SPOUSES MARIA LUISA P.

MORATA AND JULIUS MORATA, petitioners,

vs.
SPOUSES VICTOR GO and FLORA C. GO and HON. VALERIANO P. TOMOL, JR.,
Judge, Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XI, respondents.

From this order, petitioners came to Us thru this petition. In a resolution dated December 2,
1982, We required respondents to file an answer, and likewise granted a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondent judge from requiring petitioners to file their answer
and enter into trial in Civil Case No. R-22154.

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction,
the Court is called upon to determine the classes of actions which fall within the coverage
of Presidential Decree No. 1508, 1 otherwise known as Katarungang Pambarangay Law. This
law requires the compulsory process of arbitration at the Barangay level as a pre-condition
for filing a complaint in court, Petitioners contend that said legislation is so broad and allembracing as to apply to actions cognizable not only by the city and municipal courts, now
known as the metropolitan trial courts and municipal trial courts, but also by the courts of
first instance, now the regional trial courts. Upon the other hand, respondents would limit
its coverage only to those cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the metropolitan
trial courts and municipal trial courts.

We find the petition impressed with merit. Section 6 of P.D. 1508 reads as follows:

The antecedent facts are not disputed. On August 5, 1982, respondents Victor Go and Flora
D. Go filed in the defunct Court of First Instance of Cebu, presided by respondent Judge
Valeriano P. Tomol, Jr., a complaint against petitioners Julius Morata and Ma. Luisa Morata
for recovery of a sum of money plus damages amounting to P49,400.00. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. R-22154.
On the basis of the allegation in the complaint that the parties-litigants are all residents of
Cebu City, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, citing as grounds therefor, the failure of the
complaint to allege prior availment by the plaintiffs of the barangay conciliation process
required by P.D. 1508, as well as the absence of a certification by the Lupon or Pangkat
Secretary that no conciliation or settlement had been reached by the parties. The motion
was opposed by private respondents.
On September 2, 1982, respondent judge issued an order denying the motion to dismiss.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied in an order dated
October 3, 1982, as follows:
Considering the specific reference to City or Municipal Courts in the provisions of
Sections 11 and 12 of P.D. No. 1508, as the Courts to which the dispute settled or
arbitrated by the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat, shall be elevated for nullification
of the award or for execution of the same, and considering that from the provision
of Section 14 of the same law, the pre- condition to the filing of a complaint as
provided for in Section 6 thereof, is specifically referred to, it is the considered
opinion of this Court that the provision of Section 6 of the law applies only to cases
cognizable by the inferior courts mentioned in Sections 11 and 12 of the law.
In view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants, of
the order of September 2. 1982, denying their motion to dismiss, is hereby denied.
[Annex 'G', p. 36, Rollo].

SECTION 6. Conciliation pre-condition to filing of complaint. No complaint,

petition, action for proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the
Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any
other government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of
the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat
Secretary attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has
been repudiated. However, the parties may go directly to court in the following
cases:
[1] Where the accused is under detention;
[2] Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling
for habeas corpus proceedings;
[3] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary
injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and support pendente
lite; and
[4] Where the action may otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations
Section 2 of the law defines the scope of authority of the Lupon thus:
SECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement.The Lupon of each barangay
shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city
or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:
[1] Where one party is the government ,or any subdivision or instrumentality
thereof;
[2] Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the
performance of his official functions;
[3] Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding
P200.00;
[4] Offenses where there is no private offended party;

[5] Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the interest of
justice determine upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister
of Local Government.
Thus, except in the instances enumerated in sections 2 and 6 of the law, the Lupon has the
authority to settle amicably all types of disputes involving parties who actually reside in
the same city or municipality. The law, as written, makes no distinction whatsoever with
respect to the classes of civil disputes that should be compromised at the barangay level,
in contradistinction to the limitation imposed upon the Lupon by paragraph (3), section 2
thereof as regards its authority over criminal cases. In fact, in defining the Lupon's
authority, Section 2 of said law employed the universal and comprehensive term "all", to
which usage We should neither add nor subtract in consonance with the rudimentary
precept in statutory construction that "where the law does not distinguish, We should not
distinguish. 2 By compelling the disputants to settle their differences through the
intervention of the barangay leader and other respected members of the barangay, the
animosity generated by protracted court litigations between members of the same political
unit, a disruptive factor toward unity and cooperation, is avoided. It must be borne in mind
that the conciliation process at the barangay level is likewise designed to discourage
indiscriminate filing of cases in court in order to decongest its clogged dockets and, in the
process, enhance the quality of justice dispensed by it. Thus, to say that the authority of
the Lupon is limited to cases exclusively cognizable by the inferior courts is to lose sight of
this objective. Worse, it would make the law a self-defeating one. For what would stop a
party, say in an action for a sum of money or damages, as in the instant case, from
bloating up his claim in order to place his case beyond the jurisdiction of the inferior court
and thereby avoid the mandatory requirement of P.D. 1508? And why, indeed, should the
law seek to ease the congestion of dockets only in inferior courts and not in the regional
trial courts where the log-jam of cases is much more serious? Indeed, the lawmakers could
not have intended such half-measure and self-defeating legislation.
The objectives of the law are set forth in its preamble thus:
WHEREAS, the perpetuation and official recognition of the time-honored tradition of
amicably settling disputes among family and barangay level without judicial
resources would promote the speedy administration of justice and implement the
constitutional mandate to preserve and develop Filipino culture and to strengthen
the family as a basic social institution;
WHEREAS, the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts of justice contributes
heavily and unjustifiably to the congestion of court dockets, thus causing a
deterioration in the quality of justice;
WHEREAS, in order to help relieve the courts of such docket congestion and
thereby enhance the quality of justice dispensed by the courts, it is deemed
desirable to formally organize and institutionalize a system of amicably settling
disputes at the barangay level.

There can be no question that when the law conferred upon the Lupon "the authority to
bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable
settlement of all disputes, ... ," its obvious intendment was to grant to the Lupon as broad
and comprehensive an authority as possible as would bring about the optimum realization
of the aforesaid objectives. These objectives would only be half-met and easily thwarted if
the Lupon's authority is exercised only in cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of
inferior courts.
Moreover, if it is the intention of the law to restrict its coverage only to cases cognizable by
the inferior courts, then it would not have provided in Section 3 thereof the following rule
on Venue, to wit:
Section 3. Venue. ... However, all disputes which involve real property or any
interest therein shall be brought in the Barangay where the real property or and
part thereof is situated.
for it should be noted that, traditionally and historically, jurisdiction over cases involving
real property or any interest therein, except forcible entry and detainer cases, has always
been vested in the courts of first instance [now regional trial court].
But it is pointed out by the respondent judge that Sections 11, 3 12, 4 and 14, 5 of the law
speak of the city and/or municipal courts as the forum for the nullification or execution of
the settlement or arbitration award issued by the Lupon. We hold that this circumstance
cannot be construed as a limitation of the scope of authority of the Lupon. As heretofore
stated, the authority of the Lupon is clearly established in Section 2 of the law; whereas
Sections 11, 12 and 14, relied upon by respondent judge, deal with the nullification or
execution of the settlement or arbitration awards obtained at the barangay level. These
sections conferred upon the city and municipal courts the jurisdiction to pass upon and
resolve petitions or actions for nullification or enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards
issued by the Lupon, regardless of the amount involved or the nature of the original
dispute. But there is nothing in the context of said sections to justify the thesis that the
mandated conciliation process in other types of cases applies exclusively to said inferior
courts.
Any doubt on the issue before Us should be dispelled by Circular No. 22 issued by Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando, 6 the full text of which is quoted as follows:
TO: ALL JUDGES OF THE COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURTS,
JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURTS, COURTS OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS,
CITY COURTS, MUNICIPAL COURTS AND THEIR CLERKS OF COURT
SUBJECT: Implementation of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
Effective upon your receipt of the certification by the Minister of Local Government
and Community Development that all the barangays within your respective

jurisdictions have organized their Lupons provided for in Presidential Decree No.
1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, in implementation
of the barangay system of settlement of disputes, you are hereby directed to desist
from receiving complaints, petitions, actions or proceedings in cases falling within
the authority of said Lupons.
Circular No. 12 dated October 20, 1978, issued by the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro is to that extent modified.

February 2005, which reversed and set aside the Judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 36, Bontoc, Mountain Province, and reinstated the Resolution 3 of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Besao-Sagada, Mountain Province dismissing herein
petitioners action for Enforcement of Arbitration Award and Damages.
The instant petition draws its origin from an Action4 for recovery of possession of real
property situated in Sitio Abatan, Barrio Dagdag, Sagada filed by herein petitioner before
the MCTC of Besao-Sagada, Mountain Province on 9 November 1994, against the spouses
Leoncio and Florentina Manacnes, the predecessors-in-interest of herein respondent.

This Circular takes effect immediately.

It is significant that the above-quoted circular embodying the directive "to desist from
receiving complaints, petitions, actions and proceedings in cases falling within the
authority of said Lupons," has been addressed not only to judges of city and municipal
courts, but also to all the judges of the courts of first instance, circuit criminal courts,
juvenile and domestic courts and courts of agrarian relations, now known as regional trial
courts under B.P. No. 129. The said circular was noted by president Ferdinand E. Marcos in
a Letter of Implementation, dated November 12, 1979, the first paragraph of which reads
as follows: "with the view to easing up the log-jam of cases and solving the backlogs in the
case of dockets of all government offices involved in the investigation, trial and
adjudication of cases, it is hereby ordered that immediate implementation be made by all
government officials and offices concerned of the system of amicably settling disputes at
the barangay level as provided for in the Katarungang Pambarangay Law [Presidential
Decree No. 1508]."
Therefore, for the guidance of the bench and the bar, We now declare that the conciliation
process at the barangay level, prescribed by P.D. 1508 as a pre-condition for filing a
complaint in court, is compulsory not only for cases falling under the exclusive competence
of the metropolitan and municipal trial courts, but for actions cognizable by the regional
trial courts as well.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted, and the order of respondent judge denying
petitioners' motion to dismiss is hereby set aside. Respondent judge is restrained from
conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. R-22154, except to dismiss the case. No
costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 167261

March 2, 2007

ROSARIA LUPITAN PANG-ET, Petitioner,

vs.
CATHERINE MANACNES-DAO-AS, Heir of LEONCIO MANACNES and FLORENTINA
MANACNES, Respondent.
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78019, dated 9

On 23 February 1995, during the course of the pre-trial, the parties, through their
respective counsels, agreed to refer the matter to the Barangay Lupon (Lupon) of Dagdag,
Sagada for arbitration in accordance with the provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay
Law.5 Consequently, the proceedings before the MCTC were suspended, and the case was
remanded to the Lupon for resolution.6
Thereafter, the Lupon issued a Certification to File Action on 26 February 1995 due to the
refusal of the Manacnes spouses to enter into an Agreement for Arbitration and their
insistence that the case should go to court. On 8 March 1995, the Certification, as well as
the records of the case, were forwarded to the MCTC.
An Order was issued by the MCTC on 7 April 1995, once more remanding the matter for
conciliation by the Lupon and ordering the Lupon to render an Arbitration Award thereon.
According to the MCTC, based on the records of the case, an Agreement for Arbitration was
executed by the parties concerned; however, the Lupon failed to issue an Arbitration Award
as provided under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, so that, the case must be returned
to the Lupon until an Arbitration Award is rendered.
In compliance with the MCTC Order, the Lupon rendered an Arbitration Award on 10 May
1995 ordering herein petitioner to retrieve the land upon payment to the spouses
Manacnes of the amount of P8,000.00 for the improvements on the land. Aggrieved,
Leoncios widow,7 Florentina Manacnes, repudiated the Arbitration Award but her
repudiation was rejected by the Lupon. Thereafter, the MCTC was furnished with copies of
the Arbitration Award.
On 1 June 1995, herein petitioner filed with the Lupon a Motion for Execution of the
Arbitration Award. On the other hand, Florentina Manacnes filed a Motion with the MCTC for
the resumption of the proceedings in the original case for recovery of possession and
praying that the MCTC consider her repudiation of the Arbitration Award issued by the
Lupon.
Subsequently, the MCTC heard the Motion of Florentina Manacnes notwithstanding the
latters failure to appear before the court despite notice. The MCTC denied Florentina
Manacnes Motion to repudiate the Arbitration Award elucidating that since the movant
failed to take any action within the 10-day reglementary period provided for under the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law, the arbitration award has become final and executory.

Furthermore, upon motion of herein petitioner Pang-et, the MCTC issued an Order
remanding the records of the case to the Lupon for the execution of the Arbitration Award.
On 31 August 1995, the then incumbent Punong Barangay of Dagdag issued a Notice of
Execution of the Award.
Said Notice of Execution was never implemented. Thus, on 16 October 2001, herein
petitioner Pang-et filed with the MCTC an action for enforcement of the Arbitration Award
which was sought to be dismissed by the heir of the Manacnes spouses. 8 The heir of the
Manacnes spouses argues that the Agreement for Arbitration and the Arbitration Award are
void, the Agreement for Arbitration not having been personally signed by the spouses
Manacnes, and the Arbitration Award having been written in English a language not
understood by the parties.
In its Resolution dated 20 August 2002, the MCTC dismissed the Petition for Enforcement of
Arbitration Award in this wise:
x x x Are defendants estopped from questioning the proceedings before the Lupon
Tagapamayapa concerned?
The defendants having put in issue the validity of the proceedings before the lupon
concerned and the products thereof, they are not estopped. It is a hornbook rule that a null
and void act could always be questioned at any time as the action or defense based upon
it is imprescriptible.
The second issue: Is the agreement to Arbitrate null and void? Let us peruse the pertinent
law dealing on this matter which is Section 413 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA
7160), to wit:
"Section 413 (a) The parties may, at any stage of the proceedings, agree in writing that
they shall abide by the arbitration award of the lupon chairman or the pangkat. x x x"
The foregoing should be taken together with Section 415 of the same code which provides:
"Section 415. Appearance of parties in person. In all katarungang pambarangay
proceedings, the parties must appear in person without the assistance of counsel or
representative, except for minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their next-ofkin who are not lawyers."
It is very clear from the foregoing that personal appearance of the parties in conciliation
proceedings before a Lupon Tagapamayapa is mandatory. Likewise, the execution of the
agreement to arbitrate must be done personally by the parties themselves so that they
themselves are mandated to sign the agreement.
Unfortunately, in this case, it was not respondents-spouses [Manacnis] who signed the
agreement to arbitrate as plaintiff herself admitted but another person. Thus, it is very

clear that the mandatory provisos of Section 413 and 415 of RA 7160 are violated.
Granting arguendo that it was Catherine who signed the agreement per instruction of her
parents, will it cure the violation? The answer must still be in the negative. As provided for
by the cited provisos of RA 7160, if ever a party is entitled to an assistance, it shall be done
only when the party concerned is a minor or incompetent. Here, there is no showing that
the spouses [Manacnis] were incompetent. Perhaps very old but not incompetent. Likewise,
what the law provides is assistance, not signing of agreements or settlements.
Just suppose the spouses [Manacnis] executed a special power of attorney in favor of their
daughter Catherine to attend the proceedings and to sign the agreement to arbitrate? The
more that it is proscribed by the Katarungang Pambarangay Law specifically Section 415 of
RA 7160 which mandates the personal appearance of the parties before the lupon and
likewise prohibits the appearance of representatives.
In view of the foregoing, it could now be safely concluded that the questioned agreement
to arbitrate is inefficacious for being violative of the mandatory provisions of RA 7160
particularly sections 413 and 415 thereof as it was not the respondents-spouses
[Manacnis] who signed it.
The third issue: Is the Arbitration Award now sought to be enforced effective? Much to be
desired, the natural flow of events must follow as a consequence. Considering that the
agreement to arbitrate is inefficacious as earlier declared, it follows that the arbitration
award which emanated from it is also inefficacious. Further, the Arbitration Award by itself,
granting arguendo that the agreement to arbitrate is valid, will readily show that it does
not also conform with the mandate of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law particularly
Section 411 thereto which provides:
"Sec. 411. Form of Settlement All amicable settlements shall be in writing in a language
or dialect known to the parties x x x. When the parties to the dispute do not use the same
language or dialect, the settlement shall be written in the language known to them."
Likewise, the implementing rules thereof, particularly Section 13 provides:
"Sec. 13 Form of Settlement and Award. All settlements, whether by mediation,
conciliation or arbitration, shall be in writing, in a language or dialect known to the parties.
x x x"
It is of no dispute that the parties concerned belong to and are natives of the scenic and
serene community of Sagada, Mt. Province who speak the Kankanaey language. Thus, the
Arbitration Award should have been written in the Kankanaey language. However, as
shown by the Arbitration Award, it is written in English language which the parties do not
speak and therefore a further violation of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
IN THE LIGHT of all the foregoing considerations, the above-entitled case is hereby
dismissed.9

Petitioner Pang-ets Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, she filed an Appeal
before the RTC which reversed and set aside the Resolution of the MCTC and remanded the
case to the MCTC for further proceedings. According to the RTC:
As it appears on its face, the Agreement for Arbitration in point found on page 51 of the
expediente, dated Feb. 6, 1995, and attested by the Pangkat Chairman of the Office of the
Barangay Lupon of Dagdag, Sagada was signed by the respondents/defendants spouses
Manacnis. The representative of the Appellee in the instant case assails such Agreement
claiming that the signatures of her aforesaid predecessors-in-interest therein were not
personally affixed by the latter or are falsified-which in effect is an attack on the validity of
the document on the ground that the consent of the defendants spouses Manacnis is
vitiated by fraud. Indulging the Appellee Heirs of Manacnis its contention that such indeed
is the truth of the matter, the fact still remains as borne out by the circumstances, that
neither did said original defendants nor did any of such heirs effectively repudiate the
Agreement in question in accordance with the procedure outlined by the law, within five (5)
days from Feb. 6, 1995, on the ground as above-stated (Secs. 413 (a), 418, RA 7160; Secs.
7, 13, KP Law; Sec. 12, Rule IV, KP Rules). As mandated, such failure is deemed a waiver on
the part of the defendants spouses Manacnis to challenge the Agreement for Arbitration on
the ground that their consent thereto is obtained and vitiated by fraud (Sec. 12, Par. 3, KP
Rules). Corollarily, the Appellee Heirs being privy to the now deceased original defendants
should have not been permitted by the court a quo under the equitable principle of
estoppel, to raise the matter in issue for the first time in the present case (Lopez vs.
Ochoa, 103 Phil. 94).
The Arbitration Award relative to Civil Case 83 (B.C. No. 07) dated May 10, 1995, written in
English, attested by the Punong Barangay of Dagdag and found on page 4 of the record is
likewise assailed by the Appellee as void on the ground that the English language is not
known by the defendants spouses Manacnis who are Igorots. Said Appellee contends that
the document should have been written in Kankana-ey, the dialect known to the party
(Sec. 413 (b), RA 7160; Sec. 7, Par. 2, KP law, Sec. 11, KP Rules). On this score, the court a
quo presumptuously concluded on the basis of the self-serving mere say-so of the
representative of the Appellee that her predecessors did not speak or understand English.
As a matter of judicial notice, American Episcopalian Missionaries had been in Sagada,
Mountain Province as early as 1902 and continuously stayed in the place by turns, comingling with the indigenous people thereat, instructing and educating them, and
converting most to the Christian faith, among other things, until the former left about
twenty years ago. By constant association with the white folks, the natives too old to go to
school somehow learned the Kings English by ear and can effectively speak and
communicate in that language. Any which way, even granting arguendo that the
defendants spouses Manacnis were the exceptions and indeed totally ignorant of English,
no petition to nullify the Arbitration award in issue on such ground as advanced was filed
by the party or any of the Appellee Heirs with the MCTC of Besao-Sagada, within ten (10)
days from May 10, 1995, the date of the document. Thus, upon the expiration thereof, the
Arbitration Award acquired the force and effect of a final judgment of a court (Sec. 416, RA
7160; Sec. 11, KP Law; Sec. 13, KP Rules); conclusive upon the original defendants in Civil
Case 83 (B.C. No. 07) and the Appellee Heirs herein privy to said defendants.

In the light thereof, the collateral attack of the Appellee on the Agreement for Arbitration
and Arbitration Award re Civil Case 83 (B.C. No. 07) should not have in the first place been
given due course by the court a quo. In which case, it would not have in the logical flow of
things declared both documents "inefficacious"; without which pronouncements, said court
would not have dismissed the case at bar.
Wherefore, Judgment is hereby rendered Reversing and Setting Aside the Resolution
appealed from, and ordering the record of the case subject thereof remanded to the court
of origin for further proceedings.10
Aggrieved by the reversal of the RTC, herein respondent filed a petition before the Court of
Appeals seeking to set aside the RTC Judgment. On 9 February 2005, the appellate court
rendered the herein assailed Decision, to wit:
After thoroughly reviewing through the record, We find nothing that would show that the
spouses Manacnes were ever amenable to any compromise with respondent Pang-et. Thus,
We are at a loss as to the basis of the Arbitration Award sought to be enforced by
respondent Pang-ets subsequent action before the MCTC.
There is no dispute that the proceeding in Civil Case No. 83 was suspended and the same
remanded to the Lupon on account of the Agreement to Arbitrate which was allegedly not
signed by the parties but agreed upon by their respective counsels during the pre-trial
conference. In the meeting before the Lupon, it would seem that the agreement to
arbitrate was not signed by the spouses Manacnes. More importantly, when the pangkat
chairman asked the spouses Manacnes to sign or affix their thumbmarks in the agreement,
they refused and insisted that the case should instead go to court. Thus, the Lupon had no
other recourse but to issue a certificate to file action. Unfortunately, the case was again
remanded to the Lupon to "render an arbitration award". This time, the Lupon heard the
voice tape of the late Beket Padonay affirming respondent Pang-ets right to the disputed
property. While Pang-et offered to pay P8,000.00 for the improvements made by the
spouses Manacnes, the latter refused to accept the same and insisted on their right to the
subject property. Despite this, the Lupon on May 10, 1995 issued an Arbitration award
which favored respondent Pang-et.
From the time the case was first referred to the Lupon to the time the same was again
remanded to it, the Spouses Manacnes remained firm in not entering into any compromise
with respondent Pang-et. This was made clear in both the minutes of the Arbitration
Hearing on 26 February 1995 and on 9 April 1995. With the foregoing, We find it evident
that the spouses Manacnes never intended to submit the case for arbitration.
Moreover, the award itself is riddled with flaws. First of all there is no showing that the
Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo was duly constituted in accordance with Rule V of the
Katarungan Pambarangay Rules. And after constituting of the Pangkat, Rule VI, thereof the
Punong Barangay and the Pangkat must proceed to hear the case. However, according to
the minutes of the hearing before the lupon on 9 April 1995, the pangkat Chairman and
another pangkat member were absent for the hearing.

Finally, Section 13 of the same Rule requires that the Punong Barangay or the Pangkat
Chairman should attest that parties freely and voluntarily agreed to the settlement arrived
at. But how can this be possible when the minutes of the two hearings show that the
spouses Manacnes neither freely nor voluntarily agreed to anything.
While RA 7160 and the Katarungan Pambarangay rules provide for a period to repudiate
the Arbitration Award, the same is neither applicable nor necessary since the Agreement to
Arbitrate or the Arbitration Award were never freely nor voluntarily entered into by one of
the parties to the dispute. In short, there is no agreement validly concluded that needs to
be repudiated.
With all the foregoing, estoppel may not be applied against petitioners for an action or
defense against a null and void act does not prescribe. With this, We cannot but agree with
the MCTC that the very agreement to arbitrate is null and void. Similarly, the arbitration
award which was but the off shoot of the agreement is also void.
WHEREFORE, the RTC judgment of 2 June 2003 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, the MCTC
Resolution DISMISSING the Civil Case No. 118 for enforcement of Arbitration Award is
REINSTATED.11
Vehemently disagreeing with the Decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner Pang-et filed
the instant petition. Petitioner maintains that the appellate court overlooked material facts
that resulted in reversible errors in the assailed Decision. According to petitioner, the Court
of Appeals overlooked the fact that the original parties, as represented by their respective
counsels in Civil Case No. 83, mutually agreed to submit the case for arbitration by the
Lupon ng Tagapamayapa of Barangay Dagdag. Petitioner insists that the parties must be
bound by the initial agreement by their counsels during pre-trial to an amicable settlement
as any representation made by the lawyers are deemed made with the conformity of their
clients. Furthermore, petitioner maintains that if indeed the spouses Manacnes did not
want to enter into an amicable settlement, then they should have raised their opposition at
the first instance, which was at the pre-trial on Civil Case No. 83 when the MCTC ordered
that the case be remanded to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa for arbitration.
We do not agree with the petitioner.
First and foremost, in order to resolve the case before us, it is pivotal to stress that, during
the initial hearing before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa, the spouses Manacnes declined to
sign the Agreement for Arbitration and were adamant that the proceedings before the
MCTC in Civil Case No. 83 must continue. As reflected in the Minutes 12 of the Arbitration
Hearing held on 26 February 1995, the legality of the signature of Catherine Manacnes,
daughter of the Manacnes spouses, who signed the Agreement for Arbitration on behalf of
her parents, was assailed on the ground that it should be the spouses Manacnes
themselves who should have signed such agreement. To resolve the issue, the Pangkat
Chairman then asked the spouses Manacnes that if they wanted the arbitration
proceedings to continue, they must signify their intention in the Agreement for Arbitration

form. However, as stated earlier, the Manacnes spouses did not want to sign such
agreement and instead insisted that the case go to court.
Consequently, the Lupon issued a Certification to File Action on 26 February 1995 due to
the refusal of the Manacnes spouses. Indicated in said Certification are the following: 1)
that there was personal confrontation between the parties before the Punong Barangay but
conciliation failed and 2) that the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo was constituted but the
personal confrontation before the Pangkat failed likewise because respondents do not want
to submit this case for arbitration and insist that said case will go to court. 13 Nevertheless,
upon receipt of said certification and the records of the case, the MCTC ordered that the
case be remanded to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa and for the latter to render an
arbitration award, explaining that:
Going over the documents submitted to the court by the office of the Lupon Tagapamayapa
of Dagdag, Sagada, Mountain Province, the court observed that an "Agreement for
Arbitration" was executed by the parties anent the above-entitled case. However, said
Lupon did not make any arbitration award as mandated by the Katarungang Pambarangay
Law but instead made a finding that the case may now be brought to the court. This is
violative of the KP Law, which cannot be sanctioned by the court. 14
At this juncture, it must be stressed that the object of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law
is the amicable settlement of disputes through conciliation proceedings voluntarily and
freely entered into by the parties.15 Through this mechanism, the parties are encouraged to
settle their disputes without enduring the rigors of court litigation. Nonetheless, the
disputing parties are not compelled to settle their controversy during the barangay
proceedings before the Lupon or the Pangkat, as they are free to instead find recourse in
the courts16 in the event that no true compromise is reached.
The key in achieving the objectives of an effective amicable settlement under the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law is the free and voluntary agreement of the parties to
submit the dispute for adjudication either by the Lupon or the Pangkat, whose award or
decision shall be binding upon them with the force and effect of a final judgment of a
court.17 Absent this voluntary submission by the parties to submit their dispute to
arbitration under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, there cannot be a binding
settlement arrived at effectively resolving the case. Hence, we fail to see why the MCTC
further remanded the case to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa and insisted that the arbitration
proceedings continue, despite the clear showing that the spouses Manacnes refused to
submit the controversy for arbitration.
It would seem from the Order of the MCTC, which again remanded the case for arbitration
to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa, that it is compulsory on the part of the parties to submit
the case for arbitration until an arbitration award is rendered by the Lupon. This, to our
minds, is contrary to the very nature of the proceedings under the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law which espouses the principle of voluntary acquiescence of the disputing
parties to amicable settlement.

What is compulsory under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is that there be a

confrontation between the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and that a
certification be issued that no conciliation or settlement has been reached, as attested to
by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, before a case falling within the authority of the Lupon
may be instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication. 18 In other
words, the only necessary pre-condition before any case falling within the authority of the
Lupon or the Pangkat may be filed before a court is that there has been personal
confrontation between the parties but despite earnest efforts to conciliate, there was a
failure to amicably settle the dispute. It should be emphasized that while the spouses
Manacnes appeared before the Lupon during the initial hearing for the conciliation
proceedings, they refused to sign the Agreement for Arbitration form, which would have
signified their consent to submit the case for arbitration. Therefore, upon certification by
the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa that the confrontation before the Pangkat failed because the
spouses Manacnes refused to submit the case for arbitration and insisted that the case
should go to court, the MCTC should have continued with the proceedings in the case for
recovery of possession which it suspended in order to give way for the possible amicable
resolution of the case through arbitration before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa.
Petitioners assertion that the parties must be bound by their respective counsels
agreement to submit the case for arbitration and thereafter enter into an amicable
settlement is imprecise. What was agreed to by the parties respective counsels was the
remand of the case to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa for conciliation proceedings and not
the actual amicable settlement of the case. As stated earlier, the parties may only be
compelled to appear before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa for the necessary confrontation,
but not to enter into any amicable settlement, or in the case at bar, to sign the Agreement
for Arbitration. Thus, when the Manacnes spouses personally appeared during the initial
hearing before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa, they had already complied with the
agreement during the pre-trial to submit the case for conciliation proceedings. Their
presence during said hearing is already their acquiescence to the order of the MCTC
remanding the case to the Lupon for conciliation proceedings, as there has been an actual
confrontation between the parties despite the fact that no amicable settlement was
reached due to the spouses Manacnes refusal to sign the Agreement for Arbitration.
Furthermore, the MCTC should not have persisted in ordering the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa
to render an arbitration award upon the refusal of the spouses Manacnes to submit the
case for arbitration since such arbitration award will not bind the spouses. As reflected in
Section 413 of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, in order that a party may be
bound by an arbitration award, said party must have agreed in writing that they shall abide
by the arbitration award of the Lupon or the Pangkat. Like in any other contract, parties
who have not signed an agreement to arbitrate will not be bound by said agreement since
it is axiomatic that a contract cannot be binding upon and cannot be enforced against one
who is not a party to it.19 In view of the fact that upon verification by the Pangkat
Chairman, in order to settle the issue of whether or not they intend to submit the matter
for arbitration, the spouses Manacnes refused to affix their signature or thumb mark on the
Agreement for Arbitration Form, the Manacnes spouses cannot be bound by the Agreement
for Arbitration and the ensuing arbitration award since they never became privy to any
agreement submitting the case for arbitration by the Pangkat.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78019 is hereby AFFIRMED. The Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Besao-Sagada, Mountain Province, is hereby ORDERED to proceed with the
trial of Civil Case No. 83 for Recovery of Possession of Real Property, and the immediate
resolution of the same with deliberate dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE M. PASCUAL, represented by REYMEL R. SAGARIO, Petitioner,
vs.
MARILOU M. PASCUAL, Respondent.
On challenge via Petition for Review on Certiorari is the February 10, 2003 Order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Isabela, Branch 23 at Roxas dismissing, on motion of herein
respondent Marilou M. Pascual, the complaint filed against her by her brother-herein
petitioner Dante M. Pascual, represented by his attorney-in-fact Reymel R. Sagario
(Sagario), for non-compliance with the conciliation provision-pre condition to filing of
complaint in court under R.A. 7160 (the Local Government Code).
Petitioner, a permanent resident of the United States of America, appointed Sagario as his
attorney-in-fact by a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated April 10, 2002:
1. To file a case for the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-271656 issued in
the name of Marilou M. Pascual as well as the Deed of Sale of Registered Land (Dec. No.
639; Page No. 52; Book No. XXI; Series of 1994) and/or Reconveyance at the appropriate
court;
2. To collect the monthly rentals from the tenant;
3. To enter into amicable settlement with Marilou M. Pascual or any other mode of
payment/and/or dispute resolution;
4. To execute and sign any and all papers, contracts/documents which may be necessary
relative to the above acts.
x x x1
Pursuant to the SPA, Sagario filed on October 14, 2002 before the Isabela RTC at Roxas a
complaint entitled "Dante M. Pascual, plaintiff v. Marilou M. Pascual and Register of Deeds,
Defendants," docketed as Civil Case No. Br. 23-713-02, for Annulment of Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-271657 of Isabela and Deed of Absolute Sale of Registered Land
and/or Reconveyance with Damages.2
To the Complaint the defendant-herein respondent Marilou M. Pascual filed a Motion to
Dismiss3 on two grounds one of which was non-compliance with the requirement under

Section 412 of the Local Government Code,4 she contending that there is no showing that
the dispute was referred to the barangay court before the case was filed in court.
By the assailed Order of February 10, 2003,5 Branch 23 of the Isabela RTC at Roxas granted
respondents Motion to Dismiss in this wise:
. . . RA 7160 repealing P.D. 1508 otherwise known as the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay provides under Section 409 "All disputes involving real property or any
interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or the larger
portion thereof is situated." Hence, the reliance of the plaintiff on Section 408 of R.A. 7160
is incorrect. When real property or any interest therein is involved, the dispute shall be filed
before the barangay where the property is located, regardless of the residence of the
parties. Besides, it is incorrect to say that the parties are not residents of the same place,
Vira, Roxas, Isabela. The Attorney-in-fact of the plaintiff in the person of Reymel R.
Sagario is a resident of Vira, Roxas, Isabela, and he substitute (sic) Dante
Pascual by virtue of said Special Power of Attorney. Hence, said Attorney-in-fact
should have brought the dispute before barangay Vira, Roxas, Isabela, where the property
is located. In the case of Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 127 SCRA 470,
"Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could
affect the sufficiency of the plaintiffs cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to
dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity."6 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration7 of the above-said order was denied by Order of
March 24, 2003:8
xxx
Consequently, the Court is [of] the opinion that the said Attorney-in-fact shall be
deemed to be the real party in interest, reading from the tenor of the provisions of the
Special Power of Attorney. Being a real party in interest, the Attorney-in-fact is therefore
obliged to bring this case first before the Barangay Court. Sec. 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court provides that "Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a
representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included
in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest.
xxx
Being the real party in interest, the Attorney-in-fact may therefore bring the necessary
complaint before the Lupon Tagapayapa and appear in person as if he is the owner of
the land.9 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner argues that since he, not his attorney-in-fact Sagario, is the real party in interest,
and since he actually resides abroad, the lupon would have no jurisdiction to pass upon the
dispute involving real property, he citing Agbayani v. Belen.10
Respondent submits, on the other hand, that Section 408, paragraph (f), of the Local
Government Code, is qualified by paragraph (c) of Section 409 of the same Code the latter
of which provides that "[a]ll disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be
brought in the barangay where the real property is located," hence, the use of the word
"shall" makes it mandatory for the bringing of the dispute before the lupon.
That attorney-in-fact Sagario is a resident of the same barangay as that of hers,
respondent argues in any event, brings the matter under the jurisdiction of the lupon, for
Sagario, following Section 3 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:
Sec. 3. Representative as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or
defended by a representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary
shall be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in
interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express trust, a guardian, an executor or
administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own
name for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the
principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal,
being a substitute, becomes the real party-in-interest.
Respondents submissions do not lie.
The pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code read:
SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. The lupon of each
barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same
city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:
(a) Where one party is the government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;
(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the
performance of his official functions;
(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding Five
Thousand pesos (P5,000.00);
(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;

Hence, the present petition questioning "the palpable legal errors" of the RTC.

(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities
unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an
appropriate lupon;
(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto
agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon; and
(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of
justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon under
this Code are filed may, at any time before trial, motu proprio refer the case to the lupon
concerned for amicable settlement. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 409. Venue. (a) Disputes between persons actually residing in the same barangay
shall be brought for amicable settlement before the lupon of said barangay .
(b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or
municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the
respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant.
(c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the
barangay where the real property or the larger portion thereof is situated.
(d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the
institution where such parties are enrolled for study shall be brought in the barangay
where such workplace or institution is located.
Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation proceedings before the punong
barangay; otherwise, the same shall be deemed waived. Any legal question which may
confront the punong barangay in resolving objections to venue herein referred to may be
submitted to the Secretary of Justice or his duly designated representative whose ruling
thereon shall be binding. (Emphasis supplied)
In the 1982 case of Tavora v. Veloso,11 this Court held that where the parties are not actual
residents in the same city or municipality or adjoining barangays, there is no requirement
for them to submit their dispute to the lupon as provided for in Section 6 vis a vis Sections
2 and 3 of P.D. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law).
[B]y express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall have no jurisdiction over
disputes where the parties are not actual residents of the same city or municipality, except
where the barangays in which they actually reside adjoin each other. (Underscoring
supplied)

In the 2000 case of Vercide v. Hernandez,12 this Court, noting that the Tavora ruling,
reiterated in other cases including the 1996 case of Agbayani13 cited by petitioner, was
decided under the provisions of P.D. No. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay) Law which
were, except for some modifications, echoed in Sections 408-409 of the Local Government
Code which took effect on January 1, 1992, held that the Tavora ruling remained.
To construe the express statutory requirement of actual residency as applicable to the
attorney-in-fact of the party-plaintiff, as contended by respondent, would abrogate the
meaning of a "real party in interest" as defined in Section 2 of Rule 3 14 of the 1997 Rules of
Court vis a vis Section 3 of the same Rule which was earlier quoted but misread and
misunderstood by respondent.
In fine, since the plaintiff-herein petitioner, the real party in interest, is not an actual
resident of the barangay where the defendant-herein respondent resides, the local lupon
has no jurisdiction over their dispute, hence, prior referral to it for conciliation is not a precondition to its filing in court.
The RTC thus erred in dismissing petitioners complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The assailed February 10, 2003 Order, as well as the
March 24, 2003 Order denying reconsideration of the first, of Branch 23 of the Regional
Trial Court of Isabela at Roxas is SET ASIDE. Said court is accordingly directed to reinstate
Civil Case No. 23-713-02 to its docket and take appropriate action thereon with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
ATTY. EVELYN J. MAGNO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA, Respondent.
In her sworn complaint, as endorsed by the President of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), Nueva Ecija Chapter, Atty. Evelyn J. Magno charged Atty. Olivia VelascoJacoba, a member of the same IBP provincial chapter, with willful violation of (a) Section
415 of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 and (b) Canon 4 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
This disciplinary case arose out of a disagreement that complainant had with her uncle,
Lorenzo Inos, over a landscaping contract they had entered into. In a bid to have the standoff between them settled, complainant addressed a letter, styled "Sumbong",1 to Bonifacio
Alcantara, barangay captain of Brgy. San Pascual, Talavera, Nueva Ecija. At the barangay
conciliation/confrontation proceedings conducted on January 5, 2003, respondent, on the
strength of a Special Power of Attorney signed by Lorenzo Inos, appeared for the latter,
accompanied by his son, Lorenzito. Complainants objection to respondents appearance
elicited the response that Lorenzo Inos is entitled to be represented by a lawyer inasmuch
as complainant is herself a lawyer. And as to complainants retort that her being a lawyer is
merely coincidental, respondent countered that she is appearing as an attorney-in-fact, not
as counsel, of Lorenzo Inos.

Complainant enumerated specific instances, with supporting documentation, tending to

prove that respondent had, in the course of the conciliation proceedings before the Punong
Barangay, acted as Inos Lorenzos counsel instead of as his attorney-in-fact. This is what
complainant said in her complaint: 2
5. xxx Atty. Olivia Jacoba asked for an ocular inspection of the subject matter of the
complaint. A heated argument took place because Lorencito Inos said that [complainants
brother] Melencio Magno, Jr. made alterations in the lagoon . Afterwards Atty. Olivia
Jacoba . . . returned to the barangay hall to have the incident recorded in the barangay
blotter.... attached as Annex "A"

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with
modification, and considering respondent's actuations was in violation of Section 415
which expressly prohibits the presence and representation by lawyers in the Katarungan
Pambarangay, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba is hereby ADMONISHED.
This resolution is now before us for confirmation.
Section 415 of the LGC of 19917, on the subject Katarungang Pambarangay, provides:

6. That on January 12, 2003, Lorenzo Inos appeared before the hearing also with the
assistance of [respondent]. When the minutes of the proceeding (sic) was read,
[respondent] averred that the minutes is partial in favor of the complainant because only
her statements were recorded for which reason, marginal insertions were made to include
what [respondent] wanted to be put on record. She also signed as "saksi" in the minutes
.
7. xxx In a letter (answer to the "sumbong") sent to the Punong Barangay dated December
22, 2002, she signed representing herself as "Family Legal Counsel of Inos Family", a copy
of the letter is attached as Annex "C" . . . . (Words in bracket added.)
In an Order dated February 17, 2003, Atty. Victor C. Fernandez, IBP Director for Bar
Discipline, directed the respondent to submit, within fifteen (15) days from notice, her
answer to the complaint, otherwise she will be considered as in default. 3
The case, docketed as CBD No. 03-1061, was assigned to Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Maala, who admitted respondents answer notwithstanding her earlier order of
July 15, 2003, declaring respondent in default for failure to file an answer in due time. 4
In her Answer, respondent alleged that the administrative complaint was filed with the
Office of the Punong Barangay, instead of before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, and heard by
Punong Barangay Bonifacio Alcantara alone, instead of the collegial Lupon or a conciliation
panel known as pangkat. Prescinding from this premise, respondent submits that the
prohibition against a lawyer appearing to assist a client in katarungan pambarangay
proceedings does not apply. Further, she argued that her appearance was not as a lawyer,
but only as an attorney-in-fact.
In her report dated October 6, 2003, Commissioner Maala stated that the "charge of
complainant has been established by clear preponderance of evidence" and, on that basis,
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of her profession for a
period of six (6) months. On the other hand, the Board of Governors, IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline, while agreeing with the inculpatory finding of the investigating
commissioner, recommended in its Resolution No. XVI-2003-235, 6 a lighter penalty, to wit:
5

Section 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. - In all katarungang pambarangay

proceedings, the parties must appear in person without the assistance of the counsel or
representative, except for minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their next of
kin who are not lawyers.
The above-quoted provision clearly requires the personal appearance of the parties in
katarungan pambarangay conciliation proceedings, unassisted by counsel or
representative. The rationale behind the personal appearance requirement is to enable the
lupon to secure first hand and direct information about the facts and issues, 8 the exception
being in cases where minors or incompetents are parties. There can be no quibbling that
laymen of goodwill can easily agree to conciliate and settle their disputes between
themselves without what sometimes is the unsettling assistance of lawyers whose
presence could sometimes obfuscate and confuse issues. 9 Worse still, the participation of
lawyers with their penchant to use their analytical skills and legal knowledge tend to
prolong instead of expedite settlement of the case.
The prohibition against the presence of a lawyer in a barangay conciliation proceedings
was not, to be sure, lost on respondent. Her defense that the aforequoted Section 415 of
the LGC does not apply since complainant addressed her Sumbong to the barangay
captain of Brgy. San Pascual who thereafter proceeded to hear the same is specious at
best. In this regard, suffice it to state that complainant wrote her Sumbong with the end in
view of availing herself of the benefits of barangay justice. That she addressed her
Sumbong to the barangay captain is really of little moment since the latter chairs the
Lupong Tagapamayapa.10
Lest it be overlooked, the prohibition in question applies to all katarungan barangay
proceedings. Section 412(a)11 the LGC of 1991 clearly provides that, as a precondition to
filing a complaint in court, the parties shall go through the conciliation process either
before the lupon chairman or the lupon or pangkat. As what happened in this case, the
punong barangay, as chairman of the Lupon Tagapamayapa, conducted the conciliation
proceedings to resolve the disputes between the two parties.
Given the above perspective, we join the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline in its
determination that respondent transgressed the prohibition prescribed in Section 415 of

the LGC. However, its recommended penalty of mere admonition must have to be
modified. Doubtless, respondents conduct tended to undermine the laudable purpose of
the katarungan pambarangay system. What compounded matters was when respondent
repeatedly ignored complainants protestation against her continued appearance in the
barangay conciliation proceedings.

Unable to secure a reconsideration of said order, petitioner came to this Court through this
petition for certiorari. In both his comment and memorandum, private respondent admitted
not having availed himself of the barangay conciliation process, but justified such omission
by citing paragraph 4, section 6 of PD 1508 which allows the direct filing of an action in
court where the same may otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations, as applying
to the case at bar.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba is hereby FINED in the amount of Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) for willful violation of Section 415 of the Local Government Code of 1991
with WARNING that commission of similar acts of impropriety on her part in the future will
be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.

The excuse advanced by private respondent is unsatisfactory. Under Article 1147 of the
Civil Code, the period for filing actions for forcible entry and detainer is one year, 1 and this
period is counted from demand to vacate the premises. 2

VDA. DE BORROMEO vs POGOY

Petitioner herein seeks to stop respondent Judge Julian B. Pogoy of the Municipal Trial Court
of Cebu City from taking cognizance of an ejectment suit for failure of the plaintiff to refer
the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation.
The intestate estate of the late Vito Borromeo is the owner of a building bearing the
deceaseds name, located at F. Ramos St., Cebu City. Said building has been leased and
occupied by petitioner Petra Vda. de Borromeo at a monthly rental of P500.00 payable in
advance within the first five days of the month.
On August 28, 1982, private respondent Atty. Ricardo Reyes, administrator of the estate
and a resident of Cebu City, served upon petitioner a letter demanding that she pay the
overdue rentals corresponding to the period from March to September 1982, and thereafter
to vacate the premises. As petitioner failed to do so, Atty. Reyes instituted on September
16, 1982 an ejectment case against the former in the Municipal Trial Court of Cebu City.
The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. R-23915 and assigned to the sala of
respondent judge.
On November 12, 1982, petitioner moved to dismiss the case, advancing, among others,
the want of jurisdiction of the trial court. Pointing out that the parties are residents of the
same city, as alleged in the complaint, petitioner contended that the court could not
exercise jurisdiction over the case for failure of respondent Atty. Reyes to refer the dispute
to the Barangay Court, as required by PD No. 1508, otherwise known as Katarungang
Pambarangay Law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss. He justified the order in this
wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Clerk of Court when this case was filed accepted for filing same. That from the
acceptance from (sic) filing, with the plaintiff having paid the docket fee to show that the
case was docketed in the civil division of this court could be considered as meeting the
requirement or precondition for were it not so, the Clerk of Court would not have accepted
the filing of the case especially that there is a standing circular from the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court without even mentioning the Letter of Instruction of the President of the
Philippines that civil cases and criminal cases with certain exceptions must not be filed
without passing the barangay court." (Order dated December 14, 1982, Annex "c", P. 13,
Rollo).

In the case at bar, the letter-demand was dated August 28, 1982, while the complaint for
ejectment was filed in court on September 16, 1982. Between these two dates, less than a
month had elapsed, thereby leaving at least eleven (11) full months of the prescriptive
period provided for in Article 1147 of the Civil Code. Under the procedure outlined in
Section 4 of PD 1508, 3 the time needed for the conciliation proceeding before the
Barangay Chairman and the Pangkat should take no more than 60 days. Giving private
respondent nine (9) months ample time indeed within which to bring his case before
the proper court should conciliation efforts fail. Thus, it cannot be truthfully asserted, as
private respondent would want Us to believe, that his case would be barred by the Statute
of Limitations if he had to course his action to the Barangay Lupon.
With certain exceptions, PD 1508 makes the conciliation process at the Barangay level a
condition precedent for filing of actions in those instances where said law applies. For this
reason, Circular No. 22 addressed to "ALL JUDGES OF THE COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE,
CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURTS, JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURT, COURTS OF
AGRARIAN RELATIONS, CITY COURTS, MUNICIPAL COURTS AND THEIR CLERKS OF COURT"
was issued by Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando on November 9, 1979. Said Circular
reads:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
"Effective upon your receipt of the certification by the Minister of Local Government and
Community Development that all the barangays within your respective jurisdictions have
organized their Lupons provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as
the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, in implementation of the barangay system of
settlement of disputes, you are hereby directed to desist from receiving complaints,
petitions, actions or proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said Lupons."cralaw
virtua1aw library
While respondent acknowledged said Circular in his order of December 14, 1982, he
nevertheless chose to overlook the failure of the complaint in Civil Case No. R-23915 to
allege compliance with the requirement of PD 1508. Neither did he cite any circumstance
as would place the suit outside the operation of said law. Instead, he insisted on relying
upon the pro tanto presumption of regularity in the performance by the clerk of court of his
official duty, which to Our mind has been sufficiently overcome by the disclosure by the
Clerk of Court that there was no certification to file action from the Lupon or Pangkat
secretary attached to the complaint. 4
Be that as it may, the instant petition should be dismissed. Under Section 4(a) of PD No.
1508, referral of a dispute to the Barangay Lupon is required only where the parties thereto
are "individuals." An "individual" means "a single human being as contrasted with a social
group or institution." 5 Obviously, the law applies only to cases involving natural persons,

and not where any of the parties is a juridical person such as a corporation, partnership,
corporation sole, testate or intestate, estate, etc.
In Civil Case No. R-23915, plaintiff Ricardo Reyes is a mere nominal party who is suing in
behalf of the Intestate Estate of Vito Borromeo. While it is true that Section 3, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court allows the administrator of an estate to sue or be sued without joining the
party for whose benefit the action is presented or defended, it is indisputable that the real
party in interest in Civil Case No. R-23915 is the intestate estate under administration.
Since the said estate is a juridical person 6 plaintiff administrator may file the complaint
directly in court, without the same being coursed to the Barangay Lupon for arbitration.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed. Respondent judge is ordered to try and
decide Civil Case No. R-23915 without unnecessary delay. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

ABRAHAM GEGARE, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, (Former Special

Twelfth Division), HON. PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BR. 217, QUEZON CITY, and SPS.
MELENCIO and SOTERA C. LAVARES, respondents.
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assails the following resolutions issued by
respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV UDK No. 9819, to wit:
1)
Resolution dated July 17, 1997 which declared that petitioners appeal may be
declared abandoned and dismissed for his failure to pay the required docket fee, pursuant
to Section 1(d), Rule 50, of the Rules of Court; i[1]
2)Resolution dated September 24, 1997, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration
with motion for extension of time to file brief;ii[2]
3)Resolution dated October 16, 1997 which noted petitioners motion for clarification and/or
final disposition of his appeal;iii[3]
4)Entry of Judgment dated November 6, 1997 declaring the Resolution of July 17, 1997
final and executory.iv[4]

After trial, judgment was rendered by the regional trial court in private respondents favor
ordering petitioner to turn over the possession of the leased premises and to pay
reasonable compensation for the use thereof as well as attorneys fees. vi[6]
Dissatisfied with the decision, petitioner filed a notice of appeal on October 3, 1996, vii[7]
stating that he was appealing to the Court of Appeals.
On April 25, 1997, petitioners counsel received a notice from the Clerk of Court of the
Court of Appeals informing him that docketing fees for petitioners appeal must be paid
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice, with a warning that failure to do so will
be deemed as abandonment of the appeal and result in its dismissal. viii[8] Petitioner failed
to pay the docket fees within the reglementary period and as a consequence, private
respondents moved for the dismissal of petitioners appeal for failure to pay docket fees. ix
[9] On July 17, 1997, respondent Court of Appeals issued the first of the assailed
resolutions, as follows:
Considering the report of the Judicial Records Division, the appeal may be
declared abandoned and dismissed for appellants failure to pay the required
docket fee, pursuant to Section 1(d), Rule 50, of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners counsel moved for reconsideration on the ground of excusable negligence in
failing to pay the docket fees. Allegedly, the lawyer originally handling the case resigned
from the law firm and inadvertently failed to turn over the records of the case and to
inform the remaining lawyer about the pendency of petitioners appeal as well as the need
to pay the docket fees. Additionally, counsel prayed for an extension of time to file
appellants brief. Petitioners counsel paid the corresponding docket fees and thereafter filed
the appellants brief on September 8, 1997.
On September 24, 1997, respondent Court of Appeals issued another resolution denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration with accompanying motion for extension to file his
brief.
On October 16, 1997, petitioners counsel filed a motion seeking clarification and/or final
disposition of the appeal but respondent Court of Appeals merely noted the same as it was
in the nature of a second motion for reconsideration, which is a prohibited pleading. x[10]

The antecedents to this suit are as follows:

On November 6, 1997, the Resolution dated July 17, 1997 became final and executory and
entry of judgment was accordingly made on December 16, 1997. xi[11] Hence, the instant
petition.

In November, 1990, plaintiffs (now private respondents) Melencio and Sotera C. Lavares
filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against petitioner before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.v[5] They alleged that petitioner failed to comply with
the terms and conditions of his lease contract by refusing to pay the monthly rentals on
private respondents property. Demands to vacate the premises were unheeded by
petitioner, prompting private respondents to file the suit.

It is petitioners contention now that respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in dismissing his appeal for
failing to pay docket fees and thus gave premium to the technical requirements, rather
than resolving the case on substantial merits.
Petitioner also maintains that Entry of Judgment could not have been made by the Court of
Appeals in the absence of any categorical declaration that his appeal has indeed been
abandoned and dismissed. The contention is anchored on the apparent permissive tenor of

respondent Court of Appeals resolution dated July 17, 1997 which declared that x x x, the
appeal may be declared abandoned and dismissed for appellants failure to pay the
required docket fee x x x. [Italics supplied.]
After careful consideration of the petition, the comments of private respondents, and the
manifestation in lieu of reply by petitioner, we find the foregoing contentions of petitioner
bereft of merit. On the contrary, respondent Court of Appeals was very explicit when it
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration with motion for extension to file brief, in its
Resolution dated September 24, 1997, in this wise:
Considering the explanations submitted in appellants motion for reconsideration
with motion for extension of time to file his brief, and appellees Opposition
thereto, appellants motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED. xii[12]
No other conclusion could be deduced from the aforecited pronouncement, in our view,
except that petitioners prayer to be allowed to pay the docket fees, file his brief, and
proceed with his appeal was being denied by respondent appellate court, categorically. The
appeal had obviously been dismissed already as of July 17, 1997 and this dismissal was
confirmed by the September 24, 1997 resolution. Thus, respondent court merely noted
petitioners subsequent motion for clarification and/or final disposition of his appeal
considering that the same is a prohibited pleading under Sec. 3, Rule 9 of the Revised
Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals. No doubt respondent Court of Appeals acted
justifiably in merely noting said motion.

xxx

xxx

xxx

(c) Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as provided in
Section 5 of Rule 40 and Section 4 of Rule 41;
xxx

xxx

x x x.

As previously discussed, we took notice of the fact that petitioner's appeal with respondent
court was considered abandoned and dismissed per Resolution dated July 17, 1997, and
the subsequent move to reconsider denied on September 24, 1997. These resolution have
become final and executory on November 6, 1997 and Entry of Judgment was made on
December 16, 1997. Thus, filing a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court cannot be used as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal, the exception
of which is not applicable in this particular case. xiv[14]
Given the circumstances in this case, and considering precedents as well as prevailing
rules, we find petitioners claim that respondent appellate court gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the assailed resolutions, could not prosper. The resultant dismissal of
his appeal is well justified.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
EDWIN N. TRIBIANA, petitioner, vs. LOURDES M. TRIBIANA, respondent.

Also without merit, in our view, is petitioners plea for a liberal treatment by the said court,
rather than a strict adherence to the technical rules, in order to promote substantial
justice. For it has consistently been held that payment in full of docket fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory. As this Court has firmly declared in Rodillas vs.
Commission on Elections,xiii[13] such payment is an essential requirement before the court
could acquire jurisdiction over a case:
The payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the
perfection of an appeal (Dorego v. Perez, 22 SCRA 8 [1968]; Bello v. Fernandez, 4
SCRA 135 [1962]). In both original and appellate cases, the court acquires
jurisdiction over the case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees
as held in Acda v. Minister of Labor, 119 SCRA 306 (1982). The requirement of an
appeal fee is by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an
essential requirement without which the decision appealed from would become
final and executory as if no appeal was filed at all. The right to appeal is merely a
statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and
in accordance with, the provision of the law.
Thus, Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:
Section 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.An appeal may be dismissed by the
Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following
grounds.

The Case
This petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals Resolutions[2]
dated 2 July 1998 and 18 January 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48049. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the Order[3] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite (RTC), denying
petitioner Edwin N. Tribianas (Edwin) motion to dismiss the petition for habeas corpus filed
against him by respondent Lourdes Tribiana (Lourdes).
Antecedent Facts
Edwin and Lourdes are husband and wife who have lived together since 1996 but
formalized their union only on 28 October 1997. On 30 April 1998, Lourdes filed a petition
for habeas corpus before the RTC claiming that Edwin left their conjugal home with their
daughter, Khriza Mae Tribiana (Khriza). Edwin has since deprived Lourdes of lawful custody
of Khriza who was then only one (1) year and four (4) months of age. Later, it turned out
that Khriza was being held by Edwins mother, Rosalina Tribiana (Rosalina). Edwin moved to
dismiss Lourdes petition on the ground that the petition failed to allege that earnest efforts
at a compromise were made before its filing as required by Article 151 of the Family Code.
On 20 May 1998, Lourdes filed her opposition to Edwins motion to dismiss claiming that
there were prior efforts at a compromise, which failed. Lourdes attached to her opposition
a copy of the Certification to File Action from their Barangay dated 1 May 1998.

On 18 May 1998, the RTC denied Edwins motion to dismiss and reiterated a previous order
requiring Edwin and his mother, Rosalina to bring Khriza before the RTC. Upon denial of his
motion for reconsideration, Edwin filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition
and certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The appellate court denied
Edwins petition on 2 July 1998. The appellate court also denied Edwins motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.

Edwins arguments do not persuade us.

It is true that the petition for habeas corpus filed by Lourdes failed to allege that she
resorted to compromise proceedings before filing the petition. However, in her opposition
to Edwins motion to dismiss, Lourdes attached a Barangay Certification to File Action dated
1 May 1998. Edwin does not dispute the authenticity of the Barangay Certification and its
contents. This effectively established that the parties tried to compromise but were
unsuccessful in their efforts. However, Edwin would have the petition dismissed despite the
existence of the Barangay Certification, which he does not even dispute.

The Rulings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals

The RTC denied Edwins motion to dismiss on the ground that the Certification to File Action
attached by Lourdes to her opposition clearly indicates that the parties attempted to reach
a compromise but failed.
The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the RTC and added that under Section 412 (b) (2)
of the Local Government Code, conciliation proceedings before the barangay are not
required in petitions for habeas corpus.
The Issue
Edwin seeks a reversal and raises the following issue for resolution:
WHETHER THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED THE
PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS ON THE GROUND OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
THE CONDITION PRECEDENT UNDER ARTICLE 151 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
Edwin argues that Lourdes failure to indicate in her petition for habeas corpus that the
parties exerted prior efforts to reach a compromise and that such efforts failed is a ground
for the petitions dismissal under Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[4] Edwin maintains that under Article 151 of the Family Code, an earnest effort to reach a
compromise is an indispensable condition precedent. Article 151 provides:
No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from
the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made,
the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under the
Civil Code.

Evidently, Lourdes has complied with the condition precedent under Article 151 of the
Family Code. A dismissal under Section 1(j) of Rule 16 is warranted only if there is a failure
to comply with a condition precedent. Given that the alleged defect is a mere failure to
allege compliance with a condition precedent, the proper solution is not an outright
dismissal of the action, but an amendment under Section 1 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.[5] It would have been a different matter if Edwin had asserted that no
efforts to arrive at a compromise have been made at all.
In addition, the failure of a party to comply with a condition precedent is not a jurisdictional
defect.[6] Such defect does not place the controversy beyond the courts power to resolve.
If a party fails to raise such defect in a motion to dismiss, such defect is deemed waived.[7]
Such defect is curable by amendment as a matter of right without leave of court, if made
before the filing of a responsive pleading.[8] A motion to dismiss is not a responsive
pleading.[9] More importantly, an amendment alleging compliance with a condition
precedent is not a jurisdictional matter. Neither does it alter the cause of action of a
petition for habeas corpus. We have held that in cases where the defect consists of the
failure to state compliance with a condition precedent, the trial court should order the
amendment of the complaint.[10] Courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to
pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits and to present the real controversies between the
parties.[11]
Moreover, in a habeas corpus proceeding involving the welfare and custody of a child of
tender age, the paramount concern is to resolve immediately the issue of who has legal
custody of the child. Technicalities should not stand in the way of giving such child of
tender age full protection.[12] This rule has sound statutory basis in Article 213 of the
Family Code, which states, No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. In this case, the child
(Khriza) was only one year and four months when taken away from the mother.
The Court of Appeals dismissed Edwins contentions by citing as an additional ground the
exception in Section 412 (b) (2) of the Local Government Code (LGC) on barangay
conciliation, which states:
(b) Where the parties may go directly to court. the parties may go directly to court in the
following instances:

xxx

BERBA vs PABLO
2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for
habeas corpus proceedings;

xxx.
Under Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may resort to a habeas corpus
proceeding in two instances. The first is when any person is deprived of liberty either
through illegal confinement or through detention. The second instance is when custody of
any person is withheld from the person entitled to such custody. The most common case
falling under the second instance involves children who are taken away from a parent by
another parent or by a relative. The case filed by Lourdes falls under this category.
The barangay conciliation requirement in Section 412 of the LGC does not apply to habeas
corpus proceedings where a person is deprived of personal liberty. In such a case, Section
412 expressly authorizes the parties to go directly to court without need of any conciliation
proceedings. There is deprivation of personal liberty warranting a petition for habeas
corpus where the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto.[13] Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err when it dismissed Edwins contentions
on the additional ground that Section 412 exempts petitions for habeas corpus from the
barangay conciliation requirement.
The petition for certiorari filed by Edwin questioning the RTCs denial of his motion to
dismiss merely states a blanket allegation of grave abuse of discretion. An order denying a
motion to dismiss is interlocutory and is not a proper subject of a petition for certiorari.[14]
Even in the face of an error of judgment on the part of a judge denying the motion to
dismiss, certiorari will not lie. Certiorari is not a remedy to correct errors of procedure.[15]
The proper remedy against an order denying a motion to dismiss is to file an answer and
interpose as affirmative defenses the objections raised in the motion to dismiss. It is only in
the presence of extraordinary circumstances evincing a patent disregard of justice and fair
play where resort to a petition for certiorari is proper.[16]
The litigation of substantive issues must not rest on a prolonged contest on technicalities.
This is precisely what has happened in this case. The circumstances are devoid of any hint
of the slightest abuse of discretion by the RTC or the Court of Appeals. A party must not be
allowed to delay litigation by the sheer expediency of filing a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 based on scant allegations of grave abuse. More importantly, any matter involving
the custody of a child of tender age deserves immediate resolution to protect the childs
welfare.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the instant petition for lack of merit. We AFFIRM the Resolutions
of the Court of Appeals dated 2 July 1998 and 18 January 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48049.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite is ordered to act with dispatch in
resolving the petition for habeas corpus pending before it. This decision is IMMEDIATELY
EXECUTORY. SO ORDERED.

Assailed before the Court on a petition for review on certiorari is the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 73531, affirming the Decision[2] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in Civil Case No. 170639.
Estela L. Berba, a resident of 978 Maligaya Street, Malate, Manila, was the owner of a
parcel of land located at No. 2338 M. Roxas Street, Sta. Ana, Manila covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 63726. A house was constructed on the lot, which she leased
to Josephine Pablo* and the Heirs of Carlos Palanca sometime in 1976. The lease was
covered by a lease contract. Upon its expiration, the lessees continued leasing the house
on a month-to-month basis.
By 1999, the monthly rental on the property was P3,450.00. The lessees failed to pay the
rentals due, and by May 1999, their arrears amounted to P81,818.00. Berba then filed a
complaint for eviction and collection of unpaid rentals only against Pablo in the Office of
the Punong Barangay. On June 5, 1999, Berba and Pablo executed an Agreement approved
by the pangkat, as follows:
Ako si Josephine Pablo, naninirahan sa 2338 M. Roxas St., Sta. Ana, Manila, na
nasasakop ng Barangay 873, Zone 96, ay nangangako kay GG Robert Berba na
nagmamay-ari ng aking tinitirahan ay maghuhulog ng halagang Tatlong Libong
Piso P3,000.00 kada ika-sampu ng buwan bilang hulog sa aking pagkakautang kay
GG Berba na umaabot sa halagang P81,818.00 na ang nasabing halagang ito ay
aking huhulugan hanggang aking mabayaran ng buo ang aking pagkakautang. Ako
rin, si Josephine Pablo, ay nangangako na ang hindi ko pagsunod o pagbayad ng
buwanang hulog, ako ay kusang aalis sa aking tinitirahan. Bukod pa sa hulog sa
aking pagkakautang, ako rin ay magbabayad ng halagang P3,450.00 bilang aking
upa sa aking tinitirahan.[3]
By May 2000, Pablo and the lessees still had a balance of P71,716.00. As of May 1, 2001,
the total arrearages of the lessees amounted to P135,115.63.[4] On May 2, 2001, Berba,
through counsel, wrote the lessees, demanding payment of the said amount and to vacate
the house within 30 days from notice, otherwise she will sue them.[5] The lessees ignored
the demand. On June 21, 2001, Berba filed a complaint[6] against Josephine Pablo and the
Heirs of Carlos Palanca in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Manila for unlawful detainer.
She prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in her favor:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed for that judgment be rendered
in favor of plaintiff ordering defendant (sic)
a) to vacate the premises situated at 2338 M. Roxas Street, Sta.
Ana, City of Manila;
b) to pay plaintiff the sum of One Hundred Thirty-Five Thousand
One Hundred Fifteen and 63/100 Pesos (P135,115.63) representing
monthly rentals in arrears to the present;
c) to pay plaintiff the amount of Four Thousand Five Hundred SixtyTwo and 63/100 Pesos (P4,562.63) per month representing monthly

rent on the premises for the year 2001 until finality of the
judgment;
d) to pay plaintiff the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00)
by way of attorneys fees;
e) to reimburse plaintiff all expenses for litigation estimated in the
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos;
f) to pay costs of suit.
Other reliefs just and equitable are, likewise, prayed for under the
premises.[7]
Berba, however, failed to append to her complaint a certification from the Lupon
ng Tagapamayapa that no conciliation or settlement had been reached.
In their answer to the complaint, the defendants admitted to have stopped paying rentals
because of financial distress. They also alleged that they were not certain if the plaintiff
was the owner of the property. By way of special and affirmative defenses, they averred
that the plaintiff had no cause of action against them as she failed to secure a Certificate
to File Action from the Lupon.[8]

reduced amount of P10,000.00 as attorneys fees plus the costs of suit. SO

ORDERED.[12]
The defendants appealed the decision to the RTC. On motion of the plaintiff, the RTC issued
an order for the execution of the decision pending appeal.[13] The defendants filed a
motion for the recall of the Order,[14] but before the court could resolve the motion, the
Sheriff turned over the physical possession of the property to Berba on May 20, 2002.[15]
In their Appeal Memorandum, Pablo and the heirs of Palanca insisted that Berbas action in
the MTC was premature because of the absence of Certificate to File Action issued by the
Lupon. They also claimed that Berba unlawfully increased the rentals for the house.[16]
Berba, on the other hand, averred that there was no need of a prior referral to the Lupon
before filing her complaint. The petitioner cited Section 408(f) of the Local Government
Code, pointing out that she resided in a Barangay in Malate, 8 kilometers away from
Barangay 873 in Sta. Ana, where Pablo and the Palanca heirs resided.[17]
On August 20, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting the appeal and setting aside the
appealed decision. The fallo of the decision reads:

During the pre-trial conference, the parties manifested to the court that, despite earnest
efforts, no amicable settlement was reached. They defined the main issue as whether or
not the plaintiff had a valid cause of action for unlawful detainer against the defendants.[9]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court a quo is ordered set aside. The complaint is
also ordered DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Writ of Execution issued by the
Court a quo pending appeal is also set aside. SO ORDERED.[18]

In her position paper, Berba appended an Agreement dated June 5, 1999 between her and
Pablo, which appeared to have been approved by Punong Barangay Cayetano L. Gonzales
of Barangay 873, as well as other members of the Lupon,[10] duly approved by the
Pangkat. She also appended a Statement of Account indicating that the defendants back
rentals amounted to P135,115.63.[11]

The RTC ruled that under Section 408 of the Local Government Code, parties who reside in
the same city or municipality although in different barangays are mandated to go through
conciliation proceedings in the Lupon.[19] The court cited the rulings of this Court in
Morata v. Go,[20] and Vda. de Borromeo v. Pogoy.[21]

In their position paper, the defendants insisted that the dispute did not go through the
Lupon ng Tagapamayapa prior to the filing of the complaint; hence, Berbas complaint was
premature. They also averred that the increase in the rental rates imposed by the plaintiff
was unjustified and illegal.
In her reply, the plaintiff alleged that there was no more need for her to secure a
Certificate to File Action because she was a resident of No. 978 Maligaya Street, Malate,
Manila, while the defendants were residing in Barangay 873, Zone 6 in Sta. Ana, Manila.
On March 14, 2002, the MTC rendered judgment in favor of Berba. The fallo of the decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and ordering the
defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate the premises at
2338 M. Roxas St., Sta. Ana, Manila and restore possession thereof to the plaintiff.
Ordering the defendant to pay the amount of P135,115.63 representing monthly
rentals since 1999 until December 2000. Ordering the defendant to pay the
plaintiff the sum of P4,562.63 per month beginning January 2001 and for the
succeeding months until finally vacated. Ordering the defendant to pay the

Berba filed a motion for the reconsideration[22] of the decision, which the RTC denied in its
Order[23] dated October 2, 2002. She then elevated the case to the CA via petition for
review, where she averred:
a) The raising of other affirmative defenses apart from the non-referral to the
Barangay Court by the respondents constitute a waiver of such requirement; and
b) There was substantial compliance on the part of the petitioner with
respect to referring her complaint before the Barangay Court.[24]
Citing the ruling of this Court in Diu v. Court of Appeals,[25] Berba claimed that
Section 408 of the Local Government Code should be construed liberally together
with Section 412. She further averred that she had complied substantially with the
requisites of the law, and recalls that conciliation proceedings before the Lupon
resulted in the execution of an Agreement on June 5, 1999. Upon failure to comply
with the agreement, all chances of amicable settlement were effectively
foreclosed. Hence, Pablo and the Heirs of Palanca were estopped from claiming
that she failed to comply with the Local Government Codes requirement of prior
referral of their dispute to the Lupon.

After due proceedings, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition and affirming the
RTC decision. Berba moved for a reconsideration of the decision, which proved futile.

The Court rules that the CA cannot be faulted for affirming the decision of the RTC
reversing the decision of the MTC and ordering the dismissal of the complaint for unlawful
detainer without prejudice.

In the instant petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner alleges that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT FAILED
TO CONSIDER THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OF
DIU VS. COURT OF APPEALS (251 SCRA 478) AND IN DECLARING THAT
THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE MANDATE OF PD
1508 (NOW R.A. 7160) WITH RESPECT TO PRIOR REFERRAL TO THE
BARANGAY COURT, THEREBY DECIDING THE CASE NOT IN ACCORD WITH
LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE COURT.[26]
The petitioner avers that she is a sickly widow, in the twilight of her years, and whose only
source of income are the rentals generated from the property, which she also uses to pay
her medical expenses. She avers that the continued denial of her right to the fruits of the
subject property is highly unjust and contrary to the spirit behind the enactment of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1508.[27]
The petitioner also points out that, for her to pay obeisance to the decision of the CA, she
would have to go through the tedious, not to mention horrendous, process of going back to
square one; that is, referring the dispute to the barangay which, in all likelihood, would be
rendered useless considering that respondents had already been validly and effectively
ejected from the leased premises. She would then have to go through the rungs of the
judicial ladder a second time to vindicate her trampled rights. She further claims that the
CAs affirmation of the RTC decision is equivalent to sanctioning a legal anomaly. She points
out that the very purpose of barangay conciliation is to abbreviate disputes between
members of the same or adjacent barangays to the end that their disputes will not reach
the doors of the courts. Clearly, it does not contemplate a protracted process as suggested
by the RTC ruling and affirmed by the CA.[28]
In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that the petitioner was estopped
from relying on the June 5, 1999 Agreement between her and respondent Josephine Pablo
before the Lupon because the respondent Heirs of Carlos Palanca were not parties thereto.
The respondents maintained that the petitioner must bear the blame for her failure to
comply with the Local Government Code. At first, she insisted that there was no need for
prior referral of the dispute to the Lupon, claiming that she resided in a barangay other
than where the respondents resided. Thereafter, she made a volte face and invoked the
June 5, 1999 Agreement between her and respondent Josephine Pablo. Moreover, the
respondents aver, the MTC had no jurisdiction over the petitioners action for unlawful
detainer because it was filed only on June 21, 2001, or more than one year from June 5,
1999 when the petitioner and respondent Josephine Pablo executed the agreement. As
such, the action should be one for recovery of possession of property (accion publiciana).
On June 2, 2004, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required the
parties to file their respective memoranda.[29] The parties complied.

The records show that petitioner and respondent Josephine Pablo executed an Agreement
on June 5, 1999, which was approved by the Lupon. Respondent Josephine Pablo did not
repudiate the agreement; hence, such agreement of the parties settling the case had the
force and effect of a final judgment. As the Court declared in Vidal v. Escueta,[30] the
settlement of the parties may be enforced by the Lupon, through the punong barangay,
within six months; and if the settlement is not enforced after the lapse of said period, it
may be enforced by an action in the proper city or municipal court, as provided in Section
417 of the Local Government Code:
We also agree that the Secretary of the Lupon is mandated to transmit the
settlement to the appropriate city or municipal court within the time frame
under Section 418 of the LGC and to furnish the parties and the Lupon
Chairman with copies thereof. The amicable settlement which is not
repudiated within the period therefor may be enforced by execution by the
Lupon through the Punong Barangay within a time line of six months, and if
the settlement is not so enforced by the Lupon after the lapse of said
period, it may be enforced only by an action in the proper city or municipal
court as provided for in Section 417 of the LGC of 1991, as amended, which
reads:
SEC. 417. Execution. The amicable settlement or arbitration award
may be enforced by execution by the Lupon within six (6) months from
the date of the settlement. After the lapse of such time, the
settlement may be enforced by action in the proper city or municipal
court. (Italics supplied).
Section 417 of the Local Government Code provides a mechanism
for the enforcement of a settlement of the parties before the Lupon. It
provides for a two-tiered mode of enforcement of an amicable settlement
executed by the parties before the Lupon, namely, (a) by execution of the
Punong Barangay which is quasi-judicial and summary in nature on mere
motion of the party/parties entitled thereto; and (b) by an action in regular
form, which remedy is judicial. Under the first remedy, the proceedings are
covered by the LGC and the Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing
Rules and Regulations. The Punong Barangay is called upon during the
hearing to determine solely the fact of non-compliance of the terms of the
settlement and to give the defaulting party another chance at voluntarily
complying with his obligation under the settlement. Under the second
remedy, the proceedings are governed by the Rules of Court, as amended.
The cause of action is the amicable settlement itself, which, by operation
of law, has the force and effect of a final judgment.
Section 417 of the LGC grants a period of six months to enforce the
amicable settlement by the Lupon through the Punong Barangay before
such party may resort to filing an action with the MTC to enforce the
settlement. The raison detre of the law is to afford the parties during the

six-month time line, a simple, speedy and less expensive enforcement of

their settlement before the Lupon.[31]

In the present case, respondent Josephine Pablo failed to comply with her obligation of
repaying the back rentals of P81,818.00 and the current rentals for the house. Hence, the
petitioner had the right to enforce the Agreement against her and move for her eviction
from the premises. However, instead of filing a motion before the Lupon for the
enforcement of the agreement, or (after six months), an action in the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MTC) for the enforcement of the settlement, the petitioner filed an action against
respondent Josephine Pablo for unlawful detainer and the collection of unpaid rentals,
inclusive of those already due before the June 5, 1999 Agreement was executed. The
action of the petitioner against respondent Pablo was barred by the Agreement of June 5,
1999.
The Court notes that the petitioner even submitted with the MTC a copy of her June 5, 1999
Agreement with respondent Josephine Pablo. Instead of dismissing the complaint as
against such respondent, the MTC rendered judgment against her and ordered her eviction
from the leased premises.

(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of

limitations.
(c) Conciliation among members of indigenous cultural
communities. The customs and traditions of indigenous cultural
communities shall be applied in settling disputes between members of the
cultural communities.
Under Sec. 408 of the same Code, parties actually residing in the same city or municipality
are bound to submit their disputes to the Lupon for conciliation/amicable settlement,
unless otherwise provided therein:
SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. The
lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties
actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of
all disputes except:
(a)
Where one party is the government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof;

The Court thus rules that the petitioners complaint against respondent Heirs of Carlos
Palanca was premature. It bears stressing that they were not impleaded by the petitioner
as parties-respondents before the Lupon. The petitioner filed her complaint solely against
respondent Josephine Pablo. Moreover, the said respondent heirs were not privy to the said
agreement, and, as such, were not bound by it. Section 412 of the Local Government Code,
sets forth the precondition to filing of complaints in court, to wit:

(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the

dispute relates to the performance of his official functions;

SEC. 412 Conciliation.- (a) Pre-condition to filing of complaint in court. No

complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within the authority
of the lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in court or any other government
office for adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between the parties
before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or settlement
has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as
attested to by the lupon chairman or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement
has been repudiated by the parties thereto.

(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different

cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to submit their
differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;

(b) Where parties may go directly to court. The parties may go directly to
court in the following instances:

(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may

determine in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of Justice.

(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or

a fine exceeding Five Thousand pesos (P5,000.00);
(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;

(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of

different cities or municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin
each other and the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to
amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;

(1) Where the accused is under detention;

(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty
calling for habeas corpus proceedings;

The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon
under this Code are filed may, at any time before trial, motu proprio refer the case
to the lupon concerned for amicable settlement.

(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such as

preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property, and
support pendente lite; and

If the complainant/plaintiff fails to comply with the requirements of the Local

Government Code, such complaint filed with the court may be dismissed for failure
to exhaust all administrative remedies.[32]

The petitioners reliance on the ruling of this Court in Diu v. Court of Appeals[33] is
misplaced. In that case, there was a confrontation by the parties before the Barangay
Chairman and no agreement was reached. Although no pangkat was formed, the Court
held in that instance that there was substantial compliance with the law. In any event, the
issue in that case was whether the failure to specifically allege that there was no
compliance with the barangay conciliation procedure constitutes a waiver of that defense.
Moreover, no such confrontation before the Lupon occurred with respect to the unlawful
detainer suit against Josephine Pablo before the MTC.[34]
In this case, the petitioner and the respondent Heirs of Carlos Palanca resided in the City of
Manila, albeit in different barangays. The dispute between the petitioner and the
respondent heirs was thus a matter within the authority of the Lupon. Hence, the
petitioners complaint for unlawful detainer and the collection of back rentals should have
been first filed before the Lupon for mandatory conciliation, to afford the parties an
opportunity to settle the case amicably. However, the petitioner filed her complaint against
the respondent Heirs of Carlos Palanca directly with the MTC. Clearly then, her complaint

was premature. The execution of the June 5, 1999 Agreement between petitioner and
respondent Josephine Pablo does not amount to substantial compliance to the
requirements of the Local Government Code on mandatory barangay conciliation
proceedings.
Indeed, considering that the MTC had already rendered a decision on the merits of the
case, it is not without reluctance that the Court reaches this conclusion which would
require the petitioner to start again from the beginning. The facts of the present case,
however, do not leave us any choice. To grant the petition under these circumstances
would amount to refusal to give effect to the Local Government Code and to wiping it off
the statute books insofar as ejectment and other cases governed by the Rule on Summary
Procedure are concerned. This Court has no authority to do that.[35]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.

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