Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
is seriously
studying the American strategic posture in this region. Will the US choose Japan or
China as a strategic partner? Will it choose neither? Unless the US chooses to promote the
Japan-US relationship to a level like that of the Anglo-American special relatio nship,
Japan may withdraw from the alliance and the US may find itself an isolated power
in the Pacific.58 This relationship needs to be carefully considered when thinking
about Japans potential nuclear. Similarly, Japan watches how the United States deals with North Korea. Japanese
officials want to know how the United States will stem the tide of proliferation in the region. The United States has a long history of
assurances when it comes to Japanese anxieties over nuclear posture. A more recent development is that Japan has asked to be
more involved in the process of nuclear posture planning. The Japan Times noted that Two days after the latest nuclear test by the
North, U.S. President Barack Obama told Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in a telephone meeting that there would be no change
whatsoever in Americas commitment to defend Japan, including nuclear deterrence through its nuclear umbrella over Japan.59
The United States needs to continually express its intent to provide Japan with
security in both words and deeds. It is important that the United States continually involves Japan in discussions
concerning the nuclear umbrella. Japan finds itself on the same tightrope the United States finds itself on, specifically how to
applaud/pursue reductions of and emphasis on nuclear weapons while simultaneously maintaining a safe, secure, and effective
nuclear deterrent. Japan was apparently sufficiently satisfied with the final draft of the 2010 NPR and their consultations beforehand.
However, Japan was insistent on further discussions addressing more willing to talk of their specific concerns, holding high-level
meetings to discuss the details and implications of the 2010 NPR. There were, however, still a few points of contention. One of the
largest issues between Japan and the United States on the NPR is the different threat priorities. While Japan is not impervious or
ignorant towards terrorism, they see state actors as their main threats, whereas the NPR identified nuclear terrorism as the highest
priority, specifically preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.60 Japan, on the other hand, sees China and North
Korea as its biggest threats, not terrorism. In the Pacific Forum dialogue at the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Japanese
The short
flight times of ballistic missiles between the cities or military forces of contiguous states means that
very little time will be available for warning and attack assessment by the defender.
Conventionally armed missiles could easily be mistaken for a tactical nuclear first
use. Fighter-bombers appearing over the horizon could just as easily be carrying nuclear weapons as conventional
ordnance. In addition to the challenges posed by shorter flight times and uncertain weapons loads, potential
victims of nuclear attack in Asia may also have first-strike vulnerable forces and
command-control systems that increase decision pressures for rapid, and possibly
mistaken, retaliation. This potpourri of possibilities challenges conventional wisdom
about nuclear deterrence and proliferation on the part of policy makers and
academic theorists. For policy makers in the United States and NATO, spreading nuclear and other
weapons of mass destruction in Asia could profoundly shift the geopolitics of mass
destruction from a European center of gravity (in the 20th century) to an Asian and/or Middle Eastern center of
gravity (in the present century).7 This would profoundly shake up prognostications to the
effect that wars of mass destruction are now pass , on account of the emergence of the
Revolution in Military Affairs and its encouragement of information-based warfare.8 Together with this, there
has emerged the argument that large-scale war between states or coalitions of
states, as opposed to varieties of unconventional warfare and failed states, are exceptional and
potentially obsolete.9 The spread of WMD and ballistic missiles in Asia
could overturn these expectations for the obsolescence or marginalization
of major interstate warfare. For theorists, the argument that the spread of nuclear weapons might
China and North Korea; India, with Pakistan and China; Pakistan, with India and China; and so on.
be fully compatible with international stability, and perhaps even supportive of international security, may be less
sustainable than hitherto.10
These arguments, for a less alarmist view of nuclear proliferation, take comfort from the history
of nuclear policy in the first nuclear age roughly corresponding to the Cold War .11
Pessimists who predicted that some 30 or more states might have nuclear weapons by the end of the century were
powers favoring nuclear containment in general may fall short of disagreement in specific political cases. As Patrick
M. Morgan has noted, there is insufficient agreement among states on how serious it (nuclear proliferation) is and
on what to do about it.13
CP
Text: The United States federal government should enter into
trilateral cooperation with the Peoples Republic of China and
Japan for the purpose of promoting clean energy, including an
offer for the United States and the Peoples Republic of China
to mutually eliminate import tariffs and non-tariff trade
barriers on solar cells and panels produced in their respective
nations.
The CP best solves for clean energy Japan, the U.S. and China
have complementary markets and strengths
Duan et al. 15
(Fengjun Duan, Takahisa Yokoyama and, Tetsuo Yuhara, The U.S.- Japan- China
Trilateral Cooperation toward a New Climate Regime, Advances in Economics and
Business, 2015)
Through the proposed trilateral cooperation, large scale effects in combating global
warming can be expected both internal (within the three countries) and external (global contribution
through aiding developing countries). For the internal benefit, firstly the high level technology input to
the cooperation by Japan can accelerate the innovation process in both United
States and China, thereby decrease the CO2 reduction costs . Case study in China [23]
suggested that rapid technology improvement could mitigate approximately half of the minus economic influences
to achieve a deep reduction target. Hausker et al. [24] also indicated that the most parts of the national target of
the deployment of
these technologies can activate the industry and keep the competitiveness in Japan.
Secondly, the abundant energy resources in United States can contribute to the energy
security in Japan and China, which are the top two energy importers in the world. And the high level
energy producing technology of the United States such as shale technology can also
contribute to low carbon energy supply in the other two countries. Finally, the cheap products
United States can be realized through deployment of existing technology. At the meanwhile,
from China can significantly contribute to the decease of CO2 reduction costs in
United States and Japan. And the high production capacity provides the possibility of
deploy the low carbon infrastructure to other developing countries to maintain the industry
As to the external effects, three levels of contribution can be
expected. On the strategic level, the trilateral cooperation could significantly reduce the
energy demand in the three countries by which can release the tension of energy supply
market. Therefore, the developing countries in Pacific regions could get cheaper energy to support their economic
growth. On the policy level, the most advanced technologies usually couldnt be utilized
directly in developing countries due to the limitation of infrastructure and capacity . The
trilateral cooperation can generate the more suitable technology and system through
competitiveness of the three countries.
results in this study also illustrated the same problem. The southeastern Asian countries could achieve a benefit of
1.36% of GDP through fuel saving during 2010-50 compared with the number of 0.1-0.3% in industrialized countries
during the same period. However, the initial additional investment of 0.3% of GDP compared with the number of
The
trilateral cooperation scheme can be expected to solve the problem through a combination
of technology and investment. 6. Conclusions United States, Japan and China cover near half of
the current global emissions, developed more than half of the global climate
0.05-0.15% in industrialized countries prevent them to utilize the same technology in the same period [2].
technologies, produced most of the global green equipments, thereby are essential
player on combating climate change. The three countries have a mutually dependent
and mutually complementary relationship. Cooperation between the three nations will not only
contribute to overcoming the current environment danger but also contribute to energy security and
maintaining industrial competitiveness and make international contributions. Cooperation
between the three nations will contribute to achieving energy mixes in harmony with
national resource conditions and low carbon growth methods that can be disseminated to
developing nations should be established. Cooperation schemes should be established that
go beyond the limits of existing bilateral cooperation with regard to strategy, implementation and
deployment. Based on intergovernmental agreements, infrastructure for the full process flow of technology
development, demonstration, industrialization as the basis for cooperation.
as more usable. The administration also highlighted the important role that missile defense plays in extended deterrence by
complicating an adversarys strategic calculus. While generally supportive of the Obama administrations dual commitment to move
toward a world without nuclear weapons while maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist, some in
The
fears through frequent consultations
Tokyo and Seoul were concerned that the United States might move away from the nuclear option too soon or too fast. 16
administration,
however,
these
States also avoided further narrowing its nuclear declaratory policyopting to retain calculated ambiguity rather than adopting a
sole purpose formulationin part because of the concerns of allies. 19 The NPR concluded that regular extended deterrence
Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC) that same year. These forums, which build on years of unofficial discussions among experts
and officials from the respective countries, 20 have institutionalized high - Level focus on ways to strengthen deterrence in
agreement (known as KORUS), rejuvenated efforts to negotiate and implement the Trans - Pacific Partnership (TPP), which would
include Japan, and emphasized the important contributions that its allies make to regional security. Together,
these
initiatives served to solidify the U.S. political relationship with Japan and South Korea
respectively, assuring them that the United States has an enduring interest in
their partnerships.
K
The affirmatives excessive impact scenarios contribute to a
culture of fear within debate and excludes those with mental
illnesses
Calm Clinic 09
(Calm Clinic is an informational blog designed to educate the public on anxiety and
assist those with anxiety, Common Anxiety Triggers for Anxiety and Panic, Calm
Clinic http://www.calmclinic.com/anxiety/causes/triggers)
The media really has changed the culture of anxiety. They report often
on young deaths, dangers, and lawsuits that can all create a feeling of discomfort
and fear that may trigger an increase in anxiety levels . A great example was an article about
Health and News
the dangers of MRSA - a deadly infection that is immune to most medications - where doctors wrote the biggest
Coping Anxiety may also be triggered by a loss of coping ability, often due to replacement coping. This is an
incredibly common problem with those that abuse drugs or alcohol, but may affect those that party or do reckless
behaviors in order to cure stress. These behaviors are coping replacements, and unfortunately natural stress coping
is a "use it or lose it" type of ability. If you replace your coping ability with these types of negative behaviors, you
risk losing you mental ability to cope with stress and anxiety may be the result. Anxious Thoughts Certain
anxious thoughts may also trigger greater amounts of anxiety . Anxiety causes anxious
thoughts in general, so often this affects those that have already been struggling with mild anxiety. But in some
defect is the true root of ableist acts that cause far too many to feel marginalized,
discriminated against and ultimately devalued in this society . Here are just six
forms of this behavior that, though largely normalized, need to be retired immediately. 1. Failing to provide
accessibility beyond wheelchair ramps Source: Getty Perhaps the most obvious form of discrimination people with
disabilities face is the inability to access places and services open to their able-bodied counterparts even with
people think
"just [putting] wheelchair ramps everywhere" is sufficient, true accessibility
accommodates all types of disabilities not just physical disabilities that specifically bind people to
laws in place to prevent such inequality. As Tumblr user The (Chronically) Illest noted, while most
wheelchairs. Accommodations can also include "braille, seeing-eye dogs/assistant dogs, ergonomic workspaces,
easy to grip tools, closed captions ... class note-takers, recording devices for lectures" and other services and
become undeniably naturalized in the English language. Many people not only use words like "crazy," "insane" or
"retarded" without a second thought, but many adamantly defend their use of these terms, decrying anybody who
questions their right to do so as too "politically correct" or "sensitive." But this personal defense fails to recognize
that ableist language is not about the words themselves so much as what their usage suggests the speaker feels
about the individuals they represent. "When a critique of language that makes reference to disability is not
welcome, it is nearly inevitable that, as a disabled person, I am not welcome either," Rachel Cohen-Rottenberg
wrote in a 2013 Disability and Representation article. But beyond individual feelings, ableist language can
contribute to a foundation of more systemic oppression of people with disabilities as a group. "If a culture's
language is full of pejorative metaphors about a group of people," Cohen-Rottenberg continued, that culture is more
likely to view those individuals as less entitled to rights like "housing, employment, medical care, education, access,
and inclusion as people in a more favored group." 3. Able-bodied people failing to check their privilege Source:
stalls or take up space in crowded elevators, rather than taking the stairs and leave room for people with disabilities
Hehir 07
(Thomas Hehir is Professor of Practice and Director of the School Leadership
Program at Harvard Graduate School of Education, Confronting Ableism,
Educational Leadership, February 2007,
http://www.ascd.org/publications/educationalleadership/feb07/vol64/num05/Confronting-Ableism.aspx)
The U.S. education system has made major strides in improving education opportunities for students with
More of these students are finishing high school than ever, and record
numbers are moving on to employment and higher education (Wagner & Cameto, 2004).
Much of this improvement has taken place because of the work of school leaders
throughout the United States. To continue and expand this progress , however, educators
must recognize and challenge the ableist assumptions that still permeate the
culture and guide much special education practice. Students with disabilities need
carefully constructed, individual instructional programs that recognize the effects of their
disability while creating opportunities for them to learn and fully participate in school
disabilities.
and society.
Case
Solar
Solar industry is rapidly growing in the SQ
SEIA 3/9
(US Solar Market Set to Grow 119% in 2016, Installations to Reach 16 GW, SEIA, 9
March 2016)
The U.S. solar market is set to grow a staggering 119 percent this year says GTM Research
in its latest U.S. Solar Market Insight Report 2015 Year in Review, published in conjunction with the Solar Energy Industries
entire reports, Green Mercantilism: Threat to the Clean Energy Economyand Enough is Enough: Confronting Chinese
Innovation Mercantilism to the subject. It was also recently noted on the blog that a Chinese city has taken the
regard to the solar market, but the argument is applicable to clean energy in general and bears repeating here:
We need solar to be cheaper than fossil fuels so it can be globally deployed to reduce
carbon emissions to near-zero by mid-century. How far can government subsidies Chinese or otherwise
of first-generation solar PV take us to that goal? It simply cant. If we allow Chinese green
Two
months later, China imposed anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties on distillers dried grain, a byproduct of ethanol and animal feed,
Tom Tamarkin and Barrie Lawson have authored one of the more entertaining
scientific articles I have read in a long time. They actually undertake to do the math: what would it require to
replace existing fossil fuel and nuclear power plants with solar energy as current
plants are phased out over the next several decades? There are many variables, of course. For
example, if electric vehicles ever gain a significant market share, the need for electric power will be vastly greater. Here, as
storage to provide power when there is no sunlight, and the various engineering challenges associated with managing a large area
synchronous AC power grid. This analysis considers the factors involved in dimensioning solar power generating plants. To illustrate
the issues involved the example considers the case for supplying the entire electric power needs of the USA from solar energy
without the use of fossil fuel, nuclear or other back up. To simplify the calculations, the example considers a single very large
hypothetical solar power installation providing all the countrys power although in practice, generation would be dispersed in a
network of smaller installations throughout the country, each one closer to the point of need. Extensive calculations follow. You can
if located in the
Northeast, where power demands are highest, the necessary solar panels would
[cover] an area of 44,000 square kilometers or a square with sides of 210 km.
Bigger than Denmark, the Netherlands or Switzerland . If located in the Southwest,
you could get away with a solar installation the size of Belgium, or 50% larger than
Israel. Just for fun, I created this graphic that shows a 210-km square superimposed on the Northeastern United States. Click to
enlarge. Heck, we didnt need Ohio anyway! This actually understates the amount of
land that would be needed for a functioning solar power system: The total area
covered by the solar array will be significantly larger than the area of the panels to
allow for installation, maintenance access and periodic cleaning. The space required
for the batteries is in addition to this. Of course, the area consumed by the solar farm is only one aspect of the
problem: Note that If 1 square metre PV panels were manufactured at the rate of 1 per
second, it would take 930 years to manufacture 29.3 billion panels. And how about those
batteries, which would be needed so you can turn lights on at night ? The article includes a lengthy
discussion of issues surrounding lithium batteries. It turns out that adequate battery
capacity would be expensive: To store 4,400 gWh would need 4.4 million of these 40
foot containers costing $3,300,000,000,000 or $3.3 trillion. The batteries would take up a lot of space too.
Thats another thing about green energy, it is environmentally awful: For 4.4 million containers, the
containers would cover an area of 130.8 million m2 = 130.8 km2 or a square with
sides 11.44 km long; but adequate access space must also be provided, adding
substantially to the total. The standard container exterior dimensions are 12.193 m X 2.438 m giving an area of
29.727 m2. Then theres this: Note that if these 44 million containerized batteries were
manufactured in China, it would take 587 round trips of twenty days each way on
the largest container ships to deliver them to the USA. One could tinker with assumptions forever,
but the bottom line is blindingly obvious: for the United States to actually try to transition to solar
power as its sole or principal source of electricity is in practice impossible. Moreover, the
work through the calculations and critique them if so inclined, but I will cut to the conclusion:
attempt, if made, would be an economic and environmental catastrophe. It isnt going to happen. While not everyone understands
the relevant mathematics and electrical engineering, even Barack Obama is smart enough to know that his hectoring the rest of us
to do away with fossil fuels is total BS, intended only to enrich Democratic Party cronies who, in turn, subsidize Obama and his fellow
left-wing office-seekers.
not possible.
ICS security in a nutshell Controlling the boilers, fans, valves and switches and other mechanical devices that turn raw
inputs and high-voltage transmission into flip-of-a-switch electricity is a class of computers known as industrial control systems. Supervisory Control and
simply taking out the cyber assets doesnt cause a blackout, Peterson said.
Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the
opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed
by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in a n almost two-decade long struggle
between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a
most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed
terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential stateon-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear
weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the
United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-intoPakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up
to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America,
the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere
else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the
the
Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to
anything beyond advising and training local forces.
political problems (Levy 1989). Commonly known as either externalization or diversion, the main thrust of the
argument is that political elites can solidify their relationship with their domestic constituents by transferring the
public's attention from economic issues to the foreign enemy. Underlying the process is the assumption that the
military action will cause the citizens to "rally 'round the flag" (Mueller 1973) and thereby the patriotic mass will see
political elites in a more positive light. Early studies attributed to his rallying effect to a suspected in-group/outgroup relationship. Simmel (1955) argued that an altercation with an out-group (the target of the externalization
efforts) helps promote cohesion within the in-group (the troubled leader's citizenry) because it is natural for
individuals to pull together with those they know when confronted by outsiders. Transferring the argument to
action, it may be that if political elites realize that this in-group/out-group dynamic exists, then they will make
advantageous use of externalization tactics. Auxiliary arguments might suggest that leaders will prefer short,
manageable conflicts to boost their support without risking the long term costs of war. An additional implication of
the theory when applied strategically to pairs of conflictual states is that while states with problems are likely to be
conflict initiators, states without such problems are more likely to be the targets of diversion. If diversionary logic
holds and states want to initiate a cheap and manageable incident to divert attention without imposing major costs,
then leaders would prefer to initiate against states in a good economic or domestic situation. If the target is in bad
shape domestically, then leaders in that target may have their own incentives to escalate the conflict to divert
public attention. Initiators thinking strategically may try to avoid conflict against such an opponent. While
diversionary conflict theory has been the subject of much scholarly attention, the evidence supporting the
argument has been mixed. On one hand, studies that take the historical case study approach tend to support the
notion that leaders do externalize when faced with domestic problems (Levy 1988, 667); in a related body of work,
some case studies of deterrence failures have shown that these cases are often characterized by an attacker who is
quantitative
studies of externalization have not provided consistent support . Across studies of
motivated by internal problems (e.g., Jervis, Lebow, and Stein 1985). On the other hand,
externalization in general (e.g., Leeds and Davis 1997) or in the context of specific states' foreign policies (Fordham
1998; Gowa 1998; Meernik 1994; Meernik and Waterman 1996; Ostrom and Job 1986; Morgan and Bickers 1992;
Mintz and Russett 1992), findings about whether quantitative data support the theory have been mixed. The nature
of the results has led some to question the validity of the theories. For example, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (1985)
posits that the logical flaw in externalization theory lies in the psychological nature of the original scapegoat
hypothesis on which externalization theory is based. While the international relations version of this theory is
130). Similarly, Levy (1989, 266) puts forth four problems with the original causal process as described by Simmel
(1955), Coser (1956), and other early writers on externalization(:1 ) little attention is paid to the direction of the
relationship between internal problems and external conflict, (2) attempts to develop or test alternative theoretical
relationships are rare,( 3) precise specifications of when externalization should occur theoretically are rare, and (4)
the conditions under which externalization conditions should hold are unexplored. The conclusion that Levy draws
diversionary conflict may be attributable to differences in research design and variable measurement. Studies have
used a variety of research designs, different dependent variables (uses of force, major uses of force, militarized
disputes), different estimation techniques, and different data sets covering different time periods and different
states. Even the central concept of externalization, namely, domestic trouble, is unclear. Most studies to date have
used presidential popularity, overall presidential success, the election calendar, or a misery index composed of
inflation and unemployment as indicators of presidential problems. Cross-national studies have most frequently
examined what James (1988, 103) categorizes as manifest conflict, a category which includes protest demon
strations, political strikes, armed attacks, and deaths from domestic violence. This category can be opposed to
latent conflict, which exists when sources of trouble are present but have not yet led to the physical manifestations
of dissatisfaction. Diversionary conflict theory as presented is typically so general in its discussion of internal
problems that it opens a Pandora's box of possible indicators of domestic conflict, and all of the types of measures
discussed above fit with the theory. The vague nature of the theory may be contributing to this possible problem of
model misspecification, but there are few arguments that suggest one indicator is superior to the others. Alternative
relationships between domestic economic performance and international conflict also have been proposed, perhaps
most importantly by Blainey (1973, 74). Blainey offers the alternative hypothesis about economics and war that
economically challenged countries are more likely to be the target of aggressive military acts than their initiator
(1973, 86). Faced with a poor target in a bad economic situation, who is faced with an unhappy populace and
possibly limited resources, potential conflict initiators are likely to see opportunity. The argument also parallels the
historical notion that leaders would only go to war when their coffers were full-in bad times, leaders may simply not
be able to afford to go to conflict. Blainey's argument appears to pose a challenge to diversionary conflict theory in
its emphasis on what is the most likely direction of conflict. Note, however, that its prediction (weak states become
targets) differs from a strategic application of diversionary conflict theory. By coming at externalization from the
substitutability perspective, we hope to deal with some of the theoretical problems raised by critics of diversionary
conflict theory. Substitutability can be seen as a particular problem of model specification where the dependent
variable has not been fully developed. We believe that one of the theoretical problems with studies of
externalization has been a lack of attention to alternative choices; Bueno de Mesquita actually hints toward this
it is shortsighted to conclude
that a leader will uniformly externalize in response to domestic problems at the
expense of other possible policy choices (1985, 130). We hope to improve on the study of
(and the importance of foreign policy substitution) when he argues that
externalization and behavior within rivalries by considering multiple outcomes in response to domestic conditions.5
when
faced with domestic economic troubles. Rather than diverting the attention of the
public or relevant elites through military action, leaders may actually work to solve
their internal problems internally. Tying internal solutions to the external environment, we focus on
In particular, we will focus on the alternative option that instead of externalizing, leaders may internalize
the possibility that leaders may work to disengage their country from hostile relationships in the international arena
to deal with domestic issues. Domestic problems often emerge from the challenges of spreading finite resources
across many different issue areas in a manner that satisfies the public and solves real problems. Turning
inward for some time may free up resources required to jump-start the domestic
economy or may simply provide leaders the time to solve internal distributional
issues. In our study, we will focus on the condition of the domestic economy (gross domestic product [GDP] per
capita growth) as a source of pressure on leaders to externalize. We do this for a number of reasons. First, when
studying rivalries, we need an indicator of potential domestic trouble that is applicable beyond just the United
States or just advanced industrialized democracies. In many non-Western states, variables such as election cycles
and presidential popularity are irrelevant. Economics are important to all countries at all times. At a purely practical
level, GDP data is also more widely available (cross-nationally and historically) than is data on inflation or
unemployment. 6 Second, we believe that fundamental economic conditions are a source of potential political
problems to which leaders must pay attention. Slowing growth or worsening economic conditions may lead to mass
dissatisfaction and protests down the road; economic problems may best be dealt with at an early stage before they
turn into outward, potentially violent, conflict. This leads us to a third argument, which is that we in fact believe that
it may be more appropriate in general to use indicators of latent conflict rather than manifest conflict as indicators
of the potential to divert. Once the citizens of a country are so distressed that they resort to manifest conflict
(rioting or engaging in open protest), it may be too late for a leader to satisfy them by engaging in distracting
foreign policy actions. If indeed leaders do attempt to distract people's attention, then if protest reaches a high
level, that attempt has actually failed and we are looking for correlations between failed externalization attempts
and further diversion.
Trade
The CP solves warming better enables trilateral market
development to spur innovation and price reduction on a
variety of clean tech theres only a risk the aff locks in
ineffective solutions
Hsu 11
(Shi-Ling Hsu, Larson Professor Florida State University College of Law, The case
for a carbon tax: Getting past our hang-up to effective climate policy, p 43-; kdf)
that by supporting specific renewable energy technologies now,
we run the risk of effectively locking them in for decades, and perhaps missing the
chance to find renewable technologies with even smaller carbon or environmental
footprints. Wind turbines have an expected lifespan of twenty to twenty-five years, 38 solar
photovoltaic panels about the same . 39 Although these seem like environmentally
and economically sensible renewable energy technologies, what will be learned in
the next twenty or thirty years? Already, concentrated solar power has emerged as
a possibly cheaper and simpler alternative to the previously dominant solar
technology, photovoltaic solar energy . 40 Environmental organizations, oriented by their
missions to get things done, have again fallen into the trap of wedding themselves to
certain technologies. Todays environmental savior may be tomorrows
environmental pariah, and the problem with mandating an expensive environmental technology is the
The overlooked danger is
economic irreversibility of capital expenditures. A recent technological mandate sought by some environmental
groups was Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle technology, a technology that gasifies coal so as to be able to
separate out the carbon for later capture and sequestration underground. The Natural Resource Defense Council
and other organizations sued the EPA to force it to require IGCC as part of any new coal-fired power plant as part of
its New Source Review program. 41 Failing to learn the past lessons of the New Source Review program, the NRDC
seemed to have overlooked the possibility that if coal-fired power plants with IGCC were actually built, carbon
dioxide emissions might be abated but better and environmentally cleaner opportunities to reduce emissions would
be lost for generations
period of regional integration development, four periods have been identified during which the integration processes were becoming
particularly intensive and which have therefore been named "waves of regionalism". The first wave was taking place during the
capitalism development in the second half of the 19th century, in the course of British sovereign domination over the world market.
Economic integrations of the time primarily had the form of bilateral customs unions; however, owing to the comparative openness
of international trading system based on the golden standard automatism, this period is called the "era of progressive bilateralism".
The next two waves of regionalism occurred in the years following the world wars . Since the disintegration
processes caused by the wars usually spawned economic nationalisms and autarchic tendencies, it is not surprising that post-war
regionalism momentum after the First World War, which was additionally burdened by the consequences of Big Economic Crisis.
The current wave of regionalism started in late 1980s and spread around the world
to a far greater extent than any previous one did: it has covered almost all the continents and almost all
the countries, even those which have mis to join all earlier regional initiatives, such as the USA, Canada, Japan and China.
Integration processes, however, do not show any signs of flagging. Up till now, over 200
RTAs have been registered with GATT/WTO, more than 150 of them being still in force, and most of these
valid arrangement have been made in the past ten years. Specific in many ways, this wave was dubbed "new
regionalism". The most specific characteristics of new regionalism include : geographic spread
RTAs in terms of encompassing entire continents; greater speed; integration forms success;
deepening of integration processes; and, the most important for this theoretical discussion,
of
generally non-negative impact on outsiders , world economy as a whole, and the multilateral liberalization
process. Some theorists (Gilpin) actually distinguish between the "benign" and "malign" regionalism. On the one hand, regionalism
can advance the international economic stability, multilateral liberalization and world peace. On the other, it can have mercantilist
Analyses of
trends within the contemporary integration processes show that they mainly have
features of "benign" regionalism. Reasons for this are numerous. Forces driving the
features leading to economic well-being degradation and increasing international tensions and conflicts.
contemporary regionalism development differ from those that used to drive earlier
regionalism periods in the 20th century. The present regionalism emerged in the period
characterized by the increasing economic inter-dependence between different world
economy subjects, countries attempts to resolve trade disputes and multilateral framework of trade relations. As
opposed to the 1930s episode, contemporary regional initiatives represent
attempts to make the members' participation in the world economy easier, rather
than make them more distant from it. As opposed to 1950s and 1960s episode, new initiatives are
less frequently motivated exclusively by political interests, and are less frequently
being used for mercantilist purposes. After the Second World War, more powerful
countries kept using the economic integration as a means to strengthen their
political influence on their weaker partners and outsiders . The examples include CMEA and
European Community arrangements with its members' former colonies. As opposed to this practice, the new
regionalism, mostly driven by common economic interests, yielded less trade
diversion than previous one, and has also contributed to the prevention of military
conflicts of greater proportions. Various analyses have shown that many regional integrations in
earlier periods resulted in trade deviations, particularly those formed between less developed countries and
between socialist countries. In recent years, however, the newly formed or revised regional integrations
primarily seem to lead to trade creation. Contrary to the beggar thy- neighbor model of
imports registered the average annual growth of 18%. In the same time, the extra-regional exports were also growing, although at a
lower rate of 9% average a year; its share in the total Latin America exports at the end of decade amounted to 18% as compared to
12% in 1990. In the 1990-1996 period, the intraregional imports grew by some 18% a year. The extra-regional imports were also
growing very fast, reaching the 14% rate. These data reflect a great unbalance in the trade with extra-regional markets, since the
growing EU interest in outsiders is confirmed by establishing "The Euro-Med Partnership", which proclaimed a new form of
cooperation between the EU and the countries at its South periphery32. Besides,
series of inter-regional agreements between the EU on the one hand, and certain
groups from other regions on the other (MERCOSUR, CARICOM, ASEAN and GCC). In case of North America the
Any attempt to move
towards significantly closed blocs ("fortresses") would require overcoming the
significant inter-dependence between major trading blocs. Besides the analysis of
contemporary trends in extra- and intra-regional trade , other research was conducted that was
supposed to point to the reasons why the new regionalism has mainly a non-negative
impact on outsiders and global liberalization. The distinctive features of new
ratio between intra-regional and inter-regional trade is 40:60, and in East Asia, it is 45:55.
the
1980s witnessed significant changes in the world economy that the GATT trade
system was not up to. Besides. GATT had not yet managed to cover the entire trade in goods, since there were still
exceptions in the trade in agricultural and textile products that particularly affected the USA and developing countries. GATT system
In this vacuum
from the point when GATT inadequacy
became obvious until the start of the Uruguay round and the establishment of World Trade Organization, the wave
of regionalism started spreading across the world again. Prodded by the Single European Act and the
success of European integration, many countries turned to an alternative solution
establishment of new or expansion and deepening of the existing economic
integrations. Even the USA, the multilateralism bastion until then, made a radical turn in their foreign-trade policy and started
of conflict resolutions, and its organizational and administrative mechanism in general also required revision.
that was created in promoting trade and investment multilateralism
Solvency
Trump rolls back the aff he has essentially unlimited control
over tariffs
Gillespie 11/14
(Patrick Gillespie, 3 ways Trump can slap tariffs on China and Mexico, CNNMoney,
14 November 2016)
President-elect Donald Trump has threatened to slap big tariffs on China and Mexico to
help bring jobs back to America. At first glance, it may seem hard to do without backing from Congress. But
actually, Trump doesn't even need Congress to approve it. True, the Constitution gives Congress the
right to impose tariffs on other nations. However, several complicated laws have been passed in the last 100 years that delegate
that power from Congress to the president. Trump has several options -- each open to interpretation
-- but here are three key ways he can go after China and Mexico. 1. Trump's biggest weapon: Unlimited tariffs 'during time of war'
Trump could invoke the "Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917" to hit Mexico and China
with tariffs as high as he wants. Under the law, the president can restrict all types of
trade "during time of war." That definition is very loose though. America doesn't
have to be at war with China or Mexico -- it just has to be "at war" somewhere in the
world in order to apply tariffs against China or Mexico. Experts believe U.S. special forces in
Syria and Libya would suffice to meet that requirement for Trump to hit China and Mexico with tariffs.
In 1971, President Richard Nixon used this act to impose a 10% import tariff (not directed at
any particular nation) citing the Korean War, which had ended nearly two decades prior. Technically, America was still in
a state of emergency which had not lifted. All to say: the excuse of war has very loose meaning for the President to raise tariffs of
any kind. 2. Trump's next best weapon: unlimited tariffs during 'national emergency' Think that law is too outdated for Trump to use?
"You say 'it's an emergency, we've lost a lot of jobs and now I've got to act. I declare an emergency.' I think it's really that simple,"
says Doug Irwin, a trade expert at Dartmouth. "If he wants to threaten China or Mexico, he has a lot of leverage." The big difference
between this Act and the one from 1917 is that Trump can't seize assets using this one, but that's not his aim anyway. This law has
been invoked against Nicaragua, Panama, Sierra Leone and Somalia, according to the Peterson Institute of International Economics.
It was used "in circumstances that few observers would characterize as an 'unusual or extraordinary threat," says Gary Hufbauer, an
The tariff can only be up to 15% on all goods and it's only good for 150 days. Then Congress needs to approve it. So, it's a blunt rule
Trump can
also use the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Ronald Reagan used this one. It allows Trump to slap
targeted tariffs on certain industries , like steel. It's not as broad, but Trump can
raise tariffs as high as he wants on specific things.
that could have a severe short term impact but it expires after five months, unless it is extended by Congress.
human systems do
. Feedback processes between interconnected elements and dimensions lead to relationships that see change that is dynamic, nonlinear
. If dynamic nonlinear feedbacks in response to rising greenhouse gases are included in the model used in the Stern Review of Climate Change (cited in
Concept 2), for example, the total average cost of climate change rises from 5% to at least 20% of global per capita consumption (HM Treasury, 2006).6 Detailed explanation Vast numbers of naturally occurring systems exhibit
nonlinearity. As one thinker has dryly suggested (Stanislaw Ulam, in the 1950s), calling a situation nonlinear is like going to the zoo and talking about all the interesting non-elephant animals you can see there (Campbell et al., 1985):
Linearity
assume
problems can be broken down into pieces, with each piece
analysed separately
all the separate answers can be recombined to give the right
answer to the original problem
the whole
equivalent to the sum of the
parts
linearity is often an approximation of a more complicated reality
When a system starts to behave in a nonlinear fashion, all
bets are off (Strogatz, 2003). This is not to suggest that nonlinearity is necessarily a
dangerous or unwanted aspect of systems
there are as many nonlinear situations as there are non-elephant animals.
d in idealised situations where responses are proportional to forces and causes are
; finally,
. In a linear system,
is exactly
. However,
linearly if they are close to equilibrium and are not pushed too hard.
. The biology of life itself is dependent on nonlinearity, as are the laws of ecology. Combination therapy for HIV/AIDS
using a cocktail of three drugs works precisely because the immune response and viral dynamics are nonlinear the three drugs taken in combination are much more effective than the sum of the three taken separately. The
nonlinearity concept means that linear assumptions of how social phenomena play out should be questioned. It is important to note that such thinking has only relatively recently been incorporated into the hard science paradigms
Nonlinear
relationships
have to be examined all at once, as a coherent entity.
, the need to develop
such ways of thinking cannot be overstated as one thinker puts it: ... every major
unresolved problem in science from consciousness to cancer to the
collective craziness of the economy, is nonlinear
and, moreover, is still only starting to shape thinking in the social, economic and political realms.
apart they
cannot be taken
However
relationships and proportionality, and nonlinearity in terms of sequences of events one thing following another. 6 Note that the previously cited increase from 5 to 14.4% was due to natural, known feedbacks and does not include
non-linear feedbacks 25 Although nonlinearity is a mathematical formulation, it is useful to take the suggestion that what is required is a qualitative understanding of [the] quantitative when attempting to investigate
them systematically (Byrne, 1998). Such a qualitative understanding has been furthered by the work of Robert Jervis (1997) on the role of complexity in international relations. Starting with the notion that understanding of social
systems has tacitly incorporated linear approaches from Newtonian sciences, Jervis goes on to highlight three common assumptions that need to be challenged in order to take better account of nonlinearity. These assumptions
provide a solid basis for investigating nonlinearity. First, it is very common to test ideas and propositions by making comparisons between two situations which are identical except for one variable referred to as the independent
variable. This kind of analysis is usually prefaced with the statement holding all other things constant. However, in a system of interconnected and interrelated parts, with feedback loops, adaptive agents and emergent properties,
this is almost impossible, as everything else cannot be held constant and there is no independent variable. Jervis argues that, in such systems, it is impossible to look at just one thing, or to make only one change, hence to look at a
situation involving just one change is unrealistic. Secondly, it is often assumed that changes in system output are proportional to changes in input. For example, if it has been assumed that a little foreign aid slightly increases
economic growth, then more aid should produce more growth. However, as recent work by ODI and others argues, absorption capacity needs to be taken account more aid does not necessarily equate to better aid. In
complex systems, then, the output is not proportional to the input. Feedback loops and adaptive behaviours and emergent dynamics within the system may mean that the relationship between input and output is a nonlinear
one: Sometimes even a small amount of the variable can do a great deal of work and then the law of diminishing returns sets in [a negative feedback process] in other cases very little impact is felt until a critical mass is
assembled (Jervis, 1997). The third and final commonly made assumption of linearity is that the system output that follows from the sum of two different inputs is equal to the sum of the outputs arising from the individual inputs. In
other words, the assumption is that if Action A leads to Consequence X and Action B has Consequence Y then Action A plus Action B will have Consequences X plus Y. This frequently does not hold, because the consequences of Action
A may depend on the presence or absence of many other factors which may well be affected by B or Bs Consequence (Y). In addition, the sequence in which actions are undertaken may affect the outcome. Example: The growth
dynamics model as an alternative to linear regression models Studies of economic growth face methodological problems, the foremost of which is dealing with real world complexity. The standard way of understanding growth
assumes, implicitly, that the same model of growth is true for all countries, and that linear relationships of growth are true for all countries. However, linear relationships might not apply in many cases. An example would be a
country where moderate trade protection would increase economic growth but closing off the economy completely to international trade would spell economic disaster. Linear growth models imply that the effect of increasing the
value of the independent variable would be the same for all countries, regardless of the initial value of that variable or other variables. Therefore, an increase of the tariff rate from 0% to 10% is presumed to generate the same
change in the growth rate as a change from 90% to 100%. Furthermore, the change from 0% to 10% is assumed to have the same effect in a poor country as in a rich country, in a primary resource exporter as in a manufacturing
exporter, and in a country with well developed institutions as in a country with underdeveloped institutions. Despite some efforts to address these issues by relaxing the linear framework and introducing mechanisms to
capture nonlinearities and interactions among some variables, this is still a poor way of addressing real world nonlinearity. Econometric research has identified that linear models cannot generally be expected to 26 provide a good
approximation of an unknown nonlinear function, and in some cases can lead to serious misestimates (Rodrguez, 2007). Research at Harvard University has focused on the problem of designing a growth strategy in a context of
radical uncertainty about any generalised growth models. They call their method growth diagnostics, in part because it is very similar to the approach taken by medical specialists in identifying the causes of ailments. In such a
context, assuming that every country has the same problem is unlikely to be very helpful. The principal idea is to look for clues in the countrys concrete environment about the specific binding constraints on growth. The growth
diagnostics exercise asks a set of basic questions that can sequentially rule out possible explanations of the problem. The answers are inherently country-specific and time-specific. The essential method is to identify the key problem
to be addressed as the signals that the economy would provide if a particular constraint were the cause of that problem. Implication: Challenge linearity in underlying assumptions Within complex systems, the degree of nonlinearity
dynamics
and theories
a local situation
hoped-for changes.
and relationships between various factors, and the lack of proportionality between inputs and outputs, means that the
Therefore
assumptions
entirely appropriate
to
, if there are
, aggregations
when applied
the dynamics of
of change
about the relations among different aspects of a specific situation, and these are
new
to a deep
perspective, it is important to build and improve new models that can provide the sort of information required for the particular task at hand. No kind of explanatory representation can suit all kinds of phenomena ... any one
diagnosis of [a] problem and its solution is necessarily partial (Holland, 2000). From this perspective, it is important to tailor to the particular situation ones perspective on the dynamics of some phenomena. In a complex system,
one must examine the complex web of interrelationships and interdependencies among its parts or elements (Flynn Research, 2003).
understand
causes another
to change, and to look at how variables interact and feed back into each other over time (Haynes, 2003). Homer-Dixon, cited above, suggests that political scientists use methods that are
modelled on the physical sciences, developing broad theories of political behaviour to generate hypotheses about causal relations between variables of interest. These ideas resonate strongly with a recent assessment undertaken for
Sida on the use of the log frame (Bakewell and Garbutt, 2005), highlighting some of the advantages and disadvantages in a way which is particularly pertinent for this paper. In the international aid world, much of programme
planning and development is undertaken using a set of methods and tools called the logical framework. For most of the study respondents, the advantage of logical frameworks was that they force people to think carefully through
what they are planning to do, and to consider in a systematic fashion how proposed activities might contribute to the desired goal through delivering outputs and outcomes. As a result, many see the log frame as a useful way of
encouraging clear thinking. However, these positive aspects were offset by the almost universal complaint that the log frame rests on a very
linear logic
done,
This linear idea of cause and effect is profoundly ill-at-ease with the implications
Output
Outcome
C and Impact D.
, which
suggests if
that
Activity
A is
of complexity science and, indeed, the experiences of many development practitioners. The authors of the study sum up the problems of the log frame in a way that is key to our discussion of complexity: Unfortunately (for the
logical framework approach at least) we are not working with such a selfcontained system and there are so many factors involved which lie beyond the scope of the 27 planned initiative that will change the way things work.
Although the LFA makes some attempt to capture these through the consideration of the risks and assumptions, these are limited by the imagination and experience of those involved. As a result the LFA tends to be onedimensional and fails to reflect the messy realities facing development actors (Bakewell and Garbutt, 2005). Nonlinearity also has clear implications for the increased interest in randomised control trials (RCTs). While the implications
of nonlinearity for techniques and tools such as the log frame and RCTs are increasingly well understood by many actors within the aid system, the answer to the deeper question as to whether incorporation of nonlinearity will be
can be seen in as providing a theoretical underpinning of the frequently cited tension between upward accountability and learning. It also provides a means to
two
accountability and
appropriate
also
different
Concept 5: Sensitivity to initial conditions Outline of the concept The behaviours of complex systems are sensitive to their initial conditions. Simply, this means that two complex
systems that are initially very close together in terms of their various elements and dimensions can end up in distinctly different places. This comes from nonlinearity of relationships where changes are not proportional, small
changes in any one of the elements can result in large changes regarding the phenomenon of interest. Detailed explanation Imagine a small ball dropped onto the edge of a razor blade, as shown in the first image in Figure 4 below.
The ball can strike the blade in such a way that it can go off to the left (centre image) or to the right (right-hand image). The condition that will determine whether the ball goes to the left or right is minute. If the ball were initially
held centred over the blade (as in the first image), a prediction of which direction the ball would bounce would be impossible to make with certainty. A very slight change in the initial conditions of the ball can result in falling to the
right or left of the blade. Figure 4: Sensitivity to initial conditions ball striking razor blade Source: http://www.schuelers.com/ChaosPsyche/part_1_14.htm. The concept of phase space (Concept 6) allows a more precise understanding
of initial conditions. Phase space allows for the analysis of the evolution of systems by considering the evolution process as a sequence of states in time (Rosen, 1991). A state is the position of the system in its phase space at
a given time. At any time, the systems state can be seen as the initial conditions for whatever processes follow. The sensitive dependence on initial conditions, in phase space terms, means that the position of a system in its phase
space at a particular moment will have an influence on its future evolution. The interactions that are taking place at any moment in time have evolved from a previous moment in time, that is, all interactions are contingent on an
historical process. Put simply, history matters in complex systems. 28 The infamous butterfly effect was a metaphor developed to illustrate this idea in the context of the weather. Edward Lorenz (1972), a meteorologist, used the
metaphor of a flapping wing of a butterfly to explain how a minute difference in the initial condition of a weather system leads to a chain of events producing large-scale differences in weather patterns, such as the occurrence of a
tornado where there was none before. As more recent thinkers have put it, in relation to complex systems in general, an initial uncertainty in measurement of the state of a system: however small, inevitably grow[s] so large that
long-range prediction becomes impossible even the most gentle, unaccounted-for perturbation can produce, in short order, abject failure of prediction (Peak and Frame, 1998). A large proportion of complex systems are prone to
exhibiting the butterfly effect, so much so that some have defined complex behaviour as occurring where the butterfly effect is present (ibid). As no two situations will be exactly alike, the phenomenon will inevitably occur in many
settings. As with nonlinearity, many have not used formal models to demonstrate the butterfly effect, but instead have tried to develop a qualitative understanding of the likely quantitative nature of real life situations. Sensitivity to
initial conditions also means that the generalisation of good practice [between contexts] begins to look fragile (Haynes, 2003) because initial conditions are never exactly the same, and because the complexity and nonlinearity of
behaviour make it extremely difficult to separate the contributions to overall behaviour that individual factors have. Any notion of good practice requires a detailed local knowledge to understand why the practice in question was
good. This concept highlights the importance of understanding what can be forecast in complex systems to what level of certainty, as well as what is comparable across complex systems. It reinforces the point that both of these
areas are necessarily restricted by the perspective of the observer. Sensitive dependence on initial conditions suggests that no single perspective can capture all there is to know about a system, that it may be wise to look in detail
at how appropriate our solution to a problem is, and that it may be better to work with inevitable uncertainty rather than plan based on flimsy or hopeful predictions. This may mean, to take the example of predictability, that the
success of a nation may be best explained not by its populations virtues, its natural resources and its governments skills, but rather simply by the position it took in the past, with small historical advantages leading to much
bigger advantages later. Another example is how socioeconomic policy can result in a separation of neighbourhoods, driving a large gap between the rich and the poor so that, in short order, a gulf in wealth can result between two
families who once had similar wealth (Byrne and Rogers, 1996). This is closely related to the notion of path dependence, which is the idea that many alternatives are possible at some stages of a systems development, but once
one of these alternatives gains the upper hand, it becomes locked in and it is not possible to go to any of the previous available alternatives. For example, many cities developed where and how they did not because of the
natural advantages we are so quick to detect after the fact, but because their establishment set off self-reinforcing expectations and behaviours (Cronon, cited in Jervis, 1997). In economic development, the term path
dependence is used to describe how standards which are first-to-market can become entrenched lock ins - such as the QWERTY layout in typewriters still used in computer keyboards (David, 2000). In certain situations, positive
feedbacks leading from a small change can lead to such irreversible path dependence (Urry, 2003). Urry gives the example of irreversibility across an entire industry or sector, whereby through sensitive dependence on
initial conditions, feedback can set in motion institutional patterns that are hard or impossible to reverse. He cites the example of the domination of steel and petroleum-based fuel models, developed in the late 29 19th century,
which have come to dominate over other fuel alternatives, especially steam and electric, which were at the time preferable. The concept of path dependence has received some criticism from exponents of complexity
science, because it has imported into economics the view that minor initial perturbations are important while grafting this onto an underlying theory that still assumes that there are a finite number of stable and alternative endstates, one of which will arise based on the particular initial conditions. As will be explained in Concept 7 on attractors and chaos, this is not always the case in complex systems (Margolis and Liebowitz, 1998). Example: Sensitive
dependence on initial conditions and economic growth Economists have generally identified sensitive dependence on initial conditions as one of the important features of the growth process that is, what eventually happens to an
economy depends greatly on the point of departure. There is mounting evidence that large qualitative differences in outcomes can arise from small (and perhaps accidental) differences in initial conditions or events (Hurwicz, 1995).
In other words, the scope for and the direction and magnitude of change that a society can undertake depend critically on its prevailing objective conditions and the constellation of sociopolitical and institutional factors that have
shaped these conditions. For specific economies, the initial conditions affecting economic growth include levels of per capita income; the development of human capital; the natural resource base; the levels and structure
of production; the degree of the economys openness and its form of integration into the world system; the development of physical infrastructure; and institutional variables such as governance, land tenure and property rights. One
might add here the nature of colonial rule and the institutional arrangements it bequeathed the former colonies, the decolonisation process, and the economic interests and policies of the erstwhile colonial masters. Wrongly
specifying these initial conditions can undermine policy initiatives. Government polices are not simply a matter of choice made without historical or socioeconomic preconditions. Further, a sensitive appreciation of the differences
and similarities in the initial conditions is important if one is to avoid some of the invidious comparisons one runs into today and the naive voluntarism that policymakers exhibit when they declare that their particular country is about
to become the new tiger of Africa. Such comparisons and self-description actually make the process of learning from others more costly because they start the planning process off on a wrong foot (Mkandawire and
Soludo, 1999). Implication: Rethink the scope of learning and the purpose of planning in an uncertain world Sensitivity to initial conditions suggests that there are inevitably degrees of non-comparability across, and unpredictability
within, complex systems. Some have argued that this implies that: the map to the future cannot be drawn in advance. We cannot know enough to set forth a meaningful vision or plan productively (Tetenbaum, 1998). The general
implications for development theory and practice have been highlighted by a previous ODI working paper on participatory approaches, which suggests that this implies the notion of development as planned change is paradoxical. To
quote directly, perfect planning would imply perfect knowledge of the future, which in turn would imply a totally deterministic universe in which planning would not make a difference (Geyer, cited in Sellamna, 1999). Sellamna
goes on: For this reason, development planning should abandon prescriptive, goal-oriented decision making and prediction about future states and focus instead on understanding the dynamics of 30 change and promoting a
collective learning framework through which concerned stakeholders can constantly, through dialogue, express their respective interests and reach consensus. With regards to learning, this poses profound issues for the
transferability of best practice, a concept that has taken on increasing meaning within the development sector since the rise of knowledge management and organisational learning strategies (Ramalingam, 2005). While it is
possible that, for example, an understanding of the interplay of factors driving urban change in the Philippines may be relevant for analysis of urban change in Guatemala, this is not necessarily the case. The sensitivity to initial
conditions gives us a strong reason to suppose that, even if we have a generally useful perspective on urban environments, this may entirely fail to capture the key features of the next situation we look at. This means that the search
for best practices may need to be replaced by the search for good principles. Some have suggested that the most appropriate way to bring the principles of effective approaches from one context to another is for development
workers to become facilitators enabling representatives of other communities to see first hand what in the successful project they would wish to replicate (Breslin, 2004). Moving onto planning, to say that prediction of any kind
kinds of
to a useful level of probability and that, from certain perspectives, it is not possible to offer any firm prediction of the way the future will pan out on certain timescales.
However,
event
in a helpful manner. For example, Geyer (2006) suggests that, with political dynamics, it is fairly safe
to predict the short-term dynamics of basic power resources and political structures and that, therefore, there is decent scope for forecasting voting and decision outcomes of policy. On the other hand, examining party and
institutional dynamics becomes more difficult, and grasping the potential shifts in contested political and social debates is even harder, while the longterm development of political dynamics is effectively characterised by disorder, as
is important to
unpredictability
and not treat uncertainty as
embarrassing Rather than rejecting planning outright, there is a need to
accept
inherent levels of uncertainty
far as our ability to predict is concerned. It is important to clarify that certain levels of uncertainty are unavoidable when looking into the future. Complexity science suggests that it
identify
the purpose and principles of planning. This has two key strands. First, it is necessary to incorporate an
in
rethink
ance of the
requirement for a certain level of detail in understanding future events should be balanced with the understanding that both simple and intricate processes carry uncertainty of prediction. While improving ones models of change and
analyses of facets of a situation may be worthwhile, it is just as important and often more practical to work with a realistic understanding of this uncertainty and build a level of flexibility and adaptability into projects, allowing for
greater resilience. It has been argued that development projects have fallen under the enchantment of [delivering] clear, specific, measurable outcomes (Westley et al., 2006). In many cases, this could be unrealistic, ineffective or
even counterproductive; it is uncertain whether valuable social outcomes could be planned in terms of a specific series of outputs, and it is unclear why it is more productive to be able to hold agencies strictly accountable to
promises at the expense of their promises delivering real results. This resonates with critiques of the log frame approach cited earlier, which argue that the adoption of the log frame as a central tool in effect and impact evaluations
assumes higher powers of foresight than in fact is the case (Gasper, 2000). What is needed is higher levels of flexibility in the funding of international aid work, involving less stringent targets and requirements from donors. The role
of M&E would be shifted to value learning from unexpected outcomes. This is at the heart of the participatory approach to M&E developed by IDRC called outcome mapping. 31 Second, the way organisations look into the future
should be adjusted by taking a more systematic and realistic view of what the future can hold: A single vision to serve as an intended organisational future is a thoroughly bad idea not that the long term is dismissed as an
effective irrelevance, [instead we need a] refocusing: rather than establish a future target and work back to what we do now to achieve it, the sequence is reversed. We should concentrate on the significant issues which need to be
handled in the short term, and ensure that the debate about their long-term consequences is lively and engaged (Rosenhead, 2001). What is needed is a pragmatic balance between present concerns and future potentialities (ibid);
this means that ongoing systematic thinking about the future is an important task for any organisation working in development or humanitarian aid. Foresight is the ability to create and maintain viable forward views and to use
these in organisationally useful ways (Slaughter, 2003), and futures techniques, such as driver analysis or scenario planning, are suitable for this task. Scenario planning constructs a number of possible futures, in order to produce
decisions and policies that are robust under a variety of feasible circumstances. This encourages a move away from looking for optimal policies or strategies: any strategy can only be optimum under certain conditions and when
those conditions change, the strategy may no longer be optimal (Mittleton-Kelly, 2003), so it may be preferable to produce strategies that are robust and insensitive to future variability rather than optimal for one possible future
scenario. Path dependence and lock ins are also important to consider in the context of the practices of international aid agencies. The widespread use of the logical framework approach, despite the often serious critiques, is a clear
example of path dependence at play. In fact, it could be argued that linearity has a lock in when it comes to the thought processes and approaches of international agencies. How lock ins may be addressed in specific agency
contexts is touched upon in Concept 7 on attractors and chaos Concept 6: Phase space and attractors Outline of the concept The dimensions of any system can be mapped using a concept called phase space, also described as the
space of the possible (Cohen and Stewart, 1995).7 For any system, the space of the possible is developed by identifying all the dimensions that are relevant to understanding the system, then determining the possible values that
these dimensions can take (Romenska, 2006). This space of the possible is then represented in either graphical or tabular form. In natural sciences, the prevalence of time-series data means that the phase space can be
represented as a graphical map of all of the relevant dimensions and their values. In social scientific thinking, tables of data can be used to apply the same principles. The phase space of a system is literally the set of all the possible
states or phases that the system can occupy. Phase space is particularly useful as a way to describe complex systems because it does not seek to establish known relationships between selected variables, but instead attempts to
shed light on the overall shape of the system by looking at the patterns apparent when looking across all of the key dimensions. This resonates with a key point raised in Concept 1 more may be learned about complex systems by
trying to understand the important patterns of interaction and association across different elements and dimensions of such systems (Haynes, 2003). Phase space can be used to enable this kind of learning. By creating such a map
of a system, it is possible to characterise how that system changes over time and the constraints that exist to change in the system (Musters et al., 1998). 7 Phase space is often used interchangeably with the phrase state
space. 32 Detailed explanation The dimensions of a complex system mutually influence each other, leading to an intricate intertwining (Mittleton-Kelly, 2003) of these relationships and system behaviours to degrees of nonlinearity
and unpredictability. Because of the challenges involved in analysing such systems, scientists studying complex systems have made use of a mathematical tool called phase space, which allows data relating to the dimensions of a
system to be mapped rather than solved (Capra, 1996). Put simply, phase space is a visual way of representing information about the dimensions of a system. Rather than a graph, which attempts to show the relationships between
Byrne
gives the example of a city as a complex system
the cities are complex
problems
a range of variables are interacting simultaneously in
interconnected ways.
specific chosen dimensions, phase space maps the possible values of each dimension of the system (akin to drawing the axes of a graph). This is the space within which a complex system displays its behaviour.
(Byrne, 2006). He describes how
and
He cites the specific example of Leicester, a city in the UK that grew from a small market town of 2,000 people in the 11th century to a city of 280,000 in 2001. Using the
Census data from 2001, he shows that Leicester could be seen as a complex urban system made up of the following variables: