Beruflich Dokumente
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499
THIRD DIVISION.
500
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500
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501
Rollo, p. 189.
Rollo, p. 356.
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Motion for Special Protective Order, pp. 34; rollo, pp. 7677.
502
502
The Facts
The undisputed facts
are summarized by the Court of
10
Appeals as follows:
On February 13, 1998, respondent PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc.
(PCI Leasing for short) filed with the RTCQC a complaint for
[a] sum of money (Annex E), with an application for a writ of
replevin docketed as Civil Case No. Q9833500.
On March 6, 1998, upon an exparte application of PCI
Leasing, respondent judge issued a writ of replevin (Annex B)
directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and
equipment to PCI Leasing after 5 days and upon the payment of
the necessary expenses.
On March 24, 1998, in implementation of said writ, the sheriff
proceeded to petitioners factory, seized one machinery with [the]
word that he [would] return for the other machineries.
On March 25, 1998, petitioners filed a motion for special
protective order (Annex C), invoking the power of the court to
control the conduct of its officers and amend and control its
processes, praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer
enforcement of the writ of replevin.
This motion was opposed by PCI Leasing (Annex F), on the
ground that the properties [were] still personal and therefore still
subject to seizure and a writ of replevin.
In their Reply, petitioners asserted that the properties sought
to be seized [were] immovable as defined in Article 415 of the
Civil Code, the parties agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding. They argued that to give effect to the agreement
would be prejudicial to innocent third parties. They further stated
that PCI Leasing [was] estopped from treating these machineries
as personal because the contracts in which the alleged agreement
[were] embodied [were] totally sham and farcical.
On April 6, 1998, the sheriff again sought to enforce the writ
of seizure and take possession of the remaining properties. He
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was able to take two more, but was prevented by the workers
from taking the rest.
On April 7, 1998, they went to [the CA] via an original action
for certiorari.
_______________
10
503
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A.
_______________
11
The case was deemed submitted for resolution on October 21, 1999,
504
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14
Section 4 (a) of Rule 45 provides that the petition shall state the full
505
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CA, 248 SCRA 549, September 27, 1995; Machinery Engineering Supply v.
CA, 96 Phil. 70, October 29, 1954.
16
September 29, 1962, per Labrador, J. See also Vitug, Compendium of Civil
Law and Jurisprudence, 1986, ed., pp. 99100.
17
Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Dahican Lumber, |20 SCRA 84, May
16, 1967; Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800, December 26, 1984;
Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, 61 Phil. 709, August 7, 1935.
506
506
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Chua Peng Hian v. CA, 133 SCRA 572, December 19, 1984; Standard Oil Co.
v. Jaranillo, 44 Phil. 630, March 16, 1923; Luna v. Encarnacion, 91 Phil. 531, June
30, 1952; Manarang v. Ofilada, 99 Phil. 109, May 18, 1956; Peoples Bank & Trust
Co. v. Dahican Lumber, supra.
19
20
507
507
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Rollo, p. 262.
22
Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401, April
23,
23
24
25
508
spondents Comment,
they further allege that the
26
Agreement is invalid.
These arguments are unconvincing. The validity and the
nature of the contract are the lis mota of the civil action
pending before the RTC. A resolution of these questions,
therefore, is effectively a resolution of the merits of the
case. Hence, they should be threshed out in the trial, not in
the proceedings involving the issuance of the Writ of
Seizure.
27
Indeed, in La Tondea Distillers v. CA, the Court
explained that the policy under Rule 60 was that questions
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27
28
Ibid.
29
See Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 703, February 26, 1997.
509
509
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Supra, p. 301.
31
510
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