Final HN1899 DP FMEA Test Results Rev5_0

HN1899
ETESCO DRILLSHIP
TEST PROCEDURE
OF DP FMEA PROVING TRIAL
for
ETESCO DRILLSHIP
Report No : SHI-MRI-1899-061211-02 Rev 5.0
DOCUMENT HISToRY
Revision
Date
1.0
12/08/11
2.0
Reason for issue
Origin
Check
Appr.
First issue for review
K.J. Kim
G.I. Park
J.W. Choi
29/09/11
Issue reflected owners comments
K.J. Kim
G.I. Park
J.W. Choi
3.0
24/10/11
Issue for additional tests of newly installed UPS
K.J. Kim
G.I. Park
J.W. Choi
3.1
31/10/11
Issue for updating CAT numbering
K.J. Kim
G.I. Park
J.W. Choi
4.0
14/11/11
Issue for the result of DP FMEA proving trial.
K.J. Kim
G.I. Park
J.W. Choi
K.J. Kim
G.I. Park
J.W. Choi
The status of punch list still open.

5.0
06/12/11
Issue for the revised test results with closed all

punch items
Marine Research Institute

Samsung Heavy Industries Co., Ltd.
Office Address : 10TH Floor, Production Support Buildings, Geoje Shipyard, Samsung Heavy Industries
Phone Number : + 82 (0) 55 630 5610 FAX : + 82 (0) 55 630 6270
Email Address : risingsun.kim@samsung.com
Test Procedure for DP FMEA
ETESCO Drillship
INDEX
Section
Description
Page
1.
Introduction
05
2.
Check on the number of required equipments
07
Test items
09
1)
Power generation
10
2)
Power distribution
18
3)
Power management
38
4)
DP control system
47
5)
Thrusters
66
6)
Communication
75
7)
ESD and F/G system
76
77
78
to comply with DPS-3
3.
4.
The summary for results of FMEA proving

DP trials
5.
The punch list from the tests
Samsung Heavy Industries
1/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
ABBREVIATIONS
(A)
AVR
: Auto Voltage Regulator
(C)
CBU
: Capacitor Bank Unit
COS
: Console Operating System
COU
: Control Unit
CPU
: Central Processing Unit
DCS
: Drilling Control System
DCU
: Drive Control Unit
DG
: Diesel Generator
DO
: Diesel Oil
DP
: Dynamic Positioning
DPC
: Dynamic Positioning Controller
DPS
: Dynamic Positioning System
DPS
: Differential Position Sensors
: Engine Room
ECR
: Engine Control Room
FMEA
: Failure Mode Effect Analysis
FO
: Fuel Oil
FW
: Fresh Water
FS
: Field Station
HV
: High Voltage (11kV)
HiPAP
: High Precision Acoustic Positioning
HPR
: Hydroacoustic Position Reference
(D)
(E)
E/R
(F)
(H)
(I)
IALA
: International Association of Lighthouse Authorities
IAS
: Integrated Automation System
INU
: Inverter Unit
K-chief
: Kongsberg Vessel Control System
K-pos
: Kongsberg Dynamic Positioning System
K-thrust
: Kongsberg Thruster Control System
KM
: Kongsberg Maritime
LAN
: Local Area Network
LCL
: Lever Communication Link
LO
: Lubrication Oil
LSU
: Line Supply Unit
LT
: Low Temperature
LV
: Low Voltage (440V)
MGE
: Main Generator Engine
MRU
Motion Reference Unit
MSB
: Main SwitchBoard
(K)
(L)
(M)
2/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
ABBREVIATIONS
(N)
NDU
: Network Distribution Unit
(O)
OS
: Operator Station
(P)
PLC
: Programmable Logic Controller
PMS
: Power Management System
(Q)
QCV
: Quick Closing Valve
(R)
RCS
: Remote Control System
RIO
: Remote Input Output
RMS
: Riser Management System
RPM
: Revolution Per Minute
(S)
SW
: Sea Water
(T)
TEU
: Terminal Unit
(U)
UPS
: Uninterruptible Power Supply
(W)
WCU
: Water Cooling Unit
3/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
PLAN HISTORY
No
Page
Why
How
For ver. 1.0 First issue for review
For ver. 2.0 Issue for review

1.
Owners comment
The term VRS was changed to MRU.
2.
15
Owners request
3.
19
Owners comment
Test method was added to verify the load of

generator is reduce to 50% at 8% discrepancy.
The sentence, - Power source of No.4 UPS to be
auto-changed over from main supply to emcy
power supply was deleted.
4.
23
Owners comment
Some wrong UPS numbers were revised.
5.
25
Owners comment
Some wrong FS numbers were revised.
6.
63
Owners comment
Expected result 1) was revised.
For ver. 3.0 Issue for additional tests of newly installed UPS
7.
17
Owners comment
We added the following sentence in cell of Pos.

ref. system: At least one should be the different
type.
8.
17
Drawing update
UPS test in stbd 220V feeder panel was added.
9.
19
Drawing update
UPS test in cent 220V feeder panel was added.
10.
21
Drawing update
UPS test in port 220V feeder panel was added.
11.
59
Drawing update
UPS tests for DCU and RexCU in each thruster

room were added.
For ver. 3.1 Issue for updating CAT numbering

12.
27~29
Drawing update
41~43
We updated the number of CAT as reference

drawing in the DP control system FMEA test.
49, 51
53~57
For ver. 4.0 Issue for the result of DP FMEA proving trial. The status of punch list still open.
13
All
Performance of actual tests
Actual result and comment were added
For ver. 5.0 Issue for the revised results of DP FMEA proving trial with closed all punch items.
14
All
Closed all punch
We updated results with closed all punch.
4/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
1. Introduction
The Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) study for DP system of the ETESCO drillship (HN1899) has
been performed with class notation DPS-3 as specified in the ABS rule (2010) for steel vessel, 4-3-5/15
section by Samsung Marine Research Institute.
These sheets were prepared to identify the results of FMEA study by testing single failure of main items
selected and simulating the loss of one compartment for some main compartments during DP sea trial.
After trial to prove DP FMEA the conclusion and the recommendations of the tests will be updated.
1.1 The conditions for the tests

The normal conditions for DP operation during trial for the tests should be the followings:
1) One generator will at least be working in each engine room and the others will be stand-by to be
started as required (Load dependent start mode).
2) MGEs in cent engine room will be supplied with fuel oil from service tanks in both port and stbd
engine rooms.
3) Control air for cent engine room is also fed from both port and stbd sides
4) For equipments with redundancy such as FO supply pumps one is duty mode and the other stand-by.
5) All 11kV and 440V/220V bus-tie breakers will be normally open. But 11kV bus-tie breakers can be
closed on some tests.
6) The DP system will be normally operated in auto control mode and the back-up DP ready for control
transfer.
7) All thrusters will be working or at least four thrusters working depending on the situation.
8) The number of DP sensors which have to work will at least follow the specification of ABS DPS-3.
9) DGPS and HiPAP system will be together used as position reference system.
10) Printers for checking of alarms and the event logger will be set.
1.2 The basic preparation for each test

The followings will be applied during each test:
1) Each test will be performed in condition that owner, class and shipyard are all attending.
2) FMEA practitioner will manage test and shipyards technicians perform test method.
3) All tests will be reset before starting the next test.
4) If there is any discrepancy with the FMEA study in test result, it should be analyzed and a counter
measure discussed.
5) If necessary, print sheets on which the alarm lists are recorded are kept after a test.
5/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
The test order can be changed as necessary or convenient.

The sequence of the tests presented here is a proposal and may be changed should that be convenient. In
order to avoid that a test could cause damages to equipment the proposed individual failure tests should
be cleared by the yards technical experts. Alternative means to simulate the failures may be discussed.
6/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
2. Check on the number of required equipments to comply with DPS-3

This vessel is complied with ABS DPS-3 on required equipments and their number as following Table
Subsystem or Component
Power
System
ABS DPS-3
ETESCO Drillship
Generator and prime

movers
Redundant, in separate
compartments
2+2+2 in separate compartments
Main switchboard
2 with normally open bus ties

in separate compartments
3 with normally open bus ties in
Bus tie breaker
6 (2 in each MSB)
Distribution system
Redundant, through separate

compartments
1+1+1 in separate compartments
Power management
Yes
Yes (FS38, 40 and 42)
Thruster
Arrangement of thruster
Redundant in separate
compartments
6 in separate compartments
Control
Auto control; no. of

computer system
2 + 1 in alternate control
station
3+1 in alternate control station
Manual control; joystick

with auto heading
Yes
Yes (Bridge console, Port/Stbd
Single levers for each

thruster
Yes
Pos. ref. systems

(At least one should be
the different type.)
3 whereof 1 in alternate
control station
6 whereof 3 in alternate control
External
Sensor
Whereof 1in
alternate control
station
Sensors
Wind
(Port/Cent/Stbd E/R)
separate compartments
(Port/Cent/Stbd E/R)
wing joystick stations)

Yes
(K-THRUST 400-1 in W/H)
station
Whereof 1 in alternate
control station
MRU
As above
As above
Gyro
compass
As above
As above
UPS
1 + 1 separate compartment
2+1 separate compartments
Alternate control station for backup

unit
Yes
Yes (DP backup room)
Consequence analysis
Yes
Yes
7/95 Page
ABS DPS-3 : Pass
ETESCO Drillship
Fail
Witness
Comments
Signed
Date
FMEA Practitioner
SHI took complementary measures for
KiJung Kim
04/11/2011
unfinished works, which had been checked

during DP trial, and then confirmed.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists as follows :

- A) no. 1 ~ 6 at page 78 ~ 83.
- B) no. 1 at page 85..
- C) no. 1 ~ 7 at page 90 ~ 92.
Remarks
8/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
3. Test items
9/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
1) Power Generation
The systems for the power generation ars as followings :
Each Engine Room

1.1) MGE DO supply system
Fuel Oil System
Lub Oil System
No test item
1.3) Sea water pump

Cooling Water System
Compressed Air System
Ventilation System
Main Generator Engine
1.4) LT fresh water cooling system
1.5) Control air system
No test item
1.6) Electric governor
10/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
1) Power Generation (Auxiliary system Fuel system)

1.1) MGE DO supply pump
Objective
To check the auto-change over function of MGE DO supply pumps in each engine room.
Method
1. Stop No.1 supply pump

2. After recovery, stop No.2 supply pump
* Repeat for each engine room
Actual result
Expected result
Stbd
Cent
Port
- Alarm
- Auto change over to No.2 supply pump
- No effect on running MGE
As expected
As expected
As expected
- Alarm
- Auto change over to No.1 supply pump
- No effect on running MGE
As expected
As expected
As expected
ABS DPS-3 : Pass
Fail
Witness
Comments
Signed
Date
FMEA Practitioner
KiJung Kim
05/11/2011
recommendation about alarm description,

and then confirmed.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, C) no.8 at
page 93.
Remarks
11/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
1) Power Generation (Auxiliary system Fuel system)

Objective
TO check the operation of DO service tank low level alarm and the redundancy of DO
supply to cent. E/R.
Method
With one MGE running for each switchboard and bus ties open during this test.
1. Simulate low level alarm, and reinstate.
2. Close quick closing valves of DO service tank.
* Repeat for the other side engine room
Actual result
Expected result
1
- Alarm
- Alarm
- For corresponding MGEs,
MGE load will reduce as
FO pressure drops.
- The other side and cent
side MGEs runs normally
Port
As expected
As expected
As expected
FO inlet pressure low
As expected
FO inlet pressure low
No.1 & 2
MGE
As expected
Load reduced,
HV MSB frequency went
down
As expected
No effect
No.3 & 4
MGE
As expected
No effect
As expected
No effect
As expected
No effect
As expected
Load reduced,
HV MSB frequency went
down
Alarm
No.5 & 6
MGE
ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Witness
Stbd
Fail
Comments
FMEA Practitioner
Signed
Date
KiJung Kim
05/11/2011
Remarks
12/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
1) Power Generation (Auxiliary system Cooling system)

1.3) Sea water pump
Objective
To check the auto-change over function of cooling sea water (CSW) pumps in each engine
room.
Method
1. Stop No.1 CSW pump

2. After recovery, stop No.2 CSW pump
* Repeat for each engine room
Actual result
Expected result
Stbd
Cent
Port
- Alarm
- Auto change over to No.2 CSW
pump
- No effect on the cooling system
As expected.
As expected.
As expected.
- Alarm
- Auto change over to No.1 CSW
pump
- No effect on the cooling system
As expected.
As expected.
As expected.
ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Witness
Fail
Comments
FMEA Practitioner
Signed
Date
KiJung Kim
05/11/2011
Remarks
13/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
1) Power Generation (Auxiliary system Cooling system)

1.4) LT fresh water cooling system
Objective
To check the failure of LT fresh water cooling system (CFW pump, pneumatic 3-way
temp. control valve and FW expansion tank) in each engine room.
Method
1. Stop No.1 CFW pump and after recovery, stop No.2 CFW pump
2. Isolate and bleed off air from the valve
3. Push low level alarm button in FW expansion tank
* Repeat for other engine room
Actual result
Expected result
Stbd
Cent
Port
- Alarm and auto change over to stand-by

pump
As expected
As expected
As expected
- Valve fails to fully open or keeps the

failed position.
As expected
Valve was fully
opened.
As expected
Valve was fully
opened.
As expected
Valve was fully
opened.
- Alarm
As expected
As expected
As expected
ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Witness
Fail
Comments
FMEA Practitioner
Signed
Date
KiJung Kim
05/11/2011
Remarks
14/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
1) Power Generation (Auxiliary system Compressed air system)

1.5) Control air system
Objective
To check the failure of control air system in port/stbd engine room.
Method
1. Isolate the control air system and drain the air.

* Reinstate and repeat for the other engine room
Actual result
Expected result
1
Stbd
- Alarm
- Corresponding temp. control valves remain in
open position.
- All dampers remain in open due to non-return
valves
- At stbd side test, no air for brake of No.4
thruster. At port side test, no air for brake of
No.5 thruster. (The brake is used for
maintenance purpose.)
- Loss of DO and LO purifiers in the ER
- Loss of emcy DO pump in the ER
- No direct effect on DP
ABS DPS-3 : Pass
Port
As expected
As expected
Fail
Witness
Comments
Signed
Date
FMEA Practitioner
KiJung Kim
05/11/2011
unexpected results, which happened

during DP trial, and then confirmed by
retest.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, B) no.2
at page 85.
Remarks
15/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
1) Power Generation (MGE Governor)

1.6) Electric Governor
Objective
To check failure of speed sensor for MGE governor and simulate load sharing when fuel
rack position of one running MGE fails to maximum position.
Method
With closed ring operation mode and each one DG running on each MSB
1. Disconnect one pick up sensor at running engine. Reinstate
2. Disconnect second pick up sensor at running engine. Reinstate
* Repeat for other engines
3. Fail the fuel rack on one engine to maximum position manually.
Actual result
Expected result
Stbd
Cent
Port
(No.1 MGE)
(No.3 MGE)
(No.5 MGE)
- Alarm
- No effect on running engine
As expected
As expected
As expected
- Alarm
- No effect on running engine
As expected
As expected
As expected
If the difference between set actuator travel and

actual actuator travel exceeds 8% of the total
actuator travel for over ten seconds the load of
the faulty engine will be reduced to maximum
50% of rated power, provided that there are
generators available for additional load on the
net. Simultaneously the standby engine
automatically started and when connected, the
faulty engine will be downloaded to 10% and
disconnected and stopped.
If 10%, the CB of the MGE will be tripped and
MGE will shut down.
Otherwise, if total load is less than one MGE
load, the faulty DG hogs load and may drive the
other DG(s) into reverse power trip. The faulty
DG may also trip on over-speed protection and
as the result the corresponding switchboard(s)
may be dead. But bus tie to open before DG
breakers to prevent two or more switchboard
blackout.
As expected
16/95 Page
ABS DPS-3 : Pass
ETESCO Drillship
Fail
Witness
Comments
Signed
Date
FMEA Practitioner
KiJung
05/11/2011
unexpected results, which happened during DP
Kim
trial, and then confirmed by retest.

Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, B) no.3 at page 85.
Remarks
17/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
2) Power Distribution
In order to verify complying with ABS DPS-3 rule, carry out a battery capacity and failure test of UPS
during DP trial as follows :
a. Power distribution
b. UPS
18/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
2.1) Stbd MSB Room
Objective
To check the effect on the failure of stbd 220V feeder panel, LV MSB, HV MSB and the
total loss of stbd MSB room
Method
With closed ring operation mode

1. Disconnect input power cable of UPS in 220V feeder panel and check UPS capacity for
30 min.
2. Fail LV transformer feeding
3. Fail HV transformer feeding
4. Open breakers of each DC110V UPS feeding to stbd HV switchboard
5. Fail PDU-04, DC110V UPS, and FS-38,39 in stbd MSB room
Expected result
Actual result
- Alarm
- Loss of power source of UPS for stbd MGEs
- Battery discharging time > 30 minutes
As expected.
- Alarm
- Power sources of MGE local control panels and
governor control panels to be auto-changed over
after UPS battery time
- Loss of power source of No.1 DC 110V dist. board
- Power source of No.4 UPS to be auto-changed
over from main supply to emcy power supply
- No effect on DP
As expected.
- Alarm
- Loss of stbd 220V feeder panel
- Loss of FO, CSW and CFW pumps
- Loss of LO and DO purifiers
- Loss of G/S and starting air compressors
- Loss of No.2 air supply fan
- Power source of MGE LO priming and cylinder
pumps to be auto-changed over
- Emcy air driven DO pump will start
- Loss of No.4 thruster due to power loss of No.4
thruster aux. panel. Remaining 5 thrusters will keep
the position.
As expected.
19/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
- Alarm and partial black-out

- Bus-tie breakers to be open
- Breaker of running generator in stbd engine room
to be open
- Loss of stbd 440V and 220V sections
- Loss of fwd No.1 440V and 220V sections
- No.1 and 2 generators to be unusable. Remaining 4
generators will cover sufficient power to maintain
the position
- Loss of No.3 and 4 thrusters. Remaining 4 thrusters
will keep the position.
As expected.
- Alarm
- K-chief OS 36 in ECR shut down
- Loss of FS 38 and 39
- Net B error
- No effect on remaining 4 thrusters and 4 generators
As expected.
ABS DPS-3 : Pass
Fail
Witness
Comments
Signed
Date
FMEA Practitioner
KiJung Kim
06/11/2011

retest.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, B) no. 4
and 5 at page 86.
Remarks
20/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
2.2) Cent MSB Room
Objective
To check the effect on the failure of cent 220V feeder panel, LV MSB, HV MSB and the
total loss of cent MSB room
Method

30 min.
4. Open breakers of each DC110V UPS feeding to cent HV switchboard
5. Fail aft 220V emcy dist. board, DC110V UPS, and FS-40,41 in cent MSB room
Expected result
Actual result
- Alarm
- Loss of power source of UPS for cent MGEs
As expected.
- Alarm
- Power source of ECC to be auto-changed over
from main supply to emcy power supply
- No effect on DP
As expected.
- Alarm
- Loss of cent 220V feeder panel
the position.
As expected.
21/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship

- Breaker of running generator in cent engine room
to be open
- Loss of cent 440V and 220V sections
the position
As expected.
- Alarm
- Loss of alternative power source of No. 4,5 UPS
- Loss of alternative power source of FS 38~43
As expected.
ABS DPS-3 : Pass
Fail
Witness
Comments
Signed
Date
FMEA Practitioner
KiJung Kim
06/11/2011

retest.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, B) no.4
at page 86.
Remarks
22/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
2.3) Port MSB Room
Objective
To check the effect on the failure of port 220V feeder panel, LV MSB, HV MSB and the
total loss of port MSB room
Method

30 min.
4. Open breakers of each DC110V UPS feeding to port HV switchboard
5. Fail PDU-05, DC110V UPS, and FS-40,41 in port MSB room
Expected result
Actual result
- Alarm
- Loss of power source of UPS for stbd MGEs
As expected.
- Alarm
- Loss of power source of No.3 DC 110V dist. board
- Power source of No.5 UPS to be auto-changed
over from main supply to emcy power supply
- No effect on DP
As expected.
- Alarm
- Loss of port 220V feeder panel
- Loss of G/S and starting air compressors
the position.
As expected.
23/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship

- Breaker of running generator in port engine room
to be open
- Loss of port 440V and 220V sections
the position
As expected.
- Alarm
- Loss of K-Chief 35
- Net A error
As expected.
ABS DPS-3 : Pass
Fail
Witness
Comments
Signed
Date
FMEA Practitioner
KiJung Kim
06/11/2011

retest.
and 5 at page 86.
Remarks
24/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
2.4) Fwd Section
Objective
To check the effect on failure of fwd 220V feeder panel, LV switchboard, and total loss of
fwd section
Method
1. Fail the LV transformer feeding to No.1 220V feeder panel

2. Fail the HV transformer feeding to No.1 LV switchboard. Reinstate
3. Fail the LV transformer feeding to No.2 220V feeder panel
4. Fail the HV transformer feeding to No.2 LV switchboard.
5. Fail the HV transformer feeding of both switchboards. (to check compartment loss)
Expected result
Actual result
- Alarm
- No. 1,3 UPS and No.1 PA UPS power auto
change to emcy feeder panel
- No effect on DP
As expected
- Alarm
- Loss of fwd No.1 220V feeder panel
- Auto change over of SW and FW pumps to
No.2 section
- No effect on DP
As expected
- Alarm
- No. 2 UPS power and No.2 PA UPS auto
change to emcy feeder panel
- No effect on DP
As expected
- Alarm
- Loss of fwd No.2 220V feeder panel
- Auto change over of SW and FW pumps to
No.1 section
- No effect on DP
As expected
25/95 Page

5
ETESCO Drillship
- Alarm
- Loss of fwd 220V feeder panels
- Loss of cooling system of No.1 thruster
- No. 1,2,3 UPS and No.1,2 PA UPS power
auto change to emcy feeder panel
ABS DPS-3 : Pass
As expected
Fail
Witness
Comments
Signed
Date
FMEA Practitioner
KiJung Kim
06/11/2011

retest.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, C) no. 9
at page 93.
Remarks
26/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
2.5) Emergency Switchboard
Objective
To check the effect on failure of emergency switchboard (440V and 220V)
Method
Check the emergency generator is set in manual-mode.

1. Open 220V incoming supply breaker after blocking auto-change over alternative supply
2. After blocking auto-change over alternative supply, open 440V incoming supply breaker
Expected result
Actual result
- Alarm
- Loss of alternative power source of No.
1,2,3,4,5 UPS and No.1,2 PA UPS
- Loss of alternative power source of FS 31, FS
38~43 and FS 47
- Loss of alternative power source of thruster
No.1~6 DCU UPS
- Loss of alternative power source of ECC
- Power fail of No.2 DC 110V DB
As expected.
- Alarm
- Loss of alternative power of LO priming
pumps and cyl. Pumps in each engine
- Loss of one air supply fan in each engine
room
- Loss of stbd and port HPR hoist control unit
- Loss of emergency 220V feeder panel
As expected.
ABS DPS-3 : Pass
Fail
Witness
Comments
Signed
Date
FMEA Practitioner
KiJung Kim
06/11/2011
unexpected results, which happened during

DP trial, and then confirmed by retest.
- B) no. 6 at page 86.
- C) no. 10 at page 93.
Remarks
27/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
2.6) DC 110V Distribution Board
Objective
To check the effect on failure of AVR and one DC 110V dist. board.
Method
1. Fail incoming power supply for each DC 110V dist. board.

2. Check battery discharging time (over 30 minutes)
3. Disconnect DC110V power cable to AVR for each engine.
4. Open battery breaker and all output breakers.
* Restore and repeat for other dist. board
Actual result
Expected result
Port
Cent
Stbd
- Alarm Battery charger abnormal

- No effect on DP
As expected.
As expected.
As expected.
As expected.
After 30min,
output voltage
= 115V
As expected.
After 30min,
output voltage
= 112V
As expected.
After 30min,
output voltage
= 113V
- Alarm
- Other DC 110V DB will supply power for the
AVR.
As expected.
As expected.
As expected.
- Alarm
- Other DC 110V DB will compensate
- Protective relay (SEPAM) for the
corresponding LV switchboard will trip. But
CB will be still closed
As expected.
As expected.
As expected.
ABS DPS-3 : Pass
Fail
Witness
Comments
Signed
Date
FMEA Practitioner
KiJung Kim
06/11/2011

retest.
and 12 at page 93.
Remarks
28/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
< CAT 4.5.2 / 4.8.3>

2) Power distribution
2.7) UPS 1 (NAV. INST. Room)
Objective
Test a capacity of battery and failure of the UPS 1.
Method
1. Disconnect main power(online) from UPS 1.

2. And then fail all of power source for UPS 1.
Keep a battery supply for 30 minutes.
3. And then fail the UPS 1 during DP.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1, 2) A redundancy and battery capacity tests of the UPS are carried out during CAT 4.5.2
/ 4.8.3.
Please refer to the CAT item.
3) Item 4.5 Power supplies of DPC-3, 4.6 NDU and 4.8 Position reference system are
checked from results of this test.
Expected result
Actual result
- UPS error alarm.

- UPS is supplied power from second source.
As expected
- UPS battery discharging time > 30 minutes

- No effect on DP.
As expected
- Alarm and no effect on DP.

- The NDU, reference systems and K-POS OS
for DP have redundancy.
As expected
< Lost DP equipments >
< Lost DP equipments >
MRU 1 (from DPC-3 power A)
F1
MRU 1
K-POS OS 1
F2
K-POS OS 1
K-CHIEF OS 31
F4
K-CHIEF OS 31
DPS 232-1
F5
DPS 232-1
GYRO 1
F6
GYRO 1
NETWORK PRINTER 4
F7
NETWORK PRINTER 4
ALARM PRINTER 6
F8
ALARM PRINTER 6
SVC-OS 41/HS
F9
SVC-OS 41/HS
WIND 1
F10
WIND 1
K-POS OS 8 DATA LOGGER
F11
K-POS OS 8 DATA LOGGER
HiPAP OS 6
F12
HiPAP OS 6
NDU A1
F13
NDU A1
K-THRUST OS 5
F21
K-THRUST OS 5
RMS 10
F22
RMS 10
OS 40 LOAD CALCULATOR
F23
OS 40 LOAD CALCULATOR
CONNING COMPUTER
F27
CONNING COMPUTER
INMARSAT TERMINAL
F28
INMARSAT TERMINAL
29/95 Page
ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Witness
ETESCO Drillship
Fail
Comments
FMEA Practitioner
Signed
Date
KyeongKi,
06/11/2011
Kim
The other equipments, which are not listed in above Lost DP equipments, have redundant
Remarks
power. Therefore those equipments could be working normally in spite of loss of power from
UPS 1.
30/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
< CAT 4.5.2 / 4.8.3>

2.8) UPS 2 (DP Backup Room)
Objective
Method

/ 4.8.3.
Expected result
Actual result
- UPS error alarm.

As expected

- No effect on DP.
As expected

- Loss of all of the back-up system but main DP
system is still working.
As expected
< Lost equipments >
< Lost equipments >
DPC-1
F1
DPC-1
K-POS OS 4
F2
K-POS OS 4
HiPAP OS 7
F3
HiPAP OS 7
GYRO 3
F4
GYRO 3
WIND 3
F5
WIND 3
ALARM PRINTEWR 1
F6
ALARM PRINTEWR 1
AUTO S/W BOX(S) HPR STBD
F7
AUTO S/W BOX(S) HPR STBD
ISOLATION BOX
F8
ISOLATION BOX
MRU 3 (powered from isolation box)
F8
MRU 3
DPS 132-2
F9
DPS 132-2
DPS 232-2
F10
DPS 232-2
NDU B1/C1
F18
NDU B1/C1
NDU B2
F20
NDU B2
K-CHIEF OS 32
F25
K-CHIEF OS 32
31/95 Page
ABS DPS-3 : Pass
ETESCO Drillship
Fail
Witness
Comments
Signed
Date
FMEA Practitioner
KyeongKi,
06/11/2011
Kim

retest.
- C) no. 13 at page 93.
Remarks
UPS 2.
32/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
< CAT 4.5.2 / 4.8.3>

2.9) UPS 3 (Gen. Elec. Room)
Objective
Method

/ 4.8.3.
Expected result
Actual result
- UPS error alarm.

As expected

- No effect on DP.
As expected

- The NDU, reference systems and K-POS OS
for DP have redundancy.
As expected
< Lost equipments >
< Lost equipments >
NDU A2
F7
NDU A2
WIND 2
F16
WIND 2
NO.2 DISPLAY FOR X-BAND RADAR
F17
NO.2 DISPLAY FOR X-BAND RADAR
GYRO 2
F18
GYRO 2
MRU 2 (from DPC-3 power B)
F19
MRU 2
K-POS ALARM PRINTER 2
F21
K-POS ALARM PRINTER 2
K-POS O S 2
F22
K-POS O S 2
DPS 132-1
F23
DPS 132-1
33/95 Page
ABS DPS-3 : Pass
ETESCO Drillship
Fail
Witness
Comments
Signed
Date
FMEA Practitioner
KyeongKi,
06/11/2011
Kim

retest.
at page 87.
Remarks
UPS 3.
34/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
2.10) UPS 4 (Stbd MSB Room)
Objective
Method

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1) Item 4.7 NDU is checked from results of this test.
Expected result
Actual result
- UPS error alarm.

As expected

- No effect on DP.
As expected

- Network B error
- The Field Stations are powered from
redundant power, aft emcy AC220V dist.
board.
As expected
< Lost equipments >
< Lost equipments >
NDU B3/C3
F1
NDU B3/C3
K-CHIEF OS 36
F15
K-CHIEF OS 36
ABS DPS-3 : Pass
Fail
Witness
Comments
Signed
Date
FMEA Practitioner
KyeongKi,
06/11/2011
Kim

retest.
at page 87.
Remarks
UPS 4.
35/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
2.11) UPS 5 (Port MSB Room)
Objective
Test a capacity of battery and failure of the UPS 5
Method

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1) Item 4.7 NDU is checked from results of this test.
Expected result
Actual result
- UPS error alarm.

As expected

- No effect on DP.
As expected

- Network A error
- The Field Stations are powered from
redundant power, aft emcy AC220V dist.
board.
As expected
< Lost equipments >
< Lost equipments >
K-CHIEF OS 35
F4
K-CHIEF OS 35
NDU A3
F5
NDU A3
NETWORK PRINTER 7
F6
NETWORK PRINTER 7
AUTO S/W BOX(P) HPR PORT
F7
AUTO S/W BOX(P) HPR PORT
ALARM PRINTER 8
F13
ALARM PRINTER 8
36/95 Page
ABS DPS-3 : Pass
ETESCO Drillship
Fail
Witness
Comments
Signed
Date
FMEA Practitioner
KyeongKi,
06/11/2011
Kim

retest.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists as
follows :
- C) no. 13 at page 93.
Remarks
UPS 5.
37/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
3) Power management
The Field Stations for power management, which used to control and monitor, are classified as follows :
- IAS Field Station in ECR
- MGE Field Station
- Thruster Field Station
In order to verify complying with ABS DPS-3 rule, carry out redundant power and failure test during DP
trial as follow :
Overload Prevention by PMS

Port MSB
Port MSB
Port MSB
3.1) Overload Prevention for DG
MGE Field Station
IAS Field Station

CENT SWBD Room
FS 43
PORT SWBD Room
FS 44
FS 37
FS 38
CENT SWBD Room

FS 39
FS 40
STBD SWBD Room

FS 41
FS 42
3.3) Field Station for PORT MGE (FS37, FS38)
3.2) Field Station for IAS (FS43, FS44)
3.4) Field Station for CENT MGE (FS39, FS40)

3.5) Field Station for STBD MGE (FS41, FS42)
Thruster Field Station

AFT
FWD
FS 31
FS 32
FS 33
FS 34
FS 35
FS 36
3.6) Field Station for FWD thruster (FS31, FS32, FS33)

3.7) Field Station for AFT thruster (FS34, FS35, FS36)
38/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
3) Power management
3.1) Overload Prevention for DG
Objective
To prove DP/ PMS cut back on thruster load.
Method
For each MSB, two DGs running online.

Deselect two thrusters on DP mode, increase each thruster load to approx. 100% facing
each other.
The other thrusters on DP mode.
1. Trip one running DG by pushing MGE emcy stop or simulating MGE LO pressure low
* Reinstate and repeat for other MSB
Actual result
Expected result
1
- Alarm
- Cut back on running thrusters
to prevent partial blackout by
overloading the
remaining DG.
ABS DPS-3 : Pass
Stbd
Cent
Port
As expected
As expected
As expected
Fail
Witness
Comments
Signed
Date
FMEA Practitioner
KiJung Kim
07/11/2011

retest.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, A) no. 7
at page 84.
Remarks
39/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
3) Power management
3.2) Field Station for IAS (FS 36, FS 37)
Objective
Simulate failure of the field station for IAS.
Method
1. Fail main supply for FS and after recovery, fail second supply for FS.
2. Fail both supply for FS.
Actual result
Expected result
FS 36
FS 37
- 24VDC supply power failure alarm in the

K-CHIEF OS.
- The FS is still working normally by second
power.
As expected.
As expected.
- Station is not communicational alarm in the

K-CHIEF OS.
- The FS fails.
- Loss of data and machinery related to the FS.
- No effect on DP.
As expected.
As expected.
ABS DPS-3 : Pass
Fail
Witness
Comments
Signed
Date
FMEA Practitioner
KiJung Kim
07/11/2011

retest.
at page 94.
Remarks
40/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
3) Power management
3.3) Field Station for STBD MGE (FS 38, FS 39)
Objective
Simulate failure of the field station for stbd MGE and MSB.
Method
1. Fail main supply for one FS. And after recovery, fail second supply for one FS
2. Disconnect the following signals from DG to FS
a. Generator kW signal, b. Generator Hz signal, c. Generator breaker status
d. Generator voltage, e. Bus voltage (only for FS 39), f. Generator raise/lower signal
3. Fail both power sources for the FS.
Actual result
Expected result
FS 38
FS 39
- 24VDC supply power failure alarm in the KCHIEF OS.

- The FS is still working normally by second power.
As expected.
As expected.
a. Alarm, load share fail; no kW to DP/

IAS. The corresponding DG to be changed to manual
mode.
b. Alarm, no Hz to DP/ IAS. No effect on DG
c. Alarm. No affect on DG
(But the breaker will trip at the load of DG < 10%)
d. Alarm, synchronising disabled. No affect
on DG
e. Alarm, No affect on DG
f. DG runs in DROOP.
a. As expected
a. As expected
b. As expected
c. As expected
b. As expected
c. As expected
d. As expected
d. As expected
e. f. As expected
e. As expected
f. As expected
- Station is not communicational alarm in the KCHIEF OS.

- The FS shut down
- Loss of monitoring and control by the FS
- Available power will be kept
As expected.
As expected.
ABS DPS-3 : Pass
Fail
Witness
Comments
Signed
Date
FMEA

- A) no. 8 at page 84.
- B) no. 10 at page 87
KiJung Kim
07/11/2011
Practitioner
Remarks
41/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
3) Power management
3.4) Field Station for CENT MGE (FS 40, FS 41)
Objective
Simulate failure of the field station for cent MGE and MSB.
Method
1. Fail main supply for one FS.

3. Fail second supply for the FS.
Actual result
Expected result
FS 40
FS 41

As expected.
As expected.

mode.
on DG
a. As expected
a. As expected
b. As expected
c. As expected
b. As expected
c. As expected
d. As expected
d. As expected
e. As expected
f. As expected
e. f. As expected

- The FS shut down
As expected
As expected.
ABS DPS-3 : Pass
Fail
Witness
Comments
Signed
Date
FMEA
SHI took complementary measures for unexpected

results, which happened during DP trial, and then
confirmed by retest.
- A) no. 8 at page 84.
KiJung Kim
07/11/2011
Practitioner
Remarks
42/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
3) Power management
3.5) Field Station for PORT MGE (FS 42, FS 43)
Objective
Simulate failure of the field station for port MGE and MSB.
Method
1. Fail main supply for one FS.

3. Fail second supply for the FS.
Actual result
Expected result
FS 42
FS 43

As expected.
As expected.

mode.
on DG
a. As expected
a. As expected
b. As expected
c. As expected
b. As expected
c. As expected
d. As expected
d. As expected
e. As expected
f. As expected
e. f. As expected

- The FS shut down
As expected.
As expected.
43/95 Page
ABS DPS-3 : Pass
ETESCO Drillship
Fail
Witness
Comments
Signed
Date
FMEA
KiJung Kim
07/11/2011
Practitioner

- C) no. 14 at page 94
Remarks
44/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
3) Power management
3.6) Field Station for FWD thruster (FS 32, FS 33, FS 34)
Objective
Test failure of the field station for FWD thrusters.

1. Power off main power of the FS.
Method
2. After recovery, power off another power source.

3. Fail both powers of the FS. (No power for the FS)
Expected result
Actual result
FS 32(CENT)
- 24VDC failure alarm in the K-CHIEF OS.

power.
As expected.

power.
As expected.

K-CHIEF OS.
- The FS fails.
- Loss of data and machinery related to FS.
- The related thruster is out of DP.
- No effect on DP of vessel.
As expected.
ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Witness
FS 33 (STBD)
FS 34(PORT)
Signed
Date
Moonho Son
07/11/2011
Fail
Comments
FMEA Practitioner
Remarks
45/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
3) Power management
3.7) Field Station for AFT thruster (FS 44, FS 45, FS 46)
Objective
Test failure of the field station for AFT thruster.

1. Power off main power of the FS.
Method
2. After recovery, power off another power source.

3. Fail both powers of the FS. (No power for the FS)
Actual result
Expected result
FS 44(STBD)
1

power.
As expected.

power.
As expected.

K-CHIEF OS.
- The FS fails.
- Loss of data and machinery related to FS.
- The related thruster is out of DP.
- No effect on DP of vessel.
As expected.
ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Witness
FS 45(PORT)
FS 46(CENT)
Signed
Date
Moonho Son
07/11/2011
Fail
Comments
FMEA Practitioner
Remarks
46/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
4) DP control system
From the viewpoint of control system and equipments, essential tested systems during proving trial are
summarized as follows :
- DP controller & Operation Station
- Position reference system & Environmental sensors
- Network system
- Independent Joystick System
In order to verify complying with ABS DPS-3 rule, carry out as following tests during DP trial.
a. DP FMEA tests for DP control equipments
b. Function tests for DP control

4.9) DP control accuracy
4.15) Consequence Analysis
47/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
< CAT 4.3.2>

4.1) K-POS OS
Objective
Test a redundancy of the K-POS OS.
Method
1. Power off the K-POS OS 1 which is main propulsion OS.

2. After recovery, power off the K-POS OS 2 which is main propulsion OS.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1) A redundancy tests of control processors due to power loss are carried out in
Computer console test during CAT 4.3.2. Please refer to the CAT.
2) Confirm that automatic change over to other redundant OS correctly.
Expected result
1
Actual result
< K-POS OS 1 >

- DP-OS fault alarm.
- If the K-POS OS 1 is main propulsion OS,
switch over to other OS.
- No effect on DP.
As expected
< K-POS OS 2 >

- DP-OS fault alarm.
- If the K-POS OS 2 is main propulsion OS,
switch over to other OS.
- No effect on DP.
As expected
ABS DPS-3 : Pass
DP-OS 1 : Station is not communicational

alarm
DP-OS 2 : Station is not communicational

alarm
Fail
Witness
Comments
Signed
Date
FMEA Practitioner
KyeongKi,
05/11/2011
Kim

retest.
at page 88.
Remarks
48/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
< CAT 4.3.2>

4.2) K-THRUST OS
Objective
Test a failure of the K-THRUST OS.
Method
1. Power off the K-THRUST OS 5 which is main propulsion OS.

Computer console test during CAT 4.3.2. Please refer to the CAT.
2) Confirm that automatic change over to other redundant OS correctly.
Expected result
1
Actual result
- OS fault alarm.
- If the K-THRUST OS 5 is main propulsion
OS, switch over to other K-POS OS (Hot
standby OS).
- No effect on DP.
ABS DPS-3 : Pass
As expected
TC-OS 5 : Station is not communicational
alarm
Fail
Witness
Comments
Signed
Date
FMEA Practitioner
KyeongKi,
05/11/2011
Kim

retest.
at page 88.
Remarks
49/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
< CAT 4.5.1>

4.3) Control processors(RCU) in DPC-3 (Main DP controller)
Objective
Test a redundancy of the DP control processors.
Method
1. Power off a control processor, RCU A, of DPC-3 in online(Master).

2. After recovery, power off a control processor, RCU B.
3. After recovery, power off a control processor, RCU C.
Computer redundancy test (Triple System) test during CAT 4.5.1.
Please refer to the CAT.
2) Confirm that automatic change over to standby processor correctly.
Expected result
1
Actual result
< RCU A >

- DpPs ## Station is not communicational
Alarm.
- Automatic change over to standby processor.
- No effect on DP.
As expected
< RCU B >

Alarm.
- No effect on DP.
As expected
< RCU C >

Alarm.
- No effect on DP.
As expected
ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Witness
DpPs 01 : Station is not communicational

alarm

alarm

alarm
Fail
Comments
FMEA Practitioner
Signed
Date
KyeongKi,
05/11/2011
Kim
Remarks
50/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
4.4) I/O modules in DPC-3 (Main DP controller)
Objective
Test a failure of the I/O modules in DPC-3.
Method
1. Fail one I/O module in DPC-3.

2. After recovery, repeat one by one.
Expected result
Actual result
< Unit No. 32 >

Gyro 1, DPS 132-1, Wind 1 fail.
No effect on DP.
< Unit No. 32 >

As expected.
Gyro 1, Wind 1, DPS132-1(GPS 1) fail.
< Unit No. 33 >

Gyro 3, DPS132-2 fail.
No effect on DP.
< Unit No. 33 >

As expected.
Gyro 3, DPS132-2 (GPS 3) fail.
< Unit No. 34 >

Gyro 1, MRU 1 fail.
No effect on DP.
< Unit No. 34 >

As expected.
Gyro 1, MRU 1 fail.
< Unit No. 35 >

Gyro 3 fail.
No effect on DP.
< Unit No. 35 >

As expected.
Gyro 3 fail.
< Unit No. 62 >

Gyro 2, Wind 2, DPS232-2 fail.
No effect on DP.
< Unit No. 62 >

As expected.
Gyro 2, Wind 2, DPS232-2 (GPS 2) fail.
< Unit No. 63 >

Wind 3, DPS232-2 fail.
No effect on DP.
< Unit No. 63 >

As expected.
Wind 3, DPS232-2 (GPS 4) fail.
< Unit No. 64 >

MRU 2 fail.
No effect on DP.
< Unit No. 64 >

As expected.
MRU 2 fail.
< Unit No. 65 >

Gyro 2 , MRU 3 fails.
No effect on DP.
< Unit No. 65 >

As expected.
Gyro 2, MRU 3 fail.
ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Witness
Fail
Comments
FMEA Practitioner
Signed
Date
KyeongKi,
06/11/2011
Kim
Remarks
51/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
4.5) Power supplies of DPC-3 (Main DP controller)
Objective
Test a redundant power of DPC-3.
Method
1. Switch off main power of DPC-3 from UPS 1.

2. After recovery, switch off second power failure from UPS 3.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1) This test can be confirmed from results of test item 2.7 UPS 1 and 2.9 UPS 3.
Expected result
1
Actual result
< Power A failure >

- Power failure alarm.
- MRU 1 fails.
- DPC-3 is still working by redundant power.
- No effect on DP.
< Power A failure >

As expected
< Power B failure >

- MRU 2 fails.
- DPC-3 is still working by redundant power.
- No effect on DP.
< Power B failure >

As expected
ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Witness
Critical low voltage 24V power supply A

alarm
Critical low voltage 24V power supply B

alarm
Fail
Comments
FMEA Practitioner
Signed
Date
KyeongKi,
06/11/2011
Kim
Remarks
52/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
4.6) NDU (Network Distribution Unit)
Objective
Test a redundant network.
Method
1. Power off the UPS 1 for NDU A1 and check a network status.
2. After recovery, power off the UPS 2 for NDU B1/C1, B2.
3. After recovery, power off the UPS 3 for NDU A2.
4. After recovery, power off the UPS 4 for NDU B3/C3.
5. After recovery, power off the UPS 5 for NDU A3.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1) The UPS loss causes NDU failure and so a redundant network can be confirmed during
UPS failure test.
Please refer to UPS failure test related to NDU as following in this procedure:
- UPS 1 failure : NDU A1 fail (item 2.7 UPS 1)
- UPS 2 failure : NDU B1/C1, B2 fail (item 2.8 UPS 2)
- UPS 4 failure : NDU B3/C3 fail (item 2.10 UPS 4)
2) Confirm that a network error alarm is coming and a redundant network is working
normally.
Expected result
Actual result
- Error Net alarm.

- A network with NDU failure has network
error but other network is operating healthy as
redundancy.
- No effect on DP.
< NDU A1 >

As expected. Error net A alarm
< NDU A2 >
< NDU A3 >
< NDU B1/C1 >
As expected. Error net B alarm
< NDU B2 >
< NDU B3/C3 >
ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Witness
Fail
Comments
FMEA Practitioner
Signed
Date
KyeongKi,
06/11/2011
Kim
Remarks
53/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
4.7) Voting of the position reference system
Objective
Test voting performance due to degraded position reference system.
Method
Select all of the position reference systems. (DPS systems and one HiPAP system)
1. Remove the differential correction signals or reduce the satellites of DPS 132-1.
2. After recovery, repeat of DPS 232-1.
3. After recovery, repeat DPS 132-2 in backup room.
4. After recovery, repeat DPS 232-2 in backup room.
5. After recovery, raise the transducer of HiPAP 1 stbd.
6. After recovery, restore and then repeat HiPAP 2 port.
Expected result
1
Actual result
< DPS 132-1 >

- Degraded DPS 132-1 is rejected or weight
decreasing. And no effect on DP.
As expected
< DPS 232-1 >

As expected
< DPS 132-2 in backup room >

As expected

As expected
< HiPAP 1 System >

- Degraded HiPAP 1 is rejected or weight
As expected.
< HiPAP 2 System >

- Degraded HiPAP 2 is rejected or weight
As expected.
GPS 1 no diff data received alarm.
Reference high variance HPR warning.
Reference high variance HPR warning.
54/95 Page
ABS DPS-3 : Pass
ETESCO Drillship
Fail
Witness
Comments
Signed
Date
FMEA Practitioner
Kongsberg explained why keep on the standard
KyeongKi,
06/11/2011
deviation of DGPS after disconnecting all of the
Kim
differential correction signals when tested method 1

to 4 during DP trial.
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, C) no.16 at page 94.
Remarks
55/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
4.8) Position reference system (DGPS, HiPAP systems)
Objective Test a redundancy of the position reference systems.
Method
Select all of the position reference systems.

(DGPS systems and one HiPAP system)
1. Power off the DPS132-1 from UPS 3.
2/3/4. After recovery, repeat other DPS from UPS 1 or 2.
5/6. After recovery, repeat HiPAP systems from UPS 1 or 2.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1) This test can be confirmed from results of test item 2.7 UPS 1, 2.8 UPS 2 and 2.9 UPS
3.
Expected result
Actual result
< DPS 132-1 >

- DGPS telegram timeout alarm.
- Other systems are working.
- No effect on DP.
As expected
< DPS 200-1 >

- No effect on DP.
As expected

- No effect on DP.
As expected

- No effect on DP.
As expected
< HiPAP 1 PORT >

- HPR position status invalid alarm.
- No effect on DP.
As expected
< HiPAP 2 STBD in ECR >

- HPR position status invalid alarm.
- No effect on DP.
As expected
ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Witness
Fail
Comments
FMEA Practitioner
Signed
Date
KyeongKi,
06/11/2011
Kim
Remarks
56/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
< CAT 4.4>

4.9) DP control accuracy
Objective
Test a DP control accuracy using the HiPAP or DGPS system.
Method
1. Control a positioning alongship and athwartship using the HiPAP or DGPS system.
2. Make 15heading change at low gain.
* Repeat with other reference system.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1) DP control accuracy tests with the HiPAP or DGPS system are carried out in DP
AUTO-CONTROL TEST during CAT 4.4. Please refer to the CAT.
2) Heading control test is carried out in Heading Control during CAT 4.4.13.
Please refer to the CAT.
3) Confirm that maximum overshoot at each new position shall be less then 5m and range
of heading stability shall be within 3.
Expected result
Actual result
- Position difference is recovered at new

position.
- Maximum overshoot at new position shall be
less then 5m.
As expected
- Range of heading stability shall be within

3.
As expected
ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Witness
Fail
Comments
FMEA Practitioner
Signed
Date
KyeongKi,
05/11/2011
Kim
Remarks
57/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
4.10) MRU (Motion Reference Unit)
Objective
Test a performance due to degraded MRU.
Method
1. Make a 4difference for roll and pitch of MRU 1 which selected as in use.
2. After recovery, repeat for MRU 2 which selected as in use.
3. After recovery, repeat for MRU 3 which selected as in use in DP backup room.
Expected result
Actual result
< MRU 1 HPR comp. stbd >

- VRS 1 rejected warning and rejected in DP.
- Automatically change over to other MRU.
- No effect on DP.
As expected
< MRU 2 HPR comp. port >

- No effect on DP.
As expected
< MRU 3 DP backup room >

- No effect on DP.
As expected
ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Witness
Fail
Comments
FMEA Practitioner
Signed
Date
KyeongKi,
06/11/2011
Kim
Remarks
58/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
< CAT 4.5.4>

4.11) MRU redundancy
Objective
Test a redundant MRU.
Method
1. Switch off the MRU 1 which selected as in use by disconnecting terminals in DPC-2.
2. After recovery, switch off the MRU 2 which selected as in use.
3. After recovery, switch off the MRU 3 which selected as in use in CENT MSB Room.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1) MRU redundancy tests due to power loss are carried out in Environmental Sensor
redundancy test during CAT 4.5.4. Please refer to the CAT.
2) Confirm that redundant sensor and no effect to DP control.
Expected result
Actual result
< MRU 1 >

- VRS 1 not ready alarm.
- Automatic change over to other MRU.
- No effect on DP.
As expected
< MRU 2 >

- No effect on DP.
As expected
< MRU 3 >

- No effect on DP.
As expected
ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Witness
Fail
Comments
FMEA Practitioner
Signed
Date
KyeongKi,
05/11/2011
Kim
Remarks
59/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
4.12) Gyro compass
Objective
Test a performance due to degraded Gyro compass.
Method
1. Give a difference for alarm on Gyro 1 which selected as in use.

2. After recovery, repeat for Gyro 2 which selected as in use.
3. After recovery, repeat for Gyro 3 which selected as in use in backup room.
Expected result
1
Actual result
< Gyro 1 NAV INST Room >

- Gyro rejected alarm.
- Operator can change over to other gyro.
- No effect on DP.
As expected
< Gyro 2 NAV INST Room >

- No effect on DP.
As expected
< Gyro 3 DP backup room >

- No effect on DP.
As expected
ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Witness
The gyro 1 changed over automatically to other

preference gyro compass.


Fail
Comments
FMEA Practitioner
Signed
Date
KyeongKi,
06/11/2011
Kim
Remarks
60/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
< CAT 4.5.5>

4.13) Gyro compass redundancy
Objective
Test a redundant gyro compass.
Method
1. Switch off the Gyro 1 which selected as in use by disconnecting terminals in DPC-2.
2. After recovery, switch off the Gyro 2 which selected as in use.
3. After recovery, switch off the Gyro 3 which selected as in use.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1) Gyro compass redundancy tests due to power loss are carried out in Gyro sensor
redundancy test during CAT 4.5.5. Please refer to the CAT.
Expected result
Actual result
< Gyro compass 1 >

- Gyro 1 not ready alarm.
- Automatic change over to other Gyro sensor.
- No effect on DP.
As expected
< Gyro compass 2 >

- No effect on DP.
As expected
< Gyro compass 3 >

- No effect on DP.
As expected
ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Witness
Fail
Comments
FMEA Practitioner
Signed
Date
KyeongKi,
05/11/2011
Kim
Remarks
61/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
< CAT 4.5.4>

4.14) Wind sensor redundancy
Objective
Test a redundant wind sensor.
Method
1. Switch off the wind sensor 1 unit by disconnecting terminals in DPC-2.

2. After recovery, switch off the wind sensor 2.
3. After recovery, switch off the wind sensor 3 of DP backup system.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1) Wind sensor redundancy tests due to power loss are carried out in Environmental
Sensor redundancy test during CAT 4.5.4. Please refer to the CAT.
Expected result
Actual result
< Wind sensor 1 >

- Wind 1 not ready alarm.
- Automatic change over to other wind sensor.
- No effect on DP.
As expected
< Wind sensor 2 >

- No effect on DP.
As expected
< Wind sensor 3 >

- No effect on DP.
As expected
ABS DPS-3 : Pass
Fail
Witness
Comments
Signed
Date
FMEA Practitioner
KyeongKi,
05/11/2011
incorrect wind data during DP trial, and
Kim
then confirmed by retest.

at page 88.
Remarks
62/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
< CAT 4.5.6>

4.15) Consequence Analysis
Objective
Test a consequence analysis performance with respect to reduced thrusters and generators.
Method
1) Consequence analysis test are carried out in On-line Consequence Analysis test
during CAT 4.5.6. Please refer to the CAT.
2) Confirm consequence analysis warnings.
Expected result
1
- Warnings for consequence analysis on

reduced thrusters and generators.
Actual result
< Test Condition >
DP Class 3
Type of failure : Bus pr. bus
< Result >

Consequence analysis drift off warning alarm
ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Witness
Fail
Comments
FMEA Practitioner
Signed
Date
KyeongKi,
05/11/2011
Kim
Remarks
63/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
< CAT 5.1 >

4.16) Change over between the DP systems
Objective
Test a change over between main and backup system.
Method
1. Change over to DP backup system from DP main system by operating the selector
switch located at the backup OS, K-POS OS 4.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1) Change over between the DP systems test are carried out in Backup Switch test
during CAT 5.1. Please refer to the CAT.
2) Confirm that normally change over from main to backup DP system.
Expected result
1
Actual result
- Change over correctly to backup system.

- The DP backup system can control a vessels
positioning.
ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Witness
As expected
Fail
Comments
FMEA Practitioner
Signed
Date
KyeongKi,
05/11/2011
Kim
Remarks
64/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
< CAT cJoy >

4.17) Independent joystick
Objective
Test a manual position control by the independent joystick.
Method
1) Tests of a manual position control by the joystick system are carried out during CAT
cJoy. Refer to CAT cJoy procedure.
2) Confirm that a positioning is controlled normally by the independent joystick system.
Expected result
1
Actual result
- The independent joystick system is operating

normally.
ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Witness
As expected
Fail
Comments
FMEA Practitioner
Signed
Date
KyeongKi,
05/11/2011
Kim
Remarks
65/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
5) Thrusters
The thruster system is consisted of 5 sub-systems which are needed necessarily in order to operate
thruster. 5 sub-systems are as follows:
-Power system
-Hydraulic and Lubrication Oil system
-Cooling system
-Thruster drive system
-Control system.
COOLING
COOLING
SYSTEM
SYSTEM
THRUSTER
THRUSTER
DRIVE
DRIVE SYSTEM
SYSTEM
5.6) Sea water cooling system
5.2) Azimuth Signal

5.3) Speed Signal
5.7) Fresh water cooling system
2) Power distribution PART

CONTROL
CONTROL
SYSTEM
SYSTEM
THRUSTER
THRUSTER
PROPULSION
PROPULSION
MOTOR
MOTOR
Electric
Electric Line
Line
Force
Force Line
Line
5.1) Thruster control panels

5.8) Emergency stops
HYDRAULIC
HYDRAULIC and
and
LUBRICATION
LUBRICATION
OIL
OIL SYSTEM
SYSTEM
THRUSTER
THRUSTER
5.4) Azimuth hydraulic system

5.5) Lubrication oil system
Water
Water Line
Line
Oil
Oil Line
Line
Signal
Signal Line
Line
The Power system and Thruster drive system are related to supplying thruster power. The effect of these
systems can be confirmed in the power distribution part.
The Cooling system supplies cooling water to equipment related to thruster operating. It has to be
checked that the cooling water is supplied to thruster equipment. So the operation of cooling pumps is
confirmed.
The Oil system supplies oil in order to help thruster operation. The pumps and expansion tanks which are
related to oil supply are evaluated.
The Control system controls the thruster operation signals. Azimuth and speed signals for the thruster to
be operated and emergency stop signals have to be analysed.
66/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
5) Thrusters
5.1) Thruster Control Panels
To test a failure of the DCU (Drive Control Unit) power
Objective
To test a failure of the RexCU (Rexpeller Control Unit) power

*Repeat for other thrusters.
1. Fail main supply power for DCU. (After recovery, test the other power)
2. Check battery capacity inside DCU after disconnecting two supply powers for DCU.
Method
3. Fail main supply power for RexCU. (After recovery, test the other power)
4. Check battery capacity supplied from THR. AUX. panel after disconnecting two supply
powers (UPS and THR. AUX. panel) for RexCU.
Expected result
Actual result
- DCU common alarm

- The DCU power is auto-changed to the
second power and the DCU will work normally
by second power.
As expected.
- DCU UPS alarm

As expected.

- The RexCU power is auto-changed to the
second power and the RexCU will work
normally by second power.
As expected.
- Alarm.
As expected.
ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Witness
Fail
Comments
Signed
Date
Moonho
07/11/
Son
2011
SHI took complementary measures for incorrect

wind data during DP trial, and then confirmed by
retest.
FMEA Practitioner

- B) no. 14 at page 88.
- C) no. 17 at page 95.
- C) no. 18 at page 95.
Remarks
67/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
5) Thrusters
5.2) Azimuth Signals
Objective
To test a failure of azimuth control signals.
Method
1. Disconnect azimuth command signal from FS to RexCU.

2. Disconnect azimuth command signal from RexCU to Hyd. pump unit.
3. Disconnect azimuth feedback signal from transmitter box to RexCU.
4. Disconnect azimuth feedback signal from transmitter box to FS.
Expected result
Actual result
- Azimuth freezes.
- Propeller is operating.
- The thruster is in DP.
-FU major failure alarm.
As expected.
- Azimuth is actually not operating.

- FU major failure and NFU failure alarms
- Azimuth FB mismatch warning. (Time delay)
As expected.
-Prediction error (at appx. 23deg commandfeedback differential at certain time intervals)
3
- Azimuth freezes.
- FU major failure alarm.
- Azimuth FB mismatch warning. (Time delay)
As expected.
- Azimuth is operating.
- FU major failure alarm.
- Prediction error (at appx. 23deg commandfeedback differential at certain time intervals)
As expected.
ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Witness
Fail
Comments
FMEA Practitioner
Signed
Date
Moonho
07/11/
Son
2011
Remarks
68/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
5) Thrusters
5.3) Speed Signals
Objective
To test a failure of speed control signals.
Method
1. Disconnect speed command signal from FS to DCU.

2. Disconnect speed feedback signal from DCU to FS
Expected result
Actual result
- Thruster is in DP
- Propeller is idle running.
- DCU common alarm.
-Prediction error (at appx. 30% commandfeedback differential at certain time intervals)
As expected.
- Thruster is in DP
- DCU common alarm.
- Feedback input signal error
As expected.
ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Witness
Fail
Comments
Signed
Date
Moonho
07/11/
Son
2011
FMEA Practitioner
Remarks
69/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
5) Thrusters
5.4) Azimuth hydraulic System
Objective
To test failure of hydraulic steering pumps.
Method
1. Power off running duty azimuth hydraulic pump.

2. After recovery, power off auto-changed azimuth hydraulic pump.
3. Power off two azimuth hydraulic pumps.
Expected result
Actual result
- Steering pump power failure alarm

- The stand-by pump starts.
As expected.

As expected.

- Not ready for DP alarm.
- The thruster is out of DP.
As expected.
ABS DPS-3 : Pass
Fail
Witness
Comments
Signed
FMEA Practitioner

incorrect wind data during DP trial, and then
Please refer to ch.5 punch lists, B) no. 15 at
Moonho
Son
Date
07/11/ 2011
page 89.
Remarks
70/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
5) Thrusters
5.5) Lubrication Oil System
Objective
To check a failures of lubrication oil system.
Method
1. Power off running lubrication oil pump.

2. After recovery, power off auto-changed lubrication oil pump.
3. Power off two lubrication oil pumps.
4. Operate low level switch about the gravity tank.
(Put off the cable of the gravity tank connection box)
Expected result
Actual result
- LO pump failure alarm

As expected.

As expected.

- Low press alarm.
As expected.
- Gravity Tank Low Level alarm

As expected.
ABS DPS-3 : Pass
Fail
Witness
Comments
Signed
FMEA Practitioner

Moonho Son
Date
07/11/
2011
page 95.
Remarks
71/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
5) Thrusters
5.6) Sea Water Cooling System
Objective
To test failure of the sea water cooling pump

1. Power off running duty SW cooling pump.
2. After recovery, power off auto-changed SW cooling pump.
Method
Expected result
Actual result
- SWC PMP failure alarm.

As expected.
- SWC PMP failure alarm.

As expected.
ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Witness
Fail
Comments
Signed
Date

FMEA Practitioner
Moonho Son
07/11/
2011
page 95.
Remarks
72/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
5) Thrusters
5.7) Fresh Water Cooling System
Objective
To test failure of the fresh water cooling pump.

1. Power off running duty FW cooling pump.
2. After recovery, power off auto-changed FW cooling pump.
Method
Expected result
Actual result
- FWC PMP failure alarm.

As expected.
-FWC PMP failure alarm.

-The stand-by pump starts.
As expected.
ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Witness
Fail
Comments
FMEA Practitioner
Signed
Date
Moonho
07/11/
Son
2011
Remarks
73/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
5) Thrusters
5.8) Emergency Stops
Objective
To check of a failure of emergency stop circuit.
Method
1. Make a circuit open about the emergency stop.

2. Make a circuit short about the emergency stop.
3. Control thrusters at a field station.
4. Push an emergency stop button.
Expected result
Actual result
- EM STOP LOOP FAIL Alarm

- Thruster continues to run.
As expected.
- EM STOP LOOP FAIL Alarm

- Thruster continues to run.
As expected.
- The thruster is deselected from DP.

- The thruster can be operated locally by lever.
As expected.
- The thruster is shutdown.

- Thruster trips.
- Drive stops.
- Azimuth freezes.
- The thruster is out of DP.
As expected.
ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Witness
Fail
Comments
Signed
Date
Moonho
07/11/
Son
2011
FMEA Practitioner
Remarks
74/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
6) Communication
6.1) Communication
Objective
Test normal operation of communication between DP and Drilling space.

(e.g. Wheelhouse, Driller cabin)
Method
1. Power off auto telephone system and then try to contact with other room.
2. Operate DP alert switch on K-POS OS 1. (green, yellow, red)
Expected result
1
Actual result
< Telecommunication >

- One of telecommunication is Always
available at least.
As expected.
< DP Alert system >

- The DP Alert status is confirmed correctly in
Driller cabin.
As expected.
ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Witness
Sound telephone could contact with the driller

cabinet.
Fail
Comments
Signed
Date
Moonho
07/11/
Son
2011
FMEA Practitioner
Remarks
75/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
7) ESD and F/G system

7.1) ESD and F/G control
Objective
To check failure of ESD and F/G field stations
Method
1. Fail main supply for ESD FS 51. After recovery fail second supply. And fail both supply
2. Fail main supply for F/G FS 49. After recovery fail second supply. And fail both supply
3. Fail main supply for F/G FS 50. After recovery fail second supply. And fail both supply
Expected result
Actual result
- Alarm
- Dual power redundancy to be checked
- No effect on DP
As expected.
- Alarm
- No effect on DP
As expected.
- Alarm
- No effect on DP
As expected.
ABS DPS-3 : Pass

Witness
Fail
Comments
Signed
Date
Moonho
07/11/
Son
2011
FMEA
Practitioner
Remarks
76/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
4. The summary for results of FMEA proving DP trials

4.1 All the DP FMEA tests had been carried out between 5th and 7th November 2011.
4.2 Each test had been performed in condition that owner, class, and SHI were attending.
4.3 Final document for results of FMEA proving DP trials will be submitted after the punch lists
described in chapter 5 will be taken actions by SHI and closed.
4.4 The results of tests proved that this vessel complies with classification of the guidelines for dynamic
positioning system as defined in IMO MSC 645 and ABS DPS 3 requirements.
77/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
5. The punch list from the tests

A) For Immediate Action
No.
Item
Test No.
Description
No fully insulation for bulkheads in Cent. E/R 2nd deck.
Action by SHI
SHI took
complementary
It has to be fully insulated.
measures by A-60
insulating the
2. Check on
1
Insulation
undone parts
the number
of required
equipments
< Portside in E/R 2nd deck >
78/95 Page
< Stbdside in E/R 2nd deck >
Verification by
SHI-MRI
Noted
Status
Closed
No.
Item
ETESCO Drillship
Test No.
Description
No fully insulation for bulkheads in Cent. E/R 4th deck.
Action by SHI
SHI took
complementary
measures by A-60
insulating the
undone parts
2. Check on
2
Insulation
the number
of required
< Portside in E/R 4th deck >
equipments
< Stbdside in E/R 4th deck >
79/95 Page
Verification by
SHI-MRI
Noted
Status
Closed
No.
Item
ETESCO Drillship
Test No.
Description
No fully insulation for bulkheads in Fwd. machinery room.
Action by SHI
SHI took
complementary
measures by A-60
insulating the
undone parts
2. Check on
3
Insulation
< Portside in fwd. mach. room >
the number
of required
equipments
< Stbdside in fwd. mach. room >
80/95 Page
Verification by
SHI-MRI
Noted
Status
Closed
No.
Item
ETESCO Drillship
Test No.
Description
The cable ducts, which for no.1 thruster HV power and net A cable, in the air
cond. unit room were not A60 insulated ducts.
These ducts have to be with A60 insulation in accordance with drawing and
Action by SHI
SHI took
complementary
measures for A-60
insulated ducts the
rules.
undone parts
2. Check on
4
Insulation
the number
of required
equipments
< Forward air cond. unit room >
81/95 Page
Verification by
SHI-MRI
Noted
Status
Closed
No.
Item
ETESCO Drillship
Test No.
Description
No fully insulation for bulkheads in Fwd. CO2 room.
Action by SHI
SHI took
complementary
measures by A-60
insulating the
undone parts
2. Check on
5
Insulation
the number
of required
equipments
< Forward CO2 room >
82/95 Page
Verification by
SHI-MRI
Noted
Status
Closed
No.
Item
ETESCO Drillship
Test No.
Description
Action by SHI
The cable duct, which for net A cable, in the aux. store was not A60
SHI took
insulated duct.
complementary
This duct has to be with A60 insulation in accordance with drawing and
measures for A-60
rules.
insulated duct the

undone parts
2. Check on
6
Insulation
the number
of required
equipments
< Forward aux. store >
83/95 Page
Verification by
SHI-MRI
Noted
Status
Closed
No.
Item
ETESCO Drillship
Test No.
Description
Action by SHI
Load limitation frequency :
Overload
7
Prevention
During stbd side test, when No.1 DG stopped

3.1)
for DG
: No.2 MGE was unstable. The load was fluctuating.

: The loads of No.3, 4 thrusters also were fluctuating.
Verification by
SHI-MRI
Status
Noted
Closed
Noted
Closed
58 Hz, 2SEC -> 57.5 Hz, 5SEC

Thruster lever shall be operated
slowly in manual mode.
It was fixed and confirmed
stable operating MGE.
When kw signal of a DG from as below FS was disconnected,
dummy value (minus value) came in and according to load
changing to manual mode.
sharing the other DG was tripped by reverse power. To avoid
FS for
3.3)
MGE
3.4)
this, the corresponding DG should be changed to manual

mode.
FS 38 in Stbd MSB room
FS 40 in Cent. MSB room
FS 41 in Cent. MSB room
84/95 Page
ETESCO Drillship
B) Important
No.
Item
Test No.
2. Check
on the
Earthing
number of
required
equipments
Control
2
Air
1.5)
System
Description
Action by SHI
No earthing for transceiver and switchbox in both HPR
HPR 1 at stbdside
HPR 2 at portside
by SHI-MRI
Status
Noted
Closed
Noted
Closed
Noted
Closed
earthing for the equipments.
compartments as follows :
It was fixed and confirmed an
Verification
All dampers in the engine room where control air was failed
It was fixed and confirmed a time of
kept the open position by non-return valve. As time goes by,
keeping the open position of dampers
they started to close. As the result the corresponding air
when control air fails.
supply fans stopped. Finally they were completely shut in

13mins at stbd engine room and 4mins at port engine room.
All non-return valves have some leakage because of their
characteristics. But time that they keep the opening position
is short. So they should be examined.
Electric
Governor
1.6)
When one pick-up sensor of a MGE was disconnected circuit
The function for breaker trip when
breaker of the corresponding MGE was tripped. But it is
one pick-up sensor failure has been
good that the alarm just comes out without opening the
deleted.
circuit breaker of the corresponding MGE because each

governor has two pick-up sensors.
85/95 Page
No.
Item
Test No.
UPS
Alarm
2.1)
in
2.2)
MSB
2.3)
Room
DC 110V
5
DB
Alarm
2.1)
2.3)
Swbd
2.5)
Alarm
UPS 2
Description
Action by SHI
220V UPSs of as below MSB rooms had no alarm on IAS.
It was fixed and confirmed alarm
Because UPS was newly installed the related name plates
occurring.
Stbd MSB room
Cent. MSB room
Port MSB room
At 220V feeder panel fail test, there was no alarm for loss of
one power source of as below DC 110V DB.
occurring.
No.1 DC 110V DB in stbd MSB room
No.3 DC 110V DB in port MSB room

The alarm for loss of alternative
No alarm for loss of alternative power source of thruster
Status
Noted
Closed
Noted
Closed
Noted
Closed
Noted
Closed
power of DCU UPSs and power fail
fixed correctly and confirmed.
When UPS 2 was one power loss, the earth failure alarm was
It was fixed and confirmed correct
coming incorrectly on K-POS OS. Correct alarm is auto
alarm occurring
switch failure alarm. It has to be fixed.
by SHI-MRI
alarm of No.2 DC 110V DB were
No.1~6 DCU UPS.

No alarm for power failure of No.2 DC 110V DB.
2.8)
Verification
should be changed.
( During 220V fail test )
Emcy
6
ETESCO Drillship
86/95 Page
No.
Item
UPS 3
ETESCO Drillship
Test No.
2.9)
Description
Action by SHI
When UPS 3 was one power loss, the UPS 3 PDU earth
It was fixed and confirmed correct
fail alarm was coming incorrectly on K-CHIEF OS. Correct
alarm occurring
Verification
by SHI-MRI
Status
Noted
Closed
Noted
Closed
Noted
Closed
alarm is auto switch failure: alarm. It has to be fixed.
UPS 4&5
2.10)
2.11)
When as below UPSs were both power loss, the UPS #
abnormal alarm was not coming to K-CHIEF OS.
coming up.
UPS 4
UPS 5
It has to be coming up and fixed.
10
FS for
3.3)
MGE
3.4)
When breaker status signal of a DG from as below FS was
According to KM logic, if the load of
lost, the load of the corresponding DG went to zero and CB
the DG is below 10% the DG breaker
tripped. This should be checked.
will actually trip and if over 10% the
DG breaker will still be closed when
the signal of DG breaker status is
FS 40 in Cent MSB room
disconnected.
FS 41 in Cent MSB room
87/95 Page
No.
11
12
13
14
Item
PMS FS
Test No.
In case that as below FS38 which controls PMS fails, K-
It was fixed and confirmed to keep
chief gives the dedicated two thrusters maximum available
available power just before the FS
power values (4500kW) regardless of original values. But
failure.
3.4)
Therefore it is good to keep the values just before the FS
3.5)
failure.
Mimic
4.2)
DCU
Action by SHI
this may cause the MGE to overload or frequency low.
4.1)
Sensor
Description
3.3)
DP OS
Wind
ETESCO Drillship
4.14)
FS38 in Stbd MSB room
FS40 in Cent. MSB room
FS43 in Port MSB room
The K-POS OS 1, 2 and K-THRUST OS 5 mimic have
The OS mimic was modified correctly
incorrect description of switchboard. The switchboard name
by Kongsberg.
Verification
by SHI-MRI
Status
Noted
Closed
Noted
Closed
Noted
Closed
Noted
Closed
of port and stbd should be exchanged correctly.

The wind sensors have too high difference each other
The position and sensors value were
depending on weather condition.
fixed properly and confirmed.
It has to be checked relocation and fixed.
5.1)
The battery capacity of No.1 DCU UPS must be confirmed.

The battery must last for 30 mins
The battery of no.1 DCU UPS was

changed and sufficient capacity was
confirmed.
88/95 Page
No.
Item
Test No.
Azimuth
15
Hydraulic
5.4)
Pump
Sea water
16
cooling
system
ETESCO Drillship
Verification
Description
Action by SHI
When the hyd. pump was changed the thruster was
It was fixed correctly and confirmed.
Noted
Closed
The auto-change logics for thruster
Noted
Closed
by SHI-MRI
Status
deselected in the DP mode.

It must be modified. In this case the thruster must be in the
DP mode.
1.3)
In the No.2, 3 and 5, when SWC pump was changed FWC
5.6)
pump also was changed at the same time.
89/95 Page
pumps were modified and confirmed.
ETESCO Drillship
C) Nice To Have
No.
Item
Test No.
Description
The cables of relevant DP equipments were exposed to sharp shape of the
Theses cables have to be protected against the sharp shape.
exposed sharp
the number
shape.
of required
equipments
< DP backup room on E-deck >
measures for
protection against
2. Check on
Insulation
SHI took
complementary
hole on the wall in DP backup room.
Action by SHI
90/95 Page
Verification
by SHI-MRI
Noted
Status
Closed
No.
Item
Test No.
ETESCO Drillship
Description
Action by SHI
Incorrect nametags were attached at the top of an entrance as follows :
Port bow thruster room
complementary
Stbd bow thruster room
measures to change
Center bow thruster room
correct nametags of
Forward machinery room
corresponding
These nametags have to be changed correctly.
2. Check
on the
2
Insulation
number of
required
equipments
< Nametag of port bow THR, RM > < Nametag of stbd bow THR, RM >
< Nametag of cent. bow THR, RM >
SHI took
91/95 Page
< Nametag of fwd. mach. RM >
rooms.
Verification
by SHI-MRI
Noted
Status
Closed
No.
Item
Test No.
Labels
3
ETESCO Drillship
Description
Action by SHI
The labels for the number of thruster on K-POS OS and K-
for
of
selector
It was fixed correctly and confirmed.
Noted
Closed
The labels of control selector switch
Noted
Closed
The labels of selector switch on backup K-POS OS 4 were
on backup K-POS OS 4 had been
not attached. It should be indicated.
attached after DP trial.
No nametag of switchboxes in both HPR compartments as
It was fixed and confirmed.
Noted
Closed
The transceiver 2 cable tray in HPR 2
Noted
Closed
Noted
Closed
2. Check
on the
S/W box
number of
follows :
Nametag
required
HPR 1 at stbdside
equipments
HPR 2 at portside
Cable
The transceiver 2 cable tray in HPR 2 compartment (P) was
compt. was installed correctly after
Tray
installed abnormally. It should be fixed correctly.
DP trial and confirmed.

Arrangement drawing has been
Status
be changed.
Labels
switch
by SHI-MRI
THRUST OS panel were mismatched with mimic. It should
thrusters
on OS
Verification
UPS
nametag
The PDUs of the UPS have no nametags of breakers.
inserted into the panel instead of

nametags and it was confirmed.
92/95 Page
No.
Item
Test No.
MGE DO
8
supply
1.1)
pump
Fwd
Section
ETESCO Drillship
2.4)
Description
Action by SHI
There is no engine room name in alarm description of standby
Swbd
by SHI-MRI
Status
Noted
Closed
Noted
Closed
Noted
Closed
Noted
Closed
Noted
Closed
Noted
Closed
confirmed.
started.
At fwd 220V fail test two alarm for No.1 and No.3 UPS came out.
One is Auto sw fail and the other is abnormal. But only Auto
correct alarm occurring
sw fail alarm for No.2 UPS came out.

Indication for the bus has not
Emcy
10
It was updated properly and
Verification
2.5)
The color of 220V emcy feeder panel was not changed to white.
been applied for this project.

This item was discussed with
Mimic
owner and closed.

11
DC110V
DB alarm
2.6)
No alarm when one power source of AVR failed.
LV
12
protective

2.6)
No alarm with regard to power failure of LV protective relay.
When the auto S/W box of as below UPSs was power loss, the HPR
has redundant power but no alarm coming up to OS.
relay alarm
13
Auto S/W
2.8)
box
2.11)
UPS 2 for auto S/W box at stbd side
UPS 5 for auto S/W box at port side
The alarm should be coming up to give indication for operator.
93/95 Page
No.
Item
Test No.
for
Description
Action by SHI
Unlike stbd and cent, when kw signal of a DG was
It was fixed and confirmed changing to
disconnected kW value was fixed and the other DG
manual mode.
Verification
by SHI-MRI
Status
Noted
Closed
It was fixed and confirmed.
Noted
Closed
The standard deviation of DGPS was not increased
< Kongsberg reply >
Noted
Closed
after all corresponding differential correction signals
The standard deviation increasing slowly, there
fail and then suddenly the DGPS was rejected.
are a few reasons to be aware of as follows:
Normally, in case of all correction signals loss, the
1) Vessel must move slightly since deviation is
standard deviation of DGPS is increasing due to
calculated from present position.
degraded accuracy and then the DGPS might be
2) The XP/HP must be disconnected firstly, and
rejected on DP by too high deviation.
wait at least 2~3mins.
It should be explained why keep on the standard
3) The other correction signals can then be
deviation of DGPS without differential correction
disconnected one by one, but give time between
signals.
and make sure the vessel does not stand still
was not tripped by reverse power. But the
FS
14
ETESCO Drillship
3.5)
Port MGE
corresponding DG should be not changed to manual

mode either.
Unlike stbd and cent, in case of the loss of breaker
status signal nothing happened. In our opinion this
is normal.
15
FS power
3.2) ~
fail alarm
3.7)
Voting
16
of
4.7)
PRS
Description cell on alarm view was blank at alarm

test for FS power fail.
94/95 Page
No.
17
Item
DCU
ETESCO Drillship
Test No.
5.1)
Description
Action by SHI
The alarm must be triggered when power of DCU is changed.
RexCU
5.1)
19
oil
5.5)
system
cooling
5.6)
system
When the pump is changed the description of stand-by start

alarm must put in.
Noted
Closed
Noted
Closed
Noted
Closed
Noted
Closed
alarm was updated on mimic and

confirmed.
The description of cooling system mimic must be modified.
mimic and confirmed.
STBD and PORT are changed each other.
95/95 Page
Status
correct alarm occurring.
It was modified correctly on
Sea water
20
The alarm must be installed when power of RexCU is changed.
The description of stand-by start
Lubrication
by SHI-MRI
correct alarm occurring.
The alarm must be installed.

18
Verification

Viel mehr als nur Dokumente.

Final HN1899 DP FMEA Test Results Rev5_0

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Beschreibung:

Beschreibung:

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Final HN1899 DP FMEA Test Results Rev5_0

Hochgeladen von

Beschreibung:

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Verwandte Titel

HN1899

Reason for issue

First issue for review

Issue reflected owners comments

Issue for additional tests of newly installed UPS

Issue for updating CAT numbering

Issue for the result of DP FMEA proving trial.

The status of punch list still open.

Issue for the revised test results with closed all

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

Check on the number of required equipments

ESD and F/G system

to comply with DPS-3

The summary for results of FMEA proving

The punch list from the tests

Samsung Heavy Industries

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

: Auto Voltage Regulator

: Capacitor Bank Unit

: Console Operating System

: Central Processing Unit

: Drilling Control System

: Drive Control Unit

: Dynamic Positioning Controller

: Dynamic Positioning System

: Differential Position Sensors

: Engine Control Room

: Failure Mode Effect Analysis

: High Voltage (11kV)

: High Precision Acoustic Positioning

: Hydroacoustic Position Reference

: International Association of Lighthouse Authorities

: Integrated Automation System

: Kongsberg Vessel Control System

: Kongsberg Dynamic Positioning System

: Kongsberg Thruster Control System

: Local Area Network

: Lever Communication Link

: Line Supply Unit

: Low Voltage (440V)

: Main Generator Engine

Motion Reference Unit

Samsung Heavy Industries

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

: Network Distribution Unit

: Programmable Logic Controller

: Power Management System

: Quick Closing Valve

: Remote Control System

: Remote Input Output

: Riser Management System

: Revolution Per Minute

: Uninterruptible Power Supply

: Water Cooling Unit

Samsung Heavy Industries

Marine Research Institute

Test Procedure for DP FMEA

For ver. 1.0 First issue for review

For ver. 2.0 Issue for review

The term VRS was changed to MRU.

Test method was added to verify the load of

Some wrong UPS numbers were revised.

Some wrong FS numbers were revised.