Tank Low Level alarm


- The thruster is in DP.

As expected.

ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Fail

Witness

Comments

Signed

FMEA Practitioner

SHI took complementary measures for


incorrect wind data during DP trial, and then
confirmed by retest.

Moonho Son

Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, B) no. 19 at

Date

07/11/
2011

page 95.

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

71/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

5) Thrusters
5.6) Sea Water Cooling System
Objective

To test failure of the sea water cooling pump


1. Power off running duty SW cooling pump.
2. After recovery, power off auto-changed SW cooling pump.

Method
*Repeat for other thrusters.

Expected result

Actual result

- SWC PMP failure alarm.


- The stand-by pump starts.

As expected.

- SWC PMP failure alarm.


- The stand-by pump starts.

As expected.

ABS DPS-3 : Pass


Witness

Fail

Comments

Signed

Date

SHI took complementary measures for


incorrect wind data during DP trial, and then
FMEA Practitioner

confirmed by retest.

Moonho Son

Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, B) no. 19 at

07/11/
2011

page 95.

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

72/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

5) Thrusters
5.7) Fresh Water Cooling System
Objective

To test failure of the fresh water cooling pump.


1. Power off running duty FW cooling pump.
2. After recovery, power off auto-changed FW cooling pump.

Method
*Repeat for other thrusters.

Expected result

Actual result

- FWC PMP failure alarm.


- The stand-by pump starts.

As expected.

-FWC PMP failure alarm.


-The stand-by pump starts.

As expected.

ABS DPS-3 : Pass


Witness

Fail
Comments

FMEA Practitioner

Signed

Date

Moonho

07/11/

Son

2011

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

73/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

5) Thrusters
5.8) Emergency Stops
Objective

To check of a failure of emergency stop circuit.

Method

1. Make a circuit open about the emergency stop.


2. Make a circuit short about the emergency stop.
3. Control thrusters at a field station.
4. Push an emergency stop button.

Expected result

Actual result

- EM STOP LOOP FAIL Alarm


- Thruster continues to run.

As expected.

- EM STOP LOOP FAIL Alarm


- Thruster continues to run.

As expected.

- The thruster is deselected from DP.


- The thruster can be operated locally by lever.

As expected.

- The thruster is shutdown.


- Thruster trips.
- Drive stops.
- Azimuth freezes.
- The thruster is out of DP.

As expected.

ABS DPS-3 : Pass


Witness

Fail
Comments

Signed

Date

Moonho

07/11/

Son

2011

FMEA Practitioner

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

74/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

6) Communication
6.1) Communication
Objective

Test normal operation of communication between DP and Drilling space.


(e.g. Wheelhouse, Driller cabin)

Method

1. Power off auto telephone system and then try to contact with other room.
2. Operate DP alert switch on K-POS OS 1. (green, yellow, red)

Expected result
1

Actual result

< Telecommunication >


- One of telecommunication is Always
available at least.

As expected.

< DP Alert system >


- The DP Alert status is confirmed correctly in
Driller cabin.

As expected.

ABS DPS-3 : Pass


Witness

Sound telephone could contact with the driller


cabinet.

Fail
Comments

Signed

Date

Moonho

07/11/

Son

2011

FMEA Practitioner

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

75/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

7) ESD and F/G system


7.1) ESD and F/G control
Objective

To check failure of ESD and F/G field stations

Method

1. Fail main supply for ESD FS 51. After recovery fail second supply. And fail both supply
2. Fail main supply for F/G FS 49. After recovery fail second supply. And fail both supply
3. Fail main supply for F/G FS 50. After recovery fail second supply. And fail both supply

Expected result

Actual result

- Alarm
- Dual power redundancy to be checked
- No effect on DP

As expected.

- Alarm
- Dual power redundancy to be checked
- No effect on DP

As expected.

- Alarm
- Dual power redundancy to be checked
- No effect on DP

As expected.

ABS DPS-3 : Pass


Witness

Fail

Comments

Signed

Date

Moonho

07/11/

Son

2011

FMEA
Practitioner

Remarks

Samsung Heavy Industries

76/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

4. The summary for results of FMEA proving DP trials


4.1 All the DP FMEA tests had been carried out between 5th and 7th November 2011.

4.2 Each test had been performed in condition that owner, class, and SHI were attending.

4.3 Final document for results of FMEA proving DP trials will be submitted after the punch lists
described in chapter 5 will be taken actions by SHI and closed.

4.4 The results of tests proved that this vessel complies with classification of the guidelines for dynamic
positioning system as defined in IMO MSC 645 and ABS DPS 3 requirements.

Samsung Heavy Industries

77/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

5. The punch list from the tests


A) For Immediate Action
No.

Item

Test No.

Description

No fully insulation for bulkheads in Cent. E/R 2nd deck.

Action by SHI
SHI took
complementary

It has to be fully insulated.

measures by A-60
insulating the

2. Check on
1

Insulation

undone parts

the number
of required
equipments

< Portside in E/R 2nd deck >

Samsung Heavy Industries

78/95 Page

< Stbdside in E/R 2nd deck >

Marine Research Institute

Verification by
SHI-MRI
Noted

Status
Closed

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

No.

Item

ETESCO Drillship

Test No.

Description
No fully insulation for bulkheads in Cent. E/R 4th deck.

Action by SHI
SHI took
complementary

It has to be fully insulated.

measures by A-60
insulating the
undone parts

2. Check on
2

Insulation

the number
of required

< Portside in E/R 4th deck >

equipments

< Stbdside in E/R 4th deck >

Samsung Heavy Industries

79/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Verification by
SHI-MRI
Noted

Status
Closed

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

No.

Item

ETESCO Drillship

Test No.

Description
No fully insulation for bulkheads in Fwd. machinery room.

Action by SHI
SHI took
complementary

It has to be fully insulated.

measures by A-60
insulating the
undone parts

2. Check on
3

Insulation

< Portside in fwd. mach. room >

the number
of required
equipments

< Stbdside in fwd. mach. room >

Samsung Heavy Industries

80/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Verification by
SHI-MRI
Noted

Status
Closed

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

No.

Item

ETESCO Drillship

Test No.

Description

The cable ducts, which for no.1 thruster HV power and net A cable, in the air
cond. unit room were not A60 insulated ducts.
These ducts have to be with A60 insulation in accordance with drawing and

Action by SHI
SHI took
complementary
measures for A-60
insulated ducts the

rules.

undone parts
2. Check on
4

Insulation

the number
of required
equipments

< Forward air cond. unit room >

Samsung Heavy Industries

81/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Verification by
SHI-MRI
Noted

Status
Closed

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

No.

Item

ETESCO Drillship

Test No.

Description

No fully insulation for bulkheads in Fwd. CO2 room.

Action by SHI
SHI took
complementary

It has to be fully insulated.

measures by A-60
insulating the
undone parts

2. Check on
5

Insulation

the number
of required
equipments

< Forward CO2 room >

Samsung Heavy Industries

82/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Verification by
SHI-MRI
Noted

Status
Closed

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

No.

Item

ETESCO Drillship

Test No.

Description

Action by SHI

The cable duct, which for net A cable, in the aux. store was not A60

SHI took

insulated duct.

complementary

This duct has to be with A60 insulation in accordance with drawing and

measures for A-60

rules.

insulated duct the


undone parts

2. Check on
6

Insulation

the number
of required
equipments

< Forward aux. store >

Samsung Heavy Industries

83/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Verification by
SHI-MRI
Noted

Status
Closed

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

No.

Item

ETESCO Drillship

Test No.

Description

Action by SHI
Load limitation frequency :

Overload
7

Prevention

During stbd side test, when No.1 DG stopped


3.1)

for DG

: No.2 MGE was unstable. The load was fluctuating.


: The loads of No.3, 4 thrusters also were fluctuating.

Verification by
SHI-MRI

Status

Noted

Closed

Noted

Closed

58 Hz, 2SEC -> 57.5 Hz, 5SEC


Thruster lever shall be operated
slowly in manual mode.
It was fixed and confirmed
stable operating MGE.

When kw signal of a DG from as below FS was disconnected,

It was fixed and confirmed

dummy value (minus value) came in and according to load

changing to manual mode.

sharing the other DG was tripped by reverse power. To avoid

FS for

3.3)

MGE

3.4)

Samsung Heavy Industries

this, the corresponding DG should be changed to manual


mode.

FS 38 in Stbd MSB room

FS 39 in Stbd MSB room

FS 40 in Cent. MSB room

FS 41 in Cent. MSB room

84/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

B) Important
No.

Item

Test No.
2. Check
on the

Earthing

number of
required
equipments

Control
2

Air

1.5)

System

Description

Action by SHI

No earthing for transceiver and switchbox in both HPR

HPR 1 at stbdside

HPR 2 at portside

by SHI-MRI

Status

Noted

Closed

Noted

Closed

Noted

Closed

earthing for the equipments.

compartments as follows :

It was fixed and confirmed an

Verification

All dampers in the engine room where control air was failed

It was fixed and confirmed a time of

kept the open position by non-return valve. As time goes by,

keeping the open position of dampers

they started to close. As the result the corresponding air

when control air fails.

supply fans stopped. Finally they were completely shut in


13mins at stbd engine room and 4mins at port engine room.
All non-return valves have some leakage because of their
characteristics. But time that they keep the opening position
is short. So they should be examined.

Electric
Governor

1.6)

When one pick-up sensor of a MGE was disconnected circuit

The function for breaker trip when

breaker of the corresponding MGE was tripped. But it is

one pick-up sensor failure has been

good that the alarm just comes out without opening the

deleted.

circuit breaker of the corresponding MGE because each


governor has two pick-up sensors.

Samsung Heavy Industries

85/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

No.

Item

Test No.

UPS

Alarm

2.1)

in

2.2)

MSB

2.3)

Room

DC 110V
5

DB
Alarm

2.1)
2.3)

Swbd

2.5)

Alarm

UPS 2

Description

Action by SHI

220V UPSs of as below MSB rooms had no alarm on IAS.

It was fixed and confirmed alarm

Because UPS was newly installed the related name plates

occurring.

Stbd MSB room

Cent. MSB room

Port MSB room

At 220V feeder panel fail test, there was no alarm for loss of

It was fixed and confirmed alarm

one power source of as below DC 110V DB.

occurring.

No.1 DC 110V DB in stbd MSB room

No.3 DC 110V DB in port MSB room


The alarm for loss of alternative

No alarm for loss of alternative power source of thruster

Status

Noted

Closed

Noted

Closed

Noted

Closed

Noted

Closed

power of DCU UPSs and power fail

fixed correctly and confirmed.

When UPS 2 was one power loss, the earth failure alarm was

It was fixed and confirmed correct

coming incorrectly on K-POS OS. Correct alarm is auto

alarm occurring

switch failure alarm. It has to be fixed.

Samsung Heavy Industries

by SHI-MRI

alarm of No.2 DC 110V DB were

No.1~6 DCU UPS.


No alarm for power failure of No.2 DC 110V DB.

2.8)

Verification

should be changed.

( During 220V fail test )

Emcy
6

ETESCO Drillship

86/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

No.

Item

UPS 3

ETESCO Drillship

Test No.

2.9)

Description

Action by SHI

When UPS 3 was one power loss, the UPS 3 PDU earth

It was fixed and confirmed correct

fail alarm was coming incorrectly on K-CHIEF OS. Correct

alarm occurring

Verification
by SHI-MRI

Status

Noted

Closed

Noted

Closed

Noted

Closed

alarm is auto switch failure: alarm. It has to be fixed.

UPS 4&5

2.10)
2.11)

When as below UPSs were both power loss, the UPS #

It was fixed and confirmed alarm

abnormal alarm was not coming to K-CHIEF OS.

coming up.

UPS 4

UPS 5

It has to be coming up and fixed.

10

FS for

3.3)

MGE

3.4)

Samsung Heavy Industries

When breaker status signal of a DG from as below FS was

According to KM logic, if the load of

lost, the load of the corresponding DG went to zero and CB

the DG is below 10% the DG breaker

tripped. This should be checked.

will actually trip and if over 10% the

FS 38 in Stbd MSB room

DG breaker will still be closed when

FS 39 in Stbd MSB room

the signal of DG breaker status is

FS 40 in Cent MSB room

disconnected.

FS 41 in Cent MSB room

87/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

No.

11

12

13

14

Item

PMS FS

Test No.

In case that as below FS38 which controls PMS fails, K-

It was fixed and confirmed to keep

chief gives the dedicated two thrusters maximum available

available power just before the FS

power values (4500kW) regardless of original values. But

failure.

3.4)

Therefore it is good to keep the values just before the FS

3.5)

failure.

Mimic

4.2)

DCU

Action by SHI

this may cause the MGE to overload or frequency low.

4.1)

Sensor

Description

3.3)

DP OS

Wind

ETESCO Drillship

4.14)

FS38 in Stbd MSB room

FS40 in Cent. MSB room

FS43 in Port MSB room

The K-POS OS 1, 2 and K-THRUST OS 5 mimic have

The OS mimic was modified correctly

incorrect description of switchboard. The switchboard name

by Kongsberg.

Verification
by SHI-MRI

Status

Noted

Closed

Noted

Closed

Noted

Closed

Noted

Closed

of port and stbd should be exchanged correctly.


The wind sensors have too high difference each other

The position and sensors value were

depending on weather condition.

fixed properly and confirmed.

It has to be checked relocation and fixed.

5.1)

The battery capacity of No.1 DCU UPS must be confirmed.


The battery must last for 30 mins

The battery of no.1 DCU UPS was


changed and sufficient capacity was
confirmed.

Samsung Heavy Industries

88/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

No.

Item

Test No.

Azimuth
15

Hydraulic

5.4)

Pump
Sea water
16

cooling
system

ETESCO Drillship
Verification

Description

Action by SHI

When the hyd. pump was changed the thruster was

It was fixed correctly and confirmed.

Noted

Closed

The auto-change logics for thruster

Noted

Closed

by SHI-MRI

Status

deselected in the DP mode.


It must be modified. In this case the thruster must be in the
DP mode.

1.3)

In the No.2, 3 and 5, when SWC pump was changed FWC

5.6)

pump also was changed at the same time.

Samsung Heavy Industries

89/95 Page

pumps were modified and confirmed.

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

ETESCO Drillship

C) Nice To Have
No.

Item

Test No.

Description

The cables of relevant DP equipments were exposed to sharp shape of the

Theses cables have to be protected against the sharp shape.

exposed sharp

the number

shape.

of required
equipments

< DP backup room on E-deck >

Samsung Heavy Industries

measures for
protection against

2. Check on
Insulation

SHI took
complementary

hole on the wall in DP backup room.

Action by SHI

90/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Verification
by SHI-MRI
Noted

Status
Closed

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

No.

Item

Test No.

ETESCO Drillship

Description

Action by SHI

Incorrect nametags were attached at the top of an entrance as follows :

Port bow thruster room

complementary

Stbd bow thruster room

measures to change

Center bow thruster room

correct nametags of

Forward machinery room

corresponding

These nametags have to be changed correctly.

2. Check
on the
2

Insulation

number of
required
equipments
< Nametag of port bow THR, RM > < Nametag of stbd bow THR, RM >

< Nametag of cent. bow THR, RM >

Samsung Heavy Industries

SHI took

91/95 Page

< Nametag of fwd. mach. RM >

Marine Research Institute

rooms.

Verification
by SHI-MRI
Noted

Status
Closed

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

No.

Item

Test No.

Labels
3

ETESCO Drillship

Description

Action by SHI

The labels for the number of thruster on K-POS OS and K-

for

of
selector

It was fixed correctly and confirmed.

Noted

Closed

The labels of control selector switch

Noted

Closed

The labels of selector switch on backup K-POS OS 4 were

on backup K-POS OS 4 had been

not attached. It should be indicated.

attached after DP trial.

No nametag of switchboxes in both HPR compartments as

It was fixed and confirmed.

Noted

Closed

The transceiver 2 cable tray in HPR 2

Noted

Closed

Noted

Closed

2. Check
on the

S/W box

number of

follows :

Nametag

required

HPR 1 at stbdside

equipments

HPR 2 at portside

Cable

The transceiver 2 cable tray in HPR 2 compartment (P) was

compt. was installed correctly after

Tray

installed abnormally. It should be fixed correctly.

DP trial and confirmed.


Arrangement drawing has been

Status

be changed.

Labels

switch

by SHI-MRI

THRUST OS panel were mismatched with mimic. It should

thrusters
on OS

Verification

UPS
nametag

Samsung Heavy Industries

The PDUs of the UPS have no nametags of breakers.

inserted into the panel instead of


nametags and it was confirmed.

92/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

No.

Item

Test No.

MGE DO
8

supply

1.1)

pump

Fwd
Section

ETESCO Drillship

2.4)

Description

Action by SHI

There is no engine room name in alarm description of standby

Swbd

by SHI-MRI

Status

Noted

Closed

Noted

Closed

Noted

Closed

Noted

Closed

Noted

Closed

Noted

Closed

confirmed.

started.
At fwd 220V fail test two alarm for No.1 and No.3 UPS came out.

It was fixed and confirmed

One is Auto sw fail and the other is abnormal. But only Auto

correct alarm occurring

sw fail alarm for No.2 UPS came out.


Indication for the bus has not

Emcy
10

It was updated properly and

Verification

2.5)

The color of 220V emcy feeder panel was not changed to white.

been applied for this project.


This item was discussed with

Mimic

owner and closed.


11

DC110V
DB alarm

2.6)

No alarm when one power source of AVR failed.

correct alarm occurring

LV
12

protective

It was fixed and confirmed

It was fixed and confirmed


2.6)

No alarm with regard to power failure of LV protective relay.

correct alarm occurring

When the auto S/W box of as below UPSs was power loss, the HPR

It was fixed and confirmed

has redundant power but no alarm coming up to OS.

correct alarm occurring

relay alarm

13

Auto S/W

2.8)

box

2.11)

UPS 2 for auto S/W box at stbd side

UPS 5 for auto S/W box at port side

The alarm should be coming up to give indication for operator.

Samsung Heavy Industries

93/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

No.

Item

Test No.

for

Description

Action by SHI

Unlike stbd and cent, when kw signal of a DG was

It was fixed and confirmed changing to

disconnected kW value was fixed and the other DG

manual mode.

Verification
by SHI-MRI

Status

Noted

Closed

It was fixed and confirmed.

Noted

Closed

The standard deviation of DGPS was not increased

< Kongsberg reply >

Noted

Closed

after all corresponding differential correction signals

The standard deviation increasing slowly, there

fail and then suddenly the DGPS was rejected.

are a few reasons to be aware of as follows:

Normally, in case of all correction signals loss, the

1) Vessel must move slightly since deviation is

standard deviation of DGPS is increasing due to

calculated from present position.

degraded accuracy and then the DGPS might be

2) The XP/HP must be disconnected firstly, and

rejected on DP by too high deviation.

wait at least 2~3mins.

It should be explained why keep on the standard

3) The other correction signals can then be

deviation of DGPS without differential correction

disconnected one by one, but give time between

signals.

and make sure the vessel does not stand still

was not tripped by reverse power. But the

FS
14

ETESCO Drillship

3.5)

Port MGE

corresponding DG should be not changed to manual


mode either.
Unlike stbd and cent, in case of the loss of breaker
status signal nothing happened. In our opinion this
is normal.

15

FS power

3.2) ~

fail alarm

3.7)

Voting
16

of

4.7)

PRS

Samsung Heavy Industries

Description cell on alarm view was blank at alarm


test for FS power fail.

94/95 Page

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

No.

17

Item

DCU

ETESCO Drillship

Test No.

5.1)

Description

Action by SHI

The alarm must be triggered when power of DCU is changed.

It was fixed and confirmed

RexCU

5.1)

19

oil

5.5)

system

cooling

5.6)

system

Samsung Heavy Industries

When the pump is changed the description of stand-by start


alarm must put in.

Noted

Closed

Noted

Closed

Noted

Closed

Noted

Closed

alarm was updated on mimic and


confirmed.

The description of cooling system mimic must be modified.

mimic and confirmed.

STBD and PORT are changed each other.

95/95 Page

Status

correct alarm occurring.

It was modified correctly on

Sea water
20

The alarm must be installed when power of RexCU is changed.

The description of stand-by start

Lubrication

by SHI-MRI

correct alarm occurring.

The alarm must be installed.

It was fixed and confirmed


18

Verification

Marine Research Institute